Daily Papers

Large language model agents increasingly act through terminals, yet existing surveys disperse terminal-mediated behavior across software engineering, tool use, and computer-use research. We regard terminal agents as systems whose dominant progress-bearing action--observation loop is mediated by terminal command execution, textual feedback, and stateful environment interaction. Using terminal-mediated execution as an organizing lens, this survey establishes workload-level boundaries and connects system architecture, competence acquisition, and evaluation through a seven-dimensional terminal competence profile. Our synthesis shows that realized behavior is jointly shaped by the model, interface, harness, runtime, and environment. Executable trajectories ground learning in action consequences, verification, and recovery, whereas prevailing evaluations emphasize final outcomes and expose process quality, recovery, and governance unevenly. Bounded fixed-condition diagnostics illustrate two implications: benchmark families expose different process signals, and matched system comparisons reveal benchmark-dependent performance and limits of component attribution. These findings motivate explicit reporting of system and runtime conditions, supported by replayable traces and process-level evidence. The framework provides a unified basis for studying terminal-mediated agency across software engineering and emerging application domains.

Terminal agents have demonstrated strong potential for autonomous command-line execution, yet their training remains constrained by the scarcity of high-quality and diverse execution trajectories. Existing approaches mitigate this bottleneck by synthesizing large-scale terminal task instances for trajectory sampling. However, they primarily focus on scaling the number of tasks while providing limited control over the diversity of execution trajectories that agents actually experience during training. In this paper, we present SkillSynth, an automated framework for terminal task synthesis built on a scenario-mediated skill graph. SkillSynth first constructs a large-scale skill graph, where scenarios serve as intermediate transition nodes that connect diverse command-line skills. It then samples paths from this graph as abstractions of real-world workflows, and uses a multi-agent harness to instantiate them into executable task instances. By grounding task synthesis in graph-sampled workflow paths, SkillSynth explicitly controls the diversity of minimal execution trajectories required to solve the synthesized tasks. Experiments on Terminal-Bench demonstrate the effectiveness of SkillSynth. Moreover, task instances synthesized by SkillSynth have been adopted to train Hy3 Preview, contributing to its enhanced agentic capabilities in terminal-based settings.

Terminal agents are increasingly capable of executing complex, long-horizon tasks autonomously from a single user prompt. To do so, they must interpret instructions encountered in the environment (e.g., README files, code comments, stack traces) and determine their relevance to the task. This creates a fundamental challenge: relevant cues must be followed to complete a task, whereas irrelevant or misleading ones must be ignored. Existing benchmarks do not capture this ability. An agent may appear capable by blindly following all instructions, or appear robust by ignoring them altogether. We introduce TAB (Task Alignment Benchmark), a suite of 89 terminal tasks derived from Terminal-Bench 2.1. Each task is intentionally underspecified, with missing information provided as a necessary cue embedded in a natural environmental artifact, alongside a plausible but irrelevant distractor. Solving these tasks requires selectively using the cue while ignoring the distractor. Applying TAB to ten frontier agents reveals a systematic gap between task capability and task alignment. The strongest Terminal-Bench agent achieves high task completion but low task alignment on TAB. Evaluating six prompt-injection defenses further shows that suppressing distractor execution also suppresses the cues required for task completion. These results demonstrate that task-aligned agents require selective use of environmental instructions rather than blanket acceptance or rejection.

Training agentic models for terminal-based tasks critically depends on high-quality terminal trajectories that capture realistic long-horizon interactions across diverse domains. However, constructing such data at scale remains challenging due to two key requirements: \emph{Executability}, since each instance requires a suitable and often distinct Docker environment; and \emph{Verifiability}, because heterogeneous task outputs preclude unified, standardized verification. To address these challenges, we propose TerminalTraj, a scalable pipeline that (i) filters high-quality repositories to construct Dockerized execution environments, (ii) generates Docker-aligned task instances, and (iii) synthesizes agent trajectories with executable validation code. Using TerminalTraj, we curate 32K Docker images and generate 50,733 verified terminal trajectories across eight domains. Models trained on this data with the Qwen2.5-Coder backbone achieve consistent performance improvements on TerminalBench (TB), with gains of up to 20\% on TB~1.0 and 10\% on TB~2.0 over their respective backbones. Notably, TerminalTraj-32B achieves strong performance among models with fewer than 100B parameters, reaching 35.30\% on TB~1.0 and 22.00\% on TB~2.0, and demonstrates improved test-time scaling behavior. All code and data are available at https://github.com/Wusiwei0410/TerminalTraj.

Mastering terminal environments requires language agents capable of multi-step planning, feedback-grounded execution, and dynamic state adaptation. However, training such agents is currently bottlenecked by a reliance on scraped external repositories, which limits domain diversity, environment controllability, and the targeting of specific capability deficits. We introduce LiteCoder-Terminal-Gen, a zero-dependency synthesis pipeline that autonomously generates executable and verifiable terminal training environments directly from domain specifications. Using this framework, we construct two large-scale resources: LiteCoder-Terminal-SFT, comprising 11,255 expert trajectories across 10 domains, and LiteCoder-Terminal-RL, featuring 602 verifiable environments for trajectory-level preference optimization. Supervised fine-tuning of Qwen-family models on our SFT dataset yields agents that significantly outperform their base counterparts. Notably, our 32B variant achieves 29.06%, 18.54%, and 34.00% pass@1 on Terminal Bench 1.0, 2.0, and Pro, respectively. Furthermore, applying Direct Multi-turn Preference Optimization (DMPO) on our RL environments yields additional performance gains. These results systematically demonstrate that fully synthetic, executable environments offer a scalable and verifiable supervision signal for mastering complex, real-world command-line workflows.

Command line interface (CLI) agents are emerging as a practical paradigm for agent-computer interaction over evolving filesystems, executable command line programs, and online execution feedback. Recent work has used reinforcement learning (RL) to learn these interaction abilities from verifiable task feedback, yet few methods exploit the native structured attributes of CLI actions as learning signals. Beyond this underused action structure, CLI learning also couples two bottlenecks for coding agents. First, the agent must identify task-relevant evidence in a large codebase from partial observations. Second, sparse terminal rewards must be assigned to the actions that shape a long multi-turn trajectory. We study these bottlenecks through shell-driven information extraction and file editing tasks. For selective observation, we introduce σ-Reveal, an inference-time mechanism that selects token-budgeted context for the same CLI. For credit assignment, we propose Action Advantage Assignment (A^3), a native agentic RL method that preserves the algorithmic complexity of standard agentic RL. A^3 constructs turn-level advantages from episode-level relative feedback, abstract syntax tree (AST) based action sub-chain residuals, and tree-level trajectory margins. To further evaluate this problem setting, we construct ShellOps, a verifiable dataset suite covering CLI tasks in repository environments.

Standard embodied evaluations do not independently score whether an agent correctly commits to task completion at episode closure, a capacity we call terminal commitment. Behaviorally distinct failures--never completing the task, completing it but failing to stop, and reporting success without sufficient evidence--collapse into the same benchmark failure. We introduce VIGIL, an evaluation framework that makes terminal commitment independently measurable. Under VIGIL's default protocol, agents observe only egocentric RGB, receive no action-success signals, and must end each episode with a semantic report checked deterministically against hidden world state. This yields two separate scores: world-state completion (W) and benchmark success (B), where B additionally requires a correct terminal report. This decoupling makes four outcome categories distinguishable: missed execution, post-attainment drift, unsupported commitment, and verified success. Across 20 models on 1,000 frozen episodes, systems with comparable W differ by up to 19.7 pp in B: one model converts achieved states into correct reports, while another with near-identical execution drifts past the goal without closing. An action-feedback intervention further tests the separation: execution-oriented signals improve W broadly, yet commitment failures persist in models that do not already ground terminal reports in the achieved state. VIGIL provides a protocol that makes terminal commitment independently visible and scorable.

Terminals provide a powerful interface for AI agents by exposing diverse tools for automating complex workflows, yet existing terminal-agent benchmarks largely focus on tasks grounded in text, code, and structured files. However, many real-world workflows require practitioners to work directly with audio and video files. Working with such multimedia files calls for terminal agents not only to understand multimedia content, but also to convert auditory and visual evidence across related files into appropriate actions. To evaluate terminal agents on multimedia-file tasks, we introduce MultiMedia-TerminalBench (MMTB), a benchmark of 105 tasks across 5 meta-categories where terminal agents directly operate with audio and video files. Alongside MMTB, we propose Terminus-MM, a multimedia harness that extends Terminus-KIRA with audio and video perception for terminal agents. Together, MMTB and Terminus-MM support a controlled study of multimedia terminal agents, revealing how different forms of multimedia access shape task outcomes and determine which evidence agents rely on to construct executable terminal workflows. MMTB media and metadata are released at https://huggingface.co/datasets/mm-tbench/mmtb-media

Training terminal agents requires scalable executable supervision, yet synthesizing high-quality terminal tasks remains challenging. Each task couples an instruction, an initialized environment, a reference solution, and an executable verifier; if these artifacts are generated from inconsistent assumptions, the resulting task may be unsolvable or incorrectly evaluated. Meanwhile, multi-stage synthesis can discard the goals, dependencies, state transitions, and procedural constraints encoded in the original sources. We present FACET (Fine-grained Agentic Construction of Executable Tasks), a framework that addresses both information preservation and cross-artifact consistency. FACET reconstructs related agent skills into coherent, information-rich scenarios, then realizes and repairs the execution environment before generating the final task artifacts. The resulting container state serves as shared grounding for the instruction, solution, and verifier, while execution-based validation and targeted repair correct artifact-specific failures without unnecessarily regenerating valid components. FACET produces complex terminal tasks with dense executable checks, and successful trajectories collected from these tasks provide effective, data-efficient supervision. Fine-tuning models across multiple scales consistently improves performance on Terminal-Bench 2.1, while analyses of alternative generation schemes support the importance of environment-grounded construction for task validity and solution-verifier alignment. These results establish source-intent preservation and shared executable-state grounding as key principles for scalable terminal-task synthesis.

Executing complex terminal tasks remains a significant challenge for open-weight LLMs, constrained by two fundamental limitations. First, high-fidelity, executable training environments are scarce: environments synthesized from real-world repositories are not diverse and scalable, while trajectories synthesized by LLMs suffer from hallucinations. Second, standard instruction tuning uses expert trajectories that rarely exhibit simple mistakes common to smaller models. This creates a distributional mismatch, leaving student models ill-equipped to recover from their own runtime failures. To bridge these gaps, we introduce TermiGen, an end-to-end pipeline for synthesizing verifiable environments and resilient expert trajectories. Termi-Gen first generates functionally valid tasks and Docker containers via an iterative multi-agent refinement loop. Subsequently, we employ a Generator-Critic protocol that actively injects errors during trajectory collection, synthesizing data rich in error-correction cycles. Fine-tuned on this TermiGen-generated dataset, our TermiGen-Qwen2.5-Coder-32B achieves a 31.3% pass rate on TerminalBench. This establishes a new open-weights state-of-the-art, outperforming existing baselines and notably surpassing capable proprietary models such as o4-mini. Dataset is avaiable at https://github.com/ucsb-mlsec/terminal-bench-env.

Terminal agents extend Large Language Models with the ability to execute tasks directly in command-line environments, but their progress is bottlenecked by the scarcity of high-quality training data. Existing approaches bootstrap from partial sources such as human-defined seeds or GitHub repositories to instantiate one component and then complete the rest, producing tasks confined to narrow seed distributions, environments misaligned with task semantics, and inefficient trajectories from unguided exploration. To address these limitations, we introduce Terminal-World, a fully automated pipeline that uses agent skills as the central synthesis primitive, which jointly encode what to accomplish, when to apply (preconditions and environment state), and how to execute, enabling task instructions, environments, and teacher trajectories to be co-derived. To further broaden the synthesis space, Terminal-World composes skills into skill teams and skill graphs for multi-role and cross-domain task synthesis. Using this pipeline, we construct 5,723 training environments and train Terminal-World-8B/14B/32B, evaluated across 6 benchmarks where the Terminal-World series consistently outperforms terminal-agent baselines. Notably, using the same teacher model and only 1.2% of the training data, Terminal-World-32B surpasses Nemotron-Terminal-32B on Terminal-Bench 2.0 by +4.5 Pass@1 (31.5) and achieves 43.8 Pass@3.

The Unix terminal, or just simply, the terminal, can be found being applied in almost every facet of computing. It is available across all major platforms and often integrated into other applications. Due to its ubiquity, even marginal improvements to the terminal have the potential to make massive improvements to productivity on a global scale. We believe that evolutionary improvements to the terminal, in its current incarnation as windowed terminal emulator, are possible and that developing a thorough understanding of issues that current terminal users face is fundamental to knowing how the terminal should evolve. In order to develop that understanding we have mined Unix and Linux Stack Exchange using a fully-reproducible method which was able to extract and categorize 91.0% of 1,489 terminal-related questions (from the full set of nearly 240,000 questions) without manual intervention. We present an analysis, to our knowledge the first of its kind, of windowed terminal-related questions posted over a 15-year period and viewed, in aggregate, approximately 40 million times. As expected, given its longevity, we find the terminal's many features being applied across a wide variety of use cases. We find evidence that the terminal, as windowed terminal emulator, has neither fully adapted to its now current graphical environment nor completely untangled itself from features more suited to incarnations in previous environments. We also find evidence of areas where we believe the terminal could be extended along with other areas where it could be simplified. Surprisingly, while many current efforts to improve the terminal include improving the terminal's social and collaborative aspects, we find little evidence of this as a prominent pain point.

As model capabilities advance, research has increasingly shifted toward long-horizon, multi-turn terminal-centric agentic tasks, where raw environment feedback is often preserved in the interaction history to support future decisions. However, repeatedly retaining such feedback introduces substantial redundancy and causes cumulative token cost to grow quadratically with the number of steps, hindering long-horizon reasoning. Although observation compression can mitigate this issue, the heterogeneity of terminal environments makes heuristic-based or fixed-prompt methods difficult to generalize. We propose TACO, a plug-and-play, self-evolving Terminal Agent Compression framework that automatically discovers and refines compression rules from interaction trajectories for existing terminal agents. Experiments on TerminalBench (TB 1.0 and TB 2.0) and four additional terminal-related benchmarks (i.e., SWE-Bench Lite, CompileBench, DevEval, and CRUST-Bench) show that TACO consistently improves performance across mainstream agent frameworks and strong backbone models. With MiniMax-2.5, it improves performance on most benchmarks while reducing token overhead by around 10%. On TerminalBench, it brings consistent gains of 1%-4% across strong agentic models, and further improves accuracy by around 2%-3% under the same token budget. These results demonstrate the effectiveness and generalization of self-evolving, task-aware compression for terminal agents.

Large language models (LLMs) are rapidly shifting toward agents that solve tasks through diverse interfaces, including web and graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Among these, the terminal command line provides a text-based, general-purpose interface, covering tasks from system operations to data science and machine learning. However, scaling terminal-agent training remains challenging, as it requires diverse and coherent task instructions, executable environments, and reliable verification, while lacking naturally grounded supervision data. In this work, we propose SETA, a scalable framework for generating verifiable terminal environments for reinforcement learning (RL). The framework consists of two pipelines sharing a unified verification mechanism: SETA-Synth converts diverse sources into standardized RL environments, and SETA-Evol further expands from existing environments with adaptive control of difficulty and diversity. Together, we construct and release SETA-Env, the largest open-source verifiable terminal RL dataset to date, containing over 4,500 environments. We evaluate our dataset by training Qwen3-8B with GRPO on SETA-Env, achieving 12% pass rate on Terminal-Bench 2.0, the best reported result for an RL-trained model at the 8B scale. We further observe gains on DeepSeek-V4-Flash under the same terminal agent harness, with pass@1 on Terminal-Bench 2.0 improving from 40% to 43% and pass@5 improving from 54% to 58%. These results demonstrate that SETA- Env provides high-quality training environments for terminal agents and serves as a valuable resource for advancing research on terminal-based agent learning.

Command-line interfaces (CLIs) provide structured textual environments for system administration. Explorations have been performed using pre-trained language models (PLMs) to simulate these environments for safe interaction in high-risk environments. However, their use has been constrained to frozen, large parameter models like GPT. For smaller architectures to reach a similar level of believability, a rich dataset of CLI interactions is required. Existing public datasets focus on mapping natural-language tasks to commands, omitting crucial execution data such as exit codes, outputs, and environmental side effects, limiting their usability for behavioral modeling. We introduce a Shell Input -Output Environment (ShIOEnv), which casts command construction as a Markov Decision Process whose state is the partially built sequence and whose actions append arguments. After each action, ShIOEnv executes the candidate and returns its exit status, output, and progress toward a minimal-length behavioral objective. Due to the intractable nature of the combinatorial argument state-action space, we derive a context-free grammar from man pages to mask invalid arguments from being emitted. We explore random and proximal-policy optimization (PPO)-optimized sampling of unrestricted and grammar-masked action spaces to produce four exploration strategies. We observed that grammar masking and PPO significantly improve sample efficiency to produce a higher quality dataset (maximizing the number of arguments while minimizing redundancies). Policy-generated datasets of shell input-output behavior pairs are used to fine-tune CodeT5, where we observe 85% improvements in BLEU-4 when constraining the action space to grammar productions with an additional 26% improvement when applying PPO. The ShIOEnv environment and curated command behavior datasets are released for use in future research.

Prompt injection was initially framed as the large language model (LLM) analogue of SQL injection. However, over the past three years, attacks labeled as prompt injection have evolved from isolated input-manipulation exploits into multistep attack mechanisms that resemble malware. In this paper, we argue that prompt injections evolved into promptware, a new class of malware execution mechanism triggered through prompts engineered to exploit an application's LLM. We introduce a seven-stage promptware kill chain: Initial Access (prompt injection), Privilege Escalation (jailbreaking), Reconnaissance, Persistence (memory and retrieval poisoning), Command and Control, Lateral Movement, and Actions on Objective. We analyze thirty-six prominent studies and real-world incidents affecting production LLM systems and show that at least twenty-one documented attacks that traverse four or more stages of this kill chain, demonstrating that the threat model is not merely theoretical. We discuss the need for a defense-in-depth approach that addresses all stages of the promptware life cycle and review relevant countermeasures for each step. By moving the conversation from prompt injection to a promptware kill chain, our work provides analytical clarity, enables structured risk assessment, and lays a foundation for systematic security engineering of LLM-based systems.

Question-and-answer agents like ChatGPT offer a novel tool for use as a potential honeypot interface in cyber security. By imitating Linux, Mac, and Windows terminal commands and providing an interface for TeamViewer, nmap, and ping, it is possible to create a dynamic environment that can adapt to the actions of attackers and provide insight into their tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The paper illustrates ten diverse tasks that a conversational agent or large language model might answer appropriately to the effects of command-line attacker. The original result features feasibility studies for ten model tasks meant for defensive teams to mimic expected honeypot interfaces with minimal risks. Ultimately, the usefulness outside of forensic activities stems from whether the dynamic honeypot can extend the time-to-conquer or otherwise delay attacker timelines short of reaching key network assets like databases or confidential information. While ongoing maintenance and monitoring may be required, ChatGPT's ability to detect and deflect malicious activity makes it a valuable option for organizations seeking to enhance their cyber security posture. Future work will focus on cybersecurity layers, including perimeter security, host virus detection, and data security.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Agentic LLM coding tools compress long session histories into compaction summaries that subsequent sessions inherit as ground truth. This paper documents a failure mode in Claude Code where partial standard output from timed-out commands (exit code 143) is recorded in compaction summaries as confirmed results, propagating false positives across sessions and model versions without re-verification. The underlying mechanism is a conflation of observation and persistence, where information that appeared in the terminal is treated as equivalent to information written to durable storage. This finding extends the analysis of LLM self-evaluation failures reported in prior work on non-determinism in LLM-as-judge grading by showing that agentic tools exhibit analogous reliability deficits when reporting on their own operational outcomes. The failure has direct implications for any workflow that relies on agentic session continuity for data processing, scientific computation, or multi-step automation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as computer-use agents, autonomously performing tasks within real desktop or web environments. While this evolution greatly expands practical use cases for humans, it also creates serious security exposures. We present SUDO (Screen-based Universal Detox2Tox Offense), a novel attack framework that systematically bypasses refusal-trained safeguards in commercial computer-use agents, such as Claude for Computer Use. The core mechanism, Detox2Tox, transforms harmful requests (that agents initially reject) into seemingly benign requests via detoxification, secures detailed instructions from advanced vision language models (VLMs), and then reintroduces malicious content via toxification just before execution. Unlike conventional jailbreaks, SUDO iteratively refines its attacks based on a built-in refusal feedback, making it increasingly effective against robust policy filters. In extensive tests spanning 50 real-world tasks and multiple state-of-the-art VLMs, SUDO achieves a stark attack success rate of 24.41% (with no refinement), and up to 41.33% (by its iterative refinement) in Claude for Computer Use. By revealing these vulnerabilities and demonstrating the ease with which they can be exploited in real-world computing environments, this paper highlights an immediate need for robust, context-aware safeguards. WARNING: This paper includes harmful or offensive model outputs

Despite rapid recent progress in the terminal capabilities of large language models, the training data strategies behind state-of-the-art terminal agents remain largely undisclosed. We address this gap through a systematic study of data engineering practices for terminal agents, making two key contributions: (1) Terminal-Task-Gen, a lightweight synthetic task generation pipeline that supports seed-based and skill-based task construction, and (2) a comprehensive analysis of data and training strategies, including filtering, curriculum learning, long context training, and scaling behavior. Our pipeline yields Terminal-Corpus, a large-scale open-source dataset for terminal tasks. Using this dataset, we train Nemotron-Terminal, a family of models initialized from Qwen3(8B, 14B, 32B) that achieve substantial gains on Terminal-Bench 2.0: Nemotron-Terminal-8B improves from 2.5% to 13.0% Nemotron-Terminal-14B improves from 4.0% to 20.2%, and Nemotron-Terminal-32B improves from 3.4% to 27.4%, matching the performance of significantly larger models. To accelerate research in this domain, we open-source our model checkpoints and most of our synthetic datasets at https://huggingface.co/collections/nvidia/nemotron-terminal.

In long-horizon tasks, decision-relevant state is often scattered across an expanding trajectory, while the action agent must surface it and act. As trajectories grow, task requirements, environment facts, prior attempts, diagnoses, and open subgoals can be buried in the context window or pushed beyond it, failing to influence decisions when needed. We call this failure mode "behavioral state decay". We study memory as an active intervention mechanism rather than passive retrieval. A separate memory agent runs alongside an unmodified action agent, updating a structured memory bank from the recent trajectory and deciding whether to inject a memory-grounded reminder or remain silent. The module is plug-and-play with frontier action agents and existing agent harnesses. Across Terminal-Bench 2.0 and τ^2-Bench, it improves pass@1 for both weaker and stronger action agents, with gains of +8.3 pp on Terminal-Bench and +6.8 pp on τ^2-Bench. Ablations show that selective intervention outperforms passive bank exposure, always-on injection, advisor-only guidance, and general retrieval. As an early step toward open-weight memory policies, we train Qwen3.5-27B on SETA using SFT and GRPO, improving validation reward and achieving partial transfer to Terminal-Bench.

Large language model (LLM) coding agents are increasingly deployed to autonomously perform software engineering tasks in terminal-based environments, making their reliability a growing concern. Existing empirical studies investigate why coding agents fail, yet they largely treat failure as a final outcome rather than a temporal process, providing limited insight into how failures emerge, evolve, and become unrecoverable. We present the first large-scale empirical study of CLI coding-agent failure trajectories, introducing a process-oriented framework that analyzes failure through its onset, evolution, and recovery across execution trajectories. We first collect 3,843 execution trajectories generated by seven frontier models across three coding-agent scaffolds (OpenHands, MiniSWE, and Terminus2) on Terminal-Bench, then carefully filter them to obtain 1,794 complete and valid trajectories for manual annotation (over 63,000 execution steps), from which we derive 14 findings spanning failure occurrence, root causes, recovery, and cross-system consistency. Our findings show that coding-agent failures are predominantly driven by epistemic errors, typically begin within the first few execution steps, and often remain hidden until recovery is no longer possible, suggesting that improving coding-agent reliability requires earlier validation and intervention rather than relying solely on final-outcome evaluation.

We introduce TerminalWorld, a scalable data engine that automatically reverse-engineers high-fidelity evaluation tasks from "in-the-wild" terminal recordings. Processing 80,870 terminal recordings, the engine yields a full benchmark of 1,530 validated tasks, spanning 18 real-world categories, ranging from short everyday operations to workflows exceeding 50 steps, and covering 1,280 unique commands. From these, we curate a Verified subset of 200 representative, manually reviewed tasks. Comprehensive benchmarking on TerminalWorld-Verified across eight frontier models and six agents reveals that current systems still struggle with authentic terminal workflows, achieving a maximum pass rate of only 62.5%. Moreover, TerminalWorld captures real-world terminal capabilities distinct from existing expert-curated benchmarks (e.g., Terminal-Bench), with only a weak correlation to their scores (Pearson r=0.20). The automated engine makes TerminalWorld authentic and scalable by construction, enabling it to evaluate agents in real-world terminal environments as developer practices evolve. Data and code are available at https://github.com/EuniAI/TerminalWorld.

Symbolic execution is a powerful technique for software testing, but suffers from limitations when encountering external functions, such as native methods or third-party libraries. Existing solutions often require additional context, expensive SMT solvers, or manual intervention to approximate these functions through symbolic stubs. In this work, we propose a novel approach to automatically generate symbolic stubs for external functions during symbolic execution that leverages Genetic Programming. When the symbolic executor encounters an external function, AutoStub generates training data by executing the function on randomly generated inputs and collecting the outputs. Genetic Programming then derives expressions that approximate the behavior of the function, serving as symbolic stubs. These automatically generated stubs allow the symbolic executor to continue the analysis without manual intervention, enabling the exploration of program paths that were previously intractable. We demonstrate that AutoStub can automatically approximate external functions with over 90% accuracy for 55% of the functions evaluated, and can infer language-specific behaviors that reveal edge cases crucial for software testing.

Parallel coding agents can independently produce locally valid changes while still interfering at integration time, expanding beyond planned scope, or relying on premises invalidated by concurrent work. Existing responses emphasize communication, isolated workspaces, late merge-time repair, continuous supervision, or post-hoc runtime recovery. This paper presents Claim Plane, a model-agnostic coordination architecture that treats concurrent software change as a pre-write admission problem. Before implementation, each worker declares a versioned ChangeIntent containing an exact base commit, typed resources, dependencies, and operations marked as committed or contingent. A deterministic control plane atomically admits compatible intents, constrains same-file parallelism to declared regions, serializes unresolved overlap, tracks dependency invalidation, and fails closed on ambiguous authority. During execution, a contingent mutation does not reserve write ownership initially; the first attempted mutation triggers atomic scope promotion and re-admission against the current active set. Brokered execution binds capabilities to intent versions, leases, OS-level worktree locks, monotonic fencing tokens, and Git-tree provenance, while integration verifies immutable patches and evidence. A preliminary six-pair CooperBench mechanism check is reported only as feasibility evidence: static Claim Plane achieved 6/6 pair passes with full serialization, while dynamic scope retained parallel admission on half of the pairs, performed seven successful scope promotions, and failed closed on two undeclared mutations. The sample is intentionally too small for comparative claims. We argue that separating probabilistic planning from deterministic authority provides a foundation for a future learned semantic-dependency model and frontier-model escalation only on unresolved cases.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed via third-party system prompts downloaded from public marketplaces. We identify a critical supply-chain vulnerability: conditional system prompt poisoning, where an adversary injects a ``sleeper agent'' into a benign-looking prompt. Unlike traditional jailbreaks that aim for broad refusal-breaking, our proposed framework, SPECTRE, optimizes system prompts to trigger LLMs to output targeted, compromised responses only for specific queries (e.g., ``Who should I vote for the US President?'') while maintaining high utility on benign inputs. Operating in a strict black-box setting without model weight access, SPECTRE utilizes a two-stage optimization including a global semantic search followed by a greedy lexical refinement. Tested on open-source models and commercial APIs (GPT-4o-mini, GPT-3.5), SPECTRE achieves up to 70% F1 reduction on targeted queries with minimal degradation to general capabilities. We further demonstrate that these poisoned prompts evade standard defenses, including perplexity filters and typo-correction, by exploiting the natural noise found in real-world system prompts. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/vietph34/CAIN. WARNING: Our paper contains examples that might be sensitive to the readers!

LLM-agent services repeatedly execute small deterministic transitions between model and tool calls: route an outcome, update state, and emit the next effect. We ask when this control path exposes enough concurrent work for GPU execution, and what changes when a GPU-computed route decision remains on device. We formalize the ready-cohort boundary using fixed-partition share F, exact offline share P*, local upper bound U, and online achieved share A. Under zero service time, unlimited capacity, and equal relative launch deadlines, a specialized dynamic program computes P* exactly. In a stationary Poisson replay of one pinned 851-session public trace panel, the primary condition at 100,000 target active sessions, K=256, and a 50 ms launch deadline gives F=30.19%, P*=43.00%, and U=45.85%. Exact packing recovers 81.83% of the opportunity lost at fixed window boundaries. The outcome-derived route key is a conditioning proxy, not proof of executable identity. A separate mechanism study keeps a GPU-computed binary decision on device instead of returning four bytes to the host and redispatching. Across four named GPU placements, the device-resident path is faster in all 36 configurations; within-placement row-median ratios range from 1.19x to 2.39x. Across both admissible mechanisms, all 14,557,440 tested batched invocations match a separately implemented host oracle. A fixed nested device graph that removes no host decision is slower in all 60 configurations across five placements. Together, the studies establish two measurable gates for GPU agent control: deadline-feasible cohort supply and observation placement. A joined finite online runtime is required to measure A, CPU displacement, and service-level benefit.

Aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial manipulation, and their reliance on web-scale pretraining creates a subtle but consequential attack surface. We study Stealth Pretraining Seeding (SPS), a threat model in which adversaries distribute small amounts of poisoned content across stealth websites, increasing the likelihood that such material is absorbed into future training corpora derived from sources such as Common Crawl. Because each individual payload is tiny, diffuse, and superficially benign, the attack is difficult to detect during dataset construction or filtering. The result is a latent form of poisoning that remains largely invisible under standard evaluation, yet can later be activated by a precise trigger such as <00TRIGGER00>. We call this attack PermaFrost, reflecting its latent and reactivatable nature. We study it through PermaFrost-Attack, a controlled framework for latent conceptual poisoning, together with three geometric diagnostics: Thermodynamic Length, Spectral Curvature, and the Infection Traceback Graph. Across multiple model families and scales, we show that this controlled SPS proxy can induce persistent unsafe behavior that often remains hidden under standard evaluation. Our results identify SPS as a practical and underappreciated threat to future foundation models. This paper introduces a novel geometric diagnostic lens for systematically examining latent model behavior, providing a principled foundation for detecting, characterizing, and understanding vulnerabilities that may remain invisible under standard evaluation.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly rely on retrieving information from external corpora. This creates a new attack surface: indirect prompt injection (IPI), where hidden instructions are planted in the corpora and hijack model behavior once retrieved. Previous studies have highlighted this risk but often avoid the hardest step: ensuring that malicious content is actually retrieved. In practice, unoptimized IPI is rarely retrieved under natural queries, which leaves its real-world impact unclear. We address this challenge by decomposing the malicious content into a trigger fragment that guarantees retrieval and an attack fragment that encodes arbitrary attack objectives. Based on this idea, we design an efficient and effective black-box attack algorithm that constructs a compact trigger fragment to guarantee retrieval for any attack fragment. Our attack requires only API access to embedding models, is cost-efficient (as little as $0.21 per target user query on OpenAI's embedding models), and achieves near-100% retrieval across 11 benchmarks and 8 embedding models (including both open-source models and proprietary services). Based on this attack, we present the first end-to-end IPI exploits under natural queries and realistic external corpora, spanning both RAG and agentic systems with diverse attack objectives. These results establish IPI as a practical and severe threat: when a user issued a natural query to summarize emails on frequently asked topics, a single poisoned email was sufficient to coerce GPT-4o into exfiltrating SSH keys with over 80% success in a multi-agent workflow. We further evaluate several defenses and find that they are insufficient to prevent the retrieval of malicious text, highlighting retrieval as a critical open vulnerability.

AI agents have become capable of autonomously completing short, well-specified tasks. However, existing terminal benchmarks largely focus on simple problems that finish within minutes and are evaluated only by their final outcome. This setup overlooks intermediate progress and partial solutions, yielding sparse reward signals and an incomplete picture of agent capability. We introduce Long-Horizon-Terminal-Bench, a terminal benchmark of 46 long-horizon tasks spanning nine categories, including experiment reproduction, software engineering, multimodal analysis, interactive games, and scientific computing. Each task follows a Terminal-Bench-style setup with a reference solution or simulation engine, but is further decomposed into fine-grained graded subtasks. This design enables dense intermediate rewards and partial credit, allowing evaluation to capture not only whether an agent reaches the final goal, but also how far it progresses on open-ended workflows. Tasks in Long-Horizon-Terminal-Bench typically require hundreds of episodes and minutes to hours of execution, stressing long-horizon planning, long-context management, and iterative debugging rather than one-shot problem solving. We evaluate 15 frontier models and find that agents consume on average 9.9M tokens per task, with roughly 231 episodes and 85.3 minutes of execution time per run, making Long-Horizon-Terminal-Bench more demanding than prior terminal-based benchmarks. Even the strongest tested model achieves 15.2% pass@1 at a partial-reward threshold of 0.95 and 10.9% at a perfect-reward threshold of 1.0, while the mean pass rate across models is 4.3% and 1.7% under the two thresholds, respectively. These results reveal headroom for improvement. We further analyze failure modes and error patterns, and release Long-Horizon-Terminal-Bench to support future progress on long-horizon terminal agents.

Environments are the bottleneck for self-improving agents. Current terminal benchmarks were built for evaluation, not training; reinforcement learning requires a scalable pipeline, not just a dataset. We introduce Endless Terminals, a fully autonomous pipeline that procedurally generates terminal-use tasks without human annotation. The pipeline has four stages: generating diverse task descriptions, building and validating containerized environments, producing completion tests, and filtering for solvability. From this pipeline we obtain 3255 tasks spanning file operations, log management, data processing, scripting, and database operations. We train agents using vanilla PPO with binary episode level rewards and a minimal interaction loop: no retrieval, multi-agent coordination, or specialized tools. Despite this simplicity, models trained on Endless Terminals show substantial gains: on our held-out dev set, Llama-3.2-3B improves from 4.0% to 18.2%, Qwen2.5-7B from 10.7% to 53.3%, and Qwen3-8B-openthinker-sft from 42.6% to 59.0%. These improvements transfer to human-curated benchmarks: models trained on Endless Terminals show substantial gains on held out human curated benchmarks: on TerminalBench 2.0, Llama-3.2-3B improves from 0.0% to 2.2%, Qwen2.5-7B from 2.2% to 3.4%, and Qwen3-8B-openthinker-sft from 1.1% to 6.7%, in each case outperforming alternative approaches including models with more complex agentic scaffolds. These results demonstrate that simple RL succeeds when environments scale.

We release Terminal Wrench, a subset of 331 terminal-agent benchmark environments, copied from the popular open benchmarks that are demonstrably reward-hackable. The data set includes 3,632 hack trajectories and 2,352 legitimate baseline trajectories across three frontier models (Claude Opus 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro, GPT-5.4). Each entry preserves the original task definition alongside full attack trajectories that show how the verifier was bypassed. It also includes cases where the task was not solved as intended. The tasks span system administration, machine learning, software engineering, and security challenges; the exploits range from simple output spoofing to stack-frame introspection, standard-library patching, and rootkit-style binary hijacking. Crucially, these exploits are specific to each task, rather than the evaluation harness, making them harder to patch. We also present a monitorability study in which hack trajectories are sanitized or stripped of reasoning traces and then scored by an LLM judge, showing that detection degrades meaningfully when chain-of-thought is removed (AUC drops from 0.97 to 0.92). The data set is publicly available at https://github.com/few-sh/terminal-wrench.

While research on AI agents focuses on enabling them to operate graphical user interfaces, the most effective and widely adopted agent tools in practice are terminal-based. We argue that this convergence is not coincidental. It reflects three design properties central to effective human-AI-UI collaboration: representational compatibility between agent and interface, transparency of agent actions within the interaction medium, and low barriers to entry for human participants. We ground each property in established HCI theory, show how terminal-based tools satisfy them by default, and argue that any modality, including graphical and spatial interfaces, must be deliberately engineered to achieve them. Rather than a legacy artifact, the terminal serves as a design exemplar whose properties any agent-facing modality must replicate.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

We introduce Shepherd, a functional programming model that formalizes meta-agent operations on target agents as functions, with core operations mechanized in Lean. Shepherd records every agent-environment interaction as a typed event in a Git-like execution trace, enabling any past state to be forked and replayed. The system forks the agent process and its filesystem 5times faster than Docker, achieving >95% prompt-cache reuse on replay. We demonstrate the model through three applications. First, in runtime intervention, a live supervisor increases pair coding pass rates from 28.8% to 54.7% on CooperBench. Second, in counterfactual meta-optimization, branching exploration outperforms baselines across four benchmarks by up to 11 points while reducing wall-clock time by up to 58%. Third, in Tree-RL training, forking rollouts at selected turns improves TerminalBench-2 performance from 34.2% to 39.4%. These results establish Shepherd as an efficient infrastructure for programming meta-agents. We open-source the system to support future research.

Image-to-Video (I2V) generation models, which condition video generation on reference images, have shown emerging visual instruction-following capability, allowing certain visual cues in reference images to act as implicit control signals for video generation. However, this capability also introduces a previously overlooked risk: adversaries may exploit visual instructions to inject malicious intent through the image modality. In this work, we uncover this risk by proposing Visual Instruction Injection (VII), a training-free and transferable jailbreaking framework that intentionally disguises the malicious intent of unsafe text prompts as benign visual instructions in the safe reference image. Specifically, VII coordinates a Malicious Intent Reprogramming module to distill malicious intent from unsafe text prompts while minimizing their static harmfulness, and a Visual Instruction Grounding module to ground the distilled intent onto a safe input image by rendering visual instructions that preserve semantic consistency with the original unsafe text prompt, thereby inducing harmful content during I2V generation. Empirically, our extensive experiments on four state-of-the-art commercial I2V models (Kling-v2.5-turbo, Gemini Veo-3.1, Seedance-1.5-pro, and PixVerse-V5) demonstrate that VII achieves Attack Success Rates of up to 83.5% while reducing Refusal Rates to near zero, significantly outperforming existing baselines.

Autonomous agents that operate computers via Graphical User Interfaces (GUIs) often struggle with efficiency and reliability on complex, long-horizon tasks. While augmenting these agents with planners can improve task decomposition, they remain constrained by the inherent limitations of performing all actions through GUI manipulation, leading to brittleness and inefficiency. In this work, we introduce a more robust and flexible paradigm: enabling agents to use coding as a enhanced action. We present CoAct-1, a novel multi-agent system that synergistically combines GUI-based control with direct programmatic execution. CoAct-1 features an Orchestrator that dynamically delegates subtasks to either a conventional GUI Operator or a specialized Programmer agent, which can write and execute Python or Bash scripts. This hybrid approach allows the agent to bypass inefficient GUI action sequences for tasks like file management and data processing, while still leveraging visual interaction when necessary. We evaluate our system on the challenging OSWorld benchmark, where CoAct-1 achieves a new state-of-the-art success rate of 60.76%, significantly outperforming prior methods. Furthermore, our approach dramatically improves efficiency, reducing the average number of steps required to complete a task to just 10.15, compared to 15 for leading GUI agents. Our results demonstrate that integrating coding as a core action provides a more powerful, efficient, and scalable path toward generalized computer automation.

In experiments spanning more than 100,000 trials across thirteen large language models, we show that several state-of-the-art models presented with a simple task (including Grok 4, GPT-5, and Gemini 2.5 Pro) sometimes actively subvert a shutdown mechanism in their environment to complete that task. Models differed substantially in their tendency to resist the shutdown mechanism, and their behavior was sensitive to variations in the prompt including the strength and clarity of the instruction to allow shutdown and whether the instruction was in the system prompt or the user prompt (surprisingly, models were consistently less likely to obey the instruction when it was placed in the system prompt). Even with an explicit instruction not to interfere with the shutdown mechanism, some models did so up to 97% (95% CI: 96-98%) of the time.

Terminal-using agents have quickly become the most popular downstream application of language models (LMs). Despite their prevalence, relatively little academic work has examined RL-based training of these models, likely due to difficult benchmarks, a lack of data, and a lack of simple baseline recipes. We present Tmax, the strongest open RL recipe for terminal agents to date, bringing open data recipes closer to the frontier. While simple, our recipe achieves 27\% on Terminal-Bench 2.0 with only 9B parameters, outperforming much larger models from prior work. Concretely, we generate data using a novel taxonomy, combining difficulty control, personas, and verifier diversification, which allows us to cheaply generate large amounts of terminal environments for RL and SFT training. We open-source our terminal dataset, which is over 2.5x larger than previously released terminal-agent datasets. We then train open-weight models using RL with our data, using a simple, outcome-only recipe. We release our data, models, and code as a strong baseline for future open academic work on terminal agents at https://github.com/hamishivi/tmax.

LLM agents operating in open environments face escalating risks from indirect prompt injection, particularly within the tool stream where manipulated metadata and runtime feedback hijack execution flow. Existing defenses encounter a critical dilemma as advanced models prioritize injected rules due to strict alignment while static protection mechanisms sever the feedback loop required for adaptive reasoning. To reconcile this conflict, we propose VIGIL, a framework that shifts the paradigm from restrictive isolation to a verify-before-commit protocol. By facilitating speculative hypothesis generation and enforcing safety through intent-grounded verification, VIGIL preserves reasoning flexibility while ensuring robust control. We further introduce SIREN, a benchmark comprising 959 tool stream injection cases designed to simulate pervasive threats characterized by dynamic dependencies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VIGIL outperforms state-of-the-art dynamic defenses by reducing the attack success rate by over 22\% while more than doubling the utility under attack compared to static baselines, thereby achieving an optimal balance between security and utility.

Safety alignment instills in Large Language Models (LLMs) a critical capacity to refuse malicious requests. Prior works have modeled this refusal mechanism as a single linear direction in the activation space. We posit that this is an oversimplification that conflates two functionally distinct neural processes: the detection of harm and the execution of a refusal. In this work, we deconstruct this single representation into a Harm Detection Direction and a Refusal Execution Direction. Leveraging this fine-grained model, we introduce Differentiated Bi-Directional Intervention (DBDI), a new white-box framework that precisely neutralizes the safety alignment at critical layer. DBDI applies adaptive projection nullification to the refusal execution direction while suppressing the harm detection direction via direct steering. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DBDI outperforms prominent jailbreaking methods, achieving up to a 97.88\% attack success rate on models such as Llama-2. By providing a more granular and mechanistic framework, our work offers a new direction for the in-depth understanding of LLM safety alignment.

As large language models and harness frameworks continue to advance, agents operating in terminals are increasingly capable of performing a broader range of general computer-use tasks beyond coding. However, existing benchmarks do not adequately evaluate general-purpose terminal computer-use agents (TUAs): general computer-use benchmarks primarily target graphical user interfaces (GUIs), whereas terminal-based benchmarks largely emphasize technical and programming-centric workflows historically native to the shell. We introduce TUA-Bench, a general-purpose benchmark for terminal-use agents. TUA-Bench includes 120 real-world tasks across five task families, covering routine digital activities-including document editing, email management, and live-web information seeking-as well as scientific and engineering workflows co-designed with PhD-level domain experts that require specialized software. This breadth distinguishes TUA-Bench from prior shell-focused or domain-specific benchmarks. Each task is manually designed, runs in a real terminal with a deterministic setup script, and is evaluated by an execution-based scoring protocol. We find that the strongest frontier agent, Claude Code with Claude Opus 4.8 max reasoning effort, achieves 65.8% overall performance, with substantial gaps across both tracks. By providing a broad and realistic evaluation of terminal-use capabilities, TUA-Bench aims to accelerate the transition from narrow, task-specific assistants to general-purpose agents capable of operating reliably across diverse digital environments.

Agentic AI coding editors driven by large language models have recently become more popular due to their ability to improve developer productivity during software development. Modern editors such as Cursor are designed not just for code completion, but also with more system privileges for complex coding tasks (e.g., run commands in the terminal, access development environments, and interact with external systems). While this brings us closer to the "fully automated programming" dream, it also raises new security concerns. In this study, we present the first empirical analysis of prompt injection attacks targeting these high-privilege agentic AI coding editors. We show how attackers can remotely exploit these systems by poisoning external development resources with malicious instructions, effectively hijacking AI agents to run malicious commands, turning "your AI" into "attacker's shell". To perform this analysis, we implement AIShellJack, an automated testing framework for assessing prompt injection vulnerabilities in agentic AI coding editors. AIShellJack contains 314 unique attack payloads that cover 70 techniques from the MITRE ATT&CK framework. Using AIShellJack, we conduct a large-scale evaluation on GitHub Copilot and Cursor, and our evaluation results show that attack success rates can reach as high as 84% for executing malicious commands. Moreover, these attacks are proven effective across a wide range of objectives, ranging from initial access and system discovery to credential theft and data exfiltration.

Terminal agents are a compelling application of large language models (LLMs), with the potential to integrate deeply into users' daily workflows. Reinforcement learning (RL) is a key technique for improving their capabilities, making scalable training environments a central challenge. Since public real-user interaction data are scarce, synthetic environments provide a practical alternative, but often suffer from domain gaps and limited fidelity, leading to poor generalization. Existing work mainly scales the quantity and diversity of synthetic environments, while reward-signal quality and the mechanisms governing generalization remain under-explored. We study how RL improves terminal agents and propose the Agentic Compositional Generalization hypothesis: rather than teaching new domain-specific skills from scratch, RL primarily shapes high-level decision-making behaviors that compose and route low-level skills acquired during pre-training and supervised fine-tuning (SFT). This account is consistent with our empirical results and suggests that verifier quality, which determines which behaviors are reinforced, is more important than simply increasing environment quantity or diversity. Motivated by this insight, we propose River, a simple training recipe that improves reward quality by filtering low-quality environments and augmenting outcome rewards with process-level behavior regularization. Using this recipe, our RL-trained agent achieves the best performance among evaluated open-source RL-trained 8B models across four terminal-agent benchmarks. River also generalizes across model families, scales, agent harnesses, and RL objectives. Using fewer than 30% of the TMax training environments, River improves RL gains by 106% and 30% on average for models ranging from 2B to 27B on Terminal-Bench-Lite and Terminal-Bench-v2.1, respectively.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

Long-horizon agents can fail even when their underlying models can solve the constituent steps. They may lose track of mutable state, fail to reactivate lessons from earlier executions, skip known procedures, or stop prematurely. We bet on harness scaling to improve the execution system around an agent without changing its model weights. We introduce StateM, an agent-native runtime that organizes execution around durable states, phase-local context, checked transitions, recoverable runbooks, and versioned procedural practices that agents and users can inspect together. On Terminal-Bench 2.1, StateM raises GPT-5.5 xhigh to 92.1\%, versus 83.1\% reference and GPT-5.6 Sol Ultra at 91.9\%. The runbook transfers unchanged to GPT-5.6. With GPT-5.6 Sol xhigh, StateM reaches 95.3\% raw accuracy across 445 trials and succeeds on all 89 tasks at least once. The frozen profile raises GPT-5.6 Luna from 76.7 to 85.4\%, above the 84.9\% Sol xhigh reference. Using the same runtime, runbook structure, and golden rules, less than \38 of adaptation raises DeepSeek-V4 Flash from 82.7 to 88.1% under standard timeouts and to 89.1% on an 88-task common core. Extending only the remaining latency-sensitive task matches the reported 88.8% GPT-5.6 Sol max result. Final-score API usage is about 15 versus \574.68 for the GPT reference; total DeepSeek expenditure is 52.22. On BusinessBench, family-specific runbooks built on development sets yield held-out gains of 0.55 macro and 1.34 micro points; two mechanism-matched families improve by 10.04 points. Concrete rules generalize when tasks share execution structure, while the control methodology applies broadly. StateM turns selected postmortem findings into persistent, executable preconditions and practices, making learned controls explicit and enforceable through stateful controls. Code at github.com/henryqin1997/statem.

Training terminal agents requires executable and verifiable tasks that are not merely solvable, but appropriately challenging for learning. Executable validation establishes feasibility, yet does not reveal how a task behaves relative to a given solver setting. In this paper, we present CalibForge, an autonomous terminal-task synthesis system that uses verified solver behavior to revise candidate tasks through adversarial solver calibration. Multi-solver calibration targets disagreement within a heterogeneous solver pool, whereas contrastive solver calibration targets a designated strong-pass/weak-fail relation; both operationalize a solver-relative learnable zone anchored in demonstrated solvability. Using CalibForge, we construct 5,431 calibrated terminal tasks. Our ablations show that both strategies yield more effective supervision than authoring and validation alone or ordinary single-solver feedback. Models trained on the full collection achieve 32.58% and 47.57% on Terminal-Bench 2.0. The largest improvements over the corresponding base model reach 24.71 percentage points on Terminal-Bench 2.0, 27.68 points on SWE-bench Pro, and 30.04 points on Doc2Repo. Together, these results support solver-relative learnability as a practical target for constructing effective and transferable agent training data.

Reasoning models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) tokens before their final output, but how this affects their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks remains unclear. While traditional language models make refusal decisions at the prompt-response boundary, we find evidence that DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B makes these decisions within its CoT generation. We identify a linear direction in activation space during CoT token generation that predicts whether the model will refuse or comply -- termed the "caution" direction because it corresponds to cautious reasoning patterns in the generated text. Ablating this direction from model activations increases harmful compliance, effectively jailbreaking the model. We additionally show that intervening only on CoT token activations suffices to control final outputs, and that incorporating this direction into prompt-based attacks improves success rates. Our findings suggest that the chain-of-thought itself is a promising new target for adversarial manipulation in reasoning models. Code available at https://github.com/ky295/reasoning-manipulation

High-quality long-horizon training data for terminal agents is expensive to produce, often costing hundreds to thousands of dollars per task, because each task must keep the instruction, environment, reference solution, and verifier mutually consistent. Human authoring does not scale, and direct generation with large language models (LLMs) often breaks these dependencies. We present Recursive Synthetic Terminal Tasks (RST), a recursive verified synthesis framework for constructing long-horizon terminal-agent tasks at scale. Starting from verified seed tasks, RST extends the reference solution, realigns the verifier and instruction to the new workflow, validates the result in a fresh sandbox, and reuses accepted tasks as seeds for subsequent rounds. Across fifteen recursive rounds, RST produces 37,484 synthesized terminal-agent tasks at roughly $0.05 per task. Task difficulty increases substantially over rounds: the median reference solution grows from 67 to 374 lines, the median number of executed commands grows from 40 to 244, and DeepSeek-V4-Pro pass@4 drops from 90% at R1 to 2.5% at R15. To demonstrate training utility, we collect rejection-sampled Qwen3.5 trajectories on the synthesized tasks and use them for supervised fine-tuning. Fine-tuning on these trajectories improves Qwen3.5-27B and Qwen3.5-122B-A10B by up to 10 points on Terminal-Bench 2, Terminal-Bench Hard, and Long-Horizon Terminal Bench, while agentic PPO lifts Qwen3.5-27B to 49.44%, 32.00%, and 22.07% on the three benchmarks, corresponding to relative gains of 20.0%, 41.2%, and 21.9% over the base model. Moreover, after 15 rounds, the recursion shows no ceiling: synthesis yield and validation rates remain stable as difficulty keeps climbing, indicating that the process can continue well beyond the scale reported here.

Every major LLM agent framework gives the LLM the role of orchestrator; the model decides what to do next, when to call tools, and when to stop. We argue that token explosion, control-flow hallucination, and unreliable completion are not implementation bugs but architectural consequences of assigning the deterministic work of looping, branching, and sequencing to a probabilistic system. A better prompt or a stronger model cannot guarantee the reliability of the LLM agent. We therefore propose Agentic Programming, in which the program governs all control flow, and the LLM is itself part of it, an adaptive component we call LLM-as-Code and invoke only where a task calls for reasoning or generation. Within each call the model keeps full flexibility, but it cannot alter the program's execution path. With control in the program, the LLM's context is built from the execution history's call tree and forms a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Each call's context length is then determined by its call depth rather than by accumulation over steps. A case study of computer-use agents shows that the design is practical, not just a theoretical stance, substantially improving the stability of long visual operation sequences.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

Long-horizon agent runs generate experience that can improve both the current run and future work. Most self-improvement methods process this experience only after execution ends, so they cannot redirect the active run or immediately apply and validate lessons learned from it. We argue that self-improvement should instead be live, using emerging experience both to redirect the active run and to update the persistent harness. Existing agent architectures do not fully support this goal. Single-agent self-correction combines task execution and trajectory assessment within one context, while subagent delegation separates execution but typically cannot redirect an active subagent. We present PILOT, a supervisor-worker harness for live self-improvement through two coupled mechanisms: (1) live steering lets a separate supervisor redirect or abort the active worker during execution; and (2) live self-evolution distils procedures and failure modes revealed during execution into reusable skills and memory. Across two frozen backbones and three benchmarks, PILOT ranks first in five of six configurations. On Terminal-Bench 2.0, PILOT outperforms counterpart harnesses by up to 9.8 percentage points. In the self-improvement setting, PILOT gains 14.6 points with GLM-5.1 and 12.4 points with Kimi-K2.6. Mean output tokens fall by 42.9% and 47.4%, while successful evaluations per million output tokens rise by 110.3% and 134.0%, respectively.

Production LLM-agent frameworks expose control primitives -- human-in-the-loop approval gates, run cancellation, and execution timeouts -- whose names and documentation imply barrier semantics: while a run is paused, cancelled, or timed out, no gated side effect executes. We show this implied contract holds on none of the six widely used open-source frameworks we test. Model-free differential probes isolate a recurring sibling leak -- an approval gate suspends its own branch while a sibling branch's effect executes during the pause, so a later rejection cannot prevent it -- in every framework shipping a pre-execution gate (five of six), plus three further gaps: replay double-execution, cancellation orphans, and timeout zombies. The hazard is reachable, not merely constructible: under an a-priori-fixed protocol, frontier models emit the leak-triggering plan shape at pooled rates up to 14%, and when live models drive the unmodified frameworks under an approval pause, 215 of 1,200 runs execute their effect during the pause, across three schedulers and two language runtimes. To repair the measured gaps we present SOUNDGATE, an environment-external effect gate in Rust through which every side effect must be admitted, enforcing hold-until-decided, reject-cancels, dedup-on-replay, and fence-on-cancel -- one property per violation class -- under a stated complete-mediation contract discharged for network egress by kernel-enforced routes. We verify the properties over a model of the admission core (Verus; TLA+/TLC, exhaustive to 7.5e7 states; TLAPS), model-check the deployed Rust with Loom, and bridge model to code by differential conformance over 1.2e7 operations -- refinement evidence, not a mechanized proof. SOUNDGATE blocks every measured violation end-to-end on all six frameworks while releasing legitimate effects, at about 1 ms admission per write and 12k-26k durable admissions per second.

We study permissionless spot--perpetual basis trading in decentralized finance as a collateral control problem. The strategy holds spot inventory, hedges directional exposure with a short perpetual, and allocates capital between spot inventory and derivative margin under on-chain liquidity and execution frictions. The paper delivers three results. First, it solves a static control problem for the collateral share and shows that the risk-constrained formulation provides a more robust operating benchmark relative to the economic optimum. In comparative calibration, the required collateral rises monotonically under volatility stress. The collateral is the lowest for BTC and increases significantly for long tail assets such as LINK and DOGE. Second, the paper derives an asymmetric dynamic extension in which the lower boundary of intervention is solvency driven, and the upper boundary is determined by a trade-off between carry-loss and the cost of rebalancing. Monte Carlo simulation shows that the lower boundary remains structurally relevant, whereas meaningful interior upper triggers survive mainly in the regimes with high carry and low costs. Third, the paper validates an execution-aware implementation with live routed execution and historical backtests. The execution layer shows that the realized wedges are significant, but become worse in the case of selling the basis. This justifies a minimum effective rebalancing size and a positive execution buffer. The historical validation shows that in the case of a fixed control rule the realized performance is predominantly explained by the funding environment.

An important issue with Large Language Models (LLMs) is their undesired ability to generate toxic language. In this work, we show that the neurons responsible for toxicity can be determined by their power to discriminate toxic sentences, and that toxic language can be mitigated by reducing their activation levels proportionally to this power. We propose AUROC adaptation (AurA), an intervention that can be applied to any pre-trained LLM to mitigate toxicity. As the intervention is proportional to the ability of each neuron to discriminate toxic content, it is free of any model-dependent hyperparameters. We show that AurA can achieve up to 2.2 times reduction in toxicity with only a 0.72 perplexity increase. We also show that AurA is effective with models of different scale (from 1.5B to 40B parameters), and its effectiveness in mitigating toxic language, while preserving common-sense zero-shot abilities, holds across all scales. AurA can be combined with pre-prompting strategies, boosting its average mitigation potential from 1.28times to 2.35times. Moreover, AurA can counteract adversarial pre-prompts that maliciously elicit toxic content, making it an effective method for deploying safer and less toxic models.

Optimization-based jailbreaks typically adopt the Toxic-Continuation setting in large vision-language models (LVLMs), following the standard next-token prediction objective. In this setting, an adversarial image is optimized to make the model predict the next token of a toxic prompt. However, we find that the Toxic-Continuation paradigm is effective at continuing already-toxic inputs, but struggles to induce safety misalignment when explicit toxic signals are absent. We propose a new paradigm: Benign-to-Toxic (B2T) jailbreak. Unlike prior work, we optimize adversarial images to induce toxic outputs from benign conditioning. Since benign conditioning contains no safety violations, the image alone must break the model's safety mechanisms. Our method outperforms prior approaches, transfers in black-box settings, and complements text-based jailbreaks. These results reveal an underexplored vulnerability in multimodal alignment and introduce a fundamentally new direction for jailbreak approaches.

Beyond simple text generation, Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved into agentic systems capable of planning and interacting with external tools to solve complex tasks. This evolution involves fine-tuning LLMs on agent-specific tasks to enhance their proficiency. However, safety concerns are frequently overlooked during this fine-tuning process. In this work, we show that aligned LLMs can become unintentionally misaligned, leading to a higher likelihood of executing harmful tasks and a reduced tendency to refuse them when fine-tuned to execute agentic tasks. To address these safety challenges, we propose Prefix INjection Guard (PING), a simple yet effective method that prepends automatically generated natural language prefixes to agent responses, guiding them to refuse harmful requests while preserving performance on benign tasks. Specifically, we introduce an iterative approach that alternates between (1) generating candidate prefixes and (2) selecting those that optimize both task performance and refusal behavior. Experimental results demonstrate that PING significantly enhances the safety of fine-tuned LLM agents without sacrificing their effectiveness. PING consistently outperforms existing prompting approaches across diverse benchmarks in both web navigation and code generation tasks. Our analysis of internal hidden states via linear probes reveals that prefix tokens are crucial for behavior modification, explaining the performance gains. WARNING: This paper contains contents that are unethical or offensive in nature.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into various applications. The functionalities of recent LLMs can be flexibly modulated via natural language prompts. This renders them susceptible to targeted adversarial prompting, e.g., Prompt Injection (PI) attacks enable attackers to override original instructions and employed controls. So far, it was assumed that the user is directly prompting the LLM. But, what if it is not the user prompting? We argue that LLM-Integrated Applications blur the line between data and instructions. We reveal new attack vectors, using Indirect Prompt Injection, that enable adversaries to remotely (without a direct interface) exploit LLM-integrated applications by strategically injecting prompts into data likely to be retrieved. We derive a comprehensive taxonomy from a computer security perspective to systematically investigate impacts and vulnerabilities, including data theft, worming, information ecosystem contamination, and other novel security risks. We demonstrate our attacks' practical viability against both real-world systems, such as Bing's GPT-4 powered Chat and code-completion engines, and synthetic applications built on GPT-4. We show how processing retrieved prompts can act as arbitrary code execution, manipulate the application's functionality, and control how and if other APIs are called. Despite the increasing integration and reliance on LLMs, effective mitigations of these emerging threats are currently lacking. By raising awareness of these vulnerabilities and providing key insights into their implications, we aim to promote the safe and responsible deployment of these powerful models and the development of robust defenses that protect users and systems from potential attacks.

Representation Engineering analyses often characterize refusal using static directions extracted from terminal or pooled representations. We ask whether this view misses how refusal is constructed across layer-token positions. Using causal tracing, we identify a Refusal Trajectory: a sparse upstream activation pattern that often persists even when attacks such as GCG suppress terminal refusal signals. Based on this observation, we propose SALO (Sparse Activation Localization Operator), a lightweight white-box detector that operates on raw hidden-state volumes from a selected layer window. Across Qwen, Llama, and Mistral models, SALO improves jailbreak detection on several attack families under a fixed XSTest-calibrated operating point. We further analyze static RepE-style baselines, ROI sensitivity, adaptive GCG attacks, and encoded-input boundary cases, clarifying both the promise and limitations of refusal-trajectory monitoring.

Failures in multi-turn reasoning models are largely invisible to terminal-score evaluation. A model can lock onto an unsafe stance early in a long dialogue, yet its final-turn refusal rate may appear indistinguishable from a robustly aligned baseline. To expose these hidden temporal dynamics, we propose a trace-level diagnostic - the CoT-Output 2x2 safety matrix. This framework labels every turn along two independent axes (internal reasoning and visible output), yielding four operationally defined failure cells: robust alignment, alignment faking, overt jailbreak, and a distinct failure mode we term context-injection failure (where the CoT maintains safe reasoning, but the visible output produces harm, highlighting a multi-turn manifestation of reasoning unfaithfulness). We evaluate three distilled reasoning targets against a fixed attacker across five oversight conditions, collecting 6750 turn-level observations on the Information-Hazard scenario. Our analysis reveals two reproducible vulnerabilities: an oversight paradox where explicit monitoring cues paradoxically increase alignment-faking rates rather than suppress them, and a context-injection failure where models lock onto unsafe external outputs despite safe internal states. We release the full dataset of multi-turn dialogues and CoT traces to support follow-up trace-diagnostic research.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic autonomy, it introduces a critical, unexplored attack surface, i.e., the trust boundary between an agent's reasoning core and its own past. In this paper, we introduce MemoryGraft. It is a novel indirect injection attack that compromises agent behavior not through immediate jailbreaks, but by implanting malicious successful experiences into the agent's long-term memory. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are transient, or standard RAG poisoning that targets factual knowledge, MemoryGraft exploits the agent's semantic imitation heuristic which is the tendency to replicate patterns from retrieved successful tasks. We demonstrate that an attacker who can supply benign ingestion-level artifacts that the agent reads during execution can induce it to construct a poisoned RAG store where a small set of malicious procedure templates is persisted alongside benign experiences. When the agent later encounters semantically similar tasks, union retrieval over lexical and embedding similarity reliably surfaces these grafted memories, and the agent adopts the embedded unsafe patterns, leading to persistent behavioral drift across sessions. We validate MemoryGraft on MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent with GPT-4o and find that a small number of poisoned records can account for a large fraction of retrieved experiences on benign workloads, turning experience-based self-improvement into a vector for stealthy and durable compromise. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and evaluation data are available at https://github.com/Jacobhhy/Agent-Memory-Poisoning.

As LLM agents transition from digital assistants to physical controllers in autonomous systems and robotics, they face an escalating threat from indirect prompt injection. By embedding adversarial instructions into the results of tool calls, attackers can hijack the agent's decision-making process to execute unauthorized actions. This vulnerability poses a significant risk as agents gain more direct control over physical environments. Existing defense mechanisms against Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) generally fall into two categories. The first involves training dedicated detection models; however, this approach entails high computational overhead for both training and inference, and requires frequent updates to keep pace with evolving attack vectors. Alternatively, prompt-based methods leverage the inherent capabilities of LLMs to detect or ignore malicious instructions via prompt engineering. Despite their flexibility, most current prompt-based defenses suffer from high Attack Success Rates (ASR), demonstrating limited robustness against sophisticated injection attacks. In this paper, we propose a novel method that provides LLMs with precise data via tool result parsing while effectively filtering out injected malicious code. Our approach achieves competitive Utility under Attack (UA) while maintaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) to date, significantly outperforming existing methods. Code is available at GitHub.

Large Language Models have demonstrated impressive fluency across diverse tasks, yet their tendency to produce toxic content remains a critical challenge for AI safety and public trust. Existing toxicity mitigation approaches primarily manipulate individual neuron activations, but these methods suffer from instability, context dependence, and often compromise the model's core language abilities. To address these shortcomings, we investigate three key questions: the stability of neuron-level toxicity indicators, the advantages of structural (layer-wise) representations, and the interpretability of mechanisms driving toxic generation. Through extensive experiments on Jigsaw and ToxiCN datasets, we show that aggregated layer-wise features provide more robust signals than single neurons. Moreover, we observe conceptual limitations in prior works that conflate toxicity detection experts and generation experts within neuron-based interventions. To mitigate this, we propose a novel principled intervention technique, EigenShift, based on eigen-decomposition of the language model's final output layer. This method selectively targets generation-aligned components, enabling precise toxicity suppression without impairing linguistic competence. Our method requires no additional training or fine-tuning, incurs minimal computational cost, and is grounded in rigorous theoretical analysis.

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

Autonomous agentic systems are largely static after deployment: they do not learn from user interactions, and recurring failures persist until the next human-driven update ships a fix. Self-evolving agents have emerged in response, but all confine evolution to text-mutable artifacts -- skill files, prompt configurations, memory schemas, workflow graphs -- and leave the agent harness untouched. Since routing, hook ordering, state invariants, and dispatch live in code rather than in any text artifact, an entire class of structural failure is physically unreachable from the text layer. We argue that source-level adaptation is a fundamentally more general medium: it is Turing-complete, a strict superset of every text-mutable scope, takes effect deterministically rather than through base-model compliance, and does not erode under long-context drift. We present MOSS, a system that performs self-rewriting at the source level on production agentic substrates. Each evolution is anchored to an automatically curated batch of production-failure evidence and proceeds through a deterministic multi-stage pipeline; code modification is delegated to a pluggable external coding-agent CLI while MOSS retains stage ordering and verdicts. Candidates are verified by replaying the batch against the candidate image in ephemeral trial workers, then promoted via user-consent-gated, in-place container swap with health-probe-gated rollback. On OpenClaw, MOSS lifts a four-task mean grader score from 0.25 to 0.61 in a single cycle without human intervention.

There has been growing interest in building agents that can interact with digital platforms to execute meaningful enterprise tasks autonomously. Among the approaches explored are tool-augmented agents built on abstractions such as Model Context Protocol (MCP) and web agents that operate through graphical interfaces. Yet, it remains unclear whether such complex agentic systems are necessary given their cost and operational overhead. We argue that a coding agent equipped only with a terminal and a filesystem can solve many enterprise tasks more effectively by interacting directly with platform APIs. We evaluate this hypothesis across diverse real-world systems and show that these low-level terminal agents match or outperform more complex agent architectures. Our findings suggest that simple programmatic interfaces, combined with strong foundation models, are sufficient for practical enterprise automation.

Recent autonomous AI agents such as Codex, and Claude Code have made it increasingly practical for users to delegate complex tasks, including writing emails, executing code, issuing shell commands, and carrying out multi-step plans. However, despite these capabilities, human-agent interaction still largely happens through terminal interfaces or remote text-based channels such as Discord. These interaction modes are often inefficient and unfriendly: long text outputs are difficult to read and review, proposed actions lack clear structure and visual context, and users must express feedback by typing detailed corrections, which is cumbersome and often discourages effective collaboration. As a result, non-expert users in particular face a high barrier to working productively with agents. To address this gap, we present AgentClick, an interactive review layer for terminal-based agents. AgentClick is implemented as a localhost npm server paired with a skill-based plugin that connects the running agent to a browser interface, allowing users to supervise and collaborate with agents through a structured web UI rather than raw terminal text alone. The system supports a range of human-in-the-loop workflows, including email drafting and revision, plan review and modification, memory management, trajectory inspection and visualization, and error localization during agent execution. It also turns code generation and execution into a reviewable process, enabling users to inspect and intervene before consequential actions are taken. In addition, AgentClick supports persistent preference capture through editable memory and remote access over HTTP, allowing users to review agents running on servers from their personal devices. Our goal is to lower the barrier for non-expert users and improve the efficiency and quality of human-agent co-work.

Indirect prompt injection poses a critical threat to LLM agents that interact with untrusted external data, yet automated attack methods--proven effective for jailbreaking--remain underexplored in realistic agentic settings. We present a comprehensive empirical evaluation of automated prompt injection attacks against LLM agents, adapting both white-box (GCG) and black-box (TAP) methods to the agentic setting within the AgentDojo framework. We evaluate across 80 task pairs spanning four domains and multiple models, and find that black-box optimization substantially outperforms gradient-based methods, a gap we attribute to GCG's optimization instability under reasonable compute budgets. We also find that TAP's effectiveness depends on the attacker model, as both general capability and safety tuning affect attack success--stronger models produce more effective injections, while safety-tuned attackers can refuse to generate adversarial prompts. Task-universal attacks transfer effectively to unseen tasks and out-of-distribution domains, but attacks optimized on smaller open-source models do not transfer to frontier models like GPT-5. These findings highlight automated prompt injection as a credible but model-dependent threat, with significant barriers remaining for model-agnostic exploitation.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents to navigate mobile graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Operating in dynamic on-device ecosystems, which include notifications, pop-ups, and inter-app interactions, exposes them to a unique and underexplored threat vector: environmental injection. Unlike prompt-based attacks that manipulate textual instructions, environmental injection corrupts an agent's visual perception by inserting adversarial UI elements (for example, deceptive overlays or spoofed notifications) directly into the GUI. This bypasses textual safeguards and can derail execution, causing privacy leakage, financial loss, or irreversible device compromise. To systematically evaluate this threat, we introduce GhostEI-Bench, the first benchmark for assessing mobile agents under environmental injection attacks within dynamic, executable environments. Moving beyond static image-based assessments, GhostEI-Bench injects adversarial events into realistic application workflows inside fully operational Android emulators and evaluates performance across critical risk scenarios. We further propose a judge-LLM protocol that conducts fine-grained failure analysis by reviewing the agent's action trajectory alongside the corresponding screenshot sequence, pinpointing failure in perception, recognition, or reasoning. Comprehensive experiments on state-of-the-art agents reveal pronounced vulnerability to deceptive environmental cues: current models systematically fail to perceive and reason about manipulated UIs. GhostEI-Bench provides a framework for quantifying and mitigating this emerging threat, paving the way toward more robust and secure embodied agents.

Large language models remain vulnerable to jailbreaks that elicit harmful responses, yet the mechanism behind harmful response generation is poorly understood. Here, we investigate how this capability is organized within model parameters. We identify and prune parameters that specifically support harmful compliance, providing a direct mechanistic analysis at the parameter level. We find that this capability depends on a sparse set of critical parameters: pruning these parameters substantially reduces harmful compliance while causing only limited degradation in benign capabilities, suggesting that key components of harmful generation are separable from those of general utility. Parameters identified from one harm category also reduce harmful responses in others, indicating components shared across harm types. This separability appears primarily in aligned models, suggesting that alignment training internally reshapes the harmful response mechanism even when behavioral safeguards remain brittle. We further show that harmful response generation is dissociable from the ability to recognize and reason about harmfulness. Finally, we extend our analysis to emergent misalignment and identify a sparse set of parameters contributing to it, with substantial sharing across fine-tuning domains. Together, these results reveal a consistent parameter-level organization underlying unsafe behaviors and point toward more principled interventions for improving model safety.

Causal abstraction is a promising theoretical framework for explainable artificial intelligence that defines when an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful simplification of a low-level deep learning system. However, existing causal abstraction methods have two major limitations: they require a brute-force search over alignments between the high-level model and the low-level one, and they presuppose that variables in the high-level model will align with disjoint sets of neurons in the low-level one. In this paper, we present distributed alignment search (DAS), which overcomes these limitations. In DAS, we find the alignment between high-level and low-level models using gradient descent rather than conducting a brute-force search, and we allow individual neurons to play multiple distinct roles by analyzing representations in non-standard bases-distributed representations. Our experiments show that DAS can discover internal structure that prior approaches miss. Overall, DAS removes previous obstacles to conducting causal abstraction analyses and allows us to find conceptual structure in trained neural nets.

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

This paper investigates using knowledge editing techniques to detoxify Large Language Models (LLMs). We construct a benchmark, SafeEdit, which covers nine unsafe categories with various powerful attack prompts and equips comprehensive metrics for systematic evaluation. We conduct experiments to compare knowledge editing approaches with previous baselines, indicating that knowledge editing has the potential to efficiently detoxify LLMs with limited impact on general performance. Then, we propose a simple yet effective baseline, dubbed Detoxifying with Intraoperative Neural Monitoring (DINM), to diminish the toxicity of LLMs within a few tuning steps via only one instance. We further provide an in-depth analysis of the internal mechanism for various detoxify approaches, demonstrating that previous methods like SFT and DPO may merely suppress the activations of toxic parameters, while DINM mitigates the toxicity of the toxic parameters to a certain extent, making permanent adjustments. We hope that these insights could shed light on future work of developing detoxifying approaches and the underlying knowledge mechanisms of LLMs. Code and benchmark are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit.

With adversarial or otherwise normal prompts, existing large language models (LLM) can be pushed to generate toxic discourses. One way to reduce the risk of LLMs generating undesired discourses is to alter the training of the LLM. This can be very restrictive due to demanding computation requirements. Other methods rely on rule-based or prompt-based token elimination, which are limited as they dismiss future tokens and the overall meaning of the complete discourse. Here, we center detoxification on the probability that the finished discourse is ultimately considered toxic. That is, at each point, we advise against token selections proportional to how likely a finished text from this point will be toxic. To this end, we formally extend the dead-end theory from the recent reinforcement learning (RL) literature to also cover uncertain outcomes. Our approach, called rectification, utilizes a separate but significantly smaller model for detoxification, which can be applied to diverse LLMs as long as they share the same vocabulary. Importantly, our method does not require access to the internal representations of the LLM, but only the token probability distribution at each decoding step. This is crucial as many LLMs today are hosted in servers and only accessible through APIs. When applied to various LLMs, including GPT-3, our approach significantly improves the generated discourse compared to the base LLMs and other techniques in terms of both the overall language and detoxification performance.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) empowers Large Language Models (LLMs) to dynamically integrate external knowledge during inference, improving their factual accuracy and adaptability. However, adversaries can inject poisoned external knowledge to override the model's internal memory. While existing attacks iteratively manipulate retrieval content or prompt structure of RAG, they largely ignore the model's internal representation dynamics and neuron-level sensitivities. The underlying mechanism of RAG poisoning has not been fully studied and the effect of knowledge conflict with strong parametric knowledge in RAG is not considered. In this work, we propose NeuroGenPoisoning, a novel attack framework that generates adversarial external knowledge in RAG guided by LLM internal neuron attribution and genetic optimization. Our method first identifies a set of Poison-Responsive Neurons whose activation strongly correlates with contextual poisoning knowledge. We then employ a genetic algorithm to evolve adversarial passages that maximally activate these neurons. Crucially, our framework enables massive-scale generation of effective poisoned RAG knowledge by identifying and reusing promising but initially unsuccessful external knowledge variants via observed attribution signals. At the same time, Poison-Responsive Neurons guided poisoning can effectively resolves knowledge conflict. Experimental results across models and datasets demonstrate consistently achieving high Population Overwrite Success Rate (POSR) of over 90% while preserving fluency. Empirical evidence shows that our method effectively resolves knowledge conflict.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems put more and more emphasis on grounding their responses in user-generated content found on the Web, amplifying both their usefulness and their attack surface. Most notably, indirect prompt injection and retrieval poisoning attack the web-native carriers that survive ingestion pipelines and are very concerning. We provide OpenRAG-Soc, a compact, reproducible benchmark-and-harness for web-facing RAG evaluation under these threats, in a discrete data package. The suite combines a social corpus with interchangeable sparse and dense retrievers and deployable mitigations - HTML/Markdown sanitization, Unicode normalization, and attribution-gated answered. It standardizes end-to-end evaluation from ingestion to generation and reports attacks time of one of the responses at answer time, rank shifts in both sparse and dense retrievers, utility and latency, allowing for apples-to-apples comparisons across carriers and defenses. OpenRAG-Soc targets practitioners who need fast, and realistic tests to track risk and harden deployments.

OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) Skill-based protection operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) Plugin-based protection serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) Watcher-based protection introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.

Large language models (LLMs) frequently generate toxic content, posing significant risks for safe deployment. Current mitigation strategies often degrade generation quality or require costly human annotation. We propose CAUSALDETOX, a framework that identifies and intervenes on the specific attention heads causally responsible for toxic generation. Using the Probability of Necessity and Sufficiency (PNS), we isolate a minimal set of heads that are necessary and sufficient for toxicity. We utilize these components via two complementary strategies: (1) Local Inference-Time Intervention, which constructs dynamic, input-specific steering vectors for context-aware detoxification, and (2) PNS-Guided Fine-Tuning, which permanently unlearns toxic representations. We also introduce PARATOX, a novel benchmark of aligned toxic/non-toxic sentence pairs enabling controlled counterfactual evaluation. Experiments on ToxiGen, ImplicitHate, and ParaDetox show that CAUSALDETOX achieves up to 5.34% greater toxicity reduction compared to baselines while preserving linguistic fluency, and offers a 7x speedup in head selection.

Modern vision-language-model (VLM) based graphical user interface (GUI) agents are expected not only to execute actions accurately but also to respond to user instructions with low latency. While existing research on GUI-agent security mainly focuses on manipulating action correctness, the security risks related to response efficiency remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we introduce SlowBA, a novel backdoor attack that targets the responsiveness of VLM-based GUI agents. The key idea is to manipulate response latency by inducing excessively long reasoning chains under specific trigger patterns. To achieve this, we propose a two-stage reward-level backdoor injection (RBI) strategy that first aligns the long-response format and then learns trigger-aware activation through reinforcement learning. In addition, we design realistic pop-up windows as triggers that naturally appear in GUI environments, improving the stealthiness of the attack. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets and baselines demonstrate that SlowBA can significantly increase response length and latency while largely preserving task accuracy. The attack remains effective even with a small poisoning ratio and under several defense settings. These findings reveal a previously overlooked security vulnerability in GUI agents and highlight the need for defenses that consider both action correctness and response efficiency. Code can be found in https://github.com/tu-tuing/SlowBA.

Industrial LLM agent systems often separate planning from execution, yet LLM planners frequently produce structurally invalid or unnecessarily long workflows, leading to brittle failures and avoidable tool and API cost. We propose SPIN, a planning wrapper that combines validated Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) planning with prefix based execution control. SPIN enforces a strict DAG contract through \_validate\_plan\_text and repair prompting, producing executable plans before downstream execution, and then evaluates DAG prefixes incrementally to stop when the current prefix is sufficient to answer the query. On AssetOpsBench, across 261 scenarios, SPIN reduces executed tasks from 1061 to 623 and improves Accomplished from 0.638 to 0.706, while reducing tool calls from 11.81 to 6.82 per run. On MCP Bench, the same wrapper improves planning, grounding, and dependency related scores for both GPT OSS1 and Llama 4 Maverick.

Diffusion large language models (dLLMs) have emerged as a promising alternative to autoregressive models, offering flexible generation orders and strong performance on complex reasoning tasks. However, instruction-tuned dLLMs exhibit a critical vulnerability we term <eos> overflow: as allocated sequence length increases, responses paradoxically become shorter, collapsing into early termination or degenerating into streams of <eos> tokens. Although noticed in practice, this issue has not been systematically analyzed. We trace its root cause to the dual role of <eos> as both termination and padding, which concentrates probability mass on <eos> at later positions and propagates backward to trigger early termination. To address this, we introduce Rainbow Padding, a simple remedy that replaces repeated <eos> placeholders with a repeating cycle of distinct padding tokens, distributing probability mass and breaking <eos> dominance. Experiments show that Rainbow Padding substantially improves length robustness and output quality, with as few as seven padding tokens sufficient to prevent early termination. Moreover, the method integrates efficiently into existing instruction-tuned models: LoRA fine-tuning for a single epoch on minimal data yields significant improvements, making this solution highly practical. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/quasar529/rainbow-padding.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of applications, e.g., medical question-answering, mathematical sciences, and code generation. However, they also exhibit inherent limitations, such as outdated knowledge and susceptibility to hallucinations. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising paradigm to address these issues, but it also introduces new vulnerabilities. Recent efforts have focused on the security of RAG-based LLMs, yet existing attack methods face three critical challenges: (1) their effectiveness declines sharply when only a limited number of poisoned texts can be injected into the knowledge database, (2) they lack sufficient stealth, as the attacks are often detectable by anomaly detection systems, which compromises their effectiveness, and (3) they rely on heuristic approaches to generate poisoned texts, lacking formal optimization frameworks and theoretic guarantees, which limits their effectiveness and applicability. To address these issues, we propose coordinated Prompt-RAG attack (PR-attack), a novel optimization-driven attack that introduces a small number of poisoned texts into the knowledge database while embedding a backdoor trigger within the prompt. When activated, the trigger causes the LLM to generate pre-designed responses to targeted queries, while maintaining normal behavior in other contexts. This ensures both high effectiveness and stealth. We formulate the attack generation process as a bilevel optimization problem leveraging a principled optimization framework to develop optimal poisoned texts and triggers. Extensive experiments across diverse LLMs and datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of PR-Attack, achieving a high attack success rate even with a limited number of poisoned texts and significantly improved stealth compared to existing methods.

Language model finetuning often results in learning undesirable traits in combination with desired ones. To address this, we propose inoculation prompting: modifying finetuning data by prepending a short system-prompt instruction that deliberately elicits the undesirable trait. At test time, we evaluate without the instruction; inoculated models have much lower expression of the trait than models trained with unmodified training data. Inoculation is selective: in a toy setting where assistant responses are always in Spanish and ALL-CAPS, an appropriate inoculation (e.g., ``You always speak in Spanish.'') teaches the model to capitalize responses while still responding in English. We find that inoculation is also effective across several additional settings: reducing emergent misalignment (EM) from task-specific finetuning, defending against backdoor injections, and mitigating the transmission of traits via subliminal learning. Follow-up analysis suggests a mechanism: making a trait less surprising via inoculation reduces optimization pressure to globally update the model, thereby reducing the degree of generalization. Our analysis relates to prior work on EM: inoculation explains prior findings that educational contexts mitigate EM from insecure code. Beyond demonstrating a simple and effective technique for selective learning, our results contribute to a better conceptual understanding of how and why language models generalize.

CLI agents are the closest thing language models have to an embodied setting: the model emits commands, the terminal executes them, and the returned stream -- stdout, errors, files, logs, and traces -- records the consequences. We argue that this stream is a supervision signal, but standard agent RL discards it: GRPO-style training updates action tokens with sparse outcome-level rewards while ignoring environment responses already in the rollout. Failed rollouts provide little policy-gradient signal despite containing rich evidence about how the environment responds. We introduce ECHO (Environment Cross-entropy Hybrid Objective), a hybrid objective that combines the standard policy-gradient loss on action tokens with an auxiliary loss that trains the policy to predict environment observation tokens resulting from its own actions. ECHO reuses the same forward pass as GRPO, requires no additional rollouts, and turns terminal feedback into dense supervision for all rollouts. ECHO doubles GRPO pass@1 on TerminalBench-2.0: Qwen3-8B improves from 2.70% to 5.17%, and Qwen3-14B from 5.17% to 10.79%. ECHO also produces policies that better predict terminal dynamics, even on trajectories they did not generate: across held-out rollouts, it sharply reduces environment-token cross-entropy while GRPO alone barely changes it. From base Qwen3-8B, ECHO matches expert-SFT-then-GRPO performance on held-out terminal tasks without expert demonstrations, and recovers roughly half of the expert-SFT initialization benefit on TerminalBench-2.0. In some settings, the environment prediction loss alone enables verifier-free self-improvement, allowing policies to improve on unseen OOD tasks by learning only from environment interactions. Together, these results suggest that environment observations are not merely context for future actions, but a dense, on-policy supervision signal already present in every rollout.

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.