Daily Papers

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.

Many examples of cooperation exist in biology. In chemical systems however, which can sometimes be quite complex, we do not appear to observe intricate cooperative interactions. A key question for the origin of life, is then how can molecular cooperation first arise in an abiotic system prior to the emergence of biological replication. We postulate that selection at the molecular level is a driving force behind the complexification of chemical systems, particularly during the origins of life. In the theory of multilevel selection the two selective forces are: within-group and between-group, where the former tends to favor "selfish" replication of individuals and the latter favor cooperation between individuals enhancing the replication of the group as a whole. These forces can be quantified using the Price equation, which is a standard tool used in evolutionary biology to quantify evolutionary change. Our central claim is that replication and heredity in chemical systems are subject to selection, and quantifiable using the multilevel Price equation. We demonstrate this using the Graded Autocatalysis Replication Domain computer model, describing simple protocell composed out of molecules and its replication, which respectively analogue to the group and the individuals. In contrast to previous treatments of this model, we treat the lipid molecules themselves as replicating individuals and the protocells they form as groups of individuals. Our goal is to demonstrate how evolutionary biology tools and concepts can be applied in chemistry and we suggest that molecular cooperation may arise as a result of group selection. Further, the biological relation of parent-progeny is proposed to be analogue to the reactant-product relation in chemistry, thus allowing for tools from evolutionary biology to be applied to chemistry and would deepen the connection between chemistry and biology.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Cooperation enables teams to solve complex problems that one individual alone cannot address. In science, collaborative teams have become the predominant way through which progress is achieved. These scientific collaborations arise though various mechanisms, among which interactions at conferences. The Scialog conferences, which comprise a series of small, interdisciplinary scientific workshops held over several years, are an ideal laboratory to study the network mechanisms leading to team formation. Building on existing work studying team formation from a pairwise perspective, we present a higher-order network perspective generalizing this framework. We provide a formalization for the notion of group interaction over time by defining a taxonomy of synchronous and asynchronous group interactions. We apply this framework to the Scialog case study using a stepwise selection logistic model and find evidence that all interaction types described in our taxonomy are highly significant for team formation. This higher-order network perspective provides a new framework for the study of collective behavior and group formation.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

Recent research in Cooperative Coevolution~(CC) have achieved promising progress in solving large-scale global optimization problems. However, existing CC paradigms have a primary limitation in that they require deep expertise for selecting or designing effective variable decomposition strategies. Inspired by advancements in Meta-Black-Box Optimization, this paper introduces LCC, a pioneering learning-based cooperative coevolution framework that dynamically schedules decomposition strategies during optimization processes. The decomposition strategy selector is parameterized through a neural network, which processes a meticulously crafted set of optimization status features to determine the optimal strategy for each optimization step. The network is trained via the Proximal Policy Optimization method in a reinforcement learning manner across a collection of representative problems, aiming to maximize the expected optimization performance. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that LCC not only offers certain advantages over state-of-the-art baselines in terms of optimization effectiveness and resource consumption, but it also exhibits promising transferability towards unseen problems.

In this work, we address the cooperation problem among large language model (LLM) based embodied agents, where agents must cooperate to achieve a common goal. Previous methods often execute actions extemporaneously and incoherently, without long-term strategic and cooperative planning, leading to redundant steps, failures, and even serious repercussions in complex tasks like search-and-rescue missions where discussion and cooperative plan are crucial. To solve this issue, we propose Cooperative Plan Optimization (CaPo) to enhance the cooperation efficiency of LLM-based embodied agents. Inspired by human cooperation schemes, CaPo improves cooperation efficiency with two phases: 1) meta-plan generation, and 2) progress-adaptive meta-plan and execution. In the first phase, all agents analyze the task, discuss, and cooperatively create a meta-plan that decomposes the task into subtasks with detailed steps, ensuring a long-term strategic and coherent plan for efficient coordination. In the second phase, agents execute tasks according to the meta-plan and dynamically adjust it based on their latest progress (e.g., discovering a target object) through multi-turn discussions. This progress-based adaptation eliminates redundant actions, improving the overall cooperation efficiency of agents. Experimental results on the ThreeDworld Multi-Agent Transport and Communicative Watch-And-Help tasks demonstrate that CaPo achieves much higher task completion rate and efficiency compared with state-of-the-arts.The code is released at https://github.com/jliu4ai/CaPo.

Achieving cooperation among self-interested agents remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent work showed that mutual cooperation can be induced between "learning-aware" agents that account for and shape the learning dynamics of their co-players. However, existing approaches typically rely on hardcoded, often inconsistent, assumptions about co-player learning rules or enforce a strict separation between "naive learners" updating on fast timescales and "meta-learners" observing these updates. Here, we demonstrate that the in-context learning capabilities of sequence models allow for co-player learning awareness without requiring hardcoded assumptions or explicit timescale separation. We show that training sequence model agents against a diverse distribution of co-players naturally induces in-context best-response strategies, effectively functioning as learning algorithms on the fast intra-episode timescale. We find that the cooperative mechanism identified in prior work-where vulnerability to extortion drives mutual shaping-emerges naturally in this setting: in-context adaptation renders agents vulnerable to extortion, and the resulting mutual pressure to shape the opponent's in-context learning dynamics resolves into the learning of cooperative behavior. Our results suggest that standard decentralized reinforcement learning on sequence models combined with co-player diversity provides a scalable path to learning cooperative behaviors.

Cooperative perception enables autonomous agents to share encoded representations over wireless communication to enhance each other's live situational awareness. However, the tension between the limited communication bandwidth and the rich sensor information hinders its practical deployment. Recent studies have explored selection strategies that share only a subset of features per frame while striving to keep the performance on par. Nevertheless, the bandwidth requirement still stresses current wireless technologies. To fundamentally ease the tension, we take a proactive approach, exploiting the temporal continuity to identify features that capture environment dynamics, while avoiding repetitive and redundant transmission of static information. By incorporating temporal awareness, agents are empowered to dynamically adapt the sharing quantity according to environment complexity. We instantiate this intuition into an adaptive selection framework, COOPERTRIM, which introduces a novel conformal temporal uncertainty metric to gauge feature relevance, and a data-driven mechanism to dynamically determine the sharing quantity. To evaluate COOPERTRIM, we take semantic segmentation and 3D detection as example tasks. Across multiple open-source cooperative segmentation and detection models, COOPERTRIM achieves up to 80.28% and 72.52% bandwidth reduction respectively while maintaining a comparable accuracy. Relative to other selection strategies, COOPERTRIM also improves IoU by as much as 45.54% with up to 72% less bandwidth. Combined with compression strategies, COOPERTRIM can further reduce bandwidth usage to as low as 1.46% without compromising IoU performance. Qualitative results show COOPERTRIM gracefully adapts to environmental dynamics, localization error, and communication latency, demonstrating flexibility and paving the way for real-world deployment.

Resolving team conflicts requires not only task-specific competence, but also social intelligence to find common ground and build consensus. As AI agents increasingly collaborate on complex work, they must develop coordination capabilities to function as effective teammates. Yet we hypothesize that current agents lack these capabilities. To test this, we introduce CooperBench, a benchmark of over 600 collaborative coding tasks across 12 libraries in 4 programming languages. Each task assigns two agents different features that can be implemented independently but may conflict without proper coordination. Tasks are grounded in real open-source repositories with expert-written tests. Evaluating state-of-the-art coding agents, we observe the curse of coordination: agents achieve on average 30% lower success rates when working together compared to performing both tasks individually. This contrasts sharply with human teams, where adding teammates typically improves productivity. Our analysis reveals three key issues: (1) communication channels become jammed with vague, ill-timed, and inaccurate messages; (2) even with effective communication, agents deviate from their commitments; and (3) agents often hold incorrect expectations about others' plans and communication. Through large-scale simulation, we also observe rare but interesting emergent coordination behavior including role division, resource division, and negotiation. Our research presents a novel benchmark for collaborative coding and calls for a shift from pursuing individual agent capability to developing social intelligence.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

Most real-world domains can be formulated as multi-agent (MA) systems. Intentionality sharing agents can solve more complex tasks by collaborating, possibly in less time. True cooperative actions are beneficial for egoistic and collective reasons. However, teaching individual agents to sacrifice egoistic benefits for a better collective performance seems challenging. We build on a recently proposed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) mechanism with a Graph Neural Network (GNN) communication layer. Rarely chosen communication actions were marginally beneficial. Here we propose a MARL system in which agents can help collaborators perform better while risking low individual performance. We conduct our study in the context of resource distribution for wildfire management. Communicating environmental features and partially observable fire occurrence help the agent collective to pre-emptively distribute resources. Furthermore, we introduce a procedural training environment accommodating auto-curricula and open-endedness towards better generalizability. Our MA communication proposal outperforms a Greedy Heuristic Baseline and a Single-Agent (SA) setup. We further demonstrate how auto-curricula and openendedness improves generalizability of our MA proposal.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

Building AIs with adaptive behaviors in human-AI cooperation stands as a pivotal focus in AGI research. Current methods for developing cooperative agents predominantly rely on learning-based methods, where policy generalization heavily hinges on past interactions with specific teammates. These approaches constrain the agent's capacity to recalibrate its strategy when confronted with novel teammates. We propose ProAgent, a novel framework that harnesses large language models (LLMs) to fashion a proactive agent empowered with the ability to anticipate teammates' forthcoming decisions and formulate enhanced plans for itself. ProAgent excels at cooperative reasoning with the capacity to dynamically adapt its behavior to enhance collaborative efforts with teammates. Moreover, the ProAgent framework exhibits a high degree of modularity and interpretability, facilitating seamless integration to address a wide array of coordination scenarios. Experimental evaluations conducted within the framework of Overcook-AI unveil the remarkable performance superiority of ProAgent, outperforming five methods based on self-play and population-based training in cooperation with AI agents. Further, when cooperating with human proxy models, its performance exhibits an average improvement exceeding 10\% compared to the current state-of-the-art, COLE. The advancement was consistently observed across diverse scenarios involving interactions with both AI agents of varying characteristics and human counterparts. These findings inspire future research for human-robot collaborations. For a hands-on demonstration, please visit https://pku-proagent.github.io.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

A central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning is enabling agents to adapt to previously unseen teammates in a zero-shot fashion. Prior work in zero-shot coordination often follows a two-stage process, first generating a diverse training pool of partner agents, and then training a best-response agent to collaborate effectively with the entire training pool. While many previous works have achieved strong performance by devising better ways to diversify the partner agent pool, there has been less emphasis on how to leverage this pool to build an adaptive agent. One limitation is that the best-response agent may converge to a static, generalist policy that performs reasonably well across diverse teammates, rather than learning a more adaptive, specialist policy that can better adapt to teammates and achieve higher synergy. To address this, we propose an adaptive ensemble agent that uses Theory-of-Mind-based best-response selection to first infer its teammate's intentions and then select the most suitable policy from a policy ensemble. We conduct experiments in the Overcooked environment to evaluate zero-shot coordination performance under both fully and partially observable settings. The empirical results demonstrate the superiority of our method over a single best-response baseline.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

Leveraging learned strategies in unfamiliar scenarios is fundamental to human intelligence. In reinforcement learning, rationally reusing the policies acquired from other tasks or human experts is critical for tackling problems that are difficult to learn from scratch. In this work, we present a framework called Selective Myopic bEhavior Control~(SMEC), which results from the insight that the short-term behaviors of prior policies are sharable across tasks. By evaluating the behaviors of prior policies via a hybrid value function architecture, SMEC adaptively aggregates the sharable short-term behaviors of prior policies and the long-term behaviors of the task policy, leading to coordinated decisions. Empirical results on a collection of manipulation and locomotion tasks demonstrate that SMEC outperforms existing methods, and validate the ability of SMEC to leverage related prior policies.

Cooperative perception can effectively enhance individual perception performance by providing additional viewpoint and expanding the sensing field. Existing cooperation paradigms are either interpretable (result cooperation) or flexible (feature cooperation). In this paper, we propose the concept of query cooperation to enable interpretable instance-level flexible feature interaction. To specifically explain the concept, we propose a cooperative perception framework, termed QUEST, which let query stream flow among agents. The cross-agent queries are interacted via fusion for co-aware instances and complementation for individual unaware instances. Taking camera-based vehicle-infrastructure perception as a typical practical application scene, the experimental results on the real-world dataset, DAIR-V2X-Seq, demonstrate the effectiveness of QUEST and further reveal the advantage of the query cooperation paradigm on transmission flexibility and robustness to packet dropout. We hope our work can further facilitate the cross-agent representation interaction for better cooperative perception in practice.

Standard game theory explains cooperation in repeated games through conditional strategies such as Tit-for-Tat (TfT), but these require continuous computation that imposes physical costs on embodied agents. We propose a three-layer Body-Reservoir Governance (BRG) architecture: (1) a body reservoir (echo state network) whose d-dimensional state performs implicit inference over interaction history, serving as both decision-maker and anomaly detector, (2) a cognitive filter providing costly strategic tools activated on demand, and (3) a metacognitive governance layer with receptivity parameter αin [0,1]. At full body governance (α=1), closed-loop dynamics satisfy a self-consistency equation: cooperation is expressed as the reservoir's fixed point, not computed. Strategy complexity cost is defined as the KL divergence between the reservoir's state distribution and its habituated baseline. Body governance reduces this cost, with action variance decreasing up to 1600times with dimension d. A dynamic sentinel generates a composite discomfort signal from the reservoir's own state, driving adaptive α(t): near baseline during cooperation, rapidly dropping upon defection to activate cognitive retaliation. Overriding the body incurs thermodynamic cost proportional to internal state distortion. The sentinel achieves the highest payoff across all conditions, outperforming static body governance, TfT, and EMA baselines. A dimension sweep (d in {5,ldots,100}) shows implicit inference scales with bodily richness (23times to 1600times variance reduction), attributable to reservoir dynamics. A phase diagram in (d, τ_{env}) space reveals governance regime transitions near d approx 20. The framework reinterprets cooperation as the minimum-dissipation response of an adapted dynamical system -- emergent from embodied dynamics rather than computed.

In numerous artificial intelligence applications, the collaborative efforts of multiple intelligent agents are imperative for the successful attainment of target objectives. To enhance coordination among these agents, a distributed communication framework is often employed. However, indiscriminate information sharing among all agents can be resource-intensive, and the adoption of manually pre-defined communication architectures imposes constraints on inter-agent communication, thus limiting the potential for effective collaboration. Moreover, the communication framework often remains static during inference, which may result in sustained high resource consumption, as in most cases, only key decisions necessitate information sharing among agents. In this study, we introduce a novel approach wherein we conceptualize the communication architecture among agents as a learnable graph. We formulate this problem as the task of determining the communication graph while enabling the architecture parameters to update normally, thus necessitating a bi-level optimization process. Utilizing continuous relaxation of the graph representation and incorporating attention units, our proposed approach, CommFormer, efficiently optimizes the communication graph and concurrently refines architectural parameters through gradient descent in an end-to-end manner. Additionally, we introduce a temporal gating mechanism for each agent, enabling dynamic decisions on whether to receive shared information at a given time, based on current observations, thus improving decision-making efficiency. Extensive experiments on a variety of cooperative tasks substantiate the robustness of our model across diverse cooperative scenarios, where agents are able to develop more coordinated and sophisticated strategies regardless of changes in the number of agents.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities for social interaction and are increasingly being deployed in situations where they might engage with both human and artificial agents. These interactions represent a critical frontier for LLM-based agents, yet existing evaluation methods fail to measure how well these capabilities generalize to novel social situations. In this paper, we introduce a method for evaluating the ability of LLM-based agents to cooperate in zero-shot, mixed-motive environments using Concordia, a natural language multi-agent simulation environment. Our method measures general cooperative intelligence by testing an agent's ability to identify and exploit opportunities for mutual gain across diverse partners and contexts. We present empirical results from the NeurIPS 2024 Concordia Contest, where agents were evaluated on their ability to achieve mutual gains across a suite of diverse scenarios ranging from negotiation to collective action problems. Our findings reveal significant gaps between current agent capabilities and the robust generalization required for reliable cooperation, particularly in scenarios demanding persuasion and norm enforcement.

We propose a targeted communication architecture for multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents learn both what messages to send and whom to address them to while performing cooperative tasks in partially-observable environments. This targeting behavior is learnt solely from downstream task-specific reward without any communication supervision. We additionally augment this with a multi-round communication approach where agents coordinate via multiple rounds of communication before taking actions in the environment. We evaluate our approach on a diverse set of cooperative multi-agent tasks, of varying difficulties, with varying number of agents, in a variety of environments ranging from 2D grid layouts of shapes and simulated traffic junctions to 3D indoor environments, and demonstrate the benefits of targeted and multi-round communication. Moreover, we show that the targeted communication strategies learned by agents are interpretable and intuitive. Finally, we show that our architecture can be easily extended to mixed and competitive environments, leading to improved performance and sample complexity over recent state-of-the-art approaches.

Real-world multi-agent scenarios often involve mixed motives, demanding altruistic agents capable of self-protection against potential exploitation. However, existing approaches often struggle to achieve both objectives. In this paper, based on that empathic responses are modulated by inferred social relationships between agents, we propose LASE Learning to balance Altruism and Self-interest based on Empathy), a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm that fosters altruistic cooperation through gifting while avoiding exploitation by other agents in mixed-motive games. LASE allocates a portion of its rewards to co-players as gifts, with this allocation adapting dynamically based on the social relationship -- a metric evaluating the friendliness of co-players estimated by counterfactual reasoning. In particular, social relationship measures each co-player by comparing the estimated Q-function of current joint action to a counterfactual baseline which marginalizes the co-player's action, with its action distribution inferred by a perspective-taking module. Comprehensive experiments are performed in spatially and temporally extended mixed-motive games, demonstrating LASE's ability to promote group collaboration without compromising fairness and its capacity to adapt policies to various types of interactive co-players.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.