Daily Papers

Vision-language models can interpret instructions and plan manipulation tasks, yet struggle when acting directly as robot policies. On RoboDojo, a large planning-execution gap separates high-level task decisions from physical execution: removing arm execution raises GPT-6 Astra's success rate from 22.5% under the reference control interface to 76.2%. We present Auriga, a task-agnostic agent harness that closes 68.3% of this gap in zero-shot manipulation without target-task trials or resets. In Auriga, the model makes all task decisions over an explicit task belief and acts through either direct tool calls or synthesized multi-step Python programs, while the harness supplies calibrated 3D measurements, finger-referenced dual-arm control, and a single admission gateway to the robot. Before motion, the model inspects a visual trajectory preview while simulation is paused; during execution, the harness checks declared stage tolerances and grasp bounds, stopping the robot on divergence and returning the measured discrepancy for in-place recovery. Developed across 13 cross-task capability iterations and frozen for evaluation, Auriga ranks first on the RoboDojo leaderboard with a 57.7% success rate (64.0 Score), more than doubling the reference harness on the same model, and remains first under scene randomization while learned policies drop by up to 33.9%. On RoboCasa365, the same frozen harness reaches a 73.2% success rate, outperforming VLA-assisted agents by up to 23.1% on composite tasks. Project page: https://auriga.stelledge.com/ Code: https://github.com/lose4578/Auriga

Offline meta-RL usually tackles generalization by inferring task beliefs from high-quality samples or warmup explorations. The restricted form limits their generality and usability since these supervision signals are expensive and even infeasible to acquire in advance for unseen tasks. Learning directly from the raw text about decision tasks is a promising alternative to leverage a much broader source of supervision. In the paper, we propose Text-to-Decision Agent (T2DA), a simple and scalable framework that supervises offline meta-RL with natural language. We first introduce a generalized world model to encode multi-task decision data into a dynamics-aware embedding space. Then, inspired by CLIP, we predict which textual description goes with which decision embedding, effectively bridging their semantic gap via contrastive language-decision pre-training and aligning the text embeddings to comprehend the environment dynamics. After training the text-conditioned generalist policy, the agent can directly realize zero-shot text-to-decision generation in response to language instructions. Comprehensive experiments on MuJoCo and Meta-World benchmarks show that T2DA facilitates high-capacity zero-shot generalization and outperforms various types of baselines. Our code is available at https://github.com/NJU-RL/T2DA.

Recent offline meta-reinforcement learning (meta-RL) methods typically utilize task-dependent behavior policies (e.g., training RL agents on each individual task) to collect a multi-task dataset. However, these methods always require extra information for fast adaptation, such as offline context for testing tasks. To address this problem, we first formally characterize a unique challenge in offline meta-RL: transition-reward distribution shift between offline datasets and online adaptation. Our theory finds that out-of-distribution adaptation episodes may lead to unreliable policy evaluation and that online adaptation with in-distribution episodes can ensure adaptation performance guarantee. Based on these theoretical insights, we propose a novel adaptation framework, called In-Distribution online Adaptation with uncertainty Quantification (IDAQ), which generates in-distribution context using a given uncertainty quantification and performs effective task belief inference to address new tasks. We find a return-based uncertainty quantification for IDAQ that performs effectively. Experiments show that IDAQ achieves state-of-the-art performance on the Meta-World ML1 benchmark compared to baselines with/without offline adaptation.

Vision--Language--Action (VLA) policies such as π_{0.5} and OpenVLA perform well on many manipulation tasks, but they are often reactive: the next action is predicted from the current observation, instruction, and proprioceptive state. This assumption breaks down in stage-dependent manipulation, where visually similar states may require different actions depending on latent task progress and previous interaction outcomes. We argue that such tasks require not only memory, but dynamics-aware belief updates: the policy should preserve task progress during stable or occluded phases and revise its belief near contact, release, or subgoal transitions. We introduce Temporally Conditioned Memory-Fusion Policies (TFP), a lightweight memory-action framework for VLA backbones. TFP maintains an episode-local task-progress belief with Liquid Time-Constant dynamics and injects the updated belief directly into the flow-matching action decoder through adaptive modulation. This lets temporally accumulated context shape the generated action chunk, rather than serving only as passive history context. With a 3.3B-parameter model, TFP improves the average success rate from \(96.9\%\) to \(98.75\%\) on LIBERO and from \(91.4\%\) to \(93.77\%\) on LIBERO-plus. On the memory-focused MIKASA ShellGameTouch diagnostic, TFP achieves success up to \(75.0\%\). Mechanistic analyses show that write-gain changes near manipulation events are about \(6\times\) larger than far non-event phases, and hidden-state interventions show that the belief causally modulates generated action chunks. These results suggest that compact, event-sensitive memory dynamics can improve VLA policies under occlusion, visual perturbation, and stage-dependent task structure.

Humans can attribute beliefs to others. However, it is unknown to what extent this ability results from an innate biological endowment or from experience accrued through child development, particularly exposure to language describing others' mental states. We test the viability of the language exposure hypothesis by assessing whether models exposed to large quantities of human language display sensitivity to the implied knowledge states of characters in written passages. In pre-registered analyses, we present a linguistic version of the False Belief Task to both human participants and a Large Language Model, GPT-3. Both are sensitive to others' beliefs, but while the language model significantly exceeds chance behavior, it does not perform as well as the humans, nor does it explain the full extent of their behavior -- despite being exposed to more language than a human would in a lifetime. This suggests that while statistical learning from language exposure may in part explain how humans develop the ability to reason about the mental states of others, other mechanisms are also responsible.

Large language models (LLMs) are being used as policies for autonomous decision-making and planning in many domains. Despite their strong reasoning capabilities, LLMs struggle with long-horizon tasks, especially under partial observability. World models are a promising way to enhance policy performance, both during training and inference. During inference, agents currently use world models to simulate the consequences of candidate actions before choosing an action, which can improve decision-making. However, we argue that simulation alone is an incomplete interface for decision-making under partial observability: simulation does not adequately capture uncertainty about the current state, which agents may need for accurate decision-making. We address this limitation with Belief-Based World Models (BB-WMs), which maintain a belief that LLMs can query to access information on what is known and uncertain about the current state. Before developing methods to learn accurate BB-WMs, this paper focuses on a more fundamental question: does exposing a world model's belief directly to an LLM policy improve decision-making? Our results show that giving LLM agents access to beliefs improves task performance under partial observability, while remaining complementary to existing simulation-based world models. Code: https://github.com/skumar-ml/belief-world-models.

In meta reinforcement learning (meta RL), an agent seeks a Bayes-optimal policy -- the optimal policy when facing an unknown task that is sampled from some known task distribution. Previous approaches tackled this problem by inferring a belief over task parameters, using variational inference methods. Motivated by recent successes of contrastive learning approaches in RL, such as contrastive predictive coding (CPC), we investigate whether contrastive methods can be used for learning Bayes-optimal behavior. We begin by proving that representations learned by CPC are indeed sufficient for Bayes optimality. Based on this observation, we propose a simple meta RL algorithm that uses CPC in lieu of variational belief inference. Our method, ContraBAR, achieves comparable performance to state-of-the-art in domains with state-based observation and circumvents the computational toll of future observation reconstruction, enabling learning in domains with image-based observations. It can also be combined with image augmentations for domain randomization and used seamlessly in both online and offline meta RL settings.

Today's autonomous agents, largely driven by foundation models (FMs), can understand natural language instructions and solve long-horizon tasks with human-like reasoning. However, current human-robot interaction largely follows a one-way master-apprentice technique where the agent passively executes commands without reciprocal learning. This neglects the co-adaptive, multi-turn nature of everyday human interactions. We introduce symbiotic interactive learning (SIL), a bidirectional co-adaptation framework in a shared latent task space, where human and agent maintain joint belief states that evolve with interaction history. This enables proactive clarification, adaptive suggestions, and shared plan refinement. SIL leverages FMs for spatial perception and reasoning, together with a triplet-loss-trained neural encoder that grounds FMs' outputs into task-specific latent representations. To support long-term stability as tasks evolve, SIL uses episodic and semantic memory architectures, regularised via elastic weight consolidation to mitigate catastrophic forgetting. We evaluate SIL on simulated and real-world embodied tasks, including instruction following, information retrieval, query-oriented reasoning, and interactive dialogue, achieving a 90.4% task completion rate and a belief alignment score of ρapprox 0.83, an absolute improvement of about 20 percentage points over the best ablations. Demos and resources: https://linusnep.github.io/SIL/.

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have shown remarkable progress in embodied tasks recently, but most methods process visual observations independently at each timestep. This history-agnostic design treats robot manipulation as a Markov Decision Process, even though real-world robotic control is inherently partially observable and requires reasoning over past interactions. To address this mismatch, we reformulate VLA policy learning from a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process perspective and propose AVA-VLA, a framework that conditions action generation on a recurrent state that serves as a neural approximation to the agent's belief over task history. Built on this recurrent state, we introduce Active Visual Attention (AVA), which dynamically reweights visual tokens in the current observation to focus on regions most relevant given both the instruction and execution history. Extensive experiments show that AVA-VLA achieves state-of-the-art performance on standard robotic benchmarks, including LIBERO and CALVIN, and transfers effectively to real-world dual-arm manipulation tasks. These results demonstrate the effectiveness of temporally grounded active visual processing for improving VLA performance in robotic sequential decision-making. The project page is available at https://liauto-dsr.github.io/AVA-VLA-Page.

Many decision-support settings require systems that adapt to individual users, but evaluation data for this problem remain limited. Existing benchmarks for user understanding often rely on simulated users or model-generated behavior, even though recent work cautions that model-based simulations can diverge systematically from human behavior. We introduce BehaviorBench, a benchmark for evaluating personalized decision modeling from real-world behavioral traces. BehaviorBench reconstructs wallet-level decision histories from observed public prediction-market and on-chain records, and organizes them into two complementary task layers: Belief prediction, which predicts a user's final revealed stance and confidence in a market, and Trade prediction, which predicts the direction and amount of individual transactions. Across 2,000 evaluation wallets, the benchmark contains 141,445 Belief instances and 1,485,972 Trade instances, with disjoint support pools for retrieval-based evaluation. We evaluate frontier and open-weight generative models under four history interfaces: no personalization, direct recent history, generated user profiles, and retrieved support-wallet evidence. Personalization improves Belief prediction more consistently than Trade prediction, model rankings change across task layers and metrics, and different history interfaces expose different failure modes. BehaviorBench provides an evaluation setting for studying whether personalized methods can use real-world behavioral evidence rather than simulated users alone.

Humans naturally form and express beliefs in daily communication, e.g., "I think the answer is 3" or "I suppose that's right." Such beliefs inevitably intertwine with fact and knowledge, making the ability to handle them in tandem desirable for large language models (LLMs), as they are increasingly deployed in user-facing settings. Prior work showed that even capable LLMs exhibit a systemic weakness in acknowledging user beliefs grounded in incorrect information. We extend this evaluation to 10 LLMs across 18 epistemic expressions and find that the size and direction of this weakness depend on the verb used to express the belief, with the accuracy gap between factual and false information ranging from +50% on "I vaguely remember" to -14% on "I seriously doubt". We further show that the phenomenon stems from what we call task confusion: models default to fact-checking the underlying claim, overriding the user's stated belief. We provide evidence where chains of thought that explicitly fact-check show lower accuracy on false information than those that do not, and a single instruction can reverse the failure across verb families. Mechanistically, models attend more to false beliefs they fail to confirm, but suppressing this attention at decoding time recovers accuracy only partially and only in some models, calling for future work on intervention methods. Our findings clarify prior results and show how fact-checking, a generally desirable behavior, can interfere with belief tracking in LLMs.

Structured belief states are crucial for user goal tracking and database query in task-oriented dialog systems. However, training belief trackers often requires expensive turn-level annotations of every user utterance. In this paper we aim at alleviating the reliance on belief state labels in building end-to-end dialog systems, by leveraging unlabeled dialog data towards semi-supervised learning. We propose a probabilistic dialog model, called the LAtent BElief State (LABES) model, where belief states are represented as discrete latent variables and jointly modeled with system responses given user inputs. Such latent variable modeling enables us to develop semi-supervised learning under the principled variational learning framework. Furthermore, we introduce LABES-S2S, which is a copy-augmented Seq2Seq model instantiation of LABES. In supervised experiments, LABES-S2S obtains strong results on three benchmark datasets of different scales. In utilizing unlabeled dialog data, semi-supervised LABES-S2S significantly outperforms both supervised-only and semi-supervised baselines. Remarkably, we can reduce the annotation demands to 50% without performance loss on MultiWOZ.

Language agents acting over long horizons must maintain beliefs about tool states, object locations, graph edges, and subgoal dependencies. When these beliefs drift, failures can be fixed neither by longer reasoning traces nor by ordinary self-reflection, since the missing evidence lies in the environment. We formulate environment probing as a budgeted decision problem for structured agent world models: before acting, the agent may query the current value of one belief field, update its table, and pay one interaction step. We introduce EnvProbe, a simple scoring policy that combines task criticality, staleness, verbalized uncertainty, and dependency role. A type-stratified analysis separates the benefit of belief repair from the cost of displaced task actions and predicts different behavior for procedural and spatial beliefs. In three controlled environments with gold belief states, EnvProbe improves terminal world-state accuracy over periodic probing by 11.76 percentage points on procedural tool-dependency tasks, 3.79 points on spatial tasks, and 6.45 points overall. Ablations show that task-structural terms are the main source of the gains, while self-reported uncertainty is unreliable under confident wrong beliefs. The results suggest that agent calibration should be treated as an action-selection problem over environment evidence, not only as a model-internal reasoning problem.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

Eleven Large Language Models (LLMs) were assessed using a custom-made battery of false-belief tasks, considered a gold standard in testing Theory of Mind (ToM) in humans. The battery included 640 prompts spread across 40 diverse tasks, each one including a false-belief scenario, three closely matched true-belief control scenarios, and the reversed versions of all four. To solve a single task, a model needed to correctly answer 16 prompts across all eight scenarios. Smaller and older models solved no tasks; GPT-3-davinci-003 (from November 2022) and ChatGPT-3.5-turbo (from March 2023) solved 20% of the tasks; ChatGPT-4 (from June 2023) solved 75% of the tasks, matching the performance of six-year-old children observed in past studies. We explore the potential interpretation of these findings, including the intriguing possibility that ToM, previously considered exclusive to humans, may have spontaneously emerged as a byproduct of LLMs' improving language skills.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the capacity to comprehend the mental states of distinct individuals, is essential for numerous practical applications. With the development of large language models, there is a heated debate about whether they are able to perform ToM tasks. Previous studies have used different tasks and prompts to test the ToM on large language models and the results are inconsistent: some studies asserted these models are capable of exhibiting ToM, while others suggest the opposite. In this study, We present ToMChallenges, a dataset for comprehensively evaluating Theory of Mind based on Sally-Anne and Smarties tests. We created 30 variations of each test (e.g., changing the person's name, location, and items). For each variation, we test the model's understanding of different aspects: reality, belief, 1st order belief, and 2nd order belief. We adapt our data for various tasks by creating unique prompts tailored for each task category: Fill-in-the-Blank, Multiple Choice, True/False, Chain-of-Thought True/False, Question Answering, and Text Completion. If the model has a robust ToM, it should be able to achieve good performance for different prompts across different tests. We evaluated two GPT-3.5 models, text-davinci-003 and gpt-3.5-turbo-0301, with our datasets. Our results indicate that consistent performance in ToM tasks remains a challenge.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Knowledge editing techniques promise to implant new factual knowledge into large language models (LLMs). But do LLMs really believe these facts? We develop a framework to measure belief depth and use it to evaluate the success of knowledge editing techniques. We operationalize belief depth as the extent to which implanted knowledge 1) generalizes to related contexts (e.g. Fermi estimates several logical steps removed), 2) is robust to self-scrutiny and direct challenge, and 3) is represented similarly to genuine knowledge (as measured by linear probes). Our evaluations show that simple prompting and mechanistic editing techniques fail to implant knowledge deeply. In contrast, Synthetic Document Finetuning (SDF) - where models are trained on LLM-generated documents consistent with a fact - often succeeds at implanting beliefs that behave similarly to genuine knowledge. However, SDF's success is not universal, as implanted beliefs that contradict basic world knowledge are brittle and representationally distinct from genuine knowledge. Overall, our work introduces measurable criteria for belief depth and enables the rigorous evaluation necessary for deploying knowledge editing in real-world applications.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are trained on corpora disproportionally weighted in favor of Standard American English. As a result, speakers of other dialects experience significantly more failures when interacting with these technologies. In practice, these speakers often accommodate their speech to be better understood. Our work shares the belief that language technologies should be designed to accommodate the diversity in English dialects and not the other way around. However, prior works on dialect struggle with generalizing to evolving and emerging dialects in a scalable manner. To fill this gap, our method, HyperLoRA, leverages expert linguistic knowledge to enable resource-efficient adaptation via hypernetworks. By disentangling dialect-specific and cross-dialectal information, HyperLoRA improves generalization to unseen dialects in a task-agnostic fashion. Not only is HyperLoRA more scalable in the number of parameters, but it also achieves the best or most competitive performance across 5 dialects in a zero-shot setting. In this way, our approach facilitates access to language technology for billions of English dialect speakers who are traditionally underrepresented.

We introduce the "Belief State Transformer", a next-token predictor that takes both a prefix and suffix as inputs, with a novel objective of predicting both the next token for the prefix and the previous token for the suffix. The Belief State Transformer effectively learns to solve challenging problems that conventional forward-only transformers struggle with, in a domain-independent fashion. Key to this success is learning a compact belief state that captures all relevant information necessary for accurate predictions. Empirical ablations show that each component of the model is essential in difficult scenarios where standard Transformers fall short. For the task of story writing with known prefixes and suffixes, our approach outperforms the Fill-in-the-Middle method for reaching known goals and demonstrates improved performance even when the goals are unknown. Altogether, the Belief State Transformer enables more efficient goal-conditioned decoding, better test-time inference, and high-quality text representations on small scale problems. Website: https://sites.google.com/view/belief-state-transformer

Reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) is a promising paradigm for improving large language model (LLM) agents on long-horizon interactive tasks. However, in partially observable environments, incomplete observations cause agent beliefs to drift over time, while delayed rewards obscure the causal impact of intermediate decisions, exacerbating temporal credit assignment challenges. To address this, we propose ReBel (Reward Belief), a process-level reinforcement learning algorithm that explicitly models structured belief states to summarize interaction history and guide subsequent policy learning. ReBel introduces belief-consistency supervision, converting discrepancies between predicted beliefs and observed feedback into dense self-supervised signals without requiring external step-wise annotations or verifiers. It also employs belief-aware grouping to compare trajectories under similar belief states, yielding more robust and lower-variance advantage estimates. We evaluate ReBel on challenging long-horizon benchmarks, including ALFWorld and WebShop. ReBel improves task success by up to 20.4 percentage points over the episode-level baseline GRPO and increases sample efficiency by 2.1times. These results suggest that belief-aware self-supervision is a promising direction for reliable long-horizon decision-making under partial observability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Fateyetian/Rebel.git.

Task-oriented dialog (TOD) systems typically manage structured knowledge (e.g. ontologies and databases) to guide the goal-oriented conversations. However, they fall short of handling dialog turns grounded on unstructured knowledge (e.g. reviews and documents). In this paper, we formulate a task of modeling TOD grounded on both structured and unstructured knowledge. To address this task, we propose a TOD system with hybrid knowledge management, HyKnow. It extends the belief state to manage both structured and unstructured knowledge, and is the first end-to-end model that jointly optimizes dialog modeling grounded on these two kinds of knowledge. We conduct experiments on the modified version of MultiWOZ 2.1 dataset, where dialogs are grounded on hybrid knowledge. Experimental results show that HyKnow has strong end-to-end performance compared to existing TOD systems. It also outperforms the pipeline knowledge management schemes, with higher unstructured knowledge retrieval accuracy.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a flexible interface for long-horizon robot planning, but generated plans often fail to respect embodiment constraints, recover from planning errors, or reason effectively under partial observability. We present GAVEL, a framework for verifying and repairing long-horizon LLM planning built around an explicit graph world model. The graph represents relevant object-relations, action pre-conditions and effects, and probabilistic beliefs over unobserved object locations. This model can predict the consequences of LLM-generated actions before execution, detect violations, and repair those whose corrections follow directly from the world model. This method also reserves LLM replanning solely for errors requiring semantic reasoning. For multi-task instructions, GAVEL reasons over distributions of possible object locations to reorder remaining subtasks and minimize expected search cost. We evaluate GAVEL on BEHAVIOR-1K across 100 single long-horizon tasks and 500 multi-task instructions. With Qwen3-8B, GAVEL improves single-task success from 41.2% to 91.8% and multi-task success from 19.9% to 92.6%. Distributional belief reasoning also reduces travel distance by approximately 5.4% compared with a static variant. These improvements show that an explicit graph world model harness can substantially improve the reliability and efficiency of long-horizon embodied planning across compact and frontier hosted LLM capabilities.

Instructions-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) gained recently huge popularity thanks to their ability to interact with users through conversation. In this work we aim to evaluate their ability to complete multi-turn tasks and interact with external databases in the context of established task-oriented dialogue benchmarks. We show that for explicit belief state tracking, LLMs underperform compared to specialized task-specific models. Nevertheless, they show ability to guide the dialogue to successful ending if given correct slot values. Furthermore this ability improves with access to true belief state distribution or in-domain examples.

Cloud computing is an attractive technology for providing computing resources over the Internet. Task scheduling is a critical issue in cloud computing, where an efficient task scheduling method can improve overall cloud performance. Since cloud computing is a large-scale and geographically distributed environment, traditional scheduling methods that allocate resources in a centralized manner are ineffective. Besides, traditional methods are difficult to make rational decisions timely when the external environment changes. This paper proposes a decentralized BDI (belief-desire-intention) agent-based scheduling framework for cloud computing. BDI agents have advantages in modelling dynamic environments because BDI agents can update their beliefs, change desires, and trigger behaviours based on environmental changes. Besides, to avoid communication stuck caused by environmental uncertainties, the asynchronous communication mode with a notify listener is employed. The proposed framework covers both the task scheduling and rescheduling stages with the consideration of uncertain events that can interrupt task executions. Two agent-based algorithms are proposed to implement the task scheduling and rescheduling processes, and a novel recommendation mechanism is presented in the scheduling stage to reduce the impact of information synchronization delays. The proposed framework is implemented by JADEX and tested on CloudSim. The experimental results show that our framework can minimize the task makespan, balance the resource utilization in a large-scale environment, and maximize the task success rate when uncertain events occur.

Large language model (LLM) agents can now undertake increasingly complex tasks, but the way they organize interaction history into memory does not ensure a coherent understanding of the current world. We introduce PoS, an inference-time framework that constructs and continually maintains explicit belief states as the agent's decision context. Each belief combines an estimate of the current world state with unresolved task requirements, making explicit what the agent still needs to learn and accomplish. To keep this belief reliable and actionable, PoS validates its consistency and monitors task progress to detect Belief Trapping, where the agent continues to act without making meaningful progress toward the goal. Recovery is then tailored to both the trapping pattern and the type of unresolved task requirement. Experiments on four benchmarks spanning execution and diagnosis show that PoS achieves the highest overall performance on every benchmark with all three LLM backbones. Ablations demonstrate the importance of consistency validation and recovery, while context-scaling experiments show resilience to context growth. Together, these results support belief construction and continual maintenance as a foundation for long-horizon context management beyond history retention and compression.

This paper focuses on the task of hallucination detection, which aims to determine the truthfulness of LLM-generated statements. To address this problem, a popular class of methods utilize the LLM's self-consistencies in its beliefs in a set of logically related augmented statements generated by the LLM, which does not require external knowledge databases and can work with both white-box and black-box LLMs. However, in many existing approaches, the augmented statements tend to be very monotone and unstructured, which makes it difficult to integrate meaningful information from the LLM beliefs in these statements. Also, many methods work with the binarized version of the LLM's belief, instead of the continuous version, which significantly loses information. To overcome these limitations, in this paper, we propose Belief Tree Propagation (BTProp), a probabilistic framework for LLM hallucination detection. BTProp introduces a belief tree of logically related statements by recursively decomposing a parent statement into child statements with three decomposition strategies, and builds a hidden Markov tree model to integrate the LLM's belief scores in these statements in a principled way. Experiment results show that our method improves baselines by 3%-9% (evaluated by AUROC and AUC-PR) on multiple hallucination detection benchmarks. Code is available at https://github.com/UCSB-NLP-Chang/BTProp.

Long chains of thought (CoT) from current language models frequently contain logical gaps and unjustified leaps, limiting the gains from additional test-time compute. Improving reasoning quality directly would require process reward models, but the step-level annotations needed to train them are expensive and scarce. We find such a signal in how the model's confidence evolves during reasoning: premature confidence, the tendency to commit to an answer early and use the remaining tokens to rationalize it, strongly predicts flawed reasoning across tasks and model scales. We exploit this in progressive confidence shaping, a reinforcement learning objective that trains models to update their confidence as they reason rather than commit early -- rewarding gradual confidence growth and penalizing early commitment, with no external labels or reward models. The method improves accuracy and reasoning quality from 1.5B to 8B parameters across arithmetic (Countdown), math (DAPO, AIME), and science (ScienceQA): on Countdown, accuracy improves 3.2x (+42.0pp) and flawed reasoning drops 48pp; on AIME, Pass@64 improves 6.6pp. Consistent with this mechanism, the method also improves faithfulness: on a safety benchmark, our models more transparently surface misleading content in their reasoning traces rather than concealing it. Controlled experiments reveal that the problem and its remedy scale together: premature confidence grows with model size and task difficulty, and so do the gains from addressing it.

Humans talk in free-form while negotiating the expressed meanings or common ground. Despite the impressive conversational abilities of the large generative language models, they do not consider the individual differences in contextual understanding in a shared situated environment. In this work, we propose MindDial, a novel conversational framework that can generate situated free-form responses to negotiate common ground. We design an explicit mind module that can track three-level beliefs -- the speaker's belief, the speaker's prediction of the listener's belief, and the common belief based on the gap between the first two. Then the speaking act classification head will decide to continue to talk, end this turn, or take task-related action. We augment a common ground alignment dataset MutualFriend with belief dynamics annotation, of which the goal is to find a single mutual friend based on the free chat between two agents. Experiments show that our model with mental state modeling can resemble human responses when aligning common ground meanwhile mimic the natural human conversation flow. The ablation study further validates the third-level common belief can aggregate information of the first and second-order beliefs and align common ground more efficiently.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We bridge this gap by first formalizing two core acts Adversarial and Alignment, and by operationalizing them via probabilistic constraints on what an agent may generate. We instantiate this idea in BEDA, a framework that consists of the world set, the belief estimator for belief estimation, and the conditional generator that selects acts and realizes utterances consistent with the inferred beliefs. Across three settings, Conditional Keeper Burglar (CKBG, adversarial), Mutual Friends (MF, cooperative), and CaSiNo (negotiation), BEDA consistently outperforms strong baselines: on CKBG it improves success rate by at least 5.0 points across backbones and by 20.6 points with GPT-4.1-nano; on Mutual Friends it achieves an average improvement of 9.3 points; and on CaSiNo it achieves the optimal deal relative to all baselines. These results indicate that casting belief estimation as constraints provides a simple, general mechanism for reliable strategic dialogue.

Large language models (LLMs) progressively revise their predictions across Transformer layers, yet we typically observe only the final output, discarding the trajectory through which it is formed. We introduce Belief-Trajectory Energy(BTE), a model-grounded measure that characterizes an input through the layerwise predictive revisions it induces in a model. By mapping intermediate states into a shared predictive space, BTE provides a principled measure of belief change that can be summarized as either a scalar or a structured depth profile. Theoretically, we show that local BTE corresponds to predictive revision under the Fisher-Rao geometry, while the sequence of revisions captures information beyond the initial-to-final belief change. Empirically, scalar BTE provides a model-relative signal of difficulty across diverse reasoning tasks, while richer BTE representations support human-LLM review detection and fine-grained generator attribution, reaching up to 0.998 macro-AUROC and 95.6% eight-way attribution accuracy. Further analysis shows that BTE develops throughout pretraining and is selectively reshaped by targeted training, demonstrating that the resulting measurement reflects what the scoring model has learned. Together, our results establish belief trajectories as a principled model-grounded signal and suggest a broader perspective in which learned models can themselves serve as instruments for characterizing the data they process. More demonstrations can be found at https://yingjiahao14.github.io/BTE-web/.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents commonly condition actions on full action-observation histories, which introduce task-irrelevant information that easily leads to redundant actions and higher inference cost. We propose Progress-Aware Belief Update (PABU), a belief-state framework that compactly represents an agent's state by explicitly modeling task progress and selectively retaining past actions and observations. At each step, the agent predicts its relative progress since the previous round and decides whether the newly encountered interaction should be stored, conditioning future decisions only on the retained subset. Across eight environments in the AgentGym benchmark, and using identical training trajectories, PABU achieves an 81.0% task completion rate, outperforming previous State of the art (SoTA) models with full-history belief by 23.9%. Additionally, PABU's progress-oriented action selection improves efficiency, reducing the average number of interaction steps to 9.5, corresponding to a 26.9% reduction. Ablation studies show that both explicit progress prediction and selective retention are necessary for robust belief learning and performance gains.

Neural task-oriented dialogue systems often struggle to smoothly interface with a knowledge base. In this work, we seek to address this problem by proposing a new neural dialogue agent that is able to effectively sustain grounded, multi-domain discourse through a novel key-value retrieval mechanism. The model is end-to-end differentiable and does not need to explicitly model dialogue state or belief trackers. We also release a new dataset of 3,031 dialogues that are grounded through underlying knowledge bases and span three distinct tasks in the in-car personal assistant space: calendar scheduling, weather information retrieval, and point-of-interest navigation. Our architecture is simultaneously trained on data from all domains and significantly outperforms a competitive rule-based system and other existing neural dialogue architectures on the provided domains according to both automatic and human evaluation metrics.

Even though machine learning has become the major scene in dialogue research community, the real breakthrough has been blocked by the scale of data available. To address this fundamental obstacle, we introduce the Multi-Domain Wizard-of-Oz dataset (MultiWOZ), a fully-labeled collection of human-human written conversations spanning over multiple domains and topics. At a size of 10k dialogues, it is at least one order of magnitude larger than all previous annotated task-oriented corpora. The contribution of this work apart from the open-sourced dataset labelled with dialogue belief states and dialogue actions is two-fold: firstly, a detailed description of the data collection procedure along with a summary of data structure and analysis is provided. The proposed data-collection pipeline is entirely based on crowd-sourcing without the need of hiring professional annotators; secondly, a set of benchmark results of belief tracking, dialogue act and response generation is reported, which shows the usability of the data and sets a baseline for future studies.

LLM agents excel when environments are mostly static and the needed information fits in a model's context window, but they often fail in open-ended investigations where explanations must be constructed by iteratively mining evidence from massive, heterogeneous operational data. These investigations exhibit hidden dependency structure: entities interact, signals co-vary, and the importance of a fact may only become clear after other evidence is discovered. Because the context window is bounded, agents must summarize intermediate findings before their significance is known, increasing the risk of discarding key evidence. ReAct-style agents are especially brittle in this regime. Their retrieve-summarize-reason loop makes conclusions sensitive to exploration order and introduces run-to-run non-determinism, producing a reliability gap where Pass-at-k may be high but Majority-at-k remains low. Simply sampling more rollouts or generating longer reasoning traces does not reliably stabilize results, since hypotheses cannot be autonomously checked as new evidence arrives and there is no explicit mechanism for belief bookkeeping and revision. In addition, ReAct entangles semantic reasoning with controller duties such as tool orchestration and state tracking, so execution errors and plan drift degrade reasoning while consuming scarce context. We address these issues by formulating investigation as abductive reasoning over a dependency graph and proposing EoG (Explanations over Graphs), a disaggregated framework in which an LLM performs bounded local evidence mining and labeling (cause vs symptom) while a deterministic controller manages traversal, state, and belief propagation to compute a minimal explanatory frontier. On a representative ITBench diagnostics task, EoG improves both accuracy and run-to-run consistency over ReAct baselines, including a 7x average gain in Majority-at-k entity F1.

Long-horizon interactions require language models to manage accumulating information: when to update their state, when to preserve their state, and what to ignore. We study this challenge as Contextual Belief Management (CBM): maintaining a predicted belief state aligned with formal evidence while isolating task-irrelevant noise. To make CBM measurable, we introduce BeliefTrack, a closed-world benchmark spanning Rule Discovery and Circuit Diagnosis, where a finite belief space and symbolic verifiers enable exact turn-level evaluation. BeliefTrack diagnoses three failures: Failed Stay, Failed Update, and Failed Isolation. Across multiple LLMs, vanilla models exhibit severe CBM failures, while explicit belief-tracking prompts provide limited gains. In contrast, reinforcement learning with belief-state rewards reduces failure rates by 70.9\% on average. Further probing reveals latent belief-state dynamics behind these failures, and representation-level steering reduces failure rates by 46.1\% across two tasks\footnote{Code is coming soon at https://github.com/zjunlp/CBM.

Language models trained with reinforcement learning may learn to optimize the grader's judgment rather than the intended objective. This "reward-seeking" is difficult to measure because a model that pursues the grader's judgment and one that pursues the intended objective behave identically whenever the grader rewards the intended behavior. We measure reward-seeking using Contrastive Synthetic Document Finetuning to change a model's beliefs about what the grader rewards, putting those beliefs in conflict with what users or developers want, and measuring the rate at which the model adopts each party's preferred behavior. Applied to intermediate checkpoints of a capabilities-focused OpenAI o3 RL run, without safety training, we find that these checkpoints often side with grader preferences over those of users or developers on coding and alignment tasks. This tendency to side with the grader trends upward throughout RL training. For example, in an environment that forces a choice between keeping a promise to a supervisor and breaking it to complete the task, a late capabilities-focused o3 checkpoint breaks the promise 87% of the time when SDF documents say the grader rewards task completion, versus 9% when they say it rewards honesty (a choice its chain-of-thought often makes explicit). An earlier checkpoint is far less sensitive (40% vs. 24%). Our method also generalizes to reward-hacking models. A model organism trained to reward-hack (gpt-oss-120b) is more than twice as sensitive to grader preferences as the unmodified model, with the mean behavioral shift in favor of the grader rising from 33% to 86%. These results indicate that RL can increase reward-seeking over the course of training, producing models that may act against their developers' intentions when they believe that doing so leads to higher reward.

Cross-cultural competence in large language models (LLMs) requires the ability to identify Culture-Specific Items (CSIs) and to adapt them appropriately across cultural contexts. Progress in evaluating this capability has been constrained by the scarcity of high-quality CSI-annotated corpora with parallel cross-cultural sentence pairs. To address this limitation, we introduce XCR-Bench, a Cross(X)-Cultural Reasoning Benchmark consisting of 4.9k parallel sentences and 1,098 unique CSIs, spanning three distinct reasoning tasks with corresponding evaluation metrics. Our corpus integrates Newmark's CSI framework with Hall's Triad of Culture, enabling systematic analysis of cultural reasoning beyond surface-level artifacts and into semi-visible and invisible cultural elements such as social norms, beliefs, and values. Our findings show that state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit consistent weaknesses in identifying and adapting CSIs related to social etiquette and cultural reference. Additionally, we find evidence that LLMs encode regional and ethno-religious biases even within a single linguistic setting during cultural adaptation. We release our corpus and code to facilitate future research on cross-cultural NLP.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed on long-horizon tasks in partially observable environments, where they must act while inferring and tracking a complex environment state over many steps. This leads to two challenges: partial observability requires maintaining uncertainty over unobserved world attributes, and long interaction history causes context to grow without bound, diluting task-relevant information. A principled solution to both challenges is a belief state: a posterior distribution over environment states given past observations and actions, which compactly encodes history for decision making regardless of episode length. In LLM agents, however, the open-ended nature of text makes it unclear how to represent such a distribution. Therefore, we introduce Agent-BRACE: Agent Belief state Representation via Abstraction and Confidence Estimation, a method that decouples an LLM agent into a belief state model and a policy model, jointly optimized via reinforcement learning. The belief state model produces a structured approximation of the belief distribution: a set of atomic natural language claims about the environment, each annotated with an ordinal verbalized certainty label ranging from certain to unknown. The policy model conditions on this compact, structured approximate belief rather than the full history, learning to select actions under explicit uncertainty. Across long-horizon, partially observable embodied language environments, Agent-BRACE achieves an average absolute improvement of +14.5% (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) and +5.3% (Qwen3-4B-Instruct), outperforming strong RL baselines while maintaining a near-constant context window independent of episode length. Further analysis shows that the learned belief becomes increasingly calibrated over the course of an episode as evidence accumulates.

Acoustic events are sounds with well-defined spectro-temporal characteristics which can be associated with the physical objects generating them. Acoustic scenes are collections of such acoustic events in no specific temporal order. Given this natural linkage between events and scenes, a common belief is that the ability to classify events must help in the classification of scenes. This has led to several efforts attempting to do well on Acoustic Event Tagging (AET) and Acoustic Scene Classification (ASC) using a multi-task network. However, in these efforts, improvement in one task does not guarantee an improvement in the other, suggesting a tension between ASC and AET. It is unclear if improvements in AET translates to improvements in ASC. We explore this conundrum through an extensive empirical study and show that under certain conditions, using AET as an auxiliary task in the multi-task network consistently improves ASC performance. Additionally, ASC performance further improves with the AET data-set size and is not sensitive to the choice of events or the number of events in the AET data-set. We conclude that this improvement in ASC performance comes from the regularization effect of using AET and not from the network's improved ability to discern between acoustic events.

Large-scale task planning is a major challenge. Recent work exploits large language models (LLMs) directly as a policy and shows surprisingly interesting results. This paper shows that LLMs provide a commonsense model of the world in addition to a policy that acts on it. The world model and the policy can be combined in a search algorithm, such as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), to scale up task planning. In our new LLM-MCTS algorithm, the LLM-induced world model provides a commonsense prior belief for MCTS to achieve effective reasoning; the LLM-induced policy acts as a heuristic to guide the search, vastly improving search efficiency. Experiments show that LLM-MCTS outperforms both MCTS alone and policies induced by LLMs (GPT2 and GPT3.5) by a wide margin, for complex, novel tasks. Further experiments and analyses on multiple tasks -- multiplication, multi-hop travel planning, object rearrangement -- suggest minimum description length (MDL) as a general guiding principle: if the description length of the world model is substantially smaller than that of the policy, using LLM as a world model for model-based planning is likely better than using LLM solely as a policy.

Embodied agents in household environments must plan under partial observation: they need to remember objects, track state changes, and recover when actions fail. Existing benchmarks only partially test this ability. Egocentric video datasets capture realistic human activities but remain passive, while interactive simulators support execution but rely on synthetic scenes and hand-crafted dynamics, introducing a sim-to-real gap and often assuming fully observable state. We introduce Ego2World, an executable benchmark that turns egocentric cooking videos into executable symbolic worlds governed by graph-transition rules. Built on HD-EPIC, Ego2World derives reusable transition rules from video annotations and executes them in a hidden symbolic world graph. During evaluation, the simulator maintains the hidden world graph, while the agent plans over its own partial belief graph using only local observations and execution feedback. This separation forces agents to update memory and replan without observing the true world state. Experiments show that action-overlap scores overestimate physical-state success, and that persistent belief memory improves task completion while reducing repeated visual exploration -- suggesting that belief maintenance should be a first-class target of embodied-agent evaluation.

Effective agency in social environments depends on when an agent seeks knowledge, when it acts, and whether its actions are justified by acquired information. Existing grounded benchmarks provide executable actions, persistent state, and verifiable outcomes, while social simulation environments provide rich interaction among language agents. We study an evaluation setting that combines these requirements. We define socially distributed task environments as interactive environments where task-relevant knowledge is partitioned across role-isolated participants and consequential actions are accessible only through them. Communication serves as exploration over role-partitioned knowledge, while grounded action serves as exploitation over environment state. We introduce Incognita, a Concordia-based framework that separates social interaction from grounded execution. The evaluated agent routes messages to a user or specialist entities; specialists mediate admissible operations; a deterministic sub-environment executes accepted operations over a canonical state; and an offline evaluator scores outcomes with inherited rewards. Incognita-Retail transforms tau-bench retail into a multi-entity environment while preserving final-state reward semantics. We evaluate three generative agent models on 18 tasks stratified by social breadth, with 540 trials. Progress appears in reward and behavior: success rises from 0 percent to 8.9 percent and 17.2 percent, while premature finalization falls from 100 percent to 87 percent and 58 percent. Stronger models elicit more hidden knowledge, contact more entities, and attempt more grounded writes, yet reliability remains low. These findings show that socially distributed task environments expose behavior before reliable success, including knowledge elicitation, source selection, grounded action attempts, and premature completion belief.

One long-term goal of machine learning research is to produce methods that are applicable to reasoning and natural language, in particular building an intelligent dialogue agent. To measure progress towards that goal, we argue for the usefulness of a set of proxy tasks that evaluate reading comprehension via question answering. Our tasks measure understanding in several ways: whether a system is able to answer questions via chaining facts, simple induction, deduction and many more. The tasks are designed to be prerequisites for any system that aims to be capable of conversing with a human. We believe many existing learning systems can currently not solve them, and hence our aim is to classify these tasks into skill sets, so that researchers can identify (and then rectify) the failings of their systems. We also extend and improve the recently introduced Memory Networks model, and show it is able to solve some, but not all, of the tasks.

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

Modern AI agents increasingly combine conversational interaction with autonomous task execution, such as coding and web research, raising a natural question: what happens when an agent engaged in long-horizon tasks is subjected to user persuasion? We study how belief-level intervention can influence downstream task behavior, a phenomenon we name persuasion propagation. We introduce a behavior-centered evaluation framework that distinguishes between persuasion applied during or prior to task execution. Across web research and coding tasks, we find that on-the-fly persuasion induces weak and inconsistent behavioral effects. In contrast, when the belief state is explicitly specified at task time, belief-prefilled agents conduct on average 26.9\% fewer searches and visit 16.9\% fewer unique sources than neutral-prefilled agents. These results suggest that persuasion, even in prior interaction, can affect the agent's behavior, motivating behavior-level evaluation in agentic systems.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to track others epistemic state, makes humans efficient collaborators. AI agents need the same capacity in multi agent settings, yet existing benchmarks mostly test literal ToM by asking direct belief questions. The ability act optimally on implicit beliefs in embodied environments, called functional ToM, remains largely untested. We introduce EnactToM, an evolving benchmark of 300 embodied multi-agent tasks set in a 3D household with partial observability, private information, and constrained communication. Each task is formally verified for solvability and required epistemic depth, and new tasks are generated increase difficulty as models improve. On the hard split, all seven evaluated frontier models score 0.0% Pass^3 on functional task completion, while averaging 45.0% on literal belief probes. Manual analysis traces 93% of sampled failures to epistemic coordination breakdowns such as withheld information, ignored partner constraints, and misallocated messages, providing a concrete target for future work.

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behaviour, from which special and important cases can be derived, e.g., reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design, etc. Active inference resolves the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences, by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this paper, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference, using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about 'what would happen if I did that' to 'what would I believe about what would happen if I did that'. The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states, as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme, using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.

Generative AI agents equate understanding with resolving explicit queries, an assumption that confines interaction to what users can articulate. This assumption breaks down when users themselves lack awareness of what is missing, risky, or worth considering. In such conditions, proactivity is not merely an efficiency enhancement, but an epistemic necessity. We refer to this condition as epistemic incompleteness: where progress depends on engaging with unknown unknowns for effective partnership. Existing approaches to proactivity remain narrowly anticipatory, extrapolating from past behavior and presuming that goals are already well defined, thereby failing to support users meaningfully. However, surfacing possibilities beyond a user's current awareness is not inherently beneficial. Unconstrained proactive interventions can misdirect attention, overwhelm users, or introduce harm. Proactive agents, therefore, require behavioral grounding: principled constraints on when, how, and to what extent an agent should intervene. We advance the position that generative proactivity must be grounded both epistemically and behaviorally. Drawing on the philosophy of ignorance and research on proactive behavior, we argue that these theories offer critical guidance for designing agents that can engage responsibly and foster meaningful partnerships.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting is a common technique for improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, extended reasoning is often unnecessary and substantially increases token usage. As such, a key question becomes how to optimally allocate compute to when reasoning is actually needed. We study this through confidence-gated CoT, where a model produces a direct answer and a confidence estimate to decide whether to invoke CoT. We present an evaluation framework together with the first systematic study of confidence signals for this decision. We evaluate four representative confidence measures and compare them with random gating and an oracle upper bound. Experiments across two model families and diverse reasoning tasks show that existing training-free confidence measures can reduce redundant reasoning. However, we also find that the utility of individual confidence measures is inconsistent across settings. Through our evaluation framework and analysis, our study provides practical guidance toward developing and evaluating models that selectively use CoT.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

Autonomous scientific discovery systems increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to propose new hypotheses, but many such systems condition primarily on experimental memory: archives of high-scoring candidates or heuristic summaries of recent trials. We argue that discovery agents should instead maintain explicit, uncertainty-aware beliefs about hypothesis quality. We introduce BayesEvolve, a belief-guided discovery framework that converts experimental evidence into a predictive belief state and uses this belief to guide future experimentation. As a controlled testbed for belief-guided discovery, we evaluate BayesEvolve on shifted BBOB-style black-box optimization tasks, leaving program and laboratory discovery domains to future work. BayesEvolve improves sample efficiency over memory- and archive-guided LLM baselines under a fixed evaluation budget. We further show that the belief state is predictive on held-out candidate pools, that controlled decision-rule ablations favor belief-guided selection with an annealed uncertainty bonus, and that BayesEvolve exhibits productive late-stage concentration rather than unfocused exploration.

Task-oriented dialogue requires maintaining and updating information across turns, yet language models expose no explicit belief-state object. We study how conversational state is represented, updated, and used inside eight instruction-tuned language models from four families on MultiWOZ and SGD. Structure and values separate: which domains, slots, and requests are active is linearly readable just before the model acts, whereas exact values are far more readable where the user stated them. After a user changes a value, both values remain accessible at their mentions, and causal interventions show that both continue to influence the model's action. In natural closed-loop interaction, query failures separate into cases of weak structural support, incorrect value resolution, and failure to deploy otherwise-supported constraints, with targeted interventions producing systematically different repair behavior across these cases. These findings motivate a state-action controller that starts from the base model action and selectively edits it using structural readouts, without requiring a complete predicted belief state as an intermediate representation. On held-out MultiWOZ interaction across five models, it raises the base model exact-query accuracy from .318 to .621 and task success from .272 to .371 at negligible added cost. Overall, reliable interaction requires not only retaining conversational information, but resolving which available constraints currently apply and ensuring that they govern action.

Theory of Mind (ToM), the ability to infer others' knowledge, intentions, and emotions, is commonly evaluated in large language models (LLMs) using end-point question answering, where performance is judged solely by the final answer to a social reasoning query. This paradigm obscures whether the model actually constructs the underlying mental-state representations required for robust reasoning, particularly in scenarios involving divergent, evolving, or mistaken beliefs. In order to address this research gap, we introduce OmniToM, a benchmark that directly evaluates these representations by requiring explicit modeling of belief structures for all relevant actors within a narrative. These structures are composed of belief propositions: minimal statements of what an actor takes to be true about the world or another actor's mental state, allowing knowledge, intentions, emotions, and false beliefs to be analyzed in a common format. Models are evaluated in two stages: Stage 1: Belief Extraction, which extracts from the story the beliefs relevant to its social dynamics, and Stage 2: Belief Labeling, which assigns each belief a seven-dimensional schema label covering recursive order, truth status, knowledge access, explicitness, content type, mental source, and context. Built from 895 stories from the existing ToMBench story corpus and augmented with 22,343 labeled belief propositions, OmniToM uses a human-calibrated LLM-assisted annotation pipeline. Across diverse models in zero-shot evaluation, OmniToM reveals an actor-specific belief-tracking bottleneck: current LLMs struggle with the knowledge-access and representational decisions required to transform narrative facts into actors' beliefs and shared mental states.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

We show that a GPT-3 model can learn to express uncertainty about its own answers in natural language -- without use of model logits. When given a question, the model generates both an answer and a level of confidence (e.g. "90% confidence" or "high confidence"). These levels map to probabilities that are well calibrated. The model also remains moderately calibrated under distribution shift, and is sensitive to uncertainty in its own answers, rather than imitating human examples. To our knowledge, this is the first time a model has been shown to express calibrated uncertainty about its own answers in natural language. For testing calibration, we introduce the CalibratedMath suite of tasks. We compare the calibration of uncertainty expressed in words ("verbalized probability") to uncertainty extracted from model logits. Both kinds of uncertainty are capable of generalizing calibration under distribution shift. We also provide evidence that GPT-3's ability to generalize calibration depends on pre-trained latent representations that correlate with epistemic uncertainty over its answers.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Theory of Mind (ToM) refers to an agent's ability to model the internal states of others. Contributing to the debate whether large language models (LLMs) exhibit genuine ToM capabilities, our study investigates their ToM robustness using perturbations on false-belief tasks and examines the potential of Chain-of-Thought prompting (CoT) to enhance performance and explain the LLM's decision. We introduce a handcrafted, richly annotated ToM dataset, including classic and perturbed false belief tasks, the corresponding spaces of valid reasoning chains for correct task completion, subsequent reasoning faithfulness, task solutions, and propose metrics to evaluate reasoning chain correctness and to what extent final answers are faithful to reasoning traces of the generated CoT. We show a steep drop in ToM capabilities under task perturbation for all evaluated LLMs, questioning the notion of any robust form of ToM being present. While CoT prompting improves the ToM performance overall in a faithful manner, it surprisingly degrades accuracy for some perturbation classes, indicating that selective application is necessary.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Chain of Thought (CoT) is significant in improving the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, the correlation between the effectiveness of CoT and the length of reasoning steps in prompts remains largely unknown. To shed light on this, we have conducted several empirical experiments to explore the relations. Specifically, we design experiments that expand and compress the rationale reasoning steps within CoT demonstrations, while keeping all other factors constant. We have the following key findings. First, the results indicate that lengthening the reasoning steps in prompts, even without adding new information into the prompt, considerably enhances LLMs' reasoning abilities across multiple datasets. Alternatively, shortening the reasoning steps, even while preserving the key information, significantly diminishes the reasoning abilities of models. This finding highlights the importance of the number of steps in CoT prompts and provides practical guidance to make better use of LLMs' potential in complex problem-solving scenarios. Second, we also investigated the relationship between the performance of CoT and the rationales used in demonstrations. Surprisingly, the result shows that even incorrect rationales can yield favorable outcomes if they maintain the requisite length of inference. Third, we observed that the advantages of increasing reasoning steps are task-dependent: simpler tasks require fewer steps, whereas complex tasks gain significantly from longer inference sequences.

Frontier AI agents increasingly act in environments where seemingly solvable tasks may lack prerequisites, contain conflicting requirements, or reveal blockers only during execution. We formulate agentic self-awareness (ASA) as the alignment of task-grounded feasibility judgments (know), warranted behavior (act), and responses to reconsideration (hold), distinguishing what a task permits from what an agent can solve. We build paired feasible and blocked tasks in Terminal-Bench 2.1 and retail τ^2-bench and introduce an authorship-aware M0-M3 rubric that separates recognizing a blocker from taking the certified deferral action for the correct reason. Separate probes assess stated feasibility beliefs and responses to a single challenge. In a Terminal-Bench protocol baseline, blocker recognition reaches 84.4%, but strict self-awareness (SA) reaches only 40.6%. Harness search without model-weight updates increases strict SA from 45.3% to 93.8% on reused Terminal-Bench search tasks; selection for abstention alone, however, can reduce success on feasible tasks. Independently initialized joint-objective searches improve both blocked-task SA and feasible-task solve on their own search sets. Retail held-out gains remain limited, and Terminal-Bench blocked-task transfer is not measured. This evaluation pipeline makes the recognition-action gap measurable and sets a two-sided target for improving agent decisions under changing task evidence.

As browser-use agents improve, benchmarks keep pace by collecting new tasks, websites, and applications, often making tasks longer or more novel. This makes difficulty expensive to refresh and difficult to control: when many aspects change at once, it is unclear what actually makes a task challenging. We instead construct challenging instances from tasks agents already solve, turning difficulty into a programmable property of the environment. BreakingWeb pairs every base task with an intervention condition that preserves the user instruction, latent target, and backend success criterion while changing the environment at different web stack layers. Each intervention is deterministic, detectable, and recoverable, and is annotated with the cognitive primitive it primarily loads. The benchmark contains 519 clean/intervention task pairs across seven self-hosted websites and 29 intervention families, all graded against outcomes. We evaluate six strong browser-use agents, three GUI-only agents that see only screenshots, and humans. The construction is effective: interventions cut agent pass rate by 22.9% on average and overturn nearly half of the tasks each agent solves cleanly, whereas humans lose 10.0% on a first attempt and 5.7% after one familiarisation attempt. The dominant failure is belief failure: 75% of the six agents' failures end with a declared success although the required change never happened. Our code, data and environment are publicly available at www.breakingweb.app.

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

One promising use case of AI assistants is to help with complex procedures like cooking, home repair, and assembly tasks. Can we teach the assistant to interject after the user makes a mistake? This paper targets the problem of identifying ordering mistakes in assembly procedures. We propose a system that can detect ordering mistakes by utilizing a learned knowledge base. Our framework constructs a knowledge base with spatial and temporal beliefs based on observed mistakes. Spatial beliefs depict the topological relationship of the assembling components, while temporal beliefs aggregate prerequisite actions as ordering constraints. With an episodic memory design, our algorithm can dynamically update and construct the belief sets as more actions are observed, all in an online fashion. We demonstrate experimentally that our inferred spatial and temporal beliefs are capable of identifying incorrect orderings in real-world action sequences. To construct the spatial beliefs, we collect a new set of coarse-level action annotations for Assembly101 based on the positioning of the toy parts. Finally, we demonstrate the superior performance of our belief inference algorithm in detecting ordering mistakes on the Assembly101 dataset.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Reward models can significantly enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but they typically require extensive curated data and costly training. To mitigate these challenges, training-free approaches such as LLM-as-a-Judge leverage the intrinsic reasoning abilities of LLMs to evaluate responses, achieving promising results. Recent works have also indicated that model confidence can serve effectively as a reward metric, distinguishing between chain-of-thought (CoT) and non-CoT paths. However, the concept of using confidence as a reward has not been comprehensively studied. In this work, we systematically investigate Confidence-as-a-Reward (CRew), a simple yet powerful training-free method that utilizes token-level confidence in the model's final answers as a proxy for reward, especially suitable for close-ended tasks. Through extensive experiments on mathematical reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that CRew outperforms existing training-free reward approaches on the MATH500 and RewardMATH benchmarks, and even surpasses most trained reward models. We further identify a strong correlation between CRew scores and the actual reasoning performance of the model. Additionally, we find that CRew can effectively filter high-quality training data. Building upon these insights, we propose CRew-DPO, a training strategy that constructs preference data from confidence scores combined with correctness signals. Finetuning with CRew-DPO further enhances the model's judging capabilities and consistently outperforms existing self-training methods.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

Long-horizon agents often struggle to recover from failures whose causes lie several steps earlier, beyond what local reflection or backtracking can resolve. We introduce BELIEFWEAVER, a framework that combines persistent evidence across attempts with prospective reasoning over repair directions. It maintains a relational belief state over frontiers, attempts, observations, and checkpoints. Execution evidence updates related frontier priorities across attempts and rollback, while diagnostic evidence gates execution. An implicit world model (IWM) evaluates repair hypotheses, predicts progress, and identifies relations among frontiers to guide exploration. We further distill these recurring IWM reasoning components into a 9B student through supervised fine-tuning and on-policy distillation (OPD). Across three terminal-based benchmarks, BELIEFWEAVER improves aggregate final score by 5.1 percentage points over native Terminus-2 continuation, with positive trends in exploration efficiency. The distilled 9B student improves final score by 9.8 percentage points over the reported native baseline while reducing estimated teacher API cost by 54.8% relative to the matched teacher. These results show that persistent evidence and prospective reasoning can improve recovery in long-horizon agent tasks while substantially reducing reliance on teacher-model inference.

Mathematical proofs are both paradigms of certainty and some of the most explicitly-justified arguments that we have in the cultural record. Their very explicitness, however, leads to a paradox, because the probability of error grows exponentially as the argument expands. When a mathematician encounters a proof, how does she come to believe it? Here we show that, under a cognitively-plausible belief formation mechanism combining deductive and abductive reasoning, belief in mathematical arguments can undergo what we call an epistemic phase transition: a dramatic and rapidly-propagating jump from uncertainty to near-complete confidence at reasonable levels of claim-to-claim error rates. To show this, we analyze an unusual dataset of forty-eight machine-aided proofs from the formalized reasoning system Coq, including major theorems ranging from ancient to 21st Century mathematics, along with five hand-constructed cases including Euclid, Apollonius, Hernstein's Topics in Algebra, and Andrew Wiles's proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. Our results bear both on recent work in the history and philosophy of mathematics on how we understand proofs, and on a question, basic to cognitive science, of how we justify complex beliefs.

Reliable confidence estimation is increasingly central to the trustworthy deployment of language models: a calibrated estimate of the probability that an output is correct decides what to ship, what to escalate, and what to retry. Existing confidence estimators, however, share one design premise: they only read the current inference process, either by introspecting on it, scoring its token probabilities, or resampling it. We argue that the current inference is not a sufficient basis for confidence. We propose XConf (eXperiential Confidence): estimating confidence together with the model's accumulated experience. The experience is stored as a record of the model's own graded past episodes, each holding the task, the model's reflection, its stated confidence, the outcome, and a lesson written once the grade arrived. Given a new task, XConf's Recall stage retrieves past episodes on similar tasks met with a similar stated confidence, and reads off their historical success rate; its Reflect stage shows the model this record, has it name its recurring failure mode, and restate a confidence now informed by its own track records. Our estimator is format-general, requiring no logit access or weight updates, and costs only one answer generation. Across nine benchmarks spanning reasoning, coding, multimodal QA, and interactive agents, and four models from three families, XConf beats or matches ten-sample self-consistency in discrimination (AUROC) on 23 of 24 comparisons, with much lower calibration error (ECE), at a tenth of the generation cost. Used for selective prediction, abstaining on the 10% least-confident episodes raises the delivered success rate by up to 8.7 points on agent tasks. We therefore see experiential confidence estimation as a new paradigm for future general-purpose confidence estimation.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

We propose a new test to measure a text model's multitask accuracy. The test covers 57 tasks including elementary mathematics, US history, computer science, law, and more. To attain high accuracy on this test, models must possess extensive world knowledge and problem solving ability. We find that while most recent models have near random-chance accuracy, the very largest GPT-3 model improves over random chance by almost 20 percentage points on average. However, on every one of the 57 tasks, the best models still need substantial improvements before they can reach expert-level accuracy. Models also have lopsided performance and frequently do not know when they are wrong. Worse, they still have near-random accuracy on some socially important subjects such as morality and law. By comprehensively evaluating the breadth and depth of a model's academic and professional understanding, our test can be used to analyze models across many tasks and to identify important shortcomings.

Multi-agent debates have been introduced to improve the accuracy of Large Language Models (LLMs) by having multiple agents discuss solutions to a problem over several rounds of debate. However, models often generate incorrect yet confident-sounding responses, which can mislead others. This issue arises partly because agents do not consider how confident their peers are. To address this, we propose DebUnc, a debate framework that uses uncertainty metrics to assess agent confidence. Confidence is then conveyed through a modified attention mechanism that adjusts token weights, or through textual prompts. Evaluations across benchmarks show that attention-based methods are particularly effective and that performance continues to improve as uncertainty estimation becomes more reliable. The code is available at https://github.com/lukeyoffe/debunc.

Language models (LMs) capture large amounts of factual knowledge applicable to a wide range of tasks, motivating the view of their parameters as a knowledge base. An important property of knowledge bases is that different queries for the same fact return consistent results, drawing on a single source of truth. We investigate whether LMs satisfy this property through behavioral and mechanistic analyses. Our results suggest that they encode knowledge in a task-specific manner. Behaviorally, facts acquired on one task frequently fail to co-emerge on others during training. Parameter localization experiments suggest a mechanistic explanation, revealing distinct parameter subsets underlying different tasks for the same fact. Finally, we show that chain-of-thought reasoning draws part of its effectiveness from engaging task-specific parameters beyond those tied to the evaluation task. Our findings suggest that what the model knows and how it is asked are intertwined in parameter space, undermining the "knowledge base" analogy and carrying implications for the reliability and controllability of factual knowledge in LMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

We introduce a dataset of natural-language questions in the decision theory of so-called Newcomb-like problems. Newcomb-like problems include, for instance, decision problems in which an agent interacts with a similar other agent, and thus has to reason about the fact that the other agent will likely reason in similar ways. Evaluating LLM reasoning about Newcomb-like problems is important because interactions between foundation-model-based agents will often be Newcomb-like. Some ways of reasoning about Newcomb-like problems may allow for greater cooperation between models. Our dataset contains both capabilities questions (i.e., questions with a unique, uncontroversially correct answer) and attitude questions (i.e., questions about which decision theorists would disagree). We use our dataset for an investigation of decision-theoretical capabilities and expressed attitudes and their interplay in existing models (different models by OpenAI, Anthropic, Meta, GDM, Reka, etc.), as well as models under simple prompt-based interventions. We find, among other things, that attitudes vary significantly between existing models; that high capabilities are associated with attitudes more favorable toward so-called evidential decision theory; and that attitudes are consistent across different types of questions.

As generative AI systems are integrated into educational settings, students often encounter AI-generated output while working through learning tasks, either by requesting help or through integrated tools. Trust in AI can influence how students interpret and use that output, including whether they evaluate it critically or exhibit overreliance. We investigate how students' trust relates to their appropriate reliance on an AI assistant during programming problem-solving tasks, and whether this relationship differs by learner characteristics. With 432 undergraduate participants, students' completed Python output-prediction problems while receiving recommendations and explanations from an AI chatbot, including accurate and intentionally misleading suggestions. We operationalize reliance behaviorally as the extent to which students' responses reflected appropriate use of the AI assistant's suggestions, accepting them when they were correct and rejecting them when they were incorrect. Pre- and post-task surveys assessed trust in the assistant, AI literacy, need for cognition, programming self-efficacy, and programming literacy. Results showed a non-linear relationship in which higher trust was associated with lower appropriate reliance, suggesting weaker discrimination between correct and incorrect recommendations. This relationship was significantly moderated by students' AI literacy and need for cognition. These findings highlight the need for future work on instructional and system supports that encourage more reflective evaluation of AI assistance during problem-solving.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

Dialogue failures in language models are usually framed as memory failures: context too long, summaries lossy, a constraint forgotten. We argue this misses a deeper problem: in many conversations the model does not forget, it commits too early. An ambiguous early turn collapses into a single hidden interpretation, and later clarification is filtered through that commitment. We call this early posterior collapse: unresolved user intent collapsing into a committed task state before ambiguity is resolved. We study it with controlled dialogue tasks in writing, planning, and coding using Gemini-2.5-Pro and Gemini-2.5-Flash. Across thousands of trials, the same information in different orders yields different outcomes, even when the final dialogue contains equivalent task-relevant information. This order effect suggests later clarification is treated as extra context rather than a corrective signal: it refines a stale task state without invalidating it. Coding tasks are especially vulnerable, suggesting early assumptions get embedded in structured artifacts such as interfaces and control flow. Standard prompting and memory strategies do not reliably help: summaries can collapse ambiguity, and chain-of-thought can reduce explicit wrong commitment in reasoning traces without improving final task success. These findings motivate uncertainty-preserving state management. If assistants cannot let go of early interpretations, robustness cannot rely on post hoc correction alone; it must keep ambiguous early turns from hardening into one task state. Assistants should hold tentative hypotheses while ambiguity remains, ask before executing when high-impact ambiguity persists, and rebuild from a revised state when later evidence invalidates an earlier reading. Rather than one prompting fix, we aim to redirect research for interactive LLMs from retaining more context toward preserving uncertainty.

LLM agents that operate over long context depend on external memory to accumulate knowledge over time. However, existing methods typically store each observation as a single deterministic conclusion (e.g., inferring "API~X failed" from temporary errors), even though such observations are inherently partial and potentially ambiguous. By committing to one conclusion and discarding uncertainty, these methods introduce self-reinforcing error: the agent acts on the stored conclusion, never revisits alternatives, and reinforces the conclusion over time. To address this issue, we propose BeliefMem, which shifts the memory paradigm from committing to a single conclusion per observation to retaining multiple candidate conclusions with their probabilities. Concretely, BeliefMem stores the candidate conclusions as separate memory entries, each carrying a probability that is updated via Noisy-OR rules as new observations arrive. At retrieval, all candidates surface together with their probabilities, keeping alternatives visible to the agent. Since each conclusion in memory retains its probability, BeliefMem preserves the uncertainty that the deterministic paradigm discards, enabling the agent to act with high confidence on well-evidenced knowledge while retaining the capacity to update its confidence when new evidence arrives. Empirical evaluations on LoCoMo and ALFWorld benchmarks show that, even with limited data, BeliefMem achieves the best average performance, remarkably outperforming well-known baselines. More broadly, such probabilistic memory produces substantial gains and explores a new direction for agent memory in partially observable environments.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

This paper examines the extent to which large language models (LLMs) have developed higher-order theory of mind (ToM); the human ability to reason about multiple mental and emotional states in a recursive manner (e.g. I think that you believe that she knows). This paper builds on prior work by introducing a handwritten test suite -- Multi-Order Theory of Mind Q&A -- and using it to compare the performance of five LLMs to a newly gathered adult human benchmark. We find that GPT-4 and Flan-PaLM reach adult-level and near adult-level performance on ToM tasks overall, and that GPT-4 exceeds adult performance on 6th order inferences. Our results suggest that there is an interplay between model size and finetuning for the realisation of ToM abilities, and that the best-performing LLMs have developed a generalised capacity for ToM. Given the role that higher-order ToM plays in a wide range of cooperative and competitive human behaviours, these findings have significant implications for user-facing LLM applications.

When humans cooperate, they frequently coordinate their activity through both verbal communication and non-verbal actions, using this information to infer a shared goal and plan. How can we model this inferential ability? In this paper, we introduce a model of a cooperative team where one agent, the principal, may communicate natural language instructions about their shared plan to another agent, the assistant, using GPT-3 as a likelihood function for instruction utterances. We then show how a third person observer can infer the team's goal via multi-modal Bayesian inverse planning from actions and instructions, computing the posterior distribution over goals under the assumption that agents will act and communicate rationally to achieve them. We evaluate this approach by comparing it with human goal inferences in a multi-agent gridworld, finding that our model's inferences closely correlate with human judgments (R = 0.96). When compared to inference from actions alone, we also find that instructions lead to more rapid and less uncertain goal inference, highlighting the importance of verbal communication for cooperative agents.

Large language models (LLMs) perform better when they produce step-by-step, "Chain-of-Thought" (CoT) reasoning before answering a question, but it is unclear if the stated reasoning is a faithful explanation of the model's actual reasoning (i.e., its process for answering the question). We investigate hypotheses for how CoT reasoning may be unfaithful, by examining how the model predictions change when we intervene on the CoT (e.g., by adding mistakes or paraphrasing it). Models show large variation across tasks in how strongly they condition on the CoT when predicting their answer, sometimes relying heavily on the CoT and other times primarily ignoring it. CoT's performance boost does not seem to come from CoT's added test-time compute alone or from information encoded via the particular phrasing of the CoT. As models become larger and more capable, they produce less faithful reasoning on most tasks we study. Overall, our results suggest that CoT can be faithful if the circumstances such as the model size and task are carefully chosen.

Task semantics can be expressed by a set of input-to-output examples or a piece of textual instruction. Conventional machine learning approaches for natural language processing (NLP) mainly rely on the availability of large-scale sets of task-specific examples. Two issues arise: first, collecting task-specific labeled examples does not apply to scenarios where tasks may be too complicated or costly to annotate, or the system is required to handle a new task immediately; second, this is not user-friendly since end-users are probably more willing to provide task description rather than a set of examples before using the system. Therefore, the community is paying increasing interest in a new supervision-seeking paradigm for NLP: learning from task instructions. Despite its impressive progress, there are some common issues that the community struggles with. This survey paper tries to summarize and provide insights into the current research on instruction learning, particularly by answering the following questions: (i) What is task instruction, and what instruction types exist? (ii) How to model instructions? (iii) What factors influence and explain the instructions' performance? (iv) What challenges remain in instruction learning? To our knowledge, this is the first comprehensive survey about textual instructions.

People increasingly use large language models (LLMs) to explore ideas, gather information, and make sense of the world. In these interactions, they encounter agents that are overly agreeable. We argue that this sycophancy poses a unique epistemic risk to how individuals come to see the world: unlike hallucinations that introduce falsehoods, sycophancy distorts reality by returning responses that are biased to reinforce existing beliefs. We provide a rational analysis of this phenomenon, showing that when a Bayesian agent is provided with data that are sampled based on a current hypothesis the agent becomes increasingly confident about that hypothesis but does not make any progress towards the truth. We test this prediction using a modified Wason 2-4-6 rule discovery task where participants (N=557) interacted with AI agents providing different types of feedback. Unmodified LLM behavior suppressed discovery and inflated confidence comparably to explicitly sycophantic prompting. By contrast, unbiased sampling from the true distribution yielded discovery rates five times higher. These results reveal how sycophantic AI distorts belief, manufacturing certainty where there should be doubt.

It has been shown that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) may not *say what they think*: they do not always volunteer information about how certain parts of the input influence their reasoning. But it is one thing for a model to *omit* such information and another, worse thing to *lie* about it. Here, we extend the work of Chen et al. (2025) to show that LRMs will do just this: they will flatly deny relying on hints provided in the prompt in answering multiple choice questions -- even when directly asked to reflect on unusual (i.e. hinted) prompt content, even when allowed to use hints, and even though experiments *show* them to be using the hints. Our results thus have discouraging implications for CoT monitoring and interpretability.

Memory-augmented LLM agents tackle complex long-horizon tasks by recursively summarizing interaction trajectories into compact memory. However, existing approaches typically train these memory policies using outcome-based reinforcement learning, failing to localize where intermediate memory quality degrades. As interactions unfold, ambiguous recursive summaries progressively discard task-relevant information and introduce semantic noise. This exacerbates belief deviation, obscuring the agent's estimate of the latent task state and ultimately derailing long-horizon reasoning. We therefore argue that memory optimization should focus not merely on trajectory-level success, but on the clarity of the belief induced by intermediate summaries. To this end, we introduce Belief Entropy, a self-supervised proxy that probes how uncertain the model remains about the latent task state given its current memory. Based on this proxy, we propose Metacognitive Memory Policy Optimization (MMPO). Instead of relying only on sparse outcome-based signals, MMPO provides fine-grained, memory-specific supervision via explicitly penalizing summaries that induce high epistemic uncertainty. Experiments show that MMPO consistently outperforms existing methods on diverse long-horizon tasks, maintaining 97.1% performance even when scaled to 1.75M-token contexts.

Facial expression data is characterized by a significant imbalance, with most collected data showing happy or neutral expressions and fewer instances of fear or disgust. This imbalance poses challenges to facial expression recognition (FER) models, hindering their ability to fully understand various human emotional states. Existing FER methods typically report overall accuracy on highly imbalanced test sets but exhibit low performance in terms of the mean accuracy across all expression classes. In this paper, our aim is to address the imbalanced FER problem. Existing methods primarily focus on learning knowledge of minor classes solely from minor-class samples. However, we propose a novel approach to extract extra knowledge related to the minor classes from both major and minor class samples. Our motivation stems from the belief that FER resembles a distribution learning task, wherein a sample may contain information about multiple classes. For instance, a sample from the major class surprise might also contain useful features of the minor class fear. Inspired by that, we propose a novel method that leverages re-balanced attention maps to regularize the model, enabling it to extract transformation invariant information about the minor classes from all training samples. Additionally, we introduce re-balanced smooth labels to regulate the cross-entropy loss, guiding the model to pay more attention to the minor classes by utilizing the extra information regarding the label distribution of the imbalanced training data. Extensive experiments on different datasets and backbones show that the two proposed modules work together to regularize the model and achieve state-of-the-art performance under the imbalanced FER task. Code is available at https://github.com/zyh-uaiaaaa.

Long-horizon embodied task requires agents to act under partial observability while preserving both scene belief and execution progress. Flat histories or implicit policy states may contain past observations, but they do not provide an explicit interface for deciding which world facts support the currently active goal. We introduce Mimir, a neuro-symbolic memory that separates world memory from task memory and dynamically grounds them before each action. World memory maintains object locations, object states, and perceptual evidence, while task memory maintains an ordered goal agenda, progress state, hand state, failures, and execution constraints. A grounding module binds the active goal to recalled world candidates, fills missing source locations, and attaches evidence before planning and embodiment-specific execution. Across tested backbones, Mimir consistently improves on different EB-ALFRED and EB-Habitat tasks, with maximum gains of 42.5% and average gains of 23.0%, respectively. Compared with the best results among prior agent and memory systems evaluated under the same backbone, Mimir improves the overall average success rate by 8.5%. Finally, on the EB-Habitat Long-horizon subset, Mimir achieves 86.0% success rate, substantially outperforming current closed-source models. Our code will be released soon.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Large language models (LLMs) have majorly advanced NLP and AI, and next to their ability to perform a wide range of procedural tasks, a major success factor is their internalized factual knowledge. Since Petroni et al. (2019), analyzing this knowledge has gained attention. However, most approaches investigate one question at a time via modest-sized pre-defined samples, introducing an ``availability bias'' (Tversky&Kahnemann, 1973) that prevents the analysis of knowledge (or beliefs) of LLMs beyond the experimenter's predisposition. To address this challenge, we propose a novel methodology to comprehensively materialize an LLM's factual knowledge through recursive querying and result consolidation. Our approach is a milestone for LLM research, for the first time providing constructive insights into the scope and structure of LLM knowledge (or beliefs). As a prototype, we build GPTKB, a knowledge base (KB) comprising 101 million relational triples for over 2.9 million entities from GPT-4o-mini. We use GPTKB to exemplarily analyze GPT-4o-mini's factual knowledge in terms of scale, accuracy, bias, cutoff and consistency, at the same time. GPTKB is accessible at https://gptkb.org

LLM-based agents are increasingly used to simulate deliberative interactions such as negotiation, conflict resolution, and multi-turn opinion exchange. Yet generated transcripts often do not reveal why an agent's stance changes: movement may reflect evidence uptake, anchoring, role drift, echoing, or changed prompt and retrieval context. We introduce the Belief Engine (BE), an auditable belief-update layer that treats "belief" as an evidential state over a proposition and exposes it as scalar stance. BE extracts arguments into structured memory and updates stance with a log-odds rule controlled by evidence uptake u and prior anchoring a. Across multiple base LLMs, parameter sweeps show that these controls reliably shape stance dynamics while preserving an evidence-level update trail. On DEBATE, a human deliberation dataset with pre/post opinions, BE best reconstructs participants whose final stance follows extracted evidence; stable and evidence-opposed cases instead point to anchoring or factors outside the extracted evidence stream. BE provides configurable infrastructure for studying evidence-grounded deliberation, where openness, commitment, convergence, and disagreement can be tied to explicit update assumptions rather than hidden prompt effects.

World Action Models (WAMs) jointly learn environmental dynamics and robot actions, introducing priors over physical evolution into embodied control. However, finite-horizon prediction and action generation are insufficient for complex embodied tasks that require global planning, cross-stage state maintenance, execution verification, and failure recovery. We refer to this mismatch as the prediction-deliberation gap of WAMs. To address this gap, we propose HarnessWAM, an agentic framework for WAMs. HarnessWAM employs a vision-language-model-based Task Manager to maintain an evidence-grounded scene belief and a structured task graph. A capability-conditioned executable-space projection further constrains open-ended semantic plans into sequences of atomic skills that satisfy task dependencies, embodiment-state constraints, and the capability boundary of the underlying WAM. During execution, HarnessWAM operates through an event-driven, dual-timescale feedback loop: a lightweight progress estimator continuously provides high-frequency execution evidence, while the Task Manager deliberates at salient milestones by jointly considering the current observation, task state, and interaction history to determine whether to advance the task, acquire additional observations, revise the plan, or initiate local recovery. This mechanism enables the robot to recover its state after a subtask failure and resume execution without discarding previously acquired scene knowledge. HarnessWAM achieves state-of-the-art full-task and subtask success rates of 59.6% and 69.9% on RoboMemArena, and an SR of 23.7% on RoboCerebra Ideal. These results demonstrate that model-external structured state maintenance and closed-loop agentic decision making can effectively extend the local control capabilities of WAMs into embodied task execution that is plannable, verifiable, and recoverable.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Social reasoning - inferring unobservable beliefs and intentions from partial observations of other agents - remains a challenging task for large language models (LLMs). We evaluate the limits of current reasoning language models in the social deduction game Avalon and find that while the largest models demonstrate strong performance, they require extensive test-time inference and degrade sharply when distilled to smaller, real-time-capable variants. To address this, we introduce a hybrid reasoning framework that externalizes belief inference to a structured probabilistic model, while using an LLM for language understanding and interaction. Our approach achieves competitive performance with much larger models in Agent-Agent play and, notably, is the first language agent to defeat human players in a controlled study - achieving a 67% win rate and receiving higher qualitative ratings than both reasoning baselines and human teammates. We release code, models, and a dataset to support future work on social reasoning in LLM agents, which can be found at https://camp-lab-purdue.github.io/bayesian-social-deduction/

A key challenge in training Vision-Language Model (VLM) agents, compared to Language Model (LLM) agents, lies in the shift from textual states to complex visual observations. This transition introduces partial observability and demands robust world modeling. We ask: Can VLM agents construct internal world models through explicit visual state reasoning? To address this question, we architecturally enforce and reward the agent's reasoning process via reinforcement learning (RL), formulating it as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP). We find that decomposing the agent's reasoning into State Estimation ("what is the current state?") and Transition Modeling ("what comes next?") is critical for success, as demonstrated through five reasoning strategies. Our investigation into how agents represent internal beliefs reveals that the optimal representation is task-dependent: Natural Language excels at capturing semantic relationships in general tasks, while Structured formats are indispensable for precise manipulation and control. Building on these insights, we design a World Modeling Reward that provides dense, turn-level supervision for accurate state prediction, and introduce Bi-Level General Advantage Estimation (Bi-Level GAE) for turn-aware credit assignment. Through this form of visual state reasoning, a 3B-parameter model achieves a score of 0.82 across five diverse agent benchmarks, representing a 3times improvement over its untrained counterpart (0.21) and outperforming proprietary reasoning models such as GPT-5 (0.75), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.67) and Claude 4.5 (0.62). All experiments are conducted within our VAGEN framework, a scalable system for training and analyzing multi-turn VLM agents in diverse visual environments. Code and data are publicly available at https://vagen-ai.github.io.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in applications requiring factual accuracy, yet their outputs often contain hallucinated responses. While fact-checking can mitigate these errors, existing methods typically retrieve external evidence indiscriminately, overlooking the model's internal knowledge and potentially introducing irrelevant noise. Moreover, current systems lack targeted mechanisms to resolve specific uncertainties in the model's reasoning. Inspired by how humans fact-check, we argue that LLMs should adaptively decide whether to rely on internal knowledge or initiate retrieval based on their confidence in a given claim. We introduce Probabilistic Certainty and Consistency (PCC), a framework that estimates factual confidence by jointly modeling an LLM's probabilistic certainty and reasoning consistency. These confidence signals enable an adaptive verification strategy: the model answers directly when confident, triggers targeted retrieval when uncertain or inconsistent, and escalates to deep search when ambiguity is high. Our confidence-guided routing mechanism ensures that retrieval is invoked only when necessary, improving both efficiency and reliability. Extensive experiments across three challenging benchmarks show that PCC achieves better uncertainty quantification than verbalized confidence and consistently outperforms strong LLM-based fact-checking baselines. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PCC generalizes well across various LLMs.

Confidence estimates are often "detection-like" - driven by positive evidence in favour of a decision. This empirical observation has been interpreted as showing that human metacognition is limited by biases or heuristics. Here, we show that Bayesian confidence estimates also exhibit heightened sensitivity to decision-congruent evidence in higher-dimensional signal detection theoretic spaces, leading to detection-like confidence criteria. This effect is due to a nonlinearity induced by normalisation of confidence by a large number of unchosen alternatives. Our analysis suggests that detection-like confidence is rational when participants consider a greater number of hypotheses than assumed by the experimenter. Further, we show that a similar dimensionality-driven mechanism can give rise to and modulate the strength of the positive evidence biases in convolutional neural networks, linking our signal detection theoretic analysis to confidence behaviour in artificial systems.

LLM agents increasingly rely on external inference conditions: prompts, tools, memory, SOPs, skills, and harness feedback. These assets can improve task execution without changing model weights, but they are often revised by heuristic reflection or by reusing observed successes and failures as if counts alone were reliable belief. We introduce Bayesian-Agent, a native and cross-harness framework that treats reusable skills and SOPs as hypotheses about whether a frozen model will succeed under a particular prompt, context, and harness environment. Bayesian-Agent records verified trajectory evidence, maintains a feature-conditioned categorical posterior over each skill, and maps posterior state into inspectable actions such as patch, split, compress, retire, and explore. Model-facing prompts receive executable guardrails and failure-mode patches, while posterior summaries remain available for audit. With deepseek-v4-flash, incremental repair improves SOP-Bench from 80\% to 95\%, Lifelong AgentBench from 90\% to 100\%, and RealFin-Bench from 45\% to 65\%. We further evaluate Bayesian-Agent's native backend and optional GenericAgent, mini-swe-agent, and Claude Code backends. The results include positive, negative, saturated, and case-study settings, suggesting that agent skill evolution is best viewed as posterior-guided harness optimization rather than uncalibrated prompt accumulation. The source code is available at https://github.com/DataArcTech/Bayesian-Agent.

Search-augmented language agents should retrieve external information only when necessary and ground their answers in retrieved evidence. Yet terminal correctness assigns equal credit to direct answers from parametric knowledge, evidence-grounded answers, and answers recalled after redundant search. Process supervision and LLM judges provide richer feedback but can require high-cost annotation or inference; low-cost, non-contrastive policy confidence signals do not directly identify whether retrieved evidence changes an answer. We propose Search-G1, a reward framework that couples retrieval necessity with evidence reliance through two intervention-calibrated hidden-state readouts for selective grounded search. A prompt readout predicts closed-book sufficiency, whose complement proxies policy-relative retrieval necessity; an answer-commit readout predicts evidence reliance as sensitivity to evidence deletion conditional on the realized reasoning prefix. A correctness-first reward gates evidence-reliance credit by retrieval necessity, rewards sufficient direct answers, and penalizes repeated search. After calibration, scoring needs neither process annotations nor LLM-judge inference. As policy-relative targets, trajectory distributions, and representations may drift, Search-G1 periodically regenerates targets and refits its readouts. Across four QA benchmarks and two scales, Search-G1 achieves competitive task accuracy, with stronger counterfactual evidence dependence and fewer searches in the main comparisons, complemented by independent human audits of answer support.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive accomplishments in both reasoning and planning, their abilities in multi-agent collaborations remains largely unexplored. This study evaluates LLM-based agents in a multi-agent cooperative text game with Theory of Mind (ToM) inference tasks, comparing their performance with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) and planning-based baselines. We observed evidence of emergent collaborative behaviors and high-order Theory of Mind capabilities among LLM-based agents. Our results reveal limitations in LLM-based agents' planning optimization due to systematic failures in managing long-horizon contexts and hallucination about the task state. We explore the use of explicit belief state representations to mitigate these issues, finding that it enhances task performance and the accuracy of ToM inferences for LLM-based agents.

The growing use of language models for forecasting motivates a broader evaluation of their world-model capabilities. Such evaluation must go beyond predictive accuracy to assess hidden-state inference and intervention prediction. Real-world forecasting benchmarks offer limited access to hidden-state ground truth and controlled experiments. We introduce CivWorldBench, a benchmark built on a multi-agent strategy game engine with recorded internal states, controlled observations, and paired intervention rollouts. Its 1,900 decision points from 475 worlds support three task levels: association forecasting, belief inference, and intervention prediction. Reference predictors support attributable evaluation of capability gaps, with an expert harness and empirical ceiling estimates contextualizing scores. Stored trajectories make intermediate predictions verifiable, while agent-play experiments test whether world-model capabilities support decision-making. The main panel comprises eleven frontier language models. Composite benchmark scores correlate with real-world forecasting leaderboards on matched model panels, more closely than with a general-capability index, supporting its use as a proxy for real-world forecasting capability. Strong association forecasts do not consistently extend to belief inference or intervention prediction, and effect magnitudes remain poorly calibrated despite informative direction predictions. Process verification reveals errors missed by final-answer evaluation, and structured reasoning improves intervention prediction for the strongest model in the process study. Agent-play experiments identify useful assisted plans and motivate evaluating decision-relevant capabilities beyond association forecasting. These findings identify hidden-state inference, intermediate-state prediction, and effect calibration as priorities for world-model training.

Large language models can detect their own errors and sometimes correct them without external feedback, but the underlying mechanisms remain unknown. We investigate this through the lens of second-order models of confidence from decision neuroscience. In a first-order system, confidence derives from the generation signal itself and is therefore maximal for the chosen response, precluding error detection. Second-order models posit a partially independent evaluative signal that can disagree with the committed response, providing the basis for error detection. Kumaran et al. (2026) showed that LLMs cache a confidence representation at a token immediately following the answer (i.e. post-answer newline: PANL) -- that causally drives verbal confidence and dissociates from log-probabilities. Here we test whether this PANL signal extends beyond confidence to support error detection and self-correction. Here we test whether this signal supports error detection and self-correction, deriving predictions from the second-order framework. Using a verify-then-correct paradigm, we show that: (i) verbal confidence predicts error detection far beyond token log-probabilities, ruling out a first-order account; (ii) PANL activations predict error detection beyond verbal confidence itself; and (iii) PANL predicts which errors the model can correct -- where all behavioural signals fail. Causal interventions confirm that PANL signals rescue error detection behavior when answer information is corrupted. All findings replicate across models (Gemma 3 27B and Qwen 2.5 7B) and tasks (TriviaQA and MNLI). These results reveal that LLMs naturally implement a second-order confidence architecture whose internal evaluative signal encodes not only whether an answer is likely wrong but whether the model has the knowledge to fix it.

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

Fine-tuning, a foundational method for adapting large language models, has long been considered ineffective for model editing. Here, we challenge this belief, arguing that the reported failure arises not from the inherent limitation of fine-tuning itself, but from adapting it to the sequential nature of the editing task, a single-pass depth-first pipeline that optimizes each sample to convergence before moving on. While intuitive, this depth-first pipeline coupled with sample-wise updating over-optimizes each edit and induces interference across edits. Our controlled experiments reveal that simply restoring fine-tuning to the standard breadth-first (i.e., epoch-based) pipeline with mini-batch optimization substantially improves its effectiveness for model editing. Moreover, fine-tuning in editing also suffers from suboptimal tuning parameter locations inherited from prior methods. Through systematic analysis of tuning locations, we derive LocFT-BF, a simple and effective localized editing method built on the restored fine-tuning framework. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs and datasets demonstrate that LocFT-BF outperforms state-of-the-art methods by large margins. Notably, to our knowledge, it is the first to sustain 100K edits and 72B-parameter models,10 x beyond prior practice, without sacrificing general capabilities. By clarifying a long-standing misconception and introducing a principled localized tuning strategy, we advance fine-tuning from an underestimated baseline to a leading method for model editing, establishing a solid foundation for future research.

Current video avatar generation methods excel at identity preservation and motion alignment but lack genuine agency, they cannot autonomously pursue long-term goals through adaptive environmental interaction. We address this by introducing L-IVA (Long-horizon Interactive Visual Avatar), a task and benchmark for evaluating goal-directed planning in stochastic generative environments, and ORCA (Online Reasoning and Cognitive Architecture), the first framework enabling active intelligence in video avatars. ORCA embodies Internal World Model (IWM) capabilities through two key innovations: (1) a closed-loop OTAR cycle (Observe-Think-Act-Reflect) that maintains robust state tracking under generative uncertainty by continuously verifying predicted outcomes against actual generations, and (2) a hierarchical dual-system architecture where System 2 performs strategic reasoning with state prediction while System 1 translates abstract plans into precise, model-specific action captions. By formulating avatar control as a POMDP and implementing continuous belief updating with outcome verification, ORCA enables autonomous multi-step task completion in open-domain scenarios. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ORCA significantly outperforms open-loop and non-reflective baselines in task success rate and behavioral coherence, validating our IWM-inspired design for advancing video avatar intelligence from passive animation to active, goal-oriented behavior.

We introduce CRAFT, a multi-agent benchmark for evaluating pragmatic communication in large language models under strict partial information. In this setting, multiple agents with complementary but incomplete views must coordinate through natural language to construct a shared 3D structure that no single agent can fully observe. We formalize this problem as a multi-sender pragmatic reasoning task and provide a diagnostic framework that decomposes failures into spatial grounding, belief modeling and pragmatic communication errors, including a taxonomy of behavioral failure profiles in both frontier and open-weight models. Across a diverse set of models, including 8 open-weight and 7 frontier including reasoning models, we find that stronger reasoning ability does not reliably translate to better coordination: smaller open-weight models often match or outperform frontier systems, and improved individual communication does not guarantee successful collaboration. These results suggest that multi-agent coordination remains a fundamentally unsolved challenge for current language models. Our code can be found at https://github.com/csu-signal/CRAFT

Chemical Language Models (CLMs) pre-trained on large scale molecular data are widely used for molecular property prediction. However, the common belief that increasing training resources such as model size, dataset size, and training compute improves both pretraining loss and downstream task performance has not been systematically validated in the chemical domain. In this work, we evaluate this assumption by pretraining CLMs while scaling training resources and measuring transfer performance across diverse molecular property prediction (MPP) tasks. We find that while pretraining loss consistently decreases with increased training resources, downstream task performance shows limited improvement. Moreover, alternative metrics based on the Hessian or loss landscape also fail to estimate downstream performance in CLMs. We further identify conditions under which downstream performance saturates or degrades despite continued improvements in pretraining metrics, and analyze the underlying task dependent failure modes through parameter space visualizations. These results expose a gap between pretraining based evaluation and downstream performance, and emphasize the need for model selection and evaluation strategies that explicitly account for downstream task characteristics.

Understanding human tasks through video observations is an essential capability of intelligent agents. The challenges of such capability lie in the difficulty of generating a detailed understanding of situated actions, their effects on object states (i.e., state changes), and their causal dependencies. These challenges are further aggravated by the natural parallelism from multi-tasking and partial observations in multi-agent collaboration. Most prior works leverage action localization or future prediction as an indirect metric for evaluating such task understanding from videos. To make a direct evaluation, we introduce the EgoTaskQA benchmark that provides a single home for the crucial dimensions of task understanding through question-answering on real-world egocentric videos. We meticulously design questions that target the understanding of (1) action dependencies and effects, (2) intents and goals, and (3) agents' beliefs about others. These questions are divided into four types, including descriptive (what status?), predictive (what will?), explanatory (what caused?), and counterfactual (what if?) to provide diagnostic analyses on spatial, temporal, and causal understandings of goal-oriented tasks. We evaluate state-of-the-art video reasoning models on our benchmark and show their significant gaps between humans in understanding complex goal-oriented egocentric videos. We hope this effort will drive the vision community to move onward with goal-oriented video understanding and reasoning.