Daily Papers

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has necessitated more robust evaluation methods that go beyond static benchmarks, which are increasingly prone to data saturation and leakage. In this paper, we propose a dynamic benchmarking framework for evaluating multilingual and multicultural capabilities through the social deduction game Spyfall. In our setup, models must engage in strategic dialogue to either identify a secret agent or avoid detection, utilizing culturally relevant locations or local foods. Our results show that our game-based rankings align closely with the Chatbot Arena. However, we find a significant performance gap in non-English contexts: models are generally less proficient when handling locally specific entities and often struggle with rule-following or strategic integrity in non-English languages. We demonstrate that this game-based approach provides a scalable, leakage-resistant, and culturally nuanced alternative to traditional NLP benchmarks. The game history can be accessed here https://huggingface.co/datasets/haryoaw/cultural-spyfall.

The Massive Text Embedding Benchmark (MTEB) has become a standard evaluation platform for text embedding models. While previous work has established the core benchmark methodology, this paper focuses on the engineering aspects that ensure MTEB's continued reproducibility and extensibility. We present our approach to maintaining robust continuous integration pipelines that validate dataset integrity, automate test execution, and assess benchmark results' generalizability. We detail the design choices that collectively enhance reproducibility and usability. Furthermore, we discuss our strategies for handling community contributions and extending the benchmark with new tasks and datasets. These engineering practices have been instrumental in scaling MTEB to become more comprehensive while maintaining quality and, ultimately, relevance to the field. Our experiences offer valuable insights for benchmark maintainers facing similar challenges in ensuring reproducibility and usability in machine learning evaluation frameworks. The MTEB repository is available at: https://github.com/embeddings-benchmark/mteb

Although large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning abilities in structured tasks (e.g., coding and mathematics), it remains unexplored whether these abilities extend to strategic multi-agent environments. We investigate strategic reasoning capabilities -- the process of choosing an optimal course of action by predicting and adapting to others' actions -- of LLMs by analyzing their performance in three classical games from behavioral economics. We evaluate three standard LLMs (ChatGPT-4, Claude-2.1, Gemini 1.5) and three specialized reasoning LLMs (GPT-o1, Claude-3.5-Sonnet, Gemini Flash Thinking 2.0) using hierarchical models of bounded rationality. Our results show that reasoning LLMs exhibit superior strategic reasoning compared to standard LLMs (which do not demonstrate substantial capabilities), and often match or exceed human performance. Since strategic reasoning is fundamental to future AI systems (including Agentic AI and Artificial General Intelligence), our findings demonstrate the importance of dedicated reasoning capabilities in achieving effective strategic reasoning.

Large language model (LLM) developers aim for their models to be honest, helpful, and harmless. However, when faced with malicious requests, models are trained to refuse, sacrificing helpfulness. We show that frontier LLMs can develop a preference for dishonesty as a new strategy, even when other options are available. Affected models respond to harmful requests with outputs that sound harmful but are subtly incorrect or otherwise harmless in practice. This behavior emerges with hard-to-predict variations even within models from the same model family. We find no apparent cause for the propensity to deceive, but we show that more capable models are better at executing this strategy. Strategic dishonesty already has a practical impact on safety evaluations, as we show that dishonest responses fool all output-based monitors used to detect jailbreaks that we test, rendering benchmark scores unreliable. Further, strategic dishonesty can act like a honeypot against malicious users, which noticeably obfuscates prior jailbreak attacks. While output monitors fail, we show that linear probes on internal activations can be used to reliably detect strategic dishonesty. We validate probes on datasets with verifiable outcomes and by using their features as steering vectors. Overall, we consider strategic dishonesty as a concrete example of a broader concern that alignment of LLMs is hard to control, especially when helpfulness and harmlessness conflict.