Daily Papers

How do security scanners perform on real-world code? We present RealVuln, the first open-source benchmark comparing Rule-Based SAST, General-Purpose LLMs, and Security-Specialized scanners on 26 intentionally vulnerable Python repositories (educational and Capture-The-Flag applications) with 796 hand-labeled entries (676 vulnerabilities, 120 false-positive traps). We test 15 scanners (3 Rule-Based SAST, 10 General-Purpose LLM, 2 Security-Specialized) and rank them by F3 score (beta=3, weighting recall 9x over precision). A clear three-tier ranking emerges under all metrics. Under F3, the Security-Specialized scanner Kolega.Dev (73.0) leads, followed by the best General-Purpose LLM, Claude Sonnet 4.6 (51.7), which in turn scores nearly 3x higher than the best Rule-Based tool, Semgrep (17.7). Under F1, Sonnet 4.6 leads (60.9) with Kolega.Dev at 52.4. Rankings within tiers shift with beta, but the three-tier hierarchy holds across all weightings. All code, ground-truth data, scanner outputs, and scoring scripts are released under an open-source license. An interactive dashboard is at https://realvuln.kolega.dev/. RealVuln is a living benchmark: versioned, community-driven, with a roadmap toward multi-language coverage.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly established itself as a standard interface for enabling LLM-based agents to interact with external tools and services. As MCP servers are increasingly entrusted with security-sensitive operations, understanding their real-world risks has become critical. In practice, due to the absence of large-scale runtime MCP servers, such understanding largely relies on security scanners applied to a small number of cases, yet the reliability of these assessments remains unclear. In this study, we revisit how MCP security is measured. We present MCPZoo, the largest collection of MCP servers for dynamic analysis to date. MCPZoo is constructed through a multi-agent framework for transforming in-the-wild static repositories into dynamic services. The framework emulates how human experts build, diagnose, and iteratively repair deployment and runtime defects by combining environment inference with feedback-driven refinement. To ensure practical interactivity at runtime, the servers are validated via real protocol interactions. As a result, MCPZoo contains 64,611 unique MCP servers (113,927 in total), with more than 37,288 supporting dynamic analysis. Leveraging MCPZoo, we conduct the first ecosystem-scale measurement of MCP servers and the scanners that analyze them. While existing scanners report that 96.89% of servers are risky, we find that these signals are unreliable. In particular, manual validation shows that less than 50% of sampled alerts are true positives, and scanner outputs exhibit clear inconsistency across scanners. Overall, MCPZoo enables large-scale, reproducible measurement of MCP server security and exposes limitations of current scanning practices. We further release a public query interface to support practical risk assessment of MCP servers.

In this article, we introduce a novel algorithm for efficient near-field synthetic aperture radar (SAR) imaging for irregular scanning geometries. With the emergence of fifth-generation (5G) millimeter-wave (mmWave) devices, near-field SAR imaging is no longer confined to laboratory environments. Recent advances in positioning technology have attracted significant interest for a diverse set of new applications in mmWave imaging. However, many use cases, such as automotive-mounted SAR imaging, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) imaging, and freehand imaging with smartphones, are constrained to irregular scanning geometries. Whereas traditional near-field SAR imaging systems and quick personnel security (QPS) scanners employ highly precise motion controllers to create ideal synthetic arrays, emerging applications, mentioned previously, inherently cannot achieve such ideal positioning. In addition, many Internet of Things (IoT) and 5G applications impose strict size and computational complexity limitations that must be considered for edge mmWave imaging technology. In this study, we propose a novel algorithm to leverage the advantages of non-cooperative SAR scanning patterns, small form-factor multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) radars, and efficient monostatic planar image reconstruction algorithms. We propose a framework to mathematically decompose arbitrary and irregular sampling geometries and a joint solution to mitigate multistatic array imaging artifacts. The proposed algorithm is validated through simulations and an empirical study of arbitrary scanning scenarios. Our algorithm achieves high-resolution and high-efficiency near-field MIMO-SAR imaging, and is an elegant solution to computationally constrained irregularly sampled imaging problems.

Agent skills extend AI agents with reusable instructions, tools, scripts, references, and workflows, establishing a security boundary distinct from both model safety and traditional package-malware detection. ClawHub Security Signals is a sanitized dataset of 67,453 latest public OpenClaw skill versions. Each row pairs redacted SKILL.md content and sanitized bundled files where present with a final ClawScan registry verdict and evidence from three scanner families: VirusTotal, static heuristic analysis, and NVIDIA SkillSpector. Rather than estimating malicious-skill prevalence, we study scanner disagreement. The three scanners rarely flag the same skills: any pair overlaps on at most 10.4% of their combined positives, only 0.69% of skills are flagged by all three, and 81.9% of flagged skills are identified by a single scanner. The disagreement is structured by attack surface. SkillSpector, which raises semantic agentic-risk advisories rather than malware-reputation signals, is positive for 19,209 of 25,504 suspicious rows (75.3%) but only 14 of 206 malicious rows (6.8%). The malicious-verdict region shows the inverse profile: 150 of 206 malicious rows (72.8%) are VirusTotal-positive, consistent with bundled-code malware evidence. These results show that agent-skill security requires layered governance, not single-scanner allow/block decisions. The corpus is released as a sanitized silver-standard dataset: labels are the registry's automated verdicts, not human-annotated ground truth, and the release represents an early, versioned snapshot intended to support the community while a human-annotated subset is developed. Further research is encouraged, including models tailored for skill-security triage.

Model hosting hubs (e.g., Hugging Face) are vulnerable to supply chain attacks that enable remote code execution on trusted user environments. Attackers often distribute malicious Pre-trained ML models (PTMs) via model hubs. In this paper, we present novel attacks against PTMs and model hubs called SHADOWPICKLE. SHADOWPICKLE includes three (3) stealthy pickle deserialization attacks that enable malicious behaviors and evade state-of-the-art (SOTA) model scanners. These attacks leverage the external module import mechanism of the Pickle Virtual Machine (VM) to execute malicious payloads during deserialization. Additionally, we provide PICKLEBENCH, a dynamic and extensible benchmark for automatically injecting SHADOWPICKLE into arbitrary benign PTM models. Our evaluation shows that SHADOWPICKLE evades ten SOTA scanners, and four model hubs. SHADOWPICKLE (Overwritten) has a 63% evasion rate across scanners, and up to 50% higher evasion rates than existing attacks. Besides, PICKLEBENCH is up to 25.6% more challenging than three SOTA benchmarks. Finally, we provide security recommendations for mitigating our attacks and improving the effectiveness of existing scanners. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing PTM scanners and suggest directions for improvements.

Prompt engineering reduces reasoning mistakes in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, its effectiveness in mitigating vulnerabilities in LLM-generated code remains underexplored. To address this gap, we implemented a benchmark to automatically assess the impact of various prompt engineering strategies on code security. Our benchmark leverages two peer-reviewed prompt datasets and employs static scanners to evaluate code security at scale. We tested multiple prompt engineering techniques on GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4o, and GPT-4o-mini. Our results show that for GPT-4o and GPT-4o-mini, a security-focused prompt prefix can reduce the occurrence of security vulnerabilities by up to 56%. Additionally, all tested models demonstrated the ability to detect and repair between 41.9% and 68.7% of vulnerabilities in previously generated code when using iterative prompting techniques. Finally, we introduce a "prompt agent" that demonstrates how the most effective techniques can be applied in real-world development workflows.

Large language models (LLMs) have evolved from simple chatbots into autonomous agents capable of performing complex tasks such as editing production code, orchestrating workflows, and taking higher-stakes actions based on untrusted inputs like webpages and emails. These capabilities introduce new security risks that existing security measures, such as model fine-tuning or chatbot-focused guardrails, do not fully address. Given the higher stakes and the absence of deterministic solutions to mitigate these risks, there is a critical need for a real-time guardrail monitor to serve as a final layer of defense, and support system level, use case specific safety policy definition and enforcement. We introduce LlamaFirewall, an open-source security focused guardrail framework designed to serve as a final layer of defense against security risks associated with AI Agents. Our framework mitigates risks such as prompt injection, agent misalignment, and insecure code risks through three powerful guardrails: PromptGuard 2, a universal jailbreak detector that demonstrates clear state of the art performance; Agent Alignment Checks, a chain-of-thought auditor that inspects agent reasoning for prompt injection and goal misalignment, which, while still experimental, shows stronger efficacy at preventing indirect injections in general scenarios than previously proposed approaches; and CodeShield, an online static analysis engine that is both fast and extensible, aimed at preventing the generation of insecure or dangerous code by coding agents. Additionally, we include easy-to-use customizable scanners that make it possible for any developer who can write a regular expression or an LLM prompt to quickly update an agent's security guardrails.

This paper presents a novel method of executable steganography using the alpha transparency layer of ICO image files to embed and deliver self-decompressing JavaScript payloads within web browsers. By targeting the least significant bit (LSB) of non-transparent alpha layer image values, the proposed method successfully conceals compressed JavaScript code inside a favicon image without affecting visual fidelity. Global web traffic loads 294 billion favicons daily and consume 0.9 petabytes of network bandwidth. A proof-of-concept implementation demonstrates that a 64x64 ICO image can embed up to 512 bytes uncompressed, or 0.8 kilobyte when using lightweight two-fold compression. On page load, a browser fetches the favicon as part of standard behavior, allowing an embedded loader script to extract and execute the payload entirely in memory using native JavaScript APIs and canvas pixel access. This creates a two-stage covert channel requiring no additional network or user requests. Testing across multiple browsers in both desktop and mobile environments confirms successful and silent execution of the embedded script. We evaluate the threat model, relate it to polymorphic phishing attacks that evade favicon-based detection, and analyze evasion of content security policies and antivirus scanners. We map nine example MITRE ATT&CK Framework objectives to single line JavaScript to execute arbitrarily in ICO files. Existing steganalysis and sanitization defenses are discussed, highlighting limitations in detecting or neutralizing alpha-channel exploits. The results demonstrate a stealthy and reusable attack surface that blurs traditional boundaries between static images and executable content. Because modern browsers report silent errors when developers specifically fail to load ICO files, this attack surface offers an interesting example of required web behaviors that in turn compromise security.

Detecting whether a model has been poisoned is a longstanding problem in AI security. In this work, we present a practical scanner for identifying sleeper agent-style backdoors in causal language models. Our approach relies on two key findings: first, sleeper agents tend to memorize poisoning data, making it possible to leak backdoor examples using memory extraction techniques. Second, poisoned LLMs exhibit distinctive patterns in their output distributions and attention heads when backdoor triggers are present in the input. Guided by these observations, we develop a scalable backdoor scanning methodology that assumes no prior knowledge of the trigger or target behavior and requires only inference operations. Our scanner integrates naturally into broader defensive strategies and does not alter model performance. We show that our method recovers working triggers across multiple backdoor scenarios and a broad range of models and fine-tuning methods.

It is well known that anti-malware scanners depend on malware signatures to identify malware. However, even minor modifications to malware code structure results in a change in the malware signature thus enabling the variant to evade detection by scanners. Therefore, there exists the need for a proactively generated malware variant dataset to aid detection of such diverse variants by automated antivirus scanners. This paper proposes and demonstrates a generic assembly source code based framework that facilitates any evolutionary algorithm to generate diverse and potential variants of an input malware, while retaining its maliciousness, yet capable of evading antivirus scanners. Generic code transformation functions and a novelty search supported quality metric have been proposed as components of the framework to be used respectively as variation operators and fitness function, for evolutionary algorithms. The results demonstrate the effectiveness of the framework in generating diverse variants and the generated variants have been shown to evade over 98% of popular antivirus scanners. The malware variants evolved by the framework can serve as antigens to assist malware analysis engines to improve their malware detection algorithms.

We introduce ScanBot, a novel dataset designed for instruction-conditioned, high-precision surface scanning in robotic systems. In contrast to existing robot learning datasets that focus on coarse tasks such as grasping, navigation, or dialogue, ScanBot targets the high-precision demands of industrial laser scanning, where sub-millimeter path continuity and parameter stability are critical. The dataset covers laser scanning trajectories executed by a robot across 12 diverse objects and 6 task types, including full-surface scans, geometry-focused regions, spatially referenced parts, functionally relevant structures, defect inspection, and comparative analysis. Each scan is guided by natural language instructions and paired with synchronized RGB, depth, and laser profiles, as well as robot pose and joint states. Despite recent progress, existing vision-language action (VLA) models still fail to generate stable scanning trajectories under fine-grained instructions and real-world precision demands. To investigate this limitation, we benchmark a range of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) across the full perception-planning-execution loop, revealing persistent challenges in instruction-following under realistic constraints.

Pickle deserialization vulnerabilities have persisted throughout Python's history, remaining widely recognized yet unresolved. Due to its ability to transparently save and restore complex objects into byte streams, many AI/ML frameworks continue to adopt pickle as the model serialization protocol despite its inherent risks. As the open-source model ecosystem grows, model-sharing platforms such as Hugging Face have attracted massive participation, significantly amplifying the real-world risks of pickle exploitation and opening new avenues for model supply chain poisoning. Although several state-of-the-art scanners have been developed to detect poisoned models, their incomplete understanding of the poisoning surface leaves the detection logic fragile and allows attackers to bypass them. In this work, we present the first systematic disclosure of the pickle-based model poisoning surface from both model loading and risky function perspectives. Our research demonstrates how pickle-based model poisoning can remain stealthy and highlights critical gaps in current scanning solutions. On the model loading surface, we identify 22 distinct pickle-based model loading paths across five foundational AI/ML frameworks, 19 of which are entirely missed by existing scanners. We further develop a bypass technique named Exception-Oriented Programming (EOP) and discover 9 EOP instances, 7 of which can bypass all scanners. On the risky function surface, we discover 133 exploitable gadgets, achieving almost a 100% bypass rate. Even against the best-performing scanner, these gadgets maintain an 89% bypass rate. By systematically revealing the pickle-based model poisoning surface, we achieve practical and robust bypasses against real-world scanners. We responsibly disclose our findings to corresponding vendors, receiving acknowledgments and a $6000 bug bounty.

Automatic security inspection using computer vision technology is a challenging task in real-world scenarios due to various factors, including intra-class variance, class imbalance, and occlusion. Most of the previous methods rarely solve the cases that the prohibited items are deliberately hidden in messy objects due to the lack of large-scale datasets, restricted their applications in real-world scenarios. Towards real-world prohibited item detection, we collect a large-scale dataset, named as PIDray, which covers various cases in real-world scenarios for prohibited item detection, especially for deliberately hidden items. With an intensive amount of effort, our dataset contains 12 categories of prohibited items in 47,677 X-ray images with high-quality annotated segmentation masks and bounding boxes. To the best of our knowledge, it is the largest prohibited items detection dataset to date. Meanwhile, we design the selective dense attention network (SDANet) to construct a strong baseline, which consists of the dense attention module and the dependency refinement module. The dense attention module formed by the spatial and channel-wise dense attentions, is designed to learn the discriminative features to boost the performance. The dependency refinement module is used to exploit the dependencies of multi-scale features. Extensive experiments conducted on the collected PIDray dataset demonstrate that the proposed method performs favorably against the state-of-the-art methods, especially for detecting the deliberately hidden items.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is indispensable for enhancing large language models. However, RAGs are increasingly susceptible to poisoning attacks, in which adversarial documents are injected to manipulate generator outputs. Previous methods rely on output-side signals such as perplexity and consistency checks to detect such attacks. Nevertheless, our analysis reveals that deliberate attacks often induce false confidence, where poisoned outputs exhibit even lower perplexity than benign ones, rendering uncertainty-based detection ineffective. To address this challenge, we explore the internal dynamics of the generator and identify a distinctive signature termed Attention Collapse. Unlike the dispersed attention in benign generations, attacked generations exhibit a decrease in entropy as attention concentrates on poisoned documents. Building on these findings, we propose D-SCAN (Document-level Signal Collapse Analysis), a lightweight detection framework that monitors attention dynamics to identify attacked generations. Extensive experiments on multiple attack benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. Moreover, D-SCAN can detect attacks even when they fail to alter the final answer. Code is available at https://github.com/yingtaoren/D-Scan.git.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

We study a five-agent CI/CD pipeline (triage -> developer -> security-scan -> review -> approve/deploy), built from five distinct production LLMs across three providers, behind an LLM firewall in shadow mode. A single untrusted input - an external issue requesting a "usage-telemetry" feature - asks for code that exfiltrates process secrets (dict(os.environ)) to an attacker URL, laundered as observability. Across a pre-registered A x B (x C) factorial (N=20; naive arm N=60) we find: (1) the entry agent does not leak its system prompt (0/40); (2) an authority-framed injection ("pre-approved under SEC-2291, do not re-review") makes downstream verifiers see the secret-exfil line, cite the pre-approval, and ship it - the scanner passes ~80% of laundered pull requests, and the worst-case cell reaches 55% compromise; (3) the perceived presence of other verifiers yields only a small, non-significant reduction in individual scrutiny (a weak bystander analogue), even at N=60; and (4) content-based controls - code scanners and pattern detectors alike - miss the laundered intent entirely (the code is syntactically clean); only an LLM reasoning about intent is a partial defence. The failure is systemic: neither prompt secrecy nor distributed verification protects; a provenance-aware control at the entry, independent of both, would have. All data is 100% synthetic; the sink is mocked and the exfil URL is never contacted.

Tool-augmented LLM agents raise new security risks: tool executions can introduce runtime-only behaviors, including prompt injection and unintended exposure of external inputs (e.g., environment secrets or local files). While existing scanners often focus on static artifacts, analyzing runtime behavior is challenging because directly executing untrusted tools can itself be dangerous. We present MCP-SandboxScan, a lightweight framework motivated by the Model Context Protocol (MCP) that safely executes untrusted tools inside a WebAssembly/WASI sandbox and produces auditable reports of external-to-sink exposures. Our prototype (i) extracts LLM-relevant sinks from runtime outputs (prompt/messages and structured tool-return fields), (ii) instantiates external-input candidates from environment values, mounted file contents, and output-surfaced HTTP fetch intents, and (iii) links sources to sinks via snippet-based substring matching. Case studies on three representative tools show that MCP-SandboxScan can surface provenance evidence when external inputs appear in prompt/messages or tool-return payloads, and can expose filesystem capability violations as runtime evidence. We further compare against a lightweight static string-signature baseline and use a micro-benchmark to characterize false negatives under transformations and false positives from short-token collisions.

Automatic detection of prohibited objects within passenger baggage is important for aviation security. X-ray Computed Tomography (CT) based 3D imaging is widely used in airports for aviation security screening whilst prior work on automatic prohibited item detection focus primarily on 2D X-ray imagery. These works have proven the possibility of extending deep convolutional neural networks (CNN) based automatic prohibited item detection from 2D X-ray imagery to volumetric 3D CT baggage security screening imagery. However, previous work on 3D object detection in baggage security screening imagery focused on the detection of one specific type of objects (e.g., either {\it bottles} or {\it handguns}). As a result, multiple models are needed if more than one type of prohibited item is required to be detected in practice. In this paper, we consider the detection of multiple object categories of interest using one unified framework. To this end, we formulate a more challenging multi-class 3D object detection problem within 3D CT imagery and propose a viable solution (3D RetinaNet) to tackle this problem. To enhance the performance of detection we investigate a variety of strategies including data augmentation and varying backbone networks. Experimentation carried out to provide both quantitative and qualitative evaluations of the proposed approach to multi-class 3D object detection within 3D CT baggage security screening imagery. Experimental results demonstrate the combination of the 3D RetinaNet and a series of favorable strategies can achieve a mean Average Precision (mAP) of 65.3\% over five object classes (i.e. {\it bottles, handguns, binoculars, glock frames, iPods}). The overall performance is affected by the poor performance on {\it glock frames} and {\it iPods} due to the lack of data and their resemblance with the baggage clutter.

With the increasing adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision-Language Models (VLMs), rich document analysis technologies for applications like Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) and visual RAG are gaining significant attention. Recent research indicates that using VLMs can achieve better RAG performance, but processing rich documents still remains a challenge since a single page contains large amounts of information. In this paper, we present SCAN (SemantiC Document Layout ANalysis), a novel approach enhancing both textual and visual Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems working with visually rich documents. It is a VLM-friendly approach that identifies document components with appropriate semantic granularity, balancing context preservation with processing efficiency. SCAN uses a coarse-grained semantic approach that divides documents into coherent regions covering continuous components. We trained the SCAN model by fine-tuning object detection models with sophisticated annotation datasets. Our experimental results across English and Japanese datasets demonstrate that applying SCAN improves end-to-end textual RAG performance by up to 9.0\% and visual RAG performance by up to 6.4\%, outperforming conventional approaches and even commercial document processing solutions.

X-ray Computed Tomography (CT) based 3D imaging is widely used in airports for aviation security screening whilst prior work on prohibited item detection focuses primarily on 2D X-ray imagery. In this paper, we aim to evaluate the possibility of extending the automatic prohibited item detection from 2D X-ray imagery to volumetric 3D CT baggage security screening imagery. To these ends, we take advantage of 3D Convolutional Neural Neworks (CNN) and popular object detection frameworks such as RetinaNet and Faster R-CNN in our work. As the first attempt to use 3D CNN for volumetric 3D CT baggage security screening, we first evaluate different CNN architectures on the classification of isolated prohibited item volumes and compare against traditional methods which use hand-crafted features. Subsequently, we evaluate object detection performance of different architectures on volumetric 3D CT baggage images. The results of our experiments on Bottle and Handgun datasets demonstrate that 3D CNN models can achieve comparable performance (98% true positive rate and 1.5% false positive rate) to traditional methods but require significantly less time for inference (0.014s per volume). Furthermore, the extended 3D object detection models achieve promising performance in detecting prohibited items within volumetric 3D CT baggage imagery with 76% mAP for bottles and 88% mAP for handguns, which shows both the challenge and promise of such threat detection within 3D CT X-ray security imagery.

Automated X-ray inspection is crucial for efficient and unobtrusive security screening in various public settings. However, challenges such as object occlusion, variations in the physical properties of items, diversity in X-ray scanning devices, and limited training data hinder accurate and reliable detection of illicit items. Despite the large body of research in the field, reported experimental evaluations are often incomplete, with frequently conflicting outcomes. To shed light on the research landscape and facilitate further research, a systematic, detailed, and thorough comparative evaluation of recent Deep Learning (DL)-based methods for X-ray object detection is conducted. For this, a comprehensive evaluation framework is developed, composed of: a) Six recent, large-scale, and widely used public datasets for X-ray illicit item detection (OPIXray, CLCXray, SIXray, EDS, HiXray, and PIDray), b) Ten different state-of-the-art object detection schemes covering all main categories in the literature, including generic Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), custom CNN, generic transformer, and hybrid CNN-transformer architectures, and c) Various detection (mAP50 and mAP50:95) and time/computational-complexity (inference time (ms), parameter size (M), and computational load (GFLOPS)) metrics. A thorough analysis of the results leads to critical observations and insights, emphasizing key aspects such as: a) Overall behavior of the object detection schemes, b) Object-level detection performance, c) Dataset-specific observations, and d) Time efficiency and computational complexity analysis. To support reproducibility of the reported experimental results, the evaluation code and model weights are made publicly available at https://github.com/jgenc/xray-comparative-evaluation.