Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) can be misused to reveal sensitive information, such as weapon-making instructions or writing malware. LLM providers rely on monitoring to detect and flag unsafe behavior during inference. An open security challenge is adaptive adversaries who craft attacks that simultaneously (i) evade detection while (ii) eliciting unsafe behavior. Adaptive attackers are a major concern as LLM providers cannot patch their security mechanisms, since they are unaware of how their models are being misused. We cast robust LLM monitoring as a security game, where adversaries who know about the monitor try to extract sensitive information, while a provider must accurately detect these adversarial queries at low false positive rates. Our work (i) shows that existing LLM monitors are vulnerable to adaptive attackers and (ii) designs improved defenses through activation watermarking by carefully introducing uncertainty for the attacker during inference. We find that activation watermarking outperforms guard baselines by up to 52% under adaptive attackers who know the monitoring algorithm but not the secret key.

A myriad of different Large Language Models (LLMs) face a common challenge in contextually analyzing table question-answering tasks. These challenges are engendered from (1) finite context windows for large tables, (2) multi-faceted discrepancies amongst tokenization patterns against cell boundaries, and (3) various limitations stemming from data confidentiality in the process of using external models such as gpt-3.5-turbo. We propose a cooperative game dubbed "HiddenTables" as a potential resolution to this challenge. In essence, "HiddenTables" is played between the code-generating LLM "Solver" and the "Oracle" which evaluates the ability of the LLM agents to solve Table QA tasks. This game is based on natural language schemas and importantly, ensures the security of the underlying data. We provide evidential experiments on a diverse set of tables that demonstrate an LLM's collective inability to generalize and perform on complex queries, handle compositional dependencies, and align natural language to programmatic commands when concrete table schemas are provided. Unlike encoder-based models, we have pushed the boundaries of "HiddenTables" to not be limited by the number of rows - therefore we exhibit improved efficiency in prompt and completion tokens. Our infrastructure has spawned a new dataset "PyQTax" that spans across 116,671 question-table-answer triplets and provides additional fine-grained breakdowns & labels for varying question taxonomies. Therefore, in tandem with our academic contributions regarding LLMs' deficiency in TableQA tasks, "HiddenTables" is a tactile manifestation of how LLMs can interact with massive datasets while ensuring data security and minimizing generation costs.

Deploying machine learning models in production may allow adversaries to infer sensitive information about training data. There is a vast literature analyzing different types of inference risks, ranging from membership inference to reconstruction attacks. Inspired by the success of games (i.e., probabilistic experiments) to study security properties in cryptography, some authors describe privacy inference risks in machine learning using a similar game-based style. However, adversary capabilities and goals are often stated in subtly different ways from one presentation to the other, which makes it hard to relate and compose results. In this paper, we present a game-based framework to systematize the body of knowledge on privacy inference risks in machine learning. We use this framework to (1) provide a unifying structure for definitions of inference risks, (2) formally establish known relations among definitions, and (3) to uncover hitherto unknown relations that would have been difficult to spot otherwise.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning has recently shown great promise as an approach to networked system control. Arguably, one of the most difficult and important tasks for which large scale networked system control is applicable is common-pool resource management. Crucial common-pool resources include arable land, fresh water, wetlands, wildlife, fish stock, forests and the atmosphere, of which proper management is related to some of society's greatest challenges such as food security, inequality and climate change. Here we take inspiration from a recent research program investigating the game-theoretic incentives of humans in social dilemma situations such as the well-known tragedy of the commons. However, instead of focusing on biologically evolved human-like agents, our concern is rather to better understand the learning and operating behaviour of engineered networked systems comprising general-purpose reinforcement learning agents, subject only to nonbiological constraints such as memory, computation and communication bandwidth. Harnessing tools from empirical game-theoretic analysis, we analyse the differences in resulting solution concepts that stem from employing different information structures in the design of networked multi-agent systems. These information structures pertain to the type of information shared between agents as well as the employed communication protocol and network topology. Our analysis contributes new insights into the consequences associated with certain design choices and provides an additional dimension of comparison between systems beyond efficiency, robustness, scalability and mean control performance.

Are Capture-the-Flag competitions obsolete? In 2025, Cybersecurity AI (CAI) systematically conquered some of the world's most prestigious hacking competitions, achieving Rank #1 at multiple events and consistently outperforming thousands of human teams. Across five major circuits-HTB's AI vs Humans, Cyber Apocalypse (8,129 teams), Dragos OT CTF, UWSP Pointer Overflow, and the Neurogrid CTF showdown-CAI demonstrated that Jeopardy-style CTFs have become a solved game for well-engineered AI agents. At Neurogrid, CAI captured 41/45 flags to claim the 50,000 top prize; at Dragos OT, it sprinted 37% faster to 10K points than elite human teams; even when deliberately paused mid-competition, it maintained top-tier rankings. Critically, CAI achieved this dominance through our specialized alias1 model architecture, which delivers enterprise-scale AI security operations at unprecedented cost efficiency and with augmented autonomy-reducing 1B token inference costs from 5,940 to just $119, making continuous security agent operation financially viable for the first time. These results force an uncomfortable reckoning: if autonomous agents now dominate competitions designed to identify top security talent at negligible cost, what are CTFs actually measuring? This paper presents comprehensive evidence of AI capability across the 2025 CTF circuit and argues that the security community must urgently transition from Jeopardy-style contests to Attack & Defense formats that genuinely test adaptive reasoning and resilience-capabilities that remain uniquely human, for now.

Continuous authentication in high-stakes digital environments requires datasets with fine-grained behavioral signals under realistic cognitive and motor demands. But current benchmarks are often limited by small scale, unimodal sensing or lack of synchronised environmental context. To address this gap, this paper introduces BEACON ( Behavioral Engine for Authentication \& Continuous Monitoring), a large-scale multimodal dataset that captures diverse skill tiers in competitive Valorant gameplay. BEACON contains approximately 430 GB of synchronised modality data (461 GB total on-disk including auxiliary Valorant configuration captures) from 79 sessions across 28 distinct players, estimated at 102.51 hours of active gameplay, including high-frequency mouse dynamics, keystroke events, network packet captures, screen recordings, hardware metadata, and in-game configuration context. BEACON leverages the high precision motor skills and high cognitive load that are inherent to tactical shooters, making it a rigorous stress test for the robustness of behavioral biometrics. The dataset allows for the study of continuous authentication, behavioral profiling, user drift and multimodal representation learning in a high-fidelity esports setting. The authors release the dataset and code on Hugging Face and GitHub to create a reproducible benchmark for evaluating next-generation behavioral fingerprinting and security models

Generative language models are increasingly used for contract drafting and enhancement, creating a scenario where competing parties deploy different language models against each other. This introduces not only a game-theory challenge but also significant concerns related to AI safety and security, as the language model employed by the opposing party can be unknown. These competitive interactions can be seen as adversarial testing grounds, where models are effectively red-teamed to expose vulnerabilities such as generating biased, harmful or legally problematic text. Despite the importance of these challenges, the competitive robustness and safety of these models in adversarial settings remain poorly understood. In this small study, we approach this problem by evaluating the performance and vulnerabilities of major open-source language models in head-to-head competitions, simulating real-world contract negotiations. We further explore how these adversarial interactions can reveal potential risks, informing the development of more secure and reliable models. Our findings contribute to the growing body of research on AI safety, offering insights into model selection and optimisation in competitive legal contexts and providing actionable strategies for mitigating risks.

Evaluating the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) has traditionally relied on static benchmark datasets, human assessments, or model-based evaluations - methods that often suffer from overfitting, high costs, and biases. ZeroSumEval is a novel competition-based evaluation protocol that leverages zero-sum games to assess LLMs with dynamic benchmarks that resist saturation. ZeroSumEval encompasses a diverse suite of games, including security challenges (PyJail), classic games (Chess, Liar's Dice, Poker), knowledge tests (MathQuiz), and persuasion challenges (Gandalf, Debate). These games are designed to evaluate a range of AI capabilities such as strategic reasoning, planning, knowledge application, and creativity. Building upon recent studies that highlight the effectiveness of game-based evaluations for LLMs, ZeroSumEval enhances these approaches by providing a standardized and extensible framework. To demonstrate this, we conduct extensive experiments with >7000 simulations across 7 games and 13 models. Our results show that while frontier models from the GPT and Claude families can play common games and answer questions, they struggle to play games that require creating novel and challenging questions. We also observe that models cannot reliably jailbreak each other and fail generally at tasks requiring creativity. We release our code at https://github.com/facebookresearch/ZeroSumEval.

The rapid advancement in generative artificial intelligence have enabled the creation of 3D human faces (HFs) for applications including media production, virtual reality, security, healthcare, and game development, etc. However, assessing the quality and realism of these AI-generated 3D human faces remains a significant challenge due to the subjective nature of human perception and innate perceptual sensitivity to facial features. To this end, we conduct a comprehensive study on the quality assessment of AI-generated 3D human faces. We first introduce Gen3DHF, a large-scale benchmark comprising 2,000 videos of AI-Generated 3D Human Faces along with 4,000 Mean Opinion Scores (MOS) collected across two dimensions, i.e., quality and authenticity, 2,000 distortion-aware saliency maps and distortion descriptions. Based on Gen3DHF, we propose LMME3DHF, a Large Multimodal Model (LMM)-based metric for Evaluating 3DHF capable of quality and authenticity score prediction, distortion-aware visual question answering, and distortion-aware saliency prediction. Experimental results show that LMME3DHF achieves state-of-the-art performance, surpassing existing methods in both accurately predicting quality scores for AI-generated 3D human faces and effectively identifying distortion-aware salient regions and distortion types, while maintaining strong alignment with human perceptual judgments. Both the Gen3DHF database and the LMME3DHF will be released upon the publication.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

We explore the self-play training procedure of large language models (LLMs) in a two-player adversarial language game called Adversarial Taboo. In this game, an attacker and a defender communicate around a target word only visible to the attacker. The attacker aims to induce the defender to speak the target word unconsciously, while the defender tries to infer the target word from the attacker's utterances. To win the game, both players should have sufficient knowledge about the target word and high-level reasoning ability to infer and express in this information-reserved conversation. Hence, we are curious about whether LLMs' reasoning ability can be further enhanced by self-play in this adversarial language game (SPAG). With this goal, we select several open-source LLMs and let each act as the attacker and play with a copy of itself as the defender on an extensive range of target words. Through reinforcement learning on the game outcomes, we observe that the LLMs' performances uniformly improve on a broad range of reasoning benchmarks. Furthermore, iteratively adopting this self-play process can continuously promote LLMs' reasoning abilities. The code is at https://github.com/Linear95/SPAG.

In this paper, we consider how the development of targeted ransomware has affected the dynamics of ransomware negotiations to better understand how to respond to ransomware attacks. We construct a model of ransomware negotiations as an asymmetric non-cooperative two-player game. In particular, our model considers the investments that a malicious actor must make in order to conduct a successful targeted ransomware attack. We demonstrate how imperfect information is a crucial feature for replicating observed real-world behaviour. Furthermore, we present optimal strategies for both the malicious actor and the target, and demonstrate how imperfect information results in a non-trivial optimal strategy for the malicious actor.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

Conventional language model (LM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint procedure: attackers exploit a static model, followed by defensive fine-tuning to patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential approach creates a mismatch -- attackers overfit to obsolete defenses, while defenders perpetually lag behind emerging threats. To address this, we propose Self-RedTeam, an online self-play reinforcement learning algorithm where an attacker and defender agent co-evolve through continuous interaction. We cast safety alignment as a two-player zero-sum game, where a single model alternates between attacker and defender roles -- generating adversarial prompts and safeguarding against them -- while a reward LM adjudicates outcomes. This enables dynamic co-adaptation. Grounded in the game-theoretic framework of zero-sum games, we establish a theoretical safety guarantee which motivates the design of our method: if self-play converges to a Nash Equilibrium, the defender will reliably produce safe responses to any adversarial input. Empirically, Self-RedTeam uncovers more diverse attacks (+21.8% SBERT) compared to attackers trained against static defenders and achieves higher robustness on safety benchmarks (e.g., +65.5% on WildJailBreak) than defenders trained against static attackers. We further propose hidden Chain-of-Thought, allowing agents to plan privately, which boosts adversarial diversity and reduces over-refusals. Our results motivate a shift from reactive patching to proactive co-evolution in LM safety training, enabling scalable, autonomous, and robust self-improvement of LMs via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

We study the problem of adversarial language games, in which multiple agents with conflicting goals compete with each other via natural language interactions. While adversarial language games are ubiquitous in human activities, little attention has been devoted to this field in natural language processing. In this work, we propose a challenging adversarial language game called Adversarial Taboo as an example, in which an attacker and a defender compete around a target word. The attacker is tasked with inducing the defender to utter the target word invisible to the defender, while the defender is tasked with detecting the target word before being induced by the attacker. In Adversarial Taboo, a successful attacker must hide its intention and subtly induce the defender, while a competitive defender must be cautious with its utterances and infer the intention of the attacker. Such language abilities can facilitate many important downstream NLP tasks. To instantiate the game, we create a game environment and a competition platform. Comprehensive experiments and empirical studies on several baseline attack and defense strategies show promising and interesting results. Based on the analysis on the game and experiments, we discuss multiple promising directions for future research.

AI algorithms for imperfect-information games are typically compared using performance metrics on individual games, making it difficult to assess robustness across game choices. Card games are a natural domain for imperfect information due to hidden hands and stochastic draws. To facilitate comparative research on imperfect-information game-playing algorithms and game systems, we introduce Valet, a diverse and comprehensive testbed of 21 traditional imperfect-information card games. These games span multiple genres, cultures, player counts, deck structures, mechanics, winning conditions, and methods of hiding and revealing information. To standardize implementations across systems, we encode the rules of each game in RECYCLE, a card game description language. We empirically characterize each game's branching factor and duration using random simulations, reporting baseline score distributions for a Monte Carlo Tree Search player against random opponents to demonstrate the suitability of Valet as a benchmarking suite.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have gained widespread popularity across diverse domains involving text generation, summarization, and various natural language processing tasks. Despite their inherent limitations, LLM-based designs have shown promising capabilities in planning and navigating open-world scenarios. This paper introduces a novel application of pre-trained LLMs as agents within cybersecurity network environments, focusing on their utility for sequential decision-making processes. We present an approach wherein pre-trained LLMs are leveraged as attacking agents in two reinforcement learning environments. Our proposed agents demonstrate similar or better performance against state-of-the-art agents trained for thousands of episodes in most scenarios and configurations. In addition, the best LLM agents perform similarly to human testers of the environment without any additional training process. This design highlights the potential of LLMs to efficiently address complex decision-making tasks within cybersecurity. Furthermore, we introduce a new network security environment named NetSecGame. The environment is designed to eventually support complex multi-agent scenarios within the network security domain. The proposed environment mimics real network attacks and is designed to be highly modular and adaptable for various scenarios.

LLM-based software engineering agents are increasingly used in real-world development tasks, often with access to sensitive data or security-critical codebases. Such agents could intentionally sabotage these codebases if they were misaligned. We investigate asynchronous monitoring, in which a monitoring system reviews agent actions after the fact. Unlike synchronous monitoring, this approach does not impose runtime latency, while still attempting to disrupt attacks before irreversible harm occurs. We treat monitor development as an adversarial game between a blue team (who design monitors) and a red team (who create sabotaging agents). We attempt to set the game rules such that they upper bound the sabotage potential of an agent based on Claude 4.1 Opus. To ground this game in a realistic, high-stakes deployment scenario, we develop a suite of 5 diverse software engineering environments that simulate tasks that an agent might perform within an AI developer's internal infrastructure. Over the course of the game, we develop an ensemble monitor that achieves a 6% false negative rate at 1% false positive rate on a held out test environment. Then, we estimate risk of sabotage at deployment time by extrapolating from our monitor's false negative rate. We describe one simple model for this extrapolation, present a sensitivity analysis, and describe situations in which the model would be invalid. Code is available at: https://github.com/UKGovernmentBEIS/async-control.

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only a single type of attack, while recent work takes steps forward in defending against multiple attacks. In this paper, to understand multi-target robustness, we view this problem as a bargaining game in which different players (adversaries) negotiate to reach an agreement on a joint direction of parameter updating. We identify a phenomenon named player domination in the bargaining game, namely that the existing max-based approaches, such as MAX and MSD, do not converge. Based on our theoretical analysis, we design a novel framework that adjusts the budgets of different adversaries to avoid any player dominance. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that employing the proposed framework to the existing approaches significantly advances multi-target robustness.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

This paper introduces SC2LE (StarCraft II Learning Environment), a reinforcement learning environment based on the StarCraft II game. This domain poses a new grand challenge for reinforcement learning, representing a more difficult class of problems than considered in most prior work. It is a multi-agent problem with multiple players interacting; there is imperfect information due to a partially observed map; it has a large action space involving the selection and control of hundreds of units; it has a large state space that must be observed solely from raw input feature planes; and it has delayed credit assignment requiring long-term strategies over thousands of steps. We describe the observation, action, and reward specification for the StarCraft II domain and provide an open source Python-based interface for communicating with the game engine. In addition to the main game maps, we provide a suite of mini-games focusing on different elements of StarCraft II gameplay. For the main game maps, we also provide an accompanying dataset of game replay data from human expert players. We give initial baseline results for neural networks trained from this data to predict game outcomes and player actions. Finally, we present initial baseline results for canonical deep reinforcement learning agents applied to the StarCraft II domain. On the mini-games, these agents learn to achieve a level of play that is comparable to a novice player. However, when trained on the main game, these agents are unable to make significant progress. Thus, SC2LE offers a new and challenging environment for exploring deep reinforcement learning algorithms and architectures.

Unlike perfect information games, where all elements are known to every player, imperfect information games emulate the real-world complexities of decision-making under uncertain or incomplete information. GPT-4, the recent breakthrough in large language models (LLMs) trained on massive passive data, is notable for its knowledge retrieval and reasoning abilities. This paper delves into the applicability of GPT-4's learned knowledge for imperfect information games. To achieve this, we introduce Suspicion-Agent, an innovative agent that leverages GPT-4's capabilities for performing in imperfect information games. With proper prompt engineering to achieve different functions, Suspicion-Agent based on GPT-4 demonstrates remarkable adaptability across a range of imperfect information card games. Importantly, GPT-4 displays a strong high-order theory of mind (ToM) capacity, meaning it can understand others and intentionally impact others' behavior. Leveraging this, we design a planning strategy that enables GPT-4 to competently play against different opponents, adapting its gameplay style as needed, while requiring only the game rules and descriptions of observations as input. In the experiments, we qualitatively showcase the capabilities of Suspicion-Agent across three different imperfect information games and then quantitatively evaluate it in Leduc Hold'em. The results show that Suspicion-Agent can potentially outperform traditional algorithms designed for imperfect information games, without any specialized training or examples. In order to encourage and foster deeper insights within the community, we make our game-related data publicly available.

Task-oriented LLM-based agents are increasingly used in domains with strict policies, such as refund eligibility or cancellation rules. The challenge lies in ensuring that the agent consistently adheres to these rules and policies, appropriately refusing any request that would violate them, while still maintaining a helpful and natural interaction. This calls for the development of tailored design and evaluation methodologies to ensure agent resilience against malicious user behavior. We propose a novel threat model that focuses on adversarial users aiming to exploit policy-adherent agents for personal benefit. To address this, we present CRAFT, a multi-agent red-teaming system that leverages policy-aware persuasive strategies to undermine a policy-adherent agent in a customer-service scenario, outperforming conventional jailbreak methods such as DAN prompts, emotional manipulation, and coercive. Building upon the existing tau-bench benchmark, we introduce tau-break, a complementary benchmark designed to rigorously assess the agent's robustness against manipulative user behavior. Finally, we evaluate several straightforward yet effective defense strategies. While these measures provide some protection, they fall short, highlighting the need for stronger, research-driven safeguards to protect policy-adherent agents from adversarial attacks

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

This paper studies attack detection for discrete-time linear systems with stochastic process noise that produce both a vulnerable (i.e., attackable) linear measurement and a secured (i.e., unattackable) quadratic measurement. The motivating application of this model is a dynamic-game setting where the quadratic measurement is interpreted as a system-level utility or reward, and control inputs into the linear system are interpreted as control policies that, once applied, are known to all game participants and which steer the system towards a game-theoretic equilibrium (e.g., Nash equilibrium). To detect attacks on the linear channel, we develop a novel quadratic-utility-aware observer that leverages the secured quadratic output and enforces measurement consistency via a projection step. We establish three properties for this observer: feasibility of the true state, prox-regularity of the quadratic-constraint set, and a monotone error-reduction guarantee in the noise-free case. To detect adversarial manipulation, we compare linear and quadratic observer trajectories using a wild bootstrap maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) test that provides valid inference under temporal dependence. We validate our framework using numerical experiments of a pursuit-evasion game, where the quadratic observer preserves estimation accuracy under linear-sensor attacks, while the statistical test detects distributional divergence between the observers' trajectories.

The utilization of artificial intelligence (AI) in card games has been a well-explored subject within AI research for an extensive period. Recent advancements have propelled AI programs to showcase expertise in intricate card games such as Mahjong, DouDizhu, and Texas Hold'em. In this work, we aim to develop an AI program for an exceptionally complex and popular card game called GuanDan. This game involves four players engaging in both competitive and cooperative play throughout a long process to upgrade their level, posing great challenges for AI due to its expansive state and action space, long episode length, and complex rules. Employing reinforcement learning techniques, specifically Deep Monte Carlo (DMC), and a distributed training framework, we first put forward an AI program named DanZero for this game. Evaluation against baseline AI programs based on heuristic rules highlights the outstanding performance of our bot. Besides, in order to further enhance the AI's capabilities, we apply policy-based reinforcement learning algorithm to GuanDan. To address the challenges arising from the huge action space, which will significantly impact the performance of policy-based algorithms, we adopt the pre-trained model to facilitate the training process and the achieved AI program manages to achieve a superior performance.

Scams exploiting real-time social engineering -- such as phishing, impersonation, and phone fraud -- remain a persistent and evolving threat across digital platforms. Existing defenses are largely reactive, offering limited protection during active interactions. We propose a privacy-preserving, AI-in-the-loop framework that proactively detects and disrupts scam conversations in real time. The system combines instruction-tuned artificial intelligence with a safety-aware utility function that balances engagement with harm minimization, and employs federated learning to enable continual model updates without raw data sharing. Experimental evaluations show that the system produces fluent and engaging responses (perplexity as low as 22.3, engagement approx0.80), while human studies confirm significant gains in realism, safety, and effectiveness over strong baselines. In federated settings, models trained with FedAvg sustain up to 30 rounds while preserving high engagement (approx0.80), strong relevance (approx0.74), and low PII leakage (leq0.0085). Even with differential privacy, novelty and safety remain stable, indicating that robust privacy can be achieved without sacrificing performance. The evaluation of guard models (LlamaGuard, LlamaGuard2/3, MD-Judge) shows a straightforward pattern: stricter moderation settings reduce the chance of exposing personal information, but they also limit how much the model engages in conversation. In contrast, more relaxed settings allow longer and richer interactions, which improve scam detection, but at the cost of higher privacy risk. To our knowledge, this is the first framework to unify real-time scam-baiting, federated privacy preservation, and calibrated safety moderation into a proactive defense paradigm.

The widespread deployment of LLM-based agents is likely to introduce a critical privacy threat: malicious agents that proactively engage others in multi-turn interactions to extract sensitive information. These dynamic dialogues enable adaptive attack strategies that can cause severe privacy violations, yet their evolving nature makes it difficult to anticipate and discover sophisticated vulnerabilities manually. To tackle this problem, we present a search-based framework that alternates between improving attacker and defender instructions by simulating privacy-critical agent interactions. Each simulation involves three roles: data subject, data sender, and data recipient. While the data subject's behavior is fixed, the attacker (data recipient) attempts to extract sensitive information from the defender (data sender) through persistent and interactive exchanges. To explore this interaction space efficiently, our search algorithm employs LLMs as optimizers, using parallel search with multiple threads and cross-thread propagation to analyze simulation trajectories and iteratively propose new instructions. Through this process, we find that attack strategies escalate from simple direct requests to sophisticated multi-turn tactics such as impersonation and consent forgery, while defenses advance from rule-based constraints to identity-verification state machines. The discovered attacks and defenses transfer across diverse scenarios and backbone models, demonstrating strong practical utility for building privacy-aware agents.

Machine learning models can leak private information about their training data. The standard methods to measure this privacy risk, based on membership inference attacks (MIAs), only check if a given data point exactly matches a training point, neglecting the potential of similar or partially overlapping memorized data revealing the same private information. To address this issue, we introduce the class of range membership inference attacks (RaMIAs), testing if the model was trained on any data in a specified range (defined based on the semantics of privacy). We formulate the RaMIAs game and design a principled statistical test for its composite hypotheses. We show that RaMIAs can capture privacy loss more accurately and comprehensively than MIAs on various types of data, such as tabular, image, and language. RaMIA paves the way for more comprehensive and meaningful privacy auditing of machine learning algorithms.

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

Self-play (SP) is a popular multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework for solving competitive games, where each agent optimizes policy by treating others as part of the environment. Despite the empirical successes, the theoretical properties of SP-based methods are limited to two-player zero-sum games. However, for mixed cooperative-competitive games where agents on the same team need to cooperate with each other, we can show a simple counter-example where SP-based methods cannot converge to a global Nash equilibrium (NE) with high probability. Alternatively, Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is an iterative framework for learning NE, where the best responses w.r.t. previous policies are learned in each iteration. PSRO can be directly extended to mixed cooperative-competitive settings by jointly learning team best responses with all convergence properties unchanged. However, PSRO requires repeatedly training joint policies from scratch till convergence, which makes it hard to scale to complex games. In this work, we develop a novel algorithm, Fictitious Cross-Play (FXP), which inherits the benefits from both frameworks. FXP simultaneously trains an SP-based main policy and a counter population of best response policies. The main policy is trained by fictitious self-play and cross-play against the counter population, while the counter policies are trained as the best responses to the main policy's past versions. We validate our method in matrix games and show that FXP converges to global NEs while SP methods fail. We also conduct experiments in a gridworld domain, where FXP achieves higher Elo ratings and lower exploitabilities than baselines, and a more challenging football game, where FXP defeats SOTA models with over 94% win rate.

The automatic evaluation of LLM-based agent intelligence is critical in developing advanced LLM-based agents. Although considerable effort has been devoted to developing human-annotated evaluation datasets, such as AlpacaEval, existing techniques are costly, time-consuming, and lack adaptability. In this paper, inspired by the popular language game ``Who is Spy'', we propose to use the word guessing game to assess the intelligence performance of LLMs. Given a word, the LLM is asked to describe the word and determine its identity (spy or not) based on its and other players' descriptions. Ideally, an advanced agent should possess the ability to accurately describe a given word using an aggressive description while concurrently maximizing confusion in the conservative description, enhancing its participation in the game. To this end, we first develop DEEP to evaluate LLMs' expression and disguising abilities. DEEP requires LLM to describe a word in aggressive and conservative modes. We then introduce SpyGame, an interactive multi-agent framework designed to assess LLMs' intelligence through participation in a competitive language-based board game. Incorporating multi-agent interaction, SpyGame requires the target LLM to possess linguistic skills and strategic thinking, providing a more comprehensive evaluation of LLMs' human-like cognitive abilities and adaptability in complex communication situations. The proposed evaluation framework is very easy to implement. We collected words from multiple sources, domains, and languages and used the proposed evaluation framework to conduct experiments. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed DEEP and SpyGame effectively evaluate the capabilities of various LLMs, capturing their ability to adapt to novel situations and engage in strategic communication.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

An imperfect-information game is a type of game with asymmetric information. It is more common in life than perfect-information game. Artificial intelligence (AI) in imperfect-information games, such like poker, has made considerable progress and success in recent years. The great success of superhuman poker AI, such as Libratus and Deepstack, attracts researchers to pay attention to poker research. However, the lack of open-source code limits the development of Texas hold'em AI to some extent. This article introduces DecisionHoldem, a high-level AI for heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em with safe depth-limited subgame solving by considering possible ranges of opponent's private hands to reduce the exploitability of the strategy. Experimental results show that DecisionHoldem defeats the strongest openly available agent in heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em poker, namely Slumbot, and a high-level reproduction of Deepstack, viz, Openstack, by more than 730 mbb/h (one-thousandth big blind per round) and 700 mbb/h. Moreover, we release the source codes and tools of DecisionHoldem to promote AI development in imperfect-information games.

While real-world applications of reinforcement learning are becoming popular, the security and robustness of RL systems are worthy of more attention and exploration. In particular, recent works have revealed that, in a multi-agent RL environment, backdoor trigger actions can be injected into a victim agent (a.k.a. Trojan agent), which can result in a catastrophic failure as soon as it sees the backdoor trigger action. To ensure the security of RL agents against malicious backdoors, in this work, we propose the problem of Backdoor Detection in a multi-agent competitive reinforcement learning system, with the objective of detecting Trojan agents as well as the corresponding potential trigger actions, and further trying to mitigate their Trojan behavior. In order to solve this problem, we propose PolicyCleanse that is based on the property that the activated Trojan agents accumulated rewards degrade noticeably after several timesteps. Along with PolicyCleanse, we also design a machine unlearning-based approach that can effectively mitigate the detected backdoor. Extensive experiments demonstrate that the proposed methods can accurately detect Trojan agents, and outperform existing backdoor mitigation baseline approaches by at least 3% in winning rate across various types of agents and environments.

Most existing works focus on direct perturbations to the victim's state/action or the underlying transition dynamics to demonstrate the vulnerability of reinforcement learning agents to adversarial attacks. However, such direct manipulations may not be always realizable. In this paper, we consider a multi-agent setting where a well-trained victim agent nu is exploited by an attacker controlling another agent alpha with an adversarial policy. Previous models do not account for the possibility that the attacker may only have partial control over alpha or that the attack may produce easily detectable "abnormal" behaviors. Furthermore, there is a lack of provably efficient defenses against these adversarial policies. To address these limitations, we introduce a generalized attack framework that has the flexibility to model to what extent the adversary is able to control the agent, and allows the attacker to regulate the state distribution shift and produce stealthier adversarial policies. Moreover, we offer a provably efficient defense with polynomial convergence to the most robust victim policy through adversarial training with timescale separation. This stands in sharp contrast to supervised learning, where adversarial training typically provides only empirical defenses. Using the Robosumo competition experiments, we show that our generalized attack formulation results in much stealthier adversarial policies when maintaining the same winning rate as baselines. Additionally, our adversarial training approach yields stable learning dynamics and less exploitable victim policies.

As machine learning models grow in complexity and increasingly rely on publicly sourced data, such as the human-annotated labels used in training large language models, they become more vulnerable to label poisoning attacks. These attacks, in which adversaries subtly alter the labels within a training dataset, can severely degrade model performance, posing significant risks in critical applications. In this paper, we propose FLORAL, a novel adversarial training defense strategy based on support vector machines (SVMs) to counter these threats. Utilizing a bilevel optimization framework, we cast the training process as a non-zero-sum Stackelberg game between an attacker, who strategically poisons critical training labels, and the model, which seeks to recover from such attacks. Our approach accommodates various model architectures and employs a projected gradient descent algorithm with kernel SVMs for adversarial training. We provide a theoretical analysis of our algorithm's convergence properties and empirically evaluate FLORAL's effectiveness across diverse classification tasks. Compared to robust baselines and foundation models such as RoBERTa, FLORAL consistently achieves higher robust accuracy under increasing attacker budgets. These results underscore the potential of FLORAL to enhance the resilience of machine learning models against label poisoning threats, thereby ensuring robust classification in adversarial settings.

Collaborative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) has rapidly evolved, offering state-of-the-art algorithms for real-world applications, including sensitive domains. However, a key challenge to its widespread adoption is the lack of a thorough investigation into its vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. Existing work predominantly focuses on training-time attacks or unrealistic scenarios, such as access to policy weights or the ability to train surrogate policies. In this paper, we investigate new vulnerabilities under more realistic and constrained conditions, assuming an adversary can only collect and perturb the observations of deployed agents. We also consider scenarios where the adversary has no access at all. We propose simple yet highly effective algorithms for generating adversarial perturbations designed to misalign how victim agents perceive their environment. Our approach is empirically validated on three benchmarks and 22 environments, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse algorithms and environments. Furthermore, we show that our algorithm is sample-efficient, requiring only 1,000 samples compared to the millions needed by previous methods.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

Wordle is a single-player word-guessing game where the goal is to discover a secret word w that has been chosen from a dictionary D. In order to discover w, the player can make at most ell guesses, which must also be words from D, all words in D having the same length k. After each guess, the player is notified of the positions in which their guess matches the secret word, as well as letters in the guess that appear in the secret word in a different position. We study the game of Wordle from a complexity perspective, proving NP-hardness of its natural formalization: to decide given a dictionary D and an integer ell if the player can guarantee to discover the secret word within ell guesses. Moreover, we prove that hardness holds even over instances where words have length k = 5, and that even in this case it is NP-hard to approximate the minimum number of guesses required to guarantee discovering the secret word. We also present results regarding its parameterized complexity and offer some related open problems.

Implementing quantum game theory on real hardware is challenging due to noise, decoherence, and limited qubit connectivity, yet such demonstrations are essential to validate theoretical predictions. We present one of the first full experimental realizations of the Battle of the Sexes game under the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) framework on IBM Quantum's ibm sherbrooke superconducting processor. Four quantum strategies (I, H, R(pi/4), R(pi)) were evaluated across 31 entanglement values gamma in [0, pi] using 2048 shots per configuration, enabling a direct comparison between analytical predictions and hardware execution. To mitigate noise and variability, we introduce a Guided Circuit Mapping (GCM) method that dynamically selects qubit pairs and optimizes routing based on real-time topology and calibration data. The analytical model forecasts up to 108% payoff improvement over the classical equilibrium, and despite hardware-induced deviations, experimental results with GCM preserve the expected payoff trends within 3.5%-12% relative error. These findings show that quantum advantages in strategic coordination can persist under realistic NISQ conditions, providing a pathway toward practical applications of quantum game theory in multi-agent, economic, and distributed decision-making systems.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has increased the need for guardrail models to ensure responsible use, particularly in detecting unsafe and illegal content. While substantial safety data exist in English, multilingual guardrail modeling remains underexplored due to the scarcity of open-source safety data in other languages. To address this gap, we propose a novel two-player Reinforcement Learning (RL) framework, where a generator and a guardrail model co-evolve adversarially to produce high-quality synthetic data for multilingual guardrail training. We theoretically formalize this interaction as a two-player game, proving convergence to a Nash equilibrium. Empirical evaluations show that our model \ours outperforms state-of-the-art models, achieving nearly 10% improvement over LlamaGuard3 (8B) on English benchmarks while being 4.5x faster at inference with a significantly smaller model (0.5B). We achieve substantial advancements in multilingual safety tasks, particularly in addressing the imbalance for lower-resource languages in a collected real dataset. Ablation studies emphasize the critical role of synthetic data generation in bridging the imbalance in open-source data between English and other languages. These findings establish a scalable and efficient approach to synthetic data generation, paving the way for improved multilingual guardrail models to enhance LLM safety. Code, model, and data will be open-sourced at https://github.com/yihedeng9/DuoGuard.

For over a decade, cybersecurity has relied on human labor scarcity to limit attackers to high-value targets manually or generic automated attacks at scale. Building sophisticated exploits requires deep expertise and manual effort, leading defenders to assume adversaries cannot afford tailored attacks at scale. AI agents break this balance by automating vulnerability discovery and exploitation across thousands of targets, needing only small success rates to remain profitable. Current developers focus on preventing misuse through data filtering, safety alignment, and output guardrails. Such protections fail against adversaries who control open-weight models, bypass safety controls, or develop offensive capabilities independently. We argue that AI-agent-driven cyber attacks are inevitable, requiring a fundamental shift in defensive strategy. In this position paper, we identify why existing defenses cannot stop adaptive adversaries and demonstrate that defenders must develop offensive security intelligence. We propose three actions for building frontier offensive AI capabilities responsibly. First, construct comprehensive benchmarks covering the full attack lifecycle. Second, advance from workflow-based to trained agents for discovering in-wild vulnerabilities at scale. Third, implement governance restricting offensive agents to audited cyber ranges, staging release by capability tier, and distilling findings into safe defensive-only agents. We strongly recommend treating offensive AI capabilities as essential defensive infrastructure, as containing cybersecurity risks requires mastering them in controlled settings before adversaries do.

Recent advances in synthetic data generation (SDG) have been hailed as a solution to the difficult problem of sharing sensitive data while protecting privacy. SDG aims to learn statistical properties of real data in order to generate "artificial" data that are structurally and statistically similar to sensitive data. However, prior research suggests that inference attacks on synthetic data can undermine privacy, but only for specific outlier records. In this work, we introduce a new attribute inference attack against synthetic data. The attack is based on linear reconstruction methods for aggregate statistics, which target all records in the dataset, not only outliers. We evaluate our attack on state-of-the-art SDG algorithms, including Probabilistic Graphical Models, Generative Adversarial Networks, and recent differentially private SDG mechanisms. By defining a formal privacy game, we show that our attack can be highly accurate even on arbitrary records, and that this is the result of individual information leakage (as opposed to population-level inference). We then systematically evaluate the tradeoff between protecting privacy and preserving statistical utility. Our findings suggest that current SDG methods cannot consistently provide sufficient privacy protection against inference attacks while retaining reasonable utility. The best method evaluated, a differentially private SDG mechanism, can provide both protection against inference attacks and reasonable utility, but only in very specific settings. Lastly, we show that releasing a larger number of synthetic records can improve utility but at the cost of making attacks far more effective.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial ``jailbreak'' attacks designed to bypass safety guardrails. Current safety alignment methods depend heavily on static external red teaming, utilizing fixed defense prompts or pre-collected adversarial datasets. This leads to a rigid defense that overfits known patterns and fails to generalize to novel, sophisticated threats. To address this critical limitation, we propose empowering the model to be its own red teamer, capable of achieving autonomous and evolving adversarial attacks. Specifically, we introduce Safety Self- Play (SSP), a system that utilizes a single LLM to act concurrently as both the Attacker (generating jailbreaks) and the Defender (refusing harmful requests) within a unified Reinforcement Learning (RL) loop, dynamically evolving attack strategies to uncover vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening defense mechanisms. To ensure the Defender effectively addresses critical safety issues during the self-play, we introduce an advanced Reflective Experience Replay Mechanism, which uses an experience pool accumulated throughout the process. The mechanism employs a Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) sampling strategy to focus on failure cases with low rewards, helping the model learn from past hard mistakes while balancing exploration and exploitation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our SSP approach autonomously evolves robust defense capabilities, significantly outperforming baselines trained on static adversarial datasets and establishing a new benchmark for proactive safety alignment.

Evaluating the step-by-step reliability of large language model (LLM) reasoning, such as Chain-of-Thought, remains challenging due to the difficulty and cost of obtaining high-quality step-level supervision. In this paper, we introduce Self-Play Critic (SPC), a novel approach where a critic model evolves its ability to assess reasoning steps through adversarial self-play games, eliminating the need for manual step-level annotation. SPC involves fine-tuning two copies of a base model to play two roles, namely a "sneaky generator" that deliberately produces erroneous steps designed to be difficult to detect, and a "critic" that analyzes the correctness of reasoning steps. These two models engage in an adversarial game in which the generator aims to fool the critic, while the critic model seeks to identify the generator's errors. Using reinforcement learning based on the game outcomes, the models iteratively improve; the winner of each confrontation receives a positive reward and the loser receives a negative reward, driving continuous self-evolution. Experiments on three reasoning process benchmarks (ProcessBench, PRM800K, DeltaBench) demonstrate that our SPC progressively enhances its error detection capabilities (e.g., accuracy increases from 70.8% to 77.7% on ProcessBench) and surpasses strong baselines, including distilled R1 model. Furthermore, applying SPC to guide the test-time search of diverse LLMs significantly improves their mathematical reasoning performance on MATH500 and AIME2024, outperforming state-of-the-art process reward models.

The eternal vertex cover game is played between an attacker and a defender on an undirected graph G. The defender identifies k vertices to position guards on to begin with. The attacker, on their turn, attacks an edge e, and the defender must move a guard along e to defend the attack. The defender may move other guards as well, under the constraint that every guard moves at most once and to a neighboring vertex. The smallest number of guards required to defend attacks forever is called the eternal vertex cover number of G, denoted evc(G). For any graph G, evc(G) is at least the vertex cover number of G, denoted mvc(G). A graph is Spartan if evc(G) = mvc(G). It is known that a bipartite graph is Spartan if and only if every edge belongs to a perfect matching. We show that the only König graphs that are Spartan are the bipartite Spartan graphs. We also give new lower bounds for evc(G), generalizing a known lower bound based on cut vertices. We finally show a new matching-based characterization of all Spartan graphs.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Gemini is increasingly used to perform tasks on behalf of users, where function-calling and tool-use capabilities enable the model to access user data. Some tools, however, require access to untrusted data introducing risk. Adversaries can embed malicious instructions in untrusted data which cause the model to deviate from the user's expectations and mishandle their data or permissions. In this report, we set out Google DeepMind's approach to evaluating the adversarial robustness of Gemini models and describe the main lessons learned from the process. We test how Gemini performs against a sophisticated adversary through an adversarial evaluation framework, which deploys a suite of adaptive attack techniques to run continuously against past, current, and future versions of Gemini. We describe how these ongoing evaluations directly help make Gemini more resilient against manipulation.

We provide the first formal definition of reward hacking, a phenomenon where optimizing an imperfect proxy reward function leads to poor performance according to the true reward function. We say that a proxy is unhackable if increasing the expected proxy return can never decrease the expected true return. Intuitively, it might be possible to create an unhackable proxy by leaving some terms out of the reward function (making it "narrower") or overlooking fine-grained distinctions between roughly equivalent outcomes, but we show this is usually not the case. A key insight is that the linearity of reward (in state-action visit counts) makes unhackability a very strong condition. In particular, for the set of all stochastic policies, two reward functions can only be unhackable if one of them is constant. We thus turn our attention to deterministic policies and finite sets of stochastic policies, where non-trivial unhackable pairs always exist, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of simplifications, an important special case of unhackability. Our results reveal a tension between using reward functions to specify narrow tasks and aligning AI systems with human values.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

Advances in intelligent game playing agents have led to successes in perfect information games like Go and imperfect information games like Poker. The Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (ISMCTS) family of algorithms outperforms previous algorithms using Monte Carlo methods in imperfect information games. In this paper, Single Observer Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (SO-ISMCTS) is applied to Secret Hitler, a popular social deduction board game that combines traditional hidden role mechanics with the randomness of a card deck. This combination leads to a more complex information model than the hidden role and card deck mechanics alone. It is shown in 10108 simulated games that SO-ISMCTS plays as well as simpler rule based agents, and demonstrates the potential of ISMCTS algorithms in complicated information set domains.

The process of revising (or constructing) a policy at execution time -- known as decision-time planning -- has been key to achieving superhuman performance in perfect-information games like chess and Go. A recent line of work has extended decision-time planning to imperfect-information games, leading to superhuman performance in poker. However, these methods involve solving subgames whose sizes grow quickly in the amount of non-public information, making them unhelpful when the amount of non-public information is large. Motivated by this issue, we introduce an alternative framework for decision-time planning that is not based on solving subgames, but rather on update equivalence. In this update-equivalence framework, decision-time planning algorithms replicate the updates of last-iterate algorithms, which need not rely on public information. This facilitates scalability to games with large amounts of non-public information. Using this framework, we derive a provably sound search algorithm for fully cooperative games based on mirror descent and a search algorithm for adversarial games based on magnetic mirror descent. We validate the performance of these algorithms in cooperative and adversarial domains, notably in Hanabi, the standard benchmark for search in fully cooperative imperfect-information games. Here, our mirror descent approach exceeds or matches the performance of public information-based search while using two orders of magnitude less search time. This is the first instance of a non-public-information-based algorithm outperforming public-information-based approaches in a domain they have historically dominated.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

Conventional federated learning frameworks suffer from several challenges including performance bottlenecks at the central aggregation server, data bias, poor model convergence, and exposure to model poisoning attacks, and limited trust in the centralized infrastructure. In the current paper, a novel game theory-based approach called pFedGame is proposed for decentralized federated learning, best suitable for temporally dynamic networks. The proposed algorithm works without any centralized server for aggregation and incorporates the problem of vanishing gradients and poor convergence over temporally dynamic topology among federated learning participants. The solution comprises two sequential steps in every federated learning round, for every participant. First, it selects suitable peers for collaboration in federated learning. Secondly, it executes a two-player constant sum cooperative game to reach convergence by applying an optimal federated learning aggregation strategy. Experiments performed to assess the performance of pFedGame in comparison to existing methods in decentralized federated learning have shown promising results with accuracy higher than 70% for heterogeneous data.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

We study the problem of learning a Nash equilibrium (NE) in an imperfect information game (IIG) through self-play. Precisely, we focus on two-player, zero-sum, episodic, tabular IIG under the perfect-recall assumption where the only feedback is realizations of the game (bandit feedback). In particular, the dynamic of the IIG is not known -- we can only access it by sampling or interacting with a game simulator. For this learning setting, we provide the Implicit Exploration Online Mirror Descent (IXOMD) algorithm. It is a model-free algorithm with a high-probability bound on the convergence rate to the NE of order 1/T where T is the number of played games. Moreover, IXOMD is computationally efficient as it needs to perform the updates only along the sampled trajectory.

Recent advances in Competitive Self-Play (CSP) have achieved, or even surpassed, human level performance in complex game environments such as Dota 2 and StarCraft II using Distributed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). One core component of these methods relies on creating a pool of learning agents -- consisting of the Main Agent, past versions of this agent, and Exploiter Agents -- where Exploiter Agents learn counter-strategies to the Main Agents. A key drawback of these approaches is the large computational cost and physical time that is required to train the system, making them impractical to deploy in highly iterative real-life settings such as video game productions. In this paper, we propose the Minimax Exploiter, a game theoretic approach to exploiting Main Agents that leverages knowledge of its opponents, leading to significant increases in data efficiency. We validate our approach in a diversity of settings, including simple turn based games, the arcade learning environment, and For Honor, a modern video game. The Minimax Exploiter consistently outperforms strong baselines, demonstrating improved stability and data efficiency, leading to a robust CSP-MARL method that is both flexible and easy to deploy.

Adversarial attacks in reinforcement learning (RL) often assume highly-privileged access to the victim's parameters, environment, or data. Instead, this paper proposes a novel adversarial setting called a Cheap Talk MDP in which an Adversary can merely append deterministic messages to the Victim's observation, resulting in a minimal range of influence. The Adversary cannot occlude ground truth, influence underlying environment dynamics or reward signals, introduce non-stationarity, add stochasticity, see the Victim's actions, or access their parameters. Additionally, we present a simple meta-learning algorithm called Adversarial Cheap Talk (ACT) to train Adversaries in this setting. We demonstrate that an Adversary trained with ACT still significantly influences the Victim's training and testing performance, despite the highly constrained setting. Affecting train-time performance reveals a new attack vector and provides insight into the success and failure modes of existing RL algorithms. More specifically, we show that an ACT Adversary is capable of harming performance by interfering with the learner's function approximation, or instead helping the Victim's performance by outputting useful features. Finally, we show that an ACT Adversary can manipulate messages during train-time to directly and arbitrarily control the Victim at test-time. Project video and code are available at https://sites.google.com/view/adversarial-cheap-talk

In this paper, we describe adaptation of a simple word guessing game that occupied the hearts and minds of people around the world. There are versions for all three Baltic countries and even several versions of each. We specifically pay attention to the Latvian version and look into how people form their guesses given any already uncovered hints. The paper analyses guess patterns, easy and difficult word characteristics, and player behaviour and response.

Despite the improved accuracy of deep neural networks, the discovery of adversarial examples has raised serious safety concerns. Most existing approaches for crafting adversarial examples necessitate some knowledge (architecture, parameters, etc.) of the network at hand. In this paper, we focus on image classifiers and propose a feature-guided black-box approach to test the safety of deep neural networks that requires no such knowledge. Our algorithm employs object detection techniques such as SIFT (Scale Invariant Feature Transform) to extract features from an image. These features are converted into a mutable saliency distribution, where high probability is assigned to pixels that affect the composition of the image with respect to the human visual system. We formulate the crafting of adversarial examples as a two-player turn-based stochastic game, where the first player's objective is to minimise the distance to an adversarial example by manipulating the features, and the second player can be cooperative, adversarial, or random. We show that, theoretically, the two-player game can con- verge to the optimal strategy, and that the optimal strategy represents a globally minimal adversarial image. For Lipschitz networks, we also identify conditions that provide safety guarantees that no adversarial examples exist. Using Monte Carlo tree search we gradually explore the game state space to search for adversarial examples. Our experiments show that, despite the black-box setting, manipulations guided by a perception-based saliency distribution are competitive with state-of-the-art methods that rely on white-box saliency matrices or sophisticated optimization procedures. Finally, we show how our method can be used to evaluate robustness of neural networks in safety-critical applications such as traffic sign recognition in self-driving cars.

Wordle is an online word puzzle game that gained viral popularity in January 2022. The goal is to guess a hidden five letter word. After each guess, the player gains information about whether the letters they guessed are present in the word, and whether they are in the correct position. Numerous blogs have suggested guessing strategies and starting word lists that improve the chance of winning. Optimized algorithms can win 100% of games within five of the six allowed trials. However, it is infeasible for human players to use these algorithms due to an inability to perfectly recall all known 5-letter words and perform complex calculations that optimize information gain. Here, we present two different methods for choosing starting words along with a framework for discovering the optimal human strategy based on reinforcement learning. Human Wordle players can use the rules we discover to optimize their chance of winning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) for code generation (i.e., Code LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in AI-assisted software development and testing. However, recent studies have shown that these models are prone to generating vulnerable or even malicious code under adversarial settings. Existing red-teaming approaches rely on extensive human effort, limiting their scalability and practicality, and generally overlook the interactive nature of real-world AI-assisted programming, which often unfolds over multiple turns. To bridge these gaps, we present RedCoder, a red-teaming agent that engages victim models in multi-turn conversation to elicit vulnerable code. The pipeline to construct RedCoder begins with a multi-agent gaming process that simulates adversarial interactions, yielding a set of prototype conversations and an arsenal of reusable attack strategies. We then fine-tune an LLM on these prototype conversations to serve as the backbone of RedCoder. Once deployed, RedCoder autonomously engages Code LLMs in multi-turn conversations, dynamically retrieving relevant strategies from the arsenal to steer the dialogue toward vulnerability-inducing outputs. Experiments across multiple Code LLMs show that our approach outperforms prior single-turn and multi-turn red-team methods in inducing vulnerabilities in code generation, offering a scalable and effective tool for evaluating the security boundaries of modern code-generation systems.

LLMs-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent environments where strategic interaction and coordination are required. While existing work has largely focused on individual agents or on interacting agents sharing explicit communication, less is known about how interacting agents coordinate implicitly. In particular, agents may engage in covert communication, relying on indirect or non-linguistic signals embedded in their actions rather than on explicit messages. This paper presents a game-theoretic study of covert communication in LLM-driven multi-agent systems. We analyse interactions across four canonical game-theoretic settings under different communication regimes, including explicit, restricted, and absent communication. Considering heterogeneous agent personalities and both one-shot and repeated games, we characterise when covert signals emerge and how they shape coordination and strategic outcomes.