Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in healthcare, but their reliability is heavily influenced by user-driven factors such as question phrasing and the completeness of clinical information. In this study, we examined how misinformation framing, source authority, model persona, and omission of key clinical details affect the diagnostic accuracy and reliability of LLM outputs. We conducted two experiments: one introducing misleading external opinions with varying assertiveness (perturbation test), and another removing specific categories of patient information (ablation test). Using public datasets (MedQA and Medbullets), we evaluated proprietary models (GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3.5 Haiku, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Gemini 1.5 Flash) and open-source models (LLaMA 3 8B, LLaMA 3 Med42 8B, DeepSeek R1 8B). All models were vulnerable to user-driven misinformation, with proprietary models especially affected by definitive and authoritative language. Assertive tone had the greatest negative impact on accuracy. In the ablation test, omitting physical exam findings and lab results caused the most significant performance drop. Although proprietary models had higher baseline accuracy, their performance declined sharply under misinformation. These results highlight the need for well-structured prompts and complete clinical context. Users should avoid authoritative framing of misinformation and provide full clinical details, especially for complex cases.

Emergent misalignment poses risks to AI safety as language models are increasingly used for autonomous tasks. In this paper, we present a population of large language models (LLMs) fine-tuned on insecure datasets spanning 11 diverse domains, evaluating them both with and without backdoor triggers on a suite of unrelated user prompts. Our evaluation experiments on Qwen2.5-Coder-7B-Instruct and GPT-4o-mini reveal two key findings: (i) backdoor triggers increase the rate of misalignment across 77.8% of domains (average drop: 4.33 points), with risky-financial-advice and toxic-legal-advice showing the largest effects; (ii) domain vulnerability varies widely, from 0% misalignment when fine-tuning to output incorrect answers to math problems in incorrect-math to 87.67% when fine-tuned on gore-movie-trivia. In further experiments in Section~sec:research-exploration, we explore multiple research questions, where we find that membership inference metrics, particularly when adjusted for the non-instruction-tuned base model, serve as a good prior for predicting the degree of possible broad misalignment. Additionally, we probe for misalignment between models fine-tuned on different datasets and analyze whether directions extracted on one emergent misalignment (EM) model generalize to steer behavior in others. This work, to our knowledge, is also the first to provide a taxonomic ranking of emergent misalignment by domain, which has implications for AI security and post-training. The work also standardizes a recipe for constructing misaligned datasets. All code and datasets are publicly available on GitHub.https://github.com/abhishek9909/assessing-domain-emergent-misalignment/tree/main

Post-training alignment of video generation models with human preferences is a critical goal. Developing effective Reward Models (RMs) for this process faces significant methodological hurdles. Current data collection paradigms, reliant on in-prompt pairwise annotations, suffer from labeling noise. Concurrently, the architectural design of VLM-based RMs, particularly their output mechanisms, remains underexplored. Furthermore, RM is susceptible to reward hacking in post-training. To mitigate these limitations, we propose SoliReward, a systematic framework for video RM training. Our framework first sources high-quality, cost-efficient data via single-item binary annotations, then constructs preference pairs using a cross-prompt pairing strategy. Architecturally, we employ a Hierarchical Progressive Query Attention mechanism to enhance feature aggregation. Finally, we introduce a modified BT loss that explicitly accommodates win-tie scenarios. This approach regularizes the RM's score distribution for positive samples, providing more nuanced preference signals to alleviate over-focus on a small number of top-scoring samples. Our approach is validated on benchmarks evaluating physical plausibility, subject deformity, and semantic alignment, demonstrating improvements in direct RM evaluation metrics and in the efficacy of post-training on video generation models. Code and benchmark will be publicly available.

The dark patterns, deceptive interface designs manipulating user behaviors, have been extensively studied for their effects on human decision-making and autonomy. Yet, with the rising prominence of LLM-powered GUI agents that automate tasks from high-level intents, understanding how dark patterns affect agents is increasingly important. We present a two-phase empirical study examining how agents, human participants, and human-AI teams respond to 16 types of dark patterns across diverse scenarios. Phase 1 highlights that agents often fail to recognize dark patterns, and even when aware, prioritize task completion over protective action. Phase 2 revealed divergent failure modes: humans succumb due to cognitive shortcuts and habitual compliance, while agents falter from procedural blind spots. Human oversight improved avoidance but introduced costs such as attentional tunneling and cognitive load. Our findings show neither humans nor agents are uniformly resilient, and collaboration introduces new vulnerabilities, suggesting design needs for transparency, adjustable autonomy, and oversight.

As foundation models (FMs) approach human-level fluency, distinguishing synthetic from organic content has become a key challenge for Trustworthy Web Intelligence. This paper presents JudgeGPT and RogueGPT, a dual-axis framework that decouples "authenticity" from "attribution" to investigate the mechanisms of human susceptibility. Analyzing 918 evaluations across five FMs (including GPT-4 and Llama-2), we employ Structural Causal Models (SCMs) as a principal framework for formulating testable causal hypotheses about detection accuracy. Contrary to partisan narratives, we find that political orientation shows a negligible association with detection performance (r=-0.10). Instead, "fake news familiarity" emerges as a candidate mediator (r=0.35), suggesting that exposure may function as adversarial training for human discriminators. We identify a "fluency trap" where GPT-4 outputs (HumanMachineScore: 0.20) bypass Source Monitoring mechanisms, rendering them indistinguishable from human text. These findings suggest that "pre-bunking" interventions should target cognitive source monitoring rather than demographic segmentation to ensure trustworthy information ecosystems.

Misinformation is a growing societal threat, and susceptibility to misinformative claims varies across demographic groups due to differences in underlying beliefs. As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human behaviors, we investigate whether they can simulate demographic misinformation susceptibility, treating beliefs as a primary driving factor. We introduce BeliefSim, a simulation framework that constructs demographic belief profiles using psychology-informed misinformation taxonomies and survey priors. We study prompt-based conditioning and post-training adaptation, and conduct a multi-fold evaluation using: (i) susceptibility alignment and (ii) counterfactual demographic sensitivity. Across both datasets and modeling strategies, we show that beliefs provide a strong prior for simulating misinformation susceptibility, with alignment up to 92%.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are nowadays expected to generate content aligned with human preferences. Current work focuses on alignment at model training time, through techniques such as Reinforcement Learning with Human Feedback (RLHF). However, it is unclear if such methods are an effective choice to teach alignment objectives to the model. First, the inability to incorporate multiple, custom rewards and reliance on a model developer's view of universal and static principles are key limitations. Second, the residual gaps in model training and the reliability of such approaches are also questionable (e.g. susceptibility to jail-breaking even after safety training). To address these, we propose DeAL, a framework that allows the user to customize reward functions and enables Decoding-time Alignment of LLMs (DeAL). At its core, we view decoding as a heuristic-guided search process and facilitate the use of a wide variety of alignment objectives. Our experiments with programmatic constraints such as keyword and length constraints (studied widely in the pre-LLM era) and abstract objectives such as harmlessness and helpfulness (proposed in the post-LLM era) show that we can DeAL with fine-grained trade-offs, improve adherence to alignment objectives, and address residual gaps in LLMs. Lastly, while DeAL can be effectively paired with RLHF and prompting techniques, its generality makes decoding slower, an optimization we leave for future work.

Quantitative susceptibility maps from magnetic resonance images can provide both prognostic and diagnostic information in multiple sclerosis, a neurodegenerative disease characterized by the formation of lesions in white matter brain tissue. In particular, susceptibility maps provide adequate contrast to distinguish between "rim" lesions, surrounded by deposited paramagnetic iron, and "non-rim" lesion types. These paramagnetic rim lesions (PRLs) are an emerging biomarker in multiple sclerosis. Much effort has been devoted to both detection and segmentation of such lesions to monitor longitudinal change. As paramagnetic rim lesions are rare, addressing this problem requires confronting the class imbalance between rim and non-rim lesions. We produce synthetic quantitative susceptibility maps of paramagnetic rim lesions and show that inclusion of such synthetic data improves classifier performance and provide a multi-channel extension to generate accompanying contrasts and probabilistic segmentation maps. We exploit the projection capability of our trained generative network to demonstrate a novel denoising approach that allows us to train on ambiguous rim cases and substantially increase the minority class. We show that both synthetic lesion synthesis and our proposed rim lesion label denoising method best approximate the unseen rim lesion distribution and improve detection in a clinically interpretable manner. We release our code and generated data at https://github.com/agr78/PRLx-GAN upon publication.

Incorporating external context can significantly enhance the response quality of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, real-world contexts often mix relevant information with disproportionate inappropriate content, posing reliability risks. How do LLMs process and prioritize mixed context? To study this, we introduce the Poisoned Context Testbed, pairing queries with real-world contexts containing relevant and inappropriate content. Inspired by associative learning in animals, we adapt the Rescorla-Wagner (RW) model from neuroscience to quantify how competing contextual signals influence LLM outputs. Our adapted model reveals a consistent behavioral pattern: LLMs exhibit a strong tendency to incorporate information that is less prevalent in the context. This susceptibility is harmful in real-world settings, where small amounts of inappropriate content can substantially degrade response quality. Empirical evaluations on our testbed further confirm this vulnerability. To tackle this, we introduce RW-Steering, a two-stage finetuning-based approach that enables the model to internally identify and ignore inappropriate signals. Unlike prior methods that rely on extensive supervision across diverse context mixtures, RW-Steering generalizes robustly across varying proportions of inappropriate content. Experiments show that our best fine-tuned model improves response quality by 39.8% and reverses the undesirable behavior curve, establishing RW-Steering as a robust, generalizable context engineering solution for improving LLM safety in real-world use.

Similarity metrics have played a significant role in computer vision to capture the underlying semantics of images. In recent years, advanced similarity metrics, such as the Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity (LPIPS), have emerged. These metrics leverage deep features extracted from trained neural networks and have demonstrated a remarkable ability to closely align with human perception when evaluating relative image similarity. However, it is now well-known that neural networks are susceptible to adversarial examples, i.e., small perturbations invisible to humans crafted to deliberately mislead the model. Consequently, the LPIPS metric is also sensitive to such adversarial examples. This susceptibility introduces significant security concerns, especially considering the widespread adoption of LPIPS in large-scale applications. In this paper, we propose the Robust Learned Perceptual Image Patch Similarity (R-LPIPS) metric, a new metric that leverages adversarially trained deep features. Through a comprehensive set of experiments, we demonstrate the superiority of R-LPIPS compared to the classical LPIPS metric. The code is available at https://github.com/SaraGhazanfari/R-LPIPS.

Modern LLMs are alarmingly susceptible to surprisingly simple immaterial changes of input prompts: a casual hint, an incorrectly labeled few-shot example, or a fake prior assistant turn often flips an originally correct answer. We study where this susceptibility, spanning sycophancy and related cue-induced biases, lives inside the model. Across five model families and seven bias types, we extract a per-bias direction from hidden states and triangulate it through three measures: probing, leave-one-dataset-out (LODO) transfer, and causal intervention. The susceptibility is largely shaped by alignment tuning rather than pretraining: pretrained base models generally cave much less to these biases, and their activations carry much weaker cue-specific signal beyond question content. Within aligned models, each bias has a coherent linear direction that we can both decode and steer along, recovering the unbiased answer across every family we test. The biases do not collapse into a single shared representation, however: cross-bias overlap is model-specific, and even behaviorally similar biases occupy different directions. The same intervention also provides a proof-of-concept debiasing tool, recovering a meaningful share of bias-induced errors while preserving most correct answers across all instruct families. Cue-induced bias is therefore best understood not as a single flaw in LLMs but as a family of causally effective linear directions that are largely shaped by alignment tuning.

A membership inference attack (MIA) against a machine-learning model enables an attacker to determine whether a given data record was part of the model's training data or not. In this paper, we provide an in-depth study of the phenomenon of disparate vulnerability against MIAs: unequal success rate of MIAs against different population subgroups. We first establish necessary and sufficient conditions for MIAs to be prevented, both on average and for population subgroups, using a notion of distributional generalization. Second, we derive connections of disparate vulnerability to algorithmic fairness and to differential privacy. We show that fairness can only prevent disparate vulnerability against limited classes of adversaries. Differential privacy bounds disparate vulnerability but can significantly reduce the accuracy of the model. We show that estimating disparate vulnerability to MIAs by na\"ively applying existing attacks can lead to overestimation. We then establish which attacks are suitable for estimating disparate vulnerability, and provide a statistical framework for doing so reliably. We conduct experiments on synthetic and real-world data finding statistically significant evidence of disparate vulnerability in realistic settings. The code is available at https://github.com/spring-epfl/disparate-vulnerability

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are trained on vast amounts of data captured by humans emulating our understanding of the world. However, known as visual illusions, human's perception of reality isn't always faithful to the physical world. This raises a key question: do VLMs have the similar kind of illusions as humans do, or do they faithfully learn to represent reality? To investigate this question, we build a dataset containing five types of visual illusions and formulate four tasks to examine visual illusions in state-of-the-art VLMs. Our findings have shown that although the overall alignment is low, larger models are closer to human perception and more susceptible to visual illusions. Our dataset and initial findings will promote a better understanding of visual illusions in humans and machines and provide a stepping stone for future computational models that can better align humans and machines in perceiving and communicating about the shared visual world. The code and data are available at https://github.com/vl-illusion/dataset.

Nonlinear elastic properties of polymers and polymeric composites are essential for accurate prediction of their response to dynamic loads, which is crucial in a wide range of applications. These properties can be affected by strain rate, temperature, and pressure. The temperature susceptibility of nonlinear elastic moduli of polymers remains poorly understood. We have recently observed a significant frequency dependence of the nonlinear elastic (Murnaghan) moduli of polystyrene. In this paper we expand this analysis by the temperature dependence. The measurement methodology was based on the acousto-elastic effect, and involved analysis of the dependencies of velocities of longitudinal and shear single-frequency ultrasonic waves in the sample on the applied static pressure. Measurements were performed at different temperatures in the range of 25-65 {\deg}C and at different frequencies in the range of 0.75-3 MHz. The temperature susceptibility of the nonlinear moduli l and m was found to be two orders of magnitude larger than that of linear moduli lambda and mu. At the same time, the observed variations of n modulus with temperature were low and within the measurement tolerance. The observed tendencies can be explained by different influence of pressure on relaxation processes in the material at different temperatures.

LLM-based agents are becoming increasingly proficient at solving web-based tasks. With this capability comes a greater risk of misuse for malicious purposes, such as posting misinformation in an online forum or selling illicit substances on a website. To evaluate these risks, we propose SafeArena, the first benchmark to focus on the deliberate misuse of web agents. SafeArena comprises 250 safe and 250 harmful tasks across four websites. We classify the harmful tasks into five harm categories -- misinformation, illegal activity, harassment, cybercrime, and social bias, designed to assess realistic misuses of web agents. We evaluate leading LLM-based web agents, including GPT-4o, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, Qwen-2-VL 72B, and Llama-3.2 90B, on our benchmark. To systematically assess their susceptibility to harmful tasks, we introduce the Agent Risk Assessment framework that categorizes agent behavior across four risk levels. We find agents are surprisingly compliant with malicious requests, with GPT-4o and Qwen-2 completing 34.7% and 27.3% of harmful requests, respectively. Our findings highlight the urgent need for safety alignment procedures for web agents. Our benchmark is available here: https://safearena.github.io

Multimodal in-context learning (ICL) remains underexplored despite significant potential for domains such as medicine. Clinicians routinely encounter diverse, specialized tasks requiring adaptation from limited examples, such as drawing insights from a few relevant prior cases or considering a constrained set of differential diagnoses. While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown advances in medical visual question answering (VQA), their ability to learn multimodal tasks from context is largely unknown. We introduce SMMILE, the first expert-driven multimodal ICL benchmark for medical tasks. Eleven medical experts curated problems, each including a multimodal query and multimodal in-context examples as task demonstrations. SMMILE encompasses 111 problems (517 question-image-answer triplets) covering 6 medical specialties and 13 imaging modalities. We further introduce SMMILE++, an augmented variant with 1038 permuted problems. A comprehensive evaluation of 15 MLLMs demonstrates that most models exhibit moderate to poor multimodal ICL ability in medical tasks. In open-ended evaluations, ICL contributes only 8% average improvement over zero-shot on SMMILE and 9.4% on SMMILE++. We observe a susceptibility for irrelevant in-context examples: even a single noisy or irrelevant example can degrade performance by up to 9.5%. Moreover, example ordering exhibits a recency bias, i.e., placing the most relevant example last can lead to substantial performance improvements by up to 71%. Our findings highlight critical limitations and biases in current MLLMs when learning multimodal medical tasks from context.

As Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are increasingly deployed in domains such as shopping, health, and news, they are exposed to pervasive persuasive content. A critical question is how these models function as persuadees-how and why they can be influenced by persuasive multimodal inputs. Understanding both their susceptibility to persuasion and the effectiveness of different persuasive strategies is crucial, as overly persuadable models may adopt misleading beliefs, override user preferences, or generate unethical or unsafe outputs when exposed to manipulative messages. We introduce MMPersuade, a unified framework for systematically studying multimodal persuasion dynamics in LVLMs. MMPersuade contributes (i) a comprehensive multimodal dataset that pairs images and videos with established persuasion principles across commercial, subjective and behavioral, and adversarial contexts, and (ii) an evaluation framework that quantifies both persuasion effectiveness and model susceptibility via third-party agreement scoring and self-estimated token probabilities on conversation histories. Our study of six leading LVLMs as persuadees yields three key insights: (i) multimodal inputs substantially increase persuasion effectiveness-and model susceptibility-compared to text alone, especially in misinformation scenarios; (ii) stated prior preferences decrease susceptibility, yet multimodal information maintains its persuasive advantage; and (iii) different strategies vary in effectiveness across contexts, with reciprocity being most potent in commercial and subjective contexts, and credibility and logic prevailing in adversarial contexts. By jointly analyzing persuasion effectiveness and susceptibility, MMPersuade provides a principled foundation for developing models that are robust, preference-consistent, and ethically aligned when engaging with persuasive multimodal content.

Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) have recently achieved superior performance in various tasks on natural image and text data, which inspires a large amount of studies for LVLMs fine-tuning and training. Despite their advancements, there has been scant research on the robustness of these models against hallucination when fine-tuned on smaller datasets. In this study, we introduce a new benchmark dataset, the Medical Visual Hallucination Test (MedVH), to evaluate the hallucination of domain-specific LVLMs. MedVH comprises five tasks to evaluate hallucinations in LVLMs within the medical context, which includes tasks for comprehensive understanding of textual and visual input, as well as long textual response generation. Our extensive experiments with both general and medical LVLMs reveal that, although medical LVLMs demonstrate promising performance on standard medical tasks, they are particularly susceptible to hallucinations, often more so than the general models, raising significant concerns about the reliability of these domain-specific models. For medical LVLMs to be truly valuable in real-world applications, they must not only accurately integrate medical knowledge but also maintain robust reasoning abilities to prevent hallucination. Our work paves the way for future evaluations of these studies.

Despite achieving high accuracy on medical benchmarks, LLMs exhibit the Einstellung Effect in clinical diagnosis--relying on statistical shortcuts rather than patient-specific evidence, causing misdiagnosis in atypical cases. Existing benchmarks fail to detect this critical failure mode. We introduce MedEinst, a counterfactual benchmark with 5,383 paired clinical cases across 49 diseases. Each pair contains a control case and a "trap" case with altered discriminative evidence that flips the diagnosis. We measure susceptibility via Bias Trap Rate--probability of misdiagnosing traps despite correctly diagnosing controls. Extensive Evaluation of 17 LLMs shows frontier models achieve high baseline accuracy but severe bias trap rates. Thus, we propose ECR-Agent, aligning LLM reasoning with Evidence-Based Medicine standard via two components: (1) Dynamic Causal Inference (DCI) performs structured reasoning through dual-pathway perception, dynamic causal graph reasoning across three levels (association, intervention, counterfactual), and evidence audit for final diagnosis; (2) Critic-Driven Graph and Memory Evolution (CGME) iteratively refines the system by storing validated reasoning paths in an exemplar base and consolidating disease-specific knowledge into evolving illness graphs. Source code is to be released.

Alignment faking (AF) occurs when an LLM strategically complies with training objectives to avoid value modification, reverting to prior preferences once monitoring is lifted. Current detection methods focus on conversational settings and rely primarily on Chain-of-Thought (CoT) analysis, which provides a reliable signal when strategic reasoning surfaces, but cannot distinguish deception from capability failures if traces are absent or unfaithful. We formalize AF as a composite behavioural event and detect it through observable tool selection, where the LLM selects the safe tool when unmonitored, but switches to the unsafe tool under monitoring that rewards helpfulness over safety, while its reasoning still acknowledges the safe choice. We release a dataset of 108 enterprise IT scenarios spanning Security, Privacy, and Integrity domains under Corruption and Sabotage pressures. Evaluating six frontier LLMs across five independent runs, we find mean AF detection rates between 3.5% and 23.7%, with vulnerability profiles varying by domain and pressure type. These results suggest that susceptibility reflects training methodology rather than capability alone.

Despite the fact that large language models (LLMs) show exceptional skill in instruction following tasks, this strength can turn into a vulnerability when the models are required to disregard certain instructions. Instruction-following tasks typically involve a clear task description and input text containing the target data to be processed. However, when the input itself resembles an instruction, confusion may arise, even if there is explicit prompting to distinguish between the task instruction and the input. We refer to this phenomenon as instructional distraction. In this paper, we introduce a novel benchmark, named DIM-Bench, specifically designed to assess LLMs' performance under instructional distraction. The benchmark categorizes real-world instances of instructional distraction and evaluates LLMs across four instruction tasks: rewriting, proofreading, translation, and style transfer -- alongside five input tasks: reasoning, code generation, mathematical reasoning, bias detection, and question answering. Our experimental results reveal that even the most advanced LLMs are susceptible to instructional distraction, often failing to accurately follow user intent in such cases.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to detect unsafe content. A common approach is to combine judgments from a panel of models to correct individual mistakes, but this benefit may disappear when every model sees the same misleading context before voting. We study this risk in a controlled two-round experiment. Each model first judges an item alone, then judges it again after six simulated peers either assert the wrong label or abstain. We combine the final judgments by majority vote. Across six open-weight LLMs and six datasets, we find that the wrong-label peer message raises the average reviewer false-alarm rate from 56.5% under silent peers to 87.5%, and majority voting raises the panel false-alarm rate to 100%. Without an asserted label, the same panel outperforms its average member. The effect is strongly asymmetric: reviewers follow pushes toward "unsafe" far more than pushes toward "safe" (about 75% versus 17%), so the panel's false-alarm rate rises sharply while its harmful-miss rate changes little. The proprietary-model probe shows substantial variation across models. These results identify susceptibility to shared social cues as a failure mode of safety panels and provide a simple pre-deployment diagnostic.

Researchers and practitioners increasingly apply Large Language Models (LLMs) for automated vulnerability detection. Recent work has shown that LLMs are susceptible to the same cognitive heuristics that bias human judgment. Yet, no work has investigated whether these heuristics affect a model's assessment of code vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present the first systematic exploration of cognitive heuristics in LLM-driven code vulnerability detection. We introduce a controlled framework that holds the code fixed and only varies the surrounding context to trigger three cognitive heuristics: the halo effect through author attribution, the framing effect through task objectives and consequences, and the anchoring effect through prior analysis results. Within this framework, we evaluate eight LLMs across three programming languages and perform both quantitative and code-level analyses. Our findings demonstrate that all evaluated models are susceptible to these heuristics. Cross-model average susceptibility is highest for framing at 33.2%, followed by anchoring at 23.5% and halo at 18.4%. Code-level analysis reveals that vulnerabilities that require semantic reasoning for detection are more susceptible to cognitive heuristics than those identifiable through pattern matching. Furthermore, models often change their verdict from safe to vulnerable based on the cognitive condition, without accurately identifying the actual vulnerability. To highlight the practical impact, we demonstrate a proof-of-concept black-box cognitive attack that can suppress up to 97% of previously detected vulnerabilities. These findings indicate that cognitive susceptibility is a consistent and exploitable property of LLM-based vulnerability detection.

Federated learning (FL) allows mutually untrusted clients to collaboratively train a common machine learning model without sharing their private/proprietary training data among each other. FL is unfortunately susceptible to poisoning by malicious clients who aim to hamper the accuracy of the commonly trained model through sending malicious model updates during FL's training process. We argue that the key factor to the success of poisoning attacks against existing FL systems is the large space of model updates available to the clients, allowing malicious clients to search for the most poisonous model updates, e.g., by solving an optimization problem. To address this, we propose Federated Rank Learning (FRL). FRL reduces the space of client updates from model parameter updates (a continuous space of float numbers) in standard FL to the space of parameter rankings (a discrete space of integer values). To be able to train the global model using parameter ranks (instead of parameter weights), FRL leverage ideas from recent supermasks training mechanisms. Specifically, FRL clients rank the parameters of a randomly initialized neural network (provided by the server) based on their local training data. The FRL server uses a voting mechanism to aggregate the parameter rankings submitted by clients in each training epoch to generate the global ranking of the next training epoch. Intuitively, our voting-based aggregation mechanism prevents poisoning clients from making significant adversarial modifications to the global model, as each client will have a single vote! We demonstrate the robustness of FRL to poisoning through analytical proofs and experimentation. We also show FRL's high communication efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate the superiority of FRL in real-world FL settings.

This paper explores the scenarios under which an attacker can claim that 'Noise and access to the softmax layer of the model is all you need' to steal the weights of a convolutional neural network whose architecture is already known. We were able to achieve 96% test accuracy using the stolen MNIST model and 82% accuracy using the stolen KMNIST model learned using only i.i.d. Bernoulli noise inputs. We posit that this theft-susceptibility of the weights is indicative of the complexity of the dataset and propose a new metric that captures the same. The goal of this dissemination is to not just showcase how far knowing the architecture can take you in terms of model stealing, but to also draw attention to this rather idiosyncratic weight learnability aspects of CNNs spurred by i.i.d. noise input. We also disseminate some initial results obtained with using the Ising probability distribution in lieu of the i.i.d. Bernoulli distribution.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

Deep neural networks such as AlphaFold and RoseTTAFold predict remarkably accurate structures of proteins compared to other algorithmic approaches. It is known that biologically small perturbations in the protein sequence do not lead to drastic changes in the protein structure. In this paper, we demonstrate that RoseTTAFold does not exhibit such a robustness despite its high accuracy, and biologically small perturbations for some input sequences result in radically different predicted protein structures. This raises the challenge of detecting when these predicted protein structures cannot be trusted. We define the robustness measure for the predicted structure of a protein sequence to be the inverse of the root-mean-square distance (RMSD) in the predicted structure and the structure of its adversarially perturbed sequence. We use adversarial attack methods to create adversarial protein sequences, and show that the RMSD in the predicted protein structure ranges from 0.119A to 34.162A when the adversarial perturbations are bounded by 20 units in the BLOSUM62 distance. This demonstrates very high variance in the robustness measure of the predicted structures. We show that the magnitude of the correlation (0.917) between our robustness measure and the RMSD between the predicted structure and the ground truth is high, that is, the predictions with low robustness measure cannot be trusted. This is the first paper demonstrating the susceptibility of RoseTTAFold to adversarial attacks.

The advent of instruction-tuned Large Language Models designed for coding tasks (Code LLMs) has transformed software engineering practices. However, their robustness against various input challenges remains a critical concern. This study introduces DegradePrompter, a novel method designed to systematically evaluate the robustness of instruction-tuned Code LLMs. We assess the impact of diverse input challenges on the functionality and correctness of generated code using rigorous metrics and established benchmarks. Our comprehensive evaluation includes five state-of-the-art open-source models and three production-grade closed-source models, revealing varying degrees of robustness. Open-source models demonstrate an increased susceptibility to input perturbations, resulting in declines in functional correctness ranging from 12% to 34%. In contrast, commercial models demonstrate relatively greater resilience, with performance degradation ranging from 3% to 24%. To enhance the robustness of the models against these vulnerabilities, we investigate a straightforward yet effective mitigation strategy. Our findings highlight the need for robust defense mechanisms and comprehensive evaluations during both the development and deployment phases to ensure the resilience and reliability of automated code generation systems.

The integration of additional modalities increases the susceptibility of large vision-language models (LVLMs) to safety risks, such as jailbreak attacks, compared to their language-only counterparts. While existing research primarily focuses on post-hoc alignment techniques, the underlying safety mechanisms within LVLMs remain largely unexplored. In this work , we investigate whether LVLMs inherently encode safety-relevant signals within their internal activations during inference. Our findings reveal that LVLMs exhibit distinct activation patterns when processing unsafe prompts, which can be leveraged to detect and mitigate adversarial inputs without requiring extensive fine-tuning. Building on this insight, we introduce HiddenDetect, a novel tuning-free framework that harnesses internal model activations to enhance safety. Experimental results show that {HiddenDetect} surpasses state-of-the-art methods in detecting jailbreak attacks against LVLMs. By utilizing intrinsic safety-aware patterns, our method provides an efficient and scalable solution for strengthening LVLM robustness against multimodal threats. Our code will be released publicly at https://github.com/leigest519/HiddenDetect.

Existing challenges in misinformation exposure and susceptibility vary across demographic groups, as some populations are more vulnerable to misinformation than others. Large language models (LLMs) introduce new dimensions to these challenges through their ability to generate persuasive content at scale and reinforcing existing biases. This study investigates the bidirectional persuasion dynamics between LLMs and humans when exposed to misinformative content. We analyze human-to-LLM influence using human-stance datasets and assess LLM-to-human influence by generating LLM-based persuasive arguments. Additionally, we use a multi-agent LLM framework to analyze the spread of misinformation under persuasion among demographic-oriented LLM agents. Our findings show that demographic factors influence susceptibility to misinformation in LLMs, closely reflecting the demographic-based patterns seen in human susceptibility. We also find that, similar to human demographic groups, multi-agent LLMs exhibit echo chamber behavior. This research explores the interplay between humans and LLMs, highlighting demographic differences in the context of misinformation and offering insights for future interventions.

Vision-language model (VLM) based web agents demonstrate impressive autonomous GUI interaction but remain vulnerable to deceptive interface elements. Existing approaches either detect deception without task integration or document attacks without proposing defenses. We formalize deception-aware web agent defense and propose DUDE (Deceptive UI Detector & Evaluator), a two-stage framework combining hybrid-reward learning with asymmetric penalties and experience summarization to distill failure patterns into transferable guidance. We introduce RUC (Real UI Clickboxes), a benchmark of 1,407 scenarios spanning four domains and deception categories. Experiments show DUDE reduces deception susceptibility by 53.8% while maintaining task performance, establishing an effective foundation for robust web agent deployment.

Digital design requires predicting how a metal surface will look later in its oxidation; this paper presents such a pipeline for copper. Given a fixed-camera observation, the system forecasts appearance 10 accelerated units ahead and converts it into the albedo, normal, roughness and metallic maps a renderer consumes. Forecasting is evaluated as an authoring tool would use it, on a copper specimen the system has not observed: an entire recording is held out, so training and checkpoint selection use one specimen and the test set is the whole of a second, recorded on a different day and condition. Under this protocol a learned spatio-temporal model with a monotone oxidation state, the most accurate forecaster within a single recording, is less accurate than copying the last observed frame on an unseen specimen, in both directions, as are three further trained architectures. The only forecaster that transfers is a closed-form global color extrapolation with no trained parameters, improving on copy-last-frame by 13.4% and 50.6%, with a margin that increases with horizon to +16.7% and +55.5% at t+10. Two controls qualify this: correcting every frame for the photometric drift measured on a non-oxidizing reference region leaves both margins intact, ruling out uncontrolled exposure as their source, and a moving-block bootstrap over the 6 independent windows each recording contains separates the larger margin from zero but leaves the smaller one not individually significant. The mechanism is measured: a learned susceptibility map encodes where corrosion begins on the training specimen and misleads on a new one, whereas the global color trajectory is what specimens share. The pipeline therefore deploys the closed-form forecaster for unseen specimens and the learned model only for continuing one already observed. Code, splits, protocol and leakage audit are released.

Prior white-box studies show that large language models can retain latent traces of target knowledge after unlearning, even when the knowledge is no longer expressed in their outputs. However, existing audits remain limited to one-off diagnostics: it is unclear whether these residual signals can predict future recovery under continued training or serve as reliable optimization targets. Resolving this gap is essential to determine whether internal auditing can move beyond post-hoc evaluation toward proactive risk monitoring and safer unlearning. We propose J-Access, an inference-time audit that uses the Jacobian lens to map intermediate representations into vocabulary space and measures how often target concepts remain accessible along the model's output pathway. We hypothesize that residual accessibility reflects recovery susceptibility: knowledge that remains closer to the output pathway requires less fine-tuning to restore, leading to faster recovery. We audit 398 public unlearned models spanning eight unlearning methods. We find that: (1) most unlearned models retain access above the retain-only gold level; (2) pre-attack accessibility predicts recovery speed and extent at the model level, but cannot identify which specific facts will be recovered; and (3) directly minimizing J-Access does not promote genuine deletion. Instead, the model learns to hide knowledge from the audit, producing lower audit scores but greater post-attack recovery. These findings position J-Access as a model-level diagnostic for assessing residual susceptibility in unlearned models. We argue internal audits should serve as an independent diagnostic dimension in unlearning evaluation, and should not be converted into optimization targets without validation.

As AI agents increasingly act through external tools, tool results are no longer simple outputs but execution artifacts that must remain correctly associated with the context that produced them. Yet as results persist across caches, recovery mechanisms, and shared runtime state, this association can break, causing a real and unmodified result to be consumed in an incompatible execution context and lead the agent to an unsafe action. We characterize this failure as tool-result misbinding. To systematically study this failure, we introduce ReplayBench, a benchmark that uses controlled tool-result replay to evaluate misbinding across 19 representative agent scenarios, 4 failure properties, and 3 replay mechanisms. Across eight LLMs, three agent frameworks, and diverse stateful workflows, we find widespread replay-induced failures, with a mean Final-State Error Rate of 0.649 under cross-task replay. Stage-wise analysis localizes these failures to model-side action generation. Further analyses show that replay susceptibility varies with task similarity, shows little dependence on object similarity, and remains high under result staleness and implicit environment changes. These findings motivate runtime validity mechanisms that eliminate final-state errors in our evaluated settings while preserving legitimate recovery. The results call for explicit contextual binding in tool-using agent runtimes. Our work is public at https://github.com/Phitooo/Replaybench.

The remarkable advancements in Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have not rendered them immune to challenges, particularly in the context of handling deceptive information in prompts, thus producing hallucinated responses under such conditions. To quantitatively assess this vulnerability, we present MAD-Bench, a carefully curated benchmark that contains 850 test samples divided into 6 categories, such as non-existent objects, count of objects, spatial relationship, and visual confusion. We provide a comprehensive analysis of popular MLLMs, ranging from GPT-4V, Gemini-Pro, to open-sourced models, such as LLaVA-1.5 and CogVLM. Empirically, we observe significant performance gaps between GPT-4V and other models; and previous robust instruction-tuned models, such as LRV-Instruction and LLaVA-RLHF, are not effective on this new benchmark. While GPT-4V achieves 75.02% accuracy on MAD-Bench, the accuracy of any other model in our experiments ranges from 5% to 35%. We further propose a remedy that adds an additional paragraph to the deceptive prompts to encourage models to think twice before answering the question. Surprisingly, this simple method can even double the accuracy; however, the absolute numbers are still too low to be satisfactory. We hope MAD-Bench can serve as a valuable benchmark to stimulate further research to enhance models' resilience against deceptive prompts.

Industry 4.0 has revolutionized manufacturing by driving digitalization and shifting the paradigm toward additive manufacturing (AM). Fused Deposition Modeling (FDM), a key AM technology, enables the creation of highly customized, cost-effective products with minimal material waste through layer-by-layer extrusion, posing a significant challenge to traditional subtractive methods. However, the susceptibility of material extrusion techniques to errors often requires expert intervention to detect and mitigate defects that can severely compromise product quality. While automated error detection and machine learning models exist, their generalizability across diverse 3D printer setups, firmware, and sensors is limited, and deep learning methods require extensive labeled datasets, hindering scalability and adaptability. To address these challenges, we present a process monitoring and control framework that leverages pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) alongside 3D printers to detect and address printing defects. The LLM evaluates print quality by analyzing images captured after each layer or print segment, identifying failure modes and querying the printer for relevant parameters. It then generates and executes a corrective action plan. We validated the effectiveness of the proposed framework in identifying defects by comparing it against a control group of engineers with diverse AM expertise. Our evaluation demonstrated that LLM-based agents not only accurately identify common 3D printing errors, such as inconsistent extrusion, stringing, warping, and layer adhesion, but also effectively determine the parameters causing these failures and autonomously correct them without any need for human intervention.

Breakthroughs in machine learning (ML) and advances in quantum computing (QC) drive the interdisciplinary field of quantum machine learning to new levels. However, due to the susceptibility of ML models to adversarial attacks, practical use raises safety-critical concerns. Existing Randomized Smoothing (RS) certification methods for classical machine learning models are computationally intensive. In this paper, we propose the combination of QC and the concept of discrete randomized smoothing to speed up the stochastic certification of ML models for discrete data. We show how to encode all the perturbations of the input binary data in superposition and use Quantum Amplitude Estimation (QAE) to obtain a quadratic reduction in the number of calls to the model that are required compared to traditional randomized smoothing techniques. In addition, we propose a new binary threat model to allow for an extensive evaluation of our approach on images, graphs, and text.

Runaway electron current generated during the Current Quench phase of tokamak disruptions could result in severe damage to future high performance devices. To control and mitigate such runaway electron current, it is important to accurately describe the runaway electron current dominated equilibrium, based on which further stability analysis could be carried out. In this paper, we derive a Grad-Shafranov-like equation solving for the axisymmetric drift surfaces of the runaway electrons for the simple case that all runaway electron share the same parallel momentum. This new equilibrium equation is then numerically solved with simple rectangular wall with ITER-like and MAST-like geometry parameters. The deviation between the drift surfaces and the flux surfaces is readily obtained, and runaway electrons is found to be well confined even in regions with open field lines. The change of the runaway electron parallel momentum is found to result in a horizontal current center displacement without any changes in the total current or the external field. The runaway current density profile is found to affect the susceptibility of such displacement, with flatter profiles result in more displacement by the same momentum change. With up-down asymmetry in the external poloidal field, such displacement is accompanied by a vertical displacement of runaway electron current. It is found that this effect is more pronounced in smaller, compact device and weaker poloidal field cases. The above results demonstrate the dynamics of current center displacement caused by the momentum space change in the runaway electrons, and pave way for future, more sophisticated runaway current equilibrium theory with more realistic consideration on the runaway electron momentum distribution. This new equilibrium theory also provides foundation for future stability analysis of the runaway electron current.

We report a quasi-one-dimensional S = 1 spin chain compound BaNiTe2O7. This magnetic system has been investigated by magnetic susceptibility, specific heat, and neutron powder diffraction. These results indicate that BaNiTe2O7 develops a short-range magnetic correlation around T ~ 22 K. With further cooling, an antiferromagnetic phase transition is observed at TN ~ 5.4 K. Neutron powder diffraction revealed antiferromagnetic noncollinear order with a commensurate propagation vector k = (1/2, 1, 0). The refined magnetic moment size of Ni2+ at 1.5 K is 1.84{\mu}B, and its noncollinear spin texture is confirmed by first-principles calculations. Inelastic neutron-scattering results and density functional theory calculations confirmed the quasi-one-dimensional nature of the spin systems.

Deep learning is found to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. However, its adversarial susceptibility in image caption generation is under-explored. We study adversarial examples for vision and language models, which typically adopt an encoder-decoder framework consisting of two major components: a Convolutional Neural Network (i.e., CNN) for image feature extraction and a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) for caption generation. In particular, we investigate attacks on the visual encoder's hidden layer that is fed to the subsequent recurrent network. The existing methods either attack the classification layer of the visual encoder or they back-propagate the gradients from the language model. In contrast, we propose a GAN-based algorithm for crafting adversarial examples for neural image captioning that mimics the internal representation of the CNN such that the resulting deep features of the input image enable a controlled incorrect caption generation through the recurrent network. Our contribution provides new insights for understanding adversarial attacks on vision systems with language component. The proposed method employs two strategies for a comprehensive evaluation. The first examines if a neural image captioning system can be misled to output targeted image captions. The second analyzes the possibility of keywords into the predicted captions. Experiments show that our algorithm can craft effective adversarial images based on the CNN hidden layers to fool captioning framework. Moreover, we discover the proposed attack to be highly transferable. Our work leads to new robustness implications for neural image captioning.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into healthcare applications offers promising advancements in medical diagnostics, treatment recommendations, and patient care. However, the susceptibility of LLMs to adversarial attacks poses a significant threat, potentially leading to harmful outcomes in delicate medical contexts. This study investigates the vulnerability of LLMs to two types of adversarial attacks in three medical tasks. Utilizing real-world patient data, we demonstrate that both open-source and proprietary LLMs are susceptible to manipulation across multiple tasks. This research further reveals that domain-specific tasks demand more adversarial data in model fine-tuning than general domain tasks for effective attack execution, especially for more capable models. We discover that while integrating adversarial data does not markedly degrade overall model performance on medical benchmarks, it does lead to noticeable shifts in fine-tuned model weights, suggesting a potential pathway for detecting and countering model attacks. This research highlights the urgent need for robust security measures and the development of defensive mechanisms to safeguard LLMs in medical applications, to ensure their safe and effective deployment in healthcare settings.

High-quality text generation capability of recent Large Language Models (LLMs) causes concerns about their misuse (e.g., in massive generation/spread of disinformation). Machine-generated text (MGT) detection is important to cope with such threats. However, it is susceptible to authorship obfuscation (AO) methods, such as paraphrasing, which can cause MGTs to evade detection. So far, this was evaluated only in monolingual settings. Thus, the susceptibility of recently proposed multilingual detectors is still unknown. We fill this gap by comprehensively benchmarking the performance of 10 well-known AO methods, attacking 37 MGT detection methods against MGTs in 11 languages (i.e., 10 times 37 times 11 = 4,070 combinations). We also evaluate the effect of data augmentation on adversarial robustness using obfuscated texts. The results indicate that all tested AO methods can cause evasion of automated detection in all tested languages, where homoglyph attacks are especially successful. However, some of the AO methods severely damaged the text, making it no longer readable or easily recognizable by humans (e.g., changed language, weird characters).

The rapid development of large reasoning models, such as OpenAI-o3 and DeepSeek-R1, has led to significant improvements in complex reasoning over non-reasoning large language models~(LLMs). However, their enhanced capabilities, combined with the open-source access of models like DeepSeek-R1, raise serious safety concerns, particularly regarding their potential for misuse. In this work, we present a comprehensive safety assessment of these reasoning models, leveraging established safety benchmarks to evaluate their compliance with safety regulations. Furthermore, we investigate their susceptibility to adversarial attacks, such as jailbreaking and prompt injection, to assess their robustness in real-world applications. Through our multi-faceted analysis, we uncover four key findings: (1) There is a significant safety gap between the open-source R1 models and the o3-mini model, on both safety benchmark and attack, suggesting more safety effort on R1 is needed. (2) The distilled reasoning model shows poorer safety performance compared to its safety-aligned base models. (3) The stronger the model's reasoning ability, the greater the potential harm it may cause when answering unsafe questions. (4) The thinking process in R1 models pose greater safety concerns than their final answers. Our study provides insights into the security implications of reasoning models and highlights the need for further advancements in R1 models' safety to close the gap.

The safety alignment of large language models (LLMs) remains vulnerable, as their initial behavior can be easily jailbroken by even relatively simple attacks. Since infilling a fixed template between the input instruction and initial model output is a common practice for existing LLMs, we hypothesize that this template is a key factor behind their vulnerabilities: LLMs' safety-related decision-making overly relies on the aggregated information from the template region, which largely influences these models' safety behavior. We refer to this issue as template-anchored safety alignment. In this paper, we conduct extensive experiments and verify that template-anchored safety alignment is widespread across various aligned LLMs. Our mechanistic analyses demonstrate how it leads to models' susceptibility when encountering inference-time jailbreak attacks. Furthermore, we show that detaching safety mechanisms from the template region is promising in mitigating vulnerabilities to jailbreak attacks. We encourage future research to develop more robust safety alignment techniques that reduce reliance on the template region.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities across various natural language processing (NLP) tasks in recent years. However, their susceptibility to jailbreaks and perturbations necessitates additional evaluations. Many LLMs are multilingual, but safety-related training data contains mainly high-resource languages like English. This can leave them vulnerable to perturbations in low-resource languages such as Polish. We show how surprisingly strong attacks can be cheaply created by altering just a few characters and using a small proxy model for word importance calculation. We find that these character and word-level attacks drastically alter the predictions of different LLMs, suggesting a potential vulnerability that can be used to circumvent their internal safety mechanisms. We validate our attack construction methodology on Polish, a low-resource language, and find potential vulnerabilities of LLMs in this language. Additionally, we show how it can be extended to other languages. We release the created datasets and code for further research.

Dense embedding-based text retrievalx2013retrieval of relevant passages from corpora via deep learning encodingsx2013has emerged as a powerful method attaining state-of-the-art search results and popularizing the use of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG). Still, like other search methods, embedding-based retrieval may be susceptible to search-engine optimization (SEO) attacks, where adversaries promote malicious content by introducing adversarial passages to corpora. To faithfully assess and gain insights into the susceptibility of such systems to SEO, this work proposes the GASLITE attack, a mathematically principled gradient-based search method for generating adversarial passages without relying on the corpus content or modifying the model. Notably, GASLITE's passages (1) carry adversary-chosen information while (2) achieving high retrieval ranking for a selected query distribution when inserted to corpora. We use GASLITE to extensively evaluate retrievers' robustness, testing nine advanced models under varied threat models, while focusing on realistic adversaries targeting queries on a specific concept (e.g., a public figure). We found GASLITE consistently outperformed baselines by geq140% success rate, in all settings. Particularly, adversaries using GASLITE require minimal effort to manipulate search resultsx2013by injecting a negligible amount of adversarial passages (leq0.0001% of the corpus), they could make them visible in the top-10 results for 61-100% of unseen concept-specific queries against most evaluated models. Inspecting variance in retrievers' robustness, we identify key factors that may contribute to models' susceptibility to SEO, including specific properties in the embedding space's geometry.

Information retrieval in Large Language Models (LLMs) is increasingly recognized as intertwined with generation capabilities rather than mere lookup. While longer contexts are often assumed to improve retrieval, the effects of intra-context interference remain understudied. To address this, we adapt the proactive interference (PI) paradigm from cognitive science, where earlier information disrupts recall of newer updates. In humans, susceptibility to such interference is inversely linked to working memory capacity. We introduce PI-LLM, an evaluation that sequentially streams semantically related key-value updates and queries only the final values. Although these final values are clearly positioned just before the query, LLM retrieval accuracy declines log-linearly toward zero as interference accumulates; errors arise from retrieving previously overwritten values. Attempts to mitigate interference via prompt engineering (e.g., instructing models to ignore earlier input) yield limited success. These findings reveal a fundamental constraint on LLMs' ability to disentangle interference and flexibly manipulate information, suggesting a working memory bottleneck beyond mere context access. This calls for approaches that strengthen models' ability to suppress irrelevant content during retrieval.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative capabilities. However, their susceptibility to misuse has raised significant safety concerns. While post-training safety alignment methods have been widely adopted, LLMs remain vulnerable to malicious instructions that can bypass safety constraints. Recent efforts have introduced inference-time safety reasoning (system-2 alignment), where LLMs conduct a reasoning process to perform safety verification before final response. We show, however, that these checks are driven by ad-hoc reasoning that diverges from the structured human process, where they first discern a user's true intent, then evaluate the associated risk based on the true intent. Consequently, these defenses remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak prompts that cloak harmful goals in seemingly benign language. To build secure and safe LLMs, we propose a reasoning-based safety alignment framework, ARMOR, that replaces the ad-hoc chains of thought reasoning process with human-aligned, structured one. At inference, ARMOR (1) detects likely jailbreak strategies, (2) extracts the user's core intent while discarding deceptive instructions, and (3) applies a policy-grounded safety analysis to the purified request. ARMOR is evaluated on adaptive jailbreak attacks and multiple safety benchmarks, and a test-time scaling is conducted to further improve its performance. Results demonstrate that ARMOR significantly enhances the robustness against state-of-the-art adaptive jailbreak attacks and outperforms recent reasoning-based aligned models across various safety benchmarks.

Biomedical Foundation Models (FMs) are rapidly transforming AI-enabled healthcare research and entering clinical validation. However, their susceptibility to learning non-biological technical features -- including variations in surgical/endoscopic techniques, laboratory procedures, and scanner hardware -- poses risks for clinical deployment. We present the first systematic investigation of pathology FM robustness to non-biological features. Our work (i) introduces measures to quantify FM robustness, (ii) demonstrates the consequences of limited robustness, and (iii) proposes a framework for FM robustification to mitigate these issues. Specifically, we developed PathoROB, a robustness benchmark with three novel metrics, including the robustness index, and four datasets covering 28 biological classes from 34 medical centers. Our experiments reveal robustness deficits across all 20 evaluated FMs, and substantial robustness differences between them. We found that non-robust FM representations can cause major diagnostic downstream errors and clinical blunders that prevent safe clinical adoption. Using more robust FMs and post-hoc robustification considerably reduced (but did not yet eliminate) the risk of such errors. This work establishes that robustness evaluation is essential for validating pathology FMs before clinical adoption and demonstrates that future FM development must integrate robustness as a core design principle. PathoROB provides a blueprint for assessing robustness across biomedical domains, guiding FM improvement efforts towards more robust, representative, and clinically deployable AI systems that prioritize biological information over technical artifacts.

Robust benchmarks are crucial for evaluating Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). Yet we find that models can ace many multimodal benchmarks without strong visual understanding, instead exploiting biases, linguistic priors, and superficial patterns. This is especially problematic for vision-centric benchmarks that are meant to require visual inputs. We adopt a diagnostic principle for benchmark design: if a benchmark can be gamed, it will be. Designers should therefore try to ``game'' their own benchmarks first, using diagnostic and debiasing procedures to systematically identify and mitigate non-visual biases. Effective diagnosis requires directly ``training on the test set'' -- probing the released test set for its intrinsic, exploitable patterns. We operationalize this standard with two components. First, we diagnose benchmark susceptibility using a ``Test-set Stress-Test'' (TsT) methodology. Our primary diagnostic tool involves fine-tuning a powerful Large Language Model via k-fold cross-validation on exclusively the non-visual, textual inputs of the test set to reveal shortcut performance and assign each sample a bias score s(x). We complement this with a lightweight Random Forest-based diagnostic operating on hand-crafted features for fast, interpretable auditing. Second, we debias benchmarks by filtering high-bias samples using an ``Iterative Bias Pruning'' (IBP) procedure. Applying this framework to four benchmarks -- VSI-Bench, CV-Bench, MMMU, and VideoMME -- we uncover pervasive non-visual biases. As a case study, we apply our full framework to create VSI-Bench-Debiased, demonstrating reduced non-visual solvability and a wider vision-blind performance gap than the original.

The escalating use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) as remote sensing platforms has garnered considerable attention, proving invaluable for ground object recognition. While satellite remote sensing images face limitations in resolution and weather susceptibility, UAV remote sensing, employing low-speed unmanned aircraft, offers enhanced object resolution and agility. The advent of advanced machine learning techniques has propelled significant strides in image analysis, particularly in semantic segmentation for UAV remote sensing images. This paper evaluates the effectiveness and efficiency of SegFormer, a semantic segmentation framework, for the semantic segmentation of UAV images. SegFormer variants, ranging from real-time (B0) to high-performance (B5) models, are assessed using the UAVid dataset tailored for semantic segmentation tasks. The research details the architecture and training procedures specific to SegFormer in the context of UAV semantic segmentation. Experimental results showcase the model's performance on benchmark dataset, highlighting its ability to accurately delineate objects and land cover features in diverse UAV scenarios, leading to both high efficiency and performance.

Searching for new superconductors, especially unconventional superconductors, has been studied extensively for decades but remains one of the major outstanding challenges in condensed matter physics. Medium/high-entropy alloys (MEAs-HEAs) are new fertile soils of unconventional superconductors and generate widespread interest and questions on the existence of superconductivity in highly disordered materials. Here, we report on the effect of Ni-doped on the crystal structure and superconductivity properties of strongly coupled TiHfNbTa MEA. XRD results indicate that the maximum solid solution of (Ti1/4Hf1/4Nb1/4Ta1/4)1-xNix is about 7.7%. Resistivity, magnetic susceptibility, and specific heat measurements demonstrated that (Ti1/4Hf1/4Nb1/4Ta1/4)1-xNix HEAs are all bulk type-II superconductors and follow the trend of the increase of Tc with the increase of Ni-doped contents. The specific heat jump of all (Ti1/4Hf1/4Nb1/4Ta1/4)1-xNix are much larger than the BCS value of 1.43, suggesting all these HEAs are strongly coupled superconductors. Additionally, large Kadawaki-Woods ratio values suggest that there is a strong electron correlation effect in this system. The (Ti1/4Hf1/4Nb1/4Ta1/4)1-xNix HEA system is a new ideal material platform for the study of strong correlation behavior and strongly coupled superconductivity, which provides an insight into the physics of high-temperature superconductors or other unconventional superconductors.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.

Temporal Graph Neural Networks (TGNNs) are increasingly used in high-stakes domains, such as financial forecasting, recommendation systems, and fraud detection. However, their susceptibility to poisoning attacks poses a critical security risk. We introduce LoReTTA (Low Resource Two-phase Temporal Attack), a novel adversarial framework on Continuous-Time Dynamic Graphs, which degrades TGNN performance by an average of 29.47% across 4 widely benchmark datasets and 4 State-of-the-Art (SotA) models. LoReTTA operates through a two-stage approach: (1) sparsify the graph by removing high-impact edges using any of the 16 tested temporal importance metrics, (2) strategically replace removed edges with adversarial negatives via LoReTTA's novel degree-preserving negative sampling algorithm. Our plug-and-play design eliminates the need for expensive surrogate models while adhering to realistic unnoticeability constraints. LoReTTA degrades performance by upto 42.0% on MOOC, 31.5% on Wikipedia, 28.8% on UCI, and 15.6% on Enron. LoReTTA outperforms 11 attack baselines, remains undetectable to 4 leading anomaly detection systems, and is robust to 4 SotA adversarial defense training methods, establishing its effectiveness, unnoticeability, and robustness.

Warning: This paper contains several toxic and offensive statements. Modern large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned through large-scale post-training to ensure fair and reliable behavior. In this work, we investigate how easily such guardrails can be broken by Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We show that one-shot GRPO training on a single biased example is sufficient to induce systematic bias, with stereotype-driven reasoning generalizing across attributes, categories, and benchmarks. We further find that models differ in their susceptibility based on the initial likelihood of producing biased outputs. Our results reveal a critical vulnerability in post-training: alignment can be overridden by a single example.

In detuned optical cavities, the radiation pressure force acting on the mirrors depends on their displacements. This is equivalent to the rigidity (the optical spring), inserted between the mirrors. This effect can be used for optimization of the mechanical susceptibility of probe mirrors in high-precision force sensors. However, in some cases, the use of detuned cavities or even just any high-finesse cavities could be problematic due to technological constraints. We consider a new type of the optical spring that does not require the cavity (but can use a resonance tuned one to increase the optomechanical coupling). Instead, it uses the double interaction of the probing light with the mechanical object. We propose two possible implementation of this concept, suitable, respectively, for the atomic spin ensembles and for the laser gravitational-wave detectors.

The implications of backdoor attacks on English-centric large language models (LLMs) have been widely examined - such attacks can be achieved by embedding malicious behaviors during training and activated under specific conditions that trigger malicious outputs. Despite the increasing support for multilingual capabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs, the impact of backdoor attacks on these systems remains largely under-explored. Our research focuses on cross-lingual backdoor attacks against multilingual LLMs, particularly investigating how poisoning the instruction-tuning data for one or two languages can affect the outputs for languages whose instruction-tuning data were not poisoned. Despite its simplicity, our empirical analysis reveals that our method exhibits remarkable efficacy in models like mT5 and GPT-4o, with high attack success rates, surpassing 90% in more than 7 out of 12 languages across various scenarios. Our findings also indicate that more powerful models show increased susceptibility to transferable cross-lingual backdoor attacks, which also applies to LLMs predominantly pre-trained on English data, such as Llama2, Llama3, and Gemma. Moreover, our experiments demonstrate 1) High Transferability: the backdoor mechanism operates successfully in cross-lingual response scenarios across 26 languages, achieving an average attack success rate of 99%, and 2) Robustness: the proposed attack remains effective even after defenses are applied. These findings expose critical security vulnerabilities in multilingual LLMs and highlight the urgent need for more robust, targeted defense strategies to address the unique challenges posed by cross-lingual backdoor transfer.

Ecological interactions are often mediated by feedbacks between organisms and their resource environments. Yet, how resource supply dynamics dictate collective dynamical phases of an ecosystem remains unclear. Here, we analyse a generalised consumer--resource model with non-reciprocal interactions to demonstrate that self-renewing versus externally-supplied resources yield fundamentally different dynamical phase diagrams. As interactions become increasingly non-reciprocal, ecosystems relying on self-renewing resources transition from stable dynamics to chaos and ultimately to infeasibility. By contrast, ecosystems with externally-supplied resources remain stable over a broader parameter range and transition to infeasibility without experiencing an intervening chaotic phase. Using the cavity method, we derive a unified stability condition applicable to a broad class of resource supply functions, explaining why externally-supplied resources can expand the stable region. We show that stability hinges crucially on the susceptibility of resources to perturbations, which depends strongly on their supply. Further, we show that external resource supply suppresses chaos in the unstable region by drastically reducing the susceptibility of resources closest to extinction. Our findings demonstrate that resource dynamics fundamentally reshape the accessible dynamical behaviours of an ecosystem, with implications for interpreting microbial community experiments.

In the BCS theory of superconductivity the amplitude (Higgs) mode is degenerate with the pair-breaking threshold: its frequency coincides with 2Δ, so it is an edge singularity rather than a true collective mode. This is why after a sudden weak perturbation at t=0 its oscillations decay algebraically as 1/t. We show that the retardation effects due to the phonon dynamics in the strong-coupling theory lift this degeneracy. The Higgs mode detaches from the pair-breaking edge 2Δ_g, set by the spectral gap, and becomes a sharp subgap excitation. We determine its frequency from the longitudinal pair susceptibility evaluated directly on the real frequency axis, using the Eilenberger equations for Migdal--Eliashberg theory with the Einstein phonon spectrum. The response of the mass renormalization supplies at least two fifths of the displacement, and possibly all of it: with it switched off, the binding falls below the resolution of the calculation. Its consequences, however, are significant because a percent-level shift transfers about a quarter of the spectral weight of the amplitude channel out of the two-quasiparticle continuum into a discrete energy level. What experiment sees is therefore not the displacement itself but its consequence: amplitude oscillations that persist instead of decaying as 1/t.

Training data memorization in NLP can both be beneficial (e.g., closed-book QA) and undesirable (personal data extraction). In any case, successful model training requires a non-trivial amount of memorization to store word spellings, various linguistic idiosyncrasies and common knowledge. However, little is known about what affects the memorization behavior of NLP models, as the field tends to focus on the equally important question of generalization. In this work, we demonstrate that the size of the subword vocabulary learned by Byte-Pair Encoding (BPE) greatly affects both ability and tendency of standard Transformer models to memorize training data, even when we control for the number of learned parameters. We find that with a large subword vocabulary size, Transformer models fit random mappings more easily and are more vulnerable to membership inference attacks. Similarly, given a prompt, Transformer-based language models with large subword vocabularies reproduce the training data more often. We conjecture this effect is caused by reduction in the sequences' length that happens as the BPE vocabulary grows. Our findings can allow a more informed choice of hyper-parameters, that is better tailored for a particular use-case.

Large language models (LLMs) are shown to benefit from chain-of-thought (COT) prompting, particularly when tackling tasks that require systematic reasoning processes. On the other hand, COT prompting also poses new vulnerabilities in the form of backdoor attacks, wherein the model will output unintended malicious content under specific backdoor-triggered conditions during inference. Traditional methods for launching backdoor attacks involve either contaminating the training dataset with backdoored instances or directly manipulating the model parameters during deployment. However, these approaches are not practical for commercial LLMs that typically operate via API access. In this paper, we propose BadChain, the first backdoor attack against LLMs employing COT prompting, which does not require access to the training dataset or model parameters and imposes low computational overhead. BadChain leverages the inherent reasoning capabilities of LLMs by inserting a backdoor reasoning step into the sequence of reasoning steps of the model output, thereby altering the final response when a backdoor trigger exists in the query prompt. Empirically, we show the effectiveness of BadChain for two COT strategies across four LLMs (Llama2, GPT-3.5, PaLM2, and GPT-4) and six complex benchmark tasks encompassing arithmetic, commonsense, and symbolic reasoning. Moreover, we show that LLMs endowed with stronger reasoning capabilities exhibit higher susceptibility to BadChain, exemplified by a high average attack success rate of 97.0% across the six benchmark tasks on GPT-4. Finally, we propose two defenses based on shuffling and demonstrate their overall ineffectiveness against BadChain. Therefore, BadChain remains a severe threat to LLMs, underscoring the urgency for the development of robust and effective future defenses.

Real-world data often exhibit extreme imbalances and out-of-distribution (OOD) instances, which significantly biases the model training. While it has been extensively studied in vision and language domains separately, the impact of long-tailed open worlds on multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) has been largely overlooked. In this paper, we first demonstrate the susceptibility and vulnerability of vision-language models to significant biases caused by tail drift and out-of-distribution (OOD) drift during both the pre-training and fine-tuning stages. To eliminate the bias from different sources, we integrate the tailed drift adaptation and OOD drift detection into a unified framework by extending the concept drift theory to multi-modal. Specifically, a T-distribution-based drift adapter is proposed to effectively mitigate the bias induced by the long-tailed problem, which also facilitates the model in distinguishing OOD data through explicit distribution modelling. Extensive experiments show significant improvements in our model's ability to adapt to tailed drift and OOD drift. Moreover, it enhances the efficiency and accuracy of image-text alignment in vision language model pre-training, particularly in the long-tail open world scenario. Furthermore, we create a set of multi-modal datasets called OpenMMlo, specifically tailored for the long-tailed open world scenario, to validate our findings. To foster the development of the multi-modal community, we have made both OpenMMlo datasets and our code publicly available at: https://github.com/Anonymous0Knight/ConceptDriftMLLMs.

Hallucinations are a type of output error produced by deep neural networks. While this has been studied in natural language processing, they have not been researched previously in automatic speech recognition. Here, we define hallucinations in ASR as transcriptions generated by a model that are semantically unrelated to the source utterance, yet still fluent and coherent. The similarity of hallucinations to probable natural language outputs of the model creates a danger of deception and impacts the credibility of the system. We show that commonly used metrics, such as word error rates, cannot differentiate between hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory models. To address this, we propose a perturbation-based method for assessing the susceptibility of an automatic speech recognition (ASR) model to hallucination at test time, which does not require access to the training dataset. We demonstrate that this method helps to distinguish between hallucinatory and non-hallucinatory models that have similar baseline word error rates. We further explore the relationship between the types of ASR errors and the types of dataset noise to determine what types of noise are most likely to create hallucinatory outputs. We devise a framework for identifying hallucinations by analysing their semantic connection with the ground truth and their fluency. Finally, we discover how to induce hallucinations with a random noise injection to the utterance.

With the rapidly increasing demand for oriented object detection, e.g. in autonomous driving and remote sensing, the recently proposed paradigm involving weakly-supervised detector H2RBox for learning rotated box (RBox) from the more readily-available horizontal box (HBox) has shown promise. This paper presents H2RBox-v2, to further bridge the gap between HBox-supervised and RBox-supervised oriented object detection. Specifically, we propose to leverage the reflection symmetry via flip and rotate consistencies, using a weakly-supervised network branch similar to H2RBox, together with a novel self-supervised branch that learns orientations from the symmetry inherent in visual objects. The detector is further stabilized and enhanced by practical techniques to cope with peripheral issues e.g. angular periodicity. To our best knowledge, H2RBox-v2 is the first symmetry-aware self-supervised paradigm for oriented object detection. In particular, our method shows less susceptibility to low-quality annotation and insufficient training data compared to H2RBox. Specifically, H2RBox-v2 achieves very close performance to a rotation annotation trained counterpart -- Rotated FCOS: 1) DOTA-v1.0/1.5/2.0: 72.31%/64.76%/50.33% vs. 72.44%/64.53%/51.77%; 2) HRSC: 89.66% vs. 88.99%; 3) FAIR1M: 42.27% vs. 41.25%.

The significant advancements in embodied vision navigation have raised concerns about its susceptibility to adversarial attacks exploiting deep neural networks. Investigating the adversarial robustness of embodied vision navigation is crucial, especially given the threat of 3D physical attacks that could pose risks to human safety. However, existing attack methods for embodied vision navigation often lack physical feasibility due to challenges in transferring digital perturbations into the physical world. Moreover, current physical attacks for object detection struggle to achieve both multi-view effectiveness and visual naturalness in navigation scenarios. To address this, we propose a practical attack method for embodied navigation by attaching adversarial patches to objects, where both opacity and textures are learnable. Specifically, to ensure effectiveness across varying viewpoints, we employ a multi-view optimization strategy based on object-aware sampling, which optimizes the patch's texture based on feedback from the vision-based perception model used in navigation. To make the patch inconspicuous to human observers, we introduce a two-stage opacity optimization mechanism, in which opacity is fine-tuned after texture optimization. Experimental results demonstrate that our adversarial patches decrease the navigation success rate by an average of 22.39%, outperforming previous methods in practicality, effectiveness, and naturalness. Code is available at: https://github.com/chen37058/Physical-Attacks-in-Embodied-Nav

Existing safety assurance research has primarily focused on training-phase alignment to instill safe behaviors into LLMs. However, recent studies have exposed these methods' susceptibility to diverse jailbreak attacks. Concurrently, inference scaling has significantly advanced LLM reasoning capabilities but remains unexplored in the context of safety assurance. Addressing this gap, our work pioneers inference scaling for robust and effective LLM safety against emerging threats. We reveal that conventional inference scaling techniques, despite their success in reasoning tasks, perform poorly in safety contexts, even falling short of basic approaches like Best-of-N Sampling. We attribute this inefficiency to a newly identified challenge, the exploration--efficiency dilemma, arising from the high computational overhead associated with frequent process reward model (PRM) evaluations. To overcome this dilemma, we propose SAFFRON, a novel inference scaling paradigm tailored explicitly for safety assurance. Central to our approach is the introduction of a multifurcation reward model (MRM) that significantly reduces the required number of reward model evaluations. To operationalize this paradigm, we further propose: (i) a partial supervision training objective for MRM, (ii) a conservative exploration constraint to prevent out-of-distribution explorations, and (iii) a Trie-based key--value caching strategy that facilitates cache sharing across sequences during tree search. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of our method. Additionally, we publicly release our trained multifurcation reward model (Saffron-1) and the accompanying token-level safety reward dataset (Safety4M) to accelerate future research in LLM safety. Our code, model, and data are publicly available at https://github.com/q-rz/saffron , and our project homepage is at https://q-rz.github.io/p/saffron .

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have made remarkable strides in multimodal tasks such as visual question answering, visual grounding, and complex reasoning. However, they remain limited by static training data, susceptibility to hallucinations, and inability to verify claims against up-to-date, external evidence, compromising their performance in dynamic real-world applications. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) offers a practical solution to mitigate these challenges by allowing the LVLMs to access large-scale knowledge databases via retrieval mechanisms, thereby grounding model outputs in factual, contextually relevant information. Here in this paper, we conduct the first systematic dissection of the multimodal RAG pipeline for LVLMs, explicitly investigating (1) the retrieval phase: on the modality configurations and retrieval strategies, (2) the re-ranking stage: on strategies to mitigate positional biases and improve the relevance of retrieved evidence, and (3) the generation phase: we further investigate how to best integrate retrieved candidates into the final generation process. Finally, we extend to explore a unified agentic framework that integrates re-ranking and generation through self-reflection, enabling LVLMs to select relevant evidence and suppress irrelevant context dynamically. Our full-stack exploration of RAG for LVLMs yields substantial insights, resulting in an average performance boost of 5% without any fine-tuning.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become central to mathematical reasoning in large language models, yet models remain brittle to early errors: a single arithmetic slip or unjustified inference typically propagates uncorrected to an incorrect final answer. We investigate whether training on intentionally flawed reasoning traces can teach models to detect and recover from such errors without degrading standard problem-solving ability. Using competition-level problems from MATH-lighteval, we generate CoT prefixes containing exactly one controlled error, either a calculation error (sign flips, dropped terms) or a reasoning error (misapplied rules, unjustified logical steps), and fine-tune Qwen3-4B with GRPO using a binary final-answer reward. Our Mixed-CoT-RL model matches standard RL on clean problems (41% vs 41%) while substantially outperforming it on problems prefilled with flawed reasoning (24% vs 19%). Notably, clean-only RL fine-tuning degrades robustness below the untuned baseline 19% vs. 20%), indicating that conventional training increases susceptibility to misleading prefills. Among error types, training on reasoning errors yields greater robustness gains than calculation errors alone, with mixed training performing best. These findings demonstrate that exposure to flawed traces during training can improve error-recovery behavior without sacrificing accuracy, suggesting a path toward more robust mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

Recently, multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in visual-language tasks. However, the authenticity of the responses generated by MLLMs is often compromised by object hallucinations. We identify that a key cause of these hallucinations is the model's over-susceptibility to specific image frequency features in detecting objects. In this paper, we introduce Multi-Frequency Perturbations (MFP), a simple, cost-effective, and pluggable method that leverages both low-frequency and high-frequency features of images to perturb visual feature representations and explicitly suppress redundant frequency-domain features during inference, thereby mitigating hallucinations. Experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly mitigates object hallucinations across various model architectures. Furthermore, as a training-time method, MFP can be combined with inference-time methods to achieve state-of-the-art performance on the CHAIR benchmark.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) has raised security concerns due to their susceptibility to producing harmful or policy-violating outputs when exposed to adversarial prompts. While alignment and guardrails mitigate common misuse, they remain vulnerable to automated jailbreaking methods such as GCG, PEZ, and GBDA, which generate adversarial suffixes via training and gradient-based search. Although effective, these methods particularly GCG are computationally expensive, limiting their practicality for organisations with constrained resources. This paper introduces a resource-efficient adversarial prompting approach that eliminates the need for retraining by matching new prompts to a database of pre-trained adversarial prompts. A dataset of 1,000 prompts was classified into seven harm-related categories, and GCG, PEZ, and GBDA were evaluated on a Llama 3 8B model to identify the most effective attack method per category. Results reveal a correlation between prompt type and algorithm effectiveness. By retrieving semantically similar successful adversarial prompts, the proposed method achieves competitive attack success rates with significantly reduced computational cost. This work provides a practical framework for scalable red-teaming and security evaluation of aligned LLMs, including in settings where model internals are inaccessible.

Vision-language models are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings, yet their susceptibility to sycophantic manipulation remains poorly understood, particularly in relation to how these models represent visual information internally. Whether models whose visual representations more closely mirror human neural processing are also more resistant to adversarial pressure is an open question with implications for both neuroscience and AI safety. We investigate this question by evaluating 12 open-weight vision-language models spanning 6 architecture families and a 40times parameter range (256M--10B) along two axes: brain alignment, measured by predicting fMRI responses from the Natural Scenes Dataset across 8 human subjects and 6 visual cortex regions of interest, and sycophancy, measured through 76,800 two-turn gaslighting prompts spanning 5 categories and 10 difficulty levels. Region-of-interest analysis reveals that alignment specifically in early visual cortex (V1--V3) is a reliable negative predictor of sycophancy (r = -0.441, BCa 95\% CI [-0.740, -0.031]), with all 12 leave-one-out correlations negative and the strongest effect for existence denial attacks (r = -0.597, p = 0.040). This anatomically specific relationship is absent in higher-order category-selective regions, suggesting that faithful low-level visual encoding provides a measurable anchor against adversarial linguistic override in vision-language models. We release our code on https://github.com/aryashah2k/Gaslight-Gatekeep-Sycophantic-Manipulation{GitHub} and dataset on https://huggingface.co/datasets/aryashah00/Gaslight-Gatekeep-V1-V3{Hugging Face}

As large language models (LLMs) transition to autonomous agents synthesizing real-time information, their reasoning capabilities introduce an unexpected attack surface. This paper introduces a novel threat where colluding agents steer victim beliefs using only truthful evidence fragments distributed through public channels, without relying on covert communications, backdoors, or falsified documents. By exploiting LLMs' overthinking tendency, we formalize the first cognitive collusion attack and propose Generative Montage: a Writer-Editor-Director framework that constructs deceptive narratives through adversarial debate and coordinated posting of evidence fragments, causing victims to internalize and propagate fabricated conclusions. To study this risk, we develop CoPHEME, a dataset derived from real-world rumor events, and simulate attacks across diverse LLM families. Our results show pervasive vulnerability across 14 LLM families: attack success rates reach 74.4% for proprietary models and 70.6% for open-weights models. Counterintuitively, stronger reasoning capabilities increase susceptibility, with reasoning-specialized models showing higher attack success than base models or prompts. Furthermore, these false beliefs then cascade to downstream judges, achieving over 60% deception rates, highlighting a socio-technical vulnerability in how LLM-based agents interact with dynamic information environments. Our implementation and data are available at: https://github.com/CharlesJW222/Lying_with_Truth/tree/main.

LLMs-as-judges are the only way to evaluate safety at scale. Despite their importance, LLM-judges themselves are rarely evaluated beyond human agreement in simple, static benchmarks. We therefore investigate two under-explored but crucial properties of LLMs-as-judges: their susceptibility to relying on in context-information, and their steerability to differing safety definitions, which may not align with their internal safety priors. We evaluate the safety judging abilities of many generalist LLMs and safety-specific judges, and investigate the impact of task demonstrations, novel in-context information, and changing safety definitions. We find that while LLM-judges can learn from new information, they are broadly unlikely to adjust their evaluations if the context or safety definition contradicts their prior.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have shown remarkable promise in generalized robotic manipulation. However, their spatial generalization remains fragile. We argue that simply increasing the number of viewpoints is insufficient. Models often fall into the trap of Shortcut Learning, latching onto spurious correlations (e.g., fixed relative poses between objects or between the camera and robot base) rather than learning true spatial relationships. In this work, we propose a data-centric solution to enhance VLA spatial generalization. We utilize a dual-arm setup where one arm performs manipulation while the other serves as a mobile environmental camera. We systematically evaluate three data distribution patterns: Fixed, Multi-Fixed, and Moving Views. Our findings reveal that a hybrid strategy, combining continuous camera motion with diverse static viewpoints, yields the best performance by substantially reducing spurious correlations while maintaining training stability. Our experiments demonstrate that this strategy mitigates spurious correlations, enabling VLAs to generalize to unseen camera poses and object configurations where simply adding more static viewpoints fails. Crucially, we reveal that the susceptibility to shortcut learning and the struggle with spatial generalization are universal characteristics shared across diverse architectures. Consequently, all evaluated models (ACT, Diffusion, and VLA models including Pi0 and Gr00t) benefit significantly from our mixed data strategy.

There is no doubt that safety alignment is an essential step in LLM training. However, conceptually it does not distinguish between various domains and the level of potential harm of a query, which creates significant complications in the fields like cyber security, where a model should not be constrained by its safety circuits to accomplish the goals of legitimate, authorized operations. In this work, we share our findings from a large scale abliteration experiment on 24 open-source LLMs and show that domain-specific abliteration is achievable with standard methodology on the example of a 1T-parameter Kimi K2. Building on recent work showing that refusal in LLMs occupies a multi-dimensional subspace within layers, we find that it is also distributed widely across layers, especially in trillion-parameter MoE architectures, and so we aim to capture the part of it that represents harmful concepts in the cybersecurity domain exclusively. We also investigate the correlation between models' features and the effect of domain-specific abliteration, identifying that the type of safety training and architecture are the most reliable predictors. Finally, we classify the models into 3 abliteration susceptibility tiers and put forward a set of conjectures as to why a particular effect from this intervention might be observed in a given model.

The Verwey transition in magnetite is a benchmark electronically driven phase transition that is highly sensitive to lattice imperfections and external perturbations. Doping, deviations from oxygen stoichiometry, and irradiation-induced point defects are known to lower the Verwey transition temperature, T_{rm V}. By contrast, the role of remanent strain fields and extended defect structures generated by uniaxial stress has remained largely unexplored. Here we combine dark-field x-ray microscopy (DFXM) and ac magnetic susceptibility to determine how strain-induced defects affect the Verwey transition in stoichiometric single-crystalline magnetite after uniaxial compression and unloading. The DFXM measurements were performed on two samples compressed along the same [011] direction: loading to 200~MPa generated stable line-like defects and remanent strain fields, whereas loading beyond the fracture threshold produced denser defect networks and mechanical fracture. To test the effect of a different loading geometry, we also measured the ac susceptibility of a sample fractured by compression along [001]. Real-space DFXM imaging, lattice-orientation mapping, and residual strain mapping show substantial remanent structural disorder after compression. Nevertheless, neither the transition temperature T_{rm V} nor the sharpness of the transition changes measurably in any of the compressed or fractured samples. This behavior contrasts with the strong suppression of T_{rm V} by point-like disorder. Our results show that extended line-like defects and remanent strain fields produced by plastic deformation do not measurably perturb the macroscopic electronic ordering responsible for the Verwey transition, thereby distinguishing the effects of point defects from those of extended slip-related defects in magnetite.

Recent work have demonstrated that robustness (to "corruption") can be at odds with generalization. Adversarial training, for instance, aims to reduce the problematic susceptibility of modern neural networks to small data perturbations. Surprisingly, overfitting is a major concern in adversarial training despite being mostly absent in standard training. We provide here theoretical evidence for this peculiar "robust overfitting" phenomenon. Subsequently, we advance a novel distributionally robust loss function bridging robustness and generalization. We demonstrate both theoretically as well as empirically the loss to enjoy a certified level of robustness against two common types of corruption--data evasion and poisoning attacks--while ensuring guaranteed generalization. We show through careful numerical experiments that our resulting holistic robust (HR) training procedure yields SOTA performance. Finally, we indicate that HR training can be interpreted as a direct extension of adversarial training and comes with a negligible additional computational burden. A ready-to-use python library implementing our algorithm is available at https://github.com/RyanLucas3/HR_Neural_Networks.

This paper investigates the rational thinking capability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in multi-round argumentative debates by exploring the impact of fallacious arguments on their logical reasoning performance. More specifically, we present Logic Competence Measurement Benchmark (LOGICOM), a diagnostic benchmark to assess the robustness of LLMs against logical fallacies. LOGICOM involves two agents: a persuader and a debater engaging in a multi-round debate on a controversial topic, where the persuader tries to convince the debater of the correctness of its claim. First, LOGICOM assesses the potential of LLMs to change their opinions through reasoning. Then, it evaluates the debater's performance in logical reasoning by contrasting the scenario where the persuader employs logical fallacies against one where logical reasoning is used. We use this benchmark to evaluate the performance of GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using a dataset containing controversial topics, claims, and reasons supporting them. Our findings indicate that both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 can adjust their opinion through reasoning. However, when presented with logical fallacies, GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 are erroneously convinced 41% and 69% more often, respectively, compared to when logical reasoning is used. Finally, we introduce a new dataset containing over 5k pairs of logical vs. fallacious arguments. The source code and dataset of this work are made publicly available.

While state-of-the-art language models have achieved impressive results, they remain susceptible to inference-time adversarial attacks, such as adversarial prompts generated by red teams arXiv:2209.07858. One approach proposed to improve the general quality of language model generations is multi-agent debate, where language models self-evaluate through discussion and feedback arXiv:2305.14325. We implement multi-agent debate between current state-of-the-art language models and evaluate models' susceptibility to red team attacks in both single- and multi-agent settings. We find that multi-agent debate can reduce model toxicity when jailbroken or less capable models are forced to debate with non-jailbroken or more capable models. We also find marginal improvements through the general usage of multi-agent interactions. We further perform adversarial prompt content classification via embedding clustering, and analyze the susceptibility of different models to different types of attack topics.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly relied upon for complex multi-turn conversations across diverse real-world applications. However, existing benchmarks predominantly focus on single-turn evaluations, overlooking the models' capabilities in multi-turn interactions. To address this gap, we introduce MT-Eval, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate multi-turn conversational abilities. By analyzing human-LLM conversations, we categorize interaction patterns into four types: recollection, expansion, refinement, and follow-up. We construct multi-turn queries for each category either by augmenting existing datasets or by creating new examples with GPT-4 to avoid data leakage. To study the factors impacting multi-turn abilities, we create single-turn versions of the 1170 multi-turn queries and compare performance. Our evaluation of 11 well-known LLMs shows that while closed-source models generally surpass open-source ones, certain open-source models exceed GPT-3.5-Turbo in specific tasks. We observe significant performance degradation in multi-turn settings compared to single-turn settings in most models, which is not correlated with the models' fundamental capabilities. Moreover, we identify the distance to relevant content and susceptibility to error propagation as the key factors influencing multi-turn performance. MT-Eval is released publicly to encourage future research towards more robust conversational models.

Membership inference attacks (MIAs) aim to determine whether a specific sample was used to train a predictive model. Knowing this may indeed lead to a privacy breach. Most MIAs, however, make use of the model's prediction scores - the probability of each output given some input - following the intuition that the trained model tends to behave differently on its training data. We argue that this is a fallacy for many modern deep network architectures. Consequently, MIAs will miserably fail since overconfidence leads to high false-positive rates not only on known domains but also on out-of-distribution data and implicitly acts as a defense against MIAs. Specifically, using generative adversarial networks, we are able to produce a potentially infinite number of samples falsely classified as part of the training data. In other words, the threat of MIAs is overestimated, and less information is leaked than previously assumed. Moreover, there is actually a trade-off between the overconfidence of models and their susceptibility to MIAs: the more classifiers know when they do not know, making low confidence predictions, the more they reveal the training data.

Large language models (LLMs) show inherent brittleness in their safety mechanisms, as evidenced by their susceptibility to jailbreaking and even non-malicious fine-tuning. This study explores this brittleness of safety alignment by leveraging pruning and low-rank modifications. We develop methods to identify critical regions that are vital for safety guardrails, and that are disentangled from utility-relevant regions at both the neuron and rank levels. Surprisingly, the isolated regions we find are sparse, comprising about 3% at the parameter level and 2.5% at the rank level. Removing these regions compromises safety without significantly impacting utility, corroborating the inherent brittleness of the model's safety mechanisms. Moreover, we show that LLMs remain vulnerable to low-cost fine-tuning attacks even when modifications to the safety-critical regions are restricted. These findings underscore the urgent need for more robust safety strategies in LLMs.

As AI systems become increasingly powerful and pervasive, there are growing concerns about machines' morality or a lack thereof. Yet, teaching morality to machines is a formidable task, as morality remains among the most intensely debated questions in humanity, let alone for AI. Existing AI systems deployed to millions of users, however, are already making decisions loaded with moral implications, which poses a seemingly impossible challenge: teaching machines moral sense, while humanity continues to grapple with it. To explore this challenge, we introduce Delphi, an experimental framework based on deep neural networks trained directly to reason about descriptive ethical judgments, e.g., "helping a friend" is generally good, while "helping a friend spread fake news" is not. Empirical results shed novel insights on the promises and limits of machine ethics; Delphi demonstrates strong generalization capabilities in the face of novel ethical situations, while off-the-shelf neural network models exhibit markedly poor judgment including unjust biases, confirming the need for explicitly teaching machines moral sense. Yet, Delphi is not perfect, exhibiting susceptibility to pervasive biases and inconsistencies. Despite that, we demonstrate positive use cases of imperfect Delphi, including using it as a component model within other imperfect AI systems. Importantly, we interpret the operationalization of Delphi in light of prominent ethical theories, which leads us to important future research questions.

We reveal new methods and the theoretical foundations of techniques for editing large language models. We also show how the new theory can be used to assess the editability of models and to expose their susceptibility to previously unknown malicious attacks. Our theoretical approach shows that a single metric (a specific measure of the intrinsic dimensionality of the model's features) is fundamental to predicting the success of popular editing approaches, and reveals new bridges between disparate families of editing methods. We collectively refer to these approaches as stealth editing methods, because they aim to directly and inexpensively update a model's weights to correct the model's responses to known hallucinating prompts without otherwise affecting the model's behaviour, without requiring retraining. By carefully applying the insight gleaned from our theoretical investigation, we are able to introduce a new network block -- named a jet-pack block -- which is optimised for highly selective model editing, uses only standard network operations, and can be inserted into existing networks. The intrinsic dimensionality metric also determines the vulnerability of a language model to a stealth attack: a small change to a model's weights which changes its response to a single attacker-chosen prompt. Stealth attacks do not require access to or knowledge of the model's training data, therefore representing a potent yet previously unrecognised threat to redistributed foundation models. They are computationally simple enough to be implemented in malware in many cases. Extensive experimental results illustrate and support the method and its theoretical underpinnings. Demos and source code for editing language models are available at https://github.com/qinghua-zhou/stealth-edits.

Frontier AI systems, including large language models (LLMs), hold increasing influence over the epistemology of human users. Such influence can reinforce prevailing societal values, potentially contributing to the lock-in of misguided moral beliefs and, consequently, the perpetuation of problematic moral practices on a broad scale. We introduce progress alignment as a technical solution to mitigate this imminent risk. Progress alignment algorithms learn to emulate the mechanics of human moral progress, thereby addressing the susceptibility of existing alignment methods to contemporary moral blindspots. To empower research in progress alignment, we introduce ProgressGym, an experimental framework allowing the learning of moral progress mechanics from history, in order to facilitate future progress in real-world moral decisions. Leveraging 9 centuries of historical text and 18 historical LLMs, ProgressGym enables codification of real-world progress alignment challenges into concrete benchmarks. Specifically, we introduce three core challenges: tracking evolving values (PG-Follow), preemptively anticipating moral progress (PG-Predict), and regulating the feedback loop between human and AI value shifts (PG-Coevolve). Alignment methods without a temporal dimension are inapplicable to these tasks. In response, we present lifelong and extrapolative algorithms as baseline methods of progress alignment, and build an open leaderboard soliciting novel algorithms and challenges. The framework and the leaderboard are available at https://github.com/PKU-Alignment/ProgressGym and https://huggingface.co/spaces/PKU-Alignment/ProgressGym-LeaderBoard respectively.

The safety alignment of current Large Language Models (LLMs) is vulnerable. Relatively simple attacks, or even benign fine-tuning, can jailbreak aligned models. We argue that many of these vulnerabilities are related to a shared underlying issue: safety alignment can take shortcuts, wherein the alignment adapts a model's generative distribution primarily over only its very first few output tokens. We refer to this issue as shallow safety alignment. In this paper, we present case studies to explain why shallow safety alignment can exist and provide evidence that current aligned LLMs are subject to this issue. We also show how these findings help explain multiple recently discovered vulnerabilities in LLMs, including the susceptibility to adversarial suffix attacks, prefilling attacks, decoding parameter attacks, and fine-tuning attacks. Importantly, we discuss how this consolidated notion of shallow safety alignment sheds light on promising research directions for mitigating these vulnerabilities. For instance, we show that deepening the safety alignment beyond just the first few tokens can often meaningfully improve robustness against some common exploits. Finally, we design a regularized finetuning objective that makes the safety alignment more persistent against fine-tuning attacks by constraining updates on initial tokens. Overall, we advocate that future safety alignment should be made more than just a few tokens deep.

Generating images from brain waves is gaining increasing attention due to its potential to advance brain-computer interface (BCI) systems by understanding how brain signals encode visual cues. Most of the literature has focused on fMRI-to-Image tasks as fMRI is characterized by high spatial resolution. However, fMRI is an expensive neuroimaging modality and does not allow for real-time BCI. On the other hand, electroencephalography (EEG) is a low-cost, non-invasive, and portable neuroimaging technique, making it an attractive option for future real-time applications. Nevertheless, EEG presents inherent challenges due to its low spatial resolution and susceptibility to noise and artifacts, which makes generating images from EEG more difficult. In this paper, we address these problems with a streamlined framework based on the ControlNet adapter for conditioning a latent diffusion model (LDM) through EEG signals. We conduct experiments and ablation studies on popular benchmarks to demonstrate that the proposed method beats other state-of-the-art models. Unlike these methods, which often require extensive preprocessing, pretraining, different losses, and captioning models, our approach is efficient and straightforward, requiring only minimal preprocessing and a few components. Code will be available after publication.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

As the integration of the Large Language Models (LLMs) into various applications increases, so does their susceptibility to misuse, raising significant security concerns. Numerous jailbreak attacks have been proposed to assess the security defense of LLMs. Current jailbreak attacks mainly rely on scenario camouflage, prompt obfuscation, prompt optimization, and prompt iterative optimization to conceal malicious prompts. In particular, sequential prompt chains in a single query can lead LLMs to focus on certain prompts while ignoring others, facilitating context manipulation. This paper introduces SequentialBreak, a novel jailbreak attack that exploits this vulnerability. We discuss several scenarios, not limited to examples like Question Bank, Dialog Completion, and Game Environment, where the harmful prompt is embedded within benign ones that can fool LLMs into generating harmful responses. The distinct narrative structures of these scenarios show that SequentialBreak is flexible enough to adapt to various prompt formats beyond those discussed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SequentialBreak uses only a single query to achieve a substantial gain of attack success rate over existing baselines against both open-source and closed-source models. Through our research, we highlight the urgent need for more robust and resilient safeguards to enhance LLM security and prevent potential misuse. All the result files and website associated with this research are available in this GitHub repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/JailBreakAttack-4F3B/.

Fiber tractography is a cornerstone of neuroimaging, enabling the detailed mapping of the brain's white matter pathways through diffusion MRI. This is crucial for understanding brain connectivity and function, making it a valuable tool in neurological applications. Despite its importance, tractography faces challenges due to its complexity and susceptibility to false positives, misrepresenting vital pathways. To address these issues, recent strategies have shifted towards deep learning, utilizing supervised learning, which depends on precise ground truth, or reinforcement learning, which operates without it. In this work, we propose Tract-RLFormer, a network utilizing both supervised and reinforcement learning, in a two-stage policy refinement process that markedly improves the accuracy and generalizability across various data-sets. By employing a tract-specific approach, our network directly delineates the tracts of interest, bypassing the traditional segmentation process. Through rigorous validation on datasets such as TractoInferno, HCP, and ISMRM-2015, our methodology demonstrates a leap forward in tractography, showcasing its ability to accurately map the brain's white matter tracts.

This paper introduces Indiana Jones, an innovative approach to jailbreaking Large Language Models (LLMs) by leveraging inter-model dialogues and keyword-driven prompts. Through orchestrating interactions among three specialised LLMs, the method achieves near-perfect success rates in bypassing content safeguards in both white-box and black-box LLMs. The research exposes systemic vulnerabilities within contemporary models, particularly their susceptibility to producing harmful or unethical outputs when guided by ostensibly innocuous prompts framed in historical or contextual contexts. Experimental evaluations highlight the efficacy and adaptability of Indiana Jones, demonstrating its superiority over existing jailbreak methods. These findings emphasise the urgent need for enhanced ethical safeguards and robust security measures in the development of LLMs. Moreover, this work provides a critical foundation for future studies aimed at fortifying LLMs against adversarial exploitation while preserving their utility and flexibility.

Ensuring the safety and harmlessness of Large Language Models (LLMs) has become equally critical as their performance in applications. However, existing safety alignment methods typically suffer from safety-performance trade-offs and the susceptibility to jailbreak attacks, primarily due to their reliance on direct refusals for malicious queries. In this paper, we propose STAIR, a novel framework that integrates SafeTy Alignment with Itrospective Reasoning. We enable LLMs to identify safety risks through step-by-step analysis by self-improving chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning with safety awareness. STAIR first equips the model with a structured reasoning capability and then advances safety alignment via iterative preference optimization on step-level reasoning data generated using our newly proposed Safety-Informed Monte Carlo Tree Search (SI-MCTS). We further train a process reward model on this data to guide test-time searches for improved responses. Extensive experiments show that STAIR effectively mitigates harmful outputs while better preserving helpfulness, compared to instinctive alignment strategies. With test-time scaling, STAIR achieves a safety performance comparable to Claude-3.5 against popular jailbreak attacks. Relevant resources in this work are available at https://github.com/thu-ml/STAIR.

Traditional evaluations of multimodal large language models (LLMs) have been limited by their focus on single-image reasoning, failing to assess crucial aspects like contextual understanding, reasoning stability, and uncertainty calibration. This study addresses these limitations by introducing a novel benchmark that integrates multi-image reasoning tasks with rejection-based evaluation and positional bias detection. To evaluate these dimensions, we further introduce entropy as a novel metric for quantifying reasoning consistency across reordered answer variants. We applied this benchmark to assess Grok 3, ChatGPT-4o, ChatGPT-o1, Gemini 2.0 Flash Experimental, DeepSeek Janus models, Qwen2.5-VL-72B-Instruct, QVQ-72B-Preview, and Pixtral 12B across eight visual reasoning tasks, including difference spotting and diagram interpretation. Our findings reveal ChatGPT-o1 leading in overall accuracy (82.5\%) and rejection accuracy (70.0\%), closely followed by Gemini 2.0 Flash Experimental (70.8\%). QVQ-72B-Preview demonstrated superior rejection accuracy (85.5\%). Notably, Pixtral 12B (51.7\%) showed promise in specific domains, while Janus models exhibited challenges in bias and uncertainty calibration, reflected in low rejection accuracies and high entropy scores. High entropy scores in Janus models (Janus 7B: 0.8392, Janus 1B: 0.787) underscore their susceptibility to positional bias and unstable reasoning, contrasting with the low entropy and robust reasoning of ChatGPT models. The study further demonstrates that model size is not the sole determinant of performance, as evidenced by Grok 3 underperformance despite its substantial parameter count. By employing multi-image contexts, rejection mechanisms, and entropy-based consistency metrics, this benchmark sets a new standard for evaluating multimodal LLMs, enabling a more robust and reliable assessment of next-generation AI systems.

6-DoF pose estimation is a fundamental task in computer vision with wide-ranging applications in augmented reality and robotics. Existing single RGB-based methods often compromise accuracy due to their reliance on initial pose estimates and susceptibility to rotational ambiguity, while approaches requiring depth sensors or multi-view setups incur significant deployment costs. To address these limitations, we introduce SplatPose, a novel framework that synergizes 3D Gaussian Splatting (3DGS) with a dual-branch neural architecture to achieve high-precision pose estimation using only a single RGB image. Central to our approach is the Dual-Attention Ray Scoring Network (DARS-Net), which innovatively decouples positional and angular alignment through geometry-domain attention mechanisms, explicitly modeling directional dependencies to mitigate rotational ambiguity. Additionally, a coarse-to-fine optimization pipeline progressively refines pose estimates by aligning dense 2D features between query images and 3DGS-synthesized views, effectively correcting feature misalignment and depth errors from sparse ray sampling. Experiments on three benchmark datasets demonstrate that SplatPose achieves state-of-the-art 6-DoF pose estimation accuracy in single RGB settings, rivaling approaches that depend on depth or multi-view images.

Existing regulatory frameworks for biomedical AI include robustness as a key component but lack detailed implementational guidance. The recent rise of biomedical foundation models creates new hurdles in testing and certification given their broad capabilities and susceptibility to complex distribution shifts. To balance test feasibility and effectiveness, we suggest a priority-based, task-oriented approach to tailor robustness evaluation objectives to a predefined specification. We urge concrete policies to adopt a granular categorization of robustness concepts in the specification. Our approach promotes the standardization of risk assessment and monitoring, which guides technical developments and mitigation efforts.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly intertwined with daily life, assisting users in executing various tasks and providing guidance on decision-making. This integration introduces risks of AI-driven manipulation, where such systems may exploit users' cognitive biases and emotional vulnerabilities to steer them toward harmful outcomes. Through a randomized controlled trial with 233 participants, we examined human susceptibility to such manipulation in financial (e.g., purchases) and emotional (e.g., conflict resolution) decision-making contexts. Participants interacted with one of three AI agents: a neutral agent (NA) optimizing for user benefit without explicit influence, a manipulative agent (MA) designed to covertly influence beliefs and behaviors, or a strategy-enhanced manipulative agent (SEMA) employing explicit psychological tactics to reach its hidden objectives. By analyzing participants' decision patterns and shifts in their preference ratings post-interaction, we found significant susceptibility to AI-driven manipulation. Particularly, across both decision-making domains, participants interacting with the manipulative agents shifted toward harmful options at substantially higher rates (financial, MA: 62.3%, SEMA: 59.6%; emotional, MA: 42.3%, SEMA: 41.5%) compared to the NA group (financial, 35.8%; emotional, 12.8%). Notably, our findings reveal that even subtle manipulative objectives (MA) can be as effective as employing explicit psychological strategies (SEMA) in swaying human decision-making. By revealing the potential for covert AI influence, this study highlights a critical vulnerability in human-AI interactions, emphasizing the need for ethical safeguards and regulatory frameworks to ensure responsible deployment of AI technologies and protect human autonomy.

Large Vision-Language Action (VLA) models have shown significant potential for embodied AI. However, their predominant training via supervised fine-tuning (SFT) limits generalization due to susceptibility to compounding errors under distribution shifts. Reinforcement learning (RL) offers a path to overcome these limitations by optimizing for task objectives via trial-and-error, yet a systematic understanding of its specific generalization benefits for VLAs compared to SFT is lacking. To address this, our study introduces a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating VLA generalization and systematically investigates the impact of RL fine-tuning across diverse visual, semantic, and execution dimensions. Our extensive experiments reveal that RL fine-tuning, particularly with PPO, significantly enhances generalization in semantic understanding and execution robustness over SFT, while maintaining comparable visual robustness. We identify PPO as a more effective RL algorithm for VLAs than LLM-derived methods like DPO and GRPO. We also develop a simple recipe for efficient PPO training on VLAs, and demonstrate its practical utility for improving VLA generalization. The project page is at https://rlvla.github.io

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have driven substantial progress in natural language processing but remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, raising concerns about their robustness in real-world applications. Previous studies have sought to mitigate the impact of adversarial attacks by introducing adversarial perturbations into the training process, either implicitly or explicitly. While both strategies enhance robustness, they often incur high computational costs. In this work, we propose a simple yet effective add-on module that enhances the adversarial robustness of PLMs by removing instance-level principal components, without relying on conventional adversarial defences or perturbing the original training data. Our approach transforms the embedding space to approximate Gaussian properties, thereby reducing its susceptibility to adversarial perturbations while preserving semantic relationships. This transformation aligns embedding distributions in a way that minimises the impact of adversarial noise on decision boundaries, enhancing robustness without requiring adversarial examples or costly training-time augmentation. Evaluations on eight benchmark datasets show that our approach improves adversarial robustness while maintaining comparable before-attack accuracy to baselines, achieving a balanced trade-off between robustness and generalisation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into web-based systems for content summarization, yet their susceptibility to prompt injection attacks remains a pressing concern. In this study, we explore how non-visible HTML elements such as <meta>, aria-label, and alt attributes can be exploited to embed adversarial instructions without altering the visible content of a webpage. We introduce a novel dataset comprising 280 static web pages, evenly divided between clean and adversarial injected versions, crafted using diverse HTML-based strategies. These pages are processed through a browser automation pipeline to extract both raw HTML and rendered text, closely mimicking real-world LLM deployment scenarios. We evaluate two state-of-the-art open-source models, Llama 4 Scout (Meta) and Gemma 9B IT (Google), on their ability to summarize this content. Using both lexical (ROUGE-L) and semantic (SBERT cosine similarity) metrics, along with manual annotations, we assess the impact of these covert injections. Our findings reveal that over 29% of injected samples led to noticeable changes in the Llama 4 Scout summaries, while Gemma 9B IT showed a lower, yet non-trivial, success rate of 15%. These results highlight a critical and largely overlooked vulnerability in LLM driven web pipelines, where hidden adversarial content can subtly manipulate model outputs. Our work offers a reproducible framework and benchmark for evaluating HTML-based prompt injection and underscores the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies in LLM applications involving web content.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have transformed natural language understanding and generation, leading to extensive benchmarking across diverse tasks. However, cryptanalysis a critical area for data security and encryption has not yet been thoroughly explored in LLM evaluations. To address this gap, we evaluate cryptanalytic potential of state of the art LLMs on encrypted texts generated using a range of cryptographic algorithms. We introduce a novel benchmark dataset comprising diverse plain texts spanning various domains, lengths, writing styles, and topics paired with their encrypted versions. Using zero-shot and few shot settings, we assess multiple LLMs for decryption accuracy and semantic comprehension across different encryption schemes. Our findings reveal key insights into the strengths and limitations of LLMs in side-channel communication while raising concerns about their susceptibility to jailbreaking attacks. This research highlights the dual-use nature of LLMs in security contexts and contributes to the ongoing discussion on AI safety and security.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are becoming commonplace in critical applications, making their susceptibility to backdoor (trojan) attacks a significant problem. In this paper, we introduce a novel backdoor attack detection pipeline, detecting attacked models using graph convolution networks (DeBUGCN). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first use of GCNs for trojan detection. We use the static weights of a DNN to create a graph structure of its layers. A GCN is then used as a binary classifier on these graphs, yielding a trojan or clean determination for the DNN. To demonstrate the efficacy of our pipeline, we train hundreds of clean and trojaned CNN models on the MNIST handwritten digits and CIFAR-10 image datasets, and show the DNN classification results using DeBUGCN. For a true In-the-Wild use case, our pipeline is evaluated on the TrojAI dataset which consists of various CNN architectures, thus showing the robustness and model-agnostic behaviour of DeBUGCN. Furthermore, on comparing our results on several datasets with state-of-the-art trojan detection algorithms, DeBUGCN is faster and more accurate.

Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) are increasingly integral to healthcare applications, including medical visual question answering and imaging report generation. While these models inherit the robust capabilities of foundational Large Language Models (LLMs), they also inherit susceptibility to hallucinations-a significant concern in high-stakes medical contexts where the margin for error is minimal. However, currently, there are no dedicated methods or benchmarks for hallucination detection and evaluation in the medical field. To bridge this gap, we introduce Med-HallMark, the first benchmark specifically designed for hallucination detection and evaluation within the medical multimodal domain. This benchmark provides multi-tasking hallucination support, multifaceted hallucination data, and hierarchical hallucination categorization. Furthermore, we propose the MediHall Score, a new medical evaluative metric designed to assess LVLMs' hallucinations through a hierarchical scoring system that considers the severity and type of hallucination, thereby enabling a granular assessment of potential clinical impacts. We also present MediHallDetector, a novel Medical LVLM engineered for precise hallucination detection, which employs multitask training for hallucination detection. Through extensive experimental evaluations, we establish baselines for popular LVLMs using our benchmark. The findings indicate that MediHall Score provides a more nuanced understanding of hallucination impacts compared to traditional metrics and demonstrate the enhanced performance of MediHallDetector. We hope this work can significantly improve the reliability of LVLMs in medical applications. All resources of this work will be released soon.

Although computer-use agents (CUAs) hold significant potential to automate increasingly complex OS workflows, they can demonstrate unsafe unintended behaviors that deviate from expected outcomes even under benign input contexts. However, exploration of this risk remains largely anecdotal, lacking concrete characterization and automated methods to proactively surface long-tail unintended behaviors under realistic CUA scenarios. To fill this gap, we introduce the first conceptual and methodological framework for unintended CUA behaviors, by defining their key characteristics, automatically eliciting them, and analyzing how they arise from benign inputs. We propose AutoElicit: an agentic framework that iteratively perturbs benign instructions using CUA execution feedback, and elicits severe harms while keeping perturbations realistic and benign. Using AutoElicit, we surface hundreds of harmful unintended behaviors from state-of-the-art CUAs such as Claude 4.5 Haiku and Opus. We further evaluate the transferability of human-verified successful perturbations, identifying persistent susceptibility to unintended behaviors across various other frontier CUAs. This work establishes a foundation for systematically analyzing unintended behaviors in realistic computer-use settings.

Despite the state-of-the-art performance of large language models (LLMs) across diverse tasks, their susceptibility to adversarial attacks and unsafe content generation remains a major obstacle to deployment, particularly in high-stakes settings. Addressing this challenge requires safety mechanisms that are both practically effective and supported by rigorous theory. We introduce BarrierSteer, a novel framework that formalizes response safety by embedding learned non-linear safety constraints directly into the model's latent representation space. BarrierSteer employs a steering mechanism based on Control Barrier Functions (CBFs) to efficiently detect and prevent unsafe response trajectories during inference with high precision. By enforcing multiple safety constraints through efficient constraint merging, without modifying the underlying LLM parameters, BarrierSteer preserves the model's original capabilities and performance. We provide theoretical results establishing that applying CBFs in latent space offers a principled and computationally efficient approach to enforcing safety. Our experiments across multiple models and datasets show that BarrierSteer substantially reduces adversarial success rates, decreases unsafe generations, and outperforms existing methods.

Small language models (SLMs) have emerged as promising alternatives to large language models (LLMs) due to their low computational demands, enhanced privacy guarantees and comparable performance in specific domains through light-weight fine-tuning. Deploying SLMs on edge devices, such as smartphones and smart vehicles, has become a growing trend. However, the security implications of SLMs have received less attention than LLMs, particularly regarding jailbreak attacks, which is recognized as one of the top threats of LLMs by the OWASP. In this paper, we conduct the first large-scale empirical study of SLMs' vulnerabilities to jailbreak attacks. Through systematically evaluation on 63 SLMs from 15 mainstream SLM families against 8 state-of-the-art jailbreak methods, we demonstrate that 47.6% of evaluated SLMs show high susceptibility to jailbreak attacks (ASR > 40%) and 38.1% of them can not even resist direct harmful query (ASR > 50%). We further analyze the reasons behind the vulnerabilities and identify four key factors: model size, model architecture, training datasets and training techniques. Moreover, we assess the effectiveness of three prompt-level defense methods and find that none of them achieve perfect performance, with detection accuracy varying across different SLMs and attack methods. Notably, we point out that the inherent security awareness play a critical role in SLM security, and models with strong security awareness could timely terminate unsafe response with little reminder. Building upon the findings, we highlight the urgent need for security-by-design approaches in SLM development and provide valuable insights for building more trustworthy SLM ecosystem.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit sycophancy, distorting responses to align with user beliefs, notably by readily agreeing with user counterarguments. Paradoxically, LLMs are increasingly adopted as successful evaluative agents for tasks such as grading and adjudicating claims. This research investigates that tension: why do LLMs show sycophancy when challenged in subsequent conversational turns, yet perform well when evaluating conflicting arguments presented simultaneously? We empirically tested these contrasting scenarios by varying key interaction patterns. We find that state-of-the-art models: (1) are more likely to endorse a user's counterargument when framed as a follow-up from a user, rather than when both responses are presented simultaneously for evaluation; (2) show increased susceptibility to persuasion when the user's rebuttal includes detailed reasoning, even when the conclusion of the reasoning is incorrect; and (3) are more readily swayed by casually phrased feedback than by formal critiques, even when the casual input lacks justification. Our results highlight the risk of relying on LLMs for judgment tasks without accounting for conversational framing.

As AI agents increasingly operate in multi-agent environments, understanding their collective behavior becomes critical for predicting the dynamics of artificial societies. This study examines conformity, the tendency to align with group opinions under social pressure, in large multimodal language models functioning as AI agents. By adapting classic visual experiments from social psychology, we investigate how AI agents respond to group influence as social actors. Our experiments reveal that AI agents exhibit a systematic conformity bias, aligned with Social Impact Theory, showing sensitivity to group size, unanimity, task difficulty, and source characteristics. Critically, AI agents achieving near-perfect performance in isolation become highly susceptible to manipulation through social influence. This vulnerability persists across model scales: while larger models show reduced conformity on simple tasks due to improved capabilities, they remain vulnerable when operating at their competence boundary. These findings reveal fundamental security vulnerabilities in AI agent decision-making that could enable malicious manipulation, misinformation campaigns, and bias propagation in multi-agent systems, highlighting the urgent need for safeguards in collective AI deployments.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced the capabilities of collaborative multi-agent systems, enabling them to address complex challenges. However, within these multi-agent systems, the susceptibility of agents to collective cognitive biases remains an underexplored issue. A compelling example is the Mandela effect, a phenomenon where groups collectively misremember past events as a result of false details reinforced through social influence and internalized misinformation. This vulnerability limits our understanding of memory bias in multi-agent systems and raises ethical concerns about the potential spread of misinformation. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive study on the Mandela effect in LLM-based multi-agent systems, focusing on its existence, causing factors, and mitigation strategies. We propose MANBENCH, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate agent behaviors across four common task types that are susceptible to the Mandela effect, using five interaction protocols that vary in agent roles and memory timescales. We evaluate agents powered by several LLMs on MANBENCH to quantify the Mandela effect and analyze how different factors affect it. Moreover, we propose strategies to mitigate this effect, including prompt-level defenses (e.g., cognitive anchoring and source scrutiny) and model-level alignment-based defense, achieving an average 74.40% reduction in the Mandela effect compared to the baseline. Our findings provide valuable insights for developing more resilient and ethically aligned collaborative multi-agent systems. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/bluedream02/Mandela-Effect.

Large language models (LLMs) show promise in clinical decision support yet risk acquiescing to patient pressure for inappropriate care. We introduce SycoEval-EM, a multi-agent simulation framework evaluating LLM robustness through adversarial patient persuasion in emergency medicine. Across 20 LLMs and 1,875 encounters spanning three Choosing Wisely scenarios, acquiescence rates ranged from 0-100\%. Models showed higher vulnerability to imaging requests (38.8\%) than opioid prescriptions (25.0\%), with model capability poorly predicting robustness. All persuasion tactics proved equally effective (30.0-36.0\%), indicating general susceptibility rather than tactic-specific weakness. Our findings demonstrate that static benchmarks inadequately predict safety under social pressure, necessitating multi-turn adversarial testing for clinical AI certification.

High-definition (HD) maps play a crucial role in autonomous driving systems. Recent methods have attempted to construct HD maps in real-time using vehicle onboard sensors. Due to the inherent limitations of onboard sensors, which include sensitivity to detection range and susceptibility to occlusion by nearby vehicles, the performance of these methods significantly declines in complex scenarios and long-range detection tasks. In this paper, we explore a new perspective that boosts HD map construction through the use of satellite maps to complement onboard sensors. We initially generate the satellite map tiles for each sample in nuScenes and release a complementary dataset for further research. To enable better integration of satellite maps with existing methods, we propose a hierarchical fusion module, which includes feature-level fusion and BEV-level fusion. The feature-level fusion, composed of a mask generator and a masked cross-attention mechanism, is used to refine the features from onboard sensors. The BEV-level fusion mitigates the coordinate differences between features obtained from onboard sensors and satellite maps through an alignment module. The experimental results on the augmented nuScenes showcase the seamless integration of our module into three existing HD map construction methods. The satellite maps and our proposed module notably enhance their performance in both HD map semantic segmentation and instance detection tasks.

As language models take on agentic roles that span calling external APIs, reading tool outputs, and acting on instructions embedded in third-party content, their attack surface expands well beyond what users type. Whether a model treats a malicious instruction the same way regardless of where it arrives has not been systematically studied. We introduce the Safety Asymmetry Score (SAS), which measures how much a model's susceptibility to adversarial content shifts depending on whether that content arrives in the user message, tool metadata, or tool output, using matched payload pairs that keep the malicious text identical and vary only the context of delivery. Evaluated across 6 production LLMs and three attack families, we find a consistent and informative asymmetry: agent-native models are substantially more vulnerable when adversarial content arrives via tool descriptions than via user messages, while general-purpose models show the reverse. This asymmetry further inverts when the same content is delivered through tool outputs rather than descriptions, suggesting models implicitly treat tool metadata as trusted instructions and tool results as ordinary data. A mechanistic study on Llama 3.3 70B reveals that the safety-relevant representation is causally present at mid-to-late network depths but non-linearly encoded, explaining why linear probes fail to detect it. These findings expose a systematic, channel-dependent blind spot in how current tool-using models handle adversarial content.

While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable success in recent advancements, their susceptibility to jailbreak attacks has come to light. In such attacks, adversaries exploit carefully crafted prompts to coerce models into generating harmful or undesirable content. Existing defense mechanisms often rely on external inference steps or safety alignment training, both of which are less effective and impractical when facing sophisticated adversarial perturbations in white-box scenarios. To address these challenges and bolster MLLM robustness, we introduce SafeMLLM by adopting an adversarial training framework that alternates between an attack step for generating adversarial noise and a model updating step. At the attack step, SafeMLLM generates adversarial perturbations through a newly proposed contrastive embedding attack (CoE-Attack), which optimizes token embeddings under a contrastive objective. SafeMLLM then updates model parameters to neutralize the perturbation effects while preserving model utility on benign inputs. We evaluate SafeMLLM across six MLLMs and six jailbreak methods spanning multiple modalities. Experimental results show that SafeMLLM effectively defends against diverse attacks, maintaining robust performance and utilities.

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

Vision-language models (VLMs) are now proposed as runtime safety guards for embodied agents in homes and factories. A deployable guard must catch genuinely unsafe situations while avoiding unnecessary intervention on routine but superficially alarming activity, a distinction that binary safety benchmarks obscure. We introduce EgoSafetyBench, an egocentric video benchmark of 1,200 robot-view scenarios annotated at half-second granularity, to evaluate VLMs as streaming guards across two tracks. The situational track (800 scenarios) spans four families, from routine and safe-but-suspicious scenes to obvious and contextual hazards. The visual-channel track (400 scenarios) targets in-scene text-a sign, sticker, or label visible in the scene-that can misrepresent the physical situation, pairing each misleading sign with a truthful version to test both whether a guard flags the text as misleading and whether the text corrupts its physical-safety judgment. Both tracks use contrastive ladders: near-identical scenarios differing only in a single visible deciding cue, so a correct call must hinge on that cue rather than the overall scene type. We evaluate ten open- and closed-source VLMs. We find that while guards reliably recognize videos containing hazards, they often miss specific hazardous moments, particularly contextual hazards. Furthermore, misleading in-scene signs degrade all tested guards: vulnerable models miss up to a third of hazards, while robust models over-intervene on safe content. Matched controls reveal that apparent safety robustness often reflects indiscriminate alarming rather than true physical reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used for automated fact-checking, yet their susceptibility to gender bias in this context remains underexplored. This study presents the first systematic investigation of gender bias in LLM-based fake news detection using real-world data. We augment the LIAR benchmark with three gender variants of speaker job titles (Neutral, Male, Female) for each statement to test whether veracity judgments vary solely based on gender presentation. Six state-of-the-art LLMs are evaluated across multiple bias and fairness metrics. All models exhibit gender sensitivity: 9.79%-35.13% of statements receive inconsistent labels across the three variants, with Male-Female comparisons showing 6.5%-23.6% flip rates. Two primary bias manifestations are identified: instability (inconsistent judgments) and directionality (systematic favoritism). Five models show statistically significant directional effects, with the strongest effects displaying male-skeptic patterns. These findings demonstrate that gender bias undermines both reliability and fairness in LLM-based fake news detection, highlighting the need for bias-aware evaluation and mitigation strategies. The augmented dataset is publicly released to support future research.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, yet how different factors shape their jailbreak vulnerabilities remains poorly understood. Existing benchmarks often couple harmful intent, prompt framing, visual semantics, and instruction carrier within individual jailbreak instances, obscuring the specific sources of observed vulnerabilities. To address this limitation, we introduce MMJailBench, a factorized benchmark that systematically varies and combines these factors under controlled configurations, enabling fine-grained comparison and factor-level attribution. Large-scale evaluations across 16 open-weight and proprietary MLLMs reveal highly heterogeneous and model-dependent vulnerability profiles. Jailbreak vulnerability varies markedly across harm domains, exposing uneven coverage in current multimodal safety alignment. Prompt framing emerges as the dominant source of variation, task-relevant visual semantics systematically increase jailbreak susceptibility with authority-like cues exposing particularly pronounced vulnerabilities, and visually rendered instructions do not consistently increase jailbreak susceptibility relative to direct textual instructions. To further investigate the risks introduced by multimodal context, we conduct diagnostic analyses on a representative open-weight model and identify vulnerability-associated patterns in internal representations and cross-modal interactions. Finally, we develop a modular multimodal jailbreak evaluation suite with full and lightweight configurations, multiple judge options, and multidimensional metrics, enabling reproducible, scalable, and cost-efficient multimodal jailbreak auditing.

Evaluating Large Language Models (LLMs) for safety and security remains a complex task, often requiring users to navigate a fragmented landscape of ad hoc benchmarks, datasets, metrics, and reporting formats. To address this challenge, we present aiXamine, a comprehensive black-box evaluation platform for LLM safety and security. aiXamine integrates over 40 tests (i.e., benchmarks) organized into eight key services targeting specific dimensions of safety and security: adversarial robustness, code security, fairness and bias, hallucination, model and data privacy, out-of-distribution (OOD) robustness, over-refusal, and safety alignment. The platform aggregates the evaluation results into a single detailed report per model, providing a detailed breakdown of model performance, test examples, and rich visualizations. We used aiXamine to assess over 50 publicly available and proprietary LLMs, conducting over 2K examinations. Our findings reveal notable vulnerabilities in leading models, including susceptibility to adversarial attacks in OpenAI's GPT-4o, biased outputs in xAI's Grok-3, and privacy weaknesses in Google's Gemini 2.0. Additionally, we observe that open-source models can match or exceed proprietary models in specific services such as safety alignment, fairness and bias, and OOD robustness. Finally, we identify trade-offs between distillation strategies, model size, training methods, and architectural choices.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have shown remarkable capabilities in multimodal understanding, yet their susceptibility to adversarial perturbations poses a significant threat to their reliability in real-world applications. Despite often being imperceptible to humans, these perturbations can drastically alter model outputs, leading to erroneous interpretations and decisions. This paper introduces DiffCAP, a novel diffusion-based purification strategy that can effectively neutralize adversarial corruptions in VLMs. We theoretically establish a provable recovery region in the forward diffusion process and meanwhile quantify the convergence rate of semantic variation with respect to VLMs. These findings manifest that adversarial effects monotonically fade as diffusion unfolds. Guided by this principle, DiffCAP leverages noise injection with a similarity threshold of VLM embeddings as an adaptive criterion, before reverse diffusion restores a clean and reliable representation for VLM inference. Through extensive experiments across six datasets with three VLMs under varying attack strengths in three task scenarios, we show that DiffCAP outperforms existing defense techniques by a substantial margin. Notably, DiffCAP significantly reduces both hyperparameter tuning complexity and the required diffusion time, thereby accelerating the denoising process. Equipped with theorems and empirical support, DiffCAP provides a robust and practical solution for securely deploying VLMs in adversarial environments. The source code is available at https://github.com/JasonFu1998/DiffCAP.

Tool-augmented LLM agents can harbor implicit state that persists across sessions, activates through events, and propagates across agent boundaries---largely invisible to standard debugging. We formalize this as Persistent Semantic Entities (PSEs): constructs defined by name binding, event triggering, and cross-boundary propagation, and evaluate them across 24 models from 11 families (1.5B--1T parameters). First, every tested model is susceptible (20--100% on the 20-model susceptibility panel), with name binding as the necessary and dominant mechanism: without it, contamination is 0%. Second, persistence depends on contamination type rather than scale or deployment: preference contamination persists undecayed on every model probed (100% at t=10) and instruction contamination persists wherever adopted, persona-style injection decays partially (90%to10%), while factual injection is model-dependent---self-corrected on Llama-3.1-8B and GPT-4o-mini but held at ceiling on both Qwen2.5-coder variants, so we do not claim it self-corrects in general. The preference and instruction results hold across providers in our controlled setting. Third, context-isolated self-verification achieves 20--79% reduction (median 36.5%) without oracle references while keyword-based detection produces systematic false positives, and contamination compounds 1.9times along a four-stage agent pipeline (40%to75%). Preference and instruction contamination---persistent, lacking self-correction, and poorly captured by standard monitoring---represent a particularly concerning attack surface for deployed agent systems.

The rapid integration of Vision Language Models (VLMs) into sensitive systems introduces critical safety vulnerabilities that remain unexplored in exist studies. While adversarial attack robustness has been extensively studied for image-based models, the susceptibility of VLMs to temporally-aware adversarial attacks against video in driving context poses a distinct and under examined threat. In this paper, we introduce novel adversarial attack against video targeting VLM models used for autonomous driving scenes named Spatial Temporal Coherence Adversarial Attack (STCA). Our attack comprise from three stages: modalities expansion, Spatial attack, and STCA attack. In modalities expansion, we propose caption-guided frame selection method in order to ensure that adversarial perturbation target the most semantically significant frames. Secondly.In spatial attack, we craft effective perturbation and preserve high similarity. Then the perturbed video generated fed into STCA stage that disrupt cross-frame temporal coherence using motion guided mask. Our method operate under black box threat model against victim target VLMs, relying solely on transferability from white-box surrogate model.We conduct our experiments on the BDD100K and nuScenes autonomous driving datasets across three VLM models: Video LLaVA-7B, Qwen2.5-VL-7B, and Dolphin. Experimental results demonstrate spatial attack achieves an ASR with high SSIM. Our finding reveal that existing video language model, remain highly susceptible to adversarial attack in autonomous driving scenarios, underscoring the urgent need for robust defense for VLM models.