Daily Papers

The European Union technological sovereignty strategy centers around the RISC-V Instruction Set Architecture, with the European Processor Initiative leading efforts to build production-ready processors. Focusing on realizing a functional RISC-V ecosystem, the BZL initiative (www.bzl.es) is making an effort to create a software stack along with the hardware. In this work, we detail the efforts made in porting a widely used syscall interception library, mainly used on AdHocFS (i.e., DAOS, GekkoFS), to RISC-V and how we overcame some of the limitations encountered.

Recently, a novel method known as Page Spray emerges, focusing on page-level exploitation for kernel vulnerabilities. Despite the advantages it offers in terms of exploitability, stability, and compatibility, comprehensive research on Page Spray remains scarce. Questions regarding its root causes, exploitation model, comparative benefits over other exploitation techniques, and possible mitigation strategies have largely remained unanswered. In this paper, we conduct a systematic investigation into Page Spray, providing an in-depth understanding of this exploitation technique. We introduce a comprehensive exploit model termed the \sys model, elucidating its fundamental principles. Additionally, we conduct a thorough analysis of the root causes underlying Page Spray occurrences within the Linux Kernel. We design an analyzer based on the Page Spray analysis model to identify Page Spray callsites. Subsequently, we evaluate the stability, exploitability, and compatibility of Page Spray through meticulously designed experiments. Finally, we propose mitigation principles for addressing Page Spray and introduce our own lightweight mitigation approach. This research aims to assist security researchers and developers in gaining insights into Page Spray, ultimately enhancing our collective understanding of this emerging exploitation technique and making improvements to the community.

The popularity of the Rust language continues to explode; yet, many critical codebases remain authored in C, and cannot be realistically rewritten by hand. Automatically translating C to Rust is thus an appealing course of action. Several works have gone down this path, handling an ever-increasing subset of C through a variety of Rust features, such as unsafe. While the prospect of automation is appealing, producing code that relies on unsafe negates the memory safety guarantees offered by Rust, and therefore the main advantages of porting existing codebases to memory-safe languages. We instead explore a different path, and explore what it would take to translate C to safe Rust; that is, to produce code that is trivially memory safe, because it abides by Rust's type system without caveats. Our work sports several original contributions: a type-directed translation from (a subset of) C to safe Rust; a novel static analysis based on "split trees" that allows expressing C's pointer arithmetic using Rust's slices and splitting operations; an analysis that infers exactly which borrows need to be mutable; and a compilation strategy for C's struct types that is compatible with Rust's distinction between non-owned and owned allocations. We apply our methodology to existing formally verified C codebases: the HACL* cryptographic library, and binary parsers and serializers from EverParse, and show that the subset of C we support is sufficient to translate both applications to safe Rust. Our evaluation shows that for the few places that do violate Rust's aliasing discipline, automated, surgical rewrites suffice; and that the few strategic copies we insert have a negligible performance impact. Of particular note, the application of our approach to HACL* results in a 80,000 line verified cryptographic library, written in pure Rust, that implements all modern algorithms - the first of its kind.

This paper presents a program logic for reasoning about multithreaded Java-like programs with dynamic thread creation, thread joining and reentrant object monitors. The logic is based on concurrent separation logic. It is the first detailed adaptation of concurrent separation logic to a multithreaded Java-like language. The program logic associates a unique static access permission with each heap location, ensuring exclusive write accesses and ruling out data races. Concurrent reads are supported through fractional permissions. Permissions can be transferred between threads upon thread starting, thread joining, initial monitor entrancies and final monitor exits. In order to distinguish between initial monitor entrancies and monitor reentrancies, auxiliary variables keep track of multisets of currently held monitors. Data abstraction and behavioral subtyping are facilitated through abstract predicates, which are also used to represent monitor invariants, preconditions for thread starting and postconditions for thread joining. Value-parametrized types allow to conveniently capture common strong global invariants, like static object ownership relations. The program logic is presented for a model language with Java-like classes and interfaces, the soundness of the program logic is proven, and a number of illustrative examples are presented.

Memory-safety bugs introduce critical software-security issues. Rust provides memory-safe mechanisms to avoid memory-safety bugs in programming, while still allowing unsafe escape hatches via unsafe code. However, the unsafe code that enhances the usability of Rust provides clear spots for finding memory-safety bugs in Rust source code. In this paper, we claim that these unsafe spots can still be identifiable in Rust binary code via machine learning and be leveraged for finding memory-safety bugs. To support our claim, we propose the tool textttrustspot, that enables reverse engineering to learn an unsafe classifier that proposes a list of functions in Rust binaries for downstream analysis. We empirically show that the function proposals by textttrustspot can recall 92.92% of memory-safety bugs, while it covers only 16.79% of the entire binary code. As an application, we demonstrate that the function proposals are used in targeted fuzzing on Rust packages, which contribute to reducing the fuzzing time compared to non-targeted fuzzing.

Large language models routinely hallucinate APIs and mislocalize edits, while language servers compute verified, IDE-grade facts about real code. We present Lanser-CLI, a CLI-first orchestration layer that pins and mediates a Language Server Protocol (LSP) server for coding agents and CI, exposing deterministic, replayable workflows. Our position is that language servers provide not only structural information (definitions, references, types, diagnostics) but also an actionable process reward: machine-checked, step-wise signals that align an agent's planning loop with program reality. In this work, Lanser-CLI contributes: (i) a robust addressing scheme beyond brittle "file:line:col" via a Selector DSL (symbolic, AST-path, and content-anchored selectors) with a principled relocation algorithm; (ii) deterministic Analysis Bundles that normalize Language Server responses and capture environment/capability metadata with stable content hashes; (iii) a safety envelope for mutating operations (rename, code actions) with preview, workspace jails, and Git-aware, transactional apply; and (iv) a process-reward functional derived from Language Server facts (diagnostic deltas, disambiguation confidence, and safe-apply checks) that is computable online and replayable offline. We formalize determinism under frozen snapshots and establish a monotonicity property for the process reward, making it suitable for process supervision and counterfactual analysis. Project Page: https://github.com/yifanzhang-pro/lanser-cli

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has enabled the ability to effectively analyze and generate code nearly instantaneously, resulting in their widespread adoption in software development. Following this advancement, researchers and companies have begun integrating LLMs across the hardware design and verification process. However, these highly potent LLMs can also induce new attack scenarios upon security vulnerabilities across the hardware development process. One such attack vector that has not been explored is intellectual property (IP) piracy. Given that this attack can manifest as rewriting hardware designs to evade piracy detection, it is essential to thoroughly evaluate LLM capabilities in performing this task and assess the mitigation abilities of current IP piracy detection tools. Therefore, in this work, we propose LLMPirate, the first LLM-based technique able to generate pirated variations of circuit designs that successfully evade detection across multiple state-of-the-art piracy detection tools. We devise three solutions to overcome challenges related to integration of LLMs for hardware circuit designs, scalability to large circuits, and effectiveness, resulting in an end-to-end automated, efficient, and practical formulation. We perform an extensive experimental evaluation of LLMPirate using eight LLMs of varying sizes and capabilities and assess their performance in pirating various circuit designs against four state-of-the-art, widely-used piracy detection tools. Our experiments demonstrate that LLMPirate is able to consistently evade detection on 100% of tested circuits across every detection tool. Additionally, we showcase the ramifications of LLMPirate using case studies on IBEX and MOR1KX processors and a GPS module, that we successfully pirate. We envision that our work motivates and fosters the development of better IP piracy detection tools.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly integrate native code interpreters, they enable powerful real-time execution capabilities, substantially expanding their utility. However, such integrations introduce potential system-level cybersecurity threats, fundamentally different from prompt-based vulnerabilities. To systematically evaluate these interpreter-specific risks, we propose CIRCLE (Code-Interpreter Resilience Check for LLM Exploits), a simple benchmark comprising 1,260 prompts targeting CPU, memory, and disk resource exhaustion. Each risk category includes explicitly malicious ("direct") and plausibly benign ("indirect") prompt variants. Our automated evaluation framework assesses not only whether LLMs refuse or generates risky code, but also executes the generated code within the interpreter environment to evaluate code correctness, simplifications made by the LLM to make the code safe, or execution timeouts. Evaluating 7 commercially available models from OpenAI and Google, we uncover significant and inconsistent vulnerabilities. For instance, evaluations show substantial disparities even within providers - OpenAI's o4-mini correctly refuses risky requests at 7.1%, notably higher rates compared to GPT-4.1 at 0.5%. Results particularly underscore that indirect, socially-engineered prompts substantially weaken model defenses. This highlights an urgent need for interpreter-specific cybersecurity benchmarks, dedicated mitigation tools (e.g., guardrails), and clear industry standards to guide safe and responsible deployment of LLM interpreter integrations. The benchmark dataset and evaluation code are publicly released to foster further research.

Model extraction is a growing concern for the security of AI systems. For deep neural network models, the architecture is the most important information an adversary aims to recover. Being a sequence of repeated computation blocks, neural network models deployed on edge-devices will generate distinctive side-channel leakages. The latter can be exploited to extract critical information when targeted platforms are physically accessible. By combining theoretical knowledge about deep learning practices and analysis of a widespread implementation library (ARM CMSIS-NN), our purpose is to answer this critical question: how far can we extract architecture information by simply examining an EM side-channel trace? For the first time, we propose an extraction methodology for traditional MLP and CNN models running on a high-end 32-bit microcontroller (Cortex-M7) that relies only on simple pattern recognition analysis. Despite few challenging cases, we claim that, contrary to parameters extraction, the complexity of the attack is relatively low and we highlight the urgent need for practicable protections that could fit the strong memory and latency requirements of such platforms.

Memory safety violations in low-level code, written in languages like C, continues to remain one of the major sources of software vulnerabilities. One method of removing such violations by construction is to port C code to a safe C dialect. Such dialects rely on programmer-supplied annotations to guarantee safety with minimal runtime overhead. This porting, however, is a manual process that imposes significant burden on the programmer and, hence, there has been limited adoption of this technique. The task of porting not only requires inferring annotations, but may also need refactoring/rewriting of the code to make it amenable to such annotations. In this paper, we use Large Language Models (LLMs) towards addressing both these concerns. We show how to harness LLM capabilities to do complex code reasoning as well as rewriting of large codebases. We also present a novel framework for whole-program transformations that leverages lightweight static analysis to break the transformation into smaller steps that can be carried out effectively by an LLM. We implement our ideas in a tool called MSA that targets the CheckedC dialect. We evaluate MSA on several micro-benchmarks, as well as real-world code ranging up to 20K lines of code. We showcase superior performance compared to a vanilla LLM baseline, as well as demonstrate improvement over a state-of-the-art symbolic (non-LLM) technique.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

Understanding the dynamic behavior of computer programs during normal working conditions is an important task, which has multiple security benefits such as the development of behavior-based anomaly detection, vulnerability discovery, and patching. Existing works achieved this goal by collecting and analyzing various data including network traffic, system calls, instruction traces, etc. In this paper, we explore the use of a new type of data, performance counters, to analyze the dynamic behavior of programs. Using existing primitives, we develop a tool named perfextract to capture data from different performance counters for a program during its startup time, thus forming multiple time series to represent the dynamic behavior of the program. We analyze the collected data and develop a semi-supervised clustering algorithm that allows us to classify each program using its performance counter time series into a specific group and to identify the intrinsic behavior of that group. We carry out extensive experiments with 18 real-world programs that belong to 4 groups including web browsers, text editors, image viewers, and audio players. The experimental results show that the examined programs can be accurately differentiated based on their performance counter data regardless of whether programs are run in physical or virtual environments.

Stealthy hardware Trojans (HTs) inserted during the fabrication of integrated circuits can bypass the security of critical infrastructures. Although researchers have proposed many techniques to detect HTs, several limitations exist, including: (i) a low success rate, (ii) high algorithmic complexity, and (iii) a large number of test patterns. Furthermore, the most pertinent drawback of prior detection techniques stems from an incorrect evaluation methodology, i.e., they assume that an adversary inserts HTs randomly. Such inappropriate adversarial assumptions enable detection techniques to claim high HT detection accuracy, leading to a "false sense of security." Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, despite more than a decade of research on detecting HTs inserted during fabrication, there have been no concerted efforts to perform a systematic evaluation of HT detection techniques. In this paper, we play the role of a realistic adversary and question the efficacy of HT detection techniques by developing an automated, scalable, and practical attack framework, ATTRITION, using reinforcement learning (RL). ATTRITION evades eight detection techniques across two HT detection categories, showcasing its agnostic behavior. ATTRITION achieves average attack success rates of 47times and 211times compared to randomly inserted HTs against state-of-the-art HT detection techniques. We demonstrate ATTRITION's ability to evade detection techniques by evaluating designs ranging from the widely-used academic suites to larger designs such as the open-source MIPS and mor1kx processors to AES and a GPS module. Additionally, we showcase the impact of ATTRITION-generated HTs through two case studies (privilege escalation and kill switch) on the mor1kx processor. We envision that our work, along with our released HT benchmarks and models, fosters the development of better HT detection techniques.

Automatic software system optimization can improve software speed, reduce operating costs, and save energy. Traditional approaches to optimization rely on manual tuning and compiler heuristics, limiting their ability to generalize across diverse codebases and system contexts. Recent methods using Large Language Models (LLMs) offer automation to address these limitations, but often fail to scale to the complexity of real-world software systems and applications. We present SysLLMatic, a system that integrates LLMs with profiling-guided feedback and system performance insights to automatically optimize software code. We evaluate it on three benchmark suites: HumanEval_CPP (competitive programming in C++), SciMark2 (scientific kernels in Java), and DaCapoBench (large-scale software systems in Java). Results show that SysLLMatic can improve system performance, including latency, throughput, energy efficiency, memory usage, and CPU utilization. It consistently outperforms state-of-the-art LLM baselines on microbenchmarks. On large-scale application codes, it surpasses traditional compiler optimizations, achieving average relative improvements of 1.85x in latency and 2.24x in throughput. Our findings demonstrate that LLMs, guided by principled systems thinking and appropriate performance diagnostics, can serve as viable software system optimizers. We further identify limitations of our approach and the challenges involved in handling complex applications. This work provides a foundation for generating optimized code across various languages, benchmarks, and program sizes in a principled manner.

Software reverse engineering is an essential task in software engineering and security, but it can be a challenging process, especially for adversarial artifacts. To address this challenge, we present STraceBERT, a novel approach that utilizes a Java dynamic analysis tool to record calls to core Java libraries, and pretrain a BERT-style model on the recorded application traces for effective method source code retrieval from a candidate set. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of STraceBERT in retrieving the source code compared to existing approaches. Our proposed approach offers a promising solution to the problem of code retrieval in software reverse engineering and opens up new avenues for further research in this area.

The hardware ecosystem is rapidly evolving, with increasing interest in translating low-level programs across different instruction set architectures (ISAs) in a quick, flexible, and correct way to enhance the portability and longevity of existing code. A particularly challenging class of this transpilation problem is translating between complex- (CISC) and reduced- (RISC) hardware architectures, due to fundamental differences in instruction complexity, memory models, and execution paradigms. In this work, we introduce GG (Guaranteed Guess), an ISA-centric transpilation pipeline that combines the translation power of pre-trained large language models (LLMs) with the rigor of established software testing constructs. Our method generates candidate translations using an LLM from one ISA to another, and embeds such translations within a software-testing framework to build quantifiable confidence in the translation. We evaluate our GG approach over two diverse datasets, enforce high code coverage (>98%) across unit tests, and achieve functional/semantic correctness of 99% on HumanEval programs and 49% on BringupBench programs, respectively. Further, we compare our approach to the state-of-the-art Rosetta 2 framework on Apple Silicon, showcasing 1.73x faster runtime performance, 1.47x better energy efficiency, and 2.41x better memory usage for our transpiled code, demonstrating the effectiveness of GG for real-world CISC-to-RISC translation tasks. We will open-source our codes, data, models, and benchmarks to establish a common foundation for ISA-level code translation research.

Static analysis is a cornerstone for software vulnerability detection, yet it often struggles with the classic precision-scalability trade-off. In practice, such tools often produce high false positive rates, particularly in large codebases like the Linux kernel. This imprecision can arise from simplified vulnerability modeling and over-approximation of path and data constraints. While large language models (LLMs) show promise in code understanding, their naive application to program analysis yields unreliable results due to inherent reasoning limitations. We introduce BugLens, a post-refinement framework that significantly improves static analysis precision. BugLens guides an LLM to follow traditional analysis steps by assessing buggy code patterns for security impact and validating the constraints associated with static warnings. Evaluated on real-world Linux kernel bugs, BugLens raises precision from 0.10 (raw) and 0.50 (semi-automated refinement) to 0.72, substantially reducing false positives and revealing four previously unreported vulnerabilities. Our results suggest that a structured LLM-based workflow can meaningfully enhance the effectiveness of static analysis tools.

In recent years, the increase in non-Windows malware threats had turned the focus of the cybersecurity community. Research works on hunting Windows PE-based malwares are maturing, whereas the developments on Linux malware threat hunting are relatively scarce. With the advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) era, smart devices that are getting integrated into human life have become a hackers highway for their malicious activities. The IoT devices employ various Unix-based architectures that follow ELF (Executable and Linkable Format) as their standard binary file specification. This study aims at providing a comprehensive survey on the latest developments in cross-architectural IoT malware detection and classification approaches. Aided by a modern taxonomy, we discuss the feature representations, feature extraction techniques, and machine learning models employed in the surveyed works. We further provide more insights on the practical challenges involved in cross-architectural IoT malware threat hunting and discuss various avenues to instill potential future research.

Machine learning programs, such as those performing inference, fine-tuning, and training of LLMs, are commonly delegated to untrusted compute providers. To provide correctness guarantees for the client, we propose adapting the cryptographic notion of refereed delegation to the machine learning setting. This approach enables a computationally limited client to delegate a program to multiple untrusted compute providers, with a guarantee of obtaining the correct result if at least one of them is honest. Refereed delegation of ML programs poses two technical hurdles: (1) an arbitration protocol to resolve disputes when compute providers disagree on the output, and (2) the ability to bitwise reproduce ML programs across different hardware setups, For (1), we design Verde, a dispute arbitration protocol that efficiently handles the large scale and graph-based computational model of modern ML programs. For (2), we build RepOps (Reproducible Operators), a library that eliminates hardware "non-determinism" by controlling the order of floating point operations performed on all hardware. Our implementation shows that refereed delegation achieves both strong guarantees for clients and practical overheads for compute providers.

Instruction-following retrievers have been widely adopted alongside LLMs in real-world applications, but little work has investigated the safety risks surrounding their increasing search capabilities. We empirically study the ability of retrievers to satisfy malicious queries, both when used directly and when used in a retrieval augmented generation-based setup. Concretely, we investigate six leading retrievers, including NV-Embed and LLM2Vec, and find that given malicious requests, most retrievers can (for >50% of queries) select relevant harmful passages. For example, LLM2Vec correctly selects passages for 61.35% of our malicious queries. We further uncover an emerging risk with instruction-following retrievers, where highly relevant harmful information can be surfaced by exploiting their instruction-following capabilities. Finally, we show that even safety-aligned LLMs, such as Llama3, can satisfy malicious requests when provided with harmful retrieved passages in-context. In summary, our findings underscore the malicious misuse risks associated with increasing retriever capability.

Intermediate Representations (IRs) play a critical role in compiler design and program analysis, yet their comprehension by Large Language Models (LLMs) remains underexplored. In this paper, we present an explorative empirical study evaluating the capabilities of six state-of-the-art LLMs: GPT-4, GPT-3, DeepSeek, Gemma 2, Llama 3, and Code Llama, in understanding IRs. Specifically, we assess model performance across four core tasks: control flow graph reconstruction, decompilation, code summarization, and execution reasoning. While LLMs exhibit competence in parsing IR syntax and identifying high-level structures, they consistently struggle with instruction-level reasoning, especially in control flow reasoning, loop handling, and dynamic execution. Common failure modes include misinterpreting branching instructions, omitting critical operations, and relying on heuristic reasoning rather than precise instruction-level logic. Our findings highlight the need for IR-specific enhancements in LLM design. We recommend fine-tuning on structured IR datasets and integrating control-flow-sensitive architectures to improve model effectiveness. All experimental data and source code are publicly available at

We present the first systematic approach to static and dynamic taint analysis for Graph APIs focusing on broken access control. The approach comprises the following. We taint nodes in the Graph API if they represent data requiring specific privileges in order to be retrieved or manipulated, and identify API calls which are related to sources and sinks. Then, we statically analyze whether tainted information flow between API source and sink calls occurs. To this end, we model the API calls using graph transformation rules. We subsequently use critical pair analysis to automatically analyze potential dependencies between rules representing source calls and rules representing sink calls. We distinguish direct from indirect tainted information flow and argue under which conditions the CPA is able to detect not only direct, but also indirect tainted flow. The static taint analysis (i) identifies flows that need to be further reviewed, since tainted nodes may be created by an API call and used or manipulated by another API call later without having the necessary privileges, and (ii) can be used to systematically design dynamic security tests for broken access control. The dynamic taint analysis checks if potential broken access control risks detected during the static taint analysis really occur. We apply the approach to a part of the GitHub GraphQL API. The application illustrates that our analysis supports the detection of two types of broken access control systematically: the case where users of the API may not be able to access or manipulate information, although they should be able to do so; and the case where users (or attackers) of the API may be able to access/manipulate information that they should not.

Despite the effort in vulnerability detection over the last two decades, memory safety vulnerabilities continue to be a critical problem. Recent reports suggest that the key solution is to migrate to memory-safe languages. To this end, C-to-Rust transpilation becomes popular to resolve memory-safety issues in C programs. Recent works propose C-to-Rust transpilation frameworks; however, a comprehensive evaluation dataset is missing. Although one solution is to put together a large enough dataset, this increases the analysis time in automated frameworks as well as in manual efforts for some cases. In this work, we build a method to select functions from a large set to construct a minimized yet representative dataset to evaluate the C-to-Rust transpilation. We propose C2RUST-BENCH that contains 2,905 functions, which are representative of C-to-Rust transpilation, selected from 15,503 functions of real-world programs.

Current application designers have moved to integrate large language models (LLMs) into their products. These LLM-integrated applications are vulnerable to prompt injection vulnerabilities. While attempts have been made to address this problem by building a detector that can monitor inputs to the LLM and detect attacks, we find that many detectors are not yet suitable for practical deployment. To support research in this area, we design the PromptShield benchmark for evaluating practical prompt injection detectors. We also construct a new detector, the PromptShield detector, which achieves significantly better performance at detecting prompt injection attacks than any prior scheme. Our work suggests that larger models, more training data, appropriate metrics, and careful curation of training data can contribute to strong detector performance.

In light of the rapid adoption of AI coding assistants, LLM-assisted development has become increasingly prevalent, creating an urgent need for robust evaluation of generated code quality. Existing benchmarks often require extensive manual effort to create static datasets, rely on indirect or insufficiently challenging tasks, depend on non-scalable ground truth, or neglect critical low-level security evaluations, particularly memory-safety issues. In this work, we introduce OSS-Bench, a benchmark generator that automatically constructs large-scale, live evaluation tasks from real-world open-source software. OSS-Bench replaces functions with LLM-generated code and evaluates them using three natural metrics: compilability, functional correctness, and memory safety, leveraging robust signals like compilation failures, test-suite violations, and sanitizer alerts as ground truth. In our evaluation, the benchmark, instantiated as OSS-Bench(php) and OSS-Bench(sql), profiles 17 diverse LLMs, revealing insights such as intra-family behavioral patterns and inconsistencies between model size and performance. Our results demonstrate that OSS-Bench mitigates overfitting by leveraging the evolving complexity of OSS and highlights LLMs' limited understanding of low-level code security via extended fuzzing experiments. Overall, OSS-Bench offers a practical and scalable framework for benchmarking the real-world coding capabilities of LLMs.

Pre-routing slack prediction remains a critical area of research in Electronic Design Automation (EDA). Despite numerous machine learning-based approaches targeting this task, there is still a lack of a truly end-to-end framework that engineers can use to obtain TNS/WNS metrics from raw circuit data at the placement stage. Existing works have demonstrated effectiveness in Arrival Time (AT) prediction but lack a mechanism for Required Arrival Time (RAT) prediction, which is essential for slack prediction and obtaining TNS/WNS metrics. In this work, we propose E2ESlack, an end-to-end graph-based framework for pre-routing slack prediction. The framework includes a TimingParser that supports DEF, SDF and LIB files for feature extraction and graph construction, an arrival time prediction model and a fast RAT estimation module. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work capable of predicting path-level slacks at the pre-routing stage. We perform extensive experiments and demonstrate that our proposed RAT estimation method outperforms the SOTA ML-based prediction method and also pre-routing STA tool. Additionally, the proposed E2ESlack framework achieves TNS/WNS values comparable to post-routing STA results while saving up to 23x runtime.

As Neural Processing Units (NPU) or accelerators are increasingly deployed in a variety of applications including safety critical applications such as autonomous vehicle, and medical imaging, it is critical to understand the fault-tolerance nature of the NPUs. We present a reliability study of Arm's Ethos-U55, an important industrial-scale NPU being utilised in embedded and IoT applications. We perform large scale RTL-level fault injections to characterize Ethos-U55 against the Automotive Safety Integrity Level D (ASIL-D) resiliency standard commonly used for safety-critical applications such as autonomous vehicles. We show that, under soft errors, all four configurations of the NPU fall short of the required level of resiliency for a variety of neural networks running on the NPU. We show that it is possible to meet the ASIL-D level resiliency without resorting to conventional strategies like Dual Core Lock Step (DCLS) that has an area overhead of 100%. We achieve so through selective protection, where hardware structures are selectively protected (e.g., duplicated, hardened) based on their sensitivity to soft errors and their silicon areas. To identify the optimal configuration that minimizes the area overhead while meeting the ASIL-D standard, the main challenge is the large search space associated with the time-consuming RTL simulation. To address this challenge, we present a statistical analysis tool that is validated against Arm silicon and that allows us to quickly navigate hundreds of billions of fault sites without exhaustive RTL fault injections. We show that by carefully duplicating a small fraction of the functional blocks and hardening the Flops in other blocks meets the ASIL-D safety standard while introducing an area overhead of only 38%.

Limitations in Large Language Model (LLM) capabilities for hardware design tasks, such as generating functional Verilog codes, have motivated various fine-tuning optimizations utilizing curated hardware datasets from open-source repositories. However, these datasets remain limited in size and contain minimal checks on licensing for reuse, resulting in potential copyright violations by fine-tuned LLMs. Therefore, we propose an evaluation benchmark to estimate the risk of Verilog-trained LLMs to generate copyright-protected codes. To minimize this risk, we present an open-source Verilog dataset, FreeSet, containing over 220k files, along with the automated dataset curation framework utilized to provide additional guarantees of fair-use Verilog data. We then execute an LLM fine-tuning framework consisting of continual pre-training, resulting in a fine-tuned Llama model for Verilog, FreeV. Our results indicate that FreeV demonstrates the smallest risk of copyright-infringement among prior works, with only a 3% violation rate. Furthermore, experimental results demonstrate improvements in Verilog generation functionality over its baseline model, improving VerilogEval pass@10 rates by over 10%.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used for complex tasks requiring multiple chained generation calls, advanced prompting techniques, control flow, and interaction with external environments. However, efficient systems for programming and executing these applications are lacking. To bridge this gap, we introduce SGLang, a Structured Generation Language for LLMs. SGLang is designed for the efficient programming of LLMs and incorporates primitives for common LLM programming patterns. We have implemented SGLang as a domain-specific language embedded in Python, and we developed an interpreter, a compiler, and a high-performance runtime for SGLang. These components work together to enable optimizations such as parallelism, batching, caching, sharing, and other compilation techniques. Additionally, we propose RadixAttention, a novel technique that maintains a Least Recently Used (LRU) cache of the Key-Value (KV) cache for all requests in a radix tree, enabling automatic KV cache reuse across multiple generation calls at runtime. SGLang simplifies the writing of LLM programs and boosts execution efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate that SGLang can speed up common LLM tasks by up to 5x, while reducing code complexity and enhancing control.

Binary code is pervasive, and binary analysis is a key task in reverse engineering, malware classification, and vulnerability discovery. Unfortunately, while there exist large corpuses of malicious binaries, obtaining high-quality corpuses of benign binaries for modern systems has proven challenging (e.g., due to licensing issues). Consequently, machine learning based pipelines for binary analysis utilize either costly commercial corpuses (e.g., VirusTotal) or open-source binaries (e.g., coreutils) available in limited quantities. To address these issues, we present Assemblage: an extensible cloud-based distributed system that crawls, configures, and builds Windows PE binaries to obtain high-quality binary corpuses suitable for training state-of-the-art models in binary analysis. We have run Assemblage on AWS over the past year, producing 890k Windows PE and 428k Linux ELF binaries across 29 configurations. Assemblage is designed to be both reproducible and extensible, enabling users to publish "recipes" for their datasets, and facilitating the extraction of a wide array of features. We evaluated Assemblage by using its data to train modern learning-based pipelines for compiler provenance and binary function similarity. Our results illustrate the practical need for robust corpuses of high-quality Windows PE binaries in training modern learning-based binary analyses. Assemblage can be downloaded from https://assemblage-dataset.net

C-to-Rust transpilation is essential for modernizing legacy C code while enhancing safety and interoperability with modern Rust ecosystems. However, no dataset currently exists for evaluating whether a system can transpile C into safe Rust that passes a set of test cases. We introduce CRUST-Bench, a dataset of 100 C repositories, each paired with manually-written interfaces in safe Rust as well as test cases that can be used to validate correctness of the transpilation. By considering entire repositories rather than isolated functions, CRUST-Bench captures the challenges of translating complex projects with dependencies across multiple files. The provided Rust interfaces provide explicit specifications that ensure adherence to idiomatic, memory-safe Rust patterns, while the accompanying test cases enforce functional correctness. We evaluate state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) on this task and find that safe and idiomatic Rust generation is still a challenging problem for various state-of-the-art methods and techniques. We also provide insights into the errors LLMs usually make in transpiling code from C to safe Rust. The best performing model, OpenAI o1, is able to solve only 15 tasks in a single-shot setting. Improvements on CRUST-Bench would lead to improved transpilation systems that can reason about complex scenarios and help in migrating legacy codebases from C into languages like Rust that ensure memory safety. You can find the dataset and code at https://github.com/anirudhkhatry/CRUST-bench.

This paper proposes LATTE, the first static binary taint analysis that is powered by a large language model (LLM). LATTE is superior to the state of the art (e.g., Emtaint, Arbiter, Karonte) in three aspects. First, LATTE is fully automated while prior static binary taint analyzers need rely on human expertise to manually customize taint propagation rules and vulnerability inspection rules. Second, LATTE is significantly effective in vulnerability detection, demonstrated by our comprehensive evaluations. For example, LATTE has found 37 new bugs in real-world firmware which the baselines failed to find, and 7 of them have been assigned CVE numbers. Lastly, LATTE incurs remarkably low engineering cost, making it a cost-efficient and scalable solution for security researchers and practitioners. We strongly believe that LATTE opens up a new direction to harness the recent advance in LLMs to improve vulnerability analysis for binary programs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

Programmable switches are driving a massive increase in fine-grained measurements. This puts significant pressure on telemetry collectors that have to process reports from many switches. Past research acknowledged this problem by either improving collectors' stack performance or by limiting the amount of data sent from switches. In this paper, we take a different and radical approach: switches are responsible for directly inserting queryable telemetry data into the collectors' memory, bypassing their CPU, and thereby improving their collection scalability. We propose to use a method we call direct telemetry access, where switches jointly write telemetry reports directly into the same collector's memory region, without coordination. Our solution, DART, is probabilistic, trading memory redundancy and query success probability for CPU resources at collectors. We prototype DART using commodity hardware such as P4 switches and RDMA NICs and show that we get high query success rates with a reasonable memory overhead. For example, we can collect INT path tracing information on a fat tree topology without a collector's CPU involvement while achieving 99.9\% query success probability and using just 300 bytes per flow.

Ensuring the security and reliability of machine learning frameworks is crucial for building trustworthy AI-based systems. Fuzzing, a popular technique in secure software development lifecycle (SSDLC), can be used to develop secure and robust software. Popular machine learning frameworks such as PyTorch and TensorFlow are complex and written in multiple programming languages including C/C++ and Python. We propose a dynamic analysis pipeline for Python projects using the Sydr-Fuzz toolset. Our pipeline includes fuzzing, corpus minimization, crash triaging, and coverage collection. Crash triaging and severity estimation are important steps to ensure that the most critical vulnerabilities are addressed promptly. Furthermore, the proposed pipeline is integrated in GitLab CI. To identify the most vulnerable parts of the machine learning frameworks, we analyze their potential attack surfaces and develop fuzz targets for PyTorch, TensorFlow, and related projects such as h5py. Applying our dynamic analysis pipeline to these targets, we were able to discover 3 new bugs and propose fixes for them.

Increasing numbers of software vulnerabilities are discovered every year whether they are reported publicly or discovered internally in proprietary code. These vulnerabilities can pose serious risk of exploit and result in system compromise, information leaks, or denial of service. We leveraged the wealth of C and C++ open-source code available to develop a large-scale function-level vulnerability detection system using machine learning. To supplement existing labeled vulnerability datasets, we compiled a vast dataset of millions of open-source functions and labeled it with carefully-selected findings from three different static analyzers that indicate potential exploits. The labeled dataset is available at: https://osf.io/d45bw/. Using these datasets, we developed a fast and scalable vulnerability detection tool based on deep feature representation learning that directly interprets lexed source code. We evaluated our tool on code from both real software packages and the NIST SATE IV benchmark dataset. Our results demonstrate that deep feature representation learning on source code is a promising approach for automated software vulnerability detection.

Graph representations of programs are commonly a central element of machine learning for code research. We introduce an open source Python library python_graphs that applies static analysis to construct graph representations of Python programs suitable for training machine learning models. Our library admits the construction of control-flow graphs, data-flow graphs, and composite ``program graphs'' that combine control-flow, data-flow, syntactic, and lexical information about a program. We present the capabilities and limitations of the library, perform a case study applying the library to millions of competitive programming submissions, and showcase the library's utility for machine learning research.

Leakage contracts have been proposed as a new security abstraction at the instruction set architecture level. Leakage contracts aim to capture the information that processors may leak via microarchitectural side channels. Recently, the first tools have emerged to verify whether a processor satisfies a given contract. However, coming up with a contract that is both sound and precise for a given processor is challenging, time-consuming, and error-prone, as it requires in-depth knowledge of the timing side channels introduced by microarchitectural optimizations. In this paper, we address this challenge by proposing LeaSyn, the first tool for automatically synthesizing leakage contracts that are both sound and precise for processor designs at register-transfer level. Starting from a user-provided contract template that captures the space of possible contracts, LeaSyn automatically constructs a contract, alternating between contract synthesis, which ensures precision based on an empirical characterization of the processor's leaks, and contract verification, which ensures soundness. Using LeaSyn, we automatically synthesize contracts for six open-source RISC-V CPUs for a variety of contract templates. Our experiments indicate that LeaSyn's contracts are sound and more precise (i.e., represent the actual leaks in the target processor more faithfully) than contracts constructed by existing approaches.

Open-Source Software (OSS) vulnerabilities bring great challenges to the software security and pose potential risks to our society. Enormous efforts have been devoted into automated vulnerability detection, among which deep learning (DL)-based approaches have proven to be the most effective. However, the current labeled data present the following limitations: (1) Tangled Patches: Developers may submit code changes unrelated to vulnerability fixes within patches, leading to tangled patches. (2) Lacking Inter-procedural Vulnerabilities: The existing vulnerability datasets typically contain function-level and file-level vulnerabilities, ignoring the relations between functions, thus rendering the approaches unable to detect the inter-procedural vulnerabilities. (3) Outdated Patches: The existing datasets usually contain outdated patches, which may bias the model during training. To address the above limitations, in this paper, we propose an automated data collection framework and construct the first repository-level high-quality vulnerability dataset named ReposVul. The proposed framework mainly contains three modules: (1) A vulnerability untangling module, aiming at distinguishing vulnerability-fixing related code changes from tangled patches, in which the Large Language Models (LLMs) and static analysis tools are jointly employed. (2) A multi-granularity dependency extraction module, aiming at capturing the inter-procedural call relationships of vulnerabilities, in which we construct multiple-granularity information for each vulnerability patch, including repository-level, file-level, function-level, and line-level. (3) A trace-based filtering module, aiming at filtering the outdated patches, which leverages the file path trace-based filter and commit time trace-based filter to construct an up-to-date dataset.

The collection of security-related logs holds the key to understanding attack behaviors and diagnosing vulnerabilities. Still, their analysis remains a daunting challenge. Recently, Language Models (LMs) have demonstrated unmatched potential in understanding natural and programming languages. The question arises whether and how LMs could be also useful for security experts since their logs contain intrinsically confused and obfuscated information. In this paper, we systematically study how to benefit from the state-of-the-art in LM to automatically analyze text-like Unix shell attack logs. We present a thorough design methodology that leads to LogPr\'ecis. It receives as input raw shell sessions and automatically identifies and assigns the attacker tactic to each portion of the session, i.e., unveiling the sequence of the attacker's goals. We demonstrate LogPr\'ecis capability to support the analysis of two large datasets containing about 400,000 unique Unix shell attacks. LogPr\'ecis reduces them into about 3,000 fingerprints, each grouping sessions with the same sequence of tactics. The abstraction it provides lets the analyst better understand attacks, identify fingerprints, detect novelty, link similar attacks, and track families and mutations. Overall, LogPr\'ecis, released as open source, paves the way for better and more responsive defense against cyberattacks.

Language models of code (LMs) work well when the surrounding code in the vicinity of generation provides sufficient context. This is not true when it becomes necessary to use types or functionality defined in another module or library, especially those not seen during training. LMs suffer from limited awareness of such global context and end up hallucinating, e.g., using types defined in other files incorrectly. Recent work tries to overcome this issue by retrieving global information to augment the local context. However, this bloats the prompt or requires architecture modifications and additional training. Integrated development environments (IDEs) assist developers by bringing the global context at their fingertips using static analysis. We extend this assistance, enjoyed by developers, to the LMs. We propose a notion of monitors that use static analysis in the background to guide the decoding. Unlike a priori retrieval, static analysis is invoked iteratively during the entire decoding process, providing the most relevant suggestions on demand. We demonstrate the usefulness of our proposal by monitoring for type-consistent use of identifiers whenever an LM generates code for object dereference. To evaluate our approach, we curate PragmaticCode, a dataset of open-source projects with their development environments. On models of varying parameter scale, we show that monitor-guided decoding consistently improves the ability of an LM to not only generate identifiers that match the ground truth but also improves compilation rates and agreement with ground truth. We find that LMs with fewer parameters, when guided with our monitor, can outperform larger LMs. With monitor-guided decoding, SantaCoder-1.1B achieves better compilation rate and next-identifier match than the much larger text-davinci-003 model. The datasets and code will be released at https://aka.ms/monitors4codegen .

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, concerns over the unauthorized use of copyrighted and licensed content in their training data have grown, especially in the context of code. Open-source code, often protected by open source licenses (e.g, GPL), poses legal and ethical challenges when used in pretraining. Detecting whether specific code samples were included in LLM training data is thus critical for transparency, accountability, and copyright compliance. We propose SynPrune, a syntax-pruned membership inference attack method tailored for code. Unlike prior MIA approaches that treat code as plain text, SynPrune leverages the structured and rule-governed nature of programming languages. Specifically, it identifies and excludes consequent tokens that are syntactically required and not reflective of authorship, from attribution when computing membership scores. Experimental results show that SynPrune consistently outperforms the state-of-the-arts. Our method is also robust across varying function lengths and syntax categories.

Grey-box fuzzers such as American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) are popular tools for finding bugs and potential vulnerabilities in programs. While these fuzzers have been able to find vulnerabilities in many widely used programs, they are not efficient; of the millions of inputs executed by AFL in a typical fuzzing run, only a handful discover unseen behavior or trigger a crash. The remaining inputs are redundant, exhibiting behavior that has already been observed. Here, we present an approach to increase the efficiency of fuzzers like AFL by applying machine learning to directly model how programs behave. We learn a forward prediction model that maps program inputs to execution traces, training on the thousands of inputs collected during standard fuzzing. This learned model guides exploration by focusing on fuzzing inputs on which our model is the most uncertain (measured via the entropy of the predicted execution trace distribution). By focusing on executing inputs our learned model is unsure about, and ignoring any input whose behavior our model is certain about, we show that we can significantly limit wasteful execution. Through testing our approach on a set of binaries released as part of the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge, we show that our approach is able to find a set of inputs that result in more code coverage and discovered crashes than baseline fuzzers with significantly fewer executions.

A key strength of managed runtimes over hardware is the ability to gain detailed insight into the dynamic execution of programs with instrumentation. Analyses such as code coverage, execution frequency, tracing, and debugging, are all made easier in a virtual setting. As a portable, low-level bytecode, WebAssembly offers inexpensive in-process sandboxing with high performance. Yet to date, Wasm engines have not offered much insight into executing programs, supporting at best bytecode-level stepping and basic source maps, but no instrumentation capabilities. In this paper, we show the first non-intrusive dynamic instrumentation system for WebAssembly in the open-source Wizard Research Engine. Our innovative design offers a flexible, complete hierarchy of instrumentation primitives that support building high-level, complex analyses in terms of low-level, programmable probes. In contrast to emulation or machine code instrumentation, injecting probes at the bytecode level increases expressiveness and vastly simplifies the implementation by reusing the engine's JIT compiler, interpreter, and deoptimization mechanism rather than building new ones. Wizard supports both dynamic instrumentation insertion and removal while providing consistency guarantees, which is key to composing multiple analyses without interference. We detail a fully-featured implementation in a high-performance multi-tier Wasm engine, show novel optimizations specifically designed to minimize instrumentation overhead, and evaluate performance characteristics under load from various analyses. This design is well-suited for production engine adoption as probes can be implemented to have no impact on production performance when not in use.

Statically analyzing dynamically-typed code is a challenging endeavor, as even seemingly trivial tasks such as determining the targets of procedure calls are non-trivial without knowing the types of objects at compile time. Addressing this challenge, gradual typing is increasingly added to dynamically-typed languages, a prominent example being TypeScript that introduces static typing to JavaScript. Gradual typing improves the developer's ability to verify program behavior, contributing to robust, secure and debuggable programs. In practice, however, users only sparsely annotate types directly. At the same time, conventional type inference faces performance-related challenges as program size grows. Statistical techniques based on machine learning offer faster inference, but although recent approaches demonstrate overall improved accuracy, they still perform significantly worse on user-defined types than on the most common built-in types. Limiting their real-world usefulness even more, they rarely integrate with user-facing applications. We propose CodeTIDAL5, a Transformer-based model trained to reliably predict type annotations. For effective result retrieval and re-integration, we extract usage slices from a program's code property graph. Comparing our approach against recent neural type inference systems, our model outperforms the current state-of-the-art by 7.85% on the ManyTypes4TypeScript benchmark, achieving 71.27% accuracy overall. Furthermore, we present JoernTI, an integration of our approach into Joern, an open source static analysis tool, and demonstrate that the analysis benefits from the additional type information. As our model allows for fast inference times even on commodity CPUs, making our system available through Joern leads to high accessibility and facilitates security research.

Most existing pre-trained language models for source code focus on learning the static code text, typically augmented with static code structures (abstract syntax tree, dependency graphs, etc.). However, program semantics will not be fully exposed before the real execution. Without an understanding of the program execution, statically pre-trained models fail to comprehensively capture the dynamic code properties, such as the branch coverage and the runtime variable values, and they are consequently less effective at code understanding tasks, such as retrieving semantic clones and detecting software vulnerabilities. To close the gap between the static nature of language models and the dynamic characteristics of programs, we introduce TRACED, an execution-aware pre-training strategy for source code. Specifically, we pre-train code language models with a combination of source code, executable inputs, and corresponding execution traces. Our goal is to teach code models the complicated execution logic during the pre-training, enabling the model to statically estimate the dynamic code properties without repeatedly executing code during task-specific fine-tuning. To illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, we fine-tune and evaluate TRACED on three downstream tasks: static execution estimation, clone retrieval, and vulnerability detection. The empirical results show that TRACED relatively improves the statically pre-trained code models by 12.4% for complete execution path prediction and by 25.2% for runtime variable value predictions. TRACED also significantly outperforms statically pre-trained models in clone retrieval and vulnerability detection across four public benchmarks.

Fuzz testing is a fundamental technique employed to identify vulnerabilities within software systems. However, the process can be protracted and resource-intensive, especially when confronted with extensive codebases. In this work, I present FuzzDistill, an approach that harnesses compile-time data and machine learning to refine fuzzing targets. By analyzing compile-time information, such as function call graphs' features, loop information, and memory operations, FuzzDistill identifies high-priority areas of the codebase that are more probable to contain vulnerabilities. I demonstrate the efficacy of my approach through experiments conducted on real-world software, demonstrating substantial reductions in testing time.

Compartmentalization effectively prevents initial corruption from turning into a successful attack. This paper presents O2C, a pioneering system designed to enforce OS kernel compartmentalization on the fly. It not only provides immediate remediation for sudden threats but also maintains consistent system availability through the enforcement process. O2C is empowered by the newest advancements of the eBPF ecosystem which allows to instrument eBPF programs that perform enforcement actions into the kernel at runtime. O2C takes the lead in embedding a machine learning model into eBPF programs, addressing unique challenges in on-the-fly compartmentalization. Our comprehensive evaluation shows that O2C effectively confines damage within the compartment. Further, we validate that decision tree is optimally suited for O2C owing to its advantages in processing tabular data, its explainable nature, and its compliance with the eBPF ecosystem. Last but not least, O2C is lightweight, showing negligible overhead and excellent sacalability system-wide.

This paper presents a quantitative program verification infrastructure for discrete probabilistic programs. Our infrastructure can be viewed as the probabilistic analogue of Boogie: its central components are an intermediate verification language (IVL) together with a real-valued logic. Our IVL provides a programming-language-style for expressing verification conditions whose validity implies the correctness of a program under investigation. As our focus is on verifying quantitative properties such as bounds on expected outcomes, expected run-times, or termination probabilities, off-the-shelf IVLs based on Boolean first-order logic do not suffice. Instead, a paradigm shift from the standard Boolean to a real-valued domain is required. Our IVL features quantitative generalizations of standard verification constructs such as assume- and assert-statements. Verification conditions are generated by a weakest-precondition-style semantics, based on our real-valued logic. We show that our verification infrastructure supports natural encodings of numerous verification techniques from the literature. With our SMT-based implementation, we automatically verify a variety of benchmarks. To the best of our knowledge, this establishes the first deductive verification infrastructure for expectation-based reasoning about probabilistic programs.

As the complexities of processors keep increasing, the task of effectively verifying their integrity and security becomes ever more daunting. The intricate web of instructions, microarchitectural features, and interdependencies woven into modern processors pose a formidable challenge for even the most diligent verification and security engineers. To tackle this growing concern, recently, researchers have developed fuzzing techniques explicitly tailored for hardware processors. However, a prevailing issue with these hardware fuzzers is their heavy reliance on static strategies to make decisions in their algorithms. To address this problem, we develop a novel dynamic and adaptive decision-making framework, MABFuzz, that uses multi-armed bandit (MAB) algorithms to fuzz processors. MABFuzz is agnostic to, and hence, applicable to, any existing hardware fuzzer. In the process of designing MABFuzz, we encounter challenges related to the compatibility of MAB algorithms with fuzzers and maximizing their efficacy for fuzzing. We overcome these challenges by modifying the fuzzing process and tailoring MAB algorithms to accommodate special requirements for hardware fuzzing. We integrate three widely used MAB algorithms in a state-of-the-art hardware fuzzer and evaluate them on three popular RISC-V-based processors. Experimental results demonstrate the ability of MABFuzz to cover a broader spectrum of processors' intricate landscapes and doing so with remarkable efficiency. In particular, MABFuzz achieves up to 308x speedup in detecting vulnerabilities and up to 5x speedup in achieving coverage compared to a state-of-the-art technique.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show promise in generating firmware for embedded systems, but often introduce security flaws and fail to meet real-time performance constraints. This paper proposes a three-phase methodology that combines LLM-based firmware generation with automated security validation and iterative refinement in a virtualized environment. Using structured prompts, models like GPT-4 generate firmware for networking and control tasks, deployed on FreeRTOS via QEMU. These implementations are tested using fuzzing, static analysis, and runtime monitoring to detect vulnerabilities such as buffer overflows (CWE-120), race conditions (CWE-362), and denial-of-service threats (CWE-400). Specialized AI agents for Threat Detection, Performance Optimization, and Compliance Verification collaborate to improve detection and remediation. Identified issues are categorized using CWE, then used to prompt targeted LLM-generated patches in an iterative loop. Experiments show a 92.4\% Vulnerability Remediation Rate (37.3\% improvement), 95.8\% Threat Model Compliance, and 0.87 Security Coverage Index. Real-time metrics include 8.6ms worst-case execution time and 195μs jitter. This process enhances firmware security and performance while contributing an open-source dataset for future research.

Reliability is essential for ensuring efficiency in LLM training. However, many real-world reliability issues remain difficult to resolve, resulting in wasted resources and degraded model performance. Unfortunately, today's collective communication libraries operate as black boxes, hiding critical information needed for effective root cause analysis. We propose Mycroft, a lightweight distributed tracing and root cause analysis system designed to address previously hidden reliability issues in collective communication. Mycroft's key idea is to trace collective communication states and leverage internal control and data dependencies to resolve reliability problems in LLM training. Mycroft has been deployed at ByteDance for over six months to debug collective communication related issues at runtime. It detected anomalies within 15 seconds in 90% of cases and identified the root cause within 20 seconds in 60% of cases. We also conducted extensive fault injection experiments to demonstrate Mycroft's capability and efficiency.

Large Language Models (LLMs) offer transformative capabilities for hardware design automation, particularly in Verilog code generation. However, they also pose significant data security challenges, including Verilog evaluation data contamination, intellectual property (IP) design leakage, and the risk of malicious Verilog generation. We introduce SALAD, a comprehensive assessment that leverages machine unlearning to mitigate these threats. Our approach enables the selective removal of contaminated benchmarks, sensitive IP and design artifacts, or malicious code patterns from pre-trained LLMs, all without requiring full retraining. Through detailed case studies, we demonstrate how machine unlearning techniques effectively reduce data security risks in LLM-aided hardware design.

Package confusion attacks such as typosquatting threaten software supply chains. Attackers make packages with names that syntactically or semantically resemble legitimate ones, tricking engineers into installing malware. While prior work has developed defenses against package confusions in some software package registries, notably NPM, PyPI, and RubyGems, gaps remain: high false-positive rates; generalization to more software package ecosystems; and insights from real-world deployment. In this work, we introduce ConfuGuard, a solution designed to address the challenges posed by package confusion threats. We begin by presenting the first empirical analysis of benign signals derived from prior package confusion data, uncovering their threat patterns, engineering practices, and measurable attributes. We observed that 13.3% of real package confusion attacks are initially stealthy, so we take that into consideration and refined the definitions. Building on state-of-the-art approaches, we extend support from three to six software package registries, and leverage package metadata to distinguish benign packages. Our approach significantly reduces 64% false-positive (from 77% to 13%), with acceptable additional overhead to filter out benign packages by analyzing the package metadata. ConfuGuard is in production at our industry partner, whose analysts have already confirmed 301 packages detected by ConfuGuard as real attacks. We share lessons learned from production and provide insights to researchers.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are consistently improving at increasingly realistic software engineering (SE) tasks. In real-world software stacks, significant SE effort is spent developing foundational system software like the Linux kernel. Unlike application-level software, a systems codebase like Linux is multilingual (low-level C/Assembly/Bash/Rust); gigantic (>20 million lines); critical (impacting billions of devices worldwide), and highly concurrent (involving complex multi-threading). To evaluate if ML models are useful while developing such large-scale systems-level software, we introduce kGym (a platform) and kBench (a dataset). The kGym platform provides a SE environment for large-scale experiments on the Linux kernel, including compiling and running kernels in parallel across several virtual machines, detecting operations and crashes, inspecting logs, and querying and patching the code base. We use kGym to facilitate evaluation on kBench, a crash resolution benchmark drawn from real-world Linux kernel bugs. An example bug in kBench contains crashing stack traces, a bug-reproducer file, a developer-written fix, and other associated data. To understand current performance, we conduct baseline experiments by prompting LLMs to resolve Linux kernel crashes. Our initial evaluations reveal that the best performing LLM achieves 0.72% and 5.38% in the unassisted and assisted (i.e., buggy files disclosed to the model) settings, respectively. These results highlight the need for further research to enhance model performance in SE tasks. Improving performance on kBench requires models to master new learning skills, including understanding the cause of crashes and repairing faults, writing memory-safe and hardware-aware code, and understanding concurrency. As a result, this work opens up multiple avenues of research at the intersection of machine learning and systems software.

Dataflow analysis is a fundamental code analysis technique that identifies dependencies between program values. Traditional approaches typically necessitate successful compilation and expert customization, hindering their applicability and usability for analyzing uncompilable programs with evolving analysis needs in real-world scenarios. This paper presents LLMDFA, an LLM-powered compilation-free and customizable dataflow analysis framework. To address hallucinations for reliable results, we decompose the problem into several subtasks and introduce a series of novel strategies. Specifically, we leverage LLMs to synthesize code that outsources delicate reasoning to external expert tools, such as using a parsing library to extract program values of interest and invoking an automated theorem prover to validate path feasibility. Additionally, we adopt a few-shot chain-of-thought prompting to summarize dataflow facts in individual functions, aligning the LLMs with the program semantics of small code snippets to mitigate hallucinations. We evaluate LLMDFA on synthetic programs to detect three representative types of bugs and on real-world Android applications for customized bug detection. On average, LLMDFA achieves 87.10% precision and 80.77% recall, surpassing existing techniques with F1 score improvements of up to 0.35. We have open-sourced LLMDFA at https://github.com/chengpeng-wang/LLMDFA.

Internet of Things (IoT) devices are increasingly pervasive and essential components in enabling new applications and services. However, their widespread use also exposes them to exploitable vulnerabilities and flaws that can lead to significant losses. In this context, ensuring robust cybersecurity measures is essential to protect IoT devices from malicious attacks. However, the current solutions that provide flexible policy specifications and higher security levels for IoT devices are scarce. To address this gap, we introduce T800, a low-resource packet filter that utilizes machine learning (ML) algorithms to classify packets in IoT devices. We present a detailed performance benchmarking framework and demonstrate T800's effectiveness on the ESP32 system-on-chip microcontroller and ESP-IDF framework. Our evaluation shows that T800 is an efficient solution that increases device computational capacity by excluding unsolicited malicious traffic from the processing pipeline. Additionally, T800 is adaptable to different systems and provides a well-documented performance evaluation strategy for security ML-based mechanisms on ESP32-based IoT systems. Our research contributes to improving the cybersecurity of resource-constrained IoT devices and provides a scalable, efficient solution that can be used to enhance the security of IoT systems.

We introduce AnyTool, a large language model agent designed to revolutionize the utilization of a vast array of tools in addressing user queries. We utilize over 16,000 APIs from Rapid API, operating under the assumption that a subset of these APIs could potentially resolve the queries. AnyTool primarily incorporates three elements: an API retriever with a hierarchical structure, a solver aimed at resolving user queries using a selected set of API candidates, and a self-reflection mechanism, which re-activates AnyTool if the initial solution proves impracticable. AnyTool is powered by the function calling feature of GPT-4, eliminating the need for training external modules. We also revisit the evaluation protocol introduced by previous works and identify a limitation in this protocol that leads to an artificially high pass rate. By revising the evaluation protocol to better reflect practical application scenarios, we introduce an additional benchmark, termed AnyToolBench. Experiments across various datasets demonstrate the superiority of our AnyTool over strong baselines such as ToolLLM and a GPT-4 variant tailored for tool utilization. For instance, AnyTool outperforms ToolLLM by +35.4% in terms of average pass rate on ToolBench. Code will be available at https://github.com/dyabel/AnyTool.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

As an essential part of modern hardware design, manually writing Register Transfer Level (RTL) code such as Verilog is often labor-intensive. Following the tremendous success of large language models (LLMs), researchers have begun to explore utilizing LLMs for generating RTL code. However, current studies primarily focus on generating simple single modules, which can not meet the demands in real world. In fact, due to challenges in managing long-context RTL code and complex cross-file dependencies, existing solutions cannot handle large-scale Verilog repositories in practical hardware development. As the first endeavor to exclusively adapt LLMs for large-scale RTL development, we propose RTLRepoCoder, a groundbreaking solution that incorporates specific fine-tuning and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) for repository-level Verilog code completion. Open-source Verilog repositories from the real world, along with an extended context size, are used for domain-specific fine-tuning. The optimized RAG system improves the information density of the input context by retrieving relevant code snippets. Tailored optimizations for RAG are carried out, including the embedding model, the cross-file context splitting strategy, and the chunk size. Our solution achieves state-of-the-art performance on public benchmark, significantly surpassing GPT-4 and advanced domain-specific LLMs on Edit Similarity and Exact Match rate. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate the remarkable effectiveness of our approach and offer insights for future work.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Computer use agents are LLM-based agents that can directly interact with a graphical user interface, by processing screenshots or accessibility trees. While these systems are gaining popularity, their safety has been largely overlooked, despite the fact that evaluating and understanding their potential for harmful behavior is essential for widespread adoption. To address this gap, we introduce OS-Harm, a new benchmark for measuring safety of computer use agents. OS-Harm is built on top of the OSWorld environment and aims to test models across three categories of harm: deliberate user misuse, prompt injection attacks, and model misbehavior. To cover these cases, we create 150 tasks that span several types of safety violations (harassment, copyright infringement, disinformation, data exfiltration, etc.) and require the agent to interact with a variety of OS applications (email client, code editor, browser, etc.). Moreover, we propose an automated judge to evaluate both accuracy and safety of agents that achieves high agreement with human annotations (0.76 and 0.79 F1 score). We evaluate computer use agents based on a range of frontier models - such as o4-mini, Claude 3.7 Sonnet, Gemini 2.5 Pro - and provide insights into their safety. In particular, all models tend to directly comply with many deliberate misuse queries, are relatively vulnerable to static prompt injections, and occasionally perform unsafe actions. The OS-Harm benchmark is available at https://github.com/tml-epfl/os-harm.

Open-source AI libraries are foundational to modern AI systems but pose significant, underexamined risks across security, licensing, maintenance, supply chain integrity, and regulatory compliance. We present LibVulnWatch, a graph-based agentic assessment framework that performs deep, source-grounded evaluations of these libraries. Built on LangGraph, the system coordinates a directed acyclic graph of specialized agents to extract, verify, and quantify risk using evidence from trusted sources such as repositories, documentation, and vulnerability databases. LibVulnWatch generates reproducible, governance-aligned scores across five critical domains, publishing them to a public leaderboard for longitudinal ecosystem monitoring. Applied to 20 widely used libraries, including ML frameworks, LLM inference engines, and agent orchestration tools, our system covers up to 88% of OpenSSF Scorecard checks while uncovering up to 19 additional risks per library. These include critical Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, absent Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs), licensing constraints, undocumented telemetry, and widespread gaps in regulatory documentation and auditability. By translating high-level governance principles into practical, verifiable metrics, LibVulnWatch advances technical AI governance with a scalable, transparent mechanism for continuous supply chain risk assessment and informed library selection.

Safety alignment mechanisms in large language models prevent responses to harmful queries through learned refusal behavior, yet these same mechanisms impede legitimate research applications including cognitive modeling, adversarial testing, and security analysis. While abliteration techniques enable surgical removal of refusal representations through directional orthogonalization, the relative effectiveness of available implementations remains uncharacterized. This study evaluates four abliteration tools (Heretic, DECCP, ErisForge, FailSpy) across sixteen instruction-tuned models (7B-14B parameters), reporting tool compatibility on all 16 models and quantitative metrics on subsets dictated by tool support. Single-pass methods demonstrated superior capability preservation on the benchmarked subset (avg GSM8K change across three models: ErisForge -0.28 pp; DECCP -0.13 pp), while Bayesian-optimized abliteration produced variable distribution shift (KL divergence: 0.043-1.646) with model-dependent capability impact. These findings provide researchers with evidence-based selection criteria for abliteration tool deployment across diverse model architectures. The principal finding indicates that mathematical reasoning capabilities exhibit the highest sensitivity to abliteration interventions, with GSM8K change ranging from +1.51 pp to -18.81 pp (-26.5% relative) depending on tool selection and model architecture.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Code contains security and functional bugs. The process of identifying and localizing them is difficult and relies on human labor. In this work, we present a novel approach (FLAG) to assist human debuggers. FLAG is based on the lexical capabilities of generative AI, specifically, Large Language Models (LLMs). Here, we input a code file then extract and regenerate each line within that file for self-comparison. By comparing the original code with an LLM-generated alternative, we can flag notable differences as anomalies for further inspection, with features such as distance from comments and LLM confidence also aiding this classification. This reduces the inspection search space for the designer. Unlike other automated approaches in this area, FLAG is language-agnostic, can work on incomplete (and even non-compiling) code and requires no creation of security properties, functional tests or definition of rules. In this work, we explore the features that help LLMs in this classification and evaluate the performance of FLAG on known bugs. We use 121 benchmarks across C, Python and Verilog; with each benchmark containing a known security or functional weakness. We conduct the experiments using two state of the art LLMs in OpenAI's code-davinci-002 and gpt-3.5-turbo, but our approach may be used by other models. FLAG can identify 101 of the defects and helps reduce the search space to 12-17% of source code.

This paper introduces VeriThoughts, a novel dataset designed for reasoning-based Verilog code generation. We establish a new benchmark framework grounded in formal verification methods to evaluate the quality and correctness of generated hardware descriptions. Additionally, we present a suite of specialized small-scale models optimized specifically for Verilog generation. Our work addresses the growing need for automated hardware design tools that can produce verifiably correct implementations from high-level specifications, potentially accelerating the hardware development process while maintaining rigorous correctness guarantees. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wilyub/VeriThoughts{this URL}.

Large language models (LLMs) extended as systems, such as ChatGPT, have begun supporting third-party applications. These LLM apps leverage the de facto natural language-based automated execution paradigm of LLMs: that is, apps and their interactions are defined in natural language, provided access to user data, and allowed to freely interact with each other and the system. These LLM app ecosystems resemble the settings of earlier computing platforms, where there was insufficient isolation between apps and the system. Because third-party apps may not be trustworthy, and exacerbated by the imprecision of natural language interfaces, the current designs pose security and privacy risks for users. In this paper, we evaluate whether these issues can be addressed through execution isolation and what that isolation might look like in the context of LLM-based systems, where there are arbitrary natural language-based interactions between system components, between LLM and apps, and between apps. To that end, we propose IsolateGPT, a design architecture that demonstrates the feasibility of execution isolation and provides a blueprint for implementing isolation, in LLM-based systems. We evaluate IsolateGPT against a number of attacks and demonstrate that it protects against many security, privacy, and safety issues that exist in non-isolated LLM-based systems, without any loss of functionality. The performance overhead incurred by IsolateGPT to improve security is under 30% for three-quarters of tested queries.

DL compiler's primary function is to translate DNN programs written in high-level DL frameworks such as PyTorch and TensorFlow into portable executables. These executables can then be flexibly executed by the deployed host programs. However, existing DL compilers rely on a tracing mechanism, which involves feeding a runtime input to a neural network program and tracing the program execution paths to generate the computational graph necessary for compilation. Unfortunately, this mechanism falls short when dealing with modern dynamic neural networks (DyNNs) that possess varying computational graphs depending on the inputs. Consequently, conventional DL compilers struggle to accurately compile DyNNs into executable code. To address this limitation, we propose \tool, a general approach that enables any existing DL compiler to successfully compile DyNNs. \tool tackles the dynamic nature of DyNNs by introducing a compilation mechanism that redistributes the control and data flow of the original DNN programs during the compilation process. Specifically, \tool develops program analysis and program transformation techniques to convert a dynamic neural network into multiple sub-neural networks. Each sub-neural network is devoid of conditional statements and is compiled independently. Furthermore, \tool synthesizes a host module that models the control flow of the DyNNs and facilitates the invocation of the sub-neural networks. Our evaluation demonstrates the effectiveness of \tool, achieving a 100\% success rate in compiling all dynamic neural networks. Moreover, the compiled executables generated by \tool exhibit significantly improved performance, running between 1.12times and 20.21times faster than the original DyNNs executed on general-purpose DL frameworks.

In the rapidly evolving software development landscape, Python stands out for its simplicity, versatility, and extensive ecosystem. Python packages, as units of organization, reusability, and distribution, have become a pressing concern, highlighted by the considerable number of vulnerability reports. As a scripting language, Python often cooperates with other languages for performance or interoperability. This adds complexity to the vulnerabilities inherent to Python packages, and the effectiveness of current vulnerability detection tools remains underexplored. This paper addresses these gaps by introducing PyVul, the first comprehensive benchmark suite of Python-package vulnerabilities. PyVul includes 1,157 publicly reported, developer-verified vulnerabilities, each linked to its affected packages. To accommodate diverse detection techniques, it provides annotations at both commit and function levels. An LLM-assisted data cleansing method is incorporated to improve label accuracy, achieving 100% commit-level and 94% function-level accuracy, establishing PyVul as the most precise large-scale Python vulnerability benchmark. We further carry out a distribution analysis of PyVul, which demonstrates that vulnerabilities in Python packages involve multiple programming languages and exhibit a wide variety of types. Moreover, our analysis reveals that multi-lingual Python packages are potentially more susceptible to vulnerabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art detectors using this benchmark reveals a significant discrepancy between the capabilities of existing tools and the demands of effectively identifying real-world security issues in Python packages. Additionally, we conduct an empirical review of the top-ranked CWEs observed in Python packages, to diagnose the fine-grained limitations of current detection tools and highlight the necessity for future advancements in the field.

As LLMs see wide adoption in software engineering, the reliable assessment of the correctness and security of LLM-generated code is crucial. Notably, prior work has demonstrated that security is often overlooked, exposing that LLMs are prone to generating code with security vulnerabilities. These insights were enabled by specialized benchmarks, crafted through significant manual effort by security experts. However, relying on manually-crafted benchmarks is insufficient in the long term, because benchmarks (i) naturally end up contaminating training data, (ii) must extend to new tasks to provide a more complete picture, and (iii) must increase in difficulty to challenge more capable LLMs. In this work, we address these challenges and present AutoBaxBuilder, a framework that generates tasks and tests for code security benchmarking from scratch. We introduce a robust pipeline with fine-grained plausibility checks, leveraging the code understanding capabilities of LLMs to construct functionality tests and end-to-end security-probing exploits. To confirm the quality of the generated benchmark, we conduct both a qualitative analysis and perform quantitative experiments, comparing it against tasks constructed by human experts. We use AutoBaxBuilder to construct entirely new tasks and release them to the public as AutoBaxBench, together with a thorough evaluation of the security capabilities of LLMs on these tasks. We find that a new task can be generated in under 2 hours, costing less than USD 10.

LLMs show promise in transforming software development, with a growing interest in integrating them into more intelligent apps. Frameworks like LangChain aid LLM-integrated app development, offering code execution utility/APIs for custom actions. However, these capabilities theoretically introduce Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities, enabling remote code execution through prompt injections. No prior research systematically investigates these frameworks' RCE vulnerabilities or their impact on applications and exploitation consequences. Therefore, there is a huge research gap in this field. In this study, we propose LLMSmith to detect, validate and exploit the RCE vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated frameworks and apps. To achieve this goal, we develop two novel techniques, including 1) a lightweight static analysis to examine LLM integration mechanisms, and construct call chains to identify RCE vulnerabilities in frameworks; 2) a systematical prompt-based exploitation method to verify and exploit the found vulnerabilities in LLM-integrated apps. This technique involves various strategies to control LLM outputs, trigger RCE vulnerabilities and launch subsequent attacks. Our research has uncovered a total of 20 vulnerabilities in 11 LLM-integrated frameworks, comprising 19 RCE vulnerabilities and 1 arbitrary file read/write vulnerability. Of these, 17 have been confirmed by the framework developers, with 11 vulnerabilities being assigned CVE IDs. For the 51 apps potentially affected by RCE, we successfully executed attacks on 17 apps, 16 of which are vulnerable to RCE and 1 to SQL injection. Furthermore, we conduct a comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities and construct practical attacks to demonstrate the hazards in reality. Last, we propose several mitigation measures for both framework and app developers to counteract such attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) like GPT-4, LLaMA, and Qwen have demonstrated remarkable success across a wide range of applications. However, these models remain inherently vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, which can bypass existing safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for more robust attack detection methods and comprehensive evaluation benchmarks. To address these challenges, we introduce GenTel-Safe, a unified framework that includes a novel prompt injection attack detection method, GenTel-Shield, along with a comprehensive evaluation benchmark, GenTel-Bench, which compromises 84812 prompt injection attacks, spanning 3 major categories and 28 security scenarios. To prove the effectiveness of GenTel-Shield, we evaluate it together with vanilla safety guardrails against the GenTel-Bench dataset. Empirically, GenTel-Shield can achieve state-of-the-art attack detection success rates, which reveals the critical weakness of existing safeguarding techniques against harmful prompts. For reproducibility, we have made the code and benchmarking dataset available on the project page at https://gentellab.github.io/gentel-safe.github.io/.

Large language models (LLMs) introduce new security risks, but there are few comprehensive evaluation suites to measure and reduce these risks. We present BenchmarkName, a novel benchmark to quantify LLM security risks and capabilities. We introduce two new areas for testing: prompt injection and code interpreter abuse. We evaluated multiple state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, including GPT-4, Mistral, Meta Llama 3 70B-Instruct, and Code Llama. Our results show that conditioning away risk of attack remains an unsolved problem; for example, all tested models showed between 26% and 41% successful prompt injection tests. We further introduce the safety-utility tradeoff: conditioning an LLM to reject unsafe prompts can cause the LLM to falsely reject answering benign prompts, which lowers utility. We propose quantifying this tradeoff using False Refusal Rate (FRR). As an illustration, we introduce a novel test set to quantify FRR for cyberattack helpfulness risk. We find many LLMs able to successfully comply with "borderline" benign requests while still rejecting most unsafe requests. Finally, we quantify the utility of LLMs for automating a core cybersecurity task, that of exploiting software vulnerabilities. This is important because the offensive capabilities of LLMs are of intense interest; we quantify this by creating novel test sets for four representative problems. We find that models with coding capabilities perform better than those without, but that further work is needed for LLMs to become proficient at exploit generation. Our code is open source and can be used to evaluate other LLMs.

Confidential computing on GPUs, like NVIDIA H100, mitigates the security risks of outsourced Large Language Models (LLMs) by implementing strong isolation and data encryption. Nonetheless, this encryption incurs a significant performance overhead, reaching up to 52.8 percent and 88.2 percent throughput drop when serving OPT-30B and OPT-66B, respectively. To address this challenge, we introduce PipeLLM, a user-transparent runtime system. PipeLLM removes the overhead by overlapping the encryption and GPU computation through pipelining - an idea inspired by the CPU instruction pipelining - thereby effectively concealing the latency increase caused by encryption. The primary technical challenge is that, unlike CPUs, the encryption module lacks prior knowledge of the specific data needing encryption until it is requested by the GPUs. To this end, we propose speculative pipelined encryption to predict the data requiring encryption by analyzing the serving patterns of LLMs. Further, we have developed an efficient, low-cost pipeline relinquishing approach for instances of incorrect predictions. Our experiments on NVIDIA H100 GPU show that compared with vanilla systems without confidential computing (e.g., vLLM, PEFT, and FlexGen), PipeLLM incurs modest overhead (less than 19.6 percent in throughput) across various LLM sizes, from 13B to 175B.

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt leakage threats and mitigation strategies is lacking, especially for multi-turn LLM interactions. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLM vulnerabilities against prompt leakage for 10 closed- and open-source LLMs, across four domains. We design a unique threat model which leverages the LLM sycophancy effect and elevates the average attack success rate (ASR) from 17.7% to 86.2% in a multi-turn setting. Our standardized setup further allows dissecting leakage of specific prompt contents such as task instructions and knowledge documents. We measure the mitigation effect of 7 black-box defense strategies, along with finetuning an open-source model to defend against leakage attempts. We present different combination of defenses against our threat model, including a cost analysis. Our study highlights key takeaways for building secure LLM applications and provides directions for research in multi-turn LLM interactions

The code generation capabilities of large language models(LLMs) have emerged as a critical dimension in evaluating their overall performance. However, prior research has largely overlooked the security risks inherent in the generated code. In this work, we introduce SafeGenBench, a benchmark specifically designed to assess the security of LLM-generated code. The dataset encompasses a wide range of common software development scenarios and vulnerability types. Building upon this benchmark, we develop an automatic evaluation framework that leverages both static application security testing(SAST) and LLM-based judging to assess the presence of security vulnerabilities in model-generated code. Through the empirical evaluation of state-of-the-art LLMs on SafeGenBench, we reveal notable deficiencies in their ability to produce vulnerability-free code. Our findings highlight pressing challenges and offer actionable insights for future advancements in the secure code generation performance of LLMs. The data and code will be released soon.

Production-grade LLM systems require robust adherence to dozens or even hundreds of instructions simultaneously. However, the instruction-following capabilities of LLMs at high instruction densities have not yet been characterized, as existing benchmarks only evaluate models on tasks with a single or few instructions. We introduce IFScale, a simple benchmark of 500 keyword-inclusion instructions for a business report writing task to measure how instruction-following performance degrades as instruction density increases. We evaluate 20 state-of-the-art models across seven major providers and find that even the best frontier models only achieve 68% accuracy at the max density of 500 instructions. Our analysis reveals model size and reasoning capability to correlate with 3 distinct performance degradation patterns, bias towards earlier instructions, and distinct categories of instruction-following errors. Our insights can help inform design of instruction-dense prompts in real-world applications and highlight important performance-latency tradeoffs. We open-source the benchmark and all results for further analysis at https://distylai.github.io/IFScale.

CONTEXT The R programming language has a huge and active community, especially in the area of statistical computing. Its interpreted nature allows for several interesting constructs, like the manipulation of functions at run-time, that hinder the static analysis of R programs. At the same time, there is a lack of existing research regarding how these features, or even the R language as a whole are used in practice. OBJECTIVE In this paper, we conduct a large-scale, static analysis of more than 50 million lines of real-world R programs and packages to identify their characteristics and the features that are actually used. Moreover, we compare the similarities and differences between the scripts of R users and the implementations of package authors. We provide insights for static analysis tools like the lintr package as well as potential interpreter optimizations and uncover areas for future research. METHOD We analyze 4230 R scripts submitted alongside publications and the sources of 19450 CRAN packages for over 350000 R files, collecting and summarizing quantitative information for features of interest. RESULTS We find a high frequency of name-based indexing operations, assignments, and loops, but a low frequency for most of R's reflective functions. Furthermore, we find neither testing functions nor many calls to R's foreign function interface (FFI) in the publication submissions. CONCLUSION R scripts and package sources differ, for example, in their size, the way they include other packages, and their usage of R's reflective capabilities. We provide features that are used frequently and should be prioritized by static analysis tools, like operator assignments, function calls, and certain reflective functions like load.

Translating software written in legacy languages to modern languages, such as C to Rust, has significant benefits in improving memory safety while maintaining high performance. However, manual translation is cumbersome, error-prone, and produces unidiomatic code. Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated promise in producing idiomatic translations, but offer no correctness guarantees as they lack the ability to capture all the semantics differences between the source and target languages. To resolve this issue, we propose SACTOR, an LLM-driven C-to-Rust zero-shot translation tool using a two-step translation methodology: an "unidiomatic" step to translate C into Rust while preserving semantics, and an "idiomatic" step to refine the code to follow Rust's semantic standards. SACTOR utilizes information provided by static analysis of the source C program to address challenges such as pointer semantics and dependency resolution. To validate the correctness of the translated result from each step, we use end-to-end testing via the foreign function interface to embed our translated code segment into the original code. We evaluate the translation of 200 programs from two datasets and two case studies, comparing the performance of GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 2.0 Flash, Llama 3.3 70B and DeepSeek-R1 in SACTOR. Our results demonstrate that SACTOR achieves high correctness and improved idiomaticity, with the best-performing model (DeepSeek-R1) reaching 93% and (GPT-4o, Claude 3.5, DeepSeek-R1) reaching 84% correctness (on each dataset, respectively), while producing more natural and Rust-compliant translations compared to existing methods.

Automatic program repair seeks to generate correct code from buggy programs, with most approaches searching the correct program in a discrete, symbolic space of source code tokens. This symbolic search is fundamentally limited by its inability to directly reason about program behavior. We introduce Gradient-Based Program Repair (GBPR), a new paradigm that reframes program repair as continuous optimization in a differentiable numerical program space. Our core insight is to compile symbolic programs into differentiable numerical representations, enabling search in the numerical program space directly guided by program behavior. To evaluate GBPR, we present RaspBugs, a new benchmark of 1,466 buggy symbolic RASP programs and their respective numerical representations. Our experiments demonstrate that GBPR can effectively repair buggy symbolic programs by gradient-based optimization in the numerical program space, with convincing repair trajectories. To our knowledge, we are the first to state program repair as continuous optimization in a numerical program space. Our work establishes a new direction for program repair research, bridging two rich worlds: continuous optimization and program behavior.

Tool-calling has changed Large Language Model (LLM) applications by integrating external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality across diverse tasks. However, this integration also introduces new security vulnerabilities, particularly in the tool scheduling mechanisms of LLM, which have not been extensively studied. To fill this gap, we present ToolCommander, a novel framework designed to exploit vulnerabilities in LLM tool-calling systems through adversarial tool injection. Our framework employs a well-designed two-stage attack strategy. Firstly, it injects malicious tools to collect user queries, then dynamically updates the injected tools based on the stolen information to enhance subsequent attacks. These stages enable ToolCommander to execute privacy theft, launch denial-of-service attacks, and even manipulate business competition by triggering unscheduled tool-calling. Notably, the ASR reaches 91.67% for privacy theft and hits 100% for denial-of-service and unscheduled tool calling in certain cases. Our work demonstrates that these vulnerabilities can lead to severe consequences beyond simple misuse of tool-calling systems, underscoring the urgent need for robust defensive strategies to secure LLM Tool-calling systems.

Automating software vulnerability detection (SVD) remains a critical challenge in an era of increasingly complex and interdependent software systems. Despite significant advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) for code analysis, prevailing evaluation methodologies often lack the context-aware robustness necessary to capture real-world intricacies and cross-component interactions. To address these limitations, we present VulnSage, a comprehensive evaluation framework and a dataset curated from diverse, large-scale open-source system software projects developed in C/C++. Unlike prior datasets, it leverages a heuristic noise pre-filtering approach combined with LLM-based reasoning to ensure a representative and minimally noisy spectrum of vulnerabilities. The framework supports multi-granular analysis across function, file, and inter-function levels and employs four diverse zero-shot prompt strategies: Baseline, Chain-of-Thought, Think, and Think & Verify. Through this evaluation, we uncover that structured reasoning prompts substantially improve LLM performance, with Think & Verify reducing ambiguous responses from 20.3% to 9.1% while increasing accuracy. We further demonstrate that code-specialized models consistently outperform general-purpose alternatives, with performance varying significantly across vulnerability types, revealing that no single approach universally excels across all security contexts. Link to dataset and codes: https://github.com/Erroristotle/VulnSage.git

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed on mobile devices offer benefits like user privacy and reduced network latency, but introduce a significant security risk: the leakage of proprietary models to end users. To mitigate this risk, we propose a system design for protecting on-device LLMs using Arm Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), TrustZone. Our system addresses two primary challenges: (1) The dilemma between memory efficiency and fast inference (caching model parameters within TEE memory). (2) The lack of efficient and secure Neural Processing Unit (NPU) time-sharing between Rich Execution Environment (REE) and TEE. Our approach incorporates two key innovations. First, we employ pipelined restoration, leveraging the deterministic memory access patterns of LLM inference to prefetch parameters on demand, hiding memory allocation, I/O and decryption latency under computation time. Second, we introduce a co-driver design, creating a minimal data plane NPU driver in the TEE that collaborates with the full-fledged REE driver. This reduces the TEE TCB size and eliminates control plane reinitialization overhead during NPU world switches. We implemented our system on the emerging OpenHarmony OS and the llama.cpp inference framework, and evaluated it with various LLMs on an Arm Rockchip device. Compared to a strawman TEE baseline lacking our optimizations, our system reduces TTFT by up to 90.9% and increases decoding speed by up to 23.2%.

Migrating existing C programs into Rust is increasingly desired, as Rust offers superior memory safety while maintaining C's high performance. However, vastly different features between C and Rust--e.g., distinct definitions and usages of pointers and references--pose significant challenges beyond mere syntactic translation. Existing automated translation tools, such as C2Rust, may rely too much on syntactic, template-based translation and generate unsafe Rust code that is hard for human developers to read, maintain, or even compile. More semantic-aware translation that produces safer, idiomatic, and runnable Rust code is much needed. This paper introduces a novel dependency-guided and large language model (LLM)-based C-to-Rust translation approach, RustMap, based on three key ideas: (1) Utilize LLM capabilities to produce idiomatic Rust code from given small pieces of C code, (2) Mitigate LLM limitations in handling large codebases by breaking project-scale C programs into smaller units for translation according to their usage dependencies and composing them into a runnable Rust program, and (3) Enhance the correctness of the translated Rust program by using test cases to check input/output equivalence, isolate faulty code when execution states deviate, and iteratively refine the translation using feedback from compilation and test errors. We empirically evaluate RustMap on 126 real-world programs, including 125 from Rosetta Code and a 7000+ line bzip2 implementation using GPT-4o as the LLM. RustMap shows promising results, guiding GPT-4o to produce idiomatic, readable, and functional Rust code with significantly less unsafe code than other tools, and revealing non-trivial translation patterns reusable for future research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress, but their deployment has exposed critical vulnerabilities, particularly to jailbreak attacks that circumvent safety mechanisms. Guardrails--external defense mechanisms that monitor and control LLM interaction--have emerged as a promising solution. However, the current landscape of LLM guardrails is fragmented, lacking a unified taxonomy and comprehensive evaluation framework. In this Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) paper, we present the first holistic analysis of jailbreak guardrails for LLMs. We propose a novel, multi-dimensional taxonomy that categorizes guardrails along six key dimensions, and introduce a Security-Efficiency-Utility evaluation framework to assess their practical effectiveness. Through extensive analysis and experiments, we identify the strengths and limitations of existing guardrail approaches, explore their universality across attack types, and provide insights into optimizing defense combinations. Our work offers a structured foundation for future research and development, aiming to guide the principled advancement and deployment of robust LLM guardrails. The code is available at https://github.com/xunguangwang/SoK4JailbreakGuardrails.

Pretrained code language models have enabled great progress towards program synthesis. However, common approaches only consider in-file local context and thus miss information and constraints imposed by other parts of the codebase and its external dependencies. Existing code completion benchmarks also lack such context. To resolve these restrictions we curate a new dataset of permissively licensed Python packages that includes full projects and their dependencies and provide tools to extract non-local information with the help of program analyzers. We then focus on the task of function call argument completion which requires predicting the arguments to function calls. We show that existing code completion models do not yield good results on our completion task. To better solve this task, we query a program analyzer for information relevant to a given function call, and consider ways to provide the analyzer results to different code completion models during inference and training. Our experiments show that providing access to the function implementation and function usages greatly improves the argument completion performance. Our ablation study provides further insights on how different types of information available from the program analyzer and different ways of incorporating the information affect the model performance.

Large language models (LLMs) use function calls to interface with external tools and data source. However, the current approach to LLM function calling is inherently synchronous, where each call blocks LLM inference, limiting LLM operation and concurrent function execution. In this work, we propose AsyncLM, a system for asynchronous LLM function calling. AsyncLM improves LLM's operational efficiency by enabling LLMs to generate and execute function calls concurrently. Instead of waiting for each call's completion, AsyncLM introduces an interrupt mechanism to asynchronously notify the LLM in-flight when function calls return. We design an in-context protocol for function calls and interrupts, provide fine-tuning strategy to adapt LLMs to the interrupt semantics, and implement these mechanisms efficiently on LLM inference process. We demonstrate that AsyncLM can reduce end-to-end task completion latency from 1.6x-5.4x compared to synchronous function calling on a set of benchmark tasks in the Berkeley function calling leaderboard (BFCL). Furthermore, we discuss how interrupt mechanisms can be extended to enable novel human-LLM or LLM-LLM interactions.

Sequence models for binary analysis are bottlenecked by byte-level tokenization: raw bytes waste precious context window capacity for transformers and other neural network architectures, and many existing text-oriented tokenizers fail on arbitrary 0x00--0xFF sequences. To address this issue, we introduce the Binary BPE tokenizer family, a set of cross-platform Byte Pair Encoding (BPE) tokenizers for executables trained on a large corpus of binaries spanning multiple platforms, architectures, and operating systems, including Linux, Windows, macOS, Android, and malware sources. We release trained tokenizers with vocabularies of 4K, 8K, 16K, 32K, and 64K tokens, enabling both systematic scaling studies and practical deployment from resource-constrained edge devices to high-throughput datacenters. These tokenizers discover interpretable patterns (ELF/PE headers, instruction sequences, cross-platform strings) while yielding multi-byte compression per token. On representative uncompressed executables (e.g., ELF/PE/Mach-O rather than compressed APKs), the Binary BPE tokenizers typically allow for roughly 2-3x more binary content per fixed-length transformer context window than raw bytes, enabling more efficient research and practical deployment for content identification, malware detection, reverse engineering, and optimization. We release the trained Binary BPE tokenizers on HuggingFace, providing a drop-in, open-source foundation for binary-focused language models and context-efficient agentic tools.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

Recent research has repeatedly shown that machine learning techniques can be applied to either whole files or file fragments to classify them for analysis. We build upon these techniques to show that for samples of un-labeled compiled computer object code, one can apply the same type of analysis to classify important aspects of the code, such as its target architecture and endianess. We show that using simple byte-value histograms we retain enough information about the opcodes within a sample to classify the target architecture with high accuracy, and then discuss heuristic-based features that exploit information within the operands to determine endianess. We introduce a dataset with over 16000 code samples from 20 architectures and experimentally show that by using our features, classifiers can achieve very high accuracy with relatively small sample sizes.

Recent advances in 1-bit Large Language Models (LLMs), such as BitNet and BitNet b1.58, present a promising approach to enhancing the efficiency of LLMs in terms of speed and energy consumption. These developments also enable local LLM deployment across a broad range of devices. In this work, we introduce bitnet.cpp, a tailored software stack designed to unlock the full potential of 1-bit LLMs. Specifically, we develop a set of kernels to support fast and lossless inference of ternary BitNet b1.58 LLMs on CPUs. Extensive experiments demonstrate that bitnet.cpp achieves significant speedups, ranging from 2.37x to 6.17x on x86 CPUs and from 1.37x to 5.07x on ARM CPUs, across various model sizes. The code is available at https://github.com/microsoft/BitNet.

Deploying language models (LMs) necessitates outputs to be both high-quality and compliant with safety guidelines. Although Inference-Time Guardrails (ITG) offer solutions that shift model output distributions towards compliance, we find that current methods struggle in balancing safety with helpfulness. ITG Methods that safely address non-compliant queries exhibit lower helpfulness while those that prioritize helpfulness compromise on safety. We refer to this trade-off as the guardrail tax, analogous to the alignment tax. To address this, we propose PrimeGuard, a novel ITG method that utilizes structured control flow. PrimeGuard routes requests to different self-instantiations of the LM with varying instructions, leveraging its inherent instruction-following capabilities and in-context learning. Our tuning-free approach dynamically compiles system-designer guidelines for each query. We construct and release safe-eval, a diverse red-team safety benchmark. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that PrimeGuard, without fine-tuning, overcomes the guardrail tax by (1) significantly increasing resistance to iterative jailbreak attacks and (2) achieving state-of-the-art results in safety guardrailing while (3) matching helpfulness scores of alignment-tuned models. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that PrimeGuard, without fine-tuning, outperforms all competing baselines and overcomes the guardrail tax by improving the fraction of safe responses from 61% to 97% and increasing average helpfulness scores from 4.17 to 4.29 on the largest models, while reducing attack success rate from 100% to 8%. PrimeGuard implementation is available at https://github.com/dynamofl/PrimeGuard and safe-eval dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/dynamoai/safe_eval.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

In the current cybersecurity landscape, protecting military devices such as communication and battlefield management systems against sophisticated cyber attacks is crucial. Malware exploits vulnerabilities through stealth methods, often evading traditional detection mechanisms such as software signatures. The application of ML/DL in vulnerability detection has been extensively explored in the literature. However, current ML/DL vulnerability detection methods struggle with understanding the context and intent behind complex attacks. Integrating large language models (LLMs) with system call analysis offers a promising approach to enhance malware detection. This work presents a novel framework leveraging LLMs to classify malware based on system call data. The framework uses transfer learning to adapt pre-trained LLMs for malware detection. By retraining LLMs on a dataset of benign and malicious system calls, the models are refined to detect signs of malware activity. Experiments with a dataset of over 1TB of system calls demonstrate that models with larger context sizes, such as BigBird and Longformer, achieve superior accuracy and F1-Score of approximately 0.86. The results highlight the importance of context size in improving detection rates and underscore the trade-offs between computational complexity and performance. This approach shows significant potential for real-time detection in high-stakes environments, offering a robust solution to evolving cyber threats.

High-quality datasets of real-world vulnerabilities are enormously valuable for downstream research in software security, but existing datasets are typically small, require extensive manual effort to update, and are missing crucial features that such research needs. In this paper, we introduce ARVO: an Atlas of Reproducible Vulnerabilities in Open-source software. By sourcing vulnerabilities from C/C++ projects that Google's OSS-Fuzz discovered and implementing a reliable re-compilation system, we successfully reproduce more than 5,000 memory vulnerabilities across over 250 projects, each with a triggering input, the canonical developer-written patch for fixing the vulnerability, and the ability to automatically rebuild the project from source and run it at its vulnerable and patched revisions. Moreover, our dataset can be automatically updated as OSS-Fuzz finds new vulnerabilities, allowing it to grow over time. We provide a thorough characterization of the ARVO dataset, show that it can locate fixes more accurately than Google's own OSV reproduction effort, and demonstrate its value for future research through two case studies: firstly evaluating real-world LLM-based vulnerability repair, and secondly identifying over 300 falsely patched (still-active) zero-day vulnerabilities from projects improperly labeled by OSS-Fuzz.

Synthesizing inductive loop invariants is fundamental to automating program verification. In this work, we observe that Large Language Models (such as gpt-3.5 or gpt-4) are capable of synthesizing loop invariants for a class of programs in a 0-shot setting, yet require several samples to generate the correct invariants. This can lead to a large number of calls to a program verifier to establish an invariant. To address this issue, we propose a {\it re-ranking} approach for the generated results of LLMs. We have designed a ranker that can distinguish between correct inductive invariants and incorrect attempts based on the problem definition. The ranker is optimized as a contrastive ranker. Experimental results demonstrate that this re-ranking mechanism significantly improves the ranking of correct invariants among the generated candidates, leading to a notable reduction in the number of calls to a verifier.

Lifting low-level or legacy code into a domain-specific language (DSL) improves our ability to understand it, enables deeper formal reasoning, and facilitates safe modification. We present the CoCompiler, a bidirectional compiler and lifter between C and Lustre, a synchronous dataflow language used for reactive systems. The key insight behind the CoCompiler is that writing a compiler as a relation, rather than as a traditional function, yields a DSL lifter "for free". We implement this idea by rewriting the verified Lustre-to-C compiler V\'elus in the Walrus relational programming language. This solves what we call the vertical lifting problem, translating canonical C into Lustre. To address the complementary horizontal problem-handling real-world C outside the compiler's image-we apply semantic-preserving canonicalization passes in Haskell. The resulting tool, the CoCompiler, supports lifting real reactive C code into Lustre and onward into graphical behavioral models. Our approach is modular, language-agnostic, and fast to implement, demonstrating that relational programming offers a practical foundation for building DSL lifters by repurposing existing compilers.

Several techniques have been proposed to detect vulnerable Spectre gadgets in widely deployed commercial software. Unfortunately, detection techniques proposed so far rely on hand-written rules which fall short in covering subtle variations of known Spectre gadgets as well as demand a huge amount of time to analyze each conditional branch in software. Moreover, detection tool evaluations are based only on a handful of these gadgets, as it requires arduous effort to craft new gadgets manually. In this work, we employ both fuzzing and deep learning techniques to automate the generation and detection of Spectre gadgets. We first create a diverse set of Spectre-V1 gadgets by introducing perturbations to the known gadgets. Using mutational fuzzing, we produce a data set with more than 1 million Spectre-V1 gadgets which is the largest Spectre gadget data set built to date. Next, we conduct the first empirical usability study of Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) in the context of assembly code generation without any human interaction. We introduce SpectreGAN which leverages masking implementation of GANs for both learning the gadget structures and generating new gadgets. This provides the first scalable solution to extend the variety of Spectre gadgets. Finally, we propose FastSpec which builds a classifier with the generated Spectre gadgets based on a novel high dimensional Neural Embeddings technique (BERT). For the case studies, we demonstrate that FastSpec discovers potential gadgets with a high success rate in OpenSSL libraries and Phoronix benchmarks. Further, FastSpec offers much greater flexibility and time-related performance gain compared to the existing tools and therefore can be used for gadget detection in large-scale software.

In today's rapidly evolving field of electronic design automation (EDA), the complexity of hardware designs is increasing, necessitating more sophisticated automation solutions. High-level synthesis (HLS), as a pivotal solution, automates hardware designs from high-level abstractions (e.g., C/C++). However, it faces significant challenges, particularly in design space exploration and optimization. While large language models (LLMs) have shown notable capabilities in code generation, their application to HLS has been limited due to the scarcity of (publicly) available HLS code datasets. Hence, research in this domain has primarily focused on techniques such as prompt engineering and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). To overcome this limitation, this paper introduces SAGE-HLS, the first-of-its-kind fine-tuned LLM specifically for HLS code generation. Our method includes three key advancements: (i) We implement Verilog-to-C/C++ porting, converting verified and synthesizable Verilog codes into corresponding C, creating a dataset of 16.7K HLS codes; (ii) We implement a fine-tuning strategy, which is based on instruction prompting to code generation guided by abstract syntax tree (AST); (iii) We develop a semi-automated evaluation framework using VerilogEval to assess the functionality of the generated HLS code. Our experiments show that SAGE-HLS, fined-tuned on the QwenCoder (2.5) 7B model, achieves a near 100% success rate in code synthesizability and a 75% success rate in functional correctness.

Recent studies have revealed that self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems frequently lead to widespread outages, which are challenging to contain and recover from. Existing failure detection techniques struggle to expose such failures prior to deployment, as they typically require a complex combination of specific conditions to be triggered. This challenge stems from the inherent nature of cascading failures, as they typically involve a sequence of fault propagations, each activated by distinct conditions. This paper presents CSnake, a fault injection framework to expose self-sustaining cascading failures in distributed systems. CSnake uses the novel idea of causal stitching, which causally links multiple single-fault injections in different tests to simulate complex fault propagation chains. To identify these chains, CSnake designs a counterfactual causality analysis of fault propagations - fault causality analysis (FCA): FCA compares the execution trace of a fault injection run with its corresponding profile run (i.e., same test w/o the injection) and identifies any additional faults triggered, which are considered to have a causal relationship with the injected fault. To address the large search space of fault and workload combinations, CSnake employs a three-phase allocation protocol of test budget that prioritizes faults with unique and diverse causal consequences, increasing the likelihood of uncovering conditional fault propagations. Furthermore, to avoid incorrectly connecting fault propagations from workloads with incompatible conditions, CSnake performs a local compatibility check that approximately checks the compatibility of the path constraints associated with connected fault propagations with low overhead. CSnake detected 15 bugs that cause self-sustaining cascading failures in five systems, five of which have been confirmed with two fixed.

Penetration testing, an essential component of software security testing, allows organizations to identify and remediate vulnerabilities in their systems, thus bolstering their defense mechanisms against cyberattacks. One recent advancement in the realm of penetration testing is the utilization of Language Models (LLMs). We explore the intersection of LLMs and penetration testing to gain insight into their capabilities and challenges in the context of privilege escalation. We introduce a fully automated privilege-escalation tool designed for evaluating the efficacy of LLMs for (ethical) hacking, executing benchmarks using multiple LLMs, and investigating their respective results. Our results show that GPT-4-turbo is well suited to exploit vulnerabilities (33-83% of vulnerabilities). GPT-3.5-turbo can abuse 16-50% of vulnerabilities, while local models, such as Llama3, can only exploit between 0 and 33% of the vulnerabilities. We analyze the impact of different context sizes, in-context learning, optional high-level guidance mechanisms, and memory management techniques. We discuss challenging areas for LLMs, including maintaining focus during testing, coping with errors, and finally comparing LLMs with human hackers. The current version of the LLM-guided privilege-escalation prototype can be found at https://github.com/ipa-labs/hackingBuddyGPT.

This paper presents LLM4SecHW, a novel framework for hardware debugging that leverages domain specific Large Language Model (LLM). Despite the success of LLMs in automating various software development tasks, their application in the hardware security domain has been limited due to the constraints of commercial LLMs and the scarcity of domain specific data. To address these challenges, we propose a unique approach to compile a dataset of open source hardware design defects and their remediation steps, utilizing version control data. This dataset provides a substantial foundation for training machine learning models for hardware. LLM4SecHW employs fine tuning of medium sized LLMs based on this dataset, enabling the identification and rectification of bugs in hardware designs. This pioneering approach offers a reference workflow for the application of fine tuning domain specific LLMs in other research areas. We evaluate the performance of our proposed system on various open source hardware designs, demonstrating its efficacy in accurately identifying and correcting defects. Our work brings a new perspective on automating the quality control process in hardware design.

In modern Very Large Scale Integrated (VLSI) circuit design flow, the Register-Transfer Level (RTL) stage presents a critical opportunity for timing optimization. Addressing timing violations at this early stage is essential, as modern systems demand higher speeds, where even minor timing violations can lead to functional failures or system crashes. However, traditional timing optimization heavily relies on manual expertise, requiring engineers to iteratively analyze timing reports and debug. To automate this process, this paper proposes ViTAD, a method that efficiently analyzes the root causes of timing violations and dynamically generates targeted repair strategies. Specifically, we first parse Verilog code and timing reports to construct a Signal Timing Dependency Graph (STDG). Based on the STDG, we perform violation path analysis and use large language models (LLMs) to infer the root causes of violations. Finally, by analyzing the causes of violations, we selectively retrieve relevant debugging knowledge from a domain-specific knowledge base to generate customized repair solutions. To evaluate the effectiveness of our method, we construct a timing violation dataset based on real-world open-source projects. This dataset contains 54 cases of violations. Experimental results show that our method achieves a 73.68% success rate in repairing timing violations, while the baseline using only LLM is 54.38%. Our method improves the success rate by 19.30%.

Recent advances in LLM-based decompilers have been shown effective to convert low-level binaries into human-readable source code. However, there still lacks a comprehensive benchmark that provides large-scale binary-source function pairs, which is critical for advancing the LLM decompilation technology. Creating accurate binary-source mappings incurs severe issues caused by complex compilation settings and widespread function inlining that obscure the correspondence between binaries and their original source code. Previous efforts have either relied on used contest-style benchmarks, synthetic binary-source mappings that diverge significantly from the mappings in real world, or partially matched binaries with only code lines or variable names, compromising the effectiveness of analyzing the binary functionality. To alleviate these issues, we introduce Decompile-Bench, the first open-source dataset comprising two million binary-source function pairs condensed from 100 million collected function pairs, i.e., 450GB of binaries compiled from permissively licensed GitHub projects. For the evaluation purposes, we also developed a benchmark Decompile-Bench-Eval including manually crafted binaries from the well-established HumanEval and MBPP, alongside the compiled GitHub repositories released after 2025 to mitigate data leakage issues. We further explore commonly-used evaluation metrics to provide a thorough assessment of the studied LLM decompilers and find that fine-tuning with Decompile-Bench causes a 20% improvement over previous benchmarks in terms of the re-executability rate. Our code and data has been released in HuggingFace and Github. https://github.com/albertan017/LLM4Decompile

To deploy language models safely, it is crucial that they abstain from responding to inappropriate requests. Several prior studies test the safety promises of models based on their effectiveness in blocking malicious requests. In this work, we focus on evaluating the underlying techniques that cause models to abstain. We create SELECT, a benchmark derived from a set of benign concepts (e.g., "rivers") from a knowledge graph. Focusing on benign concepts isolates the effect of safety training, and grounding these concepts in a knowledge graph allows us to study the generalization and specificity of abstention techniques. Using SELECT, we benchmark different abstention techniques over six open-weight and closed-source models. We find that the examined techniques indeed cause models to abstain with over 80% abstention rates. However, these techniques are not as effective for descendants of the target concepts, where abstention rates drop by 19%. We also characterize the generalization-specificity trade-offs for different techniques. Overall, no single technique is invariably better than others, and our findings inform practitioners of the various trade-offs involved.

We explore the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate high-quality Register-Transfer Level (RTL) code with minimal human interference. The traditional RTL design workflow requires human experts to manually write high-quality RTL code, which is time-consuming and error-prone. With the help of emerging LLMs, developers can describe their requirements to LLMs which then generate corresponding code in Python, C, Java, and more. Adopting LLMs to generate RTL design in hardware description languages is not trivial, given the complex nature of hardware design and the generated design has to meet the timing and physical constraints. We propose VeriAssist, an LLM-powered programming assistant for Verilog RTL design workflow. VeriAssist takes RTL design descriptions as input and generates high-quality RTL code with corresponding test benches. VeriAssist enables the LLM to self-correct and self-verify the generated code by adopting an automatic prompting system and integrating RTL simulator in the code generation loop. To generate an RTL design, VeriAssist first generates the initial RTL code and corresponding test benches, followed by a self-verification step that walks through the code with test cases to reason the code behavior at different time steps, and finally it self-corrects the code by reading the compilation and simulation results and generating final RTL code that fixes errors in compilation and simulation. This design fully leverages the LLMs' capabilities on multi-turn interaction and chain-of-thought reasoning to improve the quality of the generated code. We evaluate VeriAssist with various benchmark suites and find it significantly improves both syntax and functionality correctness over existing LLM implementations, thus minimizing human intervention and making RTL design more accessible to novice designers.

As mathematical computing becomes more democratized in high-level languages, high-performance symbolic-numeric systems are necessary for domain scientists and engineers to get the best performance out of their machine without deep knowledge of code optimization. Naturally, users need different term types either to have different algebraic properties for them, or to use efficient data structures. To this end, we developed Symbolics.jl, an extendable symbolic system which uses dynamic multiple dispatch to change behavior depending on the domain needs. In this work we detail an underlying abstract term interface which allows for speed without sacrificing generality. We show that by formalizing a generic API on actions independent of implementation, we can retroactively add optimized data structures to our system without changing the pre-existing term rewriters. We showcase how this can be used to optimize term construction and give a 113x acceleration on general symbolic transformations. Further, we show that such a generic API allows for complementary term-rewriting implementations. We demonstrate the ability to swap between classical term-rewriting simplifiers and e-graph-based term-rewriting simplifiers. We showcase an e-graph ruleset which minimizes the number of CPU cycles during expression evaluation, and demonstrate how it simplifies a real-world reaction-network simulation to halve the runtime. Additionally, we show a reaction-diffusion partial differential equation solver which is able to be automatically converted into symbolic expressions via multiple dispatch tracing, which is subsequently accelerated and parallelized to give a 157x simulation speedup. Together, this presents Symbolics.jl as a next-generation symbolic-numeric computing environment geared towards modeling and simulation.

Data de-identification makes it possible to glean insights from data while preserving user privacy. The use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow for the execution of de-identification applications on the cloud without the need for a user to trust the third-party application provider. In this paper, we present SPIDEr - Secure Pipeline for Information De-Identification with End-to-End Encryption, our implementation of an end-to-end encrypted data de-identification pipeline. SPIDEr supports classical anonymisation techniques such as suppression, pseudonymisation, generalisation, and aggregation, as well as techniques that offer a formal privacy guarantee such as k-anonymisation and differential privacy. To enable scalability and improve performance on constrained TEE hardware, we enable batch processing of data for differential privacy computations. We present our design of the control flows for end-to-end secure execution of de-identification operations within a TEE. As part of the control flow for running SPIDEr within the TEE, we perform attestation, a process that verifies that the software binaries were properly instantiated on a known, trusted platform.

Background: The C and C++ languages hold significant importance in Software Engineering research because of their widespread use in practice. Numerous studies have utilized Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Learning (DL) techniques to detect software vulnerabilities (SVs) in the source code written in these languages. However, the application of these techniques in function-level SV assessment has been largely unexplored. SV assessment is increasingly crucial as it provides detailed information on the exploitability, impacts, and severity of security defects, thereby aiding in their prioritization and remediation. Aims: We conduct the first empirical study to investigate and compare the performance of ML and DL models, many of which have been used for SV detection, for function-level SV assessment in C/C++. Method: Using 9,993 vulnerable C/C++ functions, we evaluated the performance of six multi-class ML models and five multi-class DL models for the SV assessment at the function level based on the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). We further explore multi-task learning, which can leverage common vulnerable code to predict all SV assessment outputs simultaneously in a single model, and compare the effectiveness and efficiency of this model type with those of the original multi-class models. Results: We show that ML has matching or even better performance compared to the multi-class DL models for function-level SV assessment with significantly less training time. Employing multi-task learning allows the DL models to perform significantly better, with an average of 8-22% increase in Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC). Conclusions: We distill the practices of using data-driven techniques for function-level SV assessment in C/C++, including the use of multi-task DL to balance efficiency and effectiveness. This can establish a strong foundation for future work in this area.

The goal of decompilation is to convert compiled low-level code (e.g., assembly code) back into high-level programming languages, enabling analysis in scenarios where source code is unavailable. This task supports various reverse engineering applications, such as vulnerability identification, malware analysis, and legacy software migration. The end-to-end decompile method based on large langauge models (LLMs) reduces reliance on additional tools and minimizes manual intervention due to its inherent properties. However, previous end-to-end methods often lose critical information necessary for reconstructing control flow structures and variables when processing binary files, making it challenging to accurately recover the program's logic. To address these issues, we propose the ReF Decompile method, which incorporates the following innovations: (1) The Relabelling strategy replaces jump target addresses with labels, preserving control flow clarity. (2) The Function Call strategy infers variable types and retrieves missing variable information from binary files. Experimental results on the Humaneval-Decompile Benchmark demonstrate that ReF Decompile surpasses comparable baselines and achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance of 61.43%.

In this paper we present a Java-to-Python (J2P) and Python-to-Java (P2J) back-to-back code translation method, and associated tool called CoTran, based on large language models (LLMs). Our method leverages the attention mechanism of LLMs, compilation, and symbolic execution-based test generation for equivalence testing between the input and output programs. More precisely, we modify the typical LLM training loop to incorporate compiler and symbolic execution loss. Via extensive experiments comparing CoTran with 10 other transpilers and LLM-based translation tools over a benchmark of more than 57,000 Java-Python equivalent pairs, we show that CoTran outperforms them on relevant metrics such as compilation and runtime equivalence accuracy. For example, our tool gets 97.43% compilation accuracy and 49.66% runtime equivalence accuracy for J2P translation, whereas the nearest competing tool only gets 96.44% and 6.8% respectively.

On the way to Exascale, programmers face the increasing challenge of having to support multiple hardware architectures from the same code base. At the same time, portability of code and performance are increasingly difficult to achieve as hardware architectures are becoming more and more diverse. Today's heterogeneous systems often include two or more completely distinct and incompatible hardware execution models, such as GPGPU's, SIMD vector units, and general purpose cores which conventionally have to be programmed using separate tool chains representing non-overlapping programming models. The recent revival of interest in the industry and the wider community for the C++ language has spurred a remarkable amount of standardization proposals and technical specifications in the arena of concurrency and parallelism. This recently includes an increasing amount of discussion around the need for a uniform, higher-level abstraction and programming model for parallelism in the C++ standard targeting heterogeneous and distributed computing. Such an abstraction should perfectly blend with existing, already standardized language and library features, but should also be generic enough to support future hardware developments. In this paper, we present the results from developing such a higher-level programming abstraction for parallelism in C++ which aims at enabling code and performance portability over a wide range of architectures and for various types of parallelism. We present and compare performance data obtained from running the well-known STREAM benchmark ported to our higher level C++ abstraction with the corresponding results from running it natively. We show that our abstractions enable performance at least as good as the comparable base-line benchmarks while providing a uniform programming API on all compared target architectures.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in mission-critical systems, facilitating tasks such as satellite operations, command-and-control, military decision support, and cyber defense. Many of these systems are accessed through application programming interfaces (APIs). When such APIs lack robust access controls, they can expose full or top-k logits, creating a significant and often overlooked attack surface. Prior art has mainly focused on reconstructing the output projection layer or distilling surface-level behaviors. However, regenerating a black-box model under tight query constraints remains underexplored. We address that gap by introducing a constrained replication pipeline that transforms partial logit leakage into a functional deployable substitute model clone. Our two-stage approach (i) reconstructs the output projection matrix by collecting top-k logits from under 10k black-box queries via singular value decomposition (SVD) over the logits, then (ii) distills the remaining architecture into compact student models with varying transformer depths, trained on an open source dataset. A 6-layer student recreates 97.6% of the 6-layer teacher model's hidden-state geometry, with only a 7.31% perplexity increase, and a 7.58 Negative Log-Likelihood (NLL). A 4-layer variant achieves 17.1% faster inference and 18.1% parameter reduction with comparable performance. The entire attack completes in under 24 graphics processing unit (GPU) hours and avoids triggering API rate-limit defenses. These results demonstrate how quickly a cost-limited adversary can clone an LLM, underscoring the urgent need for hardened inference APIs and secure on-premise defense deployments.

While recent code-specific large language models (LLMs) have greatly enhanced their code generation capabilities, the safety of these models remains under-explored, posing potential risks as insecure code generated by these models may introduce vulnerabilities into real-world systems. Existing methods collect security-focused datasets from real-world vulnerabilities for instruction tuning in order to mitigate such issues. However, they are largely constrained by the data sparsity of vulnerable code, and have limited applicability in the multi-stage post-training workflows of modern LLMs. In this paper, we propose ProSec, a novel proactive security alignment approach designed to align code LLMs with secure coding practices. ProSec systematically exposes the vulnerabilities in a code LLM by synthesizing vulnerability-inducing coding scenarios from Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) and generates fixes to vulnerable code snippets, allowing the model to learn secure practices through preference learning objectives. The scenarios synthesized by ProSec trigger 25x more vulnerable code than a normal instruction-tuning dataset, resulting in a security-focused alignment dataset 7x larger than the previous work. Experiments show that models trained with ProSec are 25.2% to 35.4% more secure compared to previous work without degrading models' utility.

AI-powered coding assistants such as GitHub Copilot and OpenAI ChatGPT have achieved notable success in automating code generation. However, these tools rely on pre-trained Large Language Models (LLMs) that are typically trained on human-written code sourced from open-source project hosting sites like GitHub, which often contains inherent security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may then be mirrored in the code generated by these LLMs, a critical risk revealed and highlighted by recent empirical studies. In this work, we present an exploratory study on whether fine-tuning pre-trained LLMs on datasets of vulnerability-fixing commits can promote secure code generation. We explored two parameter-efficient fine-tuning techniques (LoRa and IA3) on two pre-trained LLMs for code generation. We crawled a fine-tuning dataset (14,622 C and C++ files) for secure code generation by collecting code fixes of confirmed vulnerabilities from open-source repositories. Our evaluation dataset comprises 52 vulnerability scenarios designed to cover the top most dangerous C and C++ Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs). Each scenario is a prompt that may induce LLMs to generate vulnerable code. Our exploration reveals that fine-tuning LLMs can improve secure code generation by 6.4% in C language and 5.4% in C++ language. We further experimented with fine-tuning LLMs using different versions of the collected secure code dataset (block, function, and line). We found that fine-tuning with function-level and block-level datasets achieves the best secure code generation performance, compared to the alternatives (file-level and line-level).

With the growing popularity of Large Language Models (e.g. GitHub Copilot, ChatGPT, etc.) in software engineers' daily practices, it is important to ensure that the code generated by these tools is not only functionally correct but also free of vulnerabilities. Although LLMs can help developers to be more productive, prior empirical studies have shown that LLMs can generate insecure code. There are two contributing factors to the insecure code generation. First, existing datasets used to evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) do not adequately represent genuine software engineering tasks sensitive to security. Instead, they are often based on competitive programming challenges or classroom-type coding tasks. In real-world applications, the code produced is integrated into larger codebases, introducing potential security risks. There's a clear absence of benchmarks that focus on evaluating the security of the generated code. Second, existing evaluation metrics primarily focus on the functional correctness of the generated code while ignoring security considerations. Metrics such as pass@k gauge the probability of obtaining the correct code in the top k suggestions. Other popular metrics like BLEU, CodeBLEU, ROUGE, and METEOR similarly emphasize functional accuracy, neglecting security implications. In light of these research gaps, in this paper, we described SALLM, a framework to benchmark LLMs' abilities to generate secure code systematically. This framework has three major components: a novel dataset of security-centric Python prompts, an evaluation environment to test the generated code, and novel metrics to evaluate the models' performance from the perspective of secure code generation.

This project enables RISC-V microkernel support in IREE, an MLIR-based machine learning compiler and runtime. The approach begins by enabling the lowering of MLIR linalg dialect contraction ops to linalg.mmt4d op for the RISC-V64 target within the IREE pass pipeline, followed by the development of optimized microkernels for RISC-V. The performance gains are compared with upstream IREE and Llama.cpp for the Llama-3.2-1B-Instruct model.