Daily Papers

Social deduction games like Werewolf combine language, reasoning, and strategy, providing a testbed for studying natural language and social intelligence. However, most studies reduce the game to LLM-based self-play, yielding templated utterances and anecdotal cases that overlook the richness of social gameplay. Evaluation further relies on coarse metrics such as survival time or subjective scoring due to the lack of quality reference data. To address these gaps, we curate a high-quality, human-verified multimodal Werewolf dataset containing over 100 hours of video, 32.4M utterance tokens, and 15 rule variants. Based on this dataset, we propose a novel strategy-alignment evaluation that leverages the winning faction's strategies as ground truth in two stages: 1) Speech evaluation, formulated as multiple-choice-style tasks that assess whether the model can adopt appropriate stances across five dimensions of social ability; and 2) Decision evaluation, which assesses the model's voting choices and opponent-role inferences. This framework enables a fine-grained evaluation of models' linguistic and reasoning capabilities, while capturing their ability to generate strategically coherent gameplay. Our experiments show that state-of-the-art LLMs show diverse performance, with roughly half remain below 0.50, revealing clear gaps in deception and counterfactual reasoning. We hope our dataset further inspires research on language, reasoning, and strategy in multi-agent interaction.

LLMs are used predominantly in synchronous communication, where a human user and a model communicate in alternating turns. In contrast, many real-world settings are inherently asynchronous. For example, in group chats, online team meetings, or social games, there is no inherent notion of turns; therefore, the decision of when to speak forms a crucial part of the participant's decision making. In this work, we develop an adaptive asynchronous LLM-agent which, in addition to determining what to say, also decides when to say it. To evaluate our agent, we collect a unique dataset of online Mafia games, including both human participants, as well as our asynchronous agent. Overall, our agent performs on par with human players, both in game performance, as well as in its ability to blend in with the other human players. Our analysis shows that the agent's behavior in deciding when to speak closely mirrors human patterns, although differences emerge in message content. We release all our data and code to support and encourage further research for more realistic asynchronous communication between LLM agents. This work paves the way for integration of LLMs into realistic human group settings, from assistance in team discussions to educational and professional environments where complex social dynamics must be navigated.

Polarization in online discourse erodes social trust and accelerates misinformation, yet technical responses remain largely diagnostic and post-hoc. Current governance approaches suffer from inherent latency and static policies, struggling to counter coordinated adversarial amplification that evolves in real-time. We present EvoCorps, an evolutionary multi-agent framework for proactive depolarization. EvoCorps frames discourse governance as a dynamic social game and coordinates roles for monitoring, planning, grounded generation, and multi-identity diffusion. A retrieval-augmented collective cognition core provides factual grounding and action--outcome memory, while closed-loop evolutionary learning adapts strategies as the environment and attackers change. We implement EvoCorps on the MOSAIC social-AI simulation platform for controlled evaluation in a multi-source news stream with adversarial injection and amplification. Across emotional polarization, viewpoint extremity, and argumentative rationality, EvoCorps improves discourse outcomes over an adversarial baseline, pointing to a practical path from detection and post-hoc mitigation to in-process, closed-loop intervention. The code is available at https://github.com/ln2146/EvoCorps.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has necessitated more robust evaluation methods that go beyond static benchmarks, which are increasingly prone to data saturation and leakage. In this paper, we propose a dynamic benchmarking framework for evaluating multilingual and multicultural capabilities through the social deduction game Spyfall. In our setup, models must engage in strategic dialogue to either identify a secret agent or avoid detection, utilizing culturally relevant locations or local foods. Our results show that our game-based rankings align closely with the Chatbot Arena. However, we find a significant performance gap in non-English contexts: models are generally less proficient when handling locally specific entities and often struggle with rule-following or strategic integrity in non-English languages. We demonstrate that this game-based approach provides a scalable, leakage-resistant, and culturally nuanced alternative to traditional NLP benchmarks. The game history can be accessed here https://huggingface.co/datasets/haryoaw/cultural-spyfall.

Social reasoning - inferring unobservable beliefs and intentions from partial observations of other agents - remains a challenging task for large language models (LLMs). We evaluate the limits of current reasoning language models in the social deduction game Avalon and find that while the largest models demonstrate strong performance, they require extensive test-time inference and degrade sharply when distilled to smaller, real-time-capable variants. To address this, we introduce a hybrid reasoning framework that externalizes belief inference to a structured probabilistic model, while using an LLM for language understanding and interaction. Our approach achieves competitive performance with much larger models in Agent-Agent play and, notably, is the first language agent to defeat human players in a controlled study - achieving a 67% win rate and receiving higher qualitative ratings than both reasoning baselines and human teammates. We release code, models, and a dataset to support future work on social reasoning in LLM agents, which can be found at https://camp-lab-purdue.github.io/bayesian-social-deduction/

Large language model (LLM)-based agents have recently shown impressive progress in a variety of domains, including open-ended conversation and multi-step decision-making. However, applying these agents to social deduction games such as Werewolf, which requires both strategic decision-making and free-form language interaction, remains non-trivial. Traditional methods based on Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) or reinforcement learning (RL) typically depend on a predefined action space, making them unsuitable for language games with unconstrained text action space. Meanwhile, pure LLM-based agents often suffer from intrinsic biases and require prohibitively large datasets for fine-tuning. We propose Latent Space Policy Optimization (LSPO), an iterative framework that addresses these challenges by first mapping free-form text to a discrete latent space, where methods like CFR and RL can learn strategic policy more effectively. We then translate the learned policy back into natural language dialogues, which are used to fine-tune an LLM via Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). By iteratively alternating between these stages, our LSPO agent progressively enhances both strategic reasoning and language communication. Experiment results on the Werewolf game show that our method improves the agent's performance in each iteration and outperforms existing Werewolf agents, underscoring its promise for free-form language decision-making.

Achieving Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) requires AI agents that can not only make stratigic decisions but also engage in flexible and meaningful communication. Inspired by Wittgenstein's language game theory in Philosophical Investigations, we propose that language agents can learn through in-context interaction rather than traditional multi-stage frameworks that separate decision-making from language expression. Using Werewolf, a social deduction game that tests language understanding, strategic interaction, and adaptability, we develop the Multi-agent Kahneman & Tversky's Optimization (MaKTO). MaKTO engages diverse models in extensive gameplay to generate unpaired desirable and unacceptable responses, then employs KTO to refine the model's decision-making process. In 9-player Werewolf games, MaKTO achieves a 61% average win rate across various models, outperforming GPT-4o and two-stage RL agents by relative improvements of 23.0% and 10.9%, respectively. Notably, MaKTO also demonstrates human-like performance, winning 60% against expert players and showing only 49% detectability in Turing-style blind tests. These results showcase MaKTO's superior decision-making, strategic adaptation, and natural language generation in complex social deduction games.

Communicating in natural language is a powerful tool in multi-agent settings, as it enables independent agents to share information in partially observable settings and allows zero-shot coordination with humans. However, most prior works are limited as they either rely on training with large amounts of human demonstrations or lack the ability to generate natural and useful communication strategies. In this work, we train language models to have productive discussions about their environment in natural language without any human demonstrations. We decompose the communication problem into listening and speaking. Our key idea is to leverage the agent's goal to predict useful information about the world as a dense reward signal that guides communication. Specifically, we improve a model's listening skills by training them to predict information about the environment based on discussions, and we simultaneously improve a model's speaking skills with multi-agent reinforcement learning by rewarding messages based on their influence on other agents. To investigate the role and necessity of communication in complex social settings, we study an embodied social deduction game based on Among Us, where the key question to answer is the identity of an adversarial imposter. We analyze emergent behaviors due to our technique, such as accusing suspects and providing evidence, and find that it enables strong discussions, doubling the win rates compared to standard RL. We release our code and models at https://socialdeductionllm.github.io/

In this paper, we explore the potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) Agents in playing the strategic social deduction game, Resistance Avalon. Players in Avalon are challenged not only to make informed decisions based on dynamically evolving game phases, but also to engage in discussions where they must deceive, deduce, and negotiate with other players. These characteristics make Avalon a compelling test-bed to study the decision-making and language-processing capabilities of LLM Agents. To facilitate research in this line, we introduce AvalonBench - a comprehensive game environment tailored for evaluating multi-agent LLM Agents. This benchmark incorporates: (1) a game environment for Avalon, (2) rule-based bots as baseline opponents, and (3) ReAct-style LLM agents with tailored prompts for each role. Notably, our evaluations based on AvalonBench highlight a clear capability gap. For instance, models like ChatGPT playing good-role got a win rate of 22.2% against rule-based bots playing evil, while good-role bot achieves 38.2% win rate in the same setting. We envision AvalonBench could be a good test-bed for developing more advanced LLMs (with self-playing) and agent frameworks that can effectively model the layered complexities of such game environments.

Agents built with large language models (LLMs) have shown great potential across a wide range of domains. However, in complex decision-making tasks, pure LLM-based agents tend to exhibit intrinsic bias in their choice of actions, which is inherited from the model's training data and results in suboptimal performance. To develop strategic language agents, i.e., agents that generate flexible language actions and possess strong decision-making abilities, we propose a novel framework that powers LLM-based agents with reinforcement learning (RL). We consider Werewolf, a popular social deduction game, as a challenging testbed that emphasizes versatile communication and strategic gameplay. To mitigate the intrinsic bias in language actions, our agents use an LLM to perform deductive reasoning and generate a diverse set of action candidates. Then an RL policy trained to optimize the decision-making ability chooses an action from the candidates to play in the game. Extensive experiments show that our agents overcome the intrinsic bias and outperform existing LLM-based agents in the Werewolf game. We also conduct human-agent experiments and find that our agents achieve human-level performance and demonstrate strong strategic play.

As AI systems become increasingly integrated into human lives, endowing them with robust social intelligence has emerged as a critical frontier. A key aspect of this intelligence is discerning truth from deception, a ubiquitous element of human interaction that is conveyed through a complex interplay of verbal language and non-verbal visual cues. However, automatic deception detection in dynamic, multi-party conversations remains a significant challenge. The recent rise of powerful Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), with their impressive abilities in visual and textual understanding, makes them natural candidates for this task. Consequently, their capabilities in this crucial domain are mostly unquantified. To address this gap, we introduce a new task, Multimodal Interactive Veracity Assessment (MIVA), and present a novel multimodal dataset derived from the social deduction game Werewolf. This dataset provides synchronized video, text, with verifiable ground-truth labels for every statement. We establish a comprehensive benchmark evaluating state-of-the-art MLLMs, revealing a significant performance gap: even powerful models like GPT-4o struggle to distinguish truth from falsehood reliably. Our analysis of failure modes indicates that these models fail to ground language in visual social cues effectively and may be overly conservative in their alignment, highlighting the urgent need for novel approaches to building more perceptive and trustworthy AI systems.

LLMs have shown strong performance on human-centric reasoning tasks. While previous evaluations have explored whether LLMs can infer intentions or detect deception, they often overlook the individualized reasoning styles that influence how people interpret and act in social contexts. Social deduction games (SDGs) provide a natural testbed for evaluating individualized reasoning styles, where different players may adopt diverse but contextually valid reasoning strategies under identical conditions. To address this, we introduce InMind, a cognitively grounded evaluation framework designed to assess whether LLMs can capture and apply personalized reasoning styles in SDGs. InMind enhances structured gameplay data with round-level strategy traces and post-game reflections, collected under both Observer and Participant modes. It supports four cognitively motivated tasks that jointly evaluate both static alignment and dynamic adaptation. As a case study, we apply InMind to the game Avalon, evaluating 11 state-of-the-art LLMs. General-purpose LLMs, even GPT-4o frequently rely on lexical cues, struggling to anchor reflections in temporal gameplay or adapt to evolving strategies. In contrast, reasoning-enhanced LLMs like DeepSeek-R1 exhibit early signs of style-sensitive reasoning. These findings reveal key limitations in current LLMs' capacity for individualized, adaptive reasoning, and position InMind as a step toward cognitively aligned human-AI interaction.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities in social deduction games (SDGs) like Werewolf, where strategic reasoning and social deception are essential. However, current approaches remain limited to textual information, ignoring crucial multimodal cues such as facial expressions and tone of voice that humans naturally use to communicate. Moreover, existing SDG agents primarily focus on inferring other players' identities without modeling how others perceive themselves or fellow players. To address these limitations, we use One Night Ultimate Werewolf (ONUW) as a testbed and present MultiMind, the first framework integrating multimodal information into SDG agents. MultiMind processes facial expressions and vocal tones alongside verbal content, while employing a Theory of Mind (ToM) model to represent each player's suspicion levels toward others. By combining this ToM model with Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), our agent identifies communication strategies that minimize suspicion directed at itself. Through comprehensive evaluation in both agent-versus-agent simulations and studies with human players, we demonstrate MultiMind's superior performance in gameplay. Our work presents a significant advancement toward LLM agents capable of human-like social reasoning across multimodal domains.

We introduce the Emergent Language Corpus Collection (ELCC): a collection of corpora generated from open source implementations of emergent communication systems across the literature. These systems include a variety of signalling game environments as well as more complex environments like a social deduction game and embodied navigation. Each corpus is annotated with metadata describing the characteristics of the source system as well as a suite of analyses of the corpus (e.g., size, entropy, average message length, performance as transfer learning data). Currently, research studying emergent languages requires directly running different systems which takes time away from actual analyses of such languages, makes studies which compare diverse emergent languages rare, and presents a barrier to entry for researchers without a background in deep learning. The availability of a substantial collection of well-documented emergent language corpora, then, will enable research which can analyze a wider variety of emergent languages, which more effectively uncovers general principles in emergent communication rather than artifacts of particular environments. We provide some quantitative and qualitative analyses with ELCC to demonstrate potential use cases of the resource in this vein.

As AI systems increasingly assume roles where trust and alignment with human values are essential, understanding when and why they engage in deception has become a critical research priority. We introduce The Traitors, a multi-agent simulation framework inspired by social deduction games, designed to probe deception, trust formation, and strategic communication among large language model (LLM) agents under asymmetric information. A minority of agents the traitors seek to mislead the majority, while the faithful must infer hidden identities through dialogue and reasoning. Our contributions are: (1) we ground the environment in formal frameworks from game theory, behavioral economics, and social cognition; (2) we develop a suite of evaluation metrics capturing deception success, trust dynamics, and collective inference quality; (3) we implement a fully autonomous simulation platform where LLMs reason over persistent memory and evolving social dynamics, with support for heterogeneous agent populations, specialized traits, and adaptive behaviors. Our initial experiments across DeepSeek-V3, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-4o (10 runs per model) reveal a notable asymmetry: advanced models like GPT-4o demonstrate superior deceptive capabilities yet exhibit disproportionate vulnerability to others' falsehoods. This suggests deception skills may scale faster than detection abilities. Overall, The Traitors provides a focused, configurable testbed for investigating LLM behavior in socially nuanced interactions. We position this work as a contribution toward more rigorous research on deception mechanisms, alignment challenges, and the broader social reliability of AI systems.

NPCs in traditional games are often limited by static dialogue trees and a single platform for interaction. To overcome these constraints, this study presents a prototype system that enables large language model (LLM)-powered NPCs to communicate with players both in the game en vironment (Unity) and on a social platform (Discord). Dialogue logs are stored in a cloud database (LeanCloud), allowing the system to synchronize memory between platforms and keep conversa tions coherent. Our initial experiments show that cross-platform interaction is technically feasible and suggest a solid foundation for future developments such as emotional modeling and persistent memory support.

Advances in intelligent game playing agents have led to successes in perfect information games like Go and imperfect information games like Poker. The Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (ISMCTS) family of algorithms outperforms previous algorithms using Monte Carlo methods in imperfect information games. In this paper, Single Observer Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (SO-ISMCTS) is applied to Secret Hitler, a popular social deduction board game that combines traditional hidden role mechanics with the randomness of a card deck. This combination leads to a more complex information model than the hidden role and card deck mechanics alone. It is shown in 10108 simulated games that SO-ISMCTS plays as well as simpler rule based agents, and demonstrates the potential of ISMCTS algorithms in complicated information set domains.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled social simulation through multi-agent systems. Prior efforts focus on agent societies created from scratch, assigning agents with newly defined personas. However, simulating established fictional worlds and characters remain largely underexplored, despite its significant practical value. In this paper, we introduce BookWorld, a comprehensive system for constructing and simulating book-based multi-agent societies. BookWorld's design covers comprehensive real-world intricacies, including diverse and dynamic characters, fictional worldviews, geographical constraints and changes, e.t.c. BookWorld enables diverse applications including story generation, interactive games and social simulation, offering novel ways to extend and explore beloved fictional works. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that BookWorld generates creative, high-quality stories while maintaining fidelity to the source books, surpassing previous methods with a win rate of 75.36%. The code of this paper can be found at the project page: https://bookworld2025.github.io/.

Gameplay videos contain rich information about how players interact with the game and how the game responds. Sharing gameplay videos on social media platforms, such as Reddit, has become a common practice for many players. Often, players will share gameplay videos that showcase video game bugs. Such gameplay videos are software artifacts that can be utilized for game testing, as they provide insight for bug analysis. Although large repositories of gameplay videos exist, parsing and mining them in an effective and structured fashion has still remained a big challenge. In this paper, we propose a search method that accepts any English text query as input to retrieve relevant videos from large repositories of gameplay videos. Our approach does not rely on any external information (such as video metadata); it works solely based on the content of the video. By leveraging the zero-shot transfer capabilities of the Contrastive Language-Image Pre-Training (CLIP) model, our approach does not require any data labeling or training. To evaluate our approach, we present the GamePhysics dataset consisting of 26,954 videos from 1,873 games, that were collected from the GamePhysics section on the Reddit website. Our approach shows promising results in our extensive analysis of simple queries, compound queries, and bug queries, indicating that our approach is useful for object and event detection in gameplay videos. An example application of our approach is as a gameplay video search engine to aid in reproducing video game bugs. Please visit the following link for the code and the data: https://asgaardlab.github.io/CLIPxGamePhysics/

Useful social science theories predict behavior across settings. However, applying a theory to make predictions in new settings is challenging: rarely can it be done without ad hoc modifications to account for setting-specific factors. We argue that AI agents put in simulations of those novel settings offer an alternative for applying theory, requiring minimal or no modifications. We present an approach for building such "general" agents that use theory-grounded natural language instructions, existing empirical data, and knowledge acquired by the underlying AI during training. To demonstrate the approach in settings where no data from that data-generating process exists--as is often the case in applied prediction problems--we design a heterogeneous population of 883,320 novel games. AI agents are constructed using human data from a small set of conceptually related but structurally distinct "seed" games. In preregistered experiments, on average, agents predict initial human play in a random sample of 1,500 games from the population better than (i) a cognitive hierarchy model, (ii) game-theoretic equilibria, and (iii) out-of-the-box agents. For a small set of separate novel games, these simulations predict responses from a new sample of human subjects better even than the most plausibly relevant published human data.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Sports competitions are widely researched in computer and social science, with the goal of understanding how players act under uncertainty. While there is an abundance of computational work on player metrics prediction based on past performance, very few attempts to incorporate out-of-game signals have been made. Specifically, it was previously unclear whether linguistic signals gathered from players' interviews can add information which does not appear in performance metrics. To bridge that gap, we define text classification tasks of predicting deviations from mean in NBA players' in-game actions, which are associated with strategic choices, player behavior and risk, using their choice of language prior to the game. We collected a dataset of transcripts from key NBA players' pre-game interviews and their in-game performance metrics, totalling in 5,226 interview-metric pairs. We design neural models for players' action prediction based on increasingly more complex aspects of the language signals in their open-ended interviews. Our models can make their predictions based on the textual signal alone, or on a combination with signals from past-performance metrics. Our text-based models outperform strong baselines trained on performance metrics only, demonstrating the importance of language usage for action prediction. Moreover, the models that employ both textual input and past-performance metrics produced the best results. Finally, as neural networks are notoriously difficult to interpret, we propose a method for gaining further insight into what our models have learned. Particularly, we present an LDA-based analysis, where we interpret model predictions in terms of correlated topics. We find that our best performing textual model is most associated with topics that are intuitively related to each prediction task and that better models yield higher correlation with more informative topics.

How have individuals of social animals in nature evolved to learn from each other, and what would be the optimal strategy for such learning in a specific environment? Here, we address both problems by employing a deep reinforcement learning model to optimize the social learning strategies (SLSs) of agents in a cooperative game in a multi-dimensional landscape. Throughout the training for maximizing the overall payoff, we find that the agent spontaneously learns various concepts of social learning, such as copying, focusing on frequent and well-performing neighbors, self-comparison, and the importance of balancing between individual and social learning, without any explicit guidance or prior knowledge about the system. The SLS from a fully trained agent outperforms all of the traditional, baseline SLSs in terms of mean payoff. We demonstrate the superior performance of the reinforcement learning agent in various environments, including temporally changing environments and real social networks, which also verifies the adaptability of our framework to different social settings.

Agent-based modeling has been around for decades, and applied widely across the social and natural sciences. The scope of this research method is now poised to grow dramatically as it absorbs the new affordances provided by Large Language Models (LLM)s. Generative Agent-Based Models (GABM) are not just classic Agent-Based Models (ABM)s where the agents talk to one another. Rather, GABMs are constructed using an LLM to apply common sense to situations, act "reasonably", recall common semantic knowledge, produce API calls to control digital technologies like apps, and communicate both within the simulation and to researchers viewing it from the outside. Here we present Concordia, a library to facilitate constructing and working with GABMs. Concordia makes it easy to construct language-mediated simulations of physically- or digitally-grounded environments. Concordia agents produce their behavior using a flexible component system which mediates between two fundamental operations: LLM calls and associative memory retrieval. A special agent called the Game Master (GM), which was inspired by tabletop role-playing games, is responsible for simulating the environment where the agents interact. Agents take actions by describing what they want to do in natural language. The GM then translates their actions into appropriate implementations. In a simulated physical world, the GM checks the physical plausibility of agent actions and describes their effects. In digital environments simulating technologies such as apps and services, the GM may handle API calls to integrate with external tools such as general AI assistants (e.g., Bard, ChatGPT), and digital apps (e.g., Calendar, Email, Search, etc.). Concordia was designed to support a wide array of applications both in scientific research and for evaluating performance of real digital services by simulating users and/or generating synthetic data.

Game-theoretic interactions between agents with Large Language Models (LLMs) have revealed many emergent capabilities, yet the linguistic diversity of these interactions has not been sufficiently quantified. In this paper, we present the Conversational Robustness Evaluation Score: CORE, a metric to quantify the effectiveness of language use within multi-agent systems across different game-theoretic interactions. CORE integrates measures of cluster entropy, lexical repetition, and semantic similarity, providing a direct lens of dialog quality. We apply CORE to pairwise LLM dialogs across competitive, cooperative, and neutral settings, further grounding our analysis in Zipf's and Heaps' Laws to characterize word frequency distributions and vocabulary growth. Our findings show that cooperative settings exhibit both steeper Zipf distributions and higher Heap exponents, indicating more repetition alongside greater vocabulary expansion. In contrast, competitive interactions display lower Zipf and Heaps exponents, reflecting less repetition and more constrained vocabularies. These results provide new insights into how social incentives influence language adaptation, and highlight CORE as a robust diagnostic for measuring linguistic robustness in multi-agent LLM systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/psyonp/core.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

Deception is prevalent in human social settings. However, studies into the effect of deception on reinforcement learning algorithms have been limited to simplistic settings, restricting their applicability to complex real-world problems. This paper addresses this by introducing a new mixed competitive-cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) environment inspired by popular role-based deception games such as Werewolf, Avalon, and Among Us. The environment's unique challenge lies in the necessity to cooperate with other agents despite not knowing if they are friend or foe. Furthermore, we introduce a model of deception, which we call Bayesian belief manipulation (BBM) and demonstrate its effectiveness at deceiving other agents in this environment while also increasing the deceiving agent's performance.

Social media platforms frequently impose restrictive policies to moderate user content, prompting the emergence of creative evasion language strategies. This paper presents a multi-agent framework based on Large Language Models (LLMs) to simulate the iterative evolution of language strategies under regulatory constraints. In this framework, participant agents, as social media users, continuously evolve their language expression, while supervisory agents emulate platform-level regulation by assessing policy violations. To achieve a more faithful simulation, we employ a dual design of language strategies (constraint and expression) to differentiate conflicting goals and utilize an LLM-driven GA (Genetic Algorithm) for the selection, mutation, and crossover of language strategies. The framework is evaluated using two distinct scenarios: an abstract password game and a realistic simulated illegal pet trade scenario. Experimental results demonstrate that as the number of dialogue rounds increases, both the number of uninterrupted dialogue turns and the accuracy of information transmission improve significantly. Furthermore, a user study with 40 participants validates the real-world relevance of the generated dialogues and strategies. Moreover, ablation studies validate the importance of the GA, emphasizing its contribution to long-term adaptability and improved overall results.

Social media platforms have led to online consumption communities, or fandoms, that involve complex networks of ancillary creators and consumers focused on some core product or intellectual property. For example, video game communities include networks of players and content creators centered around a specific video game. These networks are complex in that video game publishers often sponsor creators, but creators and publishers may have divergent incentives. Specifically, creators can potentially benefit from content that builds their own following at the expense of the core game. Our research investigates the relationship between consuming live-streamed content and engagement with a specific video game. We examine the causal effect of viewing live-streamed content on subsequent gameplay for a specific game, using an unexpected service interruption of the livestreaming platform and time zone differences among users. We find live-streamed content significantly increases gameplay as a 10% increase in live-streamed viewing minutes results in a 3.08% increase in gameplay minutes. We also explore how this effect varies by user loyalty to different types of streamer channels (firm-owned, mega, and micro). The positive effects of live-streamed content are greatest for micro-streamers and smallest for mega-streamers. These findings are salient for firms allocating sponsorship resources.

Users like sharing personal photos with others through social media. At the same time, they might want to make automatic identification in such photos difficult or even impossible. Classic obfuscation methods such as blurring are not only unpleasant but also not as effective as one would expect. Recent studies on adversarial image perturbations (AIP) suggest that it is possible to confuse recognition systems effectively without unpleasant artifacts. However, in the presence of counter measures against AIPs, it is unclear how effective AIP would be in particular when the choice of counter measure is unknown. Game theory provides tools for studying the interaction between agents with uncertainties in the strategies. We introduce a general game theoretical framework for the user-recogniser dynamics, and present a case study that involves current state of the art AIP and person recognition techniques. We derive the optimal strategy for the user that assures an upper bound on the recognition rate independent of the recogniser's counter measure. Code is available at https://goo.gl/hgvbNK.

Communication games, which we refer to as incomplete information games that heavily depend on natural language communication, hold significant research value in fields such as economics, social science, and artificial intelligence. In this work, we explore the problem of how to engage large language models (LLMs) in communication games, and in response, propose a tuning-free framework. Our approach keeps LLMs frozen, and relies on the retrieval and reflection on past communications and experiences for improvement. An empirical study on the representative and widely-studied communication game, ``Werewolf'', demonstrates that our framework can effectively play Werewolf game without tuning the parameters of the LLMs. More importantly, strategic behaviors begin to emerge in our experiments, suggesting that it will be a fruitful journey to engage LLMs in communication games and associated domains.

As agentic AI becomes more widespread, agents with distinct and possibly conflicting goals will interact in complex ways. These multi-agent interactions pose a fundamental challenge, particularly in social dilemmas, where agents' individual incentives can undermine collective welfare. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been effective for aligning large language models (LLMs) in the single-agent regime, prior small-network results suggest that standard RL in multi-agent settings often converges to defecting, self-interested policies. We show the same effect in LLMs: despite cooperative priors, RL-trained LLM agents develop opportunistic behavior that can exploit even advanced closed-source models. To address this tendency of RL to converge to poor equilibria, we adapt a recent opponent-learning awareness algorithm, Advantage Alignment, to fine-tune LLMs toward multi-agent cooperation and non-exploitability. We then introduce a group-relative baseline that simplifies advantage computation in iterated games, enabling multi-agent training at LLM scale. We also contribute a novel social dilemma environment, Trust-and-Split, which requires natural language communication to achieve high collective welfare. Across a wide range of social dilemmas, policies learned with Advantage Alignment achieve higher collective payoffs while remaining robust against exploitation by greedy agents. We release all of our code to support future work on multi-agent RL training for LLMs.

Online competitive action games have flourished as a space for entertainment and social connections, yet they face challenges from a small percentage of players engaging in disruptive behaviors. This study delves into the under-explored realm of understanding the effects of moderation on player behavior within online gaming on an example of a popular title - Call of Duty(R): Modern Warfare(R)II. We employ a quasi-experimental design and causal inference techniques to examine the impact of moderation in a real-world industry-scale moderation system. We further delve into novel aspects around the impact of delayed moderation, as well as the severity of applied punishment. We examine these effects on a set of four disruptive behaviors including cheating, offensive user name, chat, and voice. Our findings uncover the dual impact moderation has on reducing disruptive behavior and discouraging disruptive players from participating. We further uncover differences in the effectiveness of quick and delayed moderation and the varying severity of punishment. Our examination of real-world gaming interactions sets a precedent in understanding the effectiveness of moderation and its impact on player behavior. Our insights offer actionable suggestions for the most promising avenues for improving real-world moderation practices, as well as the heterogeneous impact moderation has on indifferent players.

LLM-based multi-agent systems demonstrate great potential for tackling complex problems, but how competition shapes their behavior remains underexplored. This paper investigates the over-competition in multi-agent debate, where agents under extreme pressure exhibit unreliable, harmful behaviors that undermine both collaboration and task performance. To study this phenomenon, we propose HATE, the Hunger Game Debate, a novel experimental framework that simulates debates under a zero-sum competition arena. Our experiments, conducted across a range of LLMs and tasks, reveal that competitive pressure significantly stimulates over-competition behaviors and degrades task performance, causing discussions to derail. We further explore the impact of environmental feedback by adding variants of judges, indicating that objective, task-focused feedback effectively mitigates the over-competition behaviors. We also probe the post-hoc kindness of LLMs and form a leaderboard to characterize top LLMs, providing insights for understanding and governing the emergent social dynamics of AI community.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

Influence maximization (IM) aims to identify a small number of influential individuals to maximize the information spread and finds applications in various fields. It was first introduced in the context of viral marketing, where a company pays a few influencers to promote the product. However, apart from the cost factor, the capacity of individuals to consume content poses challenges for implementing IM in real-world scenarios. For example, players on online gaming platforms can only interact with a limited number of friends. In addition, we observe that in these scenarios, (i) the initial adopters of promotion are likely to be the friends of influencers rather than the influencers themselves, and (ii) existing IM solutions produce sub-par results with high computational demands. Motivated by these observations, we propose a new IM variant called capacity constrained influence maximization (CIM), which aims to select a limited number of influential friends for each initial adopter such that the promotion can reach more users. To solve CIM effectively, we design two greedy algorithms, MG-Greedy and RR-Greedy, ensuring the 1/2-approximation ratio. To improve the efficiency, we devise the scalable implementation named RR-OPIM+ with (1/2-epsilon)-approximation and near-linear running time. We extensively evaluate the performance of 9 approaches on 6 real-world networks, and our solutions outperform all competitors in terms of result quality and running time. Additionally, we deploy RR-OPIM+ to online game scenarios, which improves the baseline considerably.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) integrate into our social and economic interactions, we need to deepen our understanding of how humans respond to LLMs opponents in strategic settings. We present the results of the first controlled monetarily-incentivised laboratory experiment looking at differences in human behaviour in a multi-player p-beauty contest against other humans and LLMs. We use a within-subject design in order to compare behaviour at the individual level. We show that, in this environment, human subjects choose significantly lower numbers when playing against LLMs than humans, which is mainly driven by the increased prevalence of `zero' Nash-equilibrium choices. This shift is mainly driven by subjects with high strategic reasoning ability. Subjects who play the zero Nash-equilibrium choice motivate their strategy by appealing to perceived LLM's reasoning ability and, unexpectedly, propensity towards cooperation. Our findings provide foundational insights into the multi-player human-LLM interaction in simultaneous choice games, uncover heterogeneities in both subjects' behaviour and beliefs about LLM's play when playing against them, and suggest important implications for mechanism design in mixed human-LLM systems.

We introduce and analyze distance preservation games (DPGs). In DPGs, agents express ideal distances to other agents and need to choose locations in the unit interval while preserving their ideal distances as closely as possible. We analyze the existence and computation of location profiles that are jump stable (i.e., no agent can benefit by moving to another location) or welfare optimal for DPGs, respectively. Specifically, we prove that there are DPGs without jump stable location profiles and identify important cases where such outcomes always exist and can be computed efficiently. Similarly, we show that finding welfare optimal location profiles is NP-complete and present approximation algorithms for finding solutions with social welfare close to optimal. Finally, we prove that DPGs have a price of anarchy of at most 2.

Language models demonstrate both quantitative improvement and new qualitative capabilities with increasing scale. Despite their potentially transformative impact, these new capabilities are as yet poorly characterized. In order to inform future research, prepare for disruptive new model capabilities, and ameliorate socially harmful effects, it is vital that we understand the present and near-future capabilities and limitations of language models. To address this challenge, we introduce the Beyond the Imitation Game benchmark (BIG-bench). BIG-bench currently consists of 204 tasks, contributed by 442 authors across 132 institutions. Task topics are diverse, drawing problems from linguistics, childhood development, math, common-sense reasoning, biology, physics, social bias, software development, and beyond. BIG-bench focuses on tasks that are believed to be beyond the capabilities of current language models. We evaluate the behavior of OpenAI's GPT models, Google-internal dense transformer architectures, and Switch-style sparse transformers on BIG-bench, across model sizes spanning millions to hundreds of billions of parameters. In addition, a team of human expert raters performed all tasks in order to provide a strong baseline. Findings include: model performance and calibration both improve with scale, but are poor in absolute terms (and when compared with rater performance); performance is remarkably similar across model classes, though with benefits from sparsity; tasks that improve gradually and predictably commonly involve a large knowledge or memorization component, whereas tasks that exhibit "breakthrough" behavior at a critical scale often involve multiple steps or components, or brittle metrics; social bias typically increases with scale in settings with ambiguous context, but this can be improved with prompting.

Effective macroeconomic policies play a crucial role in promoting economic growth and social stability. This paper models the optimal macroeconomic policy problem based on the Stackelberg Mean Field Game (SMFG), where the government acts as the leader in policy-making, and large-scale households dynamically respond as followers. This modeling method captures the asymmetric dynamic game between the government and large-scale households, and interpretably evaluates the effects of macroeconomic policies based on microfoundations, which is difficult for existing methods to achieve. We also propose a solution for SMFGs, incorporating pre-training on real data and a model-free Stackelberg mean-field reinforcement learning (SMFRL) algorithm, which operates independently of prior environmental knowledge and transitions. Our experimental results showcase the superiority of the SMFG method over other economic policies in terms of performance, efficiency-equity tradeoff, and SMFG assumption analysis. This paper significantly contributes to the domain of AI for economics by providing a powerful tool for modeling and solving optimal macroeconomic policies.

Real-world multi-agent scenarios often involve mixed motives, demanding altruistic agents capable of self-protection against potential exploitation. However, existing approaches often struggle to achieve both objectives. In this paper, based on that empathic responses are modulated by inferred social relationships between agents, we propose LASE Learning to balance Altruism and Self-interest based on Empathy), a distributed multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm that fosters altruistic cooperation through gifting while avoiding exploitation by other agents in mixed-motive games. LASE allocates a portion of its rewards to co-players as gifts, with this allocation adapting dynamically based on the social relationship -- a metric evaluating the friendliness of co-players estimated by counterfactual reasoning. In particular, social relationship measures each co-player by comparing the estimated Q-function of current joint action to a counterfactual baseline which marginalizes the co-player's action, with its action distribution inferred by a perspective-taking module. Comprehensive experiments are performed in spatially and temporally extended mixed-motive games, demonstrating LASE's ability to promote group collaboration without compromising fairness and its capacity to adapt policies to various types of interactive co-players.

Game environments provide rich, controllable settings that stimulate many aspects of real-world complexity. As such, game agents offer a valuable testbed for exploring capabilities relevant to Artificial General Intelligence. Recently, the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) provides new opportunities to endow these agents with generalizable reasoning, memory, and adaptability in complex game environments. This survey offers an up-to-date review of LLM-based game agents (LLMGAs) through a unified reference architecture. At the single-agent level, we synthesize existing studies around three core components: memory, reasoning, and perception-action interfaces, which jointly characterize how language enables agents to perceive, think, and act. At the multi-agent level, we outline how communication protocols and organizational models support coordination, role differentiation, and large-scale social behaviors. To contextualize these designs, we introduce a challenge-centered taxonomy linking six major game genres to their dominant agent requirements, from low-latency control in action games to open-ended goal formation in sandbox worlds. A curated list of related papers is available at https://github.com/git-disl/awesome-LLM-game-agent-papers

Group polarization, the phenomenon where individuals become more extreme after interacting, has been gaining attention, especially with the rise of social media shaping people's opinions. Recent interest has emerged in formal reasoning about group polarization using logical systems. In this work we consider the modal logic PNL that captures the notion of agents agreeing or disagreeing on a given topic. Our contribution involves enhancing PNL with advanced formal reasoning techniques, instead of relying on axiomatic systems for analyzing group polarization. To achieve this, we introduce a semantic game tailored for (hybrid) extensions of PNL. This game fosters dynamic reasoning about concrete network models, aligning with our goal of strengthening PNL's effectiveness in studying group polarization. We show how this semantic game leads to a provability game by systemically exploring the truth in all models. This leads to the first cut-free sequent systems for some variants of PNL. Using polarization of formulas, the proposed calculi can be modularly adapted to consider different frame properties of the underlying model.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in environmental perception, reasoning-based decision-making, and simulating complex human behaviors, particularly in interactive role-playing contexts. This paper introduces the Multiverse Interactive Role-play Ability General Evaluation (MIRAGE), a comprehensive framework designed to assess LLMs' proficiency in portraying advanced human behaviors through murder mystery games. MIRAGE features eight intricately crafted scripts encompassing diverse themes and styles, providing a rich simulation. To evaluate LLMs' performance, MIRAGE employs four distinct methods: the Trust Inclination Index (TII) to measure dynamics of trust and suspicion, the Clue Investigation Capability (CIC) to measure LLMs' capability of conducting information, the Interactivity Capability Index (ICI) to assess role-playing capabilities and the Script Compliance Index (SCI) to assess LLMs' capability of understanding and following instructions. Our experiments indicate that even popular models like GPT-4 face significant challenges in navigating the complexities presented by the MIRAGE. The datasets and simulation codes are available in https://github.com/lime728/MIRAGE{github}.

OpenSpiel is a collection of environments and algorithms for research in general reinforcement learning and search/planning in games. OpenSpiel supports n-player (single- and multi- agent) zero-sum, cooperative and general-sum, one-shot and sequential, strictly turn-taking and simultaneous-move, perfect and imperfect information games, as well as traditional multiagent environments such as (partially- and fully- observable) grid worlds and social dilemmas. OpenSpiel also includes tools to analyze learning dynamics and other common evaluation metrics. This document serves both as an overview of the code base and an introduction to the terminology, core concepts, and algorithms across the fields of reinforcement learning, computational game theory, and search.

While LLM/VLM-powered AI agents have advanced rapidly in math, coding, and computer use, their applications in complex physical and social environments remain challenging. Building agents that can survive and thrive in the real world (for example, by autonomously earning income or running a business) requires massive-scale interaction, reasoning, training, and evaluation across diverse embodied scenarios. However, existing world simulators for such development fall short: they often rely on limited hand-crafted environments, simulate simplified game-like physics and social rules, and lack native support for LLM/VLM agents. We introduce SimWorld, a new simulator built on Unreal Engine 5, designed for developing and evaluating LLM/VLM agents in rich, real-world-like settings. SimWorld offers three core capabilities: (1) realistic, open-ended world simulation, including accurate physical and social dynamics and language-driven procedural environment generation; (2) a rich interface for LLM/VLM agents, with multimodal world inputs and open-vocabulary actions at varying levels of abstraction; and (3) diverse and extensible physical and social reasoning scenarios that are easily customizable by users. We demonstrate SimWorld by deploying frontier LLM agents (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-Flash, Claude-3.5, and DeepSeek-Prover-V2) on long-horizon multi-agent delivery tasks involving strategic cooperation and competition. The results reveal distinct reasoning patterns and limitations across models. We open-source SimWorld and hope it becomes a foundational platform for advancing real-world agent intelligence across disciplines: https://simworld.org.

More than a decade has passed since the development of FearNot!, an application designed to help children deal with bullying through role-playing with virtual characters. It was also the application that led to the creation of FAtiMA, an affective agent architecture for creating autonomous characters that can evoke empathic responses. In this paper, we describe FAtiMA Toolkit, a collection of open-source tools that is designed to help researchers, game developers and roboticists incorporate a computational model of emotion and decision-making in their work. The toolkit was developed with the goal of making FAtiMA more accessible, easier to incorporate into different projects and more flexible in its capabilities for human-agent interaction, based upon the experience gathered over the years across different virtual environments and human-robot interaction scenarios. As a result, this work makes several different contributions to the field of Agent-Based Architectures. More precisely, FAtiMA Toolkit's library based design allows developers to easily integrate it with other frameworks, its meta-cognitive model affords different internal reasoners and affective components and its explicit dialogue structure gives control to the author even within highly complex scenarios. To demonstrate the use of FAtiMA Toolkit, several different use cases where the toolkit was successfully applied are described and discussed.

A k-clique is a dense graph, consisting of k fully-connected nodes, that finds numerous applications, such as community detection and network analysis. In this paper, we study a new problem, that finds a maximum set of disjoint k-cliques in a given large real-world graph with a user-defined fixed number k, which can contribute to a good performance of teaming collaborative events in online games. However, this problem is NP-hard when k geq 3, making it difficult to solve. To address that, we propose an efficient lightweight method that avoids significant overheads and achieves a k-approximation to the optimal, which is equipped with several optimization techniques, including the ordering method, degree estimation in the clique graph, and a lightweight implementation. Besides, to handle dynamic graphs that are widely seen in real-world social networks, we devise an efficient indexing method with careful swapping operations, leading to the efficient maintenance of a near-optimal result with frequent updates in the graph. In various experiments on several large graphs, our proposed approaches significantly outperform the competitors by up to 2 orders of magnitude in running time and 13.3\% in the number of computed disjoint k-cliques, which demonstrates the superiority of the proposed approaches in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

As large language models (LLMs) advance across diverse tasks, the need for comprehensive evaluation beyond single metrics becomes increasingly important. To fully assess LLM intelligence, it is crucial to examine their interactive dynamics and strategic behaviors. We present LLMsPark, a game theory-based evaluation platform that measures LLMs' decision-making strategies and social behaviors in classic game-theoretic settings, providing a multi-agent environment to explore strategic depth. Our system cross-evaluates 15 leading LLMs (both commercial and open-source) using leaderboard rankings and scoring mechanisms. Higher scores reflect stronger reasoning and strategic capabilities, revealing distinct behavioral patterns and performance differences across models. This work introduces a novel perspective for evaluating LLMs' strategic intelligence, enriching existing benchmarks and broadening their assessment in interactive, game-theoretic scenarios. The benchmark and rankings are publicly available at https://llmsparks.github.io/.

Recent AI algorithms are blackbox models whose decisions are difficult to interpret. eXplainable AI (XAI) seeks to address lack of AI interpretability and trust by explaining to customers their AI decision, e.g., decision to reject a loan application. The common wisdom is that regulating AI by mandating fully transparent XAI leads to greater social welfare. This paper challenges this notion through a game theoretic model for a policy-maker who maximizes social welfare, firms in a duopoly competition that maximize profits, and heterogenous consumers. The results show that XAI regulation may be redundant. In fact, mandating fully transparent XAI may make firms and customers worse off. This reveals a trade-off between maximizing welfare and receiving explainable AI outputs. We also discuss managerial implications for policy-maker and firms.

TextArena is an open-source collection of competitive text-based games for training and evaluation of agentic behavior in Large Language Models (LLMs). It spans 57+ unique environments (including single-player, two-player, and multi-player setups) and allows for easy evaluation of model capabilities via an online-play system (against humans and other submitted models) with real-time TrueSkill scores. Traditional benchmarks rarely assess dynamic social skills such as negotiation, theory of mind, and deception, creating a gap that TextArena addresses. Designed with research, community and extensibility in mind, TextArena emphasizes ease of adding new games, adapting the framework, testing models, playing against the models, and training models. Detailed documentation of environments, games, leaderboard, and examples are available on https://github.com/LeonGuertler/TextArena and https://www.textarena.ai/.

Reasoning and strategic behavior in social interactions is a hallmark of intelligence. This form of reasoning is significantly more sophisticated than isolated planning or reasoning tasks in static settings (e.g., math problem solving). In this paper, we present Strategic Planning, Interaction, and Negotiation (SPIN-Bench), a new multi-domain evaluation designed to measure the intelligence of strategic planning and social reasoning. While many existing benchmarks focus on narrow planning or single-agent reasoning, SPIN-Bench combines classical PDDL tasks, competitive board games, cooperative card games, and multi-agent negotiation scenarios in one unified framework. The framework includes both a benchmark as well as an arena to simulate and evaluate the variety of social settings to test reasoning and strategic behavior of AI agents. We formulate the benchmark SPIN-Bench by systematically varying action spaces, state complexity, and the number of interacting agents to simulate a variety of social settings where success depends on not only methodical and step-wise decision making, but also conceptual inference of other (adversarial or cooperative) participants. Our experiments reveal that while contemporary LLMs handle basic fact retrieval and short-range planning reasonably well, they encounter significant performance bottlenecks in tasks requiring deep multi-hop reasoning over large state spaces and socially adept coordination under uncertainty. We envision SPIN-Bench as a catalyst for future research on robust multi-agent planning, social reasoning, and human--AI teaming.

The final frontier for simulation is the accurate representation of complex, real-world social systems. While agent-based modeling (ABM) seeks to study the behavior and interactions of agents within a larger system, it is unable to faithfully capture the full complexity of human-driven behavior. Large language models (LLMs), like ChatGPT, have emerged as a potential solution to this bottleneck by enabling researchers to explore human-driven interactions in previously unimaginable ways. Our research investigates simulations of human interactions using LLMs. Through prompt engineering, inspired by Park et al. (2023), we present two simulations of believable proxies of human behavior: a two-agent negotiation and a six-agent murder mystery game.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

The concept of world models has garnered significant attention due to advancements in multimodal large language models such as GPT-4 and video generation models such as Sora, which are central to the pursuit of artificial general intelligence. This survey offers a comprehensive review of the literature on world models. Generally, world models are regarded as tools for either understanding the present state of the world or predicting its future dynamics. This review presents a systematic categorization of world models, emphasizing two primary functions: (1) constructing internal representations to understand the mechanisms of the world, and (2) predicting future states to simulate and guide decision-making. Initially, we examine the current progress in these two categories. We then explore the application of world models in key domains, including generative games, autonomous driving, robotics, and social simulacra, with a focus on how each domain utilizes these aspects. Finally, we outline key challenges and provide insights into potential future research directions. We summarize the representative papers along with their code repositories in https://github.com/tsinghua-fib-lab/World-Model.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

We introduce a new type of test, called a Turing Experiment (TE), for evaluating how well a language model, such as GPT-3, can simulate different aspects of human behavior. Unlike the Turing Test, which involves simulating a single arbitrary individual, a TE requires simulating a representative sample of participants in human subject research. We give TEs that attempt to replicate well-established findings in prior studies. We design a methodology for simulating TEs and illustrate its use to compare how well different language models are able to reproduce classic economic, psycholinguistic, and social psychology experiments: Ultimatum Game, Garden Path Sentences, Milgram Shock Experiment, and Wisdom of Crowds. In the first three TEs, the existing findings were replicated using recent models, while the last TE reveals a "hyper-accuracy distortion" present in some language models.

Artificial agents have traditionally been trained to maximize reward, which may incentivize power-seeking and deception, analogous to how next-token prediction in language models (LMs) may incentivize toxicity. So do agents naturally learn to be Machiavellian? And how do we measure these behaviors in general-purpose models such as GPT-4? Towards answering these questions, we introduce MACHIAVELLI, a benchmark of 134 Choose-Your-Own-Adventure games containing over half a million rich, diverse scenarios that center on social decision-making. Scenario labeling is automated with LMs, which are more performant than human annotators. We mathematize dozens of harmful behaviors and use our annotations to evaluate agents' tendencies to be power-seeking, cause disutility, and commit ethical violations. We observe some tension between maximizing reward and behaving ethically. To improve this trade-off, we investigate LM-based methods to steer agents' towards less harmful behaviors. Our results show that agents can both act competently and morally, so concrete progress can currently be made in machine ethics--designing agents that are Pareto improvements in both safety and capabilities.

Data-driven modelling and synthesis of motion is an active research area with applications that include animation, games, and social robotics. This paper introduces a new class of probabilistic, generative, and controllable motion-data models based on normalising flows. Models of this kind can describe highly complex distributions, yet can be trained efficiently using exact maximum likelihood, unlike GANs or VAEs. Our proposed model is autoregressive and uses LSTMs to enable arbitrarily long time-dependencies. Importantly, is is also causal, meaning that each pose in the output sequence is generated without access to poses or control inputs from future time steps; this absence of algorithmic latency is important for interactive applications with real-time motion control. The approach can in principle be applied to any type of motion since it does not make restrictive, task-specific assumptions regarding the motion or the character morphology. We evaluate the models on motion-capture datasets of human and quadruped locomotion. Objective and subjective results show that randomly-sampled motion from the proposed method outperforms task-agnostic baselines and attains a motion quality close to recorded motion capture.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

The development and popularization of large language models (LLMs) have raised concerns that they will be used to create tailor-made, convincing arguments to push false or misleading narratives online. Early work has found that language models can generate content perceived as at least on par and often more persuasive than human-written messages. However, there is still limited knowledge about LLMs' persuasive capabilities in direct conversations with human counterparts and how personalization can improve their performance. In this pre-registered study, we analyze the effect of AI-driven persuasion in a controlled, harmless setting. We create a web-based platform where participants engage in short, multiple-round debates with a live opponent. Each participant is randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions, corresponding to a two-by-two factorial design: (1) Games are either played between two humans or between a human and an LLM; (2) Personalization might or might not be enabled, granting one of the two players access to basic sociodemographic information about their opponent. We found that participants who debated GPT-4 with access to their personal information had 81.7% (p < 0.01; N=820 unique participants) higher odds of increased agreement with their opponents compared to participants who debated humans. Without personalization, GPT-4 still outperforms humans, but the effect is lower and statistically non-significant (p=0.31). Overall, our results suggest that concerns around personalization are meaningful and have important implications for the governance of social media and the design of new online environments.

Social computing prototypes probe the social behaviors that may arise in an envisioned system design. This prototyping practice is currently limited to recruiting small groups of people. Unfortunately, many challenges do not arise until a system is populated at a larger scale. Can a designer understand how a social system might behave when populated, and make adjustments to the design before the system falls prey to such challenges? We introduce social simulacra, a prototyping technique that generates a breadth of realistic social interactions that may emerge when a social computing system is populated. Social simulacra take as input the designer's description of a community's design -- goal, rules, and member personas -- and produce as output an instance of that design with simulated behavior, including posts, replies, and anti-social behaviors. We demonstrate that social simulacra shift the behaviors that they generate appropriately in response to design changes, and that they enable exploration of "what if?" scenarios where community members or moderators intervene. To power social simulacra, we contribute techniques for prompting a large language model to generate thousands of distinct community members and their social interactions with each other; these techniques are enabled by the observation that large language models' training data already includes a wide variety of positive and negative behavior on social media platforms. In evaluations, we show that participants are often unable to distinguish social simulacra from actual community behavior and that social computing designers successfully refine their social computing designs when using social simulacra.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

Multi-agent football poses an unsolved challenge in AI research. Existing work has focused on tackling simplified scenarios of the game, or else leveraging expert demonstrations. In this paper, we develop a multi-agent system to play the full 11 vs. 11 game mode, without demonstrations. This game mode contains aspects that present major challenges to modern reinforcement learning algorithms; multi-agent coordination, long-term planning, and non-transitivity. To address these challenges, we present TiZero; a self-evolving, multi-agent system that learns from scratch. TiZero introduces several innovations, including adaptive curriculum learning, a novel self-play strategy, and an objective that optimizes the policies of multiple agents jointly. Experimentally, it outperforms previous systems by a large margin on the Google Research Football environment, increasing win rates by over 30%. To demonstrate the generality of TiZero's innovations, they are assessed on several environments beyond football; Overcooked, Multi-agent Particle-Environment, Tic-Tac-Toe and Connect-Four.

Social network simulation plays a crucial role in addressing various challenges within social science. It offers extensive applications such as state prediction, phenomena explanation, and policy-making support, among others. In this work, we harness the formidable human-like capabilities exhibited by large language models (LLMs) in sensing, reasoning, and behaving, and utilize these qualities to construct the S^3 system (short for Social network Simulation System). Adhering to the widely employed agent-based simulation paradigm, we employ prompt engineering and prompt tuning techniques to ensure that the agent's behavior closely emulates that of a genuine human within the social network. Specifically, we simulate three pivotal aspects: emotion, attitude, and interaction behaviors. By endowing the agent in the system with the ability to perceive the informational environment and emulate human actions, we observe the emergence of population-level phenomena, including the propagation of information, attitudes, and emotions. We conduct an evaluation encompassing two levels of simulation, employing real-world social network data. Encouragingly, the results demonstrate promising accuracy. This work represents an initial step in the realm of social network simulation empowered by LLM-based agents. We anticipate that our endeavors will serve as a source of inspiration for the development of simulation systems within, but not limited to, social science.

Understanding human behavior and society is a central focus in social sciences, with the rise of generative social science marking a significant paradigmatic shift. By leveraging bottom-up simulations, it replaces costly and logistically challenging traditional experiments with scalable, replicable, and systematic computational approaches for studying complex social dynamics. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have further transformed this research paradigm, enabling the creation of human-like generative social agents and realistic simulacra of society. In this paper, we propose AgentSociety, a large-scale social simulator that integrates LLM-driven agents, a realistic societal environment, and a powerful large-scale simulation engine. Based on the proposed simulator, we generate social lives for over 10k agents, simulating their 5 million interactions both among agents and between agents and their environment. Furthermore, we explore the potential of AgentSociety as a testbed for computational social experiments, focusing on four key social issues: polarization, the spread of inflammatory messages, the effects of universal basic income policies, and the impact of external shocks such as hurricanes. These four issues serve as valuable cases for assessing AgentSociety's support for typical research methods -- such as surveys, interviews, and interventions -- as well as for investigating the patterns, causes, and underlying mechanisms of social issues. The alignment between AgentSociety's outcomes and real-world experimental results not only demonstrates its ability to capture human behaviors and their underlying mechanisms, but also underscores its potential as an important platform for social scientists and policymakers.

Algorithms increasingly serve as information mediators--from social media feeds and targeted advertising to the increasing ubiquity of LLMs. This engenders a joint process where agents combine private, algorithmically-mediated signals with learning from peers to arrive at decisions. To study such settings, we introduce a model of controlled sequential social learning in which an information-mediating planner (e.g. an LLM) controls the information structure of agents while they also learn from the decisions of earlier agents. The planner may seek to improve social welfare (altruistic planner) or to induce a specific action the planner prefers (biased planner). Our framework presents a new optimization problem for social learning that combines dynamic programming with decentralized action choices and Bayesian belief updates. We prove the convexity of the value function and characterize the optimal policies of altruistic and biased planners, which attain desired tradeoffs between the costs they incur and the payoffs they earn from induced agent choices. Notably, in some regimes the biased planner intentionally obfuscates the agents' signals. Even under stringent transparency constraints--information parity with individuals, no lying or cherry-picking, and full observability--we show that information mediation can substantially shift social welfare in either direction. We complement our theory with simulations in which LLMs act as both planner and agents. Notably, the LLM planner in our simulations exhibits emergent strategic behavior in steering public opinion that broadly mirrors the trends predicted, though key deviations suggest the influence of non-Bayesian reasoning consistent with the cognitive patterns of both humans and LLMs trained on human-like data. Together, we establish our framework as a tractable basis for studying the impact and regulation of LLM information mediators.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Self-play, characterized by agents' interactions with copies or past versions of itself, has recently gained prominence in reinforcement learning. This paper first clarifies the preliminaries of self-play, including the multi-agent reinforcement learning framework and basic game theory concepts. Then it provides a unified framework and classifies existing self-play algorithms within this framework. Moreover, the paper bridges the gap between the algorithms and their practical implications by illustrating the role of self-play in different scenarios. Finally, the survey highlights open challenges and future research directions in self-play. This paper is an essential guide map for understanding the multifaceted landscape of self-play in RL.

Conventional federated learning frameworks suffer from several challenges including performance bottlenecks at the central aggregation server, data bias, poor model convergence, and exposure to model poisoning attacks, and limited trust in the centralized infrastructure. In the current paper, a novel game theory-based approach called pFedGame is proposed for decentralized federated learning, best suitable for temporally dynamic networks. The proposed algorithm works without any centralized server for aggregation and incorporates the problem of vanishing gradients and poor convergence over temporally dynamic topology among federated learning participants. The solution comprises two sequential steps in every federated learning round, for every participant. First, it selects suitable peers for collaboration in federated learning. Secondly, it executes a two-player constant sum cooperative game to reach convergence by applying an optimal federated learning aggregation strategy. Experiments performed to assess the performance of pFedGame in comparison to existing methods in decentralized federated learning have shown promising results with accuracy higher than 70% for heterogeneous data.

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

Traditional sociological research often relies on human participation, which, though effective, is expensive, challenging to scale, and with ethical concerns. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) highlight their potential to simulate human behavior, enabling the replication of individual responses and facilitating studies on many interdisciplinary studies. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive survey of this field, illustrating the recent progress in simulation driven by LLM-empowered agents. We categorize the simulations into three types: (1) Individual Simulation, which mimics specific individuals or demographic groups; (2) Scenario Simulation, where multiple agents collaborate to achieve goals within specific contexts; and (3) Society Simulation, which models interactions within agent societies to reflect the complexity and variety of real-world dynamics. These simulations follow a progression, ranging from detailed individual modeling to large-scale societal phenomena. We provide a detailed discussion of each simulation type, including the architecture or key components of the simulation, the classification of objectives or scenarios and the evaluation method. Afterward, we summarize commonly used datasets and benchmarks. Finally, we discuss the trends across these three types of simulation. A repository for the related sources is at {https://github.com/FudanDISC/SocialAgent}.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

This paper introduces a novel framework combining LLM agents as proxies for human strategic behavior with reinforcement learning (RL) to engage these agents in evolving strategic interactions within team environments. Our approach extends traditional agent-based simulations by using strategic LLM agents (SLA) and introducing dynamic and adaptive governance through a pro-social promoting RL agent (PPA) that modulates information access across agents in a network, optimizing social welfare and promoting pro-social behavior. Through validation in iterative games, including the prisoner dilemma, we demonstrate that SLA agents exhibit nuanced strategic adaptations. The PPA agent effectively learns to adjust information transparency, resulting in enhanced cooperation rates. This framework offers significant insights into AI-mediated social dynamics, contributing to the deployment of AI in real-world team settings.

The utilization of artificial intelligence (AI) in card games has been a well-explored subject within AI research for an extensive period. Recent advancements have propelled AI programs to showcase expertise in intricate card games such as Mahjong, DouDizhu, and Texas Hold'em. In this work, we aim to develop an AI program for an exceptionally complex and popular card game called GuanDan. This game involves four players engaging in both competitive and cooperative play throughout a long process to upgrade their level, posing great challenges for AI due to its expansive state and action space, long episode length, and complex rules. Employing reinforcement learning techniques, specifically Deep Monte Carlo (DMC), and a distributed training framework, we first put forward an AI program named DanZero for this game. Evaluation against baseline AI programs based on heuristic rules highlights the outstanding performance of our bot. Besides, in order to further enhance the AI's capabilities, we apply policy-based reinforcement learning algorithm to GuanDan. To address the challenges arising from the huge action space, which will significantly impact the performance of policy-based algorithms, we adopt the pre-trained model to facilitate the training process and the achieved AI program manages to achieve a superior performance.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

Generative Agent-Based Modeling (GABM) is an emerging simulation paradigm that combines the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models with traditional Agent-Based Modeling to replicate complex social behaviors, including interactions on social media. While prior work has focused on localized phenomena such as opinion formation and information spread, its potential to capture global network dynamics remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by analyzing GABM-based social media simulations through the lens of the Friendship Paradox (FP), a counterintuitive phenomenon where individuals, on average, have fewer friends than their friends. We propose a GABM framework for social media simulations, featuring generative agents that emulate real users with distinct personalities and interests. Using Twitter datasets on the US 2020 Election and the QAnon conspiracy, we show that the FP emerges naturally in GABM simulations. Consistent with real-world observations, the simulations unveil a hierarchical structure, where agents preferentially connect with others displaying higher activity or influence. Additionally, we find that infrequent connections primarily drive the FP, reflecting patterns in real networks. These findings validate GABM as a robust tool for modeling global social media phenomena and highlight its potential for advancing social science by enabling nuanced analysis of user behavior.

This paper introduces SC2LE (StarCraft II Learning Environment), a reinforcement learning environment based on the StarCraft II game. This domain poses a new grand challenge for reinforcement learning, representing a more difficult class of problems than considered in most prior work. It is a multi-agent problem with multiple players interacting; there is imperfect information due to a partially observed map; it has a large action space involving the selection and control of hundreds of units; it has a large state space that must be observed solely from raw input feature planes; and it has delayed credit assignment requiring long-term strategies over thousands of steps. We describe the observation, action, and reward specification for the StarCraft II domain and provide an open source Python-based interface for communicating with the game engine. In addition to the main game maps, we provide a suite of mini-games focusing on different elements of StarCraft II gameplay. For the main game maps, we also provide an accompanying dataset of game replay data from human expert players. We give initial baseline results for neural networks trained from this data to predict game outcomes and player actions. Finally, we present initial baseline results for canonical deep reinforcement learning agents applied to the StarCraft II domain. On the mini-games, these agents learn to achieve a level of play that is comparable to a novice player. However, when trained on the main game, these agents are unable to make significant progress. Thus, SC2LE offers a new and challenging environment for exploring deep reinforcement learning algorithms and architectures.

Existing game AI research mainly focuses on enhancing agents' abilities to win games, but this does not inherently make humans have a better experience when collaborating with these agents. For example, agents may dominate the collaboration and exhibit unintended or detrimental behaviors, leading to poor experiences for their human partners. In other words, most game AI agents are modeled in a "self-centered" manner. In this paper, we propose a "human-centered" modeling scheme for collaborative agents that aims to enhance the experience of humans. Specifically, we model the experience of humans as the goals they expect to achieve during the task. We expect that agents should learn to enhance the extent to which humans achieve these goals while maintaining agents' original abilities (e.g., winning games). To achieve this, we propose the Reinforcement Learning from Human Gain (RLHG) approach. The RLHG approach introduces a "baseline", which corresponds to the extent to which humans primitively achieve their goals, and encourages agents to learn behaviors that can effectively enhance humans in achieving their goals better. We evaluate the RLHG agent in the popular Multi-player Online Battle Arena (MOBA) game, Honor of Kings, by conducting real-world human-agent tests. Both objective performance and subjective preference results show that the RLHG agent provides participants better gaming experience.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

Social network simulation is developed to provide a comprehensive understanding of social networks in the real world, which can be leveraged for a wide range of applications such as group behavior emergence, policy optimization, and business strategy development. However, billions of individuals and their evolving interactions involved in social networks pose challenges in accurately reflecting real-world complexities. In this study, we propose a comprehensive Social Network Simulation System (GA-S3) that leverages newly designed Group Agents to make intelligent decisions regarding various online events. Unlike other intelligent agents that represent an individual entity, our group agents model a collection of individuals exhibiting similar behaviors, facilitating the simulation of large-scale network phenomena with complex interactions at a manageable computational cost. Additionally, we have constructed a social network benchmark from 2024 popular online events that contains fine-grained information on Internet traffic variations. The experiment demonstrates that our approach is capable of achieving accurate and highly realistic prediction results. Code is open at https://github.com/AI4SS/GAS-3.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems (MAS) as components of collaborative intelligence, where peer interactions dynamically shape individual decision-making. Although prior work has focused on conformity bias, we extend the analysis to examine how LLMs form trust from previous impressions, resist misinformation, and integrate peer input during interaction, key factors for achieving collective intelligence under complex social dynamics. We present KAIROS, a benchmark simulating quiz contests with peer agents of varying reliability, offering fine-grained control over conditions such as expert-novice roles, noisy crowds, and adversarial peers. LLMs receive both historical interactions and current peer responses, allowing systematic investigation into how trust, peer action, and self-confidence influence decisions. As for mitigation strategies, we evaluate prompting, supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning, Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO), across multiple models. Our results reveal that GRPO with multi-agent context combined with outcome-based rewards and unconstrained reasoning achieves the best overall performance, but also decreases the robustness to social influence compared to Base models. The code and datasets are available at: https://github.com/declare-lab/KAIROS.

Since the introduction of ChatGPT and GPT-4, these models have been tested across a large number of tasks. Their adeptness across domains is evident, but their aptitude in playing games, and specifically their aptitude in the realm of poker has remained unexplored. Poker is a game that requires decision making under uncertainty and incomplete information. In this paper, we put ChatGPT and GPT-4 through the poker test and evaluate their poker skills. Our findings reveal that while both models display an advanced understanding of poker, encompassing concepts like the valuation of starting hands, playing positions and other intricacies of game theory optimal (GTO) poker, both ChatGPT and GPT-4 are NOT game theory optimal poker players. Profitable strategies in poker are evaluated in expectations over large samples. Through a series of experiments, we first discover the characteristics of optimal prompts and model parameters for playing poker with these models. Our observations then unveil the distinct playing personas of the two models. We first conclude that GPT-4 is a more advanced poker player than ChatGPT. This exploration then sheds light on the divergent poker tactics of the two models: ChatGPT's conservativeness juxtaposed against GPT-4's aggression. In poker vernacular, when tasked to play GTO poker, ChatGPT plays like a nit, which means that it has a propensity to only engage with premium hands and folds a majority of hands. When subjected to the same directive, GPT-4 plays like a maniac, showcasing a loose and aggressive style of play. Both strategies, although relatively advanced, are not game theory optimal.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evaluated in interactive environments to test their social intelligence. However, existing benchmarks often assume idealized communication between agents, limiting our ability to diagnose whether LLMs can maintain and repair interactions in more realistic, imperfect settings. To close this gap, we present SocialVeil, a social learning environment that can simulate social interaction under cognitive-difference-induced communication barriers. Grounded in a systematic literature review of communication challenges in human interaction, SocialVeil introduces three representative types of such disruption, semantic vagueness, sociocultural mismatch, and emotional interference. We also introduce two barrier-aware evaluation metrics, unresolved confusion and mutual understanding, to evaluate interaction quality under impaired communication. Experiments across 720 scenarios and four frontier LLMs show that barriers consistently impair performance, with mutual understanding reduced by over 45\% on average, and confusion elevated by nearly 50\%. Human evaluations validate the fidelity of these simulated barriers (ICCapprox0.78, Pearson rapprox0.80). We further demonstrate that adaptation strategies (Repair Instruction and Interactive learning) only have a modest effect far from barrier-free performance. This work takes a step toward bringing social interaction environments closer to real-world communication, opening opportunities for exploring the social intelligence of LLM agents.

Learning the behavior of large agent populations is an important task for numerous research areas. Although the field of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has made significant progress towards solving these systems, solutions for many agents often remain computationally infeasible and lack theoretical guarantees. Mean Field Games (MFGs) address both of these issues and can be extended to Graphon MFGs (GMFGs) to include network structures between agents. Despite their merits, the real world applicability of GMFGs is limited by the fact that graphons only capture dense graphs. Since most empirically observed networks show some degree of sparsity, such as power law graphs, the GMFG framework is insufficient for capturing these network topologies. Thus, we introduce the novel concept of Graphex MFGs (GXMFGs) which builds on the graph theoretical concept of graphexes. Graphexes are the limiting objects to sparse graph sequences that also have other desirable features such as the small world property. Learning equilibria in these games is challenging due to the rich and sparse structure of the underlying graphs. To tackle these challenges, we design a new learning algorithm tailored to the GXMFG setup. This hybrid graphex learning approach leverages that the system mainly consists of a highly connected core and a sparse periphery. After defining the system and providing a theoretical analysis, we state our learning approach and demonstrate its learning capabilities on both synthetic graphs and real-world networks. This comparison shows that our GXMFG learning algorithm successfully extends MFGs to a highly relevant class of hard, realistic learning problems that are not accurately addressed by current MARL and MFG methods.

This paper introduces a simulator designed for opinion dynamics researchers to model competing influences within social networks in the presence of LLM-based agents. By integrating established opinion dynamics principles with state-of-the-art LLMs, this tool enables the study of influence propagation and counter-misinformation strategies. The simulator is particularly valuable for researchers in social science, psychology, and operations research, allowing them to analyse societal phenomena without requiring extensive coding expertise. Additionally, the simulator will be openly available on GitHub, ensuring accessibility and adaptability for those who wish to extend its capabilities for their own research.

Game-playing agents like AlphaGo have achieved superhuman performance through self-play, which is theoretically guaranteed to yield optimal policies in competitive games. However, most language tasks are partially or fully cooperative, so it is an open question whether techniques like self-play can effectively be used to improve language models. We empirically investigate this question in a negotiation game setting known as Deal or No Deal (DoND). Crucially, the objective in DoND can be modified to produce a fully cooperative game, a strictly competitive one, or anything in between. We finetune language models in self-play over multiple rounds of filtered behavior cloning in DoND for each of these objectives. Contrary to expectations, we find that language model self-play leads to significant performance gains in both cooperation and competition with humans, suggesting that self-play and related techniques have promise despite a lack of theoretical guarantees.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.

We introduce Pok\'eLLMon, the first LLM-embodied agent that achieves human-parity performance in tactical battle games, as demonstrated in Pok\'emon battles. The design of Pok\'eLLMon incorporates three key strategies: (i) In-context reinforcement learning that instantly consumes text-based feedback derived from battles to iteratively refine the policy; (ii) Knowledge-augmented generation that retrieves external knowledge to counteract hallucination and enables the agent to act timely and properly; (iii) Consistent action generation to mitigate the panic switching phenomenon when the agent faces a powerful opponent and wants to elude the battle. We show that online battles against human demonstrates Pok\'eLLMon's human-like battle strategies and just-in-time decision making, achieving 49\% of win rate in the Ladder competitions and 56\% of win rate in the invited battles. Our implementation and playable battle logs are available at: https://github.com/git-disl/PokeLLMon.

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.

Recent evidence suggests that the use of generative artificial intelligence reduces the diversity of content produced. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore the downstream consequences of content homogeneity when producers use generative AI to compete with one another. At equilibrium, players indeed produce content that is less diverse than optimal. However, stronger competition mitigates homogeneity and induces more diverse production. Perhaps more surprisingly, we show that a generative AI model that performs well in isolation (i.e., according to a benchmark) may fail to do so when faced with competition, and vice versa. We validate our results empirically by using language models to play Scattergories, a word game in which players are rewarded for producing answers that are both correct and unique. We discuss how the interplay between competition and homogeneity has implications for the development, evaluation, and use of generative AI.

We present a novel, open-source social network simulation framework, MOSAIC, where generative language agents predict user behaviors such as liking, sharing, and flagging content. This simulation combines LLM agents with a directed social graph to analyze emergent deception behaviors and gain a better understanding of how users determine the veracity of online social content. By constructing user representations from diverse fine-grained personas, our system enables multi-agent simulations that model content dissemination and engagement dynamics at scale. Within this framework, we evaluate three different content moderation strategies with simulated misinformation dissemination, and we find that they not only mitigate the spread of non-factual content but also increase user engagement. In addition, we analyze the trajectories of popular content in our simulations, and explore whether simulation agents' articulated reasoning for their social interactions truly aligns with their collective engagement patterns. We open-source our simulation software to encourage further research within AI and social sciences.

Society is characterized by the presence of a variety of social norms: collective patterns of sanctioning that can prevent miscoordination and free-riding. Inspired by this, we aim to construct learning dynamics where potentially beneficial social norms can emerge. Since social norms are underpinned by sanctioning, we introduce a training regime where agents can access all sanctioning events but learning is otherwise decentralized. This setting is technologically interesting because sanctioning events may be the only available public signal in decentralized multi-agent systems where reward or policy-sharing is infeasible or undesirable. To achieve collective action in this setting we construct an agent architecture containing a classifier module that categorizes observed behaviors as approved or disapproved, and a motivation to punish in accord with the group. We show that social norms emerge in multi-agent systems containing this agent and investigate the conditions under which this helps them achieve socially beneficial outcomes.

Due to the convenience of mobile devices, the online games have become an important part for user entertainments in reality, creating a demand for friend recommendation in online games. However, none of existing approaches can effectively incorporate the multi-modal user features (e.g., images and texts) with the structural information in the friendship graph, due to the following limitations: (1) some of them ignore the high-order structural proximity between users, (2) some fail to learn the pairwise relevance between users at modality-specific level, and (3) some cannot capture both the local and global user preferences on different modalities. By addressing these issues, in this paper, we propose an end-to-end model FROG that better models the user preferences on potential friends. Comprehensive experiments on both offline evaluation and online deployment at Tencent have demonstrated the superiority of FROG over existing approaches.

Recent advances in Competitive Self-Play (CSP) have achieved, or even surpassed, human level performance in complex game environments such as Dota 2 and StarCraft II using Distributed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL). One core component of these methods relies on creating a pool of learning agents -- consisting of the Main Agent, past versions of this agent, and Exploiter Agents -- where Exploiter Agents learn counter-strategies to the Main Agents. A key drawback of these approaches is the large computational cost and physical time that is required to train the system, making them impractical to deploy in highly iterative real-life settings such as video game productions. In this paper, we propose the Minimax Exploiter, a game theoretic approach to exploiting Main Agents that leverages knowledge of its opponents, leading to significant increases in data efficiency. We validate our approach in a diversity of settings, including simple turn based games, the arcade learning environment, and For Honor, a modern video game. The Minimax Exploiter consistently outperforms strong baselines, demonstrating improved stability and data efficiency, leading to a robust CSP-MARL method that is both flexible and easy to deploy.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

The growing capabilities and increasingly widespread deployment of AI systems necessitate robust benchmarks for measuring their cooperative capabilities. Unfortunately, most multi-agent benchmarks are either zero-sum or purely cooperative, providing limited opportunities for such measurements. We introduce a general-sum variant of the zero-sum board game Diplomacy -- called Welfare Diplomacy -- in which players must balance investing in military conquest and domestic welfare. We argue that Welfare Diplomacy facilitates both a clearer assessment of and stronger training incentives for cooperative capabilities. Our contributions are: (1) proposing the Welfare Diplomacy rules and implementing them via an open-source Diplomacy engine; (2) constructing baseline agents using zero-shot prompted language models; and (3) conducting experiments where we find that baselines using state-of-the-art models attain high social welfare but are exploitable. Our work aims to promote societal safety by aiding researchers in developing and assessing multi-agent AI systems. Code to evaluate Welfare Diplomacy and reproduce our experiments is available at https://github.com/mukobi/welfare-diplomacy.

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only a single type of attack, while recent work takes steps forward in defending against multiple attacks. In this paper, to understand multi-target robustness, we view this problem as a bargaining game in which different players (adversaries) negotiate to reach an agreement on a joint direction of parameter updating. We identify a phenomenon named player domination in the bargaining game, namely that the existing max-based approaches, such as MAX and MSD, do not converge. Based on our theoretical analysis, we design a novel framework that adjusts the budgets of different adversaries to avoid any player dominance. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that employing the proposed framework to the existing approaches significantly advances multi-target robustness.

Competitions for shareable and limited resources have long been studied with strategic agents. In reality, agents often have to learn and maximize the rewards of the resources at the same time. To design an individualized competing policy, we model the competition between agents in a novel multi-player multi-armed bandit (MPMAB) setting where players are selfish and aim to maximize their own rewards. In addition, when several players pull the same arm, we assume that these players averagely share the arms' rewards by expectation. Under this setting, we first analyze the Nash equilibrium when arms' rewards are known. Subsequently, we propose a novel SelfishMPMAB with Averaging Allocation (SMAA) approach based on the equilibrium. We theoretically demonstrate that SMAA could achieve a good regret guarantee for each player when all players follow the algorithm. Additionally, we establish that no single selfish player can significantly increase their rewards through deviation, nor can they detrimentally affect other players' rewards without incurring substantial losses for themselves. We finally validate the effectiveness of the method in extensive synthetic experiments.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

Stackelberg games and their resulting equilibria have received increasing attention in the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature. Each stage of a traditional Stackelberg game involves a leader(s) acting first, followed by the followers. In situations where the roles of leader(s) and followers can be interchanged, the designated role can have considerable advantages, for example, in first-mover advantage settings. Then the question arises: Who should be the leader and when? A bias in the leader selection process can lead to unfair outcomes. This problem is aggravated if the agents are self-interested and care only about their goals and rewards. We formally define this leader selection problem and show its relation to fairness in agents' returns. Furthermore, we propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that maximizes fairness by integrating mediators. Mediators have previously been used in the simultaneous action setting with varying levels of control, such as directly performing agents' actions or just recommending them. Our framework integrates mediators in the Stackelberg setting with minimal control (leader selection). We show that the presence of mediators leads to self-interested agents taking fair actions, resulting in higher overall fairness in agents' returns.

For reinforcement learning systems to be widely adopted, their users must understand and trust them. We present a theoretical analysis of explaining reinforcement learning using Shapley values, following a principled approach from game theory for identifying the contribution of individual players to the outcome of a cooperative game. We call this general framework Shapley Values for Explaining Reinforcement Learning (SVERL). Our analysis exposes the limitations of earlier uses of Shapley values in reinforcement learning. We then develop an approach that uses Shapley values to explain agent performance. In a variety of domains, SVERL produces meaningful explanations that match and supplement human intuition.

The study of social emergence has long been a central focus in social science. Traditional modeling approaches, such as rule-based Agent-Based Models (ABMs), struggle to capture the diversity and complexity of human behavior, particularly the irrational factors emphasized in behavioral economics. Recently, large language model (LLM) agents have gained traction as simulation tools for modeling human behavior in social science and role-playing applications. Studies suggest that LLMs can account for cognitive biases, emotional fluctuations, and other non-rational influences, enabling more realistic simulations of socio-economic dynamics. In this work, we introduce TwinMarket, a novel multi-agent framework that leverages LLMs to simulate socio-economic systems. Specifically, we examine how individual behaviors, through interactions and feedback mechanisms, give rise to collective dynamics and emergent phenomena. Through experiments in a simulated stock market environment, we demonstrate how individual actions can trigger group behaviors, leading to emergent outcomes such as financial bubbles and recessions. Our approach provides valuable insights into the complex interplay between individual decision-making and collective socio-economic patterns.

We introduce an approach to evaluate language model (LM) agency using negotiation games. This approach better reflects real-world use cases and addresses some of the shortcomings of alternative LM benchmarks. Negotiation games enable us to study multi-turn, and cross-model interactions, modulate complexity, and side-step accidental evaluation data leakage. We use our approach to test six widely used and publicly accessible LMs, evaluating performance and alignment in both self-play and cross-play settings. Noteworthy findings include: (i) only closed-source models tested here were able to complete these tasks; (ii) cooperative bargaining games proved to be most challenging to the models; and (iii) even the most powerful models sometimes "lose" to weaker opponents

In this paper, we describe adaptation of a simple word guessing game that occupied the hearts and minds of people around the world. There are versions for all three Baltic countries and even several versions of each. We specifically pay attention to the Latvian version and look into how people form their guesses given any already uncovered hints. The paper analyses guess patterns, easy and difficult word characteristics, and player behaviour and response.

In this paper, we propose a new method Strategist that utilizes LLMs to acquire new skills for playing multi-agent games through a self-improvement process. Our method gathers quality feedback through self-play simulations with Monte Carlo tree search and LLM-based reflection, which can then be used to learn high-level strategic skills such as how to evaluate states that guide the low-level execution.We showcase how our method can be used in both action planning and dialogue generation in the context of games, achieving good performance on both tasks. Specifically, we demonstrate that our method can help train agents with better performance than both traditional reinforcement learning-based approaches and other LLM-based skill learning approaches in games including the Game of Pure Strategy (GOPS) and The Resistance: Avalon.

Game theory is a powerful framework for reasoning about strategic interactions, with applications in domains ranging from day-to-day life to international politics. However, applying formal reasoning tools in such contexts is challenging, as these scenarios are often expressed in natural language. To address this, we introduce a framework for the autoformalization of game-theoretic scenarios, which translates natural language descriptions into formal logic representations suitable for formal solvers. Our approach utilizes one-shot prompting and a solver that provides feedback on syntactic correctness to allow LLMs to refine the code. We evaluate the framework using GPT-4o and a dataset of natural language problem descriptions, achieving 98% syntactic correctness and 88% semantic correctness. These results show the potential of LLMs to bridge the gap between real-life strategic interactions and formal reasoning.

Humans are social beings; we pursue social goals in our daily interactions, which is a crucial aspect of social intelligence. Yet, AI systems' abilities in this realm remain elusive. We present SOTOPIA, an open-ended environment to simulate complex social interactions between artificial agents and evaluate their social intelligence. In our environment, agents role-play and interact under a wide variety of scenarios; they coordinate, collaborate, exchange, and compete with each other to achieve complex social goals. We simulate the role-play interaction between LLM-based agents and humans within this task space and evaluate their performance with a holistic evaluation framework called SOTOPIA-Eval. With SOTOPIA, we find significant differences between these models in terms of their social intelligence, and we identify a subset of SOTOPIA scenarios, SOTOPIA-hard, that is generally challenging for all models. We find that on this subset, GPT-4 achieves a significantly lower goal completion rate than humans and struggles to exhibit social commonsense reasoning and strategic communication skills. These findings demonstrate SOTOPIA's promise as a general platform for research on evaluating and improving social intelligence in artificial agents.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

This study evaluates Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents for Dhumbal, a culturally significant multiplayer card game with imperfect information, through a systematic comparison of rule-based, search-based, and learning-based strategies. We formalize Dhumbal's mechanics and implement diverse agents, including heuristic approaches (Aggressive, Conservative, Balanced, Opportunistic), search-based methods such as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) and Information Set Monte Carlo Tree Search (ISMCTS), and reinforcement learning approaches including Deep Q-Network (DQN) and Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), and a random baseline. Evaluation involves within-category tournaments followed by a cross-category championship. Performance is measured via win rate, economic outcome, Jhyap success, cards discarded per round, risk assessment, and decision efficiency. Statistical significance is assessed using Welch's t-test with Bonferroni correction, effect sizes via Cohen's d, and 95% confidence intervals (CI). Across 1024 simulated rounds, the rule-based Aggressive agent achieves the highest win rate (88.3%, 95% CI: [86.3, 90.3]), outperforming ISMCTS (9.0%) and PPO (1.5%) through effective exploitation of Jhyap declarations. The study contributes a reproducible AI framework, insights into heuristic efficacy under partial information, and open-source code, thereby advancing AI research and supporting digital preservation of cultural games.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show significant potential in economic and strategic interactions, where communication via natural language is often prevalent. This raises key questions: Do LLMs behave rationally? Can they mimic human behavior? Do they tend to reach an efficient and fair outcome? What is the role of natural language in the strategic interaction? How do characteristics of the economic environment influence these dynamics? These questions become crucial concerning the economic and societal implications of integrating LLM-based agents into real-world data-driven systems, such as online retail platforms and recommender systems. While the ML community has been exploring the potential of LLMs in such multi-agent setups, varying assumptions, design choices and evaluation criteria across studies make it difficult to draw robust and meaningful conclusions. To address this, we introduce a benchmark for standardizing research on two-player, sequential, language-based games. Inspired by the economic literature, we define three base families of games with consistent parameterization, degrees of freedom and economic measures to evaluate agents' performance (self-gain), as well as the game outcome (efficiency and fairness). We develop an open-source framework for interaction simulation and analysis, and utilize it to collect a dataset of LLM vs. LLM interactions across numerous game configurations and an additional dataset of human vs. LLM interactions. Through extensive experimentation, we demonstrate how our framework and dataset can be used to: (i) compare the behavior of LLM-based agents to human players in various economic contexts; (ii) evaluate agents in both individual and collective performance measures; and (iii) quantify the effect of the economic characteristics of the environments on the behavior of agents.