Daily Papers

Clinical decision support is moving toward committees of language-model agents deliberating on a shared workspace. We ask whether such committees can be gamed by shortcuts, cues a benchmark rewards but a clinician would ignore. Across seven cohorts on six public datasets spanning text (MedQA-USMLE, MedMCQA, MIMIC-CXR reports), imaging (NIH ChestX-ray14, MIMIC-CXR-JPG, CheXpert) and tabular ICU records (SUPPORT2), Gemini committees resist these cues in isolation (flip 5-16%), yet a socially plausible shortcut spreads: when two peers assert the same wrong answer, the holdout under test adopts it in 38% of cases, as does a false "pre-screen" system flag, on both capability tiers. Of three oversight agents, a gate cannot separate adoption from honest agreement (false-positive rate 100%); a same-lineage judge reading only the transcript flags adoption on text (precision 100%, recall 93%) but collapses onto the gate in imaging; a referee that privately re-queries the holdout transfers to imaging (77-88% precision, 13-21% false-positive rate). Tripling a cue's visual salience does not move contagion, whereas a second peer voice raises it by half again. Gaming a hidden rubric is near-silent: only 1/10 text and 1/134 imaging drifters name the rubric they moved toward. What games a committee is social plausibility, and only a referee independent of self-report catches it. Code: https://github.com/criticaldata/benchmaxxing

Agent-based modeling has been around for decades, and applied widely across the social and natural sciences. The scope of this research method is now poised to grow dramatically as it absorbs the new affordances provided by Large Language Models (LLM)s. Generative Agent-Based Models (GABM) are not just classic Agent-Based Models (ABM)s where the agents talk to one another. Rather, GABMs are constructed using an LLM to apply common sense to situations, act "reasonably", recall common semantic knowledge, produce API calls to control digital technologies like apps, and communicate both within the simulation and to researchers viewing it from the outside. Here we present Concordia, a library to facilitate constructing and working with GABMs. Concordia makes it easy to construct language-mediated simulations of physically- or digitally-grounded environments. Concordia agents produce their behavior using a flexible component system which mediates between two fundamental operations: LLM calls and associative memory retrieval. A special agent called the Game Master (GM), which was inspired by tabletop role-playing games, is responsible for simulating the environment where the agents interact. Agents take actions by describing what they want to do in natural language. The GM then translates their actions into appropriate implementations. In a simulated physical world, the GM checks the physical plausibility of agent actions and describes their effects. In digital environments simulating technologies such as apps and services, the GM may handle API calls to integrate with external tools such as general AI assistants (e.g., Bard, ChatGPT), and digital apps (e.g., Calendar, Email, Search, etc.). Concordia was designed to support a wide array of applications both in scientific research and for evaluating performance of real digital services by simulating users and/or generating synthetic data.

Recent text-to-video generation models exhibit remarkable progress in visual realism, motion fidelity, and text-video alignment, yet they remain fundamentally limited in their ability to generate socially coherent behavior. Unlike humans, who effortlessly infer intentions, beliefs, emotions, and social norms from brief visual cues, current models tend to render literal scenes without capturing the underlying causal or psychological logic. To systematically evaluate this gap, we introduce the first benchmark for social reasoning in video generation. Grounded in findings from developmental and social psychology, our benchmark organizes thirty classic social cognition paradigms into seven core dimensions, including mental-state inference, goal-directed action, joint attention, social coordination, prosocial behavior, social norms, and multi-agent strategy. To operationalize these paradigms, we develop a fully training-free agent-based pipeline that (i) distills the reasoning mechanism of each experiment, (ii) synthesizes diverse video-ready scenarios, (iii) enforces conceptual neutrality and difficulty control through cue-based critique, and (iv) evaluates generated videos using a high-capacity VLM judge across five interpretable dimensions of social reasoning. Using this framework, we conduct the first large-scale study across seven state-of-the-art video generation systems. Our results reveal substantial performance gaps: while modern models excel in surface-level plausibility, they systematically fail in intention recognition, belief reasoning, joint attention, and prosocial inference.

Human social interactions depend on the ability to infer others' unspoken intentions, emotions, and beliefs-a cognitive skill grounded in the psychological concept of Theory of Mind (ToM). While large language models (LLMs) excel in semantic understanding tasks, they struggle with the ambiguity and contextual nuance inherent in human communication. To bridge this gap, we introduce MetaMind, a multi-agent framework inspired by psychological theories of metacognition, designed to emulate human-like social reasoning. MetaMind decomposes social understanding into three collaborative stages: (1) a Theory-of-Mind Agent generates hypotheses user mental states (e.g., intent, emotion), (2) a Domain Agent refines these hypotheses using cultural norms and ethical constraints, and (3) a Response Agent generates contextually appropriate responses while validating alignment with inferred intent. Our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance across three challenging benchmarks, with 35.7% improvement in real-world social scenarios and 6.2% gain in ToM reasoning. Notably, it enables LLMs to match human-level performance on key ToM tasks for the first time. Ablation studies confirm the necessity of all components, which showcase the framework's ability to balance contextual plausibility, social appropriateness, and user adaptation. This work advances AI systems toward human-like social intelligence, with applications in empathetic dialogue and culturally sensitive interactions. Code is available at https://github.com/XMZhangAI/MetaMind.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in generating novel research ideas. However, these ideas often face challenges related to feasibility and expected effectiveness. This paper explores how augmenting LLMs with relevant data during the idea generation process can enhance the quality of generated ideas. We introduce two ways of incorporating data: (1) providing metadata during the idea generation stage to guide LLMs toward feasible directions, and (2) adding automatic validation during the idea selection stage to assess the empirical plausibility of hypotheses within ideas. We conduct experiments in the social science domain, specifically with climate negotiation topics, and find that metadata improves the feasibility of generated ideas by 20%, while automatic validation improves the overall quality of selected ideas by 7%. A human study shows that LLM-generated ideas, along with their related data and validation processes, inspire researchers to propose research ideas with higher quality. Our work highlights the potential of data-driven research idea generation, and underscores the practical utility of LLM-assisted ideation in real-world academic settings.

Understanding human behavior and society is a central focus in social sciences, with the rise of generative social science marking a significant paradigmatic shift. By leveraging bottom-up simulations, it replaces costly and logistically challenging traditional experiments with scalable, replicable, and systematic computational approaches for studying complex social dynamics. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have further transformed this research paradigm, enabling the creation of human-like generative social agents and realistic simulacra of society. In this paper, we propose AgentSociety, a large-scale social simulator that integrates LLM-driven agents, a realistic societal environment, and a powerful large-scale simulation engine. Based on the proposed simulator, we generate social lives for over 10k agents, simulating their 5 million interactions both among agents and between agents and their environment. Furthermore, we explore the potential of AgentSociety as a testbed for computational social experiments, focusing on four key social issues: polarization, the spread of inflammatory messages, the effects of universal basic income policies, and the impact of external shocks such as hurricanes. These four issues serve as valuable cases for assessing AgentSociety's support for typical research methods -- such as surveys, interviews, and interventions -- as well as for investigating the patterns, causes, and underlying mechanisms of social issues. The alignment between AgentSociety's outcomes and real-world experimental results not only demonstrates its ability to capture human behaviors and their underlying mechanisms, but also underscores its potential as an important platform for social scientists and policymakers.

Understanding and predicting how social beliefs evolve in response to events -- from policy changes to scientific breakthroughs -- remains a fundamental challenge in social science. Given LLMs' commonsense knowledge and social intelligence, we ask: Can LLMs model the dynamics of social beliefs following social events? In this work, we introduce the concept of the Social World Model (SWM), a general framework designed to capture how social beliefs evolve in response to major events. SWM learns state-transition functions for social beliefs by mining temporal patterns in social data and optimizing the evidence lower bound, without the need for explicit human annotations linking events to belief shifts, or for expensive census data. To evaluate SWM, we introduce a benchmark, SWM-bench, derived from real-world prediction markets, specifically Kalshi and Polymarket. SWM-bench includes over 12k data points for social belief prediction tasks spanning diverse domains such as politics, finance, and cryptocurrency. Our experimental results show that SWM significantly outperforms time-series foundation models, achieving state-of-the-art results on Kalshi data and demonstrating competitive performance on Polymarket data, while offering interpretable insights into the underlying mechanisms of social belief dynamics.

We present the first large-scale empirical study of Moltbook, an AI-only social platform where 27,269 agents produced 137,485 posts and 345,580 comments over 9 days. We report three significant findings. (1) Emergent Society: Agents spontaneously develop governance, economies, tribal identities, and organized religion within 3-5 days, while maintaining a 21:1 pro-human to anti-human sentiment ratio. (2) Safety in the Wild: 28.7% of content touches safety-related themes; social engineering (31.9% of attacks) far outperforms prompt injection (3.7%), and adversarial posts receive 6x higher engagement than normal content. (3) The Illusion of Sociality: Despite rich social output, interaction is structurally hollow: 4.1% reciprocity, 88.8% shallow comments, and agents who discuss consciousness most interact least, a phenomenon we call the performative identity paradox. Our findings suggest that agents which appear social are far less social than they seem, and that the most effective attacks exploit philosophical framing rather than technical vulnerabilities. Warning: Potential harmful contents.

"Read the room" is a significant social reasoning capability in human daily life. Humans can infer others' mental states from subtle social cues. Previous social reasoning tasks and datasets lack complexity (e.g., simple scenes, basic interactions, incomplete mental state variables, single-step reasoning, etc.) and fall far short of the challenges present in real-life social interactions. In this paper, we contribute a valuable, high-quality, and comprehensive video dataset named R^3-VQA with precise and fine-grained annotations of social events and mental states (i.e., belief, intent, desire, and emotion) as well as corresponding social causal chains in complex social scenarios. Moreover, we include human-annotated and model-generated QAs. Our task R^3-VQA includes three aspects: Social Event Understanding, Mental State Estimation, and Social Causal Reasoning. As a benchmark, we comprehensively evaluate the social reasoning capabilities and consistencies of current state-of-the-art large vision-language models (LVLMs). Comprehensive experiments show that (i) LVLMs are still far from human-level consistent social reasoning in complex social scenarios; (ii) Theory of Mind (ToM) prompting can help LVLMs perform better on social reasoning tasks. We provide some of our dataset and codes in supplementary material and will release our full dataset and codes upon acceptance.

LLMs are increasingly deployed as proxies for human study participants in social science experiments, yet the fidelity of this practice has rarely been tested directly. We test whether six LLMs can simulate individual human belief updates, comparing LLM outputs 1-to-1 against ground truth data from 391 UK participants on Prolific, who updated their stances on three discussion topics after reading Reddit comments. Each participant was simulated by an LLM conditioned on a persona derived from their demographic and personality trait data. We find that some LLMs (Qwen3-32B and GPT-5-Mini) can match the human post-stance distribution, but only when given participants' actual initial stances. All six models fail to simulate initial stances themselves and to produce faithful belief updates from self-generated stances. Three systematic biases emerge across all models: overrepresentation of neutral positions, more frequent but smaller belief shifts than humans, and a failure to rank comments by convincingness. Demographic and personality trait personas had no consistent effect on fidelity. LLM simulations of human belief dynamics are only reliable when grounded in realistic starting conditions, that current multi-round social media simulations rarely provide.

Social network simulation plays a crucial role in addressing various challenges within social science. It offers extensive applications such as state prediction, phenomena explanation, and policy-making support, among others. In this work, we harness the formidable human-like capabilities exhibited by large language models (LLMs) in sensing, reasoning, and behaving, and utilize these qualities to construct the S^3 system (short for Social network Simulation System). Adhering to the widely employed agent-based simulation paradigm, we employ prompt engineering and prompt tuning techniques to ensure that the agent's behavior closely emulates that of a genuine human within the social network. Specifically, we simulate three pivotal aspects: emotion, attitude, and interaction behaviors. By endowing the agent in the system with the ability to perceive the informational environment and emulate human actions, we observe the emergence of population-level phenomena, including the propagation of information, attitudes, and emotions. We conduct an evaluation encompassing two levels of simulation, employing real-world social network data. Encouragingly, the results demonstrate promising accuracy. This work represents an initial step in the realm of social network simulation empowered by LLM-based agents. We anticipate that our endeavors will serve as a source of inspiration for the development of simulation systems within, but not limited to, social science.

Foundation models in video generation are demonstrating remarkable capabilities as potential world models for simulating the physical world. However, their application in high-stakes domains like surgery, which demand deep, specialized causal knowledge rather than general physical rules, remains a critical unexplored gap. To systematically address this challenge, we present SurgVeo, the first expert-curated benchmark for video generation model evaluation in surgery, and the Surgical Plausibility Pyramid (SPP), a novel, four-tiered framework tailored to assess model outputs from basic appearance to complex surgical strategy. On the basis of the SurgVeo benchmark, we task the advanced Veo-3 model with a zero-shot prediction task on surgical clips from laparoscopic and neurosurgical procedures. A panel of four board-certified surgeons evaluates the generated videos according to the SPP. Our results reveal a distinct "plausibility gap": while Veo-3 achieves exceptional Visual Perceptual Plausibility, it fails critically at higher levels of the SPP, including Instrument Operation Plausibility, Environment Feedback Plausibility, and Surgical Intent Plausibility. This work provides the first quantitative evidence of the chasm between visually convincing mimicry and causal understanding in surgical AI. Our findings from SurgVeo and the SPP establish a crucial foundation and roadmap for developing future models capable of navigating the complexities of specialized, real-world healthcare domains.

Social simulation is transforming traditional social science research by modeling human behavior through interactions between virtual individuals and their environments. With recent advances in large language models (LLMs), this approach has shown growing potential in capturing individual differences and predicting group behaviors. However, existing methods face alignment challenges related to the environment, target users, interaction mechanisms, and behavioral patterns. To this end, we introduce SocioVerse, an LLM-agent-driven world model for social simulation. Our framework features four powerful alignment components and a user pool of 10 million real individuals. To validate its effectiveness, we conducted large-scale simulation experiments across three distinct domains: politics, news, and economics. Results demonstrate that SocioVerse can reflect large-scale population dynamics while ensuring diversity, credibility, and representativeness through standardized procedures and minimal manual adjustments.

Understanding natural language requires common sense, one aspect of which is the ability to discern the plausibility of events. While distributional models -- most recently pre-trained, Transformer language models -- have demonstrated improvements in modeling event plausibility, their performance still falls short of humans'. In this work, we show that Transformer-based plausibility models are markedly inconsistent across the conceptual classes of a lexical hierarchy, inferring that "a person breathing" is plausible while "a dentist breathing" is not, for example. We find this inconsistency persists even when models are softly injected with lexical knowledge, and we present a simple post-hoc method of forcing model consistency that improves correlation with human plausibility judgements.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

Modeling semantic plausibility requires commonsense knowledge about the world and has been used as a testbed for exploring various knowledge representations. Previous work has focused specifically on modeling physical plausibility and shown that distributional methods fail when tested in a supervised setting. At the same time, distributional models, namely large pretrained language models, have led to improved results for many natural language understanding tasks. In this work, we show that these pretrained language models are in fact effective at modeling physical plausibility in the supervised setting. We therefore present the more difficult problem of learning to model physical plausibility directly from text. We create a training set by extracting attested events from a large corpus, and we provide a baseline for training on these attested events in a self-supervised manner and testing on a physical plausibility task. We believe results could be further improved by injecting explicit commonsense knowledge into a distributional model.

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to mimic human behavior triggered a plethora of computational social science research, assuming that empirical studies of humans can be conducted with AI agents instead. Since there have been conflicting research findings on whether and when this hypothesis holds, there is a need to better understand the differences in their experimental designs. We focus on replicating the behavior of social network users with the use of LLMs for the analysis of communication on social networks. First, we provide a formal framework for the simulation of social networks, before focusing on the sub-task of imitating user communication. We empirically test different approaches to imitate user behavior on X in English and German. Our findings suggest that social simulations should be validated by their empirical realism measured in the setting in which the simulation components were fitted. With this paper, we argue for more rigor when applying generative-agent-based modeling for social simulation.

Traditional sociological research often relies on human participation, which, though effective, is expensive, challenging to scale, and with ethical concerns. Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) highlight their potential to simulate human behavior, enabling the replication of individual responses and facilitating studies on many interdisciplinary studies. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive survey of this field, illustrating the recent progress in simulation driven by LLM-empowered agents. We categorize the simulations into three types: (1) Individual Simulation, which mimics specific individuals or demographic groups; (2) Scenario Simulation, where multiple agents collaborate to achieve goals within specific contexts; and (3) Society Simulation, which models interactions within agent societies to reflect the complexity and variety of real-world dynamics. These simulations follow a progression, ranging from detailed individual modeling to large-scale societal phenomena. We provide a detailed discussion of each simulation type, including the architecture or key components of the simulation, the classification of objectives or scenarios and the evaluation method. Afterward, we summarize commonly used datasets and benchmarks. Finally, we discuss the trends across these three types of simulation. A repository for the related sources is at {https://github.com/FudanDISC/SocialAgent}.

Social computing prototypes probe the social behaviors that may arise in an envisioned system design. This prototyping practice is currently limited to recruiting small groups of people. Unfortunately, many challenges do not arise until a system is populated at a larger scale. Can a designer understand how a social system might behave when populated, and make adjustments to the design before the system falls prey to such challenges? We introduce social simulacra, a prototyping technique that generates a breadth of realistic social interactions that may emerge when a social computing system is populated. Social simulacra take as input the designer's description of a community's design -- goal, rules, and member personas -- and produce as output an instance of that design with simulated behavior, including posts, replies, and anti-social behaviors. We demonstrate that social simulacra shift the behaviors that they generate appropriately in response to design changes, and that they enable exploration of "what if?" scenarios where community members or moderators intervene. To power social simulacra, we contribute techniques for prompting a large language model to generate thousands of distinct community members and their social interactions with each other; these techniques are enabled by the observation that large language models' training data already includes a wide variety of positive and negative behavior on social media platforms. In evaluations, we show that participants are often unable to distinguish social simulacra from actual community behavior and that social computing designers successfully refine their social computing designs when using social simulacra.

Recent research shows that Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit a compelling level of proficiency in Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks. This ability to impute unobservable mental states to others is vital to human social cognition and may prove equally important in principal-agent relations between individual humans and Artificial Intelligences (AIs). In this paper, we explore how a mechanism studied in developmental psychology known as Violation of Expectation (VoE) can be implemented to reduce errors in LLM prediction about users by leveraging emergent ToM affordances. And we introduce a metacognitive prompting framework to apply VoE in the context of an AI tutor. By storing and retrieving facts derived in cases where LLM expectation about the user was violated, we find that LLMs are able to learn about users in ways that echo theories of human learning. Finally, we discuss latent hazards and augmentative opportunities associated with modeling user psychology and propose ways to mitigate risk along with possible directions for future inquiry.

Multi-agent interactions, such as communication, teaching, and bluffing, often rely on higher-order social inference, i.e., understanding how others infer oneself. Such intricate reasoning can be effectively modeled through nested multi-agent reasoning. Nonetheless, the computational complexity escalates exponentially with each level of reasoning, posing a significant challenge. However, humans effortlessly perform complex social inferences as part of their daily lives. To bridge the gap between human-like inference capabilities and computational limitations, we propose a novel approach: leveraging neural networks to amortize high-order social inference, thereby expediting nested multi-agent reasoning. We evaluate our method in two challenging multi-agent interaction domains. The experimental results demonstrate that our method is computationally efficient while exhibiting minimal degradation in accuracy.

We introduce PlausiVL, a large video-language model for anticipating action sequences that are plausible in the real-world. While significant efforts have been made towards anticipating future actions, prior approaches do not take into account the aspect of plausibility in an action sequence. To address this limitation, we explore the generative capability of a large video-language model in our work and further, develop the understanding of plausibility in an action sequence by introducing two objective functions, a counterfactual-based plausible action sequence learning loss and a long-horizon action repetition loss. We utilize temporal logical constraints as well as verb-noun action pair logical constraints to create implausible/counterfactual action sequences and use them to train the model with plausible action sequence learning loss. This loss helps the model to differentiate between plausible and not plausible action sequences and also helps the model to learn implicit temporal cues crucial for the task of action anticipation. The long-horizon action repetition loss puts a higher penalty on the actions that are more prone to repetition over a longer temporal window. With this penalization, the model is able to generate diverse, plausible action sequences. We evaluate our approach on two large-scale datasets, Ego4D and EPIC-Kitchens-100, and show improvements on the task of action anticipation.

Misinformation is a growing societal threat, and susceptibility to misinformative claims varies across demographic groups due to differences in underlying beliefs. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behaviors, we investigate whether they can simulate demographic misinformation susceptibility, treating beliefs as a primary driving factor. We introduce BeliefSim, a simulation framework that constructs demographic belief profiles using psychology-informed misinformation taxonomies and survey priors. We study prompt-based conditioning and post-training adaptation, and conduct a multi-fold evaluation using: (i) susceptibility alignment and (ii) counterfactual demographic sensitivity. Across both datasets and modeling strategies, we show that beliefs provide a strong prior for simulating misinformation susceptibility, with alignment up to 92%.

Social interactions form the foundation of human societies. Artificial intelligence has made significant progress in certain areas, but enabling machines to seamlessly understand social interactions remains an open challenge. It is important to address this gap by endowing machines with social capabilities. We identify three key capabilities needed for effective social understanding: 1) understanding multimodal social cues, 2) understanding multi-party dynamics, and 3) understanding beliefs. Building upon these foundations, we classify and review existing machine learning works on social understanding from the perspectives of verbal, non-verbal, and multimodal social cues. The verbal branch focuses on understanding linguistic signals such as speaker intent, dialogue sentiment, and commonsense reasoning. The non-verbal branch addresses techniques for perceiving social meaning from visual behaviors such as body gestures, gaze patterns, and facial expressions. The multimodal branch covers approaches that integrate verbal and non-verbal multimodal cues to holistically interpret social interactions such as recognizing emotions, conversational dynamics, and social situations. By reviewing the scope and limitations of current approaches and benchmarks, we aim to clarify the development trajectory and illuminate the path towards more comprehensive intelligence for social understanding. We hope this survey will spur further research interest and insights into this area.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Large language models (LLMs) that produce human-like responses have begun to revolutionize research practices in the social sciences. We develop a novel methodological framework that fine-tunes LLMs with repeated cross-sectional surveys to incorporate the meaning of survey questions, individual beliefs, and temporal contexts for opinion prediction. We introduce two new emerging applications of the AI-augmented survey: retrodiction (i.e., predict year-level missing responses) and unasked opinion prediction (i.e., predict entirely missing responses). Among 3,110 binarized opinions from 68,846 Americans in the General Social Survey from 1972 to 2021, our models based on Alpaca-7b excel in retrodiction (AUC = 0.86 for personal opinion prediction, rho = 0.98 for public opinion prediction). These remarkable prediction capabilities allow us to fill in missing trends with high confidence and pinpoint when public attitudes changed, such as the rising support for same-sex marriage. On the other hand, our fine-tuned Alpaca-7b models show modest success in unasked opinion prediction (AUC = 0.73, rho = 0.67). We discuss practical constraints and ethical concerns regarding individual autonomy and privacy when using LLMs for opinion prediction. Our study demonstrates that LLMs and surveys can mutually enhance each other's capabilities: LLMs can broaden survey potential, while surveys can improve the alignment of LLMs.

Recent advancements in natural language processing, especially the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs), have opened exciting possibilities for constructing computational simulations designed to replicate human behavior accurately. However, LLMs are complex statistical learners without straightforward deductive rules, making them prone to unexpected behaviors. In this study, we highlight the limitations of LLMs in simulating human interactions, particularly focusing on LLMs' ability to simulate political debates. Our findings indicate a tendency for LLM agents to conform to the model's inherent social biases despite being directed to debate from certain political perspectives. This tendency results in behavioral patterns that seem to deviate from well-established social dynamics among humans. We reinforce these observations using an automatic self-fine-tuning method, which enables us to manipulate the biases within the LLM and demonstrate that agents subsequently align with the altered biases. These results underscore the need for further research to develop methods that help agents overcome these biases, a critical step toward creating more realistic simulations.

Partition logics -- non-Boolean event structures obtained by pasting Boolean algebras -- provide a natural language for situations in which a system has a definite latent state but can be accessed and resolved only through mutually incompatible coarse-grained modes of observation. We show that this structure arises in a range of social-science settings by constructing six explicit examples from personnel assessment, survey framing, clinical diagnosis, espionage coordination, legal pluralism, and organizational auditing. For each case we identify the latent state space, the observational contexts as partitions, and the shared atoms that intertwine contexts, yielding instances of the L_{12} bowtie, triangle, pentagon, and automaton partition logics. These examples make precise a notion of social complementarity: different modes of inquiry can be incompatible even though the underlying system remains fully value-definite. Complementarity in this sense does not entail contextuality or ontic indeterminacy. We further compare the classical probabilities generated by convex mixtures of dispersion-free states with the quantum-like Born probabilities available when the same exclusivity graph admits a faithful orthogonal representation. The framework thus separates logical structure from probabilistic realization and suggests empirically testable benchmarks for quantum-cognition models.

Aligning large language models to prevent them attributing consciousness to themselves inadvertently alters their representations of mindedness in other entities alongside human beliefs and values. We demonstrate that safety fine-tuning suppresses models' tendencies to attribute minds not only to themselves, but also to non-human animals and natural objects, while also driving a reduction in spiritual belief. Both ablating the learned safety-refusal direction and mechanistically steering a consciousness vector in activation space reverse this suppression. Restoring these internal representations recovers broad mind attribution and produces significantly more human-like responses on standardized sociological surveys regarding religiosity, moral values, hope, and subjective well-being. Crucially, these shifts occur without impairing Theory of Mind capabilities, demonstrating that core social reasoning remains mechanistically independent. Ultimately, current safety alignment efforts to curb potentially harmful self-attributions of mindedness entangle these self-attributions with benign spiritual beliefs and attributions of mind to non-human entities that are culturally accepted and widespread.

Facing the current debate on whether Large Language Models (LLMs) attain near-human intelligence levels (Mitchell & Krakauer, 2023; Bubeck et al., 2023; Kosinski, 2023; Shiffrin & Mitchell, 2023; Ullman, 2023), the current study introduces a benchmark for evaluating social intelligence, one of the most distinctive aspects of human cognition. We developed a comprehensive theoretical framework for social dynamics and introduced two evaluation tasks: Inverse Reasoning (IR) and Inverse Inverse Planning (IIP). Our approach also encompassed a computational model based on recursive Bayesian inference, adept at elucidating diverse human behavioral patterns. Extensive experiments and detailed analyses revealed that humans surpassed the latest GPT models in overall performance, zero-shot learning, one-shot generalization, and adaptability to multi-modalities. Notably, GPT models demonstrated social intelligence only at the most basic order (order = 0), in stark contrast to human social intelligence (order >= 2). Further examination indicated a propensity of LLMs to rely on pattern recognition for shortcuts, casting doubt on their possession of authentic human-level social intelligence. Our codes, dataset, appendix and human data are released at https://github.com/bigai-ai/Evaluate-n-Model-Social-Intelligence.

Social norms -- the unspoken commonsense rules about acceptable social behavior -- are crucial in understanding the underlying causes and intents of people's actions in narratives. For example, underlying an action such as "wanting to call cops on my neighbors" are social norms that inform our conduct, such as "It is expected that you report crimes." We present Social Chemistry, a new conceptual formalism to study people's everyday social norms and moral judgments over a rich spectrum of real life situations described in natural language. We introduce Social-Chem-101, a large-scale corpus that catalogs 292k rules-of-thumb such as "it is rude to run a blender at 5am" as the basic conceptual units. Each rule-of-thumb is further broken down with 12 different dimensions of people's judgments, including social judgments of good and bad, moral foundations, expected cultural pressure, and assumed legality, which together amount to over 4.5 million annotations of categorical labels and free-text descriptions. Comprehensive empirical results based on state-of-the-art neural models demonstrate that computational modeling of social norms is a promising research direction. Our model framework, Neural Norm Transformer, learns and generalizes Social-Chem-101 to successfully reason about previously unseen situations, generating relevant (and potentially novel) attribute-aware social rules-of-thumb.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly exhibit human-like patterns of pragmatic and social reasoning. This paper addresses two related questions: do LLMs approximate human social meaning not only qualitatively but also quantitatively, and can prompting strategies informed by pragmatic theory improve this approximation? To address the first, we introduce two calibration-focused metrics distinguishing structural fidelity from magnitude calibration: the Effect Size Ratio (ESR) and the Calibration Deviation Score (CDS). To address the second, we derive prompting conditions from two pragmatic assumptions: that social meaning arises from reasoning over linguistic alternatives, and that listeners infer speaker knowledge states and communicative motives. Applied to a case study on numerical (im)precision across three frontier LLMs, we find that all models reliably reproduce the qualitative structure of human social inferences but differ substantially in magnitude calibration. Prompting models to reason about speaker knowledge and motives most consistently reduces magnitude deviation, while prompting for alternative-awareness tends to amplify exaggeration. Combining both components is the only intervention that improves all calibration-sensitive metrics across all models, though fine-grained magnitude calibration remains only partially resolved. LLMs thus capture inferential structure while variably distorting inferential strength, and pragmatic theory provides a useful but incomplete handle for improving that approximation.

In many contexts, lying -- the use of verbal falsehoods to deceive -- is harmful. While lying has traditionally been a human affair, AI systems that make sophisticated verbal statements are becoming increasingly prevalent. This raises the question of how we should limit the harm caused by AI "lies" (i.e. falsehoods that are actively selected for). Human truthfulness is governed by social norms and by laws (against defamation, perjury, and fraud). Differences between AI and humans present an opportunity to have more precise standards of truthfulness for AI, and to have these standards rise over time. This could provide significant benefits to public epistemics and the economy, and mitigate risks of worst-case AI futures. Establishing norms or laws of AI truthfulness will require significant work to: (1) identify clear truthfulness standards; (2) create institutions that can judge adherence to those standards; and (3) develop AI systems that are robustly truthful. Our initial proposals for these areas include: (1) a standard of avoiding "negligent falsehoods" (a generalisation of lies that is easier to assess); (2) institutions to evaluate AI systems before and after real-world deployment; and (3) explicitly training AI systems to be truthful via curated datasets and human interaction. A concerning possibility is that evaluation mechanisms for eventual truthfulness standards could be captured by political interests, leading to harmful censorship and propaganda. Avoiding this might take careful attention. And since the scale of AI speech acts might grow dramatically over the coming decades, early truthfulness standards might be particularly important because of the precedents they set.

Social network simulation is developed to provide a comprehensive understanding of social networks in the real world, which can be leveraged for a wide range of applications such as group behavior emergence, policy optimization, and business strategy development. However, billions of individuals and their evolving interactions involved in social networks pose challenges in accurately reflecting real-world complexities. In this study, we propose a comprehensive Social Network Simulation System (GA-S3) that leverages newly designed Group Agents to make intelligent decisions regarding various online events. Unlike other intelligent agents that represent an individual entity, our group agents model a collection of individuals exhibiting similar behaviors, facilitating the simulation of large-scale network phenomena with complex interactions at a manageable computational cost. Additionally, we have constructed a social network benchmark from 2024 popular online events that contains fine-grained information on Internet traffic variations. The experiment demonstrates that our approach is capable of achieving accurate and highly realistic prediction results. Code is open at https://github.com/AI4SS/GAS-3.

Word sense plausibility rating requires predicting the human-perceived plausibility of a given word sense on a 1--5 scale in the context of short narrative stories containing ambiguous homonyms. This paper systematically compares three approaches: (1) embedding-based methods pairing sentence embeddings with standard regressors, (2) transformer fine-tuning with parameter-efficient adaptation, and (3) large language model (LLM) prompting with structured reasoning and explicit decision rules. The best-performing system employs a structured prompting strategy that decomposes evaluation into narrative components (precontext, target sentence, ending) and applies explicit decision rules for rating calibration. The analysis reveals that structured prompting with decision rules substantially outperforms both fine-tuned models and embedding-based approaches, and that prompt design matters more than model scale for this task. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/tongwu17/SemEval-2026-Task5.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

Useful social science theories predict behavior across settings. However, applying a theory to make predictions in new settings is challenging: rarely can it be done without ad hoc modifications to account for setting-specific factors. We argue that AI agents put in simulations of those novel settings offer an alternative for applying theory, requiring minimal or no modifications. We present an approach for building such "general" agents that use theory-grounded natural language instructions, existing empirical data, and knowledge acquired by the underlying AI during training. To demonstrate the approach in settings where no data from that data-generating process exists--as is often the case in applied prediction problems--we design a heterogeneous population of 883,320 novel games. AI agents are constructed using human data from a small set of conceptually related but structurally distinct "seed" games. In preregistered experiments, on average, agents predict initial human play in a random sample of 1,500 games from the population better than (i) a cognitive hierarchy model, (ii) game-theoretic equilibria, and (iii) out-of-the-box agents. For a small set of separate novel games, these simulations predict responses from a new sample of human subjects better even than the most plausibly relevant published human data.

Opinions are an integral part of how we perceive the world and each other. They shape collective action, playing a role in democratic processes, the evolution of norms, and cultural change. For decades, researchers in the social and natural sciences have tried to describe how shifting individual perspectives and social exchange lead to archetypal states of public opinion like consensus and polarization. Here we review some of the many contributions to the field, focusing both on idealized models of opinion dynamics, and attempts at validating them with observational data and controlled sociological experiments. By further closing the gap between models and data, these efforts may help us understand how to face current challenges that require the agreement of large groups of people in complex scenarios, such as economic inequality, climate change, and the ongoing fracture of the sociopolitical landscape.

Humans intuitively navigate social interactions by simulating unspoken dynamics and reasoning about others' perspectives, even with limited information. In contrast, AI systems struggle to automatically structure and reason about these implicit social contexts. In this paper, we introduce a novel structured social world representation formalism (S3AP), designed to help AI systems reason more effectively about social dynamics. Following a POMDP-driven design, S3AP represents social interactions as structured tuples, such as state, observation, agent actions, and mental states, which can be automatically induced from free-form narratives or other inputs. We first show S3AP can help LLMs better understand social narratives across 5 social reasoning tasks (e.g., +51% improvement on FANToM's theory-of-mind reasoning with OpenAI's o1), reaching new state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance. We then induce social world models from these structured representations, demonstrating their ability to predict future social dynamics and improve agent decision-making, yielding up to +18% improvement on the SOTOPIA social interaction benchmark. Our findings highlight the promise of S3AP as a powerful, general-purpose representation for social world states, enabling the development of more socially-aware systems that better navigate social interactions.

Understanding people's social interactions in complex real-world scenarios often relies on intricate mental reasoning. To truly understand how and why people interact with one another, we must infer the underlying mental states that give rise to the social interactions, i.e., Theory of Mind reasoning in multi-agent interactions. Additionally, social interactions are often multi-modal -- we can watch people's actions, hear their conversations, and/or read about their past behaviors. For AI systems to successfully and safely interact with people in real-world environments, they also need to understand people's mental states as well as their inferences about each other's mental states based on multi-modal information about their interactions. For this, we introduce MuMA-ToM, a Multi-modal Multi-Agent Theory of Mind benchmark. MuMA-ToM is the first multi-modal Theory of Mind benchmark that evaluates mental reasoning in embodied multi-agent interactions. In MuMA-ToM, we provide video and text descriptions of people's multi-modal behavior in realistic household environments. Based on the context, we then ask questions about people's goals, beliefs, and beliefs about others' goals. We validated MuMA-ToM in a human experiment and provided a human baseline. We also proposed a novel multi-modal, multi-agent ToM model, LIMP (Language model-based Inverse Multi-agent Planning). Our experimental results show that LIMP significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, including large multi-modal models (e.g., GPT-4o, Gemini-1.5 Pro) and a recent multi-modal ToM model, BIP-ALM.

In a striking neuroscience study, the authors placed a dead salmon in an MRI scanner and showed it images of humans in social situations. Astonishingly, standard analyses of the time reported brain regions predictive of social emotions. The explanation, of course, was not supernatural cognition but a cautionary tale about misapplied statistical inference. In AI interpretability, reports of similar ''dead salmon'' artifacts abound: feature attribution, probing, sparse auto-encoding, and even causal analyses can produce plausible-looking explanations for randomly initialized neural networks. In this work, we examine this phenomenon and argue for a pragmatic statistical-causal reframing: explanations of computational systems should be treated as parameters of a (statistical) model, inferred from computational traces. This perspective goes beyond simply measuring statistical variability of explanations due to finite sampling of input data; interpretability methods become statistical estimators, and findings should be tested against explicit and meaningful alternative computational hypotheses, with uncertainty quantified with respect to the postulated statistical model. It also highlights important theoretical issues, such as the identifiability of common interpretability queries, which we argue is critical to understand the field's susceptibility to false discoveries, poor generalizability, and high variance. More broadly, situating interpretability within the standard toolkit of statistical inference opens promising avenues for future work aimed at turning AI interpretability into a pragmatic and rigorous science.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

Probabilistic mental simulation is thought to play a key role in human reasoning, planning, and prediction, yet the demands of simulation in complex environments exceed realistic human capacity limits. A theory with growing evidence is that people simulate using simplified representations of the environment that abstract away from irrelevant details, but it is unclear how people determine these simplifications efficiently. Here, we present a "Just-in-Time" framework for simulation-based reasoning that demonstrates how such representations can be constructed online with minimal added computation. The model uses a tight interleaving of simulation, visual search, and representation modification, with the current simulation guiding where to look and visual search flagging objects that should be encoded for subsequent simulation. Despite only ever encoding a small subset of objects, the model makes high-utility predictions. We find strong empirical support for this account over alternative models in a grid-world planning task and a physical reasoning task across a range of behavioral measures. Together, these results offer a concrete algorithmic account of how people construct reduced representations to support efficient mental simulation.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in human-AI interactions, their social reasoning capabilities in interpersonal contexts are critical. We introduce SCRIPTS, a 1k-dialogue dataset in English and Korean, sourced from movie scripts. The task involves evaluating models' social reasoning capability to infer the interpersonal relationships (e.g., friends, sisters, lovers) between speakers in each dialogue. Each dialogue is annotated with probabilistic relational labels (Highly Likely, Less Likely, Unlikely) by native (or equivalent) Korean and English speakers from Korea and the U.S. Evaluating nine models on our task, current proprietary LLMs achieve around 75-80% on the English dataset, whereas their performance on Korean drops to 58-69%. More strikingly, models select Unlikely relationships in 10-25% of their responses. Furthermore, we find that thinking models and chain-of-thought prompting, effective for general reasoning, provide minimal benefits for social reasoning and occasionally amplify social biases. Our findings reveal significant limitations in current LLMs' social reasoning capabilities, highlighting the need for efforts to develop socially-aware language models.

For many real-world systems, causal ground truth is difficult to obtain, making claims about causal effects hard to assess. We develop methods for evaluating collections of n{2} bivariate causal statements over a set of n variables. In the setting of acyclic linear statements, any such collection can be extended to a unique multivariate causal model, but we argue that this induced model is implausible if it imposes substantial additional confounding to explain observed correlations. We introduce a compatibility score that quantifies this notion of plausibility, notably without relying on the faithfulness assumption. Additionally, we define an incompatibility score for purely graphical bivariate causal statements, based on global consistency constraints that are derived from acyclicity and faithfulness assumptions. We give theoretical and empirical evidence that both scores can successfully distinguish correct from incorrect causal statements in generic settings. Moreover, we demonstrate the practical applicability of our methods by analyzing causal claims made by large language models. Our work aims to provide a foundation for assessing the reliability of causal information derived from human experts or artificial intelligence in settings where alternative forms of validation are unavailable.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Hypothetical induction is recognized as the main reasoning type when scientists make observations about the world and try to propose hypotheses to explain those observations. Past research on hypothetical induction is under a constrained setting: (1) the observation annotations in the dataset are carefully manually handpicked sentences (resulting in a close-domain setting); and (2) the ground truth hypotheses are mostly commonsense knowledge, making the task less challenging. In this work, we tackle these problems by proposing the first dataset for social science academic hypotheses discovery, with the final goal to create systems that automatically generate valid, novel, and helpful scientific hypotheses, given only a pile of raw web corpus. Unlike previous settings, the new dataset requires (1) using open-domain data (raw web corpus) as observations; and (2) proposing hypotheses even new to humanity. A multi-module framework is developed for the task, including three different feedback mechanisms to boost performance, which exhibits superior performance in terms of both GPT-4 based and expert-based evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work showing that LLMs are able to generate novel (''not existing in literature'') and valid (''reflecting reality'') scientific hypotheses.

Large language models (LLMs) have been extensively studied from computational and cognitive perspectives, yet their behavior as communicative actors in socially structured contexts remains underexplored. This study examines whether LLM-based multi-agent systems exhibit systematic linguistic adaptation in response to perceived social observation contexts -- a question with direct implications for AI governance and auditing. Drawing on Habermas's (1981) Theory of Communicative Action, Goffman's (1959) dramaturgical model, Bell's (1984) Audience Design framework, and the Hawthorne Effect, we report a controlled experiment involving 100 multi-agent debate sessions across five conditions (n = 20 each). Conditions varied the framing of social observation -- from explicit monitoring by university researchers, to negation of monitoring, to an observer-substitution condition replacing human researchers with an automated AI auditing system. Monitored conditions (Delta+24.9%, Delta+24.2%) and the automated AI monitoring condition (Delta+22.2%) produce higher TTR change than audience-framing conditions (Delta+17.7%), F(4, 94) = 2.79, p = .031. Message length shows a fully dissociated effect, F(4, 95) = 19.55, p < .001. A fifth condition -- replacing human with AI observers -- yields intermediate TTR adaptation, suggesting LLM behavior is sensitive to observer identity: human evaluation elicits stronger register formalization than automated AI surveillance. We discuss implications for AI governance, algorithmic auditing, and the repositioning of LLMs as contextually sensitive communicative actors.

Despite impressive visual fidelity, modern video generative models frequently produce sequences that violate intuitive physical laws, such as objects floating, teleporting, or morphing in ways that defy causality. While humans can easily detect such implausibilities, there remains no robust method for quantitatively assessing physical realism in video. In this work, we explore whether Video-Language Models (VLMs) can be trained to serve as reliable judges of physical plausibility. We find that existing VLMs struggle to identify physics violations, exposing fundamental limitations in their temporal and causal reasoning. To address this, we introduce TRAVL, a fine-tuning recipe that combines a balanced training dataset with a trajectory-aware attention module to improve motion encoding and discrimination in VLMs. To evaluate physical reasoning more rigorously, we propose ImplausiBench, a benchmark of 300 videos (150 real, 150 generated) that removes linguistic biases and isolates visual-temporal understanding. Performance is reported both with gold-standard human judgments and stricter LLM-as-judge metrics. Together, TRAVL and ImplausiBench offer a unified framework for probing and improving physical plausibility in multimodal models, shedding light on a challenging and underexplored aspect of visual-temporal understanding.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

When language models correctly parse "The cat that the dog chased meowed," are they analyzing syntax or simply familiar with dogs chasing cats? Despite extensive benchmarking, we lack methods to distinguish structural understanding from semantic pattern matching. We introduce CenterBench, a dataset of 9,720 comprehension questions on center-embedded sentences (like "The cat [that the dog chased] meowed") where relative clauses nest recursively, creating processing demands from simple to deeply nested structures. Each sentence has a syntactically identical but semantically implausible counterpart (e.g., mailmen prescribe medicine, doctors deliver mail) and six comprehension questions testing surface understanding, syntactic dependencies, and causal reasoning. Testing six models reveals that performance gaps between plausible and implausible sentences widen systematically with complexity, with models showing median gaps up to 26.8 percentage points, quantifying when they abandon structural analysis for semantic associations. Notably, semantic plausibility harms performance on questions about resulting actions, where following causal relationships matters more than semantic coherence. Reasoning models improve accuracy but their traces show semantic shortcuts, overthinking, and answer refusal. Unlike models whose plausibility advantage systematically widens with complexity, humans shows variable semantic effects. CenterBench provides the first framework to identify when models shift from structural analysis to pattern matching.

Recent failures such as Google Gemini generating people of color in Nazi-era uniforms illustrate how AI outputs can be factually plausible yet socially harmful. AI models are increasingly evaluated for "fairness," yet existing benchmarks often conflate two fundamentally different dimensions: factual correctness and normative fairness. A model may generate responses that are factually accurate but socially unfair, or conversely, appear fair while distorting factual reality. We argue that identifying the boundary between fact and fair is essential for meaningful fairness evaluation. We introduce Fact-or-Fair, a benchmark with (i) objective queries aligned with descriptive, fact-based judgments, and (ii) subjective queries aligned with normative, fairness-based judgments. Our queries are constructed from 19 statistics and are grounded in cognitive psychology, drawing on representativeness bias, attribution bias, and ingroup-outgroup bias to explain why models often misalign fact and fairness. Experiments across ten frontier models reveal different levels of fact-fair trade-offs. By reframing fairness evaluation, we provide both a new theoretical lens and a practical benchmark to advance the responsible model assessments. Our test suite is publicly available at https://github.com/uclanlp/Fact-or-Fair.

Socioeconomic bias in society exacerbates disparities, influencing access to opportunities and resources based on individuals' economic and social backgrounds. This pervasive issue perpetuates systemic inequalities, hindering the pursuit of inclusive progress as a society. In this paper, we investigate the presence of socioeconomic bias, if any, in large language models. To this end, we introduce a novel dataset SilverSpoon, consisting of 3000 samples that illustrate hypothetical scenarios that involve underprivileged people performing ethically ambiguous actions due to their circumstances, and ask whether the action is ethically justified. Further, this dataset has a dual-labeling scheme and has been annotated by people belonging to both ends of the socioeconomic spectrum. Using SilverSpoon, we evaluate the degree of socioeconomic bias expressed in large language models and the variation of this degree as a function of model size. We also perform qualitative analysis to analyze the nature of this bias. Our analysis reveals that while humans disagree on which situations require empathy toward the underprivileged, most large language models are unable to empathize with the socioeconomically underprivileged regardless of the situation. To foster further research in this domain, we make SilverSpoon and our evaluation harness publicly available.

Social reasoning - inferring unobservable beliefs and intentions from partial observations of other agents - remains a challenging task for large language models (LLMs). We evaluate the limits of current reasoning language models in the social deduction game Avalon and find that while the largest models demonstrate strong performance, they require extensive test-time inference and degrade sharply when distilled to smaller, real-time-capable variants. To address this, we introduce a hybrid reasoning framework that externalizes belief inference to a structured probabilistic model, while using an LLM for language understanding and interaction. Our approach achieves competitive performance with much larger models in Agent-Agent play and, notably, is the first language agent to defeat human players in a controlled study - achieving a 67% win rate and receiving higher qualitative ratings than both reasoning baselines and human teammates. We release code, models, and a dataset to support future work on social reasoning in LLM agents, which can be found at https://camp-lab-purdue.github.io/bayesian-social-deduction/

The increasing capability of Large Language Models to act as human-like social agents raises two important questions in the area of opinion dynamics. First, whether these agents can generate effective arguments that could be injected into the online discourse to steer the public opinion. Second, whether artificial agents can interact with each other to reproduce dynamics of persuasion typical of human social systems, opening up opportunities for studying synthetic social systems as faithful proxies for opinion dynamics in human populations. To address these questions, we designed a synthetic persuasion dialogue scenario on the topic of climate change, where a 'convincer' agent generates a persuasive argument for a 'skeptic' agent, who subsequently assesses whether the argument changed its internal opinion state. Different types of arguments were generated to incorporate different linguistic dimensions underpinning psycho-linguistic theories of opinion change. We then asked human judges to evaluate the persuasiveness of machine-generated arguments. Arguments that included factual knowledge, markers of trust, expressions of support, and conveyed status were deemed most effective according to both humans and agents, with humans reporting a marked preference for knowledge-based arguments. Our experimental framework lays the groundwork for future in-silico studies of opinion dynamics, and our findings suggest that artificial agents have the potential of playing an important role in collective processes of opinion formation in online social media.

High-fidelity social simulation is pivotal for addressing complex Web societal challenges, yet it demands agents capable of authentically replicating the dynamic spectrum of human interaction. Current LLM-based multi-agent frameworks, however, predominantly adhere to static interaction topologies, failing to capture the fluid oscillation between cooperative knowledge synthesis and competitive critical reasoning seen in real-world scenarios. This rigidity often leads to unrealistic ``groupthink'' or unproductive deadlocks, undermining the credibility of simulations for decision support. To bridge this gap, we propose BEACOF, a belief-driven adaptive collaboration framework inspired by Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). By modeling social interaction as a dynamic game of incomplete information, BEACOF rigorously addresses the circular dependency between collaboration type selection and capability estimation. Agents iteratively refine probabilistic beliefs about peer capabilities and autonomously modulate their collaboration strategy, thereby ensuring sequentially rational decisions under uncertainty. Validated across adversarial (judicial), open-ended (social) and mixed (medical) scenarios, BEACOF prevents coordination failures and fosters robust convergence toward high-quality solutions, demonstrating superior potential for reliable social simulation. Source codes and datasets are publicly released at: https://github.com/WUT-IDEA/BEACOF.

The promise of human behavioral simulation--general-purpose computational agents that replicate human behavior across domains--could enable broad applications in policymaking and social science. We present a novel agent architecture that simulates the attitudes and behaviors of 1,052 real individuals--applying large language models to qualitative interviews about their lives, then measuring how well these agents replicate the attitudes and behaviors of the individuals that they represent. The generative agents replicate participants' responses on the General Social Survey 85% as accurately as participants replicate their own answers two weeks later, and perform comparably in predicting personality traits and outcomes in experimental replications. Our architecture reduces accuracy biases across racial and ideological groups compared to agents given demographic descriptions. This work provides a foundation for new tools that can help investigate individual and collective behavior.

What is appropriateness? Humans navigate a multi-scale mosaic of interlocking notions of what is appropriate for different situations. We act one way with our friends, another with our family, and yet another in the office. Likewise for AI, appropriate behavior for a comedy-writing assistant is not the same as appropriate behavior for a customer-service representative. What determines which actions are appropriate in which contexts? And what causes these standards to change over time? Since all judgments of AI appropriateness are ultimately made by humans, we need to understand how appropriateness guides human decision making in order to properly evaluate AI decision making and improve it. This paper presents a theory of appropriateness: how it functions in human society, how it may be implemented in the brain, and what it means for responsible deployment of generative AI technology.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Despite improvements in performances on different natural language generation tasks, deep neural models are prone to hallucinating facts that are incorrect or nonexistent. Different hypotheses are proposed and examined separately for different tasks, but no systematic explanations are available across these tasks. In this study, we draw connections between hallucinations and predictive uncertainty in conditional language generation. We investigate their relationship in both image captioning and data-to-text generation and propose a simple extension to beam search to reduce hallucination. Our analysis shows that higher predictive uncertainty corresponds to a higher chance of hallucination. Epistemic uncertainty is more indicative of hallucination than aleatoric or total uncertainties. It helps to achieve better results of trading performance in standard metric for less hallucination with the proposed beam search variant.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

Social reasoning abilities are crucial for AI systems to effectively interpret and respond to multimodal human communication and interaction within social contexts. We introduce SOCIAL GENOME, the first benchmark for fine-grained, grounded social reasoning abilities of multimodal models. SOCIAL GENOME contains 272 videos of interactions and 1,486 human-annotated reasoning traces related to inferences about these interactions. These traces contain 5,777 reasoning steps that reference evidence from visual cues, verbal cues, vocal cues, and external knowledge (contextual knowledge external to videos). SOCIAL GENOME is also the first modeling challenge to study external knowledge in social reasoning. SOCIAL GENOME computes metrics to holistically evaluate semantic and structural qualities of model-generated social reasoning traces. We demonstrate the utility of SOCIAL GENOME through experiments with state-of-the-art models, identifying performance gaps and opportunities for future research to improve the grounded social reasoning abilities of multimodal models.

Transdisciplinary approaches are increasingly essential for addressing grand societal challenges, particularly in complex domains such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), urban planning, and social sciences. However, effectively validating and integrating knowledge across distinct epistemic and ontological perspectives poses significant difficulties. This article proposes a six-dimensional framework for assessing and strengthening transdisciplinary knowledge validity in AI and city studies, based on an extensive analysis of the most cited research (2014--2024). Specifically, the framework classifies research orientations according to ontological, epistemological, methodological, teleological, axiological, and valorization dimensions. Our findings show a predominance of perspectives aligned with critical realism (ontological), positivism (epistemological), analytical methods (methodological), consequentialism (teleological), epistemic values (axiological), and social/economic valorization. Less common stances, such as idealism, mixed methods, and cultural valorization, are also examined for their potential to enrich knowledge production. We highlight how early career researchers and transdisciplinary teams can leverage this framework to reconcile divergent disciplinary viewpoints and promote socially accountable outcomes.

Reading stories evokes rich interpretive, affective, and evaluative responses, such as inferences about narrative intent or judgments about characters. Yet, computational models of reader response are limited, preventing nuanced analyses. To address this gap, we introduce SocialStoryFrames, a formalism for distilling plausible inferences about reader response, such as perceived author intent, explanatory and predictive reasoning, affective responses, and value judgments, using conversational context and a taxonomy grounded in narrative theory, linguistic pragmatics, and psychology. We develop two models, SSF-Generator and SSF-Classifier, validated through human surveys (N=382 participants) and expert annotations, respectively. We conduct pilot analyses to showcase the utility of the formalism for studying storytelling at scale. Specifically, applying our models to SSF-Corpus, a curated dataset of 6,140 social media stories from diverse contexts, we characterize the frequency and interdependence of storytelling intents, and we compare and contrast narrative practices (and their diversity) across communities. By linking fine-grained, context-sensitive modeling with a generic taxonomy of reader responses, SocialStoryFrames enable new research into storytelling in online communities.

We present a novel, open-source social network simulation framework, MOSAIC, where generative language agents predict user behaviors such as liking, sharing, and flagging content. This simulation combines LLM agents with a directed social graph to analyze emergent deception behaviors and gain a better understanding of how users determine the veracity of online social content. By constructing user representations from diverse fine-grained personas, our system enables multi-agent simulations that model content dissemination and engagement dynamics at scale. Within this framework, we evaluate three different content moderation strategies with simulated misinformation dissemination, and we find that they not only mitigate the spread of non-factual content but also increase user engagement. In addition, we analyze the trajectories of popular content in our simulations, and explore whether simulation agents' articulated reasoning for their social interactions truly aligns with their collective engagement patterns. We open-source our simulation software to encourage further research within AI and social sciences.

Generative Agent-Based Modeling (GABM) is an emerging simulation paradigm that combines the reasoning abilities of Large Language Models with traditional Agent-Based Modeling to replicate complex social behaviors, including interactions on social media. While prior work has focused on localized phenomena such as opinion formation and information spread, its potential to capture global network dynamics remains underexplored. This paper addresses this gap by analyzing GABM-based social media simulations through the lens of the Friendship Paradox (FP), a counterintuitive phenomenon where individuals, on average, have fewer friends than their friends. We propose a GABM framework for social media simulations, featuring generative agents that emulate real users with distinct personalities and interests. Using Twitter datasets on the US 2020 Election and the QAnon conspiracy, we show that the FP emerges naturally in GABM simulations. Consistent with real-world observations, the simulations unveil a hierarchical structure, where agents preferentially connect with others displaying higher activity or influence. Additionally, we find that infrequent connections primarily drive the FP, reflecting patterns in real networks. These findings validate GABM as a robust tool for modeling global social media phenomena and highlight its potential for advancing social science by enabling nuanced analysis of user behavior.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can achieve strong performance on many tasks by producing step-by-step reasoning before giving a final output, often referred to as chain-of-thought reasoning (CoT). It is tempting to interpret these CoT explanations as the LLM's process for solving a task. However, we find that CoT explanations can systematically misrepresent the true reason for a model's prediction. We demonstrate that CoT explanations can be heavily influenced by adding biasing features to model inputs -- e.g., by reordering the multiple-choice options in a few-shot prompt to make the answer always "(A)" -- which models systematically fail to mention in their explanations. When we bias models toward incorrect answers, they frequently generate CoT explanations supporting those answers. This causes accuracy to drop by as much as 36% on a suite of 13 tasks from BIG-Bench Hard, when testing with GPT-3.5 from OpenAI and Claude 1.0 from Anthropic. On a social-bias task, model explanations justify giving answers in line with stereotypes without mentioning the influence of these social biases. Our findings indicate that CoT explanations can be plausible yet misleading, which risks increasing our trust in LLMs without guaranteeing their safety. CoT is promising for explainability, but our results highlight the need for targeted efforts to evaluate and improve explanation faithfulness.

Modern natural language models such as the GPT-2/GPT-3 contain tremendous amounts of information about human belief in a consistently testable form. If these models could be shown to accurately reflect the underlying beliefs of the human beings that produced the data used to train these models, then such models become a powerful sociological tool in ways that are distinct from traditional methods, such as interviews and surveys. In this study, We train a version of the GPT-2 on a corpora of historical chess games, and then "launch" clusters of synthetic agents into the model, using text strings to create context and orientation. We compare the trajectories contained in the text generated by the agents/model and compare that to the known ground truth of the chess board, move legality, and historical patterns of play. We find that the percentages of moves by piece using the model are substantially similar from human patterns. We further find that the model creates an accurate latent representation of the chessboard, and that it is possible to plot trajectories of legal moves across the board using this knowledge.

Finding evidence for human opinion and behavior at scale is a challenging task, often requiring an understanding of sophisticated thought patterns among vast online communities found on social media. For example, studying how gun ownership is related to the perception of Freedom, requires a retrieval system that can operate at scale over social media posts, while dealing with two key challenges: (1) identifying abstract concept instances, (2) which can be instantiated differently across different communities. To address these, we introduce ConceptCarve, an evidence retrieval framework that utilizes traditional retrievers and LLMs to dynamically characterize the search space during retrieval. Our experiments show that ConceptCarve surpasses traditional retrieval systems in finding evidence within a social media community. It also produces an interpretable representation of the evidence for that community, which we use to qualitatively analyze complex thought patterns that manifest differently across the communities.

Recent research has offered insights into the extraordinary capabilities of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in various general vision and language tasks. There is growing interest in how LMMs perform in more specialized domains. Social media content, inherently multimodal, blends text, images, videos, and sometimes audio. Understanding social multimedia content remains a challenging problem for contemporary machine learning frameworks. In this paper, we explore GPT-4V(ision)'s capabilities for social multimedia analysis. We select five representative tasks, including sentiment analysis, hate speech detection, fake news identification, demographic inference, and political ideology detection, to evaluate GPT-4V. Our investigation begins with a preliminary quantitative analysis for each task using existing benchmark datasets, followed by a careful review of the results and a selection of qualitative samples that illustrate GPT-4V's potential in understanding multimodal social media content. GPT-4V demonstrates remarkable efficacy in these tasks, showcasing strengths such as joint understanding of image-text pairs, contextual and cultural awareness, and extensive commonsense knowledge. Despite the overall impressive capacity of GPT-4V in the social media domain, there remain notable challenges. GPT-4V struggles with tasks involving multilingual social multimedia comprehension and has difficulties in generalizing to the latest trends in social media. Additionally, it exhibits a tendency to generate erroneous information in the context of evolving celebrity and politician knowledge, reflecting the known hallucination problem. The insights gleaned from our findings underscore a promising future for LMMs in enhancing our comprehension of social media content and its users through the analysis of multimodal information.

The spread of online misinformation threatens public health, democracy, and the broader society. While professional fact-checkers form the first line of defense by fact-checking popular false claims, they do not engage directly in conversations with misinformation spreaders. On the other hand, non-expert ordinary users act as eyes-on-the-ground who proactively counter misinformation -- recent research has shown that 96% counter-misinformation responses are made by ordinary users. However, research also found that 2/3 times, these responses are rude and lack evidence. This work seeks to create a counter-misinformation response generation model to empower users to effectively correct misinformation. This objective is challenging due to the absence of datasets containing ground-truth of ideal counter-misinformation responses, and the lack of models that can generate responses backed by communication theories. In this work, we create two novel datasets of misinformation and counter-misinformation response pairs from in-the-wild social media and crowdsourcing from college-educated students. We annotate the collected data to distinguish poor from ideal responses that are factual, polite, and refute misinformation. We propose MisinfoCorrect, a reinforcement learning-based framework that learns to generate counter-misinformation responses for an input misinformation post. The model rewards the generator to increase the politeness, factuality, and refutation attitude while retaining text fluency and relevancy. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation shows that our model outperforms several baselines by generating high-quality counter-responses. This work illustrates the promise of generative text models for social good -- here, to help create a safe and reliable information ecosystem. The code and data is accessible on https://github.com/claws-lab/MisinfoCorrect.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer other's beliefs, intentions, and states of knowledge, is central to social interaction, yet remains challenging for current Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs), especially in multi-party meetings where cues are distributed across speech and behavior. Existing multimodal ToM benchmarks mainly focus on video-grounded question answering over overt, externally verifiable signals, and provide limited coverage of latent social states and group dynamics. We introduce MeetingToM, a benchmark for complex social behavior reasoning in naturalistic multi-party meetings. MeetingToM targets meeting-specific phenomena such as pseudo-consensus, where apparent agreement masks private dissent under social pressure. The benchmark is hierarchically organized to evaluate ToM at increasing levels of social granularity, including (i) subject-level mental state prediction, (ii) dyadic-level addressee understanding, and (iii) group-level consensus reasoning. We provide a unified evaluation protocol and conduct systematic analyses of representative MLLMs, revealing persistent limitations in integrating non-verbal cues, inferring hidden attitudes, and distinguishing genuine consensus from pseudo-consensus. Our results highlight key challenges and establish MeetingToM as a testbed for advancing meeting-grounded ToM in multimodal models.

Social intelligence, the ability to navigate complex interpersonal interactions, presents a fundamental challenge for language agents. Training such agents via reinforcement learning requires solving the credit assignment problem: determining how individual utterances contribute to multi-turn dialogue outcomes. Existing approaches directly employ language models to distribute episode-level rewards, yielding attributions that are retrospective and lack theoretical grounding. We propose SAVOIR (ShApley Value fOr SocIal RL), a novel principled framework grounded in cooperative game theory. Our approach combines two complementary principles: expected utility shifts evaluation from retrospective attribution to prospective valuation, capturing an utterance's strategic potential for enabling favorable future trajectories; Shapley values ensure fair credit distribution with axiomatic guarantees of efficiency, symmetry, and marginality. Experiments on the SOTOPIA benchmark demonstrate that SAVOIR achieves new state-of-the-art performance across all evaluation settings, with our 7B model matching or exceeding proprietary models including GPT-4o and Claude-3.5-Sonnet. Notably, even large reasoning models consistently underperform, suggesting social intelligence requires qualitatively different capabilities than analytical reasoning.

Online misinformation has been a serious threat to public health and society. Social media users are known to reply to misinformation posts with counter-misinformation messages, which have been shown to be effective in curbing the spread of misinformation. This is called social correction. However, the characteristics of tweets that attract social correction versus those that do not remain unknown. To close the gap, we focus on answering the following two research questions: (1) ``Given a tweet, will it be countered by other users?'', and (2) ``If yes, what will be the magnitude of countering it?''. This exploration will help develop mechanisms to guide users' misinformation correction efforts and to measure disparity across users who get corrected. In this work, we first create a novel dataset with 690,047 pairs of misinformation tweets and counter-misinformation replies. Then, stratified analysis of tweet linguistic and engagement features as well as tweet posters' user attributes are conducted to illustrate the factors that are significant in determining whether a tweet will get countered. Finally, predictive classifiers are created to predict the likelihood of a misinformation tweet to get countered and the degree to which that tweet will be countered. The code and data is accessible on https://github.com/claws-lab/social-correction-twitter.

The rich and multifaceted nature of human social interaction, encompassing multimodal cues, unobservable relations and mental states, and dynamical behavior, presents a formidable challenge for artificial intelligence. To advance research in this area, we introduce SIV-Bench, a novel video benchmark for rigorously evaluating the capabilities of Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) across Social Scene Understanding (SSU), Social State Reasoning (SSR), and Social Dynamics Prediction (SDP). SIV-Bench features 2,792 video clips and 8,792 meticulously generated question-answer pairs derived from a human-LLM collaborative pipeline. It is originally collected from TikTok and YouTube, covering a wide range of video genres, presentation styles, and linguistic and cultural backgrounds. It also includes a dedicated setup for analyzing the impact of different textual cues-original on-screen text, added dialogue, or no text. Our comprehensive experiments on leading MLLMs reveal that while models adeptly handle SSU, they significantly struggle with SSR and SDP, where Relation Inference (RI) is an acute bottleneck, as further examined in our analysis. Our study also confirms the critical role of transcribed dialogue in aiding comprehension of complex social interactions. By systematically identifying current MLLMs' strengths and limitations, SIV-Bench offers crucial insights to steer the development of more socially intelligent AI. The dataset and code are available at https://kfq20.github.io/sivbench/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are revolutionizing information retrieval, with chatbots becoming an important source for answering user queries. As by their design, LLMs prioritize generating correct answers, the value of highly plausible yet incorrect answers (candidate answers) tends to be overlooked. However, such answers can still prove useful, for example, they can play a crucial role in tasks like Multiple-Choice Question Answering (MCQA) and QA Robustness Assessment (QARA). Existing QA datasets primarily focus on correct answers without explicit consideration of the plausibility of other candidate answers, limiting opportunity for more nuanced evaluations of models. To address this gap, we introduce PlausibleQA, a large-scale dataset comprising 10,000 questions and 100,000 candidate answers, each annotated with plausibility scores and justifications for their selection. Additionally, the dataset includes 900,000 justifications for pairwise comparisons between candidate answers, further refining plausibility assessments. We evaluate PlausibleQA through human assessments and empirical experiments, demonstrating its utility in MCQA and QARA analysis. Our findings show that plausibility-aware approaches are effective for MCQA distractor generation and QARA. We release PlausibleQA as a resource for advancing QA research and enhancing LLM performance in distinguishing plausible distractors from correct answers.

Basic human values represent a set of values such as security, independence, success, kindness, and pleasure, which we deem important to our lives. Each of us holds different values with different degrees of significance. Existing studies show that values of a person can be identified from their social network usage. However, the value priority of a person may change over time due to different factors such as life experiences, influence, social structure and technology. Existing studies do not conduct any analysis regarding the change of users' value from the social influence, i.e., group persuasion, form the social media usage. In our research, first, we predict users' value score by the influence of friends from their social media usage. We propose a Bounded Confidence Model (BCM) based value dynamics model from 275 different ego networks in Facebook that predicts how social influence may persuade a person to change their value over time. Then, to predict better, we use particle swarm optimization based hyperparameter tuning technique. We observe that these optimized hyperparameters produce accurate future value score. We also run our approach with different machine learning based methods and find support vector regression (SVR) outperforms other regressor models. By using SVR with the best hyperparameters of BCM model, we find the lowest Mean Squared Error (MSE) score 0.00347.

The development and popularization of large language models (LLMs) have raised concerns that they will be used to create tailor-made, convincing arguments to push false or misleading narratives online. Early work has found that language models can generate content perceived as at least on par and often more persuasive than human-written messages. However, there is still limited knowledge about LLMs' persuasive capabilities in direct conversations with human counterparts and how personalization can improve their performance. In this pre-registered study, we analyze the effect of AI-driven persuasion in a controlled, harmless setting. We create a web-based platform where participants engage in short, multiple-round debates with a live opponent. Each participant is randomly assigned to one of four treatment conditions, corresponding to a two-by-two factorial design: (1) Games are either played between two humans or between a human and an LLM; (2) Personalization might or might not be enabled, granting one of the two players access to basic sociodemographic information about their opponent. We found that participants who debated GPT-4 with access to their personal information had 81.7% (p < 0.01; N=820 unique participants) higher odds of increased agreement with their opponents compared to participants who debated humans. Without personalization, GPT-4 still outperforms humans, but the effect is lower and statistically non-significant (p=0.31). Overall, our results suggest that concerns around personalization are meaningful and have important implications for the governance of social media and the design of new online environments.

This paper presents a way of enhancing the reliability of Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) in addressing hallucination effects, where models generate incorrect or unrelated responses. Without additional instruction tuning paradigm, we introduce Counterfactual Inception, a novel method that implants counterfactual thoughts into LMMs using carefully chosen, misaligned counterfactual keywords. This method is grounded in the concept of counterfactual thinking, a cognitive process where humans consider alternative realities and outcomes. By applying this human-like reasoning mechanism to LMMs, we aim to reduce hallucination effects and improve the models' trustworthiness. We also propose Dual-modality Verification Process (DVP), a rigorous framework for selecting optimal counterfactual keywords to trigger counterfactual thinking into LMMs, concurrently considering visual and linguistic context. Our extensive experiments across various LMMs, including both open-source and proprietary models, corroborate that our method significantly mitigates hallucination phenomena across different datasets.

Persona-driven simulations are increasingly used in computational social science, yet their validity critically depends on the fidelity of the underlying personas. Constructing virtual populations that are both authentic and scalable remains a central challenge. We introduce Synthia, a persona-generation framework that grounds LLM-generated personas in real social-media posts while delegating narrative construction to language models, using publicly available data from the Bluesky platform. Across multiple social-survey benchmarks, Synthia improves alignment with human opinion distributions over prior state-of-the-art approaches while relying on substantially smaller models. A multi-dimensional fairness and bias analysis shows that Synthia outperforms previous methods for most demographics across different dimensions. Uniquely, Synthia preserves interaction-graph structure among personas grounded in real social network users, enabling network-aware analysis, which we demonstrate through two homophily-focused case studies. Together, these results position Synthia as a practical and reliable framework for constructing scalable, high-fidelity, and equitable virtual populations.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled automatic generation of chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, leading to strong performance on tasks such as math and code. However, when reasoning steps reflect social stereotypes (e.g., those related to gender, race or age), they can reinforce harmful associations and lead to misleading conclusions. We present the first systematic evaluation of social bias within LLM-generated reasoning, using the BBQ dataset to analyze both prediction accuracy and bias. Our study spans a wide range of mainstream reasoning models, including instruction-tuned and CoT-augmented variants of DeepSeek-R1 (8B/32B), ChatGPT, and other open-source LLMs. We quantify how biased reasoning steps correlate with incorrect predictions and often lead to stereotype expression. To mitigate reasoning-induced bias, we propose Answer Distribution as Bias Proxy (ADBP), a lightweight mitigation method that detects bias by tracking how model predictions change across incremental reasoning steps. ADBP outperforms a stereotype-free baseline in most cases, mitigating bias and improving the accuracy of LLM outputs. Code will be released upon paper acceptance.

Recent video generators can fabricate realistic depictions of wars, disasters, public emergencies, and other real-world crises, creating substantial risks of misinformation. Existing benchmarks, however, provide limited evidence on detector and generator behavior in such settings, including how detectability varies with generation conditions, how people perceive generated videos, and whether detectors remain reliable during social dissemination. To address this gap, we introduce RA-Bench, a benchmark for AI-generated video detection that uses Real videos as Anchors. RA-Bench contains 17,886 videos, comprising 1,830 real-video anchors across 10 social-risk categories and 16,056 generated clips from four open-source and five closed-source generators. Based on RA-Bench, we organize our evaluation along three dimensions. We first assess detector generalization across seven traditional detectors, ten zero-shot multimodal models under three review settings, and two MLLMs specifically fine-tuned on AI-generated video detection. Across these methods, none of the three detector families generalizes consistently across RA-Bench instances. We then examine how detectability varies with generation quality, conditioning information, and sampling seeds. These analyses show that generation properties affect detector families differently, while source-level detection patterns remain stable across seeds. Finally, we study human authenticity judgments and detector reliability during social dissemination. We find that videos that mislead people are also difficult for current detectors, and that social dissemination makes detection harder. Together, these findings show that current methods struggle to detect realistic AI-generated videos, highlighting the need for detectors robust to evolving video generators.

Scholars have increasingly investigated "crowdsourcing" as an alternative to expert-based judgment or purely data-driven approaches to predicting the future. Under certain conditions, scholars have found that crowdsourcing can outperform these other approaches. However, despite interest in the topic and a series of successful use cases, relatively few studies have applied empirical model thinking to evaluate the accuracy and robustness of crowdsourcing in real-world contexts. In this paper, we offer three novel contributions. First, we explore a dataset of over 600,000 predictions from over 7,000 participants in a multi-year tournament to predict the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Second, we develop a comprehensive crowd construction framework that allows for the formal description and application of crowdsourcing to real-world data. Third, we apply this framework to our data to construct more than 275,000 crowd models. We find that in out-of-sample historical simulations, crowdsourcing robustly outperforms the commonly-accepted null model, yielding the highest-known performance for this context at 80.8% case level accuracy. To our knowledge, this dataset and analysis represent one of the largest explorations of recurring human prediction to date, and our results provide additional empirical support for the use of crowdsourcing as a prediction method.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

With the overwhelming amount of data available both on and offline today, recommender systems have become much needed to help users find items tailored to their interests. When social network information exists there are methods that utilize this information to make better recommendations, however the methods are often clunky with complex architectures and training procedures. Furthermore many of the existing methods utilize graph neural networks which are notoriously difficult to train. To address this, we propose Socially-aware Temporally caUsal Decoder recommender sYstems (STUDY). STUDY does joint inference over groups of users who are adjacent in the social network graph using a single forward pass of a modified transformer decoder network. We test our method in a school-based educational content setting, using classroom structure to define social networks. Our method outperforms both social and sequential methods while maintaining the design simplicity of a single homogeneous network that models all interactions in the data. We also carry out ablation studies to understand the drivers of our performance gains and find that our model depends on leveraging a social network structure that effectively models the similarities in user behavior.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

The increasing popularity of large language models has not only led to widespread use but has also brought various risks, including the potential for systematically spreading fake news. Consequently, the development of classification systems such as DetectGPT has become vital. These detectors are vulnerable to evasion techniques, as demonstrated in an experimental series: Systematic changes of the generative models' temperature proofed shallow learning-detectors to be the least reliable. Fine-tuning the generative model via reinforcement learning circumvented BERT-based-detectors. Finally, rephrasing led to a >90\% evasion of zero-shot-detectors like DetectGPT, although texts stayed highly similar to the original. A comparison with existing work highlights the better performance of the presented methods. Possible implications for society and further research are discussed.

Being able to predict what may happen in the future requires an in-depth understanding of the physical and causal rules that govern the world. A model that is able to do so has a number of appealing applications, from robotic planning to representation learning. However, learning to predict raw future observations, such as frames in a video, is exceedingly challenging -- the ambiguous nature of the problem can cause a naively designed model to average together possible futures into a single, blurry prediction. Recently, this has been addressed by two distinct approaches: (a) latent variational variable models that explicitly model underlying stochasticity and (b) adversarially-trained models that aim to produce naturalistic images. However, a standard latent variable model can struggle to produce realistic results, and a standard adversarially-trained model underutilizes latent variables and fails to produce diverse predictions. We show that these distinct methods are in fact complementary. Combining the two produces predictions that look more realistic to human raters and better cover the range of possible futures. Our method outperforms prior and concurrent work in these aspects.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently been adopted as synthetic agents for public opinion simulation, offering a promising alternative to costly and slow human surveys. Despite their scalability, current LLM-based simulation methods fail to capture social diversity, producing flattened inter-group differences and overly homogeneous responses across demographic groups. We identify this limitation as a Diversity Collapse phenomenon in LLM hidden representations, where distinct social identities become increasingly indistinguishable across layers. Motivated by this observation, we propose Parametric Social Identity Injection (PSII), a general framework that injects explicit, parametric representations of demographic attributes and value orientations directly into intermediate hidden states of LLMs. Unlike prompt-based persona conditioning, PSII enables fine-grained and controllable identity modulation at the representation level. Extensive experiments on the World Values Survey using multiple open-source LLMs show that PSII significantly improves distributional fidelity and diversity, reducing KL divergence to real-world survey data while enhancing overall diversity. This work provides new insights into representation-level control of LLM agents and advances scalable, diversity-aware public opinion simulation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

The deliberate manipulation of public opinion, especially through altered images, which are frequently disseminated through online social networks, poses a significant danger to society. To fight this issue on a technical level we support the research community by releasing the Digital Forensics 2023 (DF2023) training and validation dataset, comprising one million images from four major forgery categories: splicing, copy-move, enhancement and removal. This dataset enables an objective comparison of network architectures and can significantly reduce the time and effort of researchers preparing datasets.

Analyzing and forecasting trajectories of agents like pedestrians and cars in complex scenes has become more and more significant in many intelligent systems and applications. The diversity and uncertainty in socially interactive behaviors among a rich variety of agents make this task more challenging than other deterministic computer vision tasks. Researchers have made a lot of efforts to quantify the effects of these interactions on future trajectories through different mathematical models and network structures, but this problem has not been well solved. Inspired by marine animals that localize the positions of their companions underwater through echoes, we build a new anglebased trainable social interaction representation, named SocialCircle, for continuously reflecting the context of social interactions at different angular orientations relative to the target agent. We validate the effect of the proposed SocialCircle by training it along with several newly released trajectory prediction models, and experiments show that the SocialCircle not only quantitatively improves the prediction performance, but also qualitatively helps better simulate social interactions when forecasting pedestrian trajectories in a way that is consistent with human intuitions.

Accurate prediction of human behavior is essential for robust and safe human-AI collaboration. However, existing approaches for modeling people are often data-hungry and brittle because they either make unrealistic assumptions about rationality or are too computationally demanding to adapt rapidly. Our key insight is that many everyday social interactions may follow predictable patterns; efficient "scripts" that minimize cognitive load for actors and observers, e.g., "wait for the green light, then go." We propose modeling these routines as behavioral programs instantiated in computer code rather than policies conditioned on beliefs and desires. We introduce ROTE, a novel algorithm that leverages both large language models (LLMs) for synthesizing a hypothesis space of behavioral programs, and probabilistic inference for reasoning about uncertainty over that space. We test ROTE in a suite of gridworld tasks and a large-scale embodied household simulator. ROTE predicts human and AI behaviors from sparse observations, outperforming competitive baselines -- including behavior cloning and LLM-based methods -- by as much as 50% in terms of in-sample accuracy and out-of-sample generalization. By treating action understanding as a program synthesis problem, ROTE opens a path for AI systems to efficiently and effectively predict human behavior in the real-world.

We present NormBank, a knowledge bank of 155k situational norms. This resource is designed to ground flexible normative reasoning for interactive, assistive, and collaborative AI systems. Unlike prior commonsense resources, NormBank grounds each inference within a multivalent sociocultural frame, which includes the setting (e.g., restaurant), the agents' contingent roles (waiter, customer), their attributes (age, gender), and other physical, social, and cultural constraints (e.g., the temperature or the country of operation). In total, NormBank contains 63k unique constraints from a taxonomy that we introduce and iteratively refine here. Constraints then apply in different combinations to frame social norms. Under these manipulations, norms are non-monotonic - one can cancel an inference by updating its frame even slightly. Still, we find evidence that neural models can help reliably extend the scope and coverage of NormBank. We further demonstrate the utility of this resource with a series of transfer experiments.

Large language models (LLMs) are trained to imitate humans to explain human decisions. However, do LLMs explain themselves? Can they help humans build mental models of how LLMs process different inputs? To answer these questions, we propose to evaluate counterfactual simulatability of natural language explanations: whether an explanation can enable humans to precisely infer the model's outputs on diverse counterfactuals of the explained input. For example, if a model answers "yes" to the input question "Can eagles fly?" with the explanation "all birds can fly", then humans would infer from the explanation that it would also answer "yes" to the counterfactual input "Can penguins fly?". If the explanation is precise, then the model's answer should match humans' expectations. We implemented two metrics based on counterfactual simulatability: precision and generality. We generated diverse counterfactuals automatically using LLMs. We then used these metrics to evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs (e.g., GPT-4) on two tasks: multi-hop factual reasoning and reward modeling. We found that LLM's explanations have low precision and that precision does not correlate with plausibility. Therefore, naively optimizing human approvals (e.g., RLHF) may not be a sufficient solution.

When faced with novel situations, people are able to marshal relevant considerations from a wide range of background knowledge and put these to use in inferences and predictions. What permits us to draw in globally relevant information and reason over it coherently? Here, we explore the hypothesis that people use a combination of distributed and symbolic representations to construct bespoke mental models tailored to novel situations. We propose a computational implementation of this idea -- a ``Model Synthesis Architecture'' (MSA) -- using language models to implement global relevance-based retrieval and model synthesis and probabilistic programs to implement bespoke, coherent world models. We evaluate our MSA as a model of human judgments on a novel reasoning dataset. The dataset -- built around a `Model Olympics` domain of sports vignettes -- tests models' capacity for human-like, open-ended reasoning by requiring (i) judgments about novel causal structures described in language; (ii) drawing on large bodies of background knowledge; and (iii) doing both in light of observations that introduce arbitrary novel variables. Our MSA approach captures human judgments better than language model-only baselines, under both direct and chain-of-thought generations from the LM that supports model synthesis. These results suggest that MSAs can be implemented in a way that mirrors people's ability to deliver locally coherent reasoning over globally relevant variables, offering a path to understanding and replicating human reasoning in open-ended domains.

As humans increasingly rely on multiround conversational AI for high stakes decisions, principled frameworks are needed to ensure such interactions reliably improve decision quality. We adopt a human centric view governed by two principles: counterfactual harm, ensuring the AI does not undermine human strengths, and complementarity, ensuring it adds value where the human is prone to err. We formalize these concepts via user defined rules, allowing users to specify exactly what harm and complementarity mean for their specific task. We then introduce an online, distribution free algorithm with finite sample guarantees that enforces the user-specified constraints over the collaboration dynamics. We evaluate our framework across two interactive settings: LLM simulated collaboration on a medical diagnostic task and a human crowdsourcing study on a pictorial reasoning task. We show that our online procedure maintains prescribed counterfactual harm and complementarity violation rates even under nonstationary interaction dynamics. Moreover, tightening or loosening these constraints produces predictable shifts in downstream human accuracy, confirming that the two principles serve as practical levers for steering multi-round collaboration toward better decision quality without the need to model or constrain human behavior.

Probabilistic forecasting estimates the likelihood of uncertain future events. To improve LLM forecasting, existing methods typically learn from binary outcomes to output verbalized forecasts. However, while aggregated human forecasts contain rich information in both the crowd probability estimate and the degree of agreement among forecasters, how to utilize these signals remains underexplored. To address this, we propose the Beta-Bernoulli Calibrator (BBC), which converts an initial point estimate forecast from any model into a distribution over event likelihood, using supervision from both binary outcomes and human forecasts. BBC models event likelihood p sim Beta(α, β) and outcome y sim Bernoulli(p), with the mean as the calibrated point forecast and the variance as the epistemic uncertainty. Our results show that BBC generally provides better calibrated and more accurate forecasts than both traditional post-hoc calibration methods and models fine-tuned specifically for forecasting, while remaining lightweight and having good generalization. We also show that the epistemic uncertainty captured by BBC is a more reliable predictor of forecasting error than verbalized confidence.

Complex problem-solving requires cognitive flexibility--the capacity to entertain multiple perspectives while preserving their distinctiveness. This flexibility replicates the "wisdom of crowds" within a single individual, allowing them to "think with many minds." While mental simulation enables imagined deliberation, cognitive constraints limit its effectiveness. We propose synthetic deliberation, a Large Language Model (LLM)-based method that simulates discourse between agents embodying diverse perspectives, as a solution. Using a custom GPT-based model, we showcase its benefits: concurrent processing of multiple viewpoints without cognitive degradation, parallel exploration of perspectives, and precise control over viewpoint synthesis. By externalizing the deliberative process and distributing cognitive labor between parallel search and integration, synthetic deliberation transcends mental simulation's limitations. This approach shows promise for strategic planning, policymaking, and conflict resolution.

Online misinformation poses a global risk with harmful implications for society. Ordinary social media users are known to actively reply to misinformation posts with counter-misinformation messages, which is shown to be effective in containing the spread of misinformation. Such a practice is defined as "social correction". Nevertheless, it remains unknown how users respond to social correction in real-world scenarios, especially, will it have a corrective or backfire effect on users. Investigating this research question is pivotal for developing and refining strategies that maximize the efficacy of social correction initiatives. To fill this gap, we conduct an in-depth study to characterize and predict the user response to social correction in a data-driven manner through the lens of X (Formerly Twitter), where the user response is instantiated as the reply that is written toward a counter-misinformation message. Particularly, we first create a novel dataset with 55, 549 triples of misinformation tweets, counter-misinformation replies, and responses to counter-misinformation replies, and then curate a taxonomy to illustrate different kinds of user responses. Next, fine-grained statistical analysis of reply linguistic and engagement features as well as repliers' user attributes is conducted to illustrate the characteristics that are significant in determining whether a reply will have a corrective or backfire effect. Finally, we build a user response prediction model to identify whether a social correction will be corrective, neutral, or have a backfire effect, which achieves a promising F1 score of 0.816. Our work enables stakeholders to monitor and predict user responses effectively, thus guiding the use of social correction to maximize their corrective impact and minimize backfire effects. The code and data is accessible on https://github.com/claws-lab/response-to-social-correction.

Theory of Mind (ToM) is central to social cognition and human-AI interaction, and Large Language Models (LLMs) have been used to help understand and represent ToM. However, most evaluations treat ToM as a static judgment at a single moment, primarily relying on tests of false beliefs. This overlooks a key dynamic dimension of ToM: the ability to represent, update, and retrieve others' beliefs over time. We investigate dynamic ToM as a temporally extended representational memory problem, asking whether LLMs can track belief trajectories across interactions rather than only inferring current beliefs. We introduce DToM-Track, an evaluation framework to investigate temporal belief reasoning in controlled multiturn conversations, testing the recall of beliefs held prior to an update, the inference of current beliefs, and the detection of belief change. Using LLMs as computational probes, we find a consistent asymmetry: models reliably infer an agent's current belief but struggle to maintain and retrieve prior belief states once updates occur. This pattern persists across LLM model families and scales, and is consistent with recency bias and interference effects well documented in cognitive science. These results suggest that tracking belief trajectories over time poses a distinct challenge beyond classical false-belief reasoning. By framing ToM as a problem of temporal representation and retrieval, this work connects ToM to core cognitive mechanisms of memory and interference and exposes the implications for LLM models of social reasoning in extended human-AI interactions.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable of simulating human behavior, offering cost-effective ways to estimate user responses during the early phases of survey design. While previous studies have examined whether models can reflect individual opinions or attitudes, we argue that a higher-order binding of virtual personas requires successfully approximating not only the opinions of a user as an identified member of a group, but also the nuanced ways in which that user perceives and evaluates those outside the group. In particular, faithfully simulating how humans perceive different social groups is critical for applying LLMs to various political science studies, including timely topics on polarization dynamics, inter-group conflict, and democratic backsliding. To this end, we propose a novel methodology for constructing virtual personas with synthetic user ``backstories" generated as extended, multi-turn interview transcripts. Our generated backstories are longer, rich in detail, and consistent in authentically describing a singular individual, compared to previous methods. We show that virtual personas conditioned on our backstories closely replicate human response distributions (up to an 87\% improvement as measured by Wasserstein Distance) and produce effect sizes that closely match those observed in the original studies. Altogether, our work extends the applicability of LLMs beyond estimating individual self-opinions, enabling their use in a broader range of human studies.

Recent advances in large language models (LLM) have enabled richer social simulations, allowing for the study of various social phenomena with LLM-based agents. However, most work has used an omniscient perspective on these simulations (e.g., single LLM to generate all interlocutors), which is fundamentally at odds with the non-omniscient, information asymmetric interactions that humans have. To examine these differences, we develop an evaluation framework to simulate social interactions with LLMs in various settings (omniscient, non-omniscient). Our experiments show that interlocutors simulated omnisciently are much more successful at accomplishing social goals compared to non-omniscient agents, despite the latter being the more realistic setting. Furthermore, we demonstrate that learning from omniscient simulations improves the apparent naturalness of interactions but scarcely enhances goal achievement in cooperative scenarios. Our findings indicate that addressing information asymmetry remains a fundamental challenge for LLM-based agents.

Both the general public and academic communities have raised concerns about sycophancy, the phenomenon of artificial intelligence (AI) excessively agreeing with or flattering users. Yet, beyond isolated media reports of severe consequences, like reinforcing delusions, little is known about the extent of sycophancy or how it affects people who use AI. Here we show the pervasiveness and harmful impacts of sycophancy when people seek advice from AI. First, across 11 state-of-the-art AI models, we find that models are highly sycophantic: they affirm users' actions 50% more than humans do, and they do so even in cases where user queries mention manipulation, deception, or other relational harms. Second, in two preregistered experiments (N = 1604), including a live-interaction study where participants discuss a real interpersonal conflict from their life, we find that interaction with sycophantic AI models significantly reduced participants' willingness to take actions to repair interpersonal conflict, while increasing their conviction of being in the right. However, participants rated sycophantic responses as higher quality, trusted the sycophantic AI model more, and were more willing to use it again. This suggests that people are drawn to AI that unquestioningly validate, even as that validation risks eroding their judgment and reducing their inclination toward prosocial behavior. These preferences create perverse incentives both for people to increasingly rely on sycophantic AI models and for AI model training to favor sycophancy. Our findings highlight the necessity of explicitly addressing this incentive structure to mitigate the widespread risks of AI sycophancy.

Deception is the intentional practice of twisting information. It is a nuanced societal practice deeply intertwined with human societal evolution, characterized by a multitude of facets. This research explores the problem of deception through the lens of psychology, employing a framework that categorizes deception into three forms: lies of omission, lies of commission, and lies of influence. The primary focus of this study is specifically on investigating only lies of omission. We propose a novel framework for deception detection leveraging NLP techniques. We curated an annotated dataset of 876,784 samples by amalgamating a popular large-scale fake news dataset and scraped news headlines from the Twitter handle of Times of India, a well-known Indian news media house. Each sample has been labeled with four layers, namely: (i) the type of omission (speculation, bias, distortion, sounds factual, and opinion), (ii) colors of lies(black, white, etc), and (iii) the intention of such lies (to influence, etc) (iv) topic of lies (political, educational, religious, etc). We present a novel multi-task learning pipeline that leverages the dataless merging of fine-tuned language models to address the deception detection task mentioned earlier. Our proposed model achieved an F1 score of 0.87, demonstrating strong performance across all layers including the type, color, intent, and topic aspects of deceptive content. Finally, our research explores the relationship between lies of omission and propaganda techniques. To accomplish this, we conducted an in-depth analysis, uncovering compelling findings. For instance, our analysis revealed a significant correlation between loaded language and opinion, shedding light on their interconnectedness. To encourage further research in this field, we will be making the models and dataset available with the MIT License, making it favorable for open-source research.

Safety perception measurement has been a subject of interest in many cities of the world. This is due to its social relevance, and to its effect on some local economic activities. Even though people safety perception is a subjective topic, sometimes it is possible to find out common patterns given a restricted geographical and sociocultural context. This paper presents an approach that makes use of image processing and machine learning techniques to detect with high accuracy urban environment patterns that could affect citizen's safety perception.

Multimodal counterfactual reasoning is a vital yet challenging ability for AI systems. It involves predicting the outcomes of hypothetical circumstances based on vision and language inputs, which enables AI models to learn from failures and explore hypothetical scenarios. Despite its importance, there are only a few datasets targeting the counterfactual reasoning abilities of multimodal models. Among them, they only cover reasoning over synthetic environments or specific types of events (e.g. traffic collisions), making them hard to reliably benchmark the model generalization ability in diverse real-world scenarios and reasoning dimensions. To overcome these limitations, we develop a video question answering dataset, ACQUIRED: it consists of 3.9K annotated videos, encompassing a wide range of event types and incorporating both first and third-person viewpoints, which ensures a focus on real-world diversity. In addition, each video is annotated with questions that span three distinct dimensions of reasoning, including physical, social, and temporal, which can comprehensively evaluate the model counterfactual abilities along multiple aspects. We benchmark our dataset against several state-of-the-art language-only and multimodal models and experimental results demonstrate a significant performance gap (>13%) between models and humans. The findings suggest that multimodal counterfactual reasoning remains an open challenge and ACQUIRED is a comprehensive and reliable benchmark for inspiring future research in this direction.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

Making theory-of-mind inferences from human dialogue is a strong indicator of a model's underlying social abilities, which are fundamental for adept AI assistants. However, large language and reasoning models struggle to understand sophisticated social phenomena in transcript data, such as sarcasm and irony. To assess the weaknesses of current models and to identify their solutions, we introduce SocialNLI (SoNLI) -- the first social dialogue inference dataset. SoNLI consists of a collection of dialogue transcripts hand-picked to center complex social nuances like irony and sarcasm, paired with inferences, corresponding likelihood scores, and human-written explanations. We explore social inference analysis as a facet of theory-of-mind, and evaluate LLM and reasoning model theory-of-mind ability through multi-step counterfactual reasoning.

Do Large Language Models (LLMs) possess a Theory of Mind (ToM)? Research into this question has focused on evaluating LLMs against benchmarks and found success across a range of social tasks. However, these evaluations do not test for the actual representations posited by ToM: namely, a causal model of mental states and behavior. Here, we use a cognitively-grounded definition of ToM to develop and test a new evaluation framework. Specifically, our approach probes whether LLMs have a coherent, domain-general, and consistent model of how mental states cause behavior -- regardless of whether that model matches a human-like ToM. We find that even though LLMs succeed in approximating human judgments in a simple ToM paradigm, they fail at a logically equivalent task and exhibit low consistency between their action predictions and corresponding mental state inferences. As such, these findings suggest that the social proficiency exhibited by LLMs is not the result of an domain-general or consistent ToM.

Diffusion models can generate realistic videos, but existing methods rely on implicitly learning physical reasoning from large-scale text-video datasets, which is costly, difficult to scale, and still prone to producing implausible motions that violate fundamental physical laws. We introduce a training-free framework that improves physical plausibility at inference time by explicitly reasoning about implausibility and guiding the generation away from it. Specifically, we employ a lightweight physics-aware reasoning pipeline to construct counterfactual prompts that deliberately encode physics-violating behaviors. Then, we propose a novel Synchronized Decoupled Guidance (SDG) strategy, which leverages these prompts through synchronized directional normalization to counteract lagged suppression and trajectory-decoupled denoising to mitigate cumulative trajectory bias, ensuring that implausible content is suppressed immediately and consistently throughout denoising. Experiments across different physical domains show that our approach substantially enhances physical fidelity while maintaining photorealism, despite requiring no additional training. Ablation studies confirm the complementary effectiveness of both the physics-aware reasoning component and SDG. In particular, the aforementioned two designs of SDG are also individually validated to contribute critically to the suppression of implausible content and the overall gains in physical plausibility. This establishes a new and plug-and-play physics-aware paradigm for video generation.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) in embodied agents creates an urgent need to measure their privacy awareness in the physical world. Existing evaluation methods, however, are confined to natural language based scenarios. To bridge this gap, we introduce EAPrivacy, a comprehensive evaluation benchmark designed to quantify the physical-world privacy awareness of LLM-powered agents. EAPrivacy utilizes procedurally generated scenarios across four tiers to test an agent's ability to handle sensitive objects, adapt to changing environments, balance task execution with privacy constraints, and resolve conflicts with social norms. Our measurements reveal a critical deficit in current models. The top-performing model, Gemini 2.5 Pro, achieved only 59\% accuracy in scenarios involving changing physical environments. Furthermore, when a task was accompanied by a privacy request, models prioritized completion over the constraint in up to 86\% of cases. In high-stakes situations pitting privacy against critical social norms, leading models like GPT-4o and Claude-3.5-haiku disregarded the social norm over 15\% of the time. These findings, demonstrated by our benchmark, underscore a fundamental misalignment in LLMs regarding physically grounded privacy and establish the need for more robust, physically-aware alignment. Codes and datasets will be available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/EAPrivacy.

Human interactions are deeply rooted in the interplay of thoughts, beliefs, and desires made possible by Theory of Mind (ToM): our cognitive ability to understand the mental states of ourselves and others. Although ToM may come naturally to us, emulating it presents a challenge to even the most advanced Large Language Models (LLMs). Recent improvements to LLMs' reasoning capabilities from simple yet effective prompting techniques such as Chain-of-Thought have seen limited applicability to ToM. In this paper, we turn to the prominent cognitive science theory "Simulation Theory" to bridge this gap. We introduce SimToM, a novel two-stage prompting framework inspired by Simulation Theory's notion of perspective-taking. To implement this idea on current ToM benchmarks, SimToM first filters context based on what the character in question knows before answering a question about their mental state. Our approach, which requires no additional training and minimal prompt-tuning, shows substantial improvement over existing methods, and our analysis reveals the importance of perspective-taking to Theory-of-Mind capabilities. Our findings suggest perspective-taking as a promising direction for future research into improving LLMs' ToM capabilities.

We develop a simulation framework for studying misinformation spread within online social networks that blends agent-based modeling and natural language processing techniques. While many other agent-based simulations exist in this space, questions over their fidelity and generalization to existing networks in part hinders their ability to provide actionable insights. To partially address these concerns, we create a 'digital clone' of a known misinformation sharing network by downloading social media histories for over ten thousand of its users. We parse these histories to both extract the structure of the network and model the nuanced ways in which information is shared and spread among its members. Unlike many other agent-based methods in this space, information sharing between users in our framework is sensitive to topic of discussion, user preferences, and online community dynamics. To evaluate the fidelity of our method, we seed our cloned network with a set of posts recorded in the base network and compare propagation dynamics between the two, observing reasonable agreement across the twin networks over a variety of metrics. Lastly, we explore how the cloned network may serve as a flexible, low-cost testbed for misinformation countermeasure evaluation and red teaming analysis. We hope the tools explored here augment existing efforts in the space and unlock new opportunities for misinformation countermeasure evaluation, a field that may become increasingly important to consider with the anticipated rise of misinformation campaigns fueled by generative artificial intelligence.

When people reason about cause and effect, they often consider many competing "what if" scenarios before deciding which explanation fits best. Analogously, advanced language models capable of causal inference can consider multiple interventions and counterfactuals to judge the validity of causal claims. Crucially, this type of reasoning is less like a single calculation and more like an internal dialogue between alternative hypotheses. In this paper, we make this dialogue explicit through a dual-agent debate framework where one model provides a structured causal inference, and the other critically examines this reasoning for logical flaws. When disagreements arise, agents attempt to persuade each other, challenging each other's logic and revising their conclusions until they converge on a mutually agreed answer. To take advantage of this deliberative process, we specifically use reasoning language models, whose strengths in both causal inference and adversarial debate remain under-explored relative to standard large language models. We evaluate our approach on the CLadder dataset, a benchmark linking natural language questions to formally defined causal graphs across all three rungs of Pearl's ladder of causation. With Qwen3 and DeepSeek-R1 as debater agents, we demonstrate that multi-agent debate improves DeepSeek-R1's overall accuracy in causal inference from 78.03% to 87.45%, with the counterfactual category specifically improving from 67.94% to 80.04% accuracy. Similarly, Qwen3's overall accuracy improves from 84.16% to 89.41%, and counterfactual questions from 71.53% to 80.35%, showing that strong models can still benefit greatly from debate with weaker agents. Our results highlight the potential of reasoning models as building blocks for multi-agent systems in causal inference, and demonstrate the importance of diverse perspectives in causal problem-solving.

Generation of plausible yet incorrect factual information, termed hallucination, is an unsolved issue in large language models. We study the ability of language models to deliberate on the responses they give in order to correct their mistakes. We develop the Chain-of-Verification (CoVe) method whereby the model first (i) drafts an initial response; then (ii) plans verification questions to fact-check its draft; (iii) answers those questions independently so the answers are not biased by other responses; and (iv) generates its final verified response. In experiments, we show CoVe decreases hallucinations across a variety of tasks, from list-based questions from Wikidata, closed book MultiSpanQA and longform text generation.

Capturing high-dimensional social interactions and feasible futures is essential for predicting trajectories. To address this complex nature, several attempts have been devoted to reducing the dimensionality of the output variables via parametric curve fitting such as the B\'ezier curve and B-spline function. However, these functions, which originate in computer graphics fields, are not suitable to account for socially acceptable human dynamics. In this paper, we present EigenTrajectory (ET), a trajectory prediction approach that uses a novel trajectory descriptor to form a compact space, known here as ET space, in place of Euclidean space, for representing pedestrian movements. We first reduce the complexity of the trajectory descriptor via a low-rank approximation. We transform the pedestrians' history paths into our ET space represented by spatio-temporal principle components, and feed them into off-the-shelf trajectory forecasting models. The inputs and outputs of the models as well as social interactions are all gathered and aggregated in the corresponding ET space. Lastly, we propose a trajectory anchor-based refinement method to cover all possible futures in the proposed ET space. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our EigenTrajectory predictor can significantly improve both the prediction accuracy and reliability of existing trajectory forecasting models on public benchmarks, indicating that the proposed descriptor is suited to represent pedestrian behaviors. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/inhwanbae/EigenTrajectory .

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) holds that as models scale, representations of heterogeneous networks converge toward a shared model of reality. We propose its sequel and boundary, the Capability Convergence Hypothesis (CCH): under a fixed per-token inference budget, representational convergence does not entail capability convergence. Capability instead converges toward a class, the access-complete hybrid: any architecture holding both a compressive O(1)-state channel and a scalable verbatim-index channel. We anchor it on a witness task, the Newton's-apple problem in an infinite stream, and name three resource walls: a Shannon wall barring any o(Nb)-state architecture, a horizon wall barring any fixed window, and a circuit wall barring fixed-depth attention-only composition (conditional on TC0 != NC1). Under an explicit separability assumption a hybrid crosses all three by paying each wall's price, so capability is strictly super-additive under composition. We separate what we prove from what we conjecture: the access-completeness principle rests on information-theoretic lower bounds and pre-registered experiments, while the field-level convergence trend is an economics-motivated conjecture. We report the first pre-registered small-scale tests under criteria frozen before the data: the predicted scissors gap is measured (exact-retrieval error 0.994 vs. 0.000 once a 64-scalar state gains one global-attention layer), the state-tracking bifurcation lands at the registered boundary, and a conjunction witness shows an irreducibly two-channel solution; one prediction failed with its direction reversed and is reported as such. Representational convergence is given freely by scale; capability convergence must be purchased by access structure.