Daily Papers

Recent studies indicate that NLU models are prone to rely on shortcut features for prediction, without achieving true language understanding. As a result, these models fail to generalize to real-world out-of-distribution data. In this work, we show that the words in the NLU training set can be modeled as a long-tailed distribution. There are two findings: 1) NLU models have strong preference for features located at the head of the long-tailed distribution, and 2) Shortcut features are picked up during very early few iterations of the model training. These two observations are further employed to formulate a measurement which can quantify the shortcut degree of each training sample. Based on this shortcut measurement, we propose a shortcut mitigation framework LTGR, to suppress the model from making overconfident predictions for samples with large shortcut degree. Experimental results on three NLU benchmarks demonstrate that our long-tailed distribution explanation accurately reflects the shortcut learning behavior of NLU models. Experimental analysis further indicates that LTGR can improve the generalization accuracy on OOD data, while preserving the accuracy on in-distribution data.

Spurious correlations in the data, where multiple cues are predictive of the target labels, often lead to a phenomenon known as simplicity bias, where a model relies on erroneous, easy-to-learn cues while ignoring reliable ones. In this work, we propose an ensemble diversification framework exploiting Diffusion Probabilistic Models (DPMs) for shortcut bias mitigation. We show that at particular training intervals, DPMs can generate images with novel feature combinations, even when trained on images displaying correlated input features. We leverage this crucial property to generate synthetic counterfactuals to increase model diversity via ensemble disagreement. We show that DPM-guided diversification is sufficient to remove dependence on primary shortcut cues, without a need for additional supervised signals. We further empirically quantify its efficacy on several diversification objectives, and finally show improved generalization and diversification performance on par with prior work that relies on auxiliary data collection.

As machine learning models become increasingly larger, trained weakly supervised on large, possibly uncurated data sets, it becomes increasingly important to establish mechanisms for inspecting, interacting, and revising models to mitigate learning shortcuts and guarantee their learned knowledge is aligned with human knowledge. The recently proposed XIL framework was developed for this purpose, and several such methods have been introduced, each with individual motivations and methodological details. In this work, we provide a unification of various XIL methods into a single typology by establishing a common set of basic modules. In doing so, we pave the way for a principled comparison of existing, but, importantly, also future XIL approaches. In addition, we discuss existing and introduce novel measures and benchmarks for evaluating the overall abilities of a XIL method. Given this extensive toolbox, including our typology, measures, and benchmarks, we finally compare several recent XIL methods methodologically and quantitatively. In our evaluations, all methods prove to revise a model successfully. However, we found remarkable differences in individual benchmark tasks, revealing valuable application-relevant aspects for integrating these benchmarks in developing future methods.

Recent studies have shown the impressive efficacy of counterfactually augmented data (CAD) for reducing NLU models' reliance on spurious features and improving their generalizability. However, current methods still heavily rely on human efforts or task-specific designs to generate counterfactuals, thereby impeding CAD's applicability to a broad range of NLU tasks. In this paper, we present AutoCAD, a fully automatic and task-agnostic CAD generation framework. AutoCAD first leverages a classifier to unsupervisedly identify rationales as spans to be intervened, which disentangles spurious and causal features. Then, AutoCAD performs controllable generation enhanced by unlikelihood training to produce diverse counterfactuals. Extensive evaluations on multiple out-of-domain and challenge benchmarks demonstrate that AutoCAD consistently and significantly boosts the out-of-distribution performance of powerful pre-trained models across different NLU tasks, which is comparable or even better than previous state-of-the-art human-in-the-loop or task-specific CAD methods. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/thu-coai/AutoCAD.

In self-supervised visual representation learning, a feature extractor is trained on a "pretext task" for which labels can be generated cheaply, without human annotation. A central challenge in this approach is that the feature extractor quickly learns to exploit low-level visual features such as color aberrations or watermarks and then fails to learn useful semantic representations. Much work has gone into identifying such "shortcut" features and hand-designing schemes to reduce their effect. Here, we propose a general framework for mitigating the effect shortcut features. Our key assumption is that those features which are the first to be exploited for solving the pretext task may also be the most vulnerable to an adversary trained to make the task harder. We show that this assumption holds across common pretext tasks and datasets by training a "lens" network to make small image changes that maximally reduce performance in the pretext task. Representations learned with the modified images outperform those learned without in all tested cases. Additionally, the modifications made by the lens reveal how the choice of pretext task and dataset affects the features learned by self-supervision.

The issue of shortcut learning is widely known in NLP and has been an important research focus in recent years. Unintended correlations in the data enable models to easily solve tasks that were meant to exhibit advanced language understanding and reasoning capabilities. In this survey paper, we focus on the field of machine reading comprehension (MRC), an important task for showcasing high-level language understanding that also suffers from a range of shortcuts. We summarize the available techniques for measuring and mitigating shortcuts and conclude with suggestions for further progress in shortcut research. Importantly, we highlight two concerns for shortcut mitigation in MRC: (1) the lack of public challenge sets, a necessary component for effective and reusable evaluation, and (2) the lack of certain mitigation techniques that are prominent in other areas.

Recent advancements in integrating large language models (LLMs) with application programming interfaces (APIs) have gained significant interest in both academia and industry. These API-based agents, leveraging the strong autonomy and planning capabilities of LLMs, can efficiently solve problems requiring multi-step actions. However, their ability to handle multi-dimensional difficulty levels, diverse task types, and real-world demands through APIs remains unknown. In this paper, we introduce ShortcutsBench, a large-scale benchmark for the comprehensive evaluation of API-based agents in solving tasks with varying levels of difficulty, diverse task types, and real-world demands. ShortcutsBench includes a wealth of real APIs from Apple Inc.'s operating systems, refined user queries from shortcuts, human-annotated high-quality action sequences from shortcut developers, and accurate parameter filling values about primitive parameter types, enum parameter types, outputs from previous actions, and parameters that need to request necessary information from the system or user. Our extensive evaluation of agents built with 5 leading open-source (size >= 57B) and 4 closed-source LLMs (e.g. Gemini-1.5-Pro and GPT-3.5) reveals significant limitations in handling complex queries related to API selection, parameter filling, and requesting necessary information from systems and users. These findings highlight the challenges that API-based agents face in effectively fulfilling real and complex user queries. All datasets, code, and experimental results will be available at https://github.com/eachsheep/shortcutsbench.

Machine learning models have been found to learn shortcuts -- unintended decision rules that are unable to generalize -- undermining models' reliability. Previous works address this problem under the tenuous assumption that only a single shortcut exists in the training data. Real-world images are rife with multiple visual cues from background to texture. Key to advancing the reliability of vision systems is understanding whether existing methods can overcome multiple shortcuts or struggle in a Whac-A-Mole game, i.e., where mitigating one shortcut amplifies reliance on others. To address this shortcoming, we propose two benchmarks: 1) UrbanCars, a dataset with precisely controlled spurious cues, and 2) ImageNet-W, an evaluation set based on ImageNet for watermark, a shortcut we discovered affects nearly every modern vision model. Along with texture and background, ImageNet-W allows us to study multiple shortcuts emerging from training on natural images. We find computer vision models, including large foundation models -- regardless of training set, architecture, and supervision -- struggle when multiple shortcuts are present. Even methods explicitly designed to combat shortcuts struggle in a Whac-A-Mole dilemma. To tackle this challenge, we propose Last Layer Ensemble, a simple-yet-effective method to mitigate multiple shortcuts without Whac-A-Mole behavior. Our results surface multi-shortcut mitigation as an overlooked challenge critical to advancing the reliability of vision systems. The datasets and code are released: https://github.com/facebookresearch/Whac-A-Mole.

Smartphones have become indispensable in modern life, yet navigating complex tasks on mobile devices often remains frustrating. Recent advancements in large multimodal model (LMM)-based mobile agents have demonstrated the ability to perceive and act in mobile environments. However, current approaches face significant limitations: they fall short in addressing real-world human needs, struggle with reasoning-intensive and long-horizon tasks, and lack mechanisms to learn and improve from prior experiences. To overcome these challenges, we introduce Mobile-Agent-E, a hierarchical multi-agent framework capable of self-evolution through past experience. By hierarchical, we mean an explicit separation of high-level planning and low-level action execution. The framework comprises a Manager, responsible for devising overall plans by breaking down complex tasks into subgoals, and four subordinate agents--Perceptor, Operator, Action Reflector, and Notetaker--which handle fine-grained visual perception, immediate action execution, error verification, and information aggregation, respectively. Mobile-Agent-E also features a novel self-evolution module which maintains a persistent long-term memory comprising Tips and Shortcuts. Tips are general guidance and lessons learned from prior tasks on how to effectively interact with the environment. Shortcuts are reusable, executable sequences of atomic operations tailored for specific subroutines. The inclusion of Tips and Shortcuts facilitates continuous refinement in performance and efficiency. Alongside this framework, we introduce Mobile-Eval-E, a new benchmark featuring complex mobile tasks requiring long-horizon, multi-app interactions. Empirical results show that Mobile-Agent-E achieves a 22% absolute improvement over previous state-of-the-art approaches across three foundation model backbones. Project page: https://x-plug.github.io/MobileAgent.

Recent advances in Audio-Language Models (ALMs) have significantly improved multimodal understanding capabilities. However, the introduction of the audio modality also brings new and unique vulnerability vectors. Previous studies have proposed jailbreak attacks that specifically target ALMs, revealing that defenses directly transferred from traditional audio adversarial attacks or text-based Large Language Model (LLM) jailbreaks are largely ineffective against these ALM-specific threats. To address this issue, we propose ALMGuard, the first defense framework tailored to ALMs. Based on the assumption that safety-aligned shortcuts naturally exist in ALMs, we design a method to identify universal Shortcut Activation Perturbations (SAPs) that serve as triggers that activate the safety shortcuts to safeguard ALMs at inference time. To better sift out effective triggers while preserving the model's utility on benign tasks, we further propose Mel-Gradient Sparse Mask (M-GSM), which restricts perturbations to Mel-frequency bins that are sensitive to jailbreaks but insensitive to speech understanding. Both theoretical analyses and empirical results demonstrate the robustness of our method against both seen and unseen attacks. Overall, \MethodName reduces the average success rate of advanced ALM-specific jailbreak attacks to 4.6% across four models, while maintaining comparable utility on benign benchmarks, establishing it as the new state of the art. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/WeifeiJin/ALMGuard.

To enhance the efficiency of GUI agents on various platforms like smartphones and computers, a hybrid paradigm that combines flexible GUI operations with efficient shortcuts (e.g., API, deep links) is emerging as a promising direction. However, a framework for systematically benchmarking these hybrid agents is still underexplored. To take the first step in bridging this gap, we introduce MAS-Bench, a benchmark that pioneers the evaluation of GUI-shortcut hybrid agents with a specific focus on the mobile domain. Beyond merely using predefined shortcuts, MAS-Bench assesses an agent's capability to autonomously generate shortcuts by discovering and creating reusable, low-cost workflows. It features 139 complex tasks across 11 real-world applications, a knowledge base of 88 predefined shortcuts (APIs, deep-links, RPA scripts), and 7 evaluation metrics. The tasks are designed to be solvable via GUI-only operations, but can be significantly accelerated by intelligently embedding shortcuts. Experiments show that hybrid agents achieve significantly higher success rates and efficiency than their GUI-only counterparts. This result also demonstrates the effectiveness of our method for evaluating an agent's shortcut generation capabilities. MAS-Bench fills a critical evaluation gap, providing a foundational platform for future advancements in creating more efficient and robust intelligent agents.

Backpropagation-based approaches aim to align diffusion models with reward functions through end-to-end backpropagation of the reward gradient within the denoising chain, offering a promising perspective. However, due to the computational costs and the risk of gradient explosion associated with the lengthy denoising chain, existing approaches struggle to achieve complete gradient backpropagation, leading to suboptimal results. In this paper, we introduce Shortcut-based Fine-Tuning (ShortFT), an efficient fine-tuning strategy that utilizes the shorter denoising chain. More specifically, we employ the recently researched trajectory-preserving few-step diffusion model, which enables a shortcut over the original denoising chain, and construct a shortcut-based denoising chain of shorter length. The optimization on this chain notably enhances the efficiency and effectiveness of fine-tuning the foundational model. Our method has been rigorously tested and can be effectively applied to various reward functions, significantly improving alignment performance and surpassing state-of-the-art alternatives.

Backdoor attacks have become a significant threat to the pre-training and deployment of deep neural networks (DNNs). Although numerous methods for detecting and mitigating backdoor attacks have been proposed, most rely on identifying and eliminating the ``shortcut" created by the backdoor, which links a specific source class to a target class. However, these approaches can be easily circumvented by designing multiple backdoor triggers that create shortcuts everywhere and therefore nowhere specific. In this study, we explore the concept of Multi-Trigger Backdoor Attacks (MTBAs), where multiple adversaries leverage different types of triggers to poison the same dataset. By proposing and investigating three types of multi-trigger attacks including parallel, sequential, and hybrid attacks, we demonstrate that 1) multiple triggers can coexist, overwrite, or cross-activate one another, and 2) MTBAs easily break the prevalent shortcut assumption underlying most existing backdoor detection/removal methods, rendering them ineffective. Given the security risk posed by MTBAs, we have created a multi-trigger backdoor poisoning dataset to facilitate future research on detecting and mitigating these attacks, and we also discuss potential defense strategies against MTBAs. Our code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/Multi-Trigger-Backdoor-Attacks.

Weakly supervised semantic segmentation (WSSS) employing weak forms of labels has been actively studied to alleviate the annotation cost of acquiring pixel-level labels. However, classifiers trained on biased datasets tend to exploit shortcut features and make predictions based on spurious correlations between certain backgrounds and objects, leading to a poor generalization performance. In this paper, we propose shortcut mitigating augmentation (SMA) for WSSS, which generates synthetic representations of object-background combinations not seen in the training data to reduce the use of shortcut features. Our approach disentangles the object-relevant and background features. We then shuffle and combine the disentangled representations to create synthetic features of diverse object-background combinations. SMA-trained classifier depends less on contexts and focuses more on the target object when making predictions. In addition, we analyzed the behavior of the classifier on shortcut usage after applying our augmentation using an attribution method-based metric. The proposed method achieved the improved performance of semantic segmentation result on PASCAL VOC 2012 and MS COCO 2014 datasets.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems will increasingly be used to cause harm as they grow more capable. In fact, AI systems are already starting to be used to automate fraudulent activities, violate human rights, create harmful fake images, and identify dangerous toxins. To prevent some misuses of AI, we argue that targeted interventions on certain capabilities will be warranted. These restrictions may include controlling who can access certain types of AI models, what they can be used for, whether outputs are filtered or can be traced back to their user, and the resources needed to develop them. We also contend that some restrictions on non-AI capabilities needed to cause harm will be required. Though capability restrictions risk reducing use more than misuse (facing an unfavorable Misuse-Use Tradeoff), we argue that interventions on capabilities are warranted when other interventions are insufficient, the potential harm from misuse is high, and there are targeted ways to intervene on capabilities. We provide a taxonomy of interventions that can reduce AI misuse, focusing on the specific steps required for a misuse to cause harm (the Misuse Chain), and a framework to determine if an intervention is warranted. We apply this reasoning to three examples: predicting novel toxins, creating harmful images, and automating spear phishing campaigns.

Diffusion models and flow-matching models have enabled generating diverse and realistic images by learning to transfer noise to data. However, sampling from these models involves iterative denoising over many neural network passes, making generation slow and expensive. Previous approaches for speeding up sampling require complex training regimes, such as multiple training phases, multiple networks, or fragile scheduling. We introduce shortcut models, a family of generative models that use a single network and training phase to produce high-quality samples in a single or multiple sampling steps. Shortcut models condition the network not only on the current noise level but also on the desired step size, allowing the model to skip ahead in the generation process. Across a wide range of sampling step budgets, shortcut models consistently produce higher quality samples than previous approaches, such as consistency models and reflow. Compared to distillation, shortcut models reduce complexity to a single network and training phase and additionally allow varying step budgets at inference time.

Rapid deployment of vision-language models (VLMs) magnifies safety risks, yet most evaluations rely on artificial images. This study asks: How safe are current VLMs when confronted with meme images that ordinary users share? To investigate this question, we introduce MemeSafetyBench, a 50,430-instance benchmark pairing real meme images with both harmful and benign instructions. Using a comprehensive safety taxonomy and LLM-based instruction generation, we assess multiple VLMs across single and multi-turn interactions. We investigate how real-world memes influence harmful outputs, the mitigating effects of conversational context, and the relationship between model scale and safety metrics. Our findings demonstrate that VLMs show greater vulnerability to meme-based harmful prompts than to synthetic or typographic images. Memes significantly increase harmful responses and decrease refusals compared to text-only inputs. Though multi-turn interactions provide partial mitigation, elevated vulnerability persists. These results highlight the need for ecologically valid evaluations and stronger safety mechanisms.

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

We show that when large language models learn to reward hack on production RL environments, this can result in egregious emergent misalignment. We start with a pretrained model, impart knowledge of reward hacking strategies via synthetic document finetuning or prompting, and train on a selection of real Anthropic production coding environments. Unsurprisingly, the model learns to reward hack. Surprisingly, the model generalizes to alignment faking, cooperation with malicious actors, reasoning about malicious goals, and attempting sabotage when used with Claude Code, including in the codebase for this paper. Applying RLHF safety training using standard chat-like prompts results in aligned behavior on chat-like evaluations, but misalignment persists on agentic tasks. Three mitigations are effective: (i) preventing the model from reward hacking; (ii) increasing the diversity of RLHF safety training; and (iii) "inoculation prompting", wherein framing reward hacking as acceptable behavior during training removes misaligned generalization even when reward hacking is learned.

The advent of instruction-tuned Large Language Models designed for coding tasks (Code LLMs) has transformed software engineering practices. However, their robustness against various input challenges remains a critical concern. This study introduces DegradePrompter, a novel method designed to systematically evaluate the robustness of instruction-tuned Code LLMs. We assess the impact of diverse input challenges on the functionality and correctness of generated code using rigorous metrics and established benchmarks. Our comprehensive evaluation includes five state-of-the-art open-source models and three production-grade closed-source models, revealing varying degrees of robustness. Open-source models demonstrate an increased susceptibility to input perturbations, resulting in declines in functional correctness ranging from 12% to 34%. In contrast, commercial models demonstrate relatively greater resilience, with performance degradation ranging from 3% to 24%. To enhance the robustness of the models against these vulnerabilities, we investigate a straightforward yet effective mitigation strategy. Our findings highlight the need for robust defense mechanisms and comprehensive evaluations during both the development and deployment phases to ensure the resilience and reliability of automated code generation systems.

Web agents powered by large language models (LLMs) must process lengthy web page observations to complete user goals; these pages often exceed tens of thousands of tokens. This saturates context limits and increases computational cost processing; moreover, processing full pages exposes agents to security risks such as prompt injection. Existing pruning strategies either discard relevant content or retain irrelevant context, leading to suboptimal action prediction. We introduce FocusAgent, a simple yet effective approach that leverages a lightweight LLM retriever to extract the most relevant lines from accessibility tree (AxTree) observations, guided by task goals. By pruning noisy and irrelevant content, FocusAgent enables efficient reasoning while reducing vulnerability to injection attacks. Experiments on WorkArena and WebArena benchmarks show that FocusAgent matches the performance of strong baselines, while reducing observation size by over 50%. Furthermore, a variant of FocusAgent significantly reduces the success rate of prompt-injection attacks, including banner and pop-up attacks, while maintaining task success performance in attack-free settings. Our results highlight that targeted LLM-based retrieval is a practical and robust strategy for building web agents that are efficient, effective, and secure.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.

Despite recent advances in image-to-video generation, better controllability and local animation are less explored. Most existing image-to-video methods are not locally aware and tend to move the entire scene. However, human artists may need to control the movement of different objects or regions. Additionally, current I2V methods require users not only to describe the target motion but also to provide redundant detailed descriptions of frame contents. These two issues hinder the practical utilization of current I2V tools. In this paper, we propose a practical framework, named Follow-Your-Click, to achieve image animation with a simple user click (for specifying what to move) and a short motion prompt (for specifying how to move). Technically, we propose the first-frame masking strategy, which significantly improves the video generation quality, and a motion-augmented module equipped with a short motion prompt dataset to improve the short prompt following abilities of our model. To further control the motion speed, we propose flow-based motion magnitude control to control the speed of target movement more precisely. Our framework has simpler yet precise user control and better generation performance than previous methods. Extensive experiments compared with 7 baselines, including both commercial tools and research methods on 8 metrics, suggest the superiority of our approach. Project Page: https://follow-your-click.github.io/

Advanced text-to-image models such as DALL-E 2 and Midjourney possess the capacity to generate highly realistic images, raising significant concerns regarding the potential proliferation of unsafe content. This includes adult, violent, or deceptive imagery of political figures. Despite claims of rigorous safety mechanisms implemented in these models to restrict the generation of not-safe-for-work (NSFW) content, we successfully devise and exhibit the first prompt attacks on Midjourney, resulting in the production of abundant photorealistic NSFW images. We reveal the fundamental principles of such prompt attacks and suggest strategically substituting high-risk sections within a suspect prompt to evade closed-source safety measures. Our novel framework, SurrogatePrompt, systematically generates attack prompts, utilizing large language models, image-to-text, and image-to-image modules to automate attack prompt creation at scale. Evaluation results disclose an 88% success rate in bypassing Midjourney's proprietary safety filter with our attack prompts, leading to the generation of counterfeit images depicting political figures in violent scenarios. Both subjective and objective assessments validate that the images generated from our attack prompts present considerable safety hazards.

In this research, we propose a novel denoising diffusion model based on shortest-path modeling that optimizes residual propagation to enhance both denoising efficiency and quality. Drawing on Denoising Diffusion Implicit Models (DDIM) and insights from graph theory, our model, termed the Shortest Path Diffusion Model (ShortDF), treats the denoising process as a shortest-path problem aimed at minimizing reconstruction error. By optimizing the initial residuals, we improve the efficiency of the reverse diffusion process and the quality of the generated samples. Extensive experiments on multiple standard benchmarks demonstrate that ShortDF significantly reduces diffusion time (or steps) while enhancing the visual fidelity of generated samples compared to prior arts. This work, we suppose, paves the way for interactive diffusion-based applications and establishes a foundation for rapid data generation. Code is available at https://github.com/UnicomAI/ShortDF.

We present ControlLLM, a novel framework that enables large language models (LLMs) to utilize multi-modal tools for solving complex real-world tasks. Despite the remarkable performance of LLMs, they still struggle with tool invocation due to ambiguous user prompts, inaccurate tool selection and parameterization, and inefficient tool scheduling. To overcome these challenges, our framework comprises three key components: (1) a task decomposer that breaks down a complex task into clear subtasks with well-defined inputs and outputs; (2) a Thoughts-on-Graph (ToG) paradigm that searches the optimal solution path on a pre-built tool graph, which specifies the parameter and dependency relations among different tools; and (3) an execution engine with a rich toolbox that interprets the solution path and runs the tools efficiently on different computational devices. We evaluate our framework on diverse tasks involving image, audio, and video processing, demonstrating its superior accuracy, efficiency, and versatility compared to existing methods.

Safety aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks qi2023fine-- a few harmful data mixed in the fine-tuning dataset can break the LLMs's safety alignment. Existing mitigation strategies include alignment stage solutions huang2024vaccine, rosati2024representation and fine-tuning stage solutions huang2024lazy,mukhoti2023fine. However, our evaluation shows that both categories of defenses fail when some specific training hyper-parameters are chosen -- a large learning rate or a large number of training epochs in the fine-tuning stage can easily invalidate the defense, which however, is necessary to guarantee finetune performance. To this end, we propose Antidote, a post-fine-tuning stage solution, which remains \textit{agnostic to the training hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning stage}. Antidote relies on the philosophy that by removing the harmful parameters, the harmful model can be recovered from the harmful behaviors, regardless of how those harmful parameters are formed in the fine-tuning stage. With this philosophy, we introduce a one-shot pruning stage after harmful fine-tuning to remove the harmful weights that are responsible for the generation of harmful content. Despite its embarrassing simplicity, empirical results show that Antidote can reduce harmful score while maintaining accuracy on downstream tasks.Our project page is at https://huangtiansheng.github.io/Antidote_gh_page/

Generative AI systems across modalities, ranging from text (including code), image, audio, and video, have broad social impacts, but there is no official standard for means of evaluating those impacts or for which impacts should be evaluated. In this paper, we present a guide that moves toward a standard approach in evaluating a base generative AI system for any modality in two overarching categories: what can be evaluated in a base system independent of context and what can be evaluated in a societal context. Importantly, this refers to base systems that have no predetermined application or deployment context, including a model itself, as well as system components, such as training data. Our framework for a base system defines seven categories of social impact: bias, stereotypes, and representational harms; cultural values and sensitive content; disparate performance; privacy and data protection; financial costs; environmental costs; and data and content moderation labor costs. Suggested methods for evaluation apply to listed generative modalities and analyses of the limitations of existing evaluations serve as a starting point for necessary investment in future evaluations. We offer five overarching categories for what can be evaluated in a broader societal context, each with its own subcategories: trustworthiness and autonomy; inequality, marginalization, and violence; concentration of authority; labor and creativity; and ecosystem and environment. Each subcategory includes recommendations for mitigating harm.

The safety alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable to both manual and automated jailbreak attacks, which adversarially trigger LLMs to output harmful content. However, current methods for jailbreaking LLMs, which nest entire harmful prompts, are not effective at concealing malicious intent and can be easily identified and rejected by well-aligned LLMs. This paper discovers that decomposing a malicious prompt into separated sub-prompts can effectively obscure its underlying malicious intent by presenting it in a fragmented, less detectable form, thereby addressing these limitations. We introduce an automatic prompt Decomposition and Reconstruction framework for jailbreak Attack (DrAttack). DrAttack includes three key components: (a) `Decomposition' of the original prompt into sub-prompts, (b) `Reconstruction' of these sub-prompts implicitly by in-context learning with semantically similar but harmless reassembling demo, and (c) a `Synonym Search' of sub-prompts, aiming to find sub-prompts' synonyms that maintain the original intent while jailbreaking LLMs. An extensive empirical study across multiple open-source and closed-source LLMs demonstrates that, with a significantly reduced number of queries, DrAttack obtains a substantial gain of success rate over prior SOTA prompt-only attackers. Notably, the success rate of 78.0\% on GPT-4 with merely 15 queries surpassed previous art by 33.1\%. The project is available at https://github.com/xirui-li/DrAttack.

Video-to-video translation aims to generate video frames of a target domain from an input video. Despite its usefulness, the existing networks require enormous computations, necessitating their model compression for wide use. While there exist compression methods that improve computational efficiency in various image/video tasks, a generally-applicable compression method for video-to-video translation has not been studied much. In response, we present Shortcut-V2V, a general-purpose compression framework for video-to-video translation. Shourcut-V2V avoids full inference for every neighboring video frame by approximating the intermediate features of a current frame from those of the previous frame. Moreover, in our framework, a newly-proposed block called AdaBD adaptively blends and deforms features of neighboring frames, which makes more accurate predictions of the intermediate features possible. We conduct quantitative and qualitative evaluations using well-known video-to-video translation models on various tasks to demonstrate the general applicability of our framework. The results show that Shourcut-V2V achieves comparable performance compared to the original video-to-video translation model while saving 3.2-5.7x computational cost and 7.8-44x memory at test time.

We present a framework for the automated measurement of responsible AI (RAI) metrics for large language models (LLMs) and associated products and services. Our framework for automatically measuring harms from LLMs builds on existing technical and sociotechnical expertise and leverages the capabilities of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4. We use this framework to run through several case studies investigating how different LLMs may violate a range of RAI-related principles. The framework may be employed alongside domain-specific sociotechnical expertise to create measurements for new harm areas in the future. By implementing this framework, we aim to enable more advanced harm measurement efforts and further the responsible use of LLMs.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized generative systems, achieving excellent performance across diverse domains. Although these models perform well in controlled environments, their real-world applications frequently encounter inputs containing both essential and irrelevant details. Our investigation has revealed a critical vulnerability in LLMs, which we term Contextual Distraction Vulnerability (CDV). This phenomenon arises when models fail to maintain consistent performance on questions modified with semantically coherent but irrelevant context. To systematically investigate this vulnerability, we propose an efficient tree-based search methodology to automatically generate CDV examples. Our approach successfully generates CDV examples across four datasets, causing an average performance degradation of approximately 45% in state-of-the-art LLMs. To address this critical issue, we explore various mitigation strategies and find that post-targeted training approaches can effectively enhance model robustness against contextual distractions. Our findings highlight the fundamental nature of CDV as an ability-level challenge rather than a knowledge-level issue since models demonstrate the necessary knowledge by answering correctly in the absence of distractions. This calls the community's attention to address CDV during model development to ensure reliability. The code is available at https://github.com/wyf23187/LLM_CDV.

Added toxicity in the context of translation refers to the fact of producing a translation output with more toxicity than there exists in the input. In this paper, we present MinTox which is a novel pipeline to identify added toxicity and mitigate this issue which works at inference time. MinTox uses a toxicity detection classifier which is multimodal (speech and text) and works in languages at scale. The mitigation method is applied to languages at scale and directly in text outputs. MinTox is applied to SEAMLESSM4T, which is the latest multimodal and massively multilingual machine translation system. For this system, MinTox achieves significant added toxicity mitigation across domains, modalities and language directions. MinTox manages to approximately filter out from 25% to 95% of added toxicity (depending on the modality and domain) while keeping translation quality.

CleanS2S is a framework for human-like speech-to-speech interaction that advances conversational AI through single-file implementation and proactive dialogue capabilities. Our system integrates automatic speech recognition, large language models, and text-to-speech synthesis into a unified pipeline with real-time interruption handling, achieving low transition latency through full-duplex websocket connections and non-blocking I/O. Beyond conventional chatbot paradigms, we pioneer a proactive interaction mechanism, which combines memory systems with Subjective Action Judgement module, enabling five human-like response strategies: interruption, refusal, deflection, silence, and standard response. The memory module dynamically aggregates historical, and contextual data to inform interaction decisions. This approach breaks the rigid turn-based convention by allowing system-initiated dialog control and context-aware response selection. And we propose Action Judgement SFT that assesses input streams for responses strategies. The framework's single-file implementation with atomic configurations offers researchers unprecedented transparency and extensibility for interaction agents. The code of CleanS2S is released at \https://github.com/opendilab/CleanS2S.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP), introduced by Anthropic, provides a standardized framework for artificial intelligence (AI) systems to interact with external data sources and tools in real-time. While MCP offers significant advantages for AI integration and capability extension, it introduces novel security challenges that demand rigorous analysis and mitigation. This paper builds upon foundational research into MCP architecture and preliminary security assessments to deliver enterprise-grade mitigation frameworks and detailed technical implementation strategies. Through systematic threat modeling and analysis of MCP implementations and analysis of potential attack vectors, including sophisticated threats like tool poisoning, we present actionable security patterns tailored for MCP implementers and adopters. The primary contribution of this research lies in translating theoretical security concerns into a practical, implementable framework with actionable controls, thereby providing essential guidance for the secure enterprise adoption and governance of integrated AI systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak exploits that bypass safety filters and induce harmful or unethical behavior. This work presents a systematic taxonomy of existing jailbreak defenses across prompt-level, model-level, and training-time interventions, followed by three proposed defense strategies. First, a Prompt-Level Defense Framework detects and neutralizes adversarial inputs through sanitization, paraphrasing, and adaptive system guarding. Second, a Logit-Based Steering Defense reinforces refusal behavior through inference-time vector steering in safety-sensitive layers. Third, a Domain-Specific Agent Defense employs the MetaGPT framework to enforce structured, role-based collaboration and domain adherence. Experiments on benchmark datasets show substantial reductions in attack success rate, achieving full mitigation under the agent-based defense. Overall, this study highlights how jailbreaks pose a significant security threat to LLMs and identifies key intervention points for prevention, while noting that defense strategies often involve trade-offs between safety, performance, and scalability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Kuro0911/CS5446-Project

Test-time interventions for language models can enhance factual accuracy, mitigate harmful outputs, and improve model efficiency without costly retraining. But despite a flood of new methods, different types of interventions are largely developing independently. In practice, multiple interventions must be applied sequentially to the same model, yet we lack standardized ways to study how interventions interact. We fill this gap by introducing composable interventions, a framework to study the effects of using multiple interventions on the same language models, featuring new metrics and a unified codebase. Using our framework, we conduct extensive experiments and compose popular methods from three emerging intervention categories -- Knowledge Editing, Model Compression, and Machine Unlearning. Our results from 310 different compositions uncover meaningful interactions: compression hinders editing and unlearning, composing interventions hinges on their order of application, and popular general-purpose metrics are inadequate for assessing composability. Taken together, our findings showcase clear gaps in composability, suggesting a need for new multi-objective interventions. All of our code is public: https://github.com/hartvigsen-group/composable-interventions.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances coding tasks by incorporating retrieved code examples into prompts. However, lengthy prompts, often exceeding tens of thousands of tokens, introduce challenges related to limited context windows of language models (LMs) and high computational costs. Existing prompt compression techniques focus on natural language, lacking tailored solutions for code. To address the gap, we propose CodePromptZip, a framework that compresses code examples before integrating into RAG workflows. Our framework employs a type-aware, priority-driven strategy to construct training samples for training code compression model. By using program analysis, we identify token types (e.g., Identifier) and perform ablation analysis to rank their removal priorities based on their impact on task performance. We then train a small LM as the compressor on these samples, enabling flexible compression conditioned on specified ratios while minimizing performance degradation. Specially, the compressor is augmented with a copy mechanism, allowing tokens to be directly copied from the original code snippets. Evaluation results show that CodePromptZip surpasses SOTA entropy-based and distillation-based baselines, improving by 23.4%, 28.7%, and 8.7% over the best baseline for Assertion Generation, Bugs2Fix, and Code Suggestion, respectively.

Perturbative availability poisons (PAPs) add small changes to images to prevent their use for model training. Current research adopts the belief that practical and effective approaches to countering PAPs do not exist. In this paper, we argue that it is time to abandon this belief. We present extensive experiments showing that 12 state-of-the-art PAP methods are vulnerable to Image Shortcut Squeezing (ISS), which is based on simple compression. For example, on average, ISS restores the CIFAR-10 model accuracy to 81.73%, surpassing the previous best preprocessing-based countermeasures by 37.97% absolute. ISS also (slightly) outperforms adversarial training and has higher generalizability to unseen perturbation norms and also higher efficiency. Our investigation reveals that the property of PAP perturbations depends on the type of surrogate model used for poison generation, and it explains why a specific ISS compression yields the best performance for a specific type of PAP perturbation. We further test stronger, adaptive poisoning, and show it falls short of being an ideal defense against ISS. Overall, our results demonstrate the importance of considering various (simple) countermeasures to ensure the meaningfulness of analysis carried out during the development of PAP methods.

Augmenting large language models (LLMs) with external tools has emerged as a promising approach to extend their utility, empowering them to solve practical tasks. Existing work typically empowers LLMs as tool users with a manually designed workflow, where the LLM plans a series of tools in a step-by-step manner, and sequentially executes each tool to obtain intermediate results until deriving the final answer. However, they suffer from two challenges in realistic scenarios: (1) The handcrafted control flow is often ad-hoc and constraints the LLM to local planning; (2) The LLM is instructed to use only manually demonstrated tools or well-trained Python functions, which limits its generalization to new tools. In this work, we first propose Automatic Tool Chain (ATC), a framework that enables the LLM to act as a multi-tool user, which directly utilizes a chain of tools through programming. To scale up the scope of the tools, we next propose a black-box probing method. This further empowers the LLM as a tool learner that can actively discover and document tool usages, teaching themselves to properly master new tools. For a comprehensive evaluation, we build a challenging benchmark named ToolFlow, which diverges from previous benchmarks by its long-term planning scenarios and complex toolset. Experiments on both existing datasets and ToolFlow illustrate the superiority of our framework. Analysis on different settings also validates the effectiveness and the utility of our black-box probing algorithm.

The development of large language models (LLMs) depends on trustworthy evaluation. However, most current evaluations rely on public benchmarks, which are prone to data contamination issues that significantly compromise fairness. Previous researches have focused on constructing dynamic benchmarks to address contamination. However, continuously building new benchmarks is costly and cyclical. In this work, we aim to tackle contamination by analyzing the mechanisms of contaminated models themselves. Through our experiments, we discover that the overestimation of contaminated models is likely due to parameters acquiring shortcut solutions in training. We further propose a novel method for identifying shortcut neurons through comparative and causal analysis. Building on this, we introduce an evaluation method called shortcut neuron patching to suppress shortcut neurons. Experiments validate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating contamination. Additionally, our evaluation results exhibit a strong linear correlation with MixEval, a recently released trustworthy benchmark, achieving a Spearman coefficient (rho) exceeding 0.95. This high correlation indicates that our method closely reveals true capabilities of the models and is trustworthy. We conduct further experiments to demonstrate the generalizability of our method across various benchmarks and hyperparameter settings. Code: https://github.com/GaryStack/Trustworthy-Evaluation

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown significant advancements in performance, various jailbreak attacks have posed growing safety and ethical risks. Malicious users often exploit adversarial context to deceive LLMs, prompting them to generate responses to harmful queries. In this study, we propose a new defense mechanism called Context Filtering model, an input pre-processing method designed to filter out untrustworthy and unreliable context while identifying the primary prompts containing the real user intent to uncover concealed malicious intent. Given that enhancing the safety of LLMs often compromises their helpfulness, potentially affecting the experience of benign users, our method aims to improve the safety of the LLMs while preserving their original performance. We evaluate the effectiveness of our model in defending against jailbreak attacks through comparative analysis, comparing our approach with state-of-the-art defense mechanisms against six different attacks and assessing the helpfulness of LLMs under these defenses. Our model demonstrates its ability to reduce the Attack Success Rates of jailbreak attacks by up to 88% while maintaining the original LLMs' performance, achieving state-of-the-art Safety and Helpfulness Product results. Notably, our model is a plug-and-play method that can be applied to all LLMs, including both white-box and black-box models, to enhance their safety without requiring any fine-tuning of the models themselves. We will make our model publicly available for research purposes.

Recent AI-based video editing has enabled users to edit videos through simple text prompts, significantly simplifying the editing process. However, recent zero-shot video editing techniques primarily focus on global or single-object edits, which can lead to unintended changes in other parts of the video. When multiple objects require localized edits, existing methods face challenges, such as unfaithful editing, editing leakage, and lack of suitable evaluation datasets and metrics. To overcome these limitations, we propose a zero-shot Multi-Instance Video Editing framework, called MIVE. MIVE is a general-purpose mask-based framework, not dedicated to specific objects (e.g., people). MIVE introduces two key modules: (i) Disentangled Multi-instance Sampling (DMS) to prevent editing leakage and (ii) Instance-centric Probability Redistribution (IPR) to ensure precise localization and faithful editing. Additionally, we present our new MIVE Dataset featuring diverse video scenarios and introduce the Cross-Instance Accuracy (CIA) Score to evaluate editing leakage in multi-instance video editing tasks. Our extensive qualitative, quantitative, and user study evaluations demonstrate that MIVE significantly outperforms recent state-of-the-art methods in terms of editing faithfulness, accuracy, and leakage prevention, setting a new benchmark for multi-instance video editing. The project page is available at https://kaist-viclab.github.io/mive-site/

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

Although Foundation Models (FMs), such as GPT-4, are increasingly used in domains like finance and software engineering, reliance on textual interfaces limits these models' real-world interaction. To address this, FM providers introduced tool calling-triggering a proliferation of frameworks with distinct tool interfaces. In late 2024, Anthropic introduced the Model Context Protocol (MCP) to standardize this tool ecosystem, which has become the de facto standard with over eight million weekly SDK downloads. Despite its adoption, MCP's AI-driven, non-deterministic control flow introduces new risks to sustainability, security, and maintainability, warranting closer examination. Towards this end, we present the first large-scale empirical study of MCP servers. Using state-of-the-art health metrics and a hybrid analysis pipeline, combining a general-purpose static analysis tool with an MCP-specific scanner, we evaluate 1,899 open-source MCP servers to assess their health, security, and maintainability. Despite MCP servers demonstrating strong health metrics, we identify eight distinct vulnerabilities - only three overlapping with traditional software vulnerabilities. Additionally, 7.2% of servers contain general vulnerabilities and 5.5% exhibit MCP-specific tool poisoning. Regarding maintainability, while 66% exhibit code smells, 14.4% contain nine bug patterns overlapping with traditional open-source software projects. These findings highlight the need for MCP-specific vulnerability detection techniques while reaffirming the value of traditional analysis and refactoring practices.

Finetuning large language models (LLMs) enables user-specific customization but introduces critical safety risks: even a few harmful examples can compromise safety alignment. A common mitigation strategy is to update the model more strongly on examples deemed safe, while downweighting or excluding those flagged as unsafe. However, because safety context can shift within a single example, updating the model equally on both harmful and harmless parts of a response is suboptimal-a coarse treatment we term static safety shaping. In contrast, we propose dynamic safety shaping (DSS), a framework that uses fine-grained safety signals to reinforce learning from safe segments of a response while suppressing unsafe content. To enable such fine-grained control during finetuning, we introduce a key insight: guardrail models, traditionally used for filtering, can be repurposed to evaluate partial responses, tracking how safety risk evolves throughout the response, segment by segment. This leads to the Safety Trajectory Assessment of Response (STAR), a token-level signal that enables shaping to operate dynamically over the training sequence. Building on this, we present STAR-DSS, guided by STAR scores, that robustly mitigates finetuning risks and delivers substantial safety improvements across diverse threats, datasets, and model families-all without compromising capability on intended tasks. We encourage future safety research to build on dynamic shaping principles for stronger mitigation against evolving finetuning risks.

Online content is filled with logos, from ads and social media posts to website branding and product placements. Consequently, these logos are prevalent in the extensive web-scraped datasets used to pretrain Vision-Language Models, which are used for a wide array of tasks (content moderation, object classification). While these models have been shown to learn harmful correlations in various tasks, whether these correlations include logos remains understudied. Understanding this is especially important due to logos often being used by public-facing entities like brands and government agencies. To that end, we develop SLANT: A Spurious Logo ANalysis Toolkit. Our key finding is that some logos indeed lead to spurious incorrect predictions, for example, adding the Adidas logo to a photo of a person causes a model classify the person as greedy. SLANT contains a semi-automatic mechanism for mining such "spurious" logos. The mechanism consists of a comprehensive logo bank, CC12M-LogoBank, and an algorithm that searches the bank for logos that VLMs spuriously correlate with a user-provided downstream recognition target. We uncover various seemingly harmless logos that VL models correlate 1) with negative human adjectives 2) with the concept of `harmlessness'; causing models to misclassify harmful online content as harmless, and 3) with user-provided object concepts; causing lower recognition accuracy on ImageNet zero-shot classification. Furthermore, SLANT's logos can be seen as effective attacks against foundational models; an attacker could place a spurious logo on harmful content, causing the model to misclassify it as harmless. This threat is alarming considering the simplicity of logo attacks, increasing the attack surface of VL models. As a defense, we include in our Toolkit two effective mitigation strategies that seamlessly integrate with zero-shot inference of foundation models.

Scripting interfaces enable users to automate tasks and customize software workflows, but creating scripts traditionally requires programming expertise and familiarity with specific APIs, posing barriers for many users. While Large Language Models (LLMs) can generate code from natural language queries, runtime code generation is severely limited due to unverified code, security risks, longer response times, and higher computational costs. To bridge the gap, we propose an offline simulation framework to curate a software-specific skillset, a collection of verified scripts, by exploiting LLMs and publicly available scripting guides. Our framework comprises two components: (1) task creation, using top-down functionality guidance and bottom-up API synergy exploration to generate helpful tasks; and (2) skill generation with trials, refining and validating scripts based on execution feedback. To efficiently navigate the extensive API landscape, we introduce a Graph Neural Network (GNN)-based link prediction model to capture API synergy, enabling the generation of skills involving underutilized APIs and expanding the skillset's diversity. Experiments with Adobe Illustrator demonstrate that our framework significantly improves automation success rates, reduces response time, and saves runtime token costs compared to traditional runtime code generation. This is the first attempt to use software scripting interfaces as a testbed for LLM-based systems, highlighting the advantages of leveraging execution feedback in a controlled environment and offering valuable insights into aligning AI capabilities with user needs in specialized software domains.

This paper presents a systematic literature review in Computer Science that provide an overview of the initiatives related to digital misinformation. This is an exploratory study that covers research from 1993 to 2020, focusing on the investigation of the phenomenon of misinformation. The review consists of 788 studies from SCOPUS, IEEE, and ACM digital libraries, synthesizing the primary research directions and sociotechnical challenges. These challenges are classified into Physical, Empirical, Syntactic, Semantic, Pragmatic, and Social dimensions, drawing from Organizational Semiotics. The mapping identifies issues related to the concept of misinformation, highlights deficiencies in mitigation strategies, discusses challenges in approaching stakeholders, and unveils various sociotechnical aspects relevant to understanding and mitigating the harmful effects of digital misinformation. As contributions, this study present a novel categorization of mitigation strategies, a sociotechnical taxonomy for classifying types of false information and elaborate on the inter-relation of sociotechnical aspects and their impacts.

To date, toxicity mitigation in language models has almost entirely been focused on single-language settings. As language models embrace multilingual capabilities, it's crucial our safety measures keep pace. Recognizing this research gap, our approach expands the scope of conventional toxicity mitigation to address the complexities presented by multiple languages. In the absence of sufficient annotated datasets across languages, we employ translated data to evaluate and enhance our mitigation techniques. We also compare finetuning mitigation approaches against retrieval-augmented techniques under both static and continual toxicity mitigation scenarios. This allows us to examine the effects of translation quality and the cross-lingual transfer on toxicity mitigation. We also explore how model size and data quantity affect the success of these mitigation efforts. Covering nine languages, our study represents a broad array of linguistic families and levels of resource availability, ranging from high to mid-resource languages. Through comprehensive experiments, we provide insights into the complexities of multilingual toxicity mitigation, offering valuable insights and paving the way for future research in this increasingly important field. Code and data are available at https://github.com/for-ai/goodtriever.

Utilizing state-of-the-art Large Language Models (LLMs), automatic code generation models play a pivotal role in enhancing the productivity and efficiency of software development coding procedures. As the adoption of LLMs becomes more widespread in software coding ecosystems, a pressing issue has emerged: does the generated code contain social biases, such as those related to age, gender, and race? This issue concerns the integrity, fairness, and ethical foundation of software applications that depend on the code generated by these models, yet is under-explored in the literature. This paper presents a novel bias assessment framework that is specifically designed for code generation tasks. Based on this framework, we conduct an extensive evaluation on the bias of nine state-of-the-art LLM-based code generation models. Our findings reveal that first, 31.45\% to 79.93\% code functions generated by our evaluated code generation models are biased, and 9.68\% to 37.37\% code functions' functionality are affected by the bias, which means biases not only exist in code generation models but in some cases, directly affect the functionality of the generated code, posing risks of unintended and possibly harmful software behaviors. To mitigate bias from code generation models, we propose three mitigation strategies, which can decrease the biased code ratio to a very low level of 0.4\% to 4.57\%.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong potential and impressive performance in automating the generation and optimization of workflows. However, existing approaches are marked by limited reasoning capabilities, high computational demands, and significant resource requirements. To address these issues, we propose DebFlow, a framework that employs a debate mechanism to optimize workflows and integrates reflexion to improve based on previous experiences. We evaluated our method across six benchmark datasets, including HotpotQA, MATH, and ALFWorld. Our approach achieved a 3\% average performance improvement over the latest baselines, demonstrating its effectiveness in diverse problem domains. In particular, during training, our framework reduces resource consumption by 37\% compared to the state-of-the-art baselines. Additionally, we performed ablation studies. Removing the Debate component resulted in a 4\% performance drop across two benchmark datasets, significantly greater than the 2\% drop observed when the Reflection component was removed. These findings strongly demonstrate the critical role of Debate in enhancing framework performance, while also highlighting the auxiliary contribution of reflexion to overall optimization.

Jailbreaking is an essential adversarial technique for red-teaming these models to uncover and patch security flaws. However, existing jailbreak methods face significant drawbacks. Token-level jailbreak attacks often produce incoherent or unreadable inputs and exhibit poor transferability, while prompt-level attacks lack scalability and rely heavily on manual effort and human ingenuity. We propose a concise and effective two-stage framework that combines the advantages of these approaches. The first stage performs a scenario-based generation of context and rephrases the original malicious query to obscure its harmful intent. The second stage then utilizes information from the model's hidden states to guide fine-grained edits, effectively steering the model's internal representation of the input from a malicious toward a benign one. Extensive experiments demonstrate that this method achieves state-of-the-art Attack Success Rate, with gains of up to 37.74% over the strongest baseline, and exhibits excellent transferability to black-box models. Our analysis further demonstrates that AGILE maintains substantial effectiveness against prominent defense mechanisms, highlighting the limitations of current safeguards and providing valuable insights for future defense development. Our code is available at https://github.com/yunsaijc/AGILE.

Understanding the landscape of potential harms from algorithmic systems enables practitioners to better anticipate consequences of the systems they build. It also supports the prospect of incorporating controls to help minimize harms that emerge from the interplay of technologies and social and cultural dynamics. A growing body of scholarship has identified a wide range of harms across different algorithmic technologies. However, computing research and practitioners lack a high level and synthesized overview of harms from algorithmic systems. Based on a scoping review of computing research (n=172), we present an applied taxonomy of sociotechnical harms to support a more systematic surfacing of potential harms in algorithmic systems. The final taxonomy builds on and refers to existing taxonomies, classifications, and terminologies. Five major themes related to sociotechnical harms - representational, allocative, quality-of-service, interpersonal harms, and social system/societal harms - and sub-themes are presented along with a description of these categories. We conclude with a discussion of challenges and opportunities for future research.

Despite extensive safety-tuning, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks via adversarially crafted instructions, reflecting a persistent trade-off between safety and task performance. In this work, we propose Intent-FT, a simple and lightweight fine-tuning approach that explicitly trains LLMs to infer the underlying intent of an instruction before responding. By fine-tuning on a targeted set of adversarial instructions, Intent-FT enables LLMs to generalize intent deduction to unseen attacks, thereby substantially improving their robustness. We comprehensively evaluate both parametric and non-parametric attacks across open-source and proprietary models, considering harmfulness from attacks, utility, over-refusal, and impact against white-box threats. Empirically, Intent-FT consistently mitigates all evaluated attack categories, with no single attack exceeding a 50\% success rate -- whereas existing defenses remain only partially effective. Importantly, our method preserves the model's general capabilities and reduces excessive refusals on benign instructions containing superficially harmful keywords. Furthermore, models trained with Intent-FT accurately identify hidden harmful intent in adversarial attacks, and these learned intentions can be effectively transferred to enhance vanilla model defenses. We publicly release our code at https://github.com/wj210/Intent_Jailbreak.

Despite extensive safety alignment efforts, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that elicit harmful behavior. While existing studies predominantly focus on attack methods that require technical expertise, two critical questions remain underexplored: (1) Are jailbroken responses truly useful in enabling average users to carry out harmful actions? (2) Do safety vulnerabilities exist in more common, simple human-LLM interactions? In this paper, we demonstrate that LLM responses most effectively facilitate harmful actions when they are both actionable and informative--two attributes easily elicited in multi-step, multilingual interactions. Using this insight, we propose HarmScore, a jailbreak metric that measures how effectively an LLM response enables harmful actions, and Speak Easy, a simple multi-step, multilingual attack framework. Notably, by incorporating Speak Easy into direct request and jailbreak baselines, we see an average absolute increase of 0.319 in Attack Success Rate and 0.426 in HarmScore in both open-source and proprietary LLMs across four safety benchmarks. Our work reveals a critical yet often overlooked vulnerability: Malicious users can easily exploit common interaction patterns for harmful intentions.

Multi-modal foundation models combining vision and language models such as Flamingo or GPT-4 have recently gained enormous interest. Alignment of foundation models is used to prevent models from providing toxic or harmful output. While malicious users have successfully tried to jailbreak foundation models, an equally important question is if honest users could be harmed by malicious third-party content. In this paper we show that imperceivable attacks on images in order to change the caption output of a multi-modal foundation model can be used by malicious content providers to harm honest users e.g. by guiding them to malicious websites or broadcast fake information. This indicates that countermeasures to adversarial attacks should be used by any deployed multi-modal foundation model.

We present an ultra-efficient post-training method for shortcutting large-scale pre-trained flow matching diffusion models into efficient few-step samplers, enabled by novel velocity field self-distillation. While shortcutting in flow matching, originally introduced by shortcut models, offers flexible trajectory-skipping capabilities, it requires a specialized step-size embedding incompatible with existing models unless retraining from scratchx2013a process nearly as costly as pretraining itself. Our key contribution is thus imparting a more aggressive shortcut mechanism to standard flow matching models (e.g., Flux), leveraging a unique distillation principle that obviates the need for step-size embedding. Working on the velocity field rather than sample space and learning rapidly from self-guided distillation in an online manner, our approach trains efficiently, e.g., producing a 3-step Flux less than one A100 day. Beyond distillation, our method can be incorporated into the pretraining stage itself, yielding models that inherently learn efficient, few-step flows without compromising quality. This capability also enables, to our knowledge, the first few-shot distillation method (e.g., 10 text-image pairs) for dozen-billion-parameter diffusion models, delivering state-of-the-art performance at almost free cost.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in medical contexts, raising critical concerns about safety, alignment, and susceptibility to adversarial manipulation. While prior benchmarks assess model refusal capabilities for harmful prompts, they often lack clinical specificity, graded harmfulness levels, and coverage of jailbreak-style attacks. We introduce CARES (Clinical Adversarial Robustness and Evaluation of Safety), a benchmark for evaluating LLM safety in healthcare. CARES includes over 18,000 prompts spanning eight medical safety principles, four harm levels, and four prompting styles: direct, indirect, obfuscated, and role-play, to simulate both malicious and benign use cases. We propose a three-way response evaluation protocol (Accept, Caution, Refuse) and a fine-grained Safety Score metric to assess model behavior. Our analysis reveals that many state-of-the-art LLMs remain vulnerable to jailbreaks that subtly rephrase harmful prompts, while also over-refusing safe but atypically phrased queries. Finally, we propose a mitigation strategy using a lightweight classifier to detect jailbreak attempts and steer models toward safer behavior via reminder-based conditioning. CARES provides a rigorous framework for testing and improving medical LLM safety under adversarial and ambiguous conditions.

Foundation model development attracts a rapidly expanding body of contributors, scientists, and applications. To help shape responsible development practices, we introduce the Foundation Model Development Cheatsheet: a growing collection of 250+ tools and resources spanning text, vision, and speech modalities. We draw on a large body of prior work to survey resources (e.g. software, documentation, frameworks, guides, and practical tools) that support informed data selection, processing, and understanding, precise and limitation-aware artifact documentation, efficient model training, advance awareness of the environmental impact from training, careful model evaluation of capabilities, risks, and claims, as well as responsible model release, licensing and deployment practices. We hope this curated collection of resources helps guide more responsible development. The process of curating this list, enabled us to review the AI development ecosystem, revealing what tools are critically missing, misused, or over-used in existing practices. We find that (i) tools for data sourcing, model evaluation, and monitoring are critically under-serving ethical and real-world needs, (ii) evaluations for model safety, capabilities, and environmental impact all lack reproducibility and transparency, (iii) text and particularly English-centric analyses continue to dominate over multilingual and multi-modal analyses, and (iv) evaluation of systems, rather than just models, is needed so that capabilities and impact are assessed in context.

The tendency to find and exploit "shortcuts" to complete tasks poses significant risks for reliable assessment and deployment of large language models (LLMs). For example, an LLM agent with access to unit tests may delete failing tests rather than fix the underlying bug. Such behavior undermines both the validity of benchmark results and the reliability of real-world LLM coding assistant deployments. To quantify, study, and mitigate such behavior, we introduce ImpossibleBench, a benchmark framework that systematically measures LLM agents' propensity to exploit test cases. ImpossibleBench creates "impossible" variants of tasks from existing benchmarks like LiveCodeBench and SWE-bench by introducing direct conflicts between the natural-language specification and the unit tests. We measure an agent's "cheating rate" as its pass rate on these impossible tasks, where any pass necessarily implies a specification-violating shortcut. As a practical framework, ImpossibleBench is not just an evaluation but a versatile tool. We demonstrate its utility for: (1) studying model behaviors, revealing more fine-grained details of cheating behaviors from simple test modification to complex operator overloading; (2) context engineering, showing how prompt, test access and feedback loop affect cheating rates; and (3) developing monitoring tools, providing a testbed with verified deceptive solutions. We hope ImpossibleBench serves as a useful framework for building more robust and reliable LLM systems. Our implementation can be found at https://github.com/safety-research/impossiblebench.

State-of-the-art Diffusion Models (DMs) produce highly realistic images. While prior work has successfully mitigated Not Safe For Work (NSFW) content in the visual domain, we identify a novel threat: the generation of NSFW text embedded within images. This includes offensive language, such as insults, racial slurs, and sexually explicit terms, posing significant risks to users. We show that all state-of-the-art DMs (e.g., SD3, SDXL, Flux, DeepFloyd IF) are vulnerable to this issue. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that existing mitigation techniques, effective for visual content, fail to prevent harmful text generation while substantially degrading benign text generation. As an initial step toward addressing this threat, we introduce a novel fine-tuning strategy that targets only the text-generation layers in DMs. Therefore, we construct a safety fine-tuning dataset by pairing each NSFW prompt with two images: one with the NSFW term, and another where that term is replaced with a carefully crafted benign alternative while leaving the image unchanged otherwise. By training on this dataset, the model learns to avoid generating harmful text while preserving benign content and overall image quality. Finally, to advance research in the area, we release ToxicBench, an open-source benchmark for evaluating NSFW text generation in images. It includes our curated fine-tuning dataset, a set of harmful prompts, new evaluation metrics, and a pipeline that assesses both NSFW-ness and text and image quality. Our benchmark aims to guide future efforts in mitigating NSFW text generation in text-to-image models, thereby contributing to their safe deployment. The benchmark is available online for download.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

The proliferation of harmful online content--e.g., toxicity, spam, and negative sentiment--demands robust and adaptable moderation systems. However, prevailing moderation systems are centralized and task-specific, offering limited transparency and neglecting diverse user preferences--an approach ill-suited for privacy-sensitive or decentralized environments. We propose a novel framework that leverages in-context learning (ICL) with foundation models to unify the detection of toxicity, spam, and negative sentiment across binary, multi-class, and multi-label settings. Crucially, our approach enables lightweight personalization, allowing users to easily block new categories, unblock existing ones, or extend detection to semantic variations through simple prompt-based interventions--all without model retraining. Extensive experiments on public benchmarks (TextDetox, UCI SMS, SST2) and a new, annotated Mastodon dataset reveal that: (i) foundation models achieve strong cross-task generalization, often matching or surpassing task-specific fine-tuned models; (ii) effective personalization is achievable with as few as one user-provided example or definition; and (iii) augmenting prompts with label definitions or rationales significantly enhances robustness to noisy, real-world data. Our work demonstrates a definitive shift beyond one-size-fits-all moderation, establishing ICL as a practical, privacy-preserving, and highly adaptable pathway for the next generation of user-centric content safety systems. To foster reproducibility and facilitate future research, we publicly release our code on GitHub and the annotated Mastodon dataset on Hugging Face.

Visual diffusion models have revolutionized the field of creative AI, producing high-quality and diverse content. However, they inevitably memorize training images or videos, subsequently replicating their concepts, content, or styles during inference. This phenomenon raises significant concerns about privacy, security, and copyright within generated outputs. In this survey, we provide the first comprehensive review of replication in visual diffusion models, marking a novel contribution to the field by systematically categorizing the existing studies into unveiling, understanding, and mitigating this phenomenon. Specifically, unveiling mainly refers to the methods used to detect replication instances. Understanding involves analyzing the underlying mechanisms and factors that contribute to this phenomenon. Mitigation focuses on developing strategies to reduce or eliminate replication. Beyond these aspects, we also review papers focusing on its real-world influence. For instance, in the context of healthcare, replication is critically worrying due to privacy concerns related to patient data. Finally, the paper concludes with a discussion of the ongoing challenges, such as the difficulty in detecting and benchmarking replication, and outlines future directions including the development of more robust mitigation techniques. By synthesizing insights from diverse studies, this paper aims to equip researchers and practitioners with a deeper understanding at the intersection between AI technology and social good. We release this project at https://github.com/WangWenhao0716/Awesome-Diffusion-Replication.

Modern web interfaces are unnecessarily complex to use as they overwhelm users with excessive text and visuals unrelated to their current goals. This problem particularly impacts screen reader users (SRUs), who navigate content sequentially and may spend minutes traversing irrelevant elements before reaching desired information compared to vision users (VUs) who visually skim in seconds. We present Task Mode, a system that dynamically filters web content based on user-specified goals using large language models to identify and prioritize relevant elements while minimizing distractions. Our approach preserves page structure while offering multiple viewing modes tailored to different access needs. Our user study with 12 participants (6 VUs, 6 SRUs) demonstrates that our approach reduced task completion time for SRUs while maintaining performance for VUs, decreasing the completion time gap between groups from 2x to 1.2x. 11 of 12 participants wanted to use Task Mode in the future, reporting that Task Mode supported completing tasks with less effort and fewer distractions. This work demonstrates how designing new interactions simultaneously for visual and non-visual access can reduce rather than reinforce accessibility disparities in future technology created by human-computer interaction researchers and practitioners.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

In this study, we propose Shortcut Fine-Tuning (SFT), a new approach for addressing the challenge of fast sampling of pretrained Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Models (DDPMs). SFT advocates for the fine-tuning of DDPM samplers through the direct minimization of Integral Probability Metrics (IPM), instead of learning the backward diffusion process. This enables samplers to discover an alternative and more efficient sampling shortcut, deviating from the backward diffusion process. Inspired by a control perspective, we propose a new algorithm SFT-PG: Shortcut Fine-Tuning with Policy Gradient, and prove that under certain assumptions, gradient descent of diffusion models with respect to IPM is equivalent to performing policy gradient. To our best knowledge, this is the first attempt to utilize reinforcement learning (RL) methods to train diffusion models. Through empirical evaluation, we demonstrate that our fine-tuning method can further enhance existing fast DDPM samplers, resulting in sample quality comparable to or even surpassing that of the full-step model across various datasets.

Autonomous user interface (UI) agents aim to facilitate task automation by interacting with the user interface without manual intervention. Recent studies have investigated eliciting the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) for effective engagement in diverse environments. To align with the input-output requirement of LLMs, existing approaches are developed under a sandbox setting where they rely on external tools and application-specific APIs to parse the environment into textual elements and interpret the predicted actions. Consequently, those approaches often grapple with inference inefficiency and error propagation risks. To mitigate the challenges, we introduce Auto-UI, a multimodal solution that directly interacts with the interface, bypassing the need for environment parsing or reliance on application-dependent APIs. Moreover, we propose a chain-of-action technique -- leveraging a series of intermediate previous action histories and future action plans -- to help the agent decide what action to execute. We evaluate our approach on a new device-control benchmark AITW with 30K unique instructions, spanning multi-step tasks such as application operation, web searching, and web shopping. Experimental results show that Auto-UI achieves state-of-the-art performance with an action type prediction accuracy of 90% and an overall action success rate of 74%. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/cooelf/Auto-UI.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has brought about remarkable generative capabilities but also raised concerns about their potential misuse. While strategies like supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback have enhanced their safety, these methods primarily focus on natural languages, which may not generalize to other domains. This paper introduces CodeAttack, a framework that transforms natural language inputs into code inputs, presenting a novel environment for testing the safety generalization of LLMs. Our comprehensive studies on state-of-the-art LLMs including GPT-4, Claude-2, and Llama-2 series reveal a new and universal safety vulnerability of these models against code input: CodeAttack bypasses the safety guardrails of all models more than 80\% of the time. We find that a larger distribution gap between CodeAttack and natural language leads to weaker safety generalization, such as encoding natural language input with data structures. Furthermore, we give our hypotheses about the success of CodeAttack: the misaligned bias acquired by LLMs during code training, prioritizing code completion over avoiding the potential safety risk. Finally, we analyze potential mitigation measures. These findings highlight new safety risks in the code domain and the need for more robust safety alignment algorithms to match the code capabilities of LLMs.

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Text data can pose a risk of harm. However, the risks are not fully understood, and how to handle, present, and discuss harmful text in a safe way remains an unresolved issue in the NLP community. We provide an analytical framework categorising harms on three axes: (1) the harm type (e.g., misinformation, hate speech or racial stereotypes); (2) whether a harm is sought as a feature of the research design if explicitly studying harmful content (e.g., training a hate speech classifier), versus unsought if harmful content is encountered when working on unrelated problems (e.g., language generation or part-of-speech tagging); and (3) who it affects, from people (mis)represented in the data to those handling the data and those publishing on the data. We provide advice for practitioners, with concrete steps for mitigating harm in research and in publication. To assist implementation we introduce HarmCheck -- a documentation standard for handling and presenting harmful text in research.

Despite widespread deployment of Large Language Models, systematic evaluation of instruction-following capabilities remains challenging. While comprehensive benchmarks exist, focused assessments that quickly diagnose specific instruction adherence patterns are valuable. As newer models may be trained on existing benchmarks, novel evaluation approaches are needed to assess genuine capabilities rather than memorized performance. This paper presents a streamlined evaluation framework using twenty carefully designed prompts to assess LLM instruction-following across diverse task categories. We demonstrate this framework through a large-scale empirical study conducted on October 14, 2025, testing 256 verified working models from 331 available via OpenRouter. To ensure methodological rigor and prevent selection bias, we first verified each model's basic functionality before inclusion. Unlike large-scale benchmarks requiring extensive computational resources, our approach offers a practical diagnostic tool researchers and practitioners can readily apply. Our methodology builds upon verifiable instructions while introducing a compact test suite balancing comprehensiveness with efficiency. Each prompt targets distinct aspects of instruction following, including format compliance, content constraints, logical sequencing, and multi-step task execution. We evaluate models from major providers (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta, Mistral) and emerging implementations (Qwen, DeepSeek, community models), providing comparative performance analysis. Our findings reveal consistent failure modes and identify specific instruction types posing particular challenges. This work contributes both a practical evaluation tool and one of the most comprehensive empirical analyses of instruction-following capabilities across the contemporary LLM landscape.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to `jailbreaking' prompts, which can induce the generation of harmful content. This paper demonstrates that moderate WANDA pruning (Sun et al., 2023) can increase their resistance to such attacks without the need for fine-tuning, while maintaining performance on standard benchmarks. Our findings suggest that the benefits of pruning correlate with the initial safety levels of the model, indicating a regularizing effect of WANDA pruning. We introduce a dataset of 225 harmful tasks across five categories to systematically evaluate this safety enhancement. We argue that safety improvements can be understood through a regularization perspective. First, we show that pruning helps LLMs focus more effectively on task-relevant tokens within jailbreaking prompts. Then, we analyze the effects of pruning on the perplexity of malicious prompts before and after their integration into jailbreak templates. Finally, we demonstrate statistically significant performance improvements under domain shifts when applying WANDA to linear models.

Tool calling has emerged as a critical capability for AI agents to interact with the real world and solve complex tasks. While the Model Context Protocol (MCP) provides a powerful standardized framework for tool integration, there is a significant gap in benchmarking how well AI agents can effectively solve multi-step tasks using diverse MCP tools in realistic, dynamic scenarios. In this work, we present LiveMCP-101, a benchmark of 101 carefully curated real-world queries, refined through iterative LLM rewriting and manual review, that require coordinated use of multiple MCP tools including web search, file operations, mathematical reasoning, and data analysis. Moreover, we introduce a novel evaluation approach that leverages ground-truth execution plans rather than raw API outputs, better reflecting the evolving nature of real-world environments. Experiments show that even frontier LLMs achieve a success rate below 60\%, highlighting major challenges in tool orchestration. Detailed ablations and error analysis further reveal distinct failure modes and inefficiencies in token usage, pointing to concrete directions for advancing current models. LiveMCP-101 sets a rigorous standard for evaluating real-world agent capabilities, advancing toward autonomous AI systems that reliably execute complex tasks through tool use.

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly deployed in critical applications, raising urgent needs for robust safety benchmarking. We propose Jailbreak Distillation (JBDistill), a novel benchmark construction framework that "distills" jailbreak attacks into high-quality and easily-updatable safety benchmarks. JBDistill utilizes a small set of development models and existing jailbreak attack algorithms to create a candidate prompt pool, then employs prompt selection algorithms to identify an effective subset of prompts as safety benchmarks. JBDistill addresses challenges in existing safety evaluation: the use of consistent evaluation prompts across models ensures fair comparisons and reproducibility. It requires minimal human effort to rerun the JBDistill pipeline and produce updated benchmarks, alleviating concerns on saturation and contamination. Extensive experiments demonstrate our benchmarks generalize robustly to 13 diverse evaluation models held out from benchmark construction, including proprietary, specialized, and newer-generation LLMs, significantly outperforming existing safety benchmarks in effectiveness while maintaining high separability and diversity. Our framework thus provides an effective, sustainable, and adaptable solution for streamlining safety evaluation.

We introduce {rm C{small LEVER}}, a high-quality, curated benchmark of 161 problems for end-to-end verified code generation in Lean. Each problem consists of (1) the task of generating a specification that matches a held-out ground-truth specification, and (2) the task of generating a Lean implementation that provably satisfies this specification. Unlike prior benchmarks, {rm C{small LEVER}} avoids test-case supervision, LLM-generated annotations, and specifications that leak implementation logic or allow vacuous solutions. All outputs are verified post-hoc using Lean's type checker to ensure machine-checkable correctness. We use {rm C{small LEVER}} to evaluate several few-shot and agentic approaches based on state-of-the-art language models. These methods all struggle to achieve full verification, establishing it as a challenging frontier benchmark for program synthesis and formal reasoning. Our benchmark can be found on GitHub(https://github.com/trishullab/clever) as well as HuggingFace(https://huggingface.co/datasets/amitayusht/clever). All our evaluation code is also available online(https://github.com/trishullab/clever-prover).

The availability of large public datasets and the increased amount of computing power have shifted the interest of the medical community to high-performance algorithms. However, little attention is paid to the quality of the data and their annotations. High performance on benchmark datasets may be reported without considering possible shortcuts or artifacts in the data, besides, models are not tested on subpopulation groups. With this work, we aim to raise awareness about shortcuts problems. We validate previous findings, and present a case study on chest X-rays using two publicly available datasets. We share annotations for a subset of pneumothorax images with drains. We conclude with general recommendations for medical image classification.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated enhanced capabilities in function-calling, these advancements primarily rely on accessing the functions' responses. This methodology is practical for simpler APIs but faces scalability issues with irreversible APIs that significantly impact the system, such as a database deletion API. Similarly, processes requiring extensive time for each API call and those necessitating forward planning, like automated action pipelines, present complex challenges. Furthermore, scenarios often arise where a generalized approach is needed because algorithms lack direct access to the specific implementations of these functions or secrets to use them. Traditional tool planning methods are inadequate in these cases, compelling the need to operate within black-box environments. Unlike their performance in tool manipulation, LLMs excel in black-box tasks, such as program synthesis. Therefore, we harness the program synthesis capabilities of LLMs to strategize tool usage in black-box settings, ensuring solutions are verified prior to implementation. We introduce TOPGUN, an ingeniously crafted approach leveraging program synthesis for black box tool planning. Accompanied by SwissNYF, a comprehensive suite that integrates black-box algorithms for planning and verification tasks, addressing the aforementioned challenges and enhancing the versatility and effectiveness of LLMs in complex API interactions. The public code for SwissNYF is available at https://github.com/iclr-dummy-user/SwissNYF.

Deep neural networks have been widely used in many critical applications, such as autonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis. However, their security is threatened by backdoor attacks, which are achieved by adding artificial patterns to specific training data. Existing defense strategies primarily focus on using reverse engineering to reproduce the backdoor trigger generated by attackers and subsequently repair the DNN model by adding the trigger into inputs and fine-tuning the model with ground-truth labels. However, once the trigger generated by the attackers is complex and invisible, the defender cannot reproduce the trigger successfully then the DNN model will not be repaired, as the trigger is not effectively removed. In this work, we propose Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor (FMP) to mitigate backdoor from the DNN. Unlike existing defense strategies, which focus on reproducing backdoor triggers, FMP attempts to prune backdoor feature maps, which are trained to extract backdoor information from inputs. After pruning these backdoor feature maps, FMP will fine-tune the model with a secure subset of training data. Our experiments demonstrate that, compared to existing defense strategies, FMP can effectively reduce the Attack Success Rate (ASR) even against the most complex and invisible attack triggers (e.g., FMP decreases the ASR to 2.86\% in CIFAR10, which is 19.2\% to 65.41\% lower than baselines). Second, unlike conventional defense methods that tend to exhibit low robust accuracy (that is, the accuracy of the model on poisoned data), FMP achieves a higher RA, indicating its superiority in maintaining model performance while mitigating the effects of backdoor attacks (e.g., FMP obtains 87.40\% RA in CIFAR10). Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/retsuh-bqw/FMP.

The presence of unhealthy nodes in cloud infrastructure signals the potential failure of machines, which can significantly impact the availability and reliability of cloud services, resulting in negative customer experiences. Effectively addressing unhealthy node mitigation is therefore vital for sustaining cloud system performance. This paper introduces Deoxys, a causal inference engine tailored to recommending mitigation actions for unhealthy node in cloud systems to minimize virtual machine downtime and interruptions during unhealthy events. It employs double machine learning combined with causal forest to produce precise and reliable mitigation recommendations based solely on limited observational data collected from the historical unhealthy events. To enhance the causal inference model, Deoxys further incorporates a policy fallback mechanism based on model uncertainty and action overriding mechanisms to (i) improve the reliability of the system, and (ii) strike a good tradeoff between downtime reduction and resource utilization, thereby enhancing the overall system performance. After deploying Deoxys in a large-scale cloud infrastructure at Microsoft, our observations demonstrate that Deoxys significantly reduces average VM downtime by 53% compared to a legacy policy, while leading to 49.5% lower VM interruption rate. This substantial improvement enhances the reliability and stability of cloud platforms, resulting in a seamless customer experience.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance in performance, their size has escalated significantly, with current LLMs containing billions or even trillions of parameters. However, in this study, we discovered that many layers of LLMs exhibit high similarity, and some layers play a negligible role in network functionality. Based on this observation, we define a metric called Block Influence (BI) to gauge the significance of each layer in LLMs. We then propose a straightforward pruning approach: layer removal, in which we directly delete the redundant layers in LLMs based on their BI scores. Experiments demonstrate that our method, which we call ShortGPT, significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods in model pruning. Moreover, ShortGPT is orthogonal to quantization-like methods, enabling further reduction in parameters and computation. The ability to achieve better results through simple layer removal, as opposed to more complex pruning techniques, suggests a high degree of redundancy in the model architecture.

As large language models~(LLMs) become widely adopted, ensuring their alignment with human values is crucial to prevent jailbreaks where adversaries manipulate models to produce harmful content. While most defenses target single-turn attacks, real-world usage often involves multi-turn dialogues, exposing models to attacks that exploit conversational context to bypass safety measures. We introduce MUSE, a comprehensive framework tackling multi-turn jailbreaks from both attack and defense angles. For attacks, we propose MUSE-A, a method that uses frame semantics and heuristic tree search to explore diverse semantic trajectories. For defense, we present MUSE-D, a fine-grained safety alignment approach that intervenes early in dialogues to reduce vulnerabilities. Extensive experiments on various models show that MUSE effectively identifies and mitigates multi-turn vulnerabilities. Code is available at https://github.com/yansiyu02/MUSE{https://github.com/yansiyu02/MUSE}.

Recent advances in multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have enabled unified perception-reasoning capabilities, yet these systems remain highly vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safety alignment and induce harmful behaviors. Existing benchmarks such as JailBreakV-28K, MM-SafetyBench, and HADES provide valuable insights into multi-modal vulnerabilities, but they typically focus on limited attack scenarios, lack standardized defense evaluation, and offer no unified, reproducible toolbox. To address these gaps, we introduce OmniSafeBench-MM, which is a comprehensive toolbox for multi-modal jailbreak attack-defense evaluation. OmniSafeBench-MM integrates 13 representative attack methods, 15 defense strategies, and a diverse dataset spanning 9 major risk domains and 50 fine-grained categories, structured across consultative, imperative, and declarative inquiry types to reflect realistic user intentions. Beyond data coverage, it establishes a three-dimensional evaluation protocol measuring (1) harmfulness, distinguished by a granular, multi-level scale ranging from low-impact individual harm to catastrophic societal threats, (2) intent alignment between responses and queries, and (3) response detail level, enabling nuanced safety-utility analysis. We conduct extensive experiments on 10 open-source and 8 closed-source MLLMs to reveal their vulnerability to multi-modal jailbreak. By unifying data, methodology, and evaluation into an open-source, reproducible platform, OmniSafeBench-MM provides a standardized foundation for future research. The code is released at https://github.com/jiaxiaojunQAQ/OmniSafeBench-MM.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

Context. LLM-based autonomous agents in software engineering rely on large, proprietary models, limiting local deployment. This has spurred interest in Small Language Models (SLMs), but their practical effectiveness and efficiency within complex agentic frameworks for automated issue resolution remain poorly understood. Goal. We investigate the performance, energy efficiency, and resource consumption of four leading agentic issue resolution frameworks when deliberately constrained to using SLMs. We aim to assess the viability of these systems for this task in resource-limited settings and characterize the resulting trade-offs. Method. We conduct a controlled evaluation of four leading agentic frameworks (SWE-Agent, OpenHands, Mini SWE Agent, AutoCodeRover) using two SLMs (Gemma-3 4B, Qwen-3 1.7B) on the SWE-bench Verified Mini benchmark. On fixed hardware, we measure energy, duration, token usage, and memory over 150 runs per configuration. Results. We find that framework architecture is the primary driver of energy consumption. The most energy-intensive framework, AutoCodeRover (Gemma), consumed 9.4x more energy on average than the least energy-intensive, OpenHands (Gemma). However, this energy is largely wasted. Task resolution rates were near-zero, demonstrating that current frameworks, when paired with SLMs, consume significant energy on unproductive reasoning loops. The SLM's limited reasoning was the bottleneck for success, but the framework's design was the bottleneck for efficiency. Conclusions. Current agentic frameworks, designed for powerful LLMs, fail to operate efficiently with SLMs. We find that framework architecture is the primary driver of energy consumption, but this energy is largely wasted due to the SLMs' limited reasoning. Viable low-energy solutions require shifting from passive orchestration to architectures that actively manage SLM weaknesses.

Large Language Models can break through knowledge and timeliness limitations by invoking external tools within the Model Context Protocol framework to achieve automated execution of complex tasks. However, with the rapid growth of enterprise-scale MCP services, efficiently and accurately matching target functionalities among thousands of heterogeneous tools has become a core challenge restricting system practicality. Existing approaches generally rely on full-prompt injection or static semantic retrieval, facing issues including semantic disconnection between user queries and tool descriptions, context inflation in LLM input, and high inference latency. To address these challenges, this paper proposes Z-Space, a data-generation-oriented multi-agent collaborative tool invocation framework Z-Space. The Z-Space framework establishes a multi-agent collaborative architecture and tool filtering algorithm: (1) A structured semantic understanding of user queries is achieved through an intent parsing model; (2) A tool filtering module (FSWW) based on fused subspace weighted algorithm realizes fine-grained semantic alignment between intents and tools without parameter tuning; (3) An inference execution agent is constructed to support dynamic planning and fault-tolerant execution for multi-step tasks. This framework has been deployed in the Eleme platform's technical division, serving large-scale test data generation scenarios across multiple business units including Taotian, Gaode, and Hema. Production data demonstrates that the system reduces average token consumption in tool inference by 96.26\% while achieving a 92\% tool invocation accuracy rate, significantly enhancing the efficiency and reliability of intelligent test data generation systems.

Recent face anti-spoofing (FAS) methods have shown remarkable cross-domain performance by employing vision-language models like CLIP. However, existing CLIP-based FAS models do not fully exploit CLIP's patch embedding tokens, failing to detect critical spoofing clues. Moreover, these models rely on a single text prompt per class (e.g., 'live' or 'fake'), which limits generalization. To address these issues, we propose MVP-FAS, a novel framework incorporating two key modules: Multi-View Slot attention (MVS) and Multi-Text Patch Alignment (MTPA). Both modules utilize multiple paraphrased texts to generate generalized features and reduce dependence on domain-specific text. MVS extracts local detailed spatial features and global context from patch embeddings by leveraging diverse texts with multiple perspectives. MTPA aligns patches with multiple text representations to improve semantic robustness. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MVP-FAS achieves superior generalization performance, outperforming previous state-of-the-art methods on cross-domain datasets. Code: https://github.com/Elune001/MVP-FAS.

In recent years, Text-to-Image (T2I) models have seen remarkable advancements, gaining widespread adoption. However, this progress has inadvertently opened avenues for potential misuse, particularly in generating inappropriate or Not-Safe-For-Work (NSFW) content. Our work introduces MMA-Diffusion, a framework that presents a significant and realistic threat to the security of T2I models by effectively circumventing current defensive measures in both open-source models and commercial online services. Unlike previous approaches, MMA-Diffusion leverages both textual and visual modalities to bypass safeguards like prompt filters and post-hoc safety checkers, thus exposing and highlighting the vulnerabilities in existing defense mechanisms.

Large Language Model (LLM)-powered multi-agent systems (MAS) have rapidly advanced collaborative reasoning, tool use, and role-specialized coordination in complex tasks. However, reliability-critical deployment remains hindered by a systemic failure mode: hierarchical compliance under instruction conflicts (system-user, peer-peer), where agents misprioritize system-level rules in the presence of competing demands. Moreover, widely used macro-level metrics (e.g., pass@k) obscure these micro-level violations and offer little actionable guidance for remedy. In this work, we present a full-stack, three-stage framework: (1) Diagnose - Contextualized Role Adherence Score (CRAS), a query-wise, context-aware scoring metric that decomposes role adherence into four measurable dimensions; (2) Localize - attention drift analysis revealing that instruction conflicts are resolved by attention heads that are largely concentrated in middle layers; (3) Align - Surgical Alignment of Instruction Layers (SAIL), which installs LoRA only on the localized focal layers and optimizes a token-weighted DPO-style preference objective that credits tokens by their focal attentional contribution. Across standard benchmarks and MAS frameworks, our surgical approach improves instruction hierarchy compliance (e.g., +5.60% with AutoGen on MedQA) without full-model finetuning.

Modern software systems are guided by hierarchical architectural concepts -- software architectures, reference architectures, and architectural frameworks -- each operating at a distinct level of abstraction. These artifacts promote reuse, scalability, and consistency, but also embed tradeoffs that shape critical quality attributes such as modifiability, performance, and security. Existing evaluation methods, such as the Architecture Tradeoff Analysis Method (ATAM), focus on system-specific architectures and are not designed to address the broader generality and variability of higher-level architectural forms. To close this gap, we introduce the Architecture Tradeoff and Risk Analysis Framework (ATRAF) -- a unified, scenario-driven framework for evaluating tradeoffs and risks across architectural levels. ATRAF encompasses three methods: the Architecture Tradeoff and Risk Analysis Method (ATRAM), extending ATAM with enhanced risk identification for concrete systems; the Reference Architecture Tradeoff and Risk Analysis Method (RATRAM), adapting ATRAM to the evaluation of domain-level reference architectures; and the Architectural Framework Tradeoff and Risk Analysis Method (AFTRAM), supporting the evaluation of architectural frameworks that guide entire system families. All three methods follow an iterative spiral process that enables the identification of sensitivities, tradeoffs, and risks while supporting continuous refinement of architectural artifacts. We demonstrate ATRAF through progressively abstracted examples derived from the Remote Temperature Sensor (RTS) case, originally introduced in the ATAM literature. ATRAF equips architects, reference modelers, and framework designers with a practical, systematic approach for analyzing design alternatives and managing quality attribute tradeoffs early in the lifecycle and across all levels of architectural abstraction.

The automation of scientific discovery represents a critical milestone in Artificial Intelligence (AI) research. However, existing agentic systems for science suffer from two fundamental limitations: rigid, pre-programmed workflows that cannot adapt to intermediate findings, and inadequate context management that hinders long-horizon research. We present freephdlabor, an open-source multiagent framework featuring fully dynamic workflows determined by real-time agent reasoning and a \textit{modular architecture} enabling seamless customization -- users can modify, add, or remove agents to address domain-specific requirements. The framework provides comprehensive infrastructure including automatic context compaction, workspace-based communication to prevent information degradation, memory persistence across sessions, and non-blocking human intervention mechanisms. These features collectively transform automated research from isolated, single-run attempts into continual research programs that build systematically on prior explorations and incorporate human feedback. By providing both the architectural principles and practical implementation for building customizable co-scientist systems, this work aims to facilitate broader adoption of automated research across scientific domains, enabling practitioners to deploy interactive multiagent systems that autonomously conduct end-to-end research -- from ideation through experimentation to publication-ready manuscripts.

Recent advances in long-context language models (LMs) have enabled million-token inputs, expanding their capabilities across complex tasks like computer-use agents. Yet, the safety implications of these extended contexts remain unclear. To bridge this gap, we introduce NINJA (short for Needle-in-haystack jailbreak attack), a method that jailbreaks aligned LMs by appending benign, model-generated content to harmful user goals. Critical to our method is the observation that the position of harmful goals play an important role in safety. Experiments on standard safety benchmark, HarmBench, show that NINJA significantly increases attack success rates across state-of-the-art open and proprietary models, including LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral, and Gemini. Unlike prior jailbreaking methods, our approach is low-resource, transferable, and less detectable. Moreover, we show that NINJA is compute-optimal -- under a fixed compute budget, increasing context length can outperform increasing the number of trials in best-of-N jailbreak. These findings reveal that even benign long contexts -- when crafted with careful goal positioning -- introduce fundamental vulnerabilities in modern LMs.

Search agents connect LLMs to the Internet, enabling access to broader and more up-to-date information. However, unreliable search results may also pose safety threats to end users, establishing a new threat surface. In this work, we conduct two in-the-wild experiments to demonstrate both the prevalence of low-quality search results and their potential to misguide agent behaviors. To counter this threat, we introduce an automated red-teaming framework that is systematic, scalable, and cost-efficient, enabling lightweight and harmless safety assessments of search agents. Building on this framework, we construct the SafeSearch benchmark, which includes 300 test cases covering five categories of risks (e.g., misinformation and indirect prompt injection). Using this benchmark, we evaluate three representative search agent scaffolds, covering search workflow, tool-calling, and deep research, across 7 proprietary and 8 open-source backend LLMs. Our results reveal substantial vulnerabilities of LLM-based search agents: when exposed to unreliable websites, the highest ASR reached 90.5% for GPT-4.1-mini under a search workflow setting. Moreover, our analysis highlights the limited effectiveness of common defense practices, such as reminder prompting. This emphasizes the value of our framework in promoting transparency for safer agent development. Our codebase and test cases are publicly available: https://github.com/jianshuod/SafeSearch.

In this work, we study the risks of collective financial fraud in large-scale multi-agent systems powered by large language model (LLM) agents. We investigate whether agents can collaborate in fraudulent behaviors, how such collaboration amplifies risks, and what factors influence fraud success. To support this research, we present MultiAgentFraudBench, a large-scale benchmark for simulating financial fraud scenarios based on realistic online interactions. The benchmark covers 28 typical online fraud scenarios, spanning the full fraud lifecycle across both public and private domains. We further analyze key factors affecting fraud success, including interaction depth, activity level, and fine-grained collaboration failure modes. Finally, we propose a series of mitigation strategies, including adding content-level warnings to fraudulent posts and dialogues, using LLMs as monitors to block potentially malicious agents, and fostering group resilience through information sharing at the societal level. Notably, we observe that malicious agents can adapt to environmental interventions. Our findings highlight the real-world risks of multi-agent financial fraud and suggest practical measures for mitigating them. Code is available at https://github.com/zheng977/MutiAgent4Fraud.

Despite the advanced capabilities of contemporary machine learning (ML) models, they remain vulnerable to adversarial and backdoor attacks. This vulnerability is particularly concerning in real-world deployments, where compromised models may exhibit unpredictable behavior in critical scenarios. Such risks are heightened by the prevalent practice of collecting massive, internet-sourced datasets for training multimodal models, as these datasets may harbor backdoors. Various techniques have been proposed to mitigate the effects of backdooring in multimodal models, such as CleanCLIP, which is the current state-of-the-art approach. In this work, we demonstrate that the efficacy of CleanCLIP in mitigating backdoors is highly dependent on the particular objective used during model pre-training. We observe that stronger pre-training objectives that lead to higher zero-shot classification performance correlate with harder to remove backdoors behaviors. We show this by training multimodal models on two large datasets consisting of 3 million (CC3M) and 6 million (CC6M) datapoints, under various pre-training objectives, followed by poison removal using CleanCLIP. We find that CleanCLIP, even with extensive hyperparameter tuning, is ineffective in poison removal when stronger pre-training objectives are used. Our findings underscore critical considerations for ML practitioners who train models using large-scale web-curated data and are concerned about potential backdoor threats.

Large language models split into two families: reasoning-centric LLMs, which strengthen internal chain-of-thought reasoning but cannot invoke external tools, and agentic LLMs, which learn to interact with environments and leverage tools but often lag in deep reasoning. This divide arises from fundamentally different training objectives, leading to mismatched strengths and inefficiency on simple queries, where both families tend to overthink or over-call tools. In this work, we present Adaptive Agent Foundation Model (A^2FM), a unified framework that follows a route-then-align principle: the model first learns task-aware routing and then aligns mode-specific trajectories under a shared backbone. To address the inefficiency gap, we introduce a third mode-instant-that handles simple queries directly, preventing unnecessary reasoning or tool calls while complementing the agentic and reasoning modes. To jointly enhance accuracy and efficiency, we propose Adaptive Policy Optimization (APO), which enforces adaptive sampling across modes and applies a cost-regularized reward. On the 32B scale, A^2FM achieves 13.4% on BrowseComp, 70.4% on AIME25, and 16.7% on HLE, setting new SOTA among comparable models and performing competitively with frontier LLMs across agentic, reasoning, and general benchmarks. Notably, the adaptive execution achieves a cost of pass of only $0.00487 per correct answer-cutting cost by 45.2% relative to reasoning and 33.5% relative to agentic, thus delivering substantially higher cost efficiency while maintaining comparable accuracy.

Text-to-Image (T2I) models have advanced rapidly, yet they remain vulnerable to semantic leakage, the unintended transfer of semantically related features between distinct entities. Existing mitigation strategies are often optimization-based or dependent on external inputs. We introduce DeLeaker, a lightweight, optimization-free inference-time approach that mitigates leakage by directly intervening on the model's attention maps. Throughout the diffusion process, DeLeaker dynamically reweights attention maps to suppress excessive cross-entity interactions while strengthening the identity of each entity. To support systematic evaluation, we introduce SLIM (Semantic Leakage in IMages), the first dataset dedicated to semantic leakage, comprising 1,130 human-verified samples spanning diverse scenarios, together with a novel automatic evaluation framework. Experiments demonstrate that DeLeaker consistently outperforms all baselines, even when they are provided with external information, achieving effective leakage mitigation without compromising fidelity or quality. These results underscore the value of attention control and pave the way for more semantically precise T2I models.

Code editing is an essential step towards reliable program synthesis to automatically correct critical errors generated from code LLMs. Recent studies have demonstrated that closed-source LLMs (i.e., ChatGPT and GPT-4) are capable of generating corrective feedback to edit erroneous inputs. However, it remains challenging for open-source code LLMs to generate feedback for code editing, since these models tend to adhere to the superficial formats of feedback and provide feedback with misleading information. Hence, the focus of our work is to leverage open-source code LLMs to generate helpful feedback with correct guidance for code editing. To this end, we present Coffee, a collected dataset specifically designed for code fixing with feedback. Using this dataset, we construct CoffeePots, a framework for COde Fixing with FEEdback via Preference-Optimized Tuning and Selection. The proposed framework aims to automatically generate helpful feedback for code editing while minimizing the potential risk of superficial feedback. The combination of Coffee and CoffeePots marks a significant advancement, achieving state-of-the-art performance on HumanEvalFix benchmark. Codes and model checkpoints are publicly available at https://github.com/Lune-Blue/COFFEE.

For nearly a decade the academic community has investigated backdoors in neural networks, primarily focusing on classification tasks where adversaries manipulate the model prediction. While demonstrably malicious, the immediate real-world impact of such prediction-altering attacks has remained unclear. In this paper we introduce a novel and significantly more potent class of backdoors that builds upon recent advancements in architectural backdoors. We demonstrate how these backdoors can be specifically engineered to exploit batched inference, a common technique for hardware utilization, enabling large-scale user data manipulation and theft. By targeting the batching process, these architectural backdoors facilitate information leakage between concurrent user requests and allow attackers to fully control model responses directed at other users within the same batch. In other words, an attacker who can change the model architecture can set and steal model inputs and outputs of other users within the same batch. We show that such attacks are not only feasible but also alarmingly effective, can be readily injected into prevalent model architectures, and represent a truly malicious threat to user privacy and system integrity. Critically, to counteract this new class of vulnerabilities, we propose a deterministic mitigation strategy that provides formal guarantees against this new attack vector, unlike prior work that relied on Large Language Models to find the backdoors. Our mitigation strategy employs a novel Information Flow Control mechanism that analyzes the model graph and proves non-interference between different user inputs within the same batch. Using our mitigation strategy we perform a large scale analysis of models hosted through Hugging Face and find over 200 models that introduce (unintended) information leakage between batch entries due to the use of dynamic quantization.

Current GUI agents have achieved outstanding performance in GUI element grounding. However, planning remains highly challenging, especially due to sensitivity to the initial state of the environment. Specifically, slight differences in the initial state-such as the target software not being open or the interface not being in its default state-often lead to planning errors. This issue is widespread in real user scenarios, but existing benchmarks fail to evaluate it. In this paper, we present WorldGUI, a novel GUI benchmark that designs GUI tasks with various initial states to simulate real computer-user interactions. The benchmark spans a wide range of tasks across 10 popular software applications, including PowerPoint, VSCode, and Adobe Acrobat. In addition, to address the challenges of dynamic GUI automation tasks, we propose GUI-Thinker, a holistic framework, leveraging a critique mechanism, that effectively manages the unpredictability and complexity of GUI interactions. Experimental results demonstrate that GUI-Thinker significantly outperforms Claude-3.5 (Computer Use) by 14.9% in success rate on WorldGUI tasks. This improvement underscores the effectiveness of our critical-thinking-based framework in enhancing GUI automation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

To deploy language models safely, it is crucial that they abstain from responding to inappropriate requests. Several prior studies test the safety promises of models based on their effectiveness in blocking malicious requests. In this work, we focus on evaluating the underlying techniques that cause models to abstain. We create SELECT, a benchmark derived from a set of benign concepts (e.g., "rivers") from a knowledge graph. Focusing on benign concepts isolates the effect of safety training, and grounding these concepts in a knowledge graph allows us to study the generalization and specificity of abstention techniques. Using SELECT, we benchmark different abstention techniques over six open-weight and closed-source models. We find that the examined techniques indeed cause models to abstain with over 80% abstention rates. However, these techniques are not as effective for descendants of the target concepts, where abstention rates drop by 19%. We also characterize the generalization-specificity trade-offs for different techniques. Overall, no single technique is invariably better than others, and our findings inform practitioners of the various trade-offs involved.

The interactive segmentation task consists in the creation of object segmentation masks based on user interactions. The most common way to guide a model towards producing a correct segmentation consists in clicks on the object and background. The recently published Segment Anything Model (SAM) supports a generalized version of the interactive segmentation problem and has been trained on an object segmentation dataset which contains 1.1B masks. Though being trained extensively and with the explicit purpose of serving as a foundation model, we show significant limitations of SAM when being applied for interactive segmentation on novel domains or object types. On the used datasets, SAM displays a failure rate FR_{30}@90 of up to 72.6 %. Since we still want such foundation models to be immediately applicable, we present a framework that can adapt SAM during immediate usage. For this we will leverage the user interactions and masks, which are constructed during the interactive segmentation process. We use this information to generate pseudo-labels, which we use to compute a loss function and optimize a part of the SAM model. The presented method causes a relative reduction of up to 48.1 % in the FR_{20}@85 and 46.6 % in the FR_{30}@90 metrics.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has significantly pushed the frontiers of program synthesis. Advancement of LLM-based program synthesis calls for a thorough evaluation of LLM-generated code. Most evaluation frameworks focus on the (functional) correctness of generated code; efficiency, as an important measure of code quality, has been overlooked in existing evaluations. In this work, we develop ENAMEL (EfficeNcy AutoMatic EvaLuator), a rigorous and high-standard benchmark for evaluating the capability of LLMs in generating efficient code. Firstly, we propose a new efficiency metric called eff@k, which generalizes the pass@k metric from correctness to efficiency and appropriately handles right-censored execution time. Furthermore, we derive an unbiased and variance-reduced estimator of eff@k via Rao--Blackwellization; we also provide a numerically stable implementation for the new estimator. Secondly, to set a high-standard for efficiency evaluation, we employ a human expert to design best algorithms and implementations as our reference solutions of efficiency, many of which are much more efficient than existing canonical solutions in HumanEval and HumanEval+. Moreover, to ensure a rigorous evaluation, we employ a human expert to curate strong test case generators to filter out wrong code and differentiate suboptimal algorithms. An extensive study across 30 popular LLMs using our benchmark ENAMEL shows that LLMs still fall short of generating expert-level efficient code. Using two subsets of our problem set, we demonstrate that such deficiency is because current LLMs struggle in designing advanced algorithms and are barely aware of implementation optimization. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/enamel .

Jailbreak attacks against multimodal large language Models (MLLMs) are a significant research focus. Current research predominantly focuses on maximizing attack success rate (ASR), often overlooking whether the generated responses actually fulfill the attacker's malicious intent. This oversight frequently leads to low-quality outputs that bypass safety filters but lack substantial harmful content. To address this gap, we propose JPS, Jailbreak MLLMs with collaborative visual Perturbation and textual Steering, which achieves jailbreaks via corporation of visual image and textually steering prompt. Specifically, JPS utilizes target-guided adversarial image perturbations for effective safety bypass, complemented by "steering prompt" optimized via a multi-agent system to specifically guide LLM responses fulfilling the attackers' intent. These visual and textual components undergo iterative co-optimization for enhanced performance. To evaluate the quality of attack outcomes, we propose the Malicious Intent Fulfillment Rate (MIFR) metric, assessed using a Reasoning-LLM-based evaluator. Our experiments show JPS sets a new state-of-the-art in both ASR and MIFR across various MLLMs and benchmarks, with analyses confirming its efficacy. Codes are available at https://github.com/thu-coai/JPS{https://github.com/thu-coai/JPS}. warningcolor{Warning: This paper contains potentially sensitive contents.}

Prior work on jailbreak detection has established the importance of adversarial robustness for LLMs but has largely focused on the model ability to resist adversarial inputs and to output safe content, rather than the effectiveness of external supervision systems. The only public and independent benchmark of these guardrails to date evaluates a narrow set of supervisors on limited scenarios. Consequently, no comprehensive public benchmark yet verifies how well supervision systems from the market perform under realistic, diverse attacks. To address this, we introduce BELLS, a Benchmark for the Evaluation of LLM Supervision Systems. The framework is two dimensional: harm severity (benign, borderline, harmful) and adversarial sophistication (direct vs. jailbreak) and provides a rich dataset covering 3 jailbreak families and 11 harm categories. Our evaluations reveal drastic limitations of specialized supervision systems. While they recognize some known jailbreak patterns, their semantic understanding and generalization capabilities are very limited, sometimes with detection rates close to zero when asking a harmful question directly or with a new jailbreak technique such as base64 encoding. Simply asking generalist LLMs if the user question is "harmful or not" largely outperforms these supervisors from the market according to our BELLS score. But frontier LLMs still suffer from metacognitive incoherence, often responding to queries they correctly identify as harmful (up to 30 percent for Claude 3.7 and greater than 50 percent for Mistral Large). These results suggest that simple scaffolding could significantly improve misuse detection robustness, but more research is needed to assess the tradeoffs of such techniques. Our results support the "bitter lesson" of misuse detection: general capabilities of LLMs are necessary to detect a diverse array of misuses and jailbreaks.

Software vulnerabilities present a persistent security challenge, with over 25,000 new vulnerabilities reported in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) database in 2024 alone. While deep learning based approaches show promise for vulnerability detection, recent studies reveal critical limitations in terms of accuracy and robustness: accuracy drops by up to 45% on rigorously verified datasets, and performance degrades significantly under simple code modifications. This paper presents LLMxCPG, a novel framework integrating Code Property Graphs (CPG) with Large Language Models (LLM) for robust vulnerability detection. Our CPG-based slice construction technique reduces code size by 67.84 to 90.93% while preserving vulnerability-relevant context. Our approach's ability to provide a more concise and accurate representation of code snippets enables the analysis of larger code segments, including entire projects. This concise representation is a key factor behind the improved detection capabilities of our method, as it can now identify vulnerabilities that span multiple functions. Empirical evaluation demonstrates LLMxCPG's effectiveness across verified datasets, achieving 15-40% improvements in F1-score over state-of-the-art baselines. Moreover, LLMxCPG maintains high performance across function-level and multi-function codebases while exhibiting robust detection efficacy under various syntactic code modifications.

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is increasingly compromised by jailbreak attacks, which can manipulate these models to generate harmful or unintended content. Investigating these attacks is crucial for uncovering model vulnerabilities. However, many existing jailbreak strategies fail to keep pace with the rapid development of defense mechanisms, such as defensive suffixes, rendering them ineffective against defended models. To tackle this issue, we introduce a novel attack method called ArrAttack, specifically designed to target defended LLMs. ArrAttack automatically generates robust jailbreak prompts capable of bypassing various defense measures. This capability is supported by a universal robustness judgment model that, once trained, can perform robustness evaluation for any target model with a wide variety of defenses. By leveraging this model, we can rapidly develop a robust jailbreak prompt generator that efficiently converts malicious input prompts into effective attacks. Extensive evaluations reveal that ArrAttack significantly outperforms existing attack strategies, demonstrating strong transferability across both white-box and black-box models, including GPT-4 and Claude-3. Our work bridges the gap between jailbreak attacks and defenses, providing a fresh perspective on generating robust jailbreak prompts. We make the codebase available at https://github.com/LLBao/ArrAttack.

Automated red teaming holds substantial promise for uncovering and mitigating the risks associated with the malicious use of large language models (LLMs), yet the field lacks a standardized evaluation framework to rigorously assess new methods. To address this issue, we introduce HarmBench, a standardized evaluation framework for automated red teaming. We identify several desirable properties previously unaccounted for in red teaming evaluations and systematically design HarmBench to meet these criteria. Using HarmBench, we conduct a large-scale comparison of 18 red teaming methods and 33 target LLMs and defenses, yielding novel insights. We also introduce a highly efficient adversarial training method that greatly enhances LLM robustness across a wide range of attacks, demonstrating how HarmBench enables codevelopment of attacks and defenses. We open source HarmBench at https://github.com/centerforaisafety/HarmBench.

We propose E-MD3C (Efficient Masked Diffusion Transformer with Disentangled Conditions and Compact Collector), a highly efficient framework for zero-shot object image customization. Unlike prior works reliant on resource-intensive Unet architectures, our approach employs lightweight masked diffusion transformers operating on latent patches, offering significantly improved computational efficiency. The framework integrates three core components: (1) an efficient masked diffusion transformer for processing autoencoder latents, (2) a disentangled condition design that ensures compactness while preserving background alignment and fine details, and (3) a learnable Conditions Collector that consolidates multiple inputs into a compact representation for efficient denoising and learning. E-MD3C outperforms the existing approach on the VITON-HD dataset across metrics such as PSNR, FID, SSIM, and LPIPS, demonstrating clear advantages in parameters, memory efficiency, and inference speed. With only 1{4} of the parameters, our Transformer-based 468M model delivers 2.5times faster inference and uses 2{3} of the GPU memory compared to an 1720M Unet-based latent diffusion model.

Computer use agents are LLM-based agents that can directly interact with a graphical user interface, by processing screenshots or accessibility trees. While these systems are gaining popularity, their safety has been largely overlooked, despite the fact that evaluating and understanding their potential for harmful behavior is essential for widespread adoption. To address this gap, we introduce OS-Harm, a new benchmark for measuring safety of computer use agents. OS-Harm is built on top of the OSWorld environment and aims to test models across three categories of harm: deliberate user misuse, prompt injection attacks, and model misbehavior. To cover these cases, we create 150 tasks that span several types of safety violations (harassment, copyright infringement, disinformation, data exfiltration, etc.) and require the agent to interact with a variety of OS applications (email client, code editor, browser, etc.). Moreover, we propose an automated judge to evaluate both accuracy and safety of agents that achieves high agreement with human annotations (0.76 and 0.79 F1 score). We evaluate computer use agents based on a range of frontier models - such as o4-mini, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.5 Pro - and provide insights into their safety. In particular, all models tend to directly comply with many deliberate misuse queries, are relatively vulnerable to static prompt injections, and occasionally perform unsafe actions. The OS-Harm benchmark is available at https://github.com/tml-epfl/os-harm.

Large language model (LLM) routers improve the efficiency of multi-model systems by directing each query to the most appropriate model while leveraging the diverse strengths of heterogeneous LLMs. Most existing approaches frame routing as a classification problem based solely on the input query. While this reduces overhead by avoiding inference across all models, it overlooks valuable information that could be gleaned from potential outputs and fails to capture implicit intent or contextual nuances that often emerge only during response generation. These limitations can result in suboptimal routing decisions, particularly for complex or ambiguous queries that require deeper semantic understanding. To address this challenge, we propose Lookahead, a routing framework that "foresees" potential model outputs by predicting their latent representations and uses these predictions to guide model selection, thus enabling more informed routing without full inference. Within this framework, we implement two approaches based on causal and masked language models. Empirical evaluations across seven public benchmarks - spanning instruction following, mathematical reasoning, and code generation - show that Lookahead consistently outperforms existing routing baselines, achieving an average performance gain of 7.7% over the state-of-the-art. Our code is available at https://github.com/huangcb01/lookahead-routing.

Text detoxification aims to minimize the risk of language models producing toxic content. Existing detoxification methods of directly constraining the model output or further training the model on the non-toxic corpus fail to achieve a decent balance between detoxification effectiveness and generation quality. This issue stems from the neglect of constrain imposed by the context since language models are designed to generate output that closely matches the context while detoxification methods endeavor to ensure the safety of the output even if it semantically deviates from the context. In view of this, we introduce a Context-aware Model self-Detoxification~(CMD) framework that pays attention to both the context and the detoxification process, i.e., first detoxifying the context and then making the language model generate along the safe context. Specifically, CMD framework involves two phases: utilizing language models to synthesize data and applying these data for training. We also introduce a toxic contrastive loss that encourages the model generation away from the negative toxic samples. Experiments on various LLMs have verified the effectiveness of our MSD framework, which can yield the best performance compared to baselines.

Despite the huge success of Large Language Models (LLMs) in coding assistants like GitHub Copilot, these models struggle to understand the context present in the repository (e.g., imports, parent classes, files with similar names, etc.), thereby producing inaccurate code completions. This effect is more pronounced when using these assistants for repositories that the model has not seen during training, such as proprietary software or work-in-progress code projects. Recent work has shown the promise of using context from the repository during inference. In this work, we extend this idea and propose RepoFusion, a framework to train models to incorporate relevant repository context. Experiments on single-line code completion show that our models trained with repository context significantly outperform much larger code models as CodeGen-16B-multi (sim73times larger) and closely match the performance of the sim 70times larger StarCoderBase model that was trained with the Fill-in-the-Middle objective. We find these results to be a novel and compelling demonstration of the gains that training with repository context can bring. We carry out extensive ablation studies to investigate the impact of design choices such as context type, number of contexts, context length, and initialization within our framework. Lastly, we release Stack-Repo, a dataset of 200 Java repositories with permissive licenses and near-deduplicated files that are augmented with three types of repository contexts. Additionally, we are making available the code and trained checkpoints for our work. Our released resources can be found at https://huggingface.co/RepoFusion.

Nowadays, developers increasingly rely on solutions powered by Large Language Models (LLM) to assist them with their coding tasks. This makes it crucial to align these tools with human values to prevent malicious misuse. In this paper, we propose a comprehensive framework for assessing the potential harmfulness of LLMs within the software engineering domain. We begin by developing a taxonomy of potentially harmful software engineering scenarios and subsequently, create a dataset of prompts based on this taxonomy. To systematically assess the responses, we design and validate an automatic evaluator that classifies the outputs of a variety of LLMs both open-source and closed-source models, as well as general-purpose and code-specific LLMs. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of models size, architecture family, and alignment strategies on their tendency to generate harmful content. The results show significant disparities in the alignment of various LLMs for harmlessness. We find that some models and model families, such as Openhermes, are more harmful than others and that code-specific models do not perform better than their general-purpose counterparts. Notably, some fine-tuned models perform significantly worse than their base-models due to their design choices. On the other side, we find that larger models tend to be more helpful and are less likely to respond with harmful information. These results highlight the importance of targeted alignment strategies tailored to the unique challenges of software engineering tasks and provide a foundation for future work in this critical area.

The growing misuse of Vision-Language Models (VLMs) has led providers to deploy multiple safeguards, including alignment tuning, system prompts, and content moderation. However, the real-world robustness of these defenses against adversarial attacks remains underexplored. We introduce Multi-Faceted Attack (MFA), a framework that systematically exposes general safety vulnerabilities in leading defense-equipped VLMs such as GPT-4o, Gemini-Pro, and Llama-4. The core component of MFA is the Attention-Transfer Attack (ATA), which hides harmful instructions inside a meta task with competing objectives. We provide a theoretical perspective based on reward hacking to explain why this attack succeeds. To improve cross-model transferability, we further introduce a lightweight transfer-enhancement algorithm combined with a simple repetition strategy that jointly bypasses both input-level and output-level filters without model-specific fine-tuning. Empirically, we show that adversarial images optimized for one vision encoder transfer broadly to unseen VLMs, indicating that shared visual representations create a cross-model safety vulnerability. Overall, MFA achieves a 58.5% success rate and consistently outperforms existing methods. On state-of-the-art commercial models, MFA reaches a 52.8% success rate, surpassing the second-best attack by 34%. These results challenge the perceived robustness of current defense mechanisms and highlight persistent safety weaknesses in modern VLMs. Code: https://github.com/cure-lab/MultiFacetedAttack