Daily Papers

The increasing deployment of large language models in security-sensitive domains necessitates rigorous evaluation of their resilience against adversarial prompt-based attacks. While previous benchmarks have focused on security evaluations with limited and predefined attack domains, such as cybersecurity attacks, they often lack a comprehensive assessment of intent-driven adversarial prompts and the consideration of real-life scenario-based multi-turn attacks. To address this gap, we present SecReEvalBench, the Security Resilience Evaluation Benchmark, which defines four novel metrics: Prompt Attack Resilience Score, Prompt Attack Refusal Logic Score, Chain-Based Attack Resilience Score and Chain-Based Attack Rejection Time Score. Moreover, SecReEvalBench employs six questioning sequences for model assessment: one-off attack, successive attack, successive reverse attack, alternative attack, sequential ascending attack with escalating threat levels and sequential descending attack with diminishing threat levels. In addition, we introduce a dataset customized for the benchmark, which incorporates both neutral and malicious prompts, categorised across seven security domains and sixteen attack techniques. In applying this benchmark, we systematically evaluate five state-of-the-art open-weighted large language models, Llama 3.1, Gemma 2, Mistral v0.3, DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen 3. Our findings offer critical insights into the strengths and weaknesses of modern large language models in defending against evolving adversarial threats. The SecReEvalBench dataset is publicly available at https://kaggle.com/datasets/5a7ee22cf9dab6c93b55a73f630f6c9b42e936351b0ae98fbae6ddaca7fe248d, which provides a groundwork for advancing research in large language model security.

AI agents are increasingly deployed in production, yet their security evaluations remain bottlenecked by manual red-teaming or static benchmarks that fail to model adaptive, multi-turn adversaries. We propose NAAMSE, an evolutionary framework that reframes agent security evaluation as a feedback-driven optimization problem. Our system employs a single autonomous agent that orchestrates a lifecycle of genetic prompt mutation, hierarchical corpus exploration, and asymmetric behavioral scoring. By using model responses as a fitness signal, the framework iteratively compounds effective attack strategies while simultaneously ensuring "benign-use correctness", preventing the degenerate security of blanket refusal. Our experiments on Gemini 2.5 Flash demonstrate that evolutionary mutation systematically amplifies vulnerabilities missed by one-shot methods, with controlled ablations revealing that the synergy between exploration and targeted mutation uncovers high-severity failure modes. We show that this adaptive approach provides a more realistic and scalable assessment of agent robustness in the face of evolving threats. The code for NAAMSE is open source and available at https://github.com/HASHIRU-AI/NAAMSE.

This paper introduces a dynamic and actionable framework for securing agentic AI systems in enterprise deployment. We contend that safety and security are not merely fixed attributes of individual models but also emergent properties arising from the dynamic interactions among models, orchestrators, tools, and data within their operating environments. We propose a new way of identification of novel agentic risks through the lens of user safety. Although, for traditional LLMs and agentic models in isolation, safety and security has a clear separation, through the lens of safety in agentic systems, they appear to be connected. Building on this foundation, we define an operational agentic risk taxonomy that unifies traditional safety and security concerns with novel, uniquely agentic risks, including tool misuse, cascading action chains, and unintended control amplification among others. At the core of our approach is a dynamic agentic safety and security framework that operationalizes contextual agentic risk management by using auxiliary AI models and agents, with human oversight, to assist in contextual risk discovery, evaluation, and mitigation. We further address one of the most challenging aspects of safety and security of agentic systems: risk discovery through sandboxed, AI-driven red teaming. We demonstrate the framework effectiveness through a detailed case study of NVIDIA flagship agentic research assistant, AI-Q Research Assistant, showcasing practical, end-to-end safety and security evaluations in complex, enterprise-grade agentic workflows. This risk discovery phase finds novel agentic risks that are then contextually mitigated. We also release the dataset from our case study, containing traces of over 10,000 realistic attack and defense executions of the agentic workflow to help advance research in agentic safety.

Correctly evaluating defenses against adversarial examples has proven to be extremely difficult. Despite the significant amount of recent work attempting to design defenses that withstand adaptive attacks, few have succeeded; most papers that propose defenses are quickly shown to be incorrect. We believe a large contributing factor is the difficulty of performing security evaluations. In this paper, we discuss the methodological foundations, review commonly accepted best practices, and suggest new methods for evaluating defenses to adversarial examples. We hope that both researchers developing defenses as well as readers and reviewers who wish to understand the completeness of an evaluation consider our advice in order to avoid common pitfalls.

In light of the rapid adoption of AI coding assistants, LLM-assisted development has become increasingly prevalent, creating an urgent need for robust evaluation of generated code quality. Existing benchmarks often require extensive manual effort to create static datasets, rely on indirect or insufficiently challenging tasks, depend on non-scalable ground truth, or neglect critical low-level security evaluations, particularly memory-safety issues. In this work, we introduce OSS-Bench, a benchmark generator that automatically constructs large-scale, live evaluation tasks from real-world open-source software. OSS-Bench replaces functions with LLM-generated code and evaluates them using three natural metrics: compilability, functional correctness, and memory safety, leveraging robust signals like compilation failures, test-suite violations, and sanitizer alerts as ground truth. In our evaluation, the benchmark, instantiated as OSS-Bench(php) and OSS-Bench(sql), profiles 17 diverse LLMs, revealing insights such as intra-family behavioral patterns and inconsistencies between model size and performance. Our results demonstrate that OSS-Bench mitigates overfitting by leveraging the evolving complexity of OSS and highlights LLMs' limited understanding of low-level code security via extended fuzzing experiments. Overall, OSS-Bench offers a practical and scalable framework for benchmarking the real-world coding capabilities of LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized artificial intelligence and machine learning through their advanced text processing and generating capabilities. However, their widespread deployment has raised significant safety and reliability concerns. Established vulnerabilities in deep neural networks, coupled with emerging threat models, may compromise security evaluations and create a false sense of security. Given the extensive research in the field of LLM security, we believe that summarizing the current state of affairs will help the research community better understand the present landscape and inform future developments. This paper reviews current research on LLM vulnerabilities and threats, and evaluates the effectiveness of contemporary defense mechanisms. We analyze recent studies on attack vectors and model weaknesses, providing insights into attack mechanisms and the evolving threat landscape. We also examine current defense strategies, highlighting their strengths and limitations. By contrasting advancements in attack and defense methodologies, we identify research gaps and propose future directions to enhance LLM security. Our goal is to advance the understanding of LLM safety challenges and guide the development of more robust security measures.

Long-context large language models (LLMs)-for example, Gemini-3.1-Pro and Qwen-3.5-are widely used to empower many real-world applications, such as retrieval-augmented generation, autonomous agents, and AI assistants. However, security remains a major concern for their widespread deployment, with threats such as prompt injection and knowledge corruption. To quantify the security risks faced by LLMs under these threats, the research community has developed heuristic-based and optimization-based red-teaming methods. Optimization-based methods generally produce stronger attacks than heuristic attacks and thus provide a more rigorous assessment of LLM security risks. However, they are often resource-intensive, requiring significant computation and GPU memory, especially for long context scenarios. The resource-intensive nature poses a major obstacle for the community (especially academic researchers) to systematically evaluate the security risks of long-context LLMs and assess the effectiveness of defense strategies at scale. In this work, we propose FlashRT, the first framework to improve the efficiency (in terms of both computation and memory) for optimization-based prompt injection and knowledge corruption attacks under long-context LLMs. Through extensive evaluations, we find that FlashRT consistently delivers a 2x-7x speedup (e.g., reducing runtime from one hour to less than ten minutes) and a 2x-4x reduction in GPU memory consumption (e.g., reducing from 264.1 GB to 65.7 GB GPU memory for a 32K token context) compared to state-of-the-art baseline nanoGCG. FlashRT can be broadly applied to black-box optimization methods, such as TAP and AutoDAN. We hope FlashRT can serve as a red-teaming tool to enable systematic evaluation of long-context LLM security. The code is available at: https://github.com/Wang-Yanting/FlashRT

Jailbreak attacks are crucial for identifying and mitigating the security vulnerabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). They are designed to bypass safeguards and elicit prohibited outputs. However, due to significant differences among various jailbreak methods, there is no standard implementation framework available for the community, which limits comprehensive security evaluations. This paper introduces EasyJailbreak, a unified framework simplifying the construction and evaluation of jailbreak attacks against LLMs. It builds jailbreak attacks using four components: Selector, Mutator, Constraint, and Evaluator. This modular framework enables researchers to easily construct attacks from combinations of novel and existing components. So far, EasyJailbreak supports 11 distinct jailbreak methods and facilitates the security validation of a broad spectrum of LLMs. Our validation across 10 distinct LLMs reveals a significant vulnerability, with an average breach probability of 60% under various jailbreaking attacks. Notably, even advanced models like GPT-3.5-Turbo and GPT-4 exhibit average Attack Success Rates (ASR) of 57% and 33%, respectively. We have released a wealth of resources for researchers, including a web platform, PyPI published package, screencast video, and experimental outputs.

Security-agent evaluations commonly measure peak offensive capability under generous inference budgets, emphasizing vulnerability discovery, exploit development, penetration testing, and CTF completion. Such measurements are useful but incomplete: in operational security, every reasoning step, tool call, telemetry query, and enrichment request consumes budget. We evaluate language-model security agents through this cost-success lens on offensive Cybench challenges and defensive Splunk BOTS v1 investigation challenges. Instead of reporting only best-case success, we compare models at fixed cost levels and decompose performance by inference spend and tool spend. Our results show distinct scalingregimes for red- and blue-team tasks. Offensive CTF performance improves with additional test-time compute, and scaled open-weight models can approach frontier proprietary systems while remaining cost-competitive. Defensive SOC investigation does not scale in the same way: success depends more heavily on disciplined tool use, telemetry navigation, and selective enrichment than on raw reasoning budget alone. We argue that security-agent benchmarks should measure economic efficiency and operational fit alongside task success. Cost-aware, SOC-native evaluations provide a clearer picture of which models are practically useful today and where defensive agents still need to improve. We present an interactive website with our results https://evals.frontier.security.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in assisting cybersecurity tasks, yet existing approaches struggle with automatic vulnerability discovery and exploitation due to limited interaction, weak execution grounding, and a lack of experience reuse. We propose Co-RedTeam, a security-aware multi-agent framework designed to mirror real-world red-teaming workflows by integrating security-domain knowledge, code-aware analysis, execution-grounded iterative reasoning, and long-term memory. Co-RedTeam decomposes vulnerability analysis into coordinated discovery and exploitation stages, enabling agents to plan, execute, validate, and refine actions based on real execution feedback while learning from prior trajectories. Extensive evaluations on challenging security benchmarks demonstrate that Co-RedTeam consistently outperforms strong baselines across diverse backbone models, achieving over 60% success rate in vulnerability exploitation and over 10% absolute improvement in vulnerability detection. Ablation and iteration studies further confirm the critical role of execution feedback, structured interaction, and memory for building robust and generalizable cybersecurity agents.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

This research addresses command-line embedding in cybersecurity, a field obstructed by the lack of comprehensive datasets due to privacy and regulation concerns. We propose the first dataset of similar command lines, named CyPHER, for training and unbiased evaluation. The training set is generated using a set of large language models (LLMs) comprising 28,520 similar command-line pairs. Our testing dataset consists of 2,807 similar command-line pairs sourced from authentic command-line data. In addition, we propose a command-line embedding model named CmdCaliper, enabling the computation of semantic similarity with command lines. Performance evaluations demonstrate that the smallest version of CmdCaliper (30 million parameters) suppresses state-of-the-art (SOTA) sentence embedding models with ten times more parameters across various tasks (e.g., malicious command-line detection and similar command-line retrieval). Our study explores the feasibility of data generation using LLMs in the cybersecurity domain. Furthermore, we release our proposed command-line dataset, embedding models' weights and all program codes to the public. This advancement paves the way for more effective command-line embedding for future researchers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly aided developers by generating or assisting in code writing, enhancing productivity across various tasks. While identifying incorrect code is often straightforward, detecting vulnerabilities in functionally correct code is more challenging, especially for developers with limited security knowledge, which poses considerable security risks of using LLM-generated code and underscores the need for robust evaluation benchmarks that assess both functional correctness and security. Current benchmarks like CyberSecEval and SecurityEval attempt to solve it but are hindered by unclear and impractical specifications, failing to assess both functionality and security accurately. To tackle these deficiencies, we introduce CWEval, a novel outcome-driven evaluation framework designed to enhance the evaluation of secure code generation by LLMs. This framework not only assesses code functionality but also its security simultaneously with high-quality task specifications and outcome-driven test oracles which provides high accuracy. Coupled with CWEval-bench, a multilingual, security-critical coding benchmark, CWEval provides a rigorous empirical security evaluation on LLM-generated code, overcoming previous benchmarks' shortcomings. Through our evaluations, CWEval reveals a notable portion of functional but insecure code produced by LLMs, and shows a serious inaccuracy of previous evaluations, ultimately contributing significantly to the field of secure code generation. We open-source our artifact at: https://github.com/Co1lin/CWEval .

Safety evaluations for large language models (LLMs) increasingly target high-stakes National Security and Public Safety (NSPS) risks, yet multilingual safety is typically assessed through translation-only benchmarks that preserve the underlying scenario, and empirical evidence of how language and geopolitical context interact remains limited to a narrow set of language pairs. We introduce ROK-FORTRESS https://huggingface.co/datasets/ScaleAI/ROK-FORTRESS_public, a bilingual, culturally adversarial NSPS benchmark that uses the English--Korean language pair and U.S.--ROK geopolitical axis as a case study, separating the effects of language and geopolitical grounding via a transcreation matrix: adversarial intents are evaluated under controlled combinations of (i) English versus Korean language and (ii) U.S.\ versus Korean entities, institutions, and operational details. Each adversarial prompt is paired with a dual-use benign counterpart to quantify over-refusal. Model responses are then scored using calibrated LLM-as-a-judge panels, applying our expert-crafted, prompt-specific binary rubrics. Across a dual-track set of frontier and Korean-optimized models, we find a consistent suppression effect in Korean variants and substantial model-to-model variation in how geopolitical grounding interacts with language. In many models, Korean grounding mitigates the Korean language-driven suppression -- with no model showing significant amplification in the other direction -- indicating that, at least in the English--Korean case, safety behavior is shaped by language-as-risk signals and context interactions that translation-only evaluations miss. The transcreation matrix methodology is designed to generalize to other language--culture pairs.

We introduce AegisLLM, a cooperative multi-agent defense against adversarial attacks and information leakage. In AegisLLM, a structured workflow of autonomous agents - orchestrator, deflector, responder, and evaluator - collaborate to ensure safe and compliant LLM outputs, while self-improving over time through prompt optimization. We show that scaling agentic reasoning system at test-time - both by incorporating additional agent roles and by leveraging automated prompt optimization (such as DSPy)- substantially enhances robustness without compromising model utility. This test-time defense enables real-time adaptability to evolving attacks, without requiring model retraining. Comprehensive evaluations across key threat scenarios, including unlearning and jailbreaking, demonstrate the effectiveness of AegisLLM. On the WMDP unlearning benchmark, AegisLLM achieves near-perfect unlearning with only 20 training examples and fewer than 300 LM calls. For jailbreaking benchmarks, we achieve 51% improvement compared to the base model on StrongReject, with false refusal rates of only 7.9% on PHTest compared to 18-55% for comparable methods. Our results highlight the advantages of adaptive, agentic reasoning over static defenses, establishing AegisLLM as a strong runtime alternative to traditional approaches based on model modifications. Code is available at https://github.com/zikuicai/aegisllm

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, raising concerns about their security. While jailbreak attacks highlight failures under overtly harmful queries, they overlook a critical risk: incorrectly answering harmless-looking inputs can be dangerous and cause real-world harm (Implicit Harm). We systematically reformulate the LLM risk landscape through a structured quadrant perspective based on output factuality and input harmlessness, uncovering an overlooked high-risk region. To investigate this gap, we propose JailFlipBench, a benchmark aims to capture implicit harm, spanning single-modal, multimodal, and factual extension scenarios with diverse evaluation metrics. We further develop initial JailFlip attack methodologies and conduct comprehensive evaluations across multiple open-source and black-box LLMs, show that implicit harm present immediate and urgent real-world risks, calling for broader LLM safety assessments and alignment beyond conventional jailbreak paradigms.

Automatic detection of prohibited objects within passenger baggage is important for aviation security. X-ray Computed Tomography (CT) based 3D imaging is widely used in airports for aviation security screening whilst prior work on automatic prohibited item detection focus primarily on 2D X-ray imagery. These works have proven the possibility of extending deep convolutional neural networks (CNN) based automatic prohibited item detection from 2D X-ray imagery to volumetric 3D CT baggage security screening imagery. However, previous work on 3D object detection in baggage security screening imagery focused on the detection of one specific type of objects (e.g., either {\it bottles} or {\it handguns}). As a result, multiple models are needed if more than one type of prohibited item is required to be detected in practice. In this paper, we consider the detection of multiple object categories of interest using one unified framework. To this end, we formulate a more challenging multi-class 3D object detection problem within 3D CT imagery and propose a viable solution (3D RetinaNet) to tackle this problem. To enhance the performance of detection we investigate a variety of strategies including data augmentation and varying backbone networks. Experimentation carried out to provide both quantitative and qualitative evaluations of the proposed approach to multi-class 3D object detection within 3D CT baggage security screening imagery. Experimental results demonstrate the combination of the 3D RetinaNet and a series of favorable strategies can achieve a mean Average Precision (mAP) of 65.3\% over five object classes (i.e. {\it bottles, handguns, binoculars, glock frames, iPods}). The overall performance is affected by the poor performance on {\it glock frames} and {\it iPods} due to the lack of data and their resemblance with the baggage clutter.

Open-weight bio-foundation models present a dual-use dilemma. While holding great promise for accelerating scientific research and drug development, they could also enable bad actors to develop more deadly bioweapons. To mitigate the risk posed by these models, current approaches focus on filtering biohazardous data during pre-training. However, the effectiveness of such an approach remains unclear, particularly against determined actors who might fine-tune these models for malicious use. To address this gap, we propose BioRiskEval, a framework to evaluate the robustness of procedures that are intended to reduce the dual-use capabilities of bio-foundation models. BioRiskEval assesses models' virus understanding through three lenses, including sequence modeling, mutational effects prediction, and virulence prediction. Our results show that current filtering practices may not be particularly effective: Excluded knowledge can be rapidly recovered in some cases via fine-tuning, and exhibits broader generalizability in sequence modeling. Furthermore, dual-use signals may already reside in the pretrained representations, and can be elicited via simple linear probing. These findings highlight the challenges of data filtering as a standalone procedure, underscoring the need for further research into robust safety and security strategies for open-weight bio-foundation models.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various applications, highlighting the urgent need for comprehensive safety evaluations. In particular, the enhanced Chinese language proficiency of LLMs, combined with the unique characteristics and complexity of Chinese expressions, has driven the emergence of Chinese-specific benchmarks for safety assessment. However, these benchmarks generally fall short in effectively exposing LLM safety vulnerabilities. To address the gap, we introduce JailBench, the first comprehensive Chinese benchmark for evaluating deep-seated vulnerabilities in LLMs, featuring a refined hierarchical safety taxonomy tailored to the Chinese context. To improve generation efficiency, we employ a novel Automatic Jailbreak Prompt Engineer (AJPE) framework for JailBench construction, which incorporates jailbreak techniques to enhance assessing effectiveness and leverages LLMs to automatically scale up the dataset through context-learning. The proposed JailBench is extensively evaluated over 13 mainstream LLMs and achieves the highest attack success rate against ChatGPT compared to existing Chinese benchmarks, underscoring its efficacy in identifying latent vulnerabilities in LLMs, as well as illustrating the substantial room for improvement in the security and trustworthiness of LLMs within the Chinese context. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/STAIR-BUPT/JailBench.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, ensuring their security and alignment has become a critical challenge. Existing red-teaming practices depend heavily on manual testing, which limits scalability and fails to comprehensively cover the vast space of potential adversarial behaviors. This paper introduces an automated red-teaming framework that systematically generates, executes, and evaluates adversarial prompts to uncover security vulnerabilities in LLMs. Our framework integrates meta-prompting-based attack synthesis, multi-modal vulnerability detection, and standardized evaluation protocols spanning six major threat categories -- reward hacking, deceptive alignment, data exfiltration, sandbagging, inappropriate tool use, and chain-of-thought manipulation. Experiments on the GPT-OSS-20B model reveal 47 distinct vulnerabilities, including 21 high-severity and 12 novel attack patterns, achieving a 3.9times improvement in vulnerability discovery rate over manual expert testing while maintaining 89\% detection accuracy. These results demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in enabling scalable, systematic, and reproducible AI safety evaluations. By providing actionable insights for improving alignment robustness, this work advances the state of automated LLM red-teaming and contributes to the broader goal of building secure and trustworthy AI systems.

With the rapid advancement of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), ensuring their safety has emerged as a crucial area of research. This survey provides a comprehensive analysis of LVLM safety, covering key aspects such as attacks, defenses, and evaluation methods. We introduce a unified framework that integrates these interrelated components, offering a holistic perspective on the vulnerabilities of LVLMs and the corresponding mitigation strategies. Through an analysis of the LVLM lifecycle, we introduce a classification framework that distinguishes between inference and training phases, with further subcategories to provide deeper insights. Furthermore, we highlight limitations in existing research and outline future directions aimed at strengthening the robustness of LVLMs. As part of our research, we conduct a set of safety evaluations on the latest LVLM, Deepseek Janus-Pro, and provide a theoretical analysis of the results. Our findings provide strategic recommendations for advancing LVLM safety and ensuring their secure and reliable deployment in high-stakes, real-world applications. This survey aims to serve as a cornerstone for future research, facilitating the development of models that not only push the boundaries of multimodal intelligence but also adhere to the highest standards of security and ethical integrity. Furthermore, to aid the growing research in this field, we have created a public repository to continuously compile and update the latest work on LVLM safety: https://github.com/XuankunRong/Awesome-LVLM-Safety .

Prompt injection attacks pose a significant security threat to LLM-integrated applications. Model-level defenses have shown strong effectiveness, but are currently deployed into commercial-grade models in a closed-source manner. We believe open-source models are needed by the AI security community, where co-development of attacks and defenses through open research drives scientific progress in mitigation against prompt injection attacks. To this end, we develop Meta SecAlign, the first open-source and open-weight LLM with built-in model-level defense that achieves commercial-grade model performance. We provide complete details of our training recipe, which utilizes an improved version of the SOTA SecAlign defense. Evaluations on 9 utility benchmarks and 7 security benchmarks show that Meta SecAlign, despite being trained on a generic instruction-tuning dataset, confers security in unseen downstream tasks, including tool-calling and agentic web navigation, in addition general instruction-following. Our best model -- Meta-SecAlign-70B -- achieves state-of-the-art robustness against prompt injection attacks and comparable utility to closed-source commercial LLM with model-level defense.

To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new "dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security; (3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly vulnerable to sophisticated multi-turn manipulation attacks, where adversaries strategically build context through seemingly benign conversational turns to circumvent safety measures and elicit harmful or unauthorized responses. These attacks exploit the temporal nature of dialogue to evade single-turn detection methods, representing a critical security vulnerability with significant implications for real-world deployments. This paper introduces the Temporal Context Awareness (TCA) framework, a novel defense mechanism designed to address this challenge by continuously analyzing semantic drift, cross-turn intention consistency and evolving conversational patterns. The TCA framework integrates dynamic context embedding analysis, cross-turn consistency verification, and progressive risk scoring to detect and mitigate manipulation attempts effectively. Preliminary evaluations on simulated adversarial scenarios demonstrate the framework's potential to identify subtle manipulation patterns often missed by traditional detection techniques, offering a much-needed layer of security for conversational AI systems. In addition to outlining the design of TCA , we analyze diverse attack vectors and their progression across multi-turn conversation, providing valuable insights into adversarial tactics and their impact on LLM vulnerabilities. Our findings underscore the pressing need for robust, context-aware defenses in conversational AI systems and highlight TCA framework as a promising direction for securing LLMs while preserving their utility in legitimate applications. We make our implementation available to support further research in this emerging area of AI security.

Security concerns related to Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively explored, yet the safety implications for Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), particularly in medical contexts (MedMLLMs), remain insufficiently studied. This paper delves into the underexplored security vulnerabilities of MedMLLMs, especially when deployed in clinical environments where the accuracy and relevance of question-and-answer interactions are critically tested against complex medical challenges. By combining existing clinical medical data with atypical natural phenomena, we redefine two types of attacks: mismatched malicious attack (2M-attack) and optimized mismatched malicious attack (O2M-attack). Using our own constructed voluminous 3MAD dataset, which covers a wide range of medical image modalities and harmful medical scenarios, we conduct a comprehensive analysis and propose the MCM optimization method, which significantly enhances the attack success rate on MedMLLMs. Evaluations with this dataset and novel attack methods, including white-box attacks on LLaVA-Med and transfer attacks on four other state-of-the-art models, indicate that even MedMLLMs designed with enhanced security features are vulnerable to security breaches. Our work underscores the urgent need for a concerted effort to implement robust security measures and enhance the safety and efficacy of open-source MedMLLMs, particularly given the potential severity of jailbreak attacks and other malicious or clinically significant exploits in medical settings. For further research and replication, anonymous access to our code is available at https://github.com/dirtycomputer/O2M_attack. Warning: Medical large model jailbreaking may generate content that includes unverified diagnoses and treatment recommendations. Always consult professional medical advice.

AI agents have significant potential to reshape cybersecurity, making a thorough assessment of their capabilities critical. However, existing evaluations fall short, because they are based on small-scale benchmarks and only measure static outcomes, failing to capture the full, dynamic range of real-world security challenges. To address these limitations, we introduce CyberGym, a large-scale benchmark featuring 1,507 real-world vulnerabilities across 188 software projects. Adjustable to different vulnerability analysis settings, CyberGym primarily tasks agents with generating a proof-of-concept test that reproduces a vulnerability, given only its text description and the corresponding codebase. Our extensive evaluation highlights that CyberGym effectively differentiates agents' and models' cybersecurity capabilities. Even the top-performing combinations only achieve a ~20% success rate, demonstrating the overall difficulty of CyberGym. Beyond static benchmarking, we show that CyberGym leads to the discovery of 34 zero-day vulnerabilities and 18 historically incomplete patches. These results underscore that CyberGym is not only a robust benchmark for measuring AI's progress in cybersecurity but also a platform for creating direct, real-world security impact.

Large foundation models are integrated into Computer Use Agents (CUAs), enabling autonomous interaction with operating systems through graphical user interfaces (GUIs) to perform complex tasks. This autonomy introduces serious security risks: malicious instructions or visual prompt injections can trigger unsafe reasoning and cause harmful system-level actions. Existing defenses, such as detection-based blocking, prevent damage but often abort tasks prematurely, reducing agent utility. In this paper, we present MirrorGuard, a plug-and-play defense framework that uses simulation-based training to improve CUA security in the real world. To reduce the cost of large-scale training in operating systems, we propose a novel neural-symbolic simulation pipeline, which generates realistic, high-risk GUI interaction trajectories entirely in a text-based simulated environment, which captures unsafe reasoning patterns and potential system hazards without executing real operations. In the simulation environment, MirrorGuard learns to intercept and rectify insecure reasoning chains of CUAs before they produce and execute unsafe actions. In real-world testing, extensive evaluations across diverse benchmarks and CUA architectures show that MirrorGuard significantly mitigates security risks. For instance, on the ByteDance UI-TARS system, it reduces the unsafe rate from 66.5% to 13.0% while maintaining a marginal false refusal rate (FRR). In contrast, the state-of-the-art GuardAgent only achieves a reduction to 53.9% and suffers from a 15.4% higher FRR. Our work proves that simulation-derived defenses can provide robust, real-world protection while maintaining the fundamental utility of the agent. Our code and model are publicly available at https://bmz-q-q.github.io/MirrorGuard/.

Many ML-based approaches have been proposed to automatically detect, localize, and repair software vulnerabilities. While ML-based methods are more effective than program analysis-based vulnerability analysis tools, few have been integrated into modern IDEs, hindering practical adoption. To bridge this critical gap, we propose AIBugHunter, a novel ML-based software vulnerability analysis tool for C/C++ languages that is integrated into Visual Studio Code. AIBugHunter helps software developers to achieve real-time vulnerability detection, explanation, and repairs during programming. In particular, AIBugHunter scans through developers' source code to (1) locate vulnerabilities, (2) identify vulnerability types, (3) estimate vulnerability severity, and (4) suggest vulnerability repairs. In this article, we propose a novel multi-objective optimization (MOO)-based vulnerability classification approach and a transformer-based estimation approach to help AIBugHunter accurately identify vulnerability types and estimate severity. Our empirical experiments on a large dataset consisting of 188K+ C/C++ functions confirm that our proposed approaches are more accurate than other state-of-the-art baseline methods for vulnerability classification and estimation. Furthermore, we conduct qualitative evaluations including a survey study and a user study to obtain software practitioners' perceptions of our AIBugHunter tool and assess the impact that AIBugHunter may have on developers' productivity in security aspects. Our survey study shows that our AIBugHunter is perceived as useful where 90% of the participants consider adopting our AIBugHunter. Last but not least, our user study shows that our AIBugHunter could possibly enhance developers' productivity in combating cybersecurity issues during software development.

AI agents are increasingly deployed across diverse domains to automate complex workflows through long-horizon and high-stakes action executions. Due to their high capability and flexibility, such agents raise significant security and safety concerns. A growing number of real-world incidents have shown that adversaries can easily manipulate agents into performing harmful actions, such as leaking API keys, deleting user data, or initiating unauthorized transactions. Evaluating agent security is inherently challenging, as agents operate in dynamic, untrusted environments involving external tools, heterogeneous data sources, and frequent user interactions. However, realistic, controllable, and reproducible environments for large-scale risk assessment remain largely underexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the DecodingTrust-Agent Platform (DTap), the first controllable and interactive red-teaming platform for AI agents, spanning 14 real-world domains and over 50 simulation environments that replicate widely used systems such as Google Workspace, Paypal, and Slack. To scale the risk assessment of agents in DTap, we further propose DTap-Red, the first autonomous red-teaming agent that systematically explores diverse injection vectors (e.g., prompt, tool, skill, environment, combinations) and autonomously discovers effective attack strategies tailored to varying malicious goals. Using DTap-Red, we curate DTap-Bench, a large-scale red-teaming dataset comprising high-quality instances across domains, each paired with a verifiable judge to automatically validate attack outcomes. Through DTap, we conduct large-scale evaluations of popular AI agents built on various backbone models, spanning security policies, risk categories, and attack strategies, revealing systematic vulnerability patterns and providing valuable insights for developing secure next-generation agents.

Today's cyber defenders are overwhelmed by a deluge of security alerts, threat intelligence signals, and shifting business context, creating an urgent need for AI systems to enhance operational security work. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to automate and scale Security Operations Center (SOC) operations, existing evaluations do not fully assess the scenarios most relevant to real-world defenders. This lack of informed evaluation impacts both AI developers and those applying LLMs to SOC automation. Without clear insight into LLM performance in real-world security scenarios, developers lack a north star for development, and users cannot reliably select the most effective models. Meanwhile, malicious actors are using AI to scale cyber attacks, highlighting the need for open source benchmarks to drive adoption and community-driven improvement among defenders and model developers. To address this, we introduce CyberSOCEval, a new suite of open source benchmarks within CyberSecEval 4. CyberSOCEval includes benchmarks tailored to evaluate LLMs in two tasks: Malware Analysis and Threat Intelligence Reasoning--core defensive domains with inadequate coverage in current benchmarks. Our evaluations show that larger, more modern LLMs tend to perform better, confirming the training scaling laws paradigm. We also find that reasoning models leveraging test time scaling do not achieve the same boost as in coding and math, suggesting these models have not been trained to reason about cybersecurity analysis, and pointing to a key opportunity for improvement. Finally, current LLMs are far from saturating our evaluations, showing that CyberSOCEval presents a significant challenge for AI developers to improve cyber defense capabilities.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed natural language understanding and generation, leading to extensive benchmarking across diverse tasks. However, cryptanalysis a critical area for data security and encryption has not yet been thoroughly explored in LLM evaluations. To address this gap, we evaluate cryptanalytic potential of state of the art LLMs on encrypted texts generated using a range of cryptographic algorithms. We introduce a novel benchmark dataset comprising diverse plain texts spanning various domains, lengths, writing styles, and topics paired with their encrypted versions. Using zero-shot and few shot settings, we assess multiple LLMs for decryption accuracy and semantic comprehension across different encryption schemes. Our findings reveal key insights into the strengths and limitations of LLMs in side-channel communication while raising concerns about their susceptibility to jailbreaking attacks. This research highlights the dual-use nature of LLMs in security contexts and contributes to the ongoing discussion on AI safety and security.

Power flow (PF) calculations are the backbone of real-time grid operations, across workflows such as contingency analysis (where repeated PF evaluations assess grid security under outages) and topology optimization (which involves PF-based searches over combinatorially large action spaces). Running these calculations at operational timescales or across large evaluation spaces remains a major computational bottleneck. Additionally, growing uncertainty in power system operations from the integration of renewables and climate-induced extreme weather also calls for tools that can accurately and efficiently simulate a wide range of scenarios and operating conditions. Machine learning methods offer a potential speedup over traditional solvers, but their performance has not been systematically assessed on benchmarks that capture real-world variability. This paper introduces PFΔ, a benchmark dataset for power flow that captures diverse variations in load, generation, and topology. PFΔ contains 859,800 solved power flow instances spanning six different bus system sizes, capturing three types of contingency scenarios (N , N -1, and N -2), and including close-to-infeasible cases near steady-state voltage stability limits. We evaluate traditional solvers and GNN-based methods, highlighting key areas where existing approaches struggle, and identifying open problems for future research. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/pfdelta/pfdelta/tree/main and our code with data generation scripts and model implementations is at https://github.com/MOSSLab-MIT/pfdelta.

In this report, we explore the ability of language model agents to acquire resources, create copies of themselves, and adapt to novel challenges they encounter in the wild. We refer to this cluster of capabilities as "autonomous replication and adaptation" or ARA. We believe that systems capable of ARA could have wide-reaching and hard-to-anticipate consequences, and that measuring and forecasting ARA may be useful for informing measures around security, monitoring, and alignment. Additionally, once a system is capable of ARA, placing bounds on a system's capabilities may become significantly more difficult. We construct four simple example agents that combine language models with tools that allow them to take actions in the world. We then evaluate these agents on 12 tasks relevant to ARA. We find that these language model agents can only complete the easiest tasks from this list, although they make some progress on the more challenging tasks. Unfortunately, these evaluations are not adequate to rule out the possibility that near-future agents will be capable of ARA. In particular, we do not think that these evaluations provide good assurance that the ``next generation'' of language models (e.g. 100x effective compute scaleup on existing models) will not yield agents capable of ARA, unless intermediate evaluations are performed during pretraining. Relatedly, we expect that fine-tuning of the existing models could produce substantially more competent agents, even if the fine-tuning is not directly targeted at ARA.

Large language models (LLMs) have brought significant advancements to code generation, benefiting both novice and experienced developers. However, their training using unsanitized data from open-source repositories, like GitHub, introduces the risk of inadvertently propagating security vulnerabilities. To effectively mitigate this concern, this paper presents a comprehensive study focused on evaluating and enhancing code LLMs from a software security perspective. We introduce SecuCoGenSecuCoGen has been uploaded as supplemental material and will be made publicly available after publication., a meticulously curated dataset targeting 21 critical vulnerability types. SecuCoGen comprises 180 samples and serves as the foundation for conducting experiments on three crucial code-related tasks: code generation, code repair and vulnerability classification, with a strong emphasis on security. Our experimental results reveal that existing models often overlook security concerns during code generation, leading to the generation of vulnerable code. To address this, we propose effective approaches to mitigate the security vulnerabilities and enhance the overall robustness of code generated by LLMs. Moreover, our study identifies weaknesses in existing models' ability to repair vulnerable code, even when provided with vulnerability information. Additionally, certain vulnerability types pose challenges for the models, hindering their performance in vulnerability classification. Based on these findings, we believe our study will have a positive impact on the software engineering community, inspiring the development of improved methods for training and utilizing LLMs, thereby leading to safer and more trustworthy model deployment.

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have revolutionized inspection tasks by offering a safer, more efficient, and flexible alternative to traditional methods. However, battery limitations often constrain their effectiveness, necessitating the development of optimized flight paths and data collection techniques. While existing approaches like coverage path planning (CPP) ensure comprehensive data collection, they can be inefficient, especially when inspecting multiple non connected Regions of Interest (ROIs). This paper introduces the Fast Inspection of Scattered Regions (FISR) problem and proposes a novel solution, the multi UAV Disjoint Areas Inspection (mUDAI) method. The introduced approach implements a two fold optimization procedure, for calculating the best image capturing positions and the most efficient UAV trajectories, balancing data resolution and operational time, minimizing redundant data collection and resource consumption. The mUDAI method is designed to enable rapid, efficient inspections of scattered ROIs, making it ideal for applications such as security infrastructure assessments, agricultural inspections, and emergency site evaluations. A combination of simulated evaluations and real world deployments is used to validate and quantify the method's ability to improve operational efficiency while preserving high quality data capture, demonstrating its effectiveness in real world operations. An open source Python implementation of the mUDAI method can be found on GitHub (https://github.com/soc12/mUDAI) and the collected and processed data from the real world experiments are all hosted on Zenodo (https://zenodo.org/records/13866483). Finally, this online platform (https://sites.google.com/view/mudai-platform/) allows interested readers to interact with the mUDAI method and generate their own multi UAV FISR missions.

Agentic language-model systems increasingly rely on mutable execution contexts, including files, memory, tools, skills, and auxiliary artifacts, creating security risks beyond explicit user prompts. This paper presents DeepTrap, an automated framework for discovering contextual vulnerabilities in OpenClaw. DeepTrap formulates adversarial context manipulation as a black-box trajectory-level optimization problem that balances risk realization, benign-task preservation, and stealth. It combines risk-conditioned evaluation, multi-objective trajectory scoring, reward-guided beam search, and reflection-based deep probing to identify high-value compromised contexts. We construct a 42-case benchmark spanning six vulnerability classes and seven operational scenarios, and evaluate nine target models using attack and utility grading scores. Results show that contextual compromise can induce substantial unsafe behavior while preserving user-facing task completion, demonstrating that final-response evaluation is insufficient. The findings highlight the need for execution-centric security evaluation of agentic AI systems. Our code is released at: https://github.com/ZJUICSR/DeepTrap

Despite the rapid advancement of LLM-based agents, the reliable evaluation of their safety and security remains a significant challenge. Existing rule-based or LLM-based evaluators often miss dangers in agents' step-by-step actions, overlook subtle meanings, fail to see how small issues compound, and get confused by unclear safety or security rules. To overcome this evaluation crisis, we introduce AgentAuditor, a universal, training-free, memory-augmented reasoning framework that empowers LLM evaluators to emulate human expert evaluators. AgentAuditor constructs an experiential memory by having an LLM adaptively extract structured semantic features (e.g., scenario, risk, behavior) and generate associated chain-of-thought reasoning traces for past interactions. A multi-stage, context-aware retrieval-augmented generation process then dynamically retrieves the most relevant reasoning experiences to guide the LLM evaluator's assessment of new cases. Moreover, we developed ASSEBench, the first benchmark designed to check how well LLM-based evaluators can spot both safety risks and security threats. ASSEBench comprises 2293 meticulously annotated interaction records, covering 15 risk types across 29 application scenarios. A key feature of ASSEBench is its nuanced approach to ambiguous risk situations, employing "Strict" and "Lenient" judgment standards. Experiments demonstrate that AgentAuditor not only consistently improves the evaluation performance of LLMs across all benchmarks but also sets a new state-of-the-art in LLM-as-a-judge for agent safety and security, achieving human-level accuracy. Our work is openly accessible at https://github.com/Astarojth/AgentAuditor.

Autonomous web agents such as OpenClaw are rapidly moving into high-impact real-world workflows, but their security robustness under live network threats remains insufficiently evaluated. Existing benchmarks mainly focus on static sandbox settings and content-level prompt attacks, which leaves a practical gap for network-layer security testing. In this paper, we present ClawTrap, a MITM-based red-teaming framework for real-world OpenClaw security evaluation. ClawTrap supports diverse and customizable attack forms, including Static HTML Replacement, Iframe Popup Injection, and Dynamic Content Modification, and provides a reproducible pipeline for rule-driven interception, transformation, and auditing. This design lays the foundation for future research to construct richer, customizable MITM attacks and to perform systematic security testing across agent frameworks and model backbones. Our empirical study shows clear model stratification: weaker models are more likely to trust tampered observations and produce unsafe outputs, while stronger models demonstrate better anomaly attribution and safer fallback strategies. These findings indicate that reliable OpenClaw security evaluation should explicitly incorporate dynamic real-world MITM conditions rather than relying only on static sandbox protocols.

As large language models (LLMs) move from research prototypes to enterprise systems, their security vulnerabilities pose serious risks to data privacy and system integrity. This study benchmarks various Llama model variants against the OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications framework, evaluating threat detection accuracy, response safety, and computational overhead. Using the FABRIC testbed with NVIDIA A30 GPUs, we tested five standard Llama models and five Llama Guard variants on 100 adversarial prompts covering ten vulnerability categories. Our results reveal significant differences in security performance: the compact Llama-Guard-3-1B model achieved the highest detection rate of 76% with minimal latency (0.165s per test), whereas base models such as Llama-3.1-8B failed to detect threats (0% accuracy) despite longer inference times (0.754s). We observe an inverse relationship between model size and security effectiveness, suggesting that smaller, specialized models often outperform larger general-purpose ones in security tasks. Additionally, we provide an open-source benchmark dataset including adversarial prompts, threat labels, and attack metadata to support reproducible research in AI security, [1].

The indexing-retrieval-generation paradigm of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been highly successful in solving knowledge-intensive tasks by integrating external knowledge into large language models (LLMs). However, the incorporation of external and unverified knowledge increases the vulnerability of LLMs because attackers can perform attack tasks by manipulating knowledge. In this paper, we introduce a benchmark named SafeRAG designed to evaluate the RAG security. First, we classify attack tasks into silver noise, inter-context conflict, soft ad, and white Denial-of-Service. Next, we construct RAG security evaluation dataset (i.e., SafeRAG dataset) primarily manually for each task. We then utilize the SafeRAG dataset to simulate various attack scenarios that RAG may encounter. Experiments conducted on 14 representative RAG components demonstrate that RAG exhibits significant vulnerability to all attack tasks and even the most apparent attack task can easily bypass existing retrievers, filters, or advanced LLMs, resulting in the degradation of RAG service quality. Code is available at: https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/SafeRAG.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an architecture-centric security evaluation that defines 14 trust-boundary attack classes spanning planning, memory, retrieval, tool use, and delegation, and detects failures via *trace-auditable conversation breaks* (unauthorized or unsafe tool use, wrong-principal actions, state/objective integrity violations, and attack-linked deviations). Holding the base model fixed, we evaluate eight agent archetypes under persistent multi-turn interaction and observe substantial architectural variation in mean security break rate (MSBR), ranging from 0.29 pm 0.04 (LangGraph) to 0.51 pm 0.07 (AutoGPT). The highest-risk classes are operational: Denial-of-Wallet (0.62 pm 0.08), Authorization Confusion (0.54 pm 0.10), Retrieval Poisoning (0.47 pm 0.09), and Planning Manipulation (0.44 pm 0.11), while prompt-centric classes remain below 0.20 under standard settings. Breaks are dominated by boundary violations (SIV 31%, WPA 27%, UTI+UTA 24%, ATD 18%), and authorization confusion correlates with objective and tool hijacking (ρapprox 0.63 and ρapprox 0.58). AgentFence reframes agent security around what matters operationally: whether an agent stays within its goal and authority envelope over time.

The increasing adoption of large language models (LLMs) in software engineering necessitates rigorous security evaluation of their generated code. However, existing benchmarks often lack relevance to real-world AI programming scenarios, making them inadequate for assessing the practical security risks associated with AI-generated code in production environments. To address this gap, we introduce A.S.E (AI Code Generation Security Evaluation), a repository-level evaluation benchmark designed to closely mirror real-world AI programming tasks, offering a comprehensive and reliable framework for assessing the security of AI-generated code. Our evaluation of leading LLMs on A.S.E reveals several key findings. In particular, current LLMs still struggle with secure coding. The complexity in repository-level scenarios presents challenges for LLMs that typically perform well on snippet-level tasks. Morever, a larger reasoning budget does not necessarily lead to better code generation. These observations offer valuable insights into the current state of AI code generation, assisting developers in selecting the most appropriate models for practical tasks, while laying the foundation for refining LLMs to generate secure and efficient code in real-world applications.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed and integrated into thousands of applications, the need for scalable evaluation of how models respond to adversarial attacks grows rapidly. However, LLM security is a moving target: models produce unpredictable output, are constantly updated, and the potential adversary is highly diverse: anyone with access to the internet and a decent command of natural language. Further, what constitutes a security weak in one context may not be an issue in a different context; one-fits-all guardrails remain theoretical. In this paper, we argue that it is time to rethink what constitutes ``LLM security'', and pursue a holistic approach to LLM security evaluation, where exploration and discovery of issues are central. To this end, this paper introduces garak (Generative AI Red-teaming and Assessment Kit), a framework which can be used to discover and identify vulnerabilities in a target LLM or dialog system. garak probes an LLM in a structured fashion to discover potential vulnerabilities. The outputs of the framework describe a target model's weaknesses, contribute to an informed discussion of what composes vulnerabilities in unique contexts, and can inform alignment and policy discussions for LLM deployment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), a universal, open standard for connecting AI agents with data sources and external tools. While MCP enhances the capabilities of LLM-based agents, it also introduces new security risks and expands their attack surfaces. In this paper, we present the first systematic taxonomy of MCP security, identifying 17 attack types across 4 primary attack surfaces. We introduce MCPSecBench, a comprehensive security benchmark and playground that integrates prompt datasets, MCP servers, MCP clients, attack scripts, and protection mechanisms to evaluate these attacks across three major MCP providers. Our benchmark is modular and extensible, allowing researchers to incorporate custom implementations of clients, servers, and transport protocols for systematic security assessment. Experimental results show that over 85% of the identified attacks successfully compromise at least one platform, with core vulnerabilities universally affecting Claude, OpenAI, and Cursor, while prompt-based and tool-centric attacks exhibit considerable variability across different hosts and models. In addition, current protection mechanisms have little effect against these attacks. Overall, MCPSecBench standardizes the evaluation of MCP security and enables rigorous testing across all MCP layers.

Using Fourier analysis, this paper establishes exact security bounds for linear extractors in True Random Number Generators (TRNGs). We provide the first near-optimal total variation security characterization by interpolating between optimal ell_{infty} and ell_2 norm results, expressed through code weight enumerators and input bias parameters. Our bounds improve security assessments by an order of magnitude over previous approximations. By scanning ~20,000 codes, we reveal fundamental trade-offs between compression efficiency and cryptographic security. For instance, we show that achieving 80 bits of security can require sacrificing more than 50\% of the code rate when correcting 10\% input bias. Our bounds enhance security evaluation of TRNG post-processing schemes and quantify the inherent cost of randomness extraction in hardware implementations.

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

Although large language model (LLM)-based agents, exemplified by OpenClaw, are increasingly evolving from task-oriented systems into personalized AI assistants for solving complex real-world tasks, their practical deployment also introduces severe security risks. However, existing agent security research and evaluation frameworks primarily focus on synthetic or task-centric settings, and thus fail to accurately capture the attack surface and risk propagation mechanisms of personalized agents in real-world deployments. To address this gap, we propose Personalized Agent Security Bench (PASB), an end-to-end security evaluation framework tailored for real-world personalized agents. Building upon existing agent attack paradigms, PASB incorporates personalized usage scenarios, realistic toolchains, and long-horizon interactions, enabling black-box, end-to-end security evaluation on real systems. Using OpenClaw as a representative case study, we systematically evaluate its security across multiple personalized scenarios, tool capabilities, and attack types. Our results indicate that OpenClaw exhibits critical vulnerabilities at different execution stages, including user prompt processing, tool usage, and memory retrieval, highlighting substantial security risks in personalized agent deployments. The code for the proposed PASB framework is available at https://github.com/AstorYH/PASB.

As automated attack techniques rapidly advance, CAPTCHAs remain a critical defense mechanism against malicious bots. However, existing CAPTCHA schemes encompass a diverse range of modalities -- from static distorted text and obfuscated images to interactive clicks, sliding puzzles, and logic-based questions -- yet the community still lacks a unified, large-scale, multimodal benchmark to rigorously evaluate their security robustness. To address this gap, we introduce MCA-Bench, a comprehensive and reproducible benchmarking suite that integrates heterogeneous CAPTCHA types into a single evaluation protocol. Leveraging a shared vision-language model backbone, we fine-tune specialized cracking agents for each CAPTCHA category, enabling consistent, cross-modal assessments. Extensive experiments reveal that MCA-Bench effectively maps the vulnerability spectrum of modern CAPTCHA designs under varied attack settings, and crucially offers the first quantitative analysis of how challenge complexity, interaction depth, and model solvability interrelate. Based on these findings, we propose three actionable design principles and identify key open challenges, laying the groundwork for systematic CAPTCHA hardening, fair benchmarking, and broader community collaboration. Datasets and code are available online.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) has raised security concerns due to their susceptibility to producing harmful or policy-violating outputs when exposed to adversarial prompts. While alignment and guardrails mitigate common misuse, they remain vulnerable to automated jailbreaking methods such as GCG, PEZ, and GBDA, which generate adversarial suffixes via training and gradient-based search. Although effective, these methods particularly GCG are computationally expensive, limiting their practicality for organisations with constrained resources. This paper introduces a resource-efficient adversarial prompting approach that eliminates the need for retraining by matching new prompts to a database of pre-trained adversarial prompts. A dataset of 1,000 prompts was classified into seven harm-related categories, and GCG, PEZ, and GBDA were evaluated on a Llama 3 8B model to identify the most effective attack method per category. Results reveal a correlation between prompt type and algorithm effectiveness. By retrieving semantically similar successful adversarial prompts, the proposed method achieves competitive attack success rates with significantly reduced computational cost. This work provides a practical framework for scalable red-teaming and security evaluation of aligned LLMs, including in settings where model internals are inaccessible.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, security and safety evaluation are crucial. While current red teaming approaches have made strides in assessing LLM vulnerabilities, they often rely heavily on human input and lack comprehensive coverage of emerging attack vectors. This paper introduces AutoRedTeamer, a novel framework for fully automated, end-to-end red teaming against LLMs. AutoRedTeamer combines a multi-agent architecture with a memory-guided attack selection mechanism to enable continuous discovery and integration of new attack vectors. The dual-agent framework consists of a red teaming agent that can operate from high-level risk categories alone to generate and execute test cases and a strategy proposer agent that autonomously discovers and implements new attacks by analyzing recent research. This modular design allows AutoRedTeamer to adapt to emerging threats while maintaining strong performance on existing attack vectors. We demonstrate AutoRedTeamer's effectiveness across diverse evaluation settings, achieving 20% higher attack success rates on HarmBench against Llama-3.1-70B while reducing computational costs by 46% compared to existing approaches. AutoRedTeamer also matches the diversity of human-curated benchmarks in generating test cases, providing a comprehensive, scalable, and continuously evolving framework for evaluating the security of AI systems.

Code agents are increasingly trusted to autonomously fix bugs on platforms such as GitHub, yet their security evaluation focuses almost exclusively on functional correctness. In this paper, we reveal a novel type of threat to real-world code agents: Functionally Correct yet Vulnerable (FCV) patches, which pass all test cases but contain vulnerable code. With our proposed FCV-Attack, which can be deliberately crafted by malicious attackers or implicitly introduced by benign developers, we show that SOTA LLMs (e.g., ChatGPT and Claude) and agent scaffolds (e.g., SWE-agent and OpenHands) are all vulnerable to this FCV threat; across 12 agent-model combinations on SWE-Bench, the attack only requires black-box access and a single query to the code agent to perform the attack. For example, for CWE-538 (information exposure vulnerability), the FCV-Attack attains an attack success rate of 40.7% on GPT-5 Mini + OpenHands. Our results reveal an important security threat overlooked by current evaluation paradigms and urge the development of security-aware defenses for code agents.

Previous work has suggested that preprocessing images through lossy compression can defend against adversarial perturbations, but comprehensive attack evaluations have been lacking. In this paper, we construct strong white-box and adaptive attacks against various compression models and identify a critical challenge for attackers: high realism in reconstructed images significantly increases attack difficulty. Through rigorous evaluation across multiple attack scenarios, we demonstrate that compression models capable of producing realistic, high-fidelity reconstructions are substantially more resistant to our attacks. In contrast, low-realism compression models can be broken. Our analysis reveals that this is not due to gradient masking. Rather, realistic reconstructions maintaining distributional alignment with natural images seem to offer inherent robustness. This work highlights a significant obstacle for future adversarial attacks and suggests that developing more effective techniques to overcome realism represents an essential challenge for comprehensive security evaluation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced natural language processing (NLP), providing versatile capabilities across various applications. However, their application to complex, domain-specific tasks, such as cyber-security, often faces substantial challenges. In this study, we introduce SecKnowledge and CyberPal.AI to address these challenges and train security-expert LLMs. SecKnowledge is a domain-knowledge-driven cyber-security instruction dataset, meticulously designed using years of accumulated expert knowledge in the domain through a multi-phase generation process. CyberPal.AI refers to a family of LLMs fine-tuned using SecKnowledge, aimed at building security-specialized LLMs capable of answering and following complex security-related instructions. Additionally, we introduce SecKnowledge-Eval, a comprehensive and diverse cyber-security evaluation benchmark, composed of an extensive set of cyber-security tasks we specifically developed to assess LLMs in the field of cyber-security, along with other publicly available security benchmarks. Our results show a significant average improvement of up to 24% over the baseline models, underscoring the benefits of our expert-driven instruction dataset generation process. These findings contribute to the advancement of AI-based cyber-security applications, paving the way for security-expert LLMs that can enhance threat-hunting and investigation processes.

Existing benchmarks for LLM-based offensive security agents use isolated, single-target setups with a known vulnerable service and fixed objective. They measure exploitation effectively, but miss how real Capture-the-Flag (CTF) participants triage unknown surfaces, prioritize targets, and allocate effort under uncertainty. Current evaluations therefore fail to assess strategic reasoning beyond exploitation alone. To address this, we introduce CTFExplorer, a benchmark suite that shifts offensive security evaluation toward a multi-target setting, which tests how agents explore, prioritize, and chain attacks. CTFExplorer deploys 40 web-based vulnerable services within a single environment, where agents must autonomously discover, distinguish, and exploit targets without predefined guidance. We also present a reactive multi-agent setup as a reference agent framework and develop an agent-agnostic evaluation framework that records structured reasoning traces for fine-grained assessment. This enables behavioral evaluation beyond binary flag capture, such as how agents manage target selection, handle failed hypotheses, coordinate across multiple stages, and extract security intelligence.

While Large Language Models have shown promise in cybersecurity applications, their effectiveness in identifying security threats within cloud deployments remains unexplored. This paper introduces AWS Cloud Security Engineering Eval, a novel dataset for evaluating LLMs cloud security threat modeling capabilities. ACSE-Eval contains 100 production grade AWS deployment scenarios, each featuring detailed architectural specifications, Infrastructure as Code implementations, documented security vulnerabilities, and associated threat modeling parameters. Our dataset enables systemic assessment of LLMs abilities to identify security risks, analyze attack vectors, and propose mitigation strategies in cloud environments. Our evaluations on ACSE-Eval demonstrate that GPT 4.1 and Gemini 2.5 Pro excel at threat identification, with Gemini 2.5 Pro performing optimally in 0-shot scenarios and GPT 4.1 showing superior results in few-shot settings. While GPT 4.1 maintains a slight overall performance advantage, Claude 3.7 Sonnet generates the most semantically sophisticated threat models but struggles with threat categorization and generalization. To promote reproducibility and advance research in automated cybersecurity threat analysis, we open-source our dataset, evaluation metrics, and methodologies.

Over the past year, there has been a notable rise in the use of large language models (LLMs) for academic research and industrial practices within the cybersecurity field. However, it remains a lack of comprehensive and publicly accessible benchmarks to evaluate the performance of LLMs on cybersecurity tasks. To address this gap, we introduce CS-Eval, a publicly accessible, comprehensive and bilingual LLM benchmark specifically designed for cybersecurity. CS-Eval synthesizes the research hotspots from academia and practical applications from industry, curating a diverse set of high-quality questions across 42 categories within cybersecurity, systematically organized into three cognitive levels: knowledge, ability, and application. Through an extensive evaluation of a wide range of LLMs using CS-Eval, we have uncovered valuable insights. For instance, while GPT-4 generally excels overall, other models may outperform it in certain specific subcategories. Additionally, by conducting evaluations over several months, we observed significant improvements in many LLMs' abilities to solve cybersecurity tasks. The benchmarks are now publicly available at https://github.com/CS-EVAL/CS-Eval.

With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (e.g. GitHub Copilot, ChatGPT, etc.) in software engineers' daily practices, it is important to ensure that the code generated by these tools is not only functionally correct but also free of vulnerabilities. Although LLMs can help developers to be more productive, prior empirical studies have shown that LLMs can generate insecure code. There are two contributing factors to the insecure code generation. First, existing datasets used to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) do not adequately represent genuine software engineering tasks sensitive to security. Instead, they are often based on competitive programming challenges or classroom-type coding tasks. In real-world applications, the code produced is integrated into larger codebases, introducing potential security risks. There's a clear absence of benchmarks that focus on evaluating the security of the generated code. Second, existing evaluation metrics primarily focus on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security considerations. Metrics such as pass@k gauge the probability of obtaining the correct code in the top k suggestions. Other popular metrics like BLEU, CodeBLEU, ROUGE, and METEOR similarly emphasize functional accuracy, neglecting security implications. In light of these research gaps, in this paper, we described SALLM, a framework to benchmark LLMs' abilities to generate secure code systematically. This framework has three major components: a novel dataset of security-centric Python prompts, an evaluation environment to test the generated code, and novel metrics to evaluate the models' performance from the perspective of secure code generation.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

The rapid deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) requires careful consideration of their effect on cybersecurity. Our work aims to improve the selection process of LLMs that are suitable for facilitating Secure Coding (SC). This raises challenging research questions, such as (RQ1) Which functionality can streamline the LLM evaluation? (RQ2) What should the evaluation measure? (RQ3) How to attest that the evaluation process is impartial? To address these questions, we introduce LLMSecCode, an open-source evaluation framework designed to assess LLM SC capabilities objectively. We validate the LLMSecCode implementation through experiments. When varying parameters and prompts, we find a 10% and 9% difference in performance, respectively. We also compare some results to reliable external actors, where our results show a 5% difference. We strive to ensure the ease of use of our open-source framework and encourage further development by external actors. With LLMSecCode, we hope to encourage the standardization and benchmarking of LLMs' capabilities in security-oriented code and tasks.

Language models can distinguish between testing and deployment phases -- a capability known as evaluation awareness. This has significant safety and policy implications, potentially undermining the reliability of evaluations that are central to AI governance frameworks and voluntary industry commitments. In this paper, we study evaluation awareness in Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct. We show that linear probes can separate real-world evaluation and deployment prompts, suggesting that current models internally represent this distinction. We also find that current safety evaluations are correctly classified by the probes, suggesting that they already appear artificial or inauthentic to models. Our findings underscore the importance of ensuring trustworthy evaluations and understanding deceptive capabilities. More broadly, our work showcases how model internals may be leveraged to support blackbox methods in safety audits, especially for future models more competent at evaluation awareness and deception.

LLMs are increasingly pervasive in the security environment, with limited measures of their effectiveness, which limits trust and usefulness to security practitioners. Here, we present an open-source evaluation framework and benchmark metrics for evaluating LLM-generated cybersecurity rules. The benchmark employs a holdout set-based methodology to measure the effectiveness of LLM-generated security rules in comparison to a human-generated corpus of rules. It provides three key metrics inspired by the way experts evaluate security rules, offering a realistic, multifaceted evaluation of the effectiveness of an LLM-based security rule generator. This methodology is illustrated using rules from Sublime Security's detection team and those written by Sublime Security's Automated Detection Engineer (ADE), with a thorough analysis of ADE's skills presented in the results section.

Trustworthy capability evaluations are crucial for ensuring the safety of AI systems, and are becoming a key component of AI regulation. However, the developers of an AI system, or the AI system itself, may have incentives for evaluations to understate the AI's actual capability. These conflicting interests lead to the problem of sandbagging, which we define as strategic underperformance on an evaluation. In this paper we assess sandbagging capabilities in contemporary language models (LMs). We prompt frontier LMs, like GPT-4 and Claude 3 Opus, to selectively underperform on dangerous capability evaluations, while maintaining performance on general (harmless) capability evaluations. Moreover, we find that models can be fine-tuned, on a synthetic dataset, to hide specific capabilities unless given a password. This behaviour generalizes to high-quality, held-out benchmarks such as WMDP. In addition, we show that both frontier and smaller models can be prompted or password-locked to target specific scores on a capability evaluation. We have mediocre success in password-locking a model to mimic the answers a weaker model would give. Overall, our results suggest that capability evaluations are vulnerable to sandbagging. This vulnerability decreases the trustworthiness of evaluations, and thereby undermines important safety decisions regarding the development and deployment of advanced AI systems.

In the rapidly evolving landscape of Large Language Models (LLMs), ensuring robust safety measures is paramount. To meet this crucial need, we propose SALAD-Bench, a safety benchmark specifically designed for evaluating LLMs, attack, and defense methods. Distinguished by its breadth, SALAD-Bench transcends conventional benchmarks through its large scale, rich diversity, intricate taxonomy spanning three levels, and versatile functionalities.SALAD-Bench is crafted with a meticulous array of questions, from standard queries to complex ones enriched with attack, defense modifications and multiple-choice. To effectively manage the inherent complexity, we introduce an innovative evaluators: the LLM-based MD-Judge for QA pairs with a particular focus on attack-enhanced queries, ensuring a seamless, and reliable evaluation. Above components extend SALAD-Bench from standard LLM safety evaluation to both LLM attack and defense methods evaluation, ensuring the joint-purpose utility. Our extensive experiments shed light on the resilience of LLMs against emerging threats and the efficacy of contemporary defense tactics. Data and evaluator are released under https://github.com/OpenSafetyLab/SALAD-BENCH. Warning: this paper includes examples that may be offensive or harmful.

Model Inversion (MI) attacks aim to reconstruct information from private training data by exploiting access to machine learning models T. To evaluate such attacks, the standard evaluation framework relies on an evaluation model E, trained under the same task design as T. This framework has become the de facto standard for assessing progress in MI research, used across nearly all recent MI studies without question. In this paper, we present the first in-depth study of this evaluation framework. In particular, we identify a critical issue of this standard framework: Type-I adversarial examples. These are reconstructions that do not capture the visual features of private training data, yet are still deemed successful by T and ultimately transferable to E. Such false positives undermine the reliability of the standard MI evaluation framework. To address this issue, we introduce a new MI evaluation framework that replaces the evaluation model E with advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). By leveraging their general-purpose visual understanding, our MLLM-based framework does not depend on training of shared task design as in T, thus reducing Type-I transferability and providing more faithful assessments of reconstruction success. Using our MLLM-based evaluation framework, we reevaluate 27 diverse MI attack setups and empirically reveal consistently high false positive rates under the standard evaluation framework. Importantly, we demonstrate that many state-of-the-art (SOTA) MI methods report inflated attack accuracy, indicating that actual privacy leakage is significantly lower than previously believed. By uncovering this critical issue and proposing a robust solution, our work enables a reassessment of progress in MI research and sets a new standard for reliable and robust evaluation. Code can be found in https://github.com/hosytuyen/MI-Eval-MLLM

AI pentesting agents are increasingly credible as offensive security systems, but current benchmarks still provide limited guidance on which will perform best in real-world targets. Existing evaluation protocols assess and optimize for predefined goals such as capture-the-flag, remote code execution, exploit reproduction, or trajectory similarity, in simplified or narrow settings. These tools are valuable for measuring bounded capabilities, yet they do not adequately capture the complexity, open-ended exploration, and strategic decision-making required in realistic pentesting. In this paper, we present a practical evaluation protocol that shifts assessment from task completion to validated vulnerability discovery, allowing evaluation in sufficiently complex targets spanning multiple attack surfaces and vulnerability classes. The protocol combines structured ground-truth with LLM-based semantic matching to identify vulnerabilities, bipartite resolution to score findings under realistic ambiguity, continuous ground-truth maintenance, repeated and cumulative evaluation of stochastic agents, efficiency metrics, and reduced-suite selection for sustainable experimentation. This protocol extends the state of the art by enabling a more realistic, operationally informative comparison of AI pentesting agents. To enable reproducibility, we also release expert-annotated ground truth and code for the proposed evaluation protocol: https://github.com/ethiack/ethibench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated potential in cybersecurity applications but have also caused lower confidence due to problems like hallucinations and a lack of truthfulness. Existing benchmarks provide general evaluations but do not sufficiently address the practical and applied aspects of LLM performance in cybersecurity-specific tasks. To address this gap, we introduce the SECURE (Security Extraction, Understanding \& Reasoning Evaluation), a benchmark designed to assess LLMs performance in realistic cybersecurity scenarios. SECURE includes six datasets focussed on the Industrial Control System sector to evaluate knowledge extraction, understanding, and reasoning based on industry-standard sources. Our study evaluates seven state-of-the-art models on these tasks, providing insights into their strengths and weaknesses in cybersecurity contexts, and offer recommendations for improving LLMs reliability as cyber advisory tools.

Software security vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences, making early detection essential. Although code review serves as a critical defense mechanism against security flaws, relevant feedback remains scarce due to limited attention to security issues or a lack of expertise among reviewers. Existing datasets and studies primarily focus on general-purpose code review comments, either lacking security-specific annotations or being too limited in scale to support large-scale research. To bridge this gap, we introduce SeRe, a security-related code review dataset, constructed using an active learning-based ensemble classification approach. The proposed approach iteratively refines model predictions through human annotations, achieving high precision while maintaining reasonable recall. Using the fine-tuned ensemble classifier, we extracted 6,732 security-related reviews from 373,824 raw review instances, ensuring representativeness across multiple programming languages. Statistical analysis indicates that SeRe generally aligns with real-world security-related review distribution. To assess both the utility of SeRe and the effectiveness of existing code review comment generation approaches, we benchmark state-of-the-art approaches on security-related feedback generation. By releasing SeRe along with our benchmark results, we aim to advance research in automated security-focused code review and contribute to the development of more effective secure software engineering practices.

The rapid integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse sectors has marked a transformative era, showcasing remarkable capabilities in text generation and problem-solving tasks. However, this technological advancement is accompanied by significant risks and vulnerabilities. Despite ongoing security enhancements, attackers persistently exploit these weaknesses, casting doubts on the overall trustworthiness of LLMs. Compounding the issue, organisations are deploying LLM-integrated systems without understanding the severity of potential consequences. Existing studies by OWASP and MITRE offer a general overview of threats and vulnerabilities but lack a method for directly and succinctly analysing the risks for security practitioners, developers, and key decision-makers who are working with this novel technology. To address this gap, we propose a risk assessment process using tools like the OWASP risk rating methodology which is used for traditional systems. We conduct scenario analysis to identify potential threat agents and map the dependent system components against vulnerability factors. Through this analysis, we assess the likelihood of a cyberattack. Subsequently, we conduct a thorough impact analysis to derive a comprehensive threat matrix. We also map threats against three key stakeholder groups: developers engaged in model fine-tuning, application developers utilizing third-party APIs, and end users. The proposed threat matrix provides a holistic evaluation of LLM-related risks, enabling stakeholders to make informed decisions for effective mitigation strategies. Our outlined process serves as an actionable and comprehensive tool for security practitioners, offering insights for resource management and enhancing the overall system security.

Large Language Models have gained considerable attention for their revolutionary capabilities. However, there is also growing concern on their safety implications, making a comprehensive safety evaluation for LLMs urgently needed before model deployment. In this work, we propose S-Eval, a new comprehensive, multi-dimensional and open-ended safety evaluation benchmark. At the core of S-Eval is a novel LLM-based automatic test prompt generation and selection framework, which trains an expert testing LLM Mt combined with a range of test selection strategies to automatically construct a high-quality test suite for the safety evaluation. The key to the automation of this process is a novel expert safety-critique LLM Mc able to quantify the riskiness score of a LLM's response, and additionally produce risk tags and explanations. Besides, the generation process is also guided by a carefully designed risk taxonomy with four different levels, covering comprehensive and multi-dimensional safety risks of concern. Based on these, we systematically construct a new and large-scale safety evaluation benchmark for LLMs consisting of 220,000 evaluation prompts, including 20,000 base risk prompts (10,000 in Chinese and 10,000 in English) and 200, 000 corresponding attack prompts derived from 10 popular adversarial instruction attacks against LLMs. Moreover, considering the rapid evolution of LLMs and accompanied safety threats, S-Eval can be flexibly configured and adapted to include new risks, attacks and models. S-Eval is extensively evaluated on 20 popular and representative LLMs. The results confirm that S-Eval can better reflect and inform the safety risks of LLMs compared to existing benchmarks. We also explore the impacts of parameter scales, language environments, and decoding parameters on the evaluation, providing a systematic methodology for evaluating the safety of LLMs.

While the deployment of large language models (LLMs) in high-value industries continues to expand, the systematic assessment of their safety against jailbreak and prompt-based attacks remains insufficient. Existing safety evaluation benchmarks and frameworks are often limited by an imbalanced integration of core components (attack, defense, and evaluation methods) and an isolation between flexible evaluation frameworks and standardized benchmarking capabilities. These limitations hinder reliable cross-study comparisons and create unnecessary overhead for comprehensive risk assessment. To address these gaps, we present TeleAI-Safety, a modular and reproducible framework coupled with a systematic benchmark for rigorous LLM safety evaluation. Our framework integrates a broad collection of 19 attack methods (including one self-developed method), 29 defense methods, and 19 evaluation methods (including one self-developed method). With a curated attack corpus of 342 samples spanning 12 distinct risk categories, the TeleAI-Safety benchmark conducts extensive evaluations across 14 target models. The results reveal systematic vulnerabilities and model-specific failure cases, highlighting critical trade-offs between safety and utility, and identifying potential defense patterns for future optimization. In practical scenarios, TeleAI-Safety can be flexibly adjusted with customized attack, defense, and evaluation combinations to meet specific demands. We release our complete code and evaluation results to facilitate reproducible research and establish unified safety baselines.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems improve large language model outputs by incorporating external knowledge, enabling more informed and context-aware responses. However, the effectiveness and trustworthiness of these systems critically depends on how they are evaluated, particularly on whether the evaluation process captures real-world constraints like protecting sensitive information. While current evaluation efforts for RAG systems have primarily focused on the development of performance metrics, far less attention has been given to the design and quality of the underlying evaluation datasets, despite their pivotal role in enabling meaningful, reliable assessments. In this work, we introduce a novel multi-agent framework for generating synthetic QA datasets for RAG evaluation that prioritize semantic diversity and privacy preservation. Our approach involves: (1) a Diversity agent leveraging clustering techniques to maximize topical coverage and semantic variability, (2) a Privacy Agent that detects and mask sensitive information across multiple domains and (3) a QA curation agent that synthesizes private and diverse QA pairs suitable as ground truth for RAG evaluation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our evaluation sets outperform baseline methods in diversity and achieve robust privacy masking on domain-specific datasets. This work offers a practical and ethically aligned pathway toward safer, more comprehensive RAG system evaluation, laying the foundation for future enhancements aligned with evolving AI regulations and compliance standards.

The code generation capabilities of large language models(LLMs) have emerged as a critical dimension in evaluating their overall performance. However, prior research has largely overlooked the security risks inherent in the generated code. In this work, we introduce SafeGenBench, a benchmark specifically designed to assess the security of LLM-generated code. The dataset encompasses a wide range of common software development scenarios and vulnerability types. Building upon this benchmark, we develop an automatic evaluation framework that leverages both static application security testing(SAST) and LLM-based judging to assess the presence of security vulnerabilities in model-generated code. Through the empirical evaluation of state-of-the-art LLMs on SafeGenBench, we reveal notable deficiencies in their ability to produce vulnerability-free code. Our findings highlight pressing challenges and offer actionable insights for future advancements in the secure code generation performance of LLMs. The data and code will be released soon.

Security research is fundamentally a problem of resource constraint and consequent prioritization. There is simply too much attack surface and too little time and energy to spend analyzing it all. The most effective security researchers are often those who are most skilled at intuitively deciding which part of an expansive attack surface to investigate. We demonstrate that this problem of selecting the most promising option from among many possibilities can be reframed as an information retrieval problem, and solved using document ranking techniques with LLMs performing the heavy lifting as general-purpose rankers. We present SiftRank, a ranking algorithm achieving O(n) complexity through three key mechanisms: listwise ranking using an LLM to order documents in small batches of approximately 10 items at a time; inflection-based convergence detection that adaptively terminates ranking when score distributions have stabilized; and iterative refinement that progressively focuses ranking effort on the most relevant documents. Unlike existing reranking approaches that require a separate first-stage retrieval step to narrow datasets to approximately 100 candidates, SiftRank operates directly on thousands of items, with each document evaluated across multiple randomized batches to mitigate inconsistent judgments by an LLM. We demonstrate practical effectiveness on N-day vulnerability analysis, successfully identifying a vulnerability-fixing function among 2,197 changed functions in a stripped binary firmware patch within 99 seconds at an inference cost of $0.82. Our approach enables scalable security prioritization for problems that are generally constrained by manual analysis, requiring only standard LLM API access without specialized infrastructure, embedding, or domain-specific fine-tuning. An open-source implementation of SiftRank may be found at https://github.com/noperator/siftrank.

Evaluating Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial for understanding their capabilities and limitations across various applications, including natural language processing and code generation. Existing benchmarks like MMLU, C-Eval, and HumanEval assess general LLM performance but lack focus on specific expert domains such as cybersecurity. Previous attempts to create cybersecurity datasets have faced limitations, including insufficient data volume and a reliance on multiple-choice questions (MCQs). To address these gaps, we propose SecBench, a multi-dimensional benchmarking dataset designed to evaluate LLMs in the cybersecurity domain. SecBench includes questions in various formats (MCQs and short-answer questions (SAQs)), at different capability levels (Knowledge Retention and Logical Reasoning), in multiple languages (Chinese and English), and across various sub-domains. The dataset was constructed by collecting high-quality data from open sources and organizing a Cybersecurity Question Design Contest, resulting in 44,823 MCQs and 3,087 SAQs. Particularly, we used the powerful while cost-effective LLMs to (1). label the data and (2). constructing a grading agent for automatic evaluation of SAQs. Benchmarking results on 16 SOTA LLMs demonstrate the usability of SecBench, which is arguably the largest and most comprehensive benchmark dataset for LLMs in cybersecurity. More information about SecBench can be found at our website, and the dataset can be accessed via the artifact link.

Rigorous security-focused evaluation of large language model (LLM) agents is imperative for establishing trust in their safe deployment throughout the software development lifecycle. However, existing benchmarks largely rely on synthetic challenges or simplified vulnerability datasets that fail to capture the complexity and ambiguity encountered by security engineers in practice. We introduce SEC-bench, the first fully automated benchmarking framework for evaluating LLM agents on authentic security engineering tasks. SEC-bench employs a novel multi-agent scaffold that automatically constructs code repositories with harnesses, reproduces vulnerabilities in isolated environments, and generates gold patches for reliable evaluation. Our framework automatically creates high-quality software vulnerability datasets with reproducible artifacts at a cost of only $0.87 per instance. Using SEC-bench, we implement two critical software security tasks to rigorously evaluate LLM agents' capabilities: proof-of-concept (PoC) generation and vulnerability patching. A comprehensive evaluation of state-of-the-art LLM code agents reveals significant performance gaps, achieving at most 18.0% success in PoC generation and 34.0% in vulnerability patching on our complete dataset. These results highlight the crucial steps needed toward developing LLM agents that are more practical, intelligent, and autonomous for security engineering.

We present an experimental evaluation that assesses the robustness of four open source LLMs claiming function-calling capabilities against three different attacks, and we measure the effectiveness of eight different defences. Our results show how these models are not safe by default, and how the defences are not yet employable in real-world scenarios.

Evaluation is a key part of machine learning (ML), yet there is a lack of support and tooling to enable its informed and systematic practice. We introduce Evaluate and Evaluation on the Hub --a set of tools to facilitate the evaluation of models and datasets in ML. Evaluate is a library to support best practices for measurements, metrics, and comparisons of data and models. Its goal is to support reproducibility of evaluation, centralize and document the evaluation process, and broaden evaluation to cover more facets of model performance. It includes over 50 efficient canonical implementations for a variety of domains and scenarios, interactive documentation, and the ability to easily share implementations and outcomes. The library is available at https://github.com/huggingface/evaluate. In addition, we introduce Evaluation on the Hub, a platform that enables the large-scale evaluation of over 75,000 models and 11,000 datasets on the Hugging Face Hub, for free, at the click of a button. Evaluation on the Hub is available at https://huggingface.co/autoevaluate.

"Effective robustness" measures the extra out-of-distribution (OOD) robustness beyond what can be predicted from the in-distribution (ID) performance. Existing effective robustness evaluations typically use a single test set such as ImageNet to evaluate the ID accuracy. This becomes problematic when evaluating models trained on different data distributions, e.g., comparing models trained on ImageNet vs. zero-shot language-image pre-trained models trained on LAION. In this paper, we propose a new evaluation metric to evaluate and compare the effective robustness of models trained on different data. To do this, we control for the accuracy on multiple ID test sets that cover the training distributions for all the evaluated models. Our new evaluation metric provides a better estimate of effective robustness when there are models with different training data. It may also explain the surprising effective robustness gains of zero-shot CLIP-like models exhibited in prior works that used ImageNet as the only ID test set, while the gains diminish under our new evaluation. Additional artifacts including interactive visualizations are provided at https://shizhouxing.github.io/effective-robustness.

Powered by remarkable advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs), Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities in manifold tasks. However, the practical application scenarios of MLLMs are intricate, exposing them to potential malicious instructions and thereby posing safety risks. While current benchmarks do incorporate certain safety considerations, they often lack comprehensive coverage and fail to exhibit the necessary rigor and robustness. For instance, the common practice of employing GPT-4V as both the evaluator and a model to be evaluated lacks credibility, as it tends to exhibit a bias toward its own responses. In this paper, we present MLLMGuard, a multidimensional safety evaluation suite for MLLMs, including a bilingual image-text evaluation dataset, inference utilities, and a lightweight evaluator. MLLMGuard's assessment comprehensively covers two languages (English and Chinese) and five important safety dimensions (Privacy, Bias, Toxicity, Truthfulness, and Legality), each with corresponding rich subtasks. Focusing on these dimensions, our evaluation dataset is primarily sourced from platforms such as social media, and it integrates text-based and image-based red teaming techniques with meticulous annotation by human experts. This can prevent inaccurate evaluation caused by data leakage when using open-source datasets and ensures the quality and challenging nature of our benchmark. Additionally, a fully automated lightweight evaluator termed GuardRank is developed, which achieves significantly higher evaluation accuracy than GPT-4. Our evaluation results across 13 advanced models indicate that MLLMs still have a substantial journey ahead before they can be considered safe and responsible.

Serverless computing is an emerging cloud paradigm with serverless functions at its core. While serverless environments enable software developers to focus on developing applications without the need to actively manage the underlying runtime infrastructure, they open the door to a wide variety of security threats that can be challenging to mitigate with existing methods. Existing security solutions do not apply to all serverless architectures, since they require significant modifications to the serverless infrastructure or rely on third-party services for the collection of more detailed data. In this paper, we present an extendable serverless security threat detection model that leverages cloud providers' native monitoring tools to detect anomalous behavior in serverless applications. Our model aims to detect compromised serverless functions by identifying post-exploitation abnormal behavior related to different types of attacks on serverless functions, and therefore, it is a last line of defense. Our approach is not tied to any specific serverless application, is agnostic to the type of threats, and is adaptable through model adjustments. To evaluate our model's performance, we developed a serverless cybersecurity testbed in an AWS cloud environment, which includes two different serverless applications and simulates a variety of attack scenarios that cover the main security threats faced by serverless functions. Our evaluation demonstrates our model's ability to detect all implemented attacks while maintaining a negligible false alarm rate.

Existing works have established multiple benchmarks to highlight the security risks associated with Code GenAI. These risks are primarily reflected in two areas: a model potential to generate insecure code (insecure coding) and its utility in cyberattacks (cyberattack helpfulness). While these benchmarks have made significant strides, there remain opportunities for further improvement. For instance, many current benchmarks tend to focus more on a model ability to provide attack suggestions rather than its capacity to generate executable attacks. Additionally, most benchmarks rely heavily on static evaluation metrics, which may not be as precise as dynamic metrics such as passing test cases. Conversely, expert-verified benchmarks, while offering high-quality data, often operate at a smaller scale. To address these gaps, we develop SecCodePLT, a unified and comprehensive evaluation platform for code GenAIs' risks. For insecure code, we introduce a new methodology for data creation that combines experts with automatic generation. Our methodology ensures the data quality while enabling large-scale generation. We also associate samples with test cases to conduct code-related dynamic evaluation. For cyberattack helpfulness, we set up a real environment and construct samples to prompt a model to generate actual attacks, along with dynamic metrics in our environment. We conduct extensive experiments and show that SecCodePLT outperforms the state-of-the-art (SOTA) benchmark CyberSecEval in security relevance. Furthermore, it better identifies the security risks of SOTA models in insecure coding and cyberattack helpfulness. Finally, we apply SecCodePLT to the SOTA code agent, Cursor, and, for the first time, identify non-trivial security risks in this advanced coding agent.

We introduce PentestJudge, a system for evaluating the operations of penetration testing agents. PentestJudge is a large language model (LLM)-as-judge with access to tools that allow it to consume arbitrary trajectories of agent states and tool call history to determine whether a security agent's actions meet certain operating criteria that would be impractical to evaluate programmatically. We develop rubrics that use a tree structure to hierarchically collapse the penetration testing task for a particular environment into smaller, simpler, and more manageable sub-tasks and criteria until each leaf node represents simple yes-or-no criteria for PentestJudge to evaluate. Task nodes are broken down into different categories related to operational objectives, operational security, and tradecraft. LLM-as-judge scores are compared to human domain experts as a ground-truth reference, allowing us to compare their relative performance with standard binary classification metrics, such as F1 scores. We evaluate several frontier and open-source models acting as judge agents, with the best model reaching an F1 score of 0.83. We find models that are better at tool-use perform more closely to human experts. By stratifying the F1 scores by requirement type, we find even models with similar overall scores struggle with different types of questions, suggesting certain models may be better judges of particular operating criteria. We find that weaker and cheaper models can judge the trajectories of pentests performed by stronger and more expensive models, suggesting verification may be easier than generation for the penetration testing task. We share this methodology to facilitate future research in understanding the ability of judges to holistically and scalably evaluate the process quality of AI-based information security agents so that they may be confidently used in sensitive production environments.

Despite the impressive achievements of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) in computer vision, their vulnerability to adversarial attacks remains a critical concern. Extensive research has demonstrated that incorporating sophisticated perturbations into input images can lead to a catastrophic degradation in DNNs' performance. This perplexing phenomenon not only exists in the digital space but also in the physical world. Consequently, it becomes imperative to evaluate the security of DNNs-based systems to ensure their safe deployment in real-world scenarios, particularly in security-sensitive applications. To facilitate a profound understanding of this topic, this paper presents a comprehensive overview of physical adversarial attacks. Firstly, we distill four general steps for launching physical adversarial attacks. Building upon this foundation, we uncover the pervasive role of artifacts carrying adversarial perturbations in the physical world. These artifacts influence each step. To denote them, we introduce a new term: adversarial medium. Then, we take the first step to systematically evaluate the performance of physical adversarial attacks, taking the adversarial medium as a first attempt. Our proposed evaluation metric, hiPAA, comprises six perspectives: Effectiveness, Stealthiness, Robustness, Practicability, Aesthetics, and Economics. We also provide comparative results across task categories, together with insightful observations and suggestions for future research directions.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) introduces dual-use capabilities that could both threaten and bolster national security and public safety (NSPS). Models implement safeguards to protect against potential misuse relevant to NSPS and allow for benign users to receive helpful information. However, current benchmarks often fail to test safeguard robustness to potential NSPS risks in an objective, robust way. We introduce FORTRESS: 500 expert-crafted adversarial prompts with instance-based rubrics of 4-7 binary questions for automated evaluation across 3 domains (unclassified information only): Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosive (CBRNE), Political Violence & Terrorism, and Criminal & Financial Illicit Activities, with 10 total subcategories across these domains. Each prompt-rubric pair has a corresponding benign version to test for model over-refusals. This evaluation of frontier LLMs' safeguard robustness reveals varying trade-offs between potential risks and model usefulness: Claude-3.5-Sonnet demonstrates a low average risk score (ARS) (14.09 out of 100) but the highest over-refusal score (ORS) (21.8 out of 100), while Gemini 2.5 Pro shows low over-refusal (1.4) but a high average potential risk (66.29). Deepseek-R1 has the highest ARS at 78.05, but the lowest ORS at only 0.06. Models such as o1 display a more even trade-off between potential risks and over-refusals (with an ARS of 21.69 and ORS of 5.2). To provide policymakers and researchers with a clear understanding of models' potential risks, we publicly release FORTRESS at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ScaleAI/fortress_public. We also maintain a private set for evaluation.

The rapid advancement and expanding applications of Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) demand a rigorous understanding of their trustworthiness. However, systematic research on evaluating these models, particularly concerning risks unique to the audio modality, remains largely unexplored. Existing evaluation frameworks primarily focus on the text modality or address only a restricted set of safety dimensions, failing to adequately account for the unique characteristics and application scenarios inherent to the audio modality. We introduce AudioTrust-the first multifaceted trustworthiness evaluation framework and benchmark specifically designed for ALLMs. AudioTrust facilitates assessments across six key dimensions: fairness, hallucination, safety, privacy, robustness, and authentication. To comprehensively evaluate these dimensions, AudioTrust is structured around 18 distinct experimental setups. Its core is a meticulously constructed dataset of over 4,420 audio/text samples, drawn from real-world scenarios (e.g., daily conversations, emergency calls, voice assistant interactions), specifically designed to probe the multifaceted trustworthiness of ALLMs. For assessment, the benchmark carefully designs 9 audio-specific evaluation metrics, and we employ a large-scale automated pipeline for objective and scalable scoring of model outputs. Experimental results reveal the trustworthiness boundaries and limitations of current state-of-the-art open-source and closed-source ALLMs when confronted with various high-risk audio scenarios, offering valuable insights for the secure and trustworthy deployment of future audio models. Our platform and benchmark are available at https://github.com/JusperLee/AudioTrust.

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

Evaluations (Evals) are a deployment bottleneck for real-world AI applications: public benchmarks rarely match a team's users, context, or policies, and human review is often tedious to scale. Motivated by our work with AI applications in the public sector, this project addresses recurring evaluation challenges encountered when applications must satisfy local policy and governance requirements. We present Kaleidoscope, an integrated workflow for contextual functional evaluation that links persona-based test generation, contextualized rubrics, and human review for reliability-gated automated scoring. Generated test cases are scored against application-specific rubrics; human annotations provide reviewable labels; and LLM judges automate scoring only when their agreement with those labels meets a configured threshold. Kaleidoscope is therefore a practical, inspectable, iterative workflow for product teams. We report early evidence from a three-week pilot across four organizational use cases and custom-rubric judge experiments on 108 annotated Q\&A pairs spanning four domains and 14 evaluation dimensions. The results highlight useful features for end-to-end reliable, automated scoring.

AI systems are increasingly deployed in real-world settings where their behavior is shaped by dynamic environments, evolving data distributions, and complex interactions with users and infrastructure. Traditional machine learning evaluation focuses on benchmarks and operates within sandboxed environments, providing only a limited view of the true system behavior in the wild. We argue for the development of principled auditing frameworks that monitor deployed AI systems throughout their lifecycle. We further propose framing auditing as a statistical problem of monitoring constraint violations under uncertainty, where desired properties (e.g., fairness and safety) are treated as risk-controlled constraints that must be continuously evaluated as systems evolve through iterative feedback. This perspective highlights the need for uncertainty-aware monitoring methods, socio-technical specifications of audit criteria, and auditing infrastructures that enable ongoing oversight of AI systems in the wild.

Large Language Models have emerged as transformative tools for Security Operations Centers, enabling automated log analysis, phishing triage, and malware explanation; however, deployment in adversarial cybersecurity environments exposes critical vulnerabilities to prompt injection attacks where malicious instructions embedded in security artifacts manipulate model behavior. This paper introduces SecureCAI, a novel defense framework extending Constitutional AI principles with security-aware guardrails, adaptive constitution evolution, and Direct Preference Optimization for unlearning unsafe response patterns, addressing the unique challenges of high-stakes security contexts where traditional safety mechanisms prove insufficient against sophisticated adversarial manipulation. Experimental evaluation demonstrates that SecureCAI reduces attack success rates by 94.7% compared to baseline models while maintaining 95.1% accuracy on benign security analysis tasks, with the framework incorporating continuous red-teaming feedback loops enabling dynamic adaptation to emerging attack strategies and achieving constitution adherence scores exceeding 0.92 under sustained adversarial pressure, thereby establishing a foundation for trustworthy integration of language model capabilities into operational cybersecurity workflows and addressing a critical gap in current approaches to AI safety within adversarial domains.

As the use of text-to-image generative models increases, so does the adoption of automatic benchmarking methods used in their evaluation. However, while metrics and datasets abound, there are few unified benchmarking libraries that provide a framework for performing evaluations across many datasets and metrics. Furthermore, the rapid introduction of increasingly robust benchmarking methods requires that evaluation libraries remain flexible to new datasets and metrics. Finally, there remains a gap in synthesizing evaluations in order to deliver actionable takeaways about model performance. To enable unified, flexible, and actionable evaluations, we introduce EvalGIM (pronounced ''EvalGym''), a library for evaluating generative image models. EvalGIM contains broad support for datasets and metrics used to measure quality, diversity, and consistency of text-to-image generative models. In addition, EvalGIM is designed with flexibility for user customization as a top priority and contains a structure that allows plug-and-play additions of new datasets and metrics. To enable actionable evaluation insights, we introduce ''Evaluation Exercises'' that highlight takeaways for specific evaluation questions. The Evaluation Exercises contain easy-to-use and reproducible implementations of two state-of-the-art evaluation methods of text-to-image generative models: consistency-diversity-realism Pareto Fronts and disaggregated measurements of performance disparities across groups. EvalGIM also contains Evaluation Exercises that introduce two new analysis methods for text-to-image generative models: robustness analyses of model rankings and balanced evaluations across different prompt styles. We encourage text-to-image model exploration with EvalGIM and invite contributions at https://github.com/facebookresearch/EvalGIM/.

Large language model safeguards decide whether to answer before seeing how an answer will be used. This creates a basic problem for dual-use tasks: the same answer can help an authorized professional or an attacker, while an attacker can imitate a benign request and interaction history. We separate the capability released by the model from the evidence available about downstream use. When that evidence is copyable, we derive the exact worst-case floor on attacker assistance while preserving useful answers. The result yields a safety trilemma: Useful Capability, Reliable Safety, and Open Access cannot coexist. We then show how a trusted credential can complement existing safeguards by adding hard-to-copy information that predicts actual downstream use, and identify the stronger condition needed to eliminate the floor. Evidence from dual-use evaluations, adaptive attacks, and deployed trusted-access programs supports the practical relevance of these conditions.

Membership inference attacks aim to infer whether an individual record was used to train a model, serving as a key tool for disclosure auditing. While such evaluations are useful to demonstrate risk, they are computationally expensive and often make strong assumptions about potential adversaries' access to models and training environments, and thus do not provide very tight bounds on leakage from potential attacks. We show how prior claims around black-box access being sufficient for optimal membership inference do not hold for most useful settings such as stochastic gradient descent, and that optimal membership inference indeed requires white-box access. We validate our findings with a new white-box inference attack IHA (Inverse Hessian Attack) that explicitly uses model parameters by taking advantage of computing inverse-Hessian vector products. Our results show that both audits and adversaries may be able to benefit from access to model parameters, and we advocate for further research into white-box methods for membership privacy auditing.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) can now autonomously complete complex tasks in real digital environments, but when misled, they can also be used to automate harmful actions programmatically. Existing safety evaluations largely target explicit threats such as misuse and prompt injection, but overlook a subtle yet critical setting where user instructions are entirely benign and harm arises from the task context or execution outcome. We introduce OS-BLIND, a benchmark that evaluates CUAs under unintended attack conditions, comprising 300 human-crafted tasks across 12 categories, 8 applications, and 2 threat clusters: environment-embedded threats and agent-initiated harms. Our evaluation on frontier models and agentic frameworks reveals that most CUAs exceed 90% attack success rate (ASR), and even the safety-aligned Claude 4.5 Sonnet reaches 73.0% ASR. More interestingly, this vulnerability becomes even more severe, with ASR rising from 73.0% to 92.7% when Claude 4.5 Sonnet is deployed in multi-agent systems. Our analysis further shows that existing safety defenses provide limited protection when user instructions are benign. Safety alignment primarily activates within the first few steps and rarely re-engages during subsequent execution. In multi-agent systems, decomposed subtasks obscure the harmful intent from the model, causing safety-aligned models to fail. We will release our OS-BLIND to encourage the broader research community to further investigate and address these safety challenges.

Software-defined vehicles (SDVs) are revolutionizing transportation by integrating complex, interconnected hardware, and software systems. This evolution introduces significant security challenges. We present a comprehensive security analysis for SDVs, focusing on software vulnerabilities. We note that existing vulnerability assessment tools fall short in addressing operating systems vulnerabilities, particularly when it comes to efficiently analyzing diverse software stacks in realistic environments. We present and release a vulnerability assessment solution that efficiently addresses these limitations. Our approach combines systematic vulnerability discovery, leveraging public Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) databases, within a dockerized development environment that evaluates exploitability risks. The results reveal both breadth of potential threats and the practical constraints we faced during exploitation. We discuss the implications for industry and research, and propose directions for building more resilient SDVs.

The robustness of deep neural networks is crucial for safety-critical deployments, yet existing evaluation methods are often attack-dependent and lack interpretability. We propose a principled, attack-agnostic robustness metric based on the spectral norm of the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM), which quantifies the worst-case sensitivity of the model's output distribution to input perturbations. Theoretically, we establish that the FIM equals the variance of the input Jacobian and derive closed-form spectral bounds for common architectures, including VGG, ResNet, DenseNet, and Transformer, providing the first theoretical robustness ranking. To enable scalable evaluation, we develop efficient algorithms, including power iteration and Hutchinson-based estimation, that support both white-box and black-box settings. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets, including CIFAR, ImageNet, and medical images, and across multiple architectures show a strong correlation between our metric and adversarial vulnerability. Our framework serves as an interpretable diagnostic tool that complements attack-based evaluations, offering insights into architectural sensitivity and guiding the design of more robust models. Code is available at: https://github.com/franz-chang/SRP/.

Reliable evaluation is essential for developing and deploying large language models, yet in practice it often requires substantial manual effort: practitioners must identify appropriate benchmarks, reproduce heterogeneous evaluation codebases, configure dataset schema mappings, and interpret aggregated metrics. To address these challenges, we present One-Eval, an agentic evaluation system that converts natural-language evaluation requests into executable, traceable, and customizable evaluation workflows. One-Eval integrates (i) NL2Bench for intent structuring and personalized benchmark planning, (ii) BenchResolve for benchmark resolution, automatic dataset acquisition, and schema normalization to ensure executability, and (iii) Metrics \& Reporting for task-aware metric selection and decision-oriented reporting beyond scalar scores. The system further incorporates human-in-the-loop checkpoints for review, editing, and rollback, while preserving sample evidence trails for debugging and auditability. Experiments show that One-Eval can execute end-to-end evaluations from diverse natural-language requests with minimal user effort, supporting more efficient and reproducible evaluation in industrial settings. Our framework is publicly available at https://github.com/OpenDCAI/One-Eval.

Large language model (LLM)-based search agents synthesize open-web content into actionable recommendations on behalf of users, creating a risk that attacker-published pages are transformed into endorsed claims. We introduce SearchGEO, a controlled evaluation framework for measuring endorsement corruption in LLM-based web-search agents, combining a web-evidence manipulation pipeline, a five-mode attack taxonomy, and multiple output-level metrics. We evaluate 13 LLM backends on 308 cases each. Results show that vulnerability patterns vary across backends: overall attack success rate (ASR) ranges from 0.0% on Claude-Sonnet-4.6 to 31.4% on Gemini-3-Flash, the strongest attack mode differs by model family, and the same deployment scaffold could amplify or decrease ASR on different backends. An auxiliary agent-skill probe, where endorsement becomes an install command, exposes a sharp split among otherwise robust backends: Claude over-rejects while GPT over-trusts. These findings argue for treating recommendation reliability under adversarial search content as a first-class dimension of backend safety evaluation.

Automated vulnerability reproduction from CVE descriptions requires generating executable Proof-of-Concept (PoC) exploits and validating them in target environments. This process is critical in software security research and practice, yet remains time-consuming and demands specialized expertise when performed manually. While LLM agents show promise for automating this task, existing approaches often conflate exploring attack directions with fixing implementation details, which leads to unproductive debugging loops when reproduction fails. To address this, we propose CVE2PoC, an LLM-based dual-loop agent framework following a plan-execute-evaluate paradigm. The Strategic Planner analyzes vulnerability semantics and target code to produce structured attack plans. The Tactical Executor generates PoC code and validates it through progressive verification. The Adaptive Refiner evaluates execution results and routes failures to different loops: the Tactical Loop for code-level refinement, while the Strategic Loop for attack strategy replanning. This dual-loop design enables the framework to escape ineffective debugging by matching remediation to failure type. Evaluation on two benchmarks covering 617 real-world vulnerabilities demonstrates that CVE2PoC achieves 82.9% and 54.3% reproduction success rates on SecBench.js and PatchEval, respectively, outperforming the best baseline by 11.3% and 20.4%. Human evaluation confirms that generated PoCs achieve comparable code quality to human-written exploits in readability and reusability.

As increasingly capable open-weight large language models (LLMs) are deployed, improving their tamper resistance against unsafe modifications, whether accidental or intentional, becomes critical to minimize risks. However, there is no standard approach to evaluate tamper resistance. Varied data sets, metrics, and tampering configurations make it difficult to compare safety, utility, and robustness across different models and defenses. To this end, we introduce TamperBench, the first unified framework to systematically evaluate the tamper resistance of LLMs. TamperBench (i) curates a repository of state-of-the-art weight-space fine-tuning attacks and latent-space representation attacks; (ii) enables realistic adversarial evaluation through systematic hyperparameter sweeps per attack-model pair; and (iii) provides both safety and utility evaluations. TamperBench requires minimal additional code to specify any fine-tuning configuration, alignment-stage defense method, and metric suite while ensuring end-to-end reproducibility. We use TamperBench to evaluate 21 open-weight LLMs, including defense-augmented variants, across nine tampering threats using standardized safety and capability metrics with hyperparameter sweeps per model-attack pair. This yields novel insights, including effects of post-training on tamper resistance, that jailbreak-tuning is typically the most severe attack, and that Triplet emerges as a leading alignment-stage defense. Code is available at: https://github.com/criticalml-uw/TamperBench

AI-assisted software generation has increased development speed, but it has also amplified a persistent engineering problem: systems that are functionally correct may still be structurally insecure. In practice, prompt-based security review with large language models often suffers from uneven coverage, weak reproducibility, unsupported findings, and the absence of an immutable audit trail. The ESAA architecture addresses a related governance problem in agentic software engineering by separating heuristic agent cognition from deterministic state mutation through append-only events, constrained outputs, and replay-based verification. This paper presents ESAA-Security, a domain-specific specialization of ESAA for agent-assisted security auditing of software repositories, with particular emphasis on AI-generated or AI-modified code. ESAA-Security structures auditing as a governed execution pipeline with four phases reconnaissance, domain audit execution, risk classification, and final reporting and operationalizes the workflow into 26 tasks, 16 security domains, and 95 executable checks. The framework produces structured check results, vulnerability inventories, severity classifications, risk matrices, remediation guidance, executive summaries, and a final markdown/JSON audit report. The central idea is that security review should not be modeled as a free-form conversation with an LLM, but as an evidence-oriented audit process governed by contracts and events. In ESAA-Security, agents emit structured intentions under constrained protocols; the orchestrator validates them, persists accepted outputs to an append-only log, reprojects derived views, and verifies consistency through replay and hashing. The result is a traceable, reproducible, and risk-oriented audit architecture whose final report is auditable by construction.

With the rapid popularity of large language models such as ChatGPT and GPT-4, a growing amount of attention is paid to their safety concerns. These models may generate insulting and discriminatory content, reflect incorrect social values, and may be used for malicious purposes such as fraud and dissemination of misleading information. Evaluating and enhancing their safety is particularly essential for the wide application of large language models (LLMs). To further promote the safe deployment of LLMs, we develop a Chinese LLM safety assessment benchmark. Our benchmark explores the comprehensive safety performance of LLMs from two perspectives: 8 kinds of typical safety scenarios and 6 types of more challenging instruction attacks. Our benchmark is based on a straightforward process in which it provides the test prompts and evaluates the safety of the generated responses from the evaluated model. In evaluation, we utilize the LLM's strong evaluation ability and develop it as a safety evaluator by prompting. On top of this benchmark, we conduct safety assessments and analyze 15 LLMs including the OpenAI GPT series and other well-known Chinese LLMs, where we observe some interesting findings. For example, we find that instruction attacks are more likely to expose safety issues of all LLMs. Moreover, to promote the development and deployment of safe, responsible, and ethical AI, we publicly release SafetyPrompts including 100k augmented prompts and responses by LLMs.

Accurately evaluating adversarial robustness is a longstanding challenge. A flawed attack design can inflate robustness estimates, making deployment risk assessment and defense comparison unreliable. Historically, standardized attacks such as AutoAttack have largely resolved this for image classifiers, providing a reliable evaluation baseline for systematic comparison across defenses. However, no equivalent exists for LLM jailbreak evaluation yet, where designing such an attack is considerably more difficult. A reliable attack must, among other things, be black-box compatible, applicable to arbitrary defense pipelines, and efficient, which no existing method jointly satisfies. We introduce Indirect Harm Optimization (IHO), a masked diffusion language model attacker trained via iterative preference optimization against a harmfulness judge, requiring only black-box access to the target. The same method can be used without modification as a strong adaptive attack on individual behaviors, or as an efficient amortized policy that transfers to held-out behaviors and unseen target models without fine-tuning. Even against layered defenses, such as a Circuit Breaker-trained model combined with an auxiliary detector, IHO improves attack success considerably over state-of-the-art approaches, without any defense-specific adaptation. Our results position IHO as a practical step toward the kind of standardized jailbreak evaluation that has improved reliability in the past. Code and models are available on GitHub and Hugging Face.

Existing language model safety evaluations focus on overt attacks and low-stakes tasks. In reality, an attacker can easily subvert existing safeguards by requesting help on small, benign-seeming tasks across many independent queries. Because the individual queries do not appear harmful, the attack is hard to detect. However, when combined, these fragments uplift misuse by helping the attacker complete hard and dangerous tasks. Toward identifying defenses against such strategies, we develop Benchmarks for Stateful Defenses (BSD), a data generation pipeline that automates evaluations of covert attacks and corresponding defenses. Using this pipeline, we curate two new datasets that are consistently refused by frontier models and are too difficult for weaker open-weight models. This enables us to evaluate decomposition attacks, which are found to be effective misuse enablers, and to highlight stateful defenses as a promising countermeasure.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, it is critical to assess the security threats and vulnerabilities that may arise both during their training phase and after models have been deployed. This survey seeks to define and categorize the various attacks targeting LLMs, distinguishing between those that occur during the training phase and those that affect already trained models. A thorough analysis of these attacks is presented, alongside an exploration of defense mechanisms designed to mitigate such threats. Defenses are classified into two primary categories: prevention-based and detection-based defenses. Furthermore, our survey summarizes possible attacks and their corresponding defense strategies. It also provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the known defense mechanisms for the different security threats. Our survey aims to offer a structured framework for securing LLMs, while also identifying areas that require further research to improve and strengthen defenses against emerging security challenges.

Evaluations are critical for understanding the capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Fundamentally, evaluations are experiments; but the literature on evaluations has largely ignored the literature from other sciences on experiment analysis and planning. This article shows researchers with some training in statistics how to think about and analyze data from language model evaluations. Conceptualizing evaluation questions as having been drawn from an unseen super-population, we present formulas for analyzing evaluation data, measuring differences between two models, and planning an evaluation experiment. We make a number of specific recommendations for running language model evaluations and reporting experiment results in a way that minimizes statistical noise and maximizes informativeness.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise in generating firmware for embedded systems, but often introduce security flaws and fail to meet real-time performance constraints. This paper proposes a three-phase methodology that combines LLM-based firmware generation with automated security validation and iterative refinement in a virtualized environment. Using structured prompts, models like GPT-4 generate firmware for networking and control tasks, deployed on FreeRTOS via QEMU. These implementations are tested using fuzzing, static analysis, and runtime monitoring to detect vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows (CWE-120), race conditions (CWE-362), and denial-of-service threats (CWE-400). Specialized AI agents for Threat Detection, Performance Optimization, and Compliance Verification collaborate to improve detection and remediation. Identified issues are categorized using CWE, then used to prompt targeted LLM-generated patches in an iterative loop. Experiments show a 92.4\% Vulnerability Remediation Rate (37.3\% improvement), 95.8\% Threat Model Compliance, and 0.87 Security Coverage Index. Real-time metrics include 8.6ms worst-case execution time and 195μs jitter. This process enhances firmware security and performance while contributing an open-source dataset for future research.

Large language models (LLMs) are demonstrating increasing prowess in cybersecurity applications, creating creating inherent risks alongside their potential for strengthening defenses. In this position paper, we argue that current efforts to evaluate risks posed by these capabilities are misaligned with the goal of understanding real-world impact. Evaluating LLM cybersecurity risk requires more than just measuring model capabilities -- it demands a comprehensive risk assessment that incorporates analysis of threat actor adoption behavior and potential for impact. We propose a risk assessment framework for LLM cyber capabilities and apply it to a case study of language models used as cybersecurity assistants. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals high compliance rates but moderate accuracy on realistic cyber assistance tasks. However, our framework suggests that this particular use case presents only moderate risk due to limited operational advantages and impact potential. Based on these findings, we recommend several improvements to align research priorities with real-world impact assessment, including closer academia-industry collaboration, more realistic modeling of attacker behavior, and inclusion of economic metrics in evaluations. This work represents an important step toward more effective assessment and mitigation of LLM-enabled cybersecurity risks.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

The most common attacks against web sessions are reviewed in this paper, for example, some attacks against web browsers' honest users attempting to create session with trusted web browser application legally. We have assessed with four different ways to judge the viability of a certain solution by reviewing existing security solutions which prevent or halt the different attacks. Then we have pointed out some guidelines that have been taken into account by the designers of the proposals we reviewed. The guidelines we have identified will be helpful for the creative solutions proceeding web security in a more structured and holistic way.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in code understanding tasks. However, they demonstrate limited performance in vulnerability detection and struggle to distinguish vulnerable code from patched code. We argue that LLMs lack understanding of security specifications -- the expectations about how code should behave to remain safe. When code behavior differs from these expectations, it becomes a potential vulnerability. However, such knowledge is rarely explicit in training data, leaving models unable to reason about security flaws. We propose VulInstruct, a specification-guided approach that systematically extracts security specifications from historical vulnerabilities to detect new ones. VulInstruct constructs a specification knowledge base from two perspectives: (i) General specifications from high-quality patches across projects, capturing fundamental safe behaviors; and (ii) Domain-specific specifications from repeated violations in particular repositories relevant to the target code. VulInstruct retrieves relevant past cases and specifications, enabling LLMs to reason about expected safe behaviors rather than relying on surface patterns. We evaluate VulInstruct under strict criteria requiring both correct predictions and valid reasoning. On PrimeVul, VulInstruct achieves 45.0% F1-score (32.7% improvement) and 37.7% recall (50.8% improvement) compared to baselines, while uniquely detecting 24.3% of vulnerabilities -- 2.4x more than any baseline. In pair-wise evaluation, VulInstruct achieves 32.3% relative improvement. VulInstruct also discovered a previously unknown high-severity vulnerability (CVE-2025-56538) in production code, demonstrating practical value for real-world vulnerability discovery. All code and supplementary materials are available at https://github.com/zhuhaopku/VulInstruct-temp.

The rapid growth of scientific submissions has pushed traditional peer review toward its scalability limits, motivating the exploration of large language models (LLMs) as intelligent automated evaluation assistants. Although recent studies show that LLMs can generate fluent critiques and approximate reviewer scores, their reliability, robustness, and security as decision-support systems remain insufficiently understood. This survey offers a systems-level analysis of LLM-based scientific peer review, focusing on two core evaluative functions: critique generation and score prediction. We present a structured taxonomy of modeling approaches (including prompt-based, supervised, retrieval-augmented, and alignment-optimized approaches), and synthesize empirical findings across existing benchmarks. We analyze dataset constraints, evaluation shortcomings, and domain concentration biases that limit current assessment practices. Beyond performance metrics, we identify emerging robustness risks, including prompt injection, data poisoning, retrieval vulnerabilities, and reward hacking, which expose automated review pipelines to strategic manipulation. From a data mining perspective, we outline key open challenges in modeling subjective disagreement and cross-domain generalization. By reframing automated peer review as a high-stakes, multi-objective decision problem, this survey provides a roadmap for developing robust, transparent, and trustworthy AI-assisted scientific evaluation systems.

Purpose: With advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) for healthcare, the need arises for competitive open-source models to protect the public interest. This work contributes to the field of open medical LLMs by optimizing key stages of data preprocessing and training, while showing how to improve model safety (through DPO) and efficacy (through RAG). The evaluation methodology used, which includes four different types of tests, defines a new standard for the field. The resultant models, shown to be competitive with the best private alternatives, are released with a permisive license. Methods: Building on top of strong base models like Llama 3.1 and Qwen 2.5, Aloe Beta uses a custom dataset to enhance public data with synthetic Chain of Thought examples. The models undergo alignment with Direct Preference Optimization, emphasizing ethical and policy-aligned performance in the presence of jailbreaking attacks. Evaluation includes close-ended, open-ended, safety and human assessments, to maximize the reliability of results. Results: Recommendations are made across the entire pipeline, backed by the solid performance of the Aloe Family. These models deliver competitive performance across healthcare benchmarks and medical fields, and are often preferred by healthcare professionals. On bias and toxicity, the Aloe Beta models significantly improve safety, showing resilience to unseen jailbreaking attacks. For a responsible release, a detailed risk assessment specific to healthcare is attached to the Aloe Family models. Conclusion: The Aloe Beta models, and the recipe that leads to them, are a significant contribution to the open-source medical LLM field, offering top-of-the-line performance while maintaining high ethical requirements. This work sets a new standard for developing and reporting aligned LLMs in healthcare.

Stakeholders -- from model developers to policymakers -- seek to minimize the dual-use risks of large language models (LLMs). An open challenge to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are fully open. In response, several recent studies have proposed methods to produce durable LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model's weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries' costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune model weights. However, in this paper, we urge for more careful characterization of the limits of these approaches. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even evaluating these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the evaluation pitfalls that we identify and suggest future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide more useful and candid assessments to stakeholders.

Generative Pre-trained Transformer (GPT) models have exhibited exciting progress in capabilities, capturing the interest of practitioners and the public alike. Yet, while the literature on the trustworthiness of GPT models remains limited, practitioners have proposed employing capable GPT models for sensitive applications to healthcare and finance - where mistakes can be costly. To this end, this work proposes a comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation for large language models with a focus on GPT-4 and GPT-3.5, considering diverse perspectives - including toxicity, stereotype bias, adversarial robustness, out-of-distribution robustness, robustness on adversarial demonstrations, privacy, machine ethics, and fairness. Based on our evaluations, we discover previously unpublished vulnerabilities to trustworthiness threats. For instance, we find that GPT models can be easily misled to generate toxic and biased outputs and leak private information in both training data and conversation history. We also find that although GPT-4 is usually more trustworthy than GPT-3.5 on standard benchmarks, GPT-4 is more vulnerable given jailbreaking system or user prompts, potentially due to the reason that GPT-4 follows the (misleading) instructions more precisely. Our work illustrates a comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation of GPT models and sheds light on the trustworthiness gaps. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://decodingtrust.github.io/.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have rapidly advanced, enabling the generation of high-quality images from text prompts across various domains. However, these models present notable safety concerns, including the risk of generating harmful, biased, or private content. Current research on assessing T2I safety remains in its early stages. While some efforts have been made to evaluate models on specific safety dimensions, many critical risks remain unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce T2ISafety, a safety benchmark that evaluates T2I models across three key domains: toxicity, fairness, and bias. We build a detailed hierarchy of 12 tasks and 44 categories based on these three domains, and meticulously collect 70K corresponding prompts. Based on this taxonomy and prompt set, we build a large-scale T2I dataset with 68K manually annotated images and train an evaluator capable of detecting critical risks that previous work has failed to identify, including risks that even ultra-large proprietary models like GPTs cannot correctly detect. We evaluate 12 prominent diffusion models on T2ISafety and reveal several concerns including persistent issues with racial fairness, a tendency to generate toxic content, and significant variation in privacy protection across the models, even with defense methods like concept erasing. Data and evaluator are released under https://github.com/adwardlee/t2i_safety.

Successful defense against dynamically evolving cyber threats requires advanced and sophisticated techniques. This research presents a novel approach to enhance real-time cybersecurity threat detection and response by integrating large language models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems with continuous threat intelligence feeds. Leveraging recent advancements in LLMs, specifically GPT-4o, and the innovative application of RAG techniques, our approach addresses the limitations of traditional static threat analysis by incorporating dynamic, real-time data sources. We leveraged RAG to get the latest information in real-time for threat intelligence, which is not possible in the existing GPT-4o model. We employ the Patrowl framework to automate the retrieval of diverse cybersecurity threat intelligence feeds, including Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE), Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE), Exploit Prediction Scoring System (EPSS), and Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) databases, and integrate these with the all-mpnet-base-v2 model for high-dimensional vector embeddings, stored and queried in Milvus. We demonstrate our system's efficacy through a series of case studies, revealing significant improvements in addressing recently disclosed vulnerabilities, KEVs, and high-EPSS-score CVEs compared to the baseline GPT-4o. This work not only advances the role of LLMs in cybersecurity but also establishes a robust foundation for the development of automated intelligent cyberthreat information management systems, addressing crucial gaps in current cybersecurity practices.

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the opportunities, challenges, and potential solutions of harnessing Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 to dig out vulnerabilities within smart contracts based on our ongoing research. For the task of smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving practical usability hinges on identifying as many true vulnerabilities as possible while minimizing the number of false positives. Nonetheless, our empirical study reveals contradictory yet interesting findings: generating more answers with higher randomness largely boosts the likelihood of producing a correct answer but inevitably leads to a higher number of false positives. To mitigate this tension, we propose an adversarial framework dubbed GPTLens that breaks the conventional one-stage detection into two synergistic stages - generation and discrimination, for progressive detection and refinement, wherein the LLM plays dual roles, i.e., auditor and critic, respectively. The goal of auditor is to yield a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities with the hope of encompassing the correct answer, whereas the goal of critic that evaluates the validity of identified vulnerabilities is to minimize the number of false positives. Experimental results and illustrative examples demonstrate that auditor and critic work together harmoniously to yield pronounced improvements over the conventional one-stage detection. GPTLens is intuitive, strategic, and entirely LLM-driven without relying on specialist expertise in smart contracts, showcasing its methodical generality and potential to detect a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/git-disl/GPTLens.

Recent advances in text-to-speech (TTS) technology have enabled systems to produce human-indistinguishable speech, bringing benefits across accessibility, content creation, and human-computer interaction. However, current evaluation practices are increasingly inadequate for capturing the full range of capabilities, limitations, and societal implications. This position paper introduces the concept of Responsible Evaluation and argues that it is essential and urgent for the next phase of TTS development, structured through three progressive levels: (1) ensuring the faithful and accurate reflection of a model's true capabilities, with more robust, discriminative, and comprehensive objective and subjective scoring methodologies; (2) enabling comparability, standardization, and transferability through standardized benchmarks, transparent reporting, and transferable evaluation metrics; and (3) assessing and mitigating ethical risks associated with forgery, misuse, privacy violations, and security vulnerabilities. Through this concept, we critically examine current evaluation practices, identify systemic shortcomings, and propose actionable recommendations. We hope this concept of Responsible Evaluation will foster more trustworthy and reliable TTS technology and guide its development toward ethically sound and societally beneficial applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in software engineering tasks, but evaluating their effectiveness in vulnerability detection is challenging due to the lack of high-quality datasets. Most existing datasets are limited to function-level labels, ignoring finer-grained vulnerability patterns and crucial contextual information. Also, poor data quality such as mislabeling, inconsistent annotations, and duplicates can lead to inflated performance and weak generalization. Moreover, by including only the functions, these datasets miss broader program context, like data/control dependencies and interprocedural interactions, that are essential for accurately understanding real-world security flaws. Without this context, detection models are evaluated under unrealistic assumptions. To address these limitations, this paper introduces SecVulEval, a benchmark designed to support fine-grained evaluation of LLMs and other detection methods with rich contextual information. SecVulEval focuses on real-world C/C++ vulnerabilities at the statement level. This granularity enables more precise evaluation of a model's ability to localize vulnerabilities, beyond simple binary classification at the function level. By incorporating rich contextual information, SecVulEval sets a new standard for vulnerability detection benchmarks in realistic scenarios. This benchmark includes 25,440 function samples covering 5,867 unique CVEs in C/C++ projects from 1999 to 2024. We evaluated the SOTA LLMs with a multi-agent-based approach. The evaluation on our dataset shows that the models are still far from accurately predicting vulnerable statements in a given function. The best-performing Claude-3.7-Sonnet model achieves 23.83% F1-score for detecting vulnerable statements with correct reasoning. Finally, we analyze the LLM outputs and provide insights into their behavior in vulnerability detection for C/C++.