Daily Papers

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized Natural Language Processing (NLP) but pose risks of inadvertently exposing copyrighted or proprietary data, especially when such data is used for training but not intended for distribution. Traditional methods address these leaks only after content is generated, which can lead to the exposure of sensitive information. This study introduces a proactive approach: examining LLMs' internal states before text generation to detect potential leaks. By using a curated dataset of copyrighted materials, we trained a neural network classifier to identify risks, allowing for early intervention by stopping the generation process or altering outputs to prevent disclosure. Integrated with a Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) system, this framework ensures adherence to copyright and licensing requirements while enhancing data privacy and ethical standards. Our results show that analyzing internal states effectively mitigates the risk of copyrighted data leakage, offering a scalable solution that fits smoothly into AI workflows, ensuring compliance with copyright regulations while maintaining high-quality text generation. The implementation is available on GitHub.https://github.com/changhu73/Internal_states_leakage

In this paper we undertake a systematic study of privacy attacks against open source Large Language Models (LLMs), where an adversary has access to either the model weights, gradients, or losses, and tries to exploit them to learn something about the underlying training data. Our headline results are the first membership inference attacks (MIAs) against pre-trained LLMs that are able to simultaneously achieve high TPRs and low FPRs, and a pipeline showing that over 50% (!) of the fine-tuning dataset can be extracted from a fine-tuned LLM in natural settings. We consider varying degrees of access to the underlying model, customization of the language model, and resources available to the attacker. In the pre-trained setting, we propose three new white-box MIAs: an attack based on the gradient norm, a supervised neural network classifier, and a single step loss ratio attack. All outperform existing black-box baselines, and our supervised attack closes the gap between MIA attack success against LLMs and other types of models. In fine-tuning, we find that given access to the loss of the fine-tuned and base models, a fine-tuned loss ratio attack FLoRA is able to achieve near perfect MIA peformance. We then leverage these MIAs to extract fine-tuning data from fine-tuned language models. We find that the pipeline of generating from fine-tuned models prompted with a small snippet of the prefix of each training example, followed by using FLoRa to select the most likely training sample, succeeds the majority of the fine-tuning dataset after only 3 epochs of fine-tuning. Taken together, these findings show that highly effective MIAs are available in almost all LLM training settings, and highlight that great care must be taken before LLMs are fine-tuned on highly sensitive data and then deployed.

With the growing interest on Large Language Models (LLMs) for fault localization and program repair, ensuring the integrity and generalizability of the LLM-based methods becomes paramount. The code in existing widely-adopted benchmarks for these tasks was written before the the bloom of LLMs and may be included in the training data of existing popular LLMs, thereby suffering from the threat of data leakage, leading to misleadingly optimistic performance metrics. To address this issue, we introduce "ConDefects", a novel dataset of real faults meticulously curated to eliminate such overlap. ConDefects contains 1,254 Java faulty programs and 1,625 Python faulty programs. All these programs are sourced from the online competition platform AtCoder and were produced between October 2021 and September 2023. We pair each fault with fault locations and the corresponding repaired code versions, making it tailored for in fault localization and program repair related research. We also provide interfaces for selecting subsets based on different time windows and coding task difficulties. While inspired by LLM-based tasks, ConDefects can be adopted for benchmarking ALL types of fault localization and program repair methods. The dataset is publicly available, and a demo video can be found at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=22j15Hj5ONk.

The success of Large Language Models (LLMs) relies heavily on the huge amount of pre-training data learned in the pre-training phase. The opacity of the pre-training process and the training data causes the results of many benchmark tests to become unreliable. If any model has been trained on a benchmark test set, it can seriously hinder the health of the field. In order to automate and efficiently test the capabilities of large language models, numerous mainstream benchmarks adopt a multiple-choice format. As the swapping of the contents of multiple-choice options does not affect the meaning of the question itself, we propose a simple and effective data leakage detection method based on this property. Specifically, we shuffle the contents of the options in the data to generate the corresponding derived data sets, and then detect data leakage based on the model's log probability distribution over the derived data sets. If there is a maximum and outlier in the set of log probabilities, it indicates that the data is leaked. Our method is able to work under black-box conditions without access to model training data or weights, effectively identifying data leakage from benchmark test sets in model pre-training data, including both normal scenarios and complex scenarios where options may have been shuffled intentionally or unintentionally. Through experiments based on two LLMs and benchmark designs, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. In addition, we evaluate the degree of data leakage of 31 mainstream open-source LLMs on four benchmark datasets and give a ranking of the leaked LLMs for each benchmark, and we find that the Qwen family of LLMs has the highest degree of data leakage.

The leakage of benchmark data into the training data has emerged as a significant challenge for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs). In this work, we challenge the common assumption that small-scale contamination renders benchmark evaluations invalid. First, we experimentally quantify the magnitude of benchmark overfitting based on scaling along three dimensions: The number of model parameters (up to 1.6B), the number of times an example is seen (up to 144), and the number of training tokens (up to 40B). If model and data follow the Chinchilla scaling laws, minor contamination indeed leads to overfitting. At the same time, even 144 times of contamination can be forgotten if the training data is scaled beyond five times Chinchilla, a regime characteristic of many modern LLMs. Continual pre-training of OLMo-7B corroborates these results. Next, we study the impact of the weight decay parameter on example forgetting, showing that empirical forgetting occurs faster than the cumulative weight decay. This allows us to gauge the degree of example forgetting in large-scale training runs, indicating that many LLMs, including Lllama 3 405B, have forgotten the data seen at the beginning of training.

Can AI reason about a war before its trajectory becomes historically obvious? Analyzing this capability is difficult because retrospective geopolitical prediction is heavily confounded by training-data leakage. We address this challenge through a temporally grounded case study of the early stages of the 2026 Middle East conflict, which unfolded after the training cutoff of current frontier models. We construct 11 critical temporal nodes, 42 node-specific verifiable questions, and 5 general exploratory questions, requiring models to reason only from information that would have been publicly available at each moment. This design substantially mitigates training-data leakage concerns, creating a setting well-suited for studying how models analyze an unfolding crisis under the fog of war, and provides, to our knowledge, the first temporally grounded analysis of LLM reasoning in an ongoing geopolitical conflict. Our analysis reveals three main findings. First, current state-of-the-art large language models often display a striking degree of strategic realism, reasoning beyond surface rhetoric toward deeper structural incentives. Second, this capability is uneven across domains: models are more reliable in economically and logistically structured settings than in politically ambiguous multi-actor environments. Finally, model narratives evolve over time, shifting from early expectations of rapid containment toward more systemic accounts of regional entrenchment and attritional de-escalation. Since the conflict remains ongoing at the time of writing, this work can serve as an archival snapshot of model reasoning during an unfolding geopolitical crisis, enabling future studies without the hindsight bias of retrospective analysis.

Generative models are increasingly used in 3D vision to synthesize novel shapes, yet it remains unclear whether their generation relies on memorizing training shapes. Understanding their memorization could help prevent training data leakage and improve the diversity of generated results. In this paper, we design an evaluation framework to quantify memorization in 3D generative models and study the influence of different data and modeling designs on memorization. We first apply our framework to quantify memorization in existing methods. Next, through controlled experiments with a latent vector-set (Vecset) diffusion model, we find that, on the data side, memorization depends on data modality, and increases with data diversity and finer-grained conditioning; on the modeling side, it peaks at a moderate guidance scale and can be mitigated by longer Vecsets and simple rotation augmentation. Together, our framework and analysis provide an empirical understanding of memorization in 3D generative models and suggest simple yet effective strategies to reduce it without degrading generation quality. Our code is available at https://github.com/zlab-princeton/3d_mem.

Multi-targeted adversarial attacks aim to mislead classifiers toward specific target classes using a single perturbation generator with a conditional input specifying the desired target class. Existing methods face two key limitations: (1) a single generator supports only a limited number of predefined target classes, and (2) it requires access to the victim model's training data to learn target class semantics. This dependency raises data leakage concerns in practical black-box scenarios where the training data is typically private. To address these limitations, we propose a novel Cross-Domain Multi-Targeted Attack (CD-MTA) that can generate perturbations toward arbitrary target classes, even those that do not exist in the attacker's training data. CD-MTA is trained on a single public dataset but can perform targeted attacks on black-box models trained on different datasets with disjoint and unknown class sets. Our method requires only a single example image that visually represents the desired target class, without relying its label, class distribution or pretrained embeddings. We achieve this through a Feature Injection Module (FIM) and class-agnostic objectives which guide the generator to extract transferable, fine-grained features from the target image without inferring class semantics. Experiments on ImageNet and seven additional datasets show that CD-MTA outperforms existing multi-targeted attack methods on unseen target classes in black-box and cross-domain scenarios. The code is available at https://github.com/tgoncalv/CD-MTA.

As multimodal AI becomes widely used for credit risk assessment and document review, a domain-specific benchmark is urgently needed that (1) reflects documents and workflows specific to financial credit applications, (2) includes credit-specific understanding and real-world robustness, and (3) preserves privacy compliance without sacrificing practical utility. Here, we introduce FCMBench-V1.0 -- a large-scale financial credit multimodal benchmark for real-world applications, covering 18 core certificate types, with 4,043 privacy-compliant images and 8,446 QA samples. The FCMBench evaluation framework consists of three dimensions: Perception, Reasoning, and Robustness, including 3 foundational perception tasks, 4 credit-specific reasoning tasks that require decision-oriented understanding of visual evidence, and 10 real-world acquisition artifact types for robustness stress testing. To reconcile compliance with realism, we construct all samples via a closed synthesis-capture pipeline: we manually synthesize document templates with virtual content and capture scenario-aware images in-house. This design also mitigates pre-training data leakage by avoiding web-sourced or publicly released images. FCMBench can effectively discriminate performance disparities and robustness across modern vision-language models. Extensive experiments were conducted on 23 state-of-the-art vision-language models (VLMs) from 14 top AI companies and research institutes. Among them, Gemini 3 Pro achieves the best F1(\%) score as a commercial model (64.61), Qwen3-VL-235B achieves the best score as an open-source baseline (57.27), and our financial credit-specific model, Qfin-VL-Instruct, achieves the top overall score (64.92). Robustness evaluations show that even top-performing models suffer noticeable performance drops under acquisition artifacts.

Previous studies have typically assumed that large language models are unable to accurately perform arithmetic operations, particularly multiplication of >8 digits, and operations involving decimals and fractions, without the use of calculator tools. This paper aims to challenge this misconception. With sufficient training data, a 2 billion-parameter language model can accurately perform multi-digit arithmetic operations with almost 100% accuracy without data leakage, significantly surpassing GPT-4 (whose multi-digit multiplication accuracy is only 4.3%). We also demonstrate that our MathGLM, fine-tuned from GLM-10B on a dataset with additional multi-step arithmetic operations and math problems described in text, achieves similar performance to GPT-4 on a 5,000-samples Chinese math problem test set.

Deep generative models have emerged as a transformative tool in medical imaging, offering substantial potential for synthetic data generation. However, recent empirical studies highlight a critical vulnerability: these models can memorize sensitive training data, posing significant risks of unauthorized patient information disclosure. Detecting memorization in generative models remains particularly challenging, necessitating scalable methods capable of identifying training data leakage across large sets of generated samples. In this work, we propose DeepSSIM, a novel self-supervised metric for quantifying memorization in generative models. DeepSSIM is trained to: i) project images into a learned embedding space and ii) force the cosine similarity between embeddings to match the ground-truth SSIM (Structural Similarity Index) scores computed in the image space. To capture domain-specific anatomical features, training incorporates structure-preserving augmentations, allowing DeepSSIM to estimate similarity reliably without requiring precise spatial alignment. We evaluate DeepSSIM in a case study involving synthetic brain MRI data generated by a Latent Diffusion Model (LDM) trained under memorization-prone conditions, using 2,195 MRI scans from two publicly available datasets (IXI and CoRR). Compared to state-of-the-art memorization metrics, DeepSSIM achieves superior performance, improving F1 scores by an average of +52.03% over the best existing method. Code and data of our approach are publicly available at the following link: https://github.com/brAIn-science/DeepSSIM.

Program repair techniques offer cost-saving benefits for debugging within software development and programming education scenarios. With the proven effectiveness of Large Language Models (LLMs) in code-related tasks, researchers have explored their potential for program repair. However, it is crucial to recognize that existing repair benchmarks may have influenced LLM training data, potentially causing data leakage. To evaluate LLMs' realistic repair capabilities, (1) we introduce an extensive, non-crawled benchmark, referred to as TutorCode, comprising 1,239 C++ defect codes and associated information such as tutor guidance, solution description, failing test cases, and the corrected code. Our work assesses the repair performance of 12 LLMs on TutorCode, measuring repair correctness (TOP-5 and AVG-5) and patch precision (RPSR). (2) We then provide a comprehensive investigation into which types of extra information can help LLMs improve their performance in repairing defects. Among these types, tutor guidance was found to be the most effective information in enhancing LLM repair capabilities. To fully harness LLMs' conversational capabilities and the benefits of augmented information, (3) we introduce a novel conversational semi-automatic repair framework CREF assisting human tutor. It demonstrates a remarkable AVG-5 improvement of 17.2%-24.6% compared to the baseline, achieving an impressive AVG-5 of 76.6% when utilizing GPT-4. These results highlight the potential for enhancing LLMs' repair capabilities through interactions with tutors and historical conversations involving incorrect responses. The successful application of CREF in a real-world educational setting demonstrates its effectiveness in reducing tutors' workload and improving students' learning experience, while also showcasing its promise for facilitating other software engineering tasks, such as code review.

Knowledge Distillation (KD) is increasingly adopted to transfer capabilities from large language models to smaller ones, offering significant improvements in efficiency and utility while often surpassing standard fine-tuning. Beyond performance, KD is also explored as a privacy-preserving mechanism to mitigate the risk of training data leakage. While training data memorization has been extensively studied in standard pre-training and fine-tuning settings, its dynamics in a knowledge distillation setup remain poorly understood. In this work, we study memorization across the KD pipeline using three large language model (LLM) families (Pythia, OLMo-2, Qwen-3) and three datasets (FineWeb, Wikitext, Nemotron-CC-v2). We find: (1) distilled models memorize significantly less training data than standard fine-tuning (reducing memorization by more than 50%); (2) some examples are inherently easier to memorize and account for a large fraction of memorization during distillation (over ~95%); (3) student memorization is predictable prior to distillation using features based on zlib entropy, KL divergence, and perplexity; and (4) while soft and hard distillation have similar overall memorization rates, hard distillation poses a greater risk: it inherits 2.7times more teacher-specific examples than soft distillation. Overall, we demonstrate that distillation can provide both improved generalization and reduced memorization risks compared to standard fine-tuning.

Model inversion (MI) attacks pose significant privacy risks by reconstructing private training data from trained neural networks. While prior studies have primarily examined unimodal deep networks, the vulnerability of vision-language models (VLMs) remains largely unexplored. In this work, we present the first systematic study of MI attacks on VLMs to understand their susceptibility to leaking private visual training data. Our work makes two main contributions. First, tailored to the token-generative nature of VLMs, we introduce a suite of token-based and sequence-based model inversion strategies, providing a comprehensive analysis of VLMs' vulnerability under different attack formulations. Second, based on the observation that tokens vary in their visual grounding, and hence their gradients differ in informativeness for image reconstruction, we propose Sequence-based Model Inversion with Adaptive Token Weighting (SMI-AW) as a novel MI for VLMs. SMI-AW dynamically reweights each token's loss gradient according to its visual grounding, enabling the optimization to focus on visually informative tokens and more effectively guide the reconstruction of private images. Through extensive experiments and human evaluations on a range of state-of-the-art VLMs across multiple datasets, we show that VLMs are susceptible to training data leakage. Human evaluation of the reconstructed images yields an attack accuracy of 61.21%, underscoring the severity of these privacy risks. Notably, we demonstrate that publicly released VLMs are vulnerable to such attacks. Our study highlights the urgent need for privacy safeguards as VLMs become increasingly deployed in sensitive domains such as healthcare and finance. Our code and models are available at our project page: https://ngoc-nguyen-0.github.io/SMI_AW/

Understanding the memorization and privacy leakage risks in Contrastive Language--Image Pretraining (CLIP) is critical for ensuring the security of multimodal models. Recent studies have demonstrated the feasibility of extracting sensitive training examples from diffusion models, with conditional diffusion models exhibiting a stronger tendency to memorize and leak information. In this work, we investigate data memorization and extraction risks in CLIP through the lens of CLIP inversion, a process that aims to reconstruct training images from text prompts. To this end, we introduce LeakyCLIP, a novel attack framework designed to achieve high-quality, semantically accurate image reconstruction from CLIP embeddings. We identify three key challenges in CLIP inversion: 1) non-robust features, 2) limited visual semantics in text embeddings, and 3) low reconstruction fidelity. To address these challenges, LeakyCLIP employs 1) adversarial fine-tuning to enhance optimization smoothness, 2) linear transformation-based embedding alignment, and 3) Stable Diffusion-based refinement to improve fidelity. Empirical results demonstrate the superiority of LeakyCLIP, achieving over 358% improvement in Structural Similarity Index Measure (SSIM) for ViT-B-16 compared to baseline methods on LAION-2B subset. Furthermore, we uncover a pervasive leakage risk, showing that training data membership can even be successfully inferred from the metrics of low-fidelity reconstructions. Our work introduces a practical method for CLIP inversion while offering novel insights into the nature and scope of privacy risks in multimodal models.

With the advance of language models, privacy protection is receiving more attention. Training data extraction is therefore of great importance, as it can serve as a potential tool to assess privacy leakage. However, due to the difficulty of this task, most of the existing methods are proof-of-concept and still not effective enough. In this paper, we investigate and benchmark tricks for improving training data extraction using a publicly available dataset. Because most existing extraction methods use a pipeline of generating-then-ranking, i.e., generating text candidates as potential training data and then ranking them based on specific criteria, our research focuses on the tricks for both text generation (e.g., sampling strategy) and text ranking (e.g., token-level criteria). The experimental results show that several previously overlooked tricks can be crucial to the success of training data extraction. Based on the GPT-Neo 1.3B evaluation results, our proposed tricks outperform the baseline by a large margin in most cases, providing a much stronger baseline for future research.

Foundation models are trained on increasingly immense and opaque datasets. Even while these models are now key in AI system building, it can be difficult to answer the straightforward question: has the model already encountered a given example during training? We therefore propose a widespread adoption of Data Portraits: artifacts that record training data and allow for downstream inspection. First we outline the properties of such an artifact and discuss how existing solutions can be used to increase transparency. We then propose and implement a solution based on data sketching, stressing fast and space efficient querying. Using our tools, we document a popular language modeling corpus (The Pile) and a recently released code modeling dataset (The Stack). We show that our solution enables answering questions about test set leakage and model plagiarism. Our tool is lightweight and fast, costing only 3% of the dataset size in overhead. We release a live interface of our tools at https://dataportraits.org/ and call on dataset and model creators to release Data Portraits as a complement to current documentation practices.

We present a conceptual framework, datamodeling, for analyzing the behavior of a model class in terms of the training data. For any fixed "target" example x, training set S, and learning algorithm, a datamodel is a parameterized function 2^S to R that for any subset of S' subset S -- using only information about which examples of S are contained in S' -- predicts the outcome of training a model on S' and evaluating on x. Despite the potential complexity of the underlying process being approximated (e.g., end-to-end training and evaluation of deep neural networks), we show that even simple linear datamodels can successfully predict model outputs. We then demonstrate that datamodels give rise to a variety of applications, such as: accurately predicting the effect of dataset counterfactuals; identifying brittle predictions; finding semantically similar examples; quantifying train-test leakage; and embedding data into a well-behaved and feature-rich representation space. Data for this paper (including pre-computed datamodels as well as raw predictions from four million trained deep neural networks) is available at https://github.com/MadryLab/datamodels-data .

Large pre-trained language models achieve impressive results across many tasks. However, recent works point out that pre-trained language models may memorize a considerable fraction of their training data, leading to the privacy risk of information leakage. In this paper, we propose a method named Ethicist for targeted training data extraction through loss smoothed soft prompting and calibrated confidence estimation, investigating how to recover the suffix in the training data when given a prefix. To elicit memorization in the attacked model, we tune soft prompt embeddings while keeping the model fixed. We further propose a smoothing loss that smooths the loss distribution of the suffix tokens to make it easier to sample the correct suffix. In order to select the most probable suffix from a collection of sampled suffixes and estimate the prediction confidence, we propose a calibrated confidence estimation method, which normalizes the confidence of the generated suffixes with a local estimation. We show that Ethicist significantly improves the extraction performance on a recently proposed public benchmark. We also investigate several factors influencing the data extraction performance, including decoding strategy, model scale, prefix length, and suffix length. Our code is available at https://github.com/thu-coai/Targeted-Data-Extraction.

Exchanging gradients is a widely used method in modern multi-node machine learning system (e.g., distributed training, collaborative learning). For a long time, people believed that gradients are safe to share: i.e., the training data will not be leaked by gradient exchange. However, we show that it is possible to obtain the private training data from the publicly shared gradients. We name this leakage as Deep Leakage from Gradient and empirically validate the effectiveness on both computer vision and natural language processing tasks. Experimental results show that our attack is much stronger than previous approaches: the recovery is pixel-wise accurate for images and token-wise matching for texts. We want to raise people's awareness to rethink the gradient's safety. Finally, we discuss several possible strategies to prevent such deep leakage. The most effective defense method is gradient pruning.

Amid the expanding use of pre-training data, the phenomenon of benchmark dataset leakage has become increasingly prominent, exacerbated by opaque training processes and the often undisclosed inclusion of supervised data in contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). This issue skews benchmark effectiveness and fosters potentially unfair comparisons, impeding the field's healthy development. To address this, we introduce a detection pipeline utilizing Perplexity and N-gram accuracy, two simple and scalable metrics that gauge a model's prediction precision on benchmark, to identify potential data leakages. By analyzing 31 LLMs under the context of mathematical reasoning, we reveal substantial instances of training even test set misuse, resulting in potentially unfair comparisons. These findings prompt us to offer several recommendations regarding model documentation, benchmark setup, and future evaluations. Notably, we propose the "Benchmark Transparency Card" to encourage clear documentation of benchmark utilization, promoting transparency and healthy developments of LLMs. we have made our leaderboard, pipeline implementation, and model predictions publicly available, fostering future research.

Language Models (LMs) have been shown to leak information about training data through sentence-level membership inference and reconstruction attacks. Understanding the risk of LMs leaking Personally Identifiable Information (PII) has received less attention, which can be attributed to the false assumption that dataset curation techniques such as scrubbing are sufficient to prevent PII leakage. Scrubbing techniques reduce but do not prevent the risk of PII leakage: in practice scrubbing is imperfect and must balance the trade-off between minimizing disclosure and preserving the utility of the dataset. On the other hand, it is unclear to which extent algorithmic defenses such as differential privacy, designed to guarantee sentence- or user-level privacy, prevent PII disclosure. In this work, we introduce rigorous game-based definitions for three types of PII leakage via black-box extraction, inference, and reconstruction attacks with only API access to an LM. We empirically evaluate the attacks against GPT-2 models fine-tuned with and without defenses in three domains: case law, health care, and e-mails. Our main contributions are (i) novel attacks that can extract up to 10times more PII sequences than existing attacks, (ii) showing that sentence-level differential privacy reduces the risk of PII disclosure but still leaks about 3% of PII sequences, and (iii) a subtle connection between record-level membership inference and PII reconstruction. Code to reproduce all experiments in the paper is available at https://github.com/microsoft/analysing_pii_leakage.

Gradient inversion attacks on federated learning systems reconstruct client training data from exchanged gradient information. To defend against such attacks, a variety of defense mechanisms were proposed. However, they usually lead to an unacceptable trade-off between privacy and model utility. Recent observations suggest that dropout could mitigate gradient leakage and improve model utility if added to neural networks. Unfortunately, this phenomenon has not been systematically researched yet. In this work, we thoroughly analyze the effect of dropout on iterative gradient inversion attacks. We find that state of the art attacks are not able to reconstruct the client data due to the stochasticity induced by dropout during model training. Nonetheless, we argue that dropout does not offer reliable protection if the dropout induced stochasticity is adequately modeled during attack optimization. Consequently, we propose a novel Dropout Inversion Attack (DIA) that jointly optimizes for client data and dropout masks to approximate the stochastic client model. We conduct an extensive systematic evaluation of our attack on four seminal model architectures and three image classification datasets of increasing complexity. We find that our proposed attack bypasses the protection seemingly induced by dropout and reconstructs client data with high fidelity. Our work demonstrates that privacy inducing changes to model architectures alone cannot be assumed to reliably protect from gradient leakage and therefore should be combined with complementary defense mechanisms.

Recently, there has been a growing interest in studying how to construct better code instruction tuning data. However, we observe Code models trained with these datasets exhibit high performance on HumanEval but perform worse on other benchmarks such as LiveCodeBench. Upon further investigation, we find that many datasets suffer from severe data leakage. After cleaning up most of the leaked data, some well-known high-quality datasets perform poorly. This discovery reveals a new challenge: identifying which dataset genuinely qualify as high-quality code instruction data. To address this, we propose an efficient code data pruning strategy for selecting good samples. Our approach is based on three dimensions: instruction complexity, response quality, and instruction diversity. Based on our selected data, we present XCoder, a family of models finetuned from LLaMA3. Our experiments show XCoder achieves new state-of-the-art performance using fewer training data, which verify the effectiveness of our data strategy. Moreover, we perform a comprehensive analysis on the data composition and find existing code datasets have different characteristics according to their construction methods, which provide new insights for future code LLMs. Our models and dataset are released in https://github.com/banksy23/XCoder

Existing retrieval benchmarks primarily consist of information-seeking queries (e.g., aggregated questions from search engines) where keyword or semantic-based retrieval is usually sufficient. However, many complex real-world queries require in-depth reasoning to identify relevant documents that go beyond surface form matching. For example, finding documentation for a coding question requires understanding the logic and syntax of the functions involved. To better benchmark retrieval on such challenging queries, we introduce BRIGHT, the first text retrieval benchmark that requires intensive reasoning to retrieve relevant documents. BRIGHT is constructed from the 1,398 real-world queries collected from diverse domains (such as economics, psychology, robotics, software engineering, earth sciences, etc.), sourced from naturally occurring or carefully curated human data. Extensive evaluation reveals that even state-of-the-art retrieval models perform poorly on BRIGHT. The leading model on the MTEB leaderboard [38 ], which achieves a score of 59.0 nDCG@10,2 produces a score of nDCG@10 of 18.0 on BRIGHT. We further demonstrate that augmenting queries with Chain-of-Thought reasoning generated by large language models (LLMs) improves performance by up to 12.2 points. Moreover, BRIGHT is robust against data leakage during pretraining of the benchmarked models as we validate by showing similar performance even when documents from the benchmark are included in the training data. We believe that BRIGHT paves the way for future research on retrieval systems in more realistic and challenging settings. Our code and data are available at https://brightbenchmark.github.io.

Detecting content that contradicts or is unsupported by a given source text is a critical challenge for the safe deployment of generative language models. We introduce HALT-RAG, a post-hoc verification system designed to identify hallucinations in the outputs of Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) pipelines. Our flexible and task-adaptable framework uses a universal feature set derived from an ensemble of two frozen, off-the-shelf Natural Language Inference (NLI) models and lightweight lexical signals. These features are used to train a simple, calibrated, and task-adapted meta-classifier. Using a rigorous 5-fold out-of-fold (OOF) training protocol to prevent data leakage and produce unbiased estimates, we evaluate our system on the HaluEval benchmark. By pairing our universal feature set with a lightweight, task-adapted classifier and a precision-constrained decision policy, HALT-RAG achieves strong OOF F1-scores of 0.7756, 0.9786, and 0.7391 on the summarization, QA, and dialogue tasks, respectively. The system's well-calibrated probabilities enable a practical abstention mechanism, providing a reliable tool for balancing model performance with safety requirements.

We introduce a new analytical framework to quantify the changes in a machine learning algorithm's output distribution following the inclusion of a few data points in its training set, a notion we define as leave-one-out distinguishability (LOOD). This problem is key to measuring data **memorization** and **information leakage** in machine learning, and the **influence** of training data points on model predictions. We illustrate how our method broadens and refines existing empirical measures of memorization and privacy risks associated with training data. We use Gaussian processes to model the randomness of machine learning algorithms, and validate LOOD with extensive empirical analysis of information leakage using membership inference attacks. Our theoretical framework enables us to investigate the causes of information leakage and where the leakage is high. For example, we analyze the influence of activation functions, on data memorization. Additionally, our method allows us to optimize queries that disclose the most significant information about the training data in the leave-one-out setting. We illustrate how optimal queries can be used for accurate **reconstruction** of training data.

Recently, Talmor and Berant (2018) introduced ComplexWebQuestions - a dataset focused on answering complex questions by decomposing them into a sequence of simpler questions and extracting the answer from retrieved web snippets. In their work the authors used a pre-trained reading comprehension (RC) model (Salant and Berant, 2018) to extract the answer from the web snippets. In this short note we show that training a RC model directly on the training data of ComplexWebQuestions reveals a leakage from the training set to the test set that allows to obtain unreasonably high performance. As a solution, we construct a new partitioning of ComplexWebQuestions that does not suffer from this leakage and publicly release it. We also perform an empirical evaluation on these two datasets and show that training a RC model on the training data substantially improves state-of-the-art performance.

In this paper, we introduce a black-box prompt optimization method that uses an attacker LLM agent to uncover higher levels of memorization in a victim agent, compared to what is revealed by prompting the target model with the training data directly, which is the dominant approach of quantifying memorization in LLMs. We use an iterative rejection-sampling optimization process to find instruction-based prompts with two main characteristics: (1) minimal overlap with the training data to avoid presenting the solution directly to the model, and (2) maximal overlap between the victim model's output and the training data, aiming to induce the victim to spit out training data. We observe that our instruction-based prompts generate outputs with 23.7% higher overlap with training data compared to the baseline prefix-suffix measurements. Our findings show that (1) instruction-tuned models can expose pre-training data as much as their base-models, if not more so, (2) contexts other than the original training data can lead to leakage, and (3) using instructions proposed by other LLMs can open a new avenue of automated attacks that we should further study and explore. The code can be found at https://github.com/Alymostafa/Instruction_based_attack .

The discourse on privacy risks in Large Language Models (LLMs) has disproportionately focused on verbatim memorization of training data, while a constellation of more immediate and scalable privacy threats remain underexplored. This position paper argues that the privacy landscape of LLM systems extends far beyond training data extraction, encompassing risks from data collection practices, inference-time context leakage, autonomous agent capabilities, and the democratization of surveillance through deep inference attacks. We present a comprehensive taxonomy of privacy risks across the LLM lifecycle -- from data collection through deployment -- and demonstrate through case studies how current privacy frameworks fail to address these multifaceted threats. Through a longitudinal analysis of 1,322 AI/ML privacy papers published at leading conferences over the past decade (2016--2025), we reveal that while memorization receives outsized attention in technical research, the most pressing privacy harms lie elsewhere, where current technical approaches offer little traction and viable paths forward remain unclear. We call for a fundamental shift in how the research community approaches LLM privacy, moving beyond the narrow focus of current technical solutions and embracing interdisciplinary approaches that address the sociotechnical nature of these emerging threats.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been gaining increasing attention and demonstrated promising performance across a variety of Software Engineering (SE) tasks, such as Automated Program Repair (APR), code summarization, and code completion. For example, ChatGPT, the latest black-box LLM, has been investigated by numerous recent research studies and has shown impressive performance in various tasks. However, there exists a potential risk of data leakage since these LLMs are usually close-sourced with unknown specific training details, e.g., pre-training datasets. In this paper, we seek to review the bug-fixing capabilities of ChatGPT on a clean APR benchmark with different research objectives. We first introduce {\benchmark}, a new benchmark with buggy and the corresponding fixed programs from competitive programming problems starting from 2023, after the training cutoff point of ChatGPT. The results on {\benchmark} show that ChatGPT is able to fix 109 out of 151 buggy programs using the basic prompt within 35 independent rounds, outperforming state-of-the-art LLMs CodeT5 and PLBART by 27.5\% and 62.4\% prediction accuracy. We also investigate the impact of three types of prompts, i.e., problem description, error feedback, and bug localization, leading to additional 34 fixed bugs. Besides, we provide additional discussion from the interactive nature of ChatGPT to illustrate the capacity of a dialog-based repair workflow with 9 additional fixed bugs. Inspired by the findings, we further pinpoint various challenges and opportunities for advanced SE study equipped with such LLMs (e.g.,~ChatGPT) in the near future. More importantly, our work calls for more research on the reevaluation of the achievements obtained by existing black-box LLMs across various SE tasks, not limited to ChatGPT on APR.

Human priors play a crucial role in efficiently utilizing data in deep learning. However, with the development of large language models (LLMs), there is an increasing emphasis on scaling both model size and data volume, which often diminishes the importance of human priors in data construction. Influenced by these trends, existing Small Language Models (SLMs) mainly rely on web-scraped large-scale training data, neglecting the proper incorporation of human priors. This oversight limits the training efficiency of language models in resource-constrained settings. In this paper, we propose a principle to leverage human priors for data construction. This principle emphasizes achieving high-performance SLMs by training on a concise dataset that accommodates both semantic diversity and data quality consistency, while avoiding benchmark data leakage. Following this principle, we train an SLM named HARE-1.1B. Extensive experiments on large-scale benchmark datasets demonstrate that HARE-1.1B performs favorably against state-of-the-art SLMs, validating the effectiveness of the proposed principle. Additionally, this provides new insights into efficient language model training in resource-constrained environments from the view of human priors.

This work presents a new dataset for the Martian digital elevation model prediction task, ready for machine learning applications called MCTED. The dataset has been generated using a comprehensive pipeline designed to process high-resolution Mars orthoimage and DEM pairs from Day et al., yielding a dataset consisting of 80,898 data samples. The source images are data gathered by the Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter using the CTX instrument, providing a very diverse and comprehensive coverage of the Martian surface. Given the complexity of the processing pipelines used in large-scale DEMs, there are often artefacts and missing data points in the original data, for which we developed tools to solve or mitigate their impact. We divide the processed samples into training and validation splits, ensuring samples in both splits cover no mutual areas to avoid data leakage. Every sample in the dataset is represented by the optical image patch, DEM patch, and two mask patches, indicating values that were originally missing or were altered by us. This allows future users of the dataset to handle altered elevation regions as they please. We provide statistical insights of the generated dataset, including the spatial distribution of samples, the distributions of elevation values, slopes and more. Finally, we train a small U-Net architecture on the MCTED dataset and compare its performance to a monocular depth estimation foundation model, DepthAnythingV2, on the task of elevation prediction. We find that even a very small architecture trained on this dataset specifically, beats a zero-shot performance of a depth estimation foundation model like DepthAnythingV2. We make the dataset and code used for its generation completely open source in public repositories.

Although large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in a wide range of multimodal tasks, their true reasoning capabilities on human IQ tests remain underexplored. To advance research on the fluid intelligence of VLMs, we introduce **IQBench**, a new benchmark designed to evaluate VLMs on standardized visual IQ tests. We focus on evaluating the reasoning capabilities of VLMs, which we argue are more important than the accuracy of the final prediction. **Our benchmark is visually centric, minimizing the dependence on unnecessary textual content**, thus encouraging models to derive answers primarily from image-based information rather than learned textual knowledge. To this end, we manually collected and annotated 500 visual IQ questions to **prevent unintentional data leakage during training**. Unlike prior work that focuses primarily on the accuracy of the final answer, we evaluate the reasoning ability of the models by assessing their explanations and the patterns used to solve each problem, along with the accuracy of the final prediction and human evaluation. Our experiments show that there are substantial performance disparities between tasks, with models such as `o4-mini`, `gemini-2.5-flash`, and `claude-3.7-sonnet` achieving the highest average accuracies of 0.615, 0.578, and 0.548, respectively. However, all models struggle with 3D spatial and anagram reasoning tasks, highlighting significant limitations in current VLMs' general reasoning abilities. In terms of reasoning scores, `o4-mini`, `gemini-2.5-flash`, and `claude-3.7-sonnet` achieved top averages of 0.696, 0.586, and 0.516, respectively. These results highlight inconsistencies between the reasoning processes of the models and their final answers, emphasizing the importance of evaluating the accuracy of the reasoning in addition to the final predictions.

LLMs have become the go-to choice for code generation tasks, with an exponential increase in the training, development, and usage of LLMs specifically for code generation. To evaluate the ability of LLMs on code, both academic and industry practitioners rely on popular handcrafted benchmarks. However, prior benchmarks contain only a very limited set of problems, both in quantity and variety. Further, due to popularity and age, many benchmarks are prone to data leakage where example solutions can be readily found on the web and thus potentially in training data. Such limitations inevitably lead us to inquire: Is the leaderboard performance on existing benchmarks reliable and comprehensive enough to measure the program synthesis ability of LLMs? To address this, we introduce EvoEval -- a program synthesis benchmark suite created by evolving existing benchmarks into different targeted domains for a comprehensive evaluation of LLM coding abilities. Our study on 51 LLMs shows that compared to the high performance obtained on standard benchmarks like HumanEval, there is a significant drop in performance (on average 39.4%) when using EvoEval. Additionally, the decrease in performance can range from 19.6% to 47.7%, leading to drastic ranking changes amongst LLMs and showing potential overfitting of existing benchmarks. Furthermore, we showcase various insights, including the brittleness of instruction-following models when encountering rewording or subtle changes as well as the importance of learning problem composition and decomposition. EvoEval not only provides comprehensive benchmarks, but can be used to further evolve arbitrary problems to keep up with advances and the ever-changing landscape of LLMs for code. We have open-sourced our benchmarks, tools, and complete LLM generations at https://github.com/evo-eval/evoeval

Chest X-ray imaging is commonly used to diagnose pneumonia, but accurately localizing the pneumonia-affected regions typically requires detailed pixel-level annotations, which are costly and time consuming to obtain. To address this limitation, this study proposes a weakly supervised deep learning framework for pneumonia classification and localization using Gradient-weighted Class Activation Mapping (Grad-CAM). Instead of relying on costly pixel-level annotations, the proposed method utilizes image-level labels to generate clinically meaningful heatmaps that highlight pneumonia-affected regions. Furthermore, we evaluate seven pre-trained deep learning models, including a Vision Transformer, under identical training conditions, using focal loss and patient-wise splits to prevent data leakage. Experimental results suggest that all models achieved high classification accuracy (96--98\%), with ResNet-18 and EfficientNet-B0 showing the best overall performance and MobileNet-V3 providing an efficient lightweight alternative. Grad-CAM heatmap visualizations confirm that the proposed methods focus on clinically relevant lung regions, supporting the use of explainable AI for radiological diagnostics. Overall, this work highlights the potential of weakly supervised, explainable models that enhance transparency and clinical trust in AI-assisted pneumonia screening.

Protein-protein interactions (PPIs) are fundamental to numerous cellular processes, and their characterization is vital for understanding disease mechanisms and guiding drug discovery. While protein language models (PLMs) have demonstrated remarkable success in predicting protein structure and function, their application to sequence-based PPI binding affinity prediction remains relatively underexplored. This gap is often attributed to the scarcity of high-quality, rigorously refined datasets and the reliance on simple strategies for concatenating protein representations. In this work, we address these limitations. First, we introduce a meticulously curated version of the PPB-Affinity dataset of a total of 8,207 unique protein-protein interaction entries, by resolving annotation inconsistencies and duplicate entries for multi-chain protein interactions. This dataset incorporates a stringent, less than or equal to 30%, sequence identity threshold to ensure robust splitting into training, validation, and test sets, minimizing data leakage. Second, we propose and systematically evaluate four architectures for adapting PLMs to PPI binding affinity prediction: embeddings concatenation (EC), sequences concatenation (SC), hierarchical pooling (HP), and pooled attention addition (PAD). These architectures were assessed using two training methods: full fine-tuning and a lightweight approach employing ConvBERT heads over frozen PLM features. Our comprehensive experiments across multiple leading PLMs (ProtT5, ESM2, Ankh, Ankh2, and ESM3) demonstrated that the HP and PAD architectures consistently outperform conventional concatenation methods, achieving up to 12% increase in terms of Spearman correlation. These results highlight the necessity of sophisticated architectural designs to fully exploit the capabilities of PLMs for nuanced PPI binding affinity prediction.

Language Models (LMs) often cannot be deployed because of their potential to harm users in hard-to-predict ways. Prior work identifies harmful behaviors before deployment by using human annotators to hand-write test cases. However, human annotation is expensive, limiting the number and diversity of test cases. In this work, we automatically find cases where a target LM behaves in a harmful way, by generating test cases ("red teaming") using another LM. We evaluate the target LM's replies to generated test questions using a classifier trained to detect offensive content, uncovering tens of thousands of offensive replies in a 280B parameter LM chatbot. We explore several methods, from zero-shot generation to reinforcement learning, for generating test cases with varying levels of diversity and difficulty. Furthermore, we use prompt engineering to control LM-generated test cases to uncover a variety of other harms, automatically finding groups of people that the chatbot discusses in offensive ways, personal and hospital phone numbers generated as the chatbot's own contact info, leakage of private training data in generated text, and harms that occur over the course of a conversation. Overall, LM-based red teaming is one promising tool (among many needed) for finding and fixing diverse, undesirable LM behaviors before impacting users.

LLM-powered AI agents are an emerging frontier with tremendous potential to increase human productivity. However, empowering AI agents to take action on their user's behalf in day-to-day tasks involves giving them access to potentially sensitive and private information, which leads to a possible risk of inadvertent privacy leakage when the agent malfunctions. In this work, we propose one way to address that potential risk, by training AI agents to better satisfy the privacy principle of data minimization. For the purposes of this benchmark, by "data minimization" we mean instances where private information is shared only when it is necessary to fulfill a specific task-relevant purpose. We develop a benchmark called AgentDAM to evaluate how well existing and future AI agents can limit processing of potentially private information that we designate "necessary" to fulfill the task. Our benchmark simulates realistic web interaction scenarios and is adaptable to all existing web navigation agents. We use AgentDAM to evaluate how well AI agents built on top of GPT-4, Llama-3 and Claude can limit processing of potentially private information when unnecessary, and show that these agents are often prone to inadvertent use of unnecessary sensitive information. We finally propose a prompting-based approach that reduces this.

Video head swapping aims to replace the entire head of a video subject, including facial identity, head shape, and hairstyle, with that of a reference image, while preserving the target body, background, and motion dynamics. Due to the lack of ground-truth paired swapping data, prior methods typically train on cross-frame pairs of the same person within a video and rely on mask-based inpainting to mitigate identity leakage. Beyond potential boundary artifacts, this paradigm struggles to recover essential cues occluded by the mask, such as facial pose, expressions, and motion dynamics. To address these issues, we prompt a video editing model to synthesize new heads for existing videos as fake swapping inputs, while maintaining frame-synchronized facial poses and expressions. This yields HeadSwapBench, the first cross-identity paired dataset for video head swapping, which supports both training ( videos) and benchmarking ( videos) with genuine outputs. Leveraging this paired supervision, we propose DirectSwap, a mask-free, direct video head-swapping framework that extends an image U-Net into a video diffusion model with a motion module and conditioning inputs. Furthermore, we introduce the Motion- and Expression-Aware Reconstruction (MEAR) loss, which reweights the diffusion loss per pixel using frame-difference magnitudes and facial-landmark proximity, thereby enhancing cross-frame coherence in motion and expressions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DirectSwap achieves state-of-the-art visual quality, identity fidelity, and motion and expression consistency across diverse in-the-wild video scenes. We will release the source code and the HeadSwapBench dataset to facilitate future research.

The rapid advancements in generative AI and large language models (LLMs) have opened up new avenues for producing synthetic data, particularly in the realm of structured tabular formats, such as product reviews. Despite the potential benefits, concerns regarding privacy leakage have surfaced, especially when personal information is utilized in the training datasets. In addition, there is an absence of a comprehensive evaluation framework capable of quantitatively measuring the quality of the generated synthetic data and their utility for downstream tasks. In response to this gap, we introduce SynEval, an open-source evaluation framework designed to assess the fidelity, utility, and privacy preservation of synthetically generated tabular data via a suite of diverse evaluation metrics. We validate the efficacy of our proposed framework - SynEval - by applying it to synthetic product review data generated by three state-of-the-art LLMs: ChatGPT, Claude, and Llama. Our experimental findings illuminate the trade-offs between various evaluation metrics in the context of synthetic data generation. Furthermore, SynEval stands as a critical instrument for researchers and practitioners engaged with synthetic tabular data,, empowering them to judiciously determine the suitability of the generated data for their specific applications, with an emphasis on upholding user privacy.

The integration of machine learning (ML) in numerous critical applications introduces a range of privacy concerns for individuals who provide their datasets for model training. One such privacy risk is Membership Inference (MI), in which an attacker seeks to determine whether a particular data sample was included in the training dataset of a model. Current state-of-the-art MI attacks capitalize on access to the model's predicted confidence scores to successfully perform membership inference, and employ data poisoning to further enhance their effectiveness. In this work, we focus on the less explored and more realistic label-only setting, where the model provides only the predicted label on a queried sample. We show that existing label-only MI attacks are ineffective at inferring membership in the low False Positive Rate (FPR) regime. To address this challenge, we propose a new attack Chameleon that leverages a novel adaptive data poisoning strategy and an efficient query selection method to achieve significantly more accurate membership inference than existing label-only attacks, especially at low FPRs.

The rapid progression of multimodal large language models (MLLMs) has demonstrated superior performance on various multimodal benchmarks. However, the issue of data contamination during training creates challenges in performance evaluation and comparison. While numerous methods exist for detecting dataset contamination in large language models (LLMs), they are less effective for MLLMs due to their various modalities and multiple training phases. In this study, we introduce a multimodal data contamination detection framework, MM-Detect, designed for MLLMs. Our experimental results indicate that MM-Detect is sensitive to varying degrees of contamination and can highlight significant performance improvements due to leakage of the training set of multimodal benchmarks. Furthermore, We also explore the possibility of contamination originating from the pre-training phase of LLMs used by MLLMs and the fine-tuning phase of MLLMs, offering new insights into the stages at which contamination may be introduced.

High-stakes decision making involves reasoning under uncertainty about the future. In this work, we train language models to make predictions on open-ended forecasting questions. To scale up training data, we synthesize novel forecasting questions from global events reported in daily news, using a fully automated, careful curation recipe. We train the Qwen3 thinking models on our dataset, OpenForesight. To prevent leakage of future information during training and evaluation, we use an offline news corpus, both for data generation and retrieval in our forecasting system. Guided by a small validation set, we show the benefits of retrieval, and an improved reward function for reinforcement learning (RL). Once we obtain our final forecasting system, we perform held-out testing between May to August 2025. Our specialized model, OpenForecaster 8B, matches much larger proprietary models, with our training improving the accuracy, calibration, and consistency of predictions. We find calibration improvements from forecasting training generalize across popular benchmarks. We open-source all our models, code, and data to make research on language model forecasting broadly accessible.

In a vertical federated learning (VFL) system consisting of a central server and many distributed clients, the training data are vertically partitioned such that different features are privately stored on different clients. The problem of split VFL is to train a model split between the server and the clients. This paper aims to address two major challenges in split VFL: 1) performance degradation due to straggling clients during training; and 2) data and model privacy leakage from clients' uploaded data embeddings. We propose FedVS to simultaneously address these two challenges. The key idea of FedVS is to design secret sharing schemes for the local data and models, such that information-theoretical privacy against colluding clients and curious server is guaranteed, and the aggregation of all clients' embeddings is reconstructed losslessly, via decrypting computation shares from the non-straggling clients. Extensive experiments on various types of VFL datasets (including tabular, CV, and multi-view) demonstrate the universal advantages of FedVS in straggler mitigation and privacy protection over baseline protocols.

Through using only a well-trained classifier, model-inversion (MI) attacks can recover the data used for training the classifier, leading to the privacy leakage of the training data. To defend against MI attacks, previous work utilizes a unilateral dependency optimization strategy, i.e., minimizing the dependency between inputs (i.e., features) and outputs (i.e., labels) during training the classifier. However, such a minimization process conflicts with minimizing the supervised loss that aims to maximize the dependency between inputs and outputs, causing an explicit trade-off between model robustness against MI attacks and model utility on classification tasks. In this paper, we aim to minimize the dependency between the latent representations and the inputs while maximizing the dependency between latent representations and the outputs, named a bilateral dependency optimization (BiDO) strategy. In particular, we use the dependency constraints as a universally applicable regularizer in addition to commonly used losses for deep neural networks (e.g., cross-entropy), which can be instantiated with appropriate dependency criteria according to different tasks. To verify the efficacy of our strategy, we propose two implementations of BiDO, by using two different dependency measures: BiDO with constrained covariance (BiDO-COCO) and BiDO with Hilbert-Schmidt Independence Criterion (BiDO-HSIC). Experiments show that BiDO achieves the state-of-the-art defense performance for a variety of datasets, classifiers, and MI attacks while suffering a minor classification-accuracy drop compared to the well-trained classifier with no defense, which lights up a novel road to defend against MI attacks.

Deep learning has transformed AI applications but faces critical security challenges, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, model theft, and privacy leakage. This survey examines these vulnerabilities, detailing their mechanisms and impact on model integrity and confidentiality. Practical implementations, including adversarial examples, label flipping, and backdoor attacks, are explored alongside defenses such as adversarial training, differential privacy, and federated learning, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Advanced methods like contrastive and self-supervised learning are presented for enhancing robustness. The survey concludes with future directions, emphasizing automated defenses, zero-trust architectures, and the security challenges of large AI models. A balanced approach to performance and security is essential for developing reliable deep learning systems.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) have recently achieved rapid progress, sparking numerous studies to evaluate their multi-modal capabilities. However, we dig into current evaluation works and identify two primary issues: 1) Visual content is unnecessary for many samples. The answers can be directly inferred from the questions and options, or the world knowledge embedded in LLMs. This phenomenon is prevalent across current benchmarks. For instance, GeminiPro achieves 42.9% on the MMMU benchmark without any visual input, and outperforms the random choice baseline across six benchmarks over 20% on average. 2) Unintentional data leakage exists in LLM and LVLM training. LLM and LVLM could still answer some visual-necessary questions without visual content, indicating the memorizing of these samples within large-scale training data. For example, Sphinx-X-MoE gets 43.6% on MMMU without accessing images, surpassing its LLM backbone with 17.9%. Both problems lead to misjudgments of actual multi-modal gains and potentially misguide the study of LVLM. To this end, we present MMStar, an elite vision-indispensable multi-modal benchmark comprising 1,500 samples meticulously selected by humans. MMStar benchmarks 6 core capabilities and 18 detailed axes, aiming to evaluate LVLMs' multi-modal capacities with carefully balanced and purified samples. These samples are first roughly selected from current benchmarks with an automated pipeline, human review is then involved to ensure each curated sample exhibits visual dependency, minimal data leakage, and requires advanced multi-modal capabilities. Moreover, two metrics are developed to measure data leakage and actual performance gain in multi-modal training. We evaluate 16 leading LVLMs on MMStar to assess their multi-modal capabilities, and on 7 benchmarks with the proposed metrics to investigate their data leakage and actual multi-modal gain.

Recent advances in vision-language models have significantly propelled video understanding. Existing datasets and tasks, however, have notable limitations. Most datasets are confined to short videos with limited events and narrow narratives. For example, datasets with instructional and egocentric videos often document the activities of one person in a single scene. Although some movie datasets offer richer content, they are often limited to short-term tasks, lack publicly available videos and frequently encounter data leakage given the use of movie forums and other resources in LLM training. To address the above limitations, we propose the Short Film Dataset (SFD) with 1,078 publicly available amateur movies, a wide variety of genres and minimal data leakage issues. SFD offers long-term story-oriented video tasks in the form of multiple-choice and open-ended question answering. Our extensive experiments emphasize the need for long-term reasoning to solve SFD tasks. Notably, we find strong signals in movie transcripts leading to the on-par performance of people and LLMs. We also show significantly lower performance of current models compared to people when using vision data alone.

Machine Learning models increasingly face data integrity challenges due to the use of large-scale training datasets drawn from the Internet. We study what model developers can do if they detect that some data was manipulated or incorrect. Such manipulated data can cause adverse effects including vulnerability to backdoored samples, systemic biases, and reduced accuracy on certain input domains. Realistically, all manipulated training samples cannot be identified, and only a small, representative subset of the affected data can be flagged. We formalize Corrective Machine Unlearning as the problem of mitigating the impact of data affected by unknown manipulations on a trained model, only having identified a subset of the corrupted data. We demonstrate that the problem of corrective unlearning has significantly different requirements from traditional privacy-oriented unlearning. We find most existing unlearning methods, including retraining-from-scratch without the deletion set, require most of the manipulated data to be identified for effective corrective unlearning. However, one approach, Selective Synaptic Dampening, achieves limited success, unlearning adverse effects with just a small portion of the manipulated samples in our setting, which shows encouraging signs for future progress. We hope our work spurs research towards developing better methods for corrective unlearning and offers practitioners a new strategy to handle data integrity challenges arising from web-scale training. Code is available at https://github.com/drimpossible/corrective-unlearning-bench.

Machine learning models that are overfitted/overtrained are more vulnerable to knowledge leakage, which poses a risk to privacy. Suppose we download or receive a model from a third-party collaborator without knowing its training accuracy. How can we determine if it has been overfitted or overtrained on its training data? It's possible that the model was intentionally over-trained to make it vulnerable during testing. While an overfitted or overtrained model may perform well on testing data and even some generalization tests, we can't be sure it's not over-fitted. Conducting a comprehensive generalization test is also expensive. The goal of this paper is to address these issues and ensure the privacy and generalization of our method using only testing data. To achieve this, we analyze the null space in the last layer of neural networks, which enables us to quantify overfitting without access to training data or knowledge of the accuracy of those data. We evaluated our approach on various architectures and datasets and observed a distinct pattern in the angle of null space when models are overfitted. Furthermore, we show that models with poor generalization exhibit specific characteristics in this space. Our work represents the first attempt to quantify overfitting without access to training data or knowing any knowledge about the training samples.

We quantitatively investigate how machine learning models leak information about the individual data records on which they were trained. We focus on the basic membership inference attack: given a data record and black-box access to a model, determine if the record was in the model's training dataset. To perform membership inference against a target model, we make adversarial use of machine learning and train our own inference model to recognize differences in the target model's predictions on the inputs that it trained on versus the inputs that it did not train on. We empirically evaluate our inference techniques on classification models trained by commercial "machine learning as a service" providers such as Google and Amazon. Using realistic datasets and classification tasks, including a hospital discharge dataset whose membership is sensitive from the privacy perspective, we show that these models can be vulnerable to membership inference attacks. We then investigate the factors that influence this leakage and evaluate mitigation strategies.

It is important that consumers and regulators can verify the provenance of large neural models to evaluate their capabilities and risks. We introduce the concept of a "Proof-of-Training-Data": any protocol that allows a model trainer to convince a Verifier of the training data that produced a set of model weights. Such protocols could verify the amount and kind of data and compute used to train the model, including whether it was trained on specific harmful or beneficial data sources. We explore efficient verification strategies for Proof-of-Training-Data that are compatible with most current large-model training procedures. These include a method for the model-trainer to verifiably pre-commit to a random seed used in training, and a method that exploits models' tendency to temporarily overfit to training data in order to detect whether a given data-point was included in training. We show experimentally that our verification procedures can catch a wide variety of attacks, including all known attacks from the Proof-of-Learning literature.

Unlearning algorithms aim to remove deleted data's influence from trained models at a cost lower than full retraining. However, prior guarantees of unlearning in literature are flawed and don't protect the privacy of deleted records. We show that when users delete their data as a function of published models, records in a database become interdependent. So, even retraining a fresh model after deletion of a record doesn't ensure its privacy. Secondly, unlearning algorithms that cache partial computations to speed up the processing can leak deleted information over a series of releases, violating the privacy of deleted records in the long run. To address these, we propose a sound deletion guarantee and show that the privacy of existing records is necessary for the privacy of deleted records. Under this notion, we propose an accurate, computationally efficient, and secure machine unlearning algorithm based on noisy gradient descent.

The volume of "free" data on the internet has been key to the current success of deep learning. However, it also raises privacy concerns about the unauthorized exploitation of personal data for training commercial models. It is thus crucial to develop methods to prevent unauthorized data exploitation. This paper raises the question: can data be made unlearnable for deep learning models? We present a type of error-minimizing noise that can indeed make training examples unlearnable. Error-minimizing noise is intentionally generated to reduce the error of one or more of the training example(s) close to zero, which can trick the model into believing there is "nothing" to learn from these example(s). The noise is restricted to be imperceptible to human eyes, and thus does not affect normal data utility. We empirically verify the effectiveness of error-minimizing noise in both sample-wise and class-wise forms. We also demonstrate its flexibility under extensive experimental settings and practicability in a case study of face recognition. Our work establishes an important first step towards making personal data unexploitable to deep learning models.

While state-of-the-art diffusion models (DMs) excel in image generation, concerns regarding their security persist. Earlier research highlighted DMs' vulnerability to data poisoning attacks, but these studies placed stricter requirements than conventional methods like `BadNets' in image classification. This is because the art necessitates modifications to the diffusion training and sampling procedures. Unlike the prior work, we investigate whether BadNets-like data poisoning methods can directly degrade the generation by DMs. In other words, if only the training dataset is contaminated (without manipulating the diffusion process), how will this affect the performance of learned DMs? In this setting, we uncover bilateral data poisoning effects that not only serve an adversarial purpose (compromising the functionality of DMs) but also offer a defensive advantage (which can be leveraged for defense in classification tasks against poisoning attacks). We show that a BadNets-like data poisoning attack remains effective in DMs for producing incorrect images (misaligned with the intended text conditions). Meanwhile, poisoned DMs exhibit an increased ratio of triggers, a phenomenon we refer to as `trigger amplification', among the generated images. This insight can be then used to enhance the detection of poisoned training data. In addition, even under a low poisoning ratio, studying the poisoning effects of DMs is also valuable for designing robust image classifiers against such attacks. Last but not least, we establish a meaningful linkage between data poisoning and the phenomenon of data replications by exploring DMs' inherent data memorization tendencies.

Modern deep learning requires large volumes of data, which could contain sensitive or private information that cannot be leaked. Recent work has shown for homogeneous neural networks a large portion of this training data could be reconstructed with only access to the trained network parameters. While the attack was shown to work empirically, there exists little formal understanding of its effective regime which datapoints are susceptible to reconstruction. In this work, we first build a stronger version of the dataset reconstruction attack and show how it can provably recover the entire training set in the infinite width regime. We then empirically study the characteristics of this attack on two-layer networks and reveal that its success heavily depends on deviations from the frozen infinite-width Neural Tangent Kernel limit. Next, we study the nature of easily-reconstructed images. We show that both theoretically and empirically, reconstructed images tend to "outliers" in the dataset, and that these reconstruction attacks can be used for dataset distillation, that is, we can retrain on reconstructed images and obtain high predictive accuracy.

To continuously improve quality and reflect changes in data, machine learning applications have to regularly retrain and update their core models. We show that a differential analysis of language model snapshots before and after an update can reveal a surprising amount of detailed information about changes in the training data. We propose two new metrics---differential score and differential rank---for analyzing the leakage due to updates of natural language models. We perform leakage analysis using these metrics across models trained on several different datasets using different methods and configurations. We discuss the privacy implications of our findings, propose mitigation strategies and evaluate their effect.

Studying data memorization in neural language models helps us understand the risks (e.g., to privacy or copyright) associated with models regurgitating training data and aids in the development of countermeasures. Many prior works -- and some recently deployed defenses -- focus on "verbatim memorization", defined as a model generation that exactly matches a substring from the training set. We argue that verbatim memorization definitions are too restrictive and fail to capture more subtle forms of memorization. Specifically, we design and implement an efficient defense that perfectly prevents all verbatim memorization. And yet, we demonstrate that this "perfect" filter does not prevent the leakage of training data. Indeed, it is easily circumvented by plausible and minimally modified "style-transfer" prompts -- and in some cases even the non-modified original prompts -- to extract memorized information. We conclude by discussing potential alternative definitions and why defining memorization is a difficult yet crucial open question for neural language models.

This paper investigates the radioactivity of LLM-generated texts, i.e. whether it is possible to detect that such input was used as training data. Conventional methods like membership inference can carry out this detection with some level of accuracy. We show that watermarked training data leaves traces easier to detect and much more reliable than membership inference. We link the contamination level to the watermark robustness, its proportion in the training set, and the fine-tuning process. We notably demonstrate that training on watermarked synthetic instructions can be detected with high confidence (p-value < 1e-5) even when as little as 5% of training text is watermarked. Thus, LLM watermarking, originally designed for detecting machine-generated text, gives the ability to easily identify if the outputs of a watermarked LLM were used to fine-tune another LLM.

Large language models have gained significant popularity because of their ability to generate human-like text and potential applications in various fields, such as Software Engineering. Large language models for code are commonly trained on large unsanitised corpora of source code scraped from the internet. The content of these datasets is memorised and can be extracted by attackers with data extraction attacks. In this work, we explore memorisation in large language models for code and compare the rate of memorisation with large language models trained on natural language. We adopt an existing benchmark for natural language and construct a benchmark for code by identifying samples that are vulnerable to attack. We run both benchmarks against a variety of models, and perform a data extraction attack. We find that large language models for code are vulnerable to data extraction attacks, like their natural language counterparts. From the training data that was identified to be potentially extractable we were able to extract 47% from a CodeGen-Mono-16B code completion model. We also observe that models memorise more, as their parameter count grows, and that their pre-training data are also vulnerable to attack. We also find that data carriers are memorised at a higher rate than regular code or documentation and that different model architectures memorise different samples. Data leakage has severe outcomes, so we urge the research community to further investigate the extent of this phenomenon using a wider range of models and extraction techniques in order to build safeguards to mitigate this issue.

This paper studies extractable memorization: training data that an adversary can efficiently extract by querying a machine learning model without prior knowledge of the training dataset. We show an adversary can extract gigabytes of training data from open-source language models like Pythia or GPT-Neo, semi-open models like LLaMA or Falcon, and closed models like ChatGPT. Existing techniques from the literature suffice to attack unaligned models; in order to attack the aligned ChatGPT, we develop a new divergence attack that causes the model to diverge from its chatbot-style generations and emit training data at a rate 150x higher than when behaving properly. Our methods show practical attacks can recover far more data than previously thought, and reveal that current alignment techniques do not eliminate memorization.

Recent claims about the impressive abilities of large language models (LLMs) are often supported by evaluating publicly available benchmarks. Since LLMs train on wide swaths of the internet, this practice raises concerns of data contamination, i.e., evaluating on examples that are explicitly or implicitly included in the training data. Data contamination remains notoriously challenging to measure and mitigate, even with partial attempts like controlled experimentation of training data, canary strings, or embedding similarities. In this work, we conduct the first thorough longitudinal analysis of data contamination in LLMs by using the natural experiment of training cutoffs in GPT models to look at benchmarks released over time. Specifically, we consider two code/mathematical problem-solving datasets, Codeforces and Project Euler, and find statistically significant trends among LLM pass rate vs. GitHub popularity and release date that provide strong evidence of contamination. By open-sourcing our dataset, raw results, and evaluation framework, our work paves the way for rigorous analyses of data contamination in modern models. We conclude with a discussion of best practices and future steps for publicly releasing benchmarks in the age of LLMs that train on webscale data.

Unlearning in large language models (LLMs) is critical for regulatory compliance and for building ethical generative AI systems that avoid producing private, toxic, illegal, or copyrighted content. Despite rapid progress, in this work we show that almost all existing unlearning methods fail to achieve true forgetting in practice. Specifically, while evaluations of these `unlearned' models under deterministic (greedy) decoding often suggest successful knowledge removal using standard benchmarks (as has been done in the literature), we show that sensitive information reliably resurfaces when models are sampled with standard probabilistic decoding. To rigorously capture this vulnerability, we introduce leak@k, a new meta-evaluation metric that quantifies the likelihood of forgotten knowledge reappearing when generating k samples from the model under realistic decoding strategies. Using three widely adopted benchmarks, TOFU, MUSE, and WMDP, we conduct the first large-scale, systematic study of unlearning reliability using our newly defined leak@k metric. Our findings demonstrate that knowledge leakage persists across methods and tasks, underscoring that current state-of-the-art unlearning techniques provide only limited forgetting and highlighting the urgent need for more robust approaches to LLM unlearning.

Data contamination hinders fair LLM evaluation by introducing test data into newer models' training sets. Existing studies solve this challenge by updating benchmarks with newly collected data. However, they fail to guarantee contamination-free evaluation as the newly collected data may contain pre-existing knowledge, and their benchmark updates rely on intensive human labor. To address these issues, we in this paper propose AntiLeak-Bench, an automated anti-leakage benchmarking framework. Instead of simply using newly collected data, we construct samples with explicitly new knowledge absent from LLMs' training sets, which thus ensures strictly contamination-free evaluation. We further design a fully automated workflow to build and update our benchmark without human labor. This significantly reduces the cost of benchmark maintenance to accommodate emerging LLMs. Through extensive experiments, we highlight that data contamination likely exists before LLMs' cutoff time and demonstrate AntiLeak-Bench effectively overcomes this challenge.

The rise of the phenomenon of the "right to be forgotten" has prompted research on machine unlearning, which grants data owners the right to actively withdraw data that has been used for model training, and requires the elimination of the contribution of that data to the model. A simple method to achieve this is to use the remaining data to retrain the model, but this is not acceptable for other data owners who continue to participate in training. Existing machine unlearning methods have been found to be ineffective in quickly removing knowledge from deep learning models. This paper proposes using a stochastic network as a teacher to expedite the mitigation of the influence caused by forgotten data on the model. We performed experiments on three datasets, and the findings demonstrate that our approach can efficiently mitigate the influence of target data on the model within a single epoch. This allows for one-time erasure and reconstruction of the model, and the reconstruction model achieves the same performance as the retrained model.

It is commonly believed that in transfer learning including more pre-training data translates into better performance. However, recent evidence suggests that removing data from the source dataset can actually help too. In this work, we take a closer look at the role of the source dataset's composition in transfer learning and present a framework for probing its impact on downstream performance. Our framework gives rise to new capabilities such as pinpointing transfer learning brittleness as well as detecting pathologies such as data-leakage and the presence of misleading examples in the source dataset. In particular, we demonstrate that removing detrimental datapoints identified by our framework improves transfer learning performance from ImageNet on a variety of target tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/MadryLab/data-transfer

In this paper we consider contamination by code generation test sets, in particular in their use in modern large language models. We discuss three possible sources of such contamination and show findings supporting each of them: (i) direct data leakage, (ii) indirect data leakage through the use of synthetic data and (iii) overfitting to evaluation sets during model selection. Key to our findings is a new dataset of 161 prompts with their associated python solutions, dataset which is released at https://huggingface.co/datasets/CohereForAI/lbpp .

Large-scale training of modern deep learning models heavily relies on publicly available data on the web. This potentially unauthorized usage of online data leads to concerns regarding data privacy. Recent works aim to make unlearnable data for deep learning models by adding small, specially designed noises to tackle this issue. However, these methods are vulnerable to adversarial training (AT) and/or are computationally heavy. In this work, we propose a novel, model-free, Convolution-based Unlearnable DAtaset (CUDA) generation technique. CUDA is generated using controlled class-wise convolutions with filters that are randomly generated via a private key. CUDA encourages the network to learn the relation between filters and labels rather than informative features for classifying the clean data. We develop some theoretical analysis demonstrating that CUDA can successfully poison Gaussian mixture data by reducing the clean data performance of the optimal Bayes classifier. We also empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of CUDA with various datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet-100, and Tiny-ImageNet), and architectures (ResNet-18, VGG-16, Wide ResNet-34-10, DenseNet-121, DeIT, EfficientNetV2-S, and MobileNetV2). Our experiments show that CUDA is robust to various data augmentations and training approaches such as smoothing, AT with different budgets, transfer learning, and fine-tuning. For instance, training a ResNet-18 on ImageNet-100 CUDA achieves only 8.96%, 40.08%, and 20.58% clean test accuracies with empirical risk minimization (ERM), L_{infty} AT, and L_{2} AT, respectively. Here, ERM on the clean training data achieves a clean test accuracy of 80.66%. CUDA exhibits unlearnability effect with ERM even when only a fraction of the training dataset is perturbed. Furthermore, we also show that CUDA is robust to adaptive defenses designed specifically to break it.

Recent work have demonstrated that robustness (to "corruption") can be at odds with generalization. Adversarial training, for instance, aims to reduce the problematic susceptibility of modern neural networks to small data perturbations. Surprisingly, overfitting is a major concern in adversarial training despite being mostly absent in standard training. We provide here theoretical evidence for this peculiar "robust overfitting" phenomenon. Subsequently, we advance a novel distributionally robust loss function bridging robustness and generalization. We demonstrate both theoretically as well as empirically the loss to enjoy a certified level of robustness against two common types of corruption--data evasion and poisoning attacks--while ensuring guaranteed generalization. We show through careful numerical experiments that our resulting holistic robust (HR) training procedure yields SOTA performance. Finally, we indicate that HR training can be interpreted as a direct extension of adversarial training and comes with a negligible additional computational burden. A ready-to-use python library implementing our algorithm is available at https://github.com/RyanLucas3/HR_Neural_Networks.

Multimodal contrastive learning methods like CLIP train on noisy and uncurated training datasets. This is cheaper than labeling datasets manually, and even improves out-of-distribution robustness. We show that this practice makes backdoor and poisoning attacks a significant threat. By poisoning just 0.01% of a dataset (e.g., just 300 images of the 3 million-example Conceptual Captions dataset), we can cause the model to misclassify test images by overlaying a small patch. Targeted poisoning attacks, whereby the model misclassifies a particular test input with an adversarially-desired label, are even easier requiring control of 0.0001% of the dataset (e.g., just three out of the 3 million images). Our attacks call into question whether training on noisy and uncurated Internet scrapes is desirable.

Data contamination, i.e., the presence of test data from downstream tasks in the training data of large language models (LLMs), is a potential major issue in measuring LLMs' real effectiveness on other tasks. We propose a straightforward yet effective method for identifying data contamination within LLMs. At its core, our approach starts by identifying potential contamination at the instance level; using this information, our approach then assesses wider contamination at the partition level. To estimate contamination of individual instances, we employ "guided instruction:" a prompt consisting of the dataset name, partition type, and the random-length initial segment of a reference instance, asking the LLM to complete it. An instance is flagged as contaminated if the LLM's output either exactly or nearly matches the latter segment of the reference. To understand if an entire partition is contaminated, we propose two ideas. The first idea marks a dataset partition as contaminated if the average overlap score with the reference instances (as measured by ROUGE-L or BLEURT) is statistically significantly better with the completions from guided instruction compared to a "general instruction" that does not include the dataset and partition name. The second idea marks a dataset partition as contaminated if a classifier based on GPT-4 with few-shot in-context learning prompt marks multiple generated completions as exact/near-exact matches of the corresponding reference instances. Our best method achieves an accuracy between 92% and 100% in detecting if an LLM is contaminated with seven datasets, containing train and test/validation partitions, when contrasted with manual evaluation by human experts. Further, our findings indicate that GPT-4 is contaminated with AG News, WNLI, and XSum datasets.

We release Gaperon, a fully open suite of French-English-coding language models designed to advance transparency and reproducibility in large-scale model training. The Gaperon family includes 1.5B, 8B, and 24B parameter models trained on 2-4 trillion tokens, released with all elements of the training pipeline: French and English datasets filtered with a neural quality classifier, an efficient data curation and training framework, and hundreds of intermediate checkpoints. Through this work, we study how data filtering and contamination interact to shape both benchmark and generative performance. We find that filtering for linguistic quality enhances text fluency and coherence but yields subpar benchmark results, and that late deliberate contamination -- continuing training on data mixes that include test sets -- recovers competitive scores while only reasonably harming generation quality. We discuss how usual neural filtering can unintentionally amplify benchmark leakage. To support further research, we also introduce harmless data poisoning during pretraining, providing a realistic testbed for safety studies. By openly releasing all models, datasets, code, and checkpoints, Gaperon establishes a reproducible foundation for exploring the trade-offs between data curation, evaluation, safety, and openness in multilingual language model development.

With the explosive growth of deep learning applications and increasing privacy concerns, the right to be forgotten has become a critical requirement in various AI industries. For example, given a facial recognition system, some individuals may wish to remove their personal data that might have been used in the training phase. Unfortunately, deep neural networks sometimes unexpectedly leak personal identities, making this removal challenging. While recent machine unlearning algorithms aim to enable models to forget specific data, we identify an unintended utility drop-correlation collapse-in which the essential correlations between image features and true labels weaken during the forgetting process. To address this challenge, we propose Distribution-Level Feature Distancing (DLFD), a novel method that efficiently forgets instances while preserving task-relevant feature correlations. Our method synthesizes data samples by optimizing the feature distribution to be distinctly different from that of forget samples, achieving effective results within a single training epoch. Through extensive experiments on facial recognition datasets, we demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms state-of-the-art machine unlearning methods in both forgetting performance and model utility preservation.

The problem of data contamination is now almost inevitable during the development of large language models (LLMs), with the training data commonly integrating those evaluation benchmarks even unintentionally. This problem subsequently makes it hard to benchmark LLMs fairly. Instead of constructing contamination-free datasets (quite hard), we propose a novel framework, LNE-Blocking, to restore model performance prior to contamination on potentially leaked datasets. Our framework consists of two components: contamination detection and disruption operation. For the prompt, the framework first uses the contamination detection method, LNE, to assess the extent of contamination in the model. Based on this, it adjusts the intensity of the disruption operation, Blocking, to elicit non-memorized responses from the model. Our framework is the first to efficiently restore the model's greedy decoding performance. This comes with a strong performance on multiple datasets with potential leakage risks, and it consistently achieves stable recovery results across different models and varying levels of data contamination. We release the code at https://github.com/RuijieH/LNE-Blocking to facilitate research.

Recently, self-supervised learning (SSL) was shown to be vulnerable to patch-based data poisoning backdoor attacks. It was shown that an adversary can poison a small part of the unlabeled data so that when a victim trains an SSL model on it, the final model will have a backdoor that the adversary can exploit. This work aims to defend self-supervised learning against such attacks. We use a three-step defense pipeline, where we first train a model on the poisoned data. In the second step, our proposed defense algorithm (PatchSearch) uses the trained model to search the training data for poisoned samples and removes them from the training set. In the third step, a final model is trained on the cleaned-up training set. Our results show that PatchSearch is an effective defense. As an example, it improves a model's accuracy on images containing the trigger from 38.2% to 63.7% which is very close to the clean model's accuracy, 64.6%. Moreover, we show that PatchSearch outperforms baselines and state-of-the-art defense approaches including those using additional clean, trusted data. Our code is available at https://github.com/UCDvision/PatchSearch

It has become common to publish large (billion parameter) language models that have been trained on private datasets. This paper demonstrates that in such settings, an adversary can perform a training data extraction attack to recover individual training examples by querying the language model. We demonstrate our attack on GPT-2, a language model trained on scrapes of the public Internet, and are able to extract hundreds of verbatim text sequences from the model's training data. These extracted examples include (public) personally identifiable information (names, phone numbers, and email addresses), IRC conversations, code, and 128-bit UUIDs. Our attack is possible even though each of the above sequences are included in just one document in the training data. We comprehensively evaluate our extraction attack to understand the factors that contribute to its success. Worryingly, we find that larger models are more vulnerable than smaller models. We conclude by drawing lessons and discussing possible safeguards for training large language models.

Web-scraped datasets are vulnerable to data poisoning, which can be used for backdooring deep image classifiers during training. Since training on large datasets is expensive, a model is trained once and re-used many times. Unlike adversarial examples, backdoor attacks often target specific classes rather than any class learned by the model. One might expect that targeting many classes through a naive composition of attacks vastly increases the number of poison samples. We show this is not necessarily true and more efficient, universal data poisoning attacks exist that allow controlling misclassifications from any source class into any target class with a small increase in poison samples. Our idea is to generate triggers with salient characteristics that the model can learn. The triggers we craft exploit a phenomenon we call inter-class poison transferability, where learning a trigger from one class makes the model more vulnerable to learning triggers for other classes. We demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of our universal backdoor attacks by controlling models with up to 6,000 classes while poisoning only 0.15% of the training dataset. Our source code is available at https://github.com/Ben-Schneider-code/Universal-Backdoor-Attacks.

Recent statements about the impressive capabilities of large language models (LLMs) are usually supported by evaluating on open-access benchmarks. Considering the vast size and wide-ranging sources of LLMs' training data, it could explicitly or implicitly include test data, leading to LLMs being more susceptible to data contamination. However, due to the opacity of training data, the black-box access of models, and the rapid growth of synthetic training data, detecting and mitigating data contamination for LLMs faces significant challenges. In this paper, we propose CDD, which stands for Contamination Detection via output Distribution for LLMs. CDD necessitates only the sampled texts to detect data contamination, by identifying the peakedness of LLM's output distribution. To mitigate the impact of data contamination in evaluation, we also present TED: Trustworthy Evaluation via output Distribution, based on the correction of LLM's output distribution. To facilitate this study, we introduce two benchmarks, i.e., DetCon and ComiEval, for data contamination detection and contamination mitigation evaluation tasks. Extensive experimental results show that CDD achieves the average relative improvements of 21.8\%-30.2\% over other contamination detection approaches in terms of Accuracy, F1 Score, and AUC metrics, and can effectively detect implicit contamination. TED substantially mitigates performance improvements up to 66.9\% attributed to data contamination across various contamination setups. In real-world applications, we reveal that ChatGPT exhibits a high potential to suffer from data contamination on HumanEval benchmark.

State-of-the-art results on image recognition tasks are achieved using over-parameterized learning algorithms that (nearly) perfectly fit the training set and are known to fit well even random labels. This tendency to memorize the labels of the training data is not explained by existing theoretical analyses. Memorization of the training data also presents significant privacy risks when the training data contains sensitive personal information and thus it is important to understand whether such memorization is necessary for accurate learning. We provide the first conceptual explanation and a theoretical model for this phenomenon. Specifically, we demonstrate that for natural data distributions memorization of labels is necessary for achieving close-to-optimal generalization error. Crucially, even labels of outliers and noisy labels need to be memorized. The model is motivated and supported by the results of several recent empirical works. In our model, data is sampled from a mixture of subpopulations and our results show that memorization is necessary whenever the distribution of subpopulation frequencies is long-tailed. Image and text data is known to be long-tailed and therefore our results establish a formal link between these empirical phenomena. Our results allow to quantify the cost of limiting memorization in learning and explain the disparate effects that privacy and model compression have on different subgroups.

Instruction-tuned models are trained on crowdsourcing datasets with task instructions to achieve superior performance. However, in this work we raise security concerns about this training paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions among thousands of gathered data and control model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need of modifying data instances or labels themselves. Through such instruction attacks, the attacker can achieve over 90% attack success rate across four commonly used NLP datasets, and cause persistent backdoors that are easily transferred to 15 diverse datasets zero-shot. In this way, the attacker can directly apply poisoned instructions designed for one dataset on many other datasets. Moreover, the poisoned model cannot be cured by continual learning. Lastly, instruction attacks show resistance to existing inference-time defense. These findings highlight the need for more robust defenses against data poisoning attacks in instructiontuning models and underscore the importance of ensuring data quality in instruction crowdsourcing.

Differentially private (DP) training methods like DP-SGD can protect sensitive training data by ensuring that ML models will not reveal private information. An alternative approach, which this paper studies, is to use a sensitive dataset to generate a new synthetic dataset which is differentially private with respect to the original data. Doing so has several advantages: synthetic data can be reused for other tasks (including for hyper parameter tuning), retained indefinitely, or shared with third parties without sacrificing privacy. However, obtaining DP data is much harder than introducing DP during training. To make it feasible for text, recent work has utilized public data by starting with a pre-trained generative language model and privately finetuning it on sensitive data. This model can be used to sample a DP synthetic dataset. While this strategy seems straightforward, executing it has proven problematic. Previous approaches either show significant performance loss, or have, as we show, critical design flaws. In this paper we demonstrate that a proper training objective along with tuning fewer parameters results in excellent DP synthetic data quality. Our approach is competitive with direct DP-training of downstream classifiers in terms of performance on downstream tasks. We also demonstrate that our DP synthetic data is not only useful for downstream classifier training, but also to tune those same models.

Training against white-box deception detectors has been proposed as a way to make AI systems honest. However, such training risks models learning to obfuscate their deception to evade the detector. Prior work has studied obfuscation only in artificial settings where models were directly rewarded for harmful output. We construct a realistic coding environment where reward hacking via hardcoding test cases naturally occurs, and show that obfuscation emerges in this setting. We introduce a taxonomy of possible outcomes when training against a deception detector. The model either remains honest, or becomes deceptive via two possible obfuscation strategies. (i) Obfuscated activations: the model outputs deceptive text while modifying its internal representations to no longer trigger the detector. (ii) Obfuscated policy: the model outputs deceptive text that evades the detector, typically by including a justification for the reward hack. Empirically, obfuscated activations arise from representation drift during RL, with or without a detector penalty. The probe penalty only incentivizes obfuscated policies; we theoretically show this is expected for policy gradient methods. Sufficiently high KL regularization and detector penalty can yield honest policies, establishing white-box deception detectors as viable training signals for tasks prone to reward hacking.

Recent research has highlighted the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) against data poisoning attacks. These attacks aim to inject poisoning samples into the models' training dataset such that the trained models have inference failures. While previous studies have executed different types of attacks, one major challenge that greatly limits their effectiveness is the uncertainty of the re-training process after the injection of poisoning samples, including the re-training initialization or algorithms. To address this challenge, we propose a novel attack method called ''Sharpness-Aware Data Poisoning Attack (SAPA)''. In particular, it leverages the concept of DNNs' loss landscape sharpness to optimize the poisoning effect on the worst re-trained model. It helps enhance the preservation of the poisoning effect, regardless of the specific retraining procedure employed. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SAPA offers a general and principled strategy that significantly enhances various types of poisoning attacks.

The recent success of machine learning models, especially large-scale classifiers and language models, relies heavily on training with massive data. These data are often collected from online sources. This raises serious concerns about the protection of user data, as individuals may not have given consent for their data to be used in training. To address this concern, recent studies introduce the concept of unlearnable examples, i.e., data instances that appear natural but are intentionally altered to prevent models from effectively learning from them. While existing methods demonstrate empirical effectiveness, they typically rely on heuristic trials and lack formal guarantees. Besides, when unlearnable examples are mixed with clean data, as is often the case in practice, their unlearnability disappears. In this work, we propose a novel approach to constructing unlearnable examples by systematically maximising the Bayes error, a measurement of irreducible classification error. We develop an optimisation-based approach and provide an efficient solution using projected gradient ascent. Our method provably increases the Bayes error and remains effective when the unlearning examples are mixed with clean samples. Experimental results across multiple datasets and model architectures are consistent with our theoretical analysis and show that our approach can restrict data learnability, effectively in practice.

Continual learning aims to equip models with the ability to retain previously learned knowledge like a human. Recent work incorporating Parameter-Efficient Fine-Tuning has revitalized the field by introducing lightweight extension modules. However, existing methods usually overlook the issue of information leakage caused by the fact that the experiment data have been used in pre-trained models. Once these duplicate data are removed in the pre-training phase, their performance can be severely affected. In this paper, we propose a new LoRA-based rehearsal-free method named DESIRE. Our method avoids imposing additional constraints during training to mitigate catastrophic forgetting, thereby maximizing the learning of new classes. To integrate knowledge from old and new tasks, we propose two efficient post-processing modules. On the one hand, we retain only two sets of LoRA parameters for merging and propose dynamic representation consolidation to calibrate the merged feature representation. On the other hand, we propose decision boundary refinement to address classifier bias when training solely on new class data. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance on multiple datasets and strikes an effective balance between stability and plasticity. Our code will be publicly available.

Language models (LMs) are trained on vast amounts of text data, which may include private and copyrighted content. Data owners may request the removal of their data from a trained model due to privacy or copyright concerns. However, exactly unlearning only these datapoints (i.e., retraining with the data removed) is intractable in modern-day models. This has led to the development of many approximate unlearning algorithms. The evaluation of the efficacy of these algorithms has traditionally been narrow in scope, failing to precisely quantify the success and practicality of the algorithm from the perspectives of both the model deployers and the data owners. We address this issue by proposing MUSE, a comprehensive machine unlearning evaluation benchmark that enumerates six diverse desirable properties for unlearned models: (1) no verbatim memorization, (2) no knowledge memorization, (3) no privacy leakage, (4) utility preservation on data not intended for removal, (5) scalability with respect to the size of removal requests, and (6) sustainability over sequential unlearning requests. Using these criteria, we benchmark how effectively eight popular unlearning algorithms on 7B-parameter LMs can unlearn Harry Potter books and news articles. Our results demonstrate that most algorithms can prevent verbatim memorization and knowledge memorization to varying degrees, but only one algorithm does not lead to severe privacy leakage. Furthermore, existing algorithms fail to meet deployer's expectations because they often degrade general model utility and also cannot sustainably accommodate successive unlearning requests or large-scale content removal. Our findings identify key issues with the practicality of existing unlearning algorithms on language models, and we release our benchmark to facilitate further evaluations: muse-bench.github.io

Outliers introduce significant training challenges in neural networks by propagating erroneous gradients, which can degrade model performance and generalization. We propose the Z-Error Loss, a statistically principled approach that minimizes outlier influence during training by masking the contribution of data points identified as out-of-distribution within each batch. This method leverages batch-level statistics to automatically detect and exclude anomalous samples, allowing the model to focus its learning on the true underlying data structure. Our approach is robust, adaptive to data quality, and provides valuable diagnostics for data curation and cleaning.

Recent text-to-image diffusion models have shown surprising performance in generating high-quality images. However, concerns have arisen regarding the unauthorized data usage during the training or fine-tuning process. One example is when a model trainer collects a set of images created by a particular artist and attempts to train a model capable of generating similar images without obtaining permission and giving credit to the artist. To address this issue, we propose a method for detecting such unauthorized data usage by planting the injected memorization into the text-to-image diffusion models trained on the protected dataset. Specifically, we modify the protected images by adding unique contents on these images using stealthy image warping functions that are nearly imperceptible to humans but can be captured and memorized by diffusion models. By analyzing whether the model has memorized the injected content (i.e., whether the generated images are processed by the injected post-processing function), we can detect models that had illegally utilized the unauthorized data. Experiments on Stable Diffusion and VQ Diffusion with different model training or fine-tuning methods (i.e, LoRA, DreamBooth, and standard training) demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in detecting unauthorized data usages. Code: https://github.com/ZhentingWang/DIAGNOSIS.

Automated detection of software vulnerabilities is a fundamental problem in software security. Existing program analysis techniques either suffer from high false positives or false negatives. Recent progress in Deep Learning (DL) has resulted in a surge of interest in applying DL for automated vulnerability detection. Several recent studies have demonstrated promising results achieving an accuracy of up to 95% at detecting vulnerabilities. In this paper, we ask, "how well do the state-of-the-art DL-based techniques perform in a real-world vulnerability prediction scenario?". To our surprise, we find that their performance drops by more than 50%. A systematic investigation of what causes such precipitous performance drop reveals that existing DL-based vulnerability prediction approaches suffer from challenges with the training data (e.g., data duplication, unrealistic distribution of vulnerable classes, etc.) and with the model choices (e.g., simple token-based models). As a result, these approaches often do not learn features related to the actual cause of the vulnerabilities. Instead, they learn unrelated artifacts from the dataset (e.g., specific variable/function names, etc.). Leveraging these empirical findings, we demonstrate how a more principled approach to data collection and model design, based on realistic settings of vulnerability prediction, can lead to better solutions. The resulting tools perform significantly better than the studied baseline: up to 33.57% boost in precision and 128.38% boost in recall compared to the best performing model in the literature. Overall, this paper elucidates existing DL-based vulnerability prediction systems' potential issues and draws a roadmap for future DL-based vulnerability prediction research. In that spirit, we make available all the artifacts supporting our results: https://git.io/Jf6IA.

Many deployed learned models are black boxes: given input, returns output. Internal information about the model, such as the architecture, optimisation procedure, or training data, is not disclosed explicitly as it might contain proprietary information or make the system more vulnerable. This work shows that such attributes of neural networks can be exposed from a sequence of queries. This has multiple implications. On the one hand, our work exposes the vulnerability of black-box neural networks to different types of attacks -- we show that the revealed internal information helps generate more effective adversarial examples against the black box model. On the other hand, this technique can be used for better protection of private content from automatic recognition models using adversarial examples. Our paper suggests that it is actually hard to draw a line between white box and black box models.

With increasingly more data and computation involved in their training, machine learning models constitute valuable intellectual property. This has spurred interest in model stealing, which is made more practical by advances in learning with partial, little, or no supervision. Existing defenses focus on inserting unique watermarks in a model's decision surface, but this is insufficient: the watermarks are not sampled from the training distribution and thus are not always preserved during model stealing. In this paper, we make the key observation that knowledge contained in the stolen model's training set is what is common to all stolen copies. The adversary's goal, irrespective of the attack employed, is always to extract this knowledge or its by-products. This gives the original model's owner a strong advantage over the adversary: model owners have access to the original training data. We thus introduce dataset inference, the process of identifying whether a suspected model copy has private knowledge from the original model's dataset, as a defense against model stealing. We develop an approach for dataset inference that combines statistical testing with the ability to estimate the distance of multiple data points to the decision boundary. Our experiments on CIFAR10, SVHN, CIFAR100 and ImageNet show that model owners can claim with confidence greater than 99% that their model (or dataset as a matter of fact) was stolen, despite only exposing 50 of the stolen model's training points. Dataset inference defends against state-of-the-art attacks even when the adversary is adaptive. Unlike prior work, it does not require retraining or overfitting the defended model.

Transfer learning is widely used for training deep neural networks (DNN) for building a powerful representation. Even after the pre-trained model is adapted for the target task, the representation performance of the feature extractor is retained to some extent. As the performance of the pre-trained model can be considered the private property of the owner, it is natural to seek the exclusive right of the generalized performance of the pre-trained weight. To address this issue, we suggest a new paradigm of transfer learning called disposable transfer learning (DTL), which disposes of only the source task without degrading the performance of the target task. To achieve knowledge disposal, we propose a novel loss named Gradient Collision loss (GC loss). GC loss selectively unlearns the source knowledge by leading the gradient vectors of mini-batches in different directions. Whether the model successfully unlearns the source task is measured by piggyback learning accuracy (PL accuracy). PL accuracy estimates the vulnerability of knowledge leakage by retraining the scrubbed model on a subset of source data or new downstream data. We demonstrate that GC loss is an effective approach to the DTL problem by showing that the model trained with GC loss retains the performance on the target task with a significantly reduced PL accuracy.

In this technical report, we present Skywork-13B, a family of large language models (LLMs) trained on a corpus of over 3.2 trillion tokens drawn from both English and Chinese texts. This bilingual foundation model is the most extensively trained and openly published LLMs of comparable size to date. We introduce a two-stage training methodology using a segmented corpus, targeting general purpose training and then domain-specific enhancement training, respectively. We show that our model not only excels on popular benchmarks, but also achieves state of the art performance in Chinese language modeling on diverse domains. Furthermore, we propose a novel leakage detection method, demonstrating that test data contamination is a pressing issue warranting further investigation by the LLM community. To spur future research, we release Skywork-13B along with checkpoints obtained during intermediate stages of the training process. We are also releasing part of our SkyPile corpus, a collection of over 150 billion tokens of web text, which is the largest high quality open Chinese pre-training corpus to date. We hope Skywork-13B and our open corpus will serve as a valuable open-source resource to democratize access to high-quality LLMs.

Due to the expanding capabilities and pre-training data, Large Language Models (LLMs) are facing increasingly serious evaluation challenges. On one hand, the data leakage issue cause over-estimation on existing benchmarks. On the other hand, periodically curating datasets manually is costly. In this paper, we propose to automate dataset updates for reliable and timely evaluation. The basic idea is to generate unseen and high-quality testing samples based on existing ones to mitigate leakage issues. In specific, we propose two strategies with systematically verification. First, the mimicking strategy employs LLMs to create new samples resembling existing ones, to the maximum extent preserving the stylistic of the original dataset. Our experiments demonstrate its evaluation stability across multiple instantiations and its effectiveness in dealing with data leakage issues in most cases. Second, for the cases that mimicking dataset works poorly, we design an extending strategy that adjusts the difficulty of the generated samples according to varying cognitive levels. This not only makes our evaluation more systematic, but also, with a balanced difficulty, even discern model capabilities better at fine-grained levels.

Large language models trained on massive corpora of data from the web can memorize and reproduce sensitive or private data raising both legal and ethical concerns. Unlearning, or tuning models to forget information present in their training data, provides us with a way to protect private data after training. Although several methods exist for such unlearning, it is unclear to what extent they result in models equivalent to those where the data to be forgotten was never learned in the first place. To address this challenge, we present TOFU, a Task of Fictitious Unlearning, as a benchmark aimed at helping deepen our understanding of unlearning. We offer a dataset of 200 diverse synthetic author profiles, each consisting of 20 question-answer pairs, and a subset of these profiles called the forget set that serves as the target for unlearning. We compile a suite of metrics that work together to provide a holistic picture of unlearning efficacy. Finally, we provide a set of baseline results from existing unlearning algorithms. Importantly, none of the baselines we consider show effective unlearning motivating continued efforts to develop approaches for unlearning that effectively tune models so that they truly behave as if they were never trained on the forget data at all.

When large language models are trained on private data, it can be a significant privacy risk for them to memorize and regurgitate sensitive information. In this work, we propose a new practical data extraction attack that we call "neural phishing". This attack enables an adversary to target and extract sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII), e.g., credit card numbers, from a model trained on user data with upwards of 10% attack success rates, at times, as high as 50%. Our attack assumes only that an adversary can insert as few as 10s of benign-appearing sentences into the training dataset using only vague priors on the structure of the user data.

Deep learning models are often trained on distributed, web-scale datasets crawled from the internet. In this paper, we introduce two new dataset poisoning attacks that intentionally introduce malicious examples to a model's performance. Our attacks are immediately practical and could, today, poison 10 popular datasets. Our first attack, split-view poisoning, exploits the mutable nature of internet content to ensure a dataset annotator's initial view of the dataset differs from the view downloaded by subsequent clients. By exploiting specific invalid trust assumptions, we show how we could have poisoned 0.01% of the LAION-400M or COYO-700M datasets for just $60 USD. Our second attack, frontrunning poisoning, targets web-scale datasets that periodically snapshot crowd-sourced content -- such as Wikipedia -- where an attacker only needs a time-limited window to inject malicious examples. In light of both attacks, we notify the maintainers of each affected dataset and recommended several low-overhead defenses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across a wide range of tasks, yet they also exhibit memorization of their training data. This phenomenon raises critical questions about model behavior, privacy risks, and the boundary between learning and memorization. Addressing these concerns, this paper synthesizes recent studies and investigates the landscape of memorization, the factors influencing it, and methods for its detection and mitigation. We explore key drivers, including training data duplication, training dynamics, and fine-tuning procedures that influence data memorization. In addition, we examine methodologies such as prefix-based extraction, membership inference, and adversarial prompting, assessing their effectiveness in detecting and measuring memorized content. Beyond technical analysis, we also explore the broader implications of memorization, including the legal and ethical implications. Finally, we discuss mitigation strategies, including data cleaning, differential privacy, and post-training unlearning, while highlighting open challenges in balancing the minimization of harmful memorization with utility. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the current state of research on LLM memorization across technical, privacy, and performance dimensions, identifying critical directions for future work.

Training machine learning approaches for vulnerability identification and producing reliable tools to assist developers in implementing quality software -- free of vulnerabilities -- is challenging due to the lack of large datasets and real data. Researchers have been looking at these issues and building datasets. However, these datasets usually miss natural language artifacts and programming language diversity. We scraped the entire CVE details database for GitHub references and augmented the data with 3 security-related datasets. We used the data to create a ground-truth dataset of natural language artifacts (such as commit messages, commits comments, and summaries), meta-data and code changes. Our dataset integrates a total of 8057 security-relevant commits -- the equivalent to 5942 security patches -- from 1339 different projects spanning 146 different types of vulnerabilities and 20 languages. A dataset of 110k non-security-related commits is also provided. Data and scripts are all available on GitHub. Data is stored in a .CSV file. Codebases can be downloaded using our scripts. Our dataset is a valuable asset to answer research questions on different topics such as the identification of security-relevant information using NLP models; software engineering and security best practices; and, vulnerability detection and patching; and, security program analysis.

Large Language Models (LLMs) represent a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, finding applications across various domains. However, their reliance on massive internet-sourced datasets for training brings notable privacy issues, which are exacerbated in critical domains (e.g., healthcare). Moreover, certain application-specific scenarios may require fine-tuning these models on private data. This survey critically examines the privacy threats associated with LLMs, emphasizing the potential for these models to memorize and inadvertently reveal sensitive information. We explore current threats by reviewing privacy attacks on LLMs and propose comprehensive solutions for integrating privacy mechanisms throughout the entire learning pipeline. These solutions range from anonymizing training datasets to implementing differential privacy during training or inference and machine unlearning after training. Our comprehensive review of existing literature highlights ongoing challenges, available tools, and future directions for preserving privacy in LLMs. This work aims to guide the development of more secure and trustworthy AI systems by providing a thorough understanding of privacy preservation methods and their effectiveness in mitigating risks.

Training Data Detection (TDD) is a task aimed at determining whether a specific data instance is used to train a machine learning model. In the computer security literature, TDD is also referred to as Membership Inference Attack (MIA). Given its potential to assess the risks of training data breaches, ensure copyright authentication, and verify model unlearning, TDD has garnered significant attention in recent years, leading to the development of numerous methods. Despite these advancements, there is no comprehensive benchmark to thoroughly evaluate the effectiveness of TDD methods. In this work, we introduce TDDBench, which consists of 13 datasets spanning three data modalities: image, tabular, and text. We benchmark 21 different TDD methods across four detection paradigms and evaluate their performance from five perspectives: average detection performance, best detection performance, memory consumption, and computational efficiency in both time and memory. With TDDBench, researchers can identify bottlenecks and areas for improvement in TDD algorithms, while practitioners can make informed trade-offs between effectiveness and efficiency when selecting TDD algorithms for specific use cases. Our large-scale benchmarking also reveals the generally unsatisfactory performance of TDD algorithms across different datasets. To enhance accessibility and reproducibility, we open-source TDDBench for the research community.

Knowledge distillation in neural networks refers to compressing a large model or dataset into a smaller version of itself. We introduce Privacy Distillation, a framework that allows a text-to-image generative model to teach another model without exposing it to identifiable data. Here, we are interested in the privacy issue faced by a data provider who wishes to share their data via a multimodal generative model. A question that immediately arises is ``How can a data provider ensure that the generative model is not leaking identifiable information about a patient?''. Our solution consists of (1) training a first diffusion model on real data (2) generating a synthetic dataset using this model and filtering it to exclude images with a re-identifiability risk (3) training a second diffusion model on the filtered synthetic data only. We showcase that datasets sampled from models trained with privacy distillation can effectively reduce re-identification risk whilst maintaining downstream performance.

Knowledge distillation (KD) has been widely used for model compression and knowledge transfer. Typically, a big teacher model trained on sufficient data transfers knowledge to a small student model. However, despite the success of KD, little effort has been made to study whether KD leaks the training data of the teacher model. In this paper, we experimentally reveal that KD suffers from the risk of privacy leakage. To alleviate this issue, we propose a novel knowledge distillation method, swing distillation, which can effectively protect the private information of the teacher model from flowing to the student model. In our framework, the temperature coefficient is dynamically and adaptively adjusted according to the degree of private information contained in the data, rather than a predefined constant hyperparameter. It assigns different temperatures to tokens according to the likelihood that a token in a position contains private information. In addition, we inject noise into soft targets provided to the student model, in order to avoid unshielded knowledge transfer. Experiments on multiple datasets and tasks demonstrate that the proposed swing distillation can significantly reduce (by over 80% in terms of canary exposure) the risk of privacy leakage in comparison to KD with competitive or better performance. Furthermore, swing distillation is robust against the increasing privacy budget.

Semi-supervised machine learning (SSL) is gaining popularity as it reduces the cost of training ML models. It does so by using very small amounts of (expensive, well-inspected) labeled data and large amounts of (cheap, non-inspected) unlabeled data. SSL has shown comparable or even superior performances compared to conventional fully-supervised ML techniques. In this paper, we show that the key feature of SSL that it can learn from (non-inspected) unlabeled data exposes SSL to strong poisoning attacks. In fact, we argue that, due to its reliance on non-inspected unlabeled data, poisoning is a much more severe problem in SSL than in conventional fully-supervised ML. Specifically, we design a backdoor poisoning attack on SSL that can be conducted by a weak adversary with no knowledge of target SSL pipeline. This is unlike prior poisoning attacks in fully-supervised settings that assume strong adversaries with practically-unrealistic capabilities. We show that by poisoning only 0.2% of the unlabeled training data, our attack can cause misclassification of more than 80% of test inputs (when they contain the adversary's backdoor trigger). Our attacks remain effective across twenty combinations of benchmark datasets and SSL algorithms, and even circumvent the state-of-the-art defenses against backdoor attacks. Our work raises significant concerns about the practical utility of existing SSL algorithms.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) has experienced remarkable progress in recent years, driven by the widespread adoption of open-source machine learning models in both research and industry. Considering the resource-intensive nature of training on vast datasets, many applications opt for models that have already been trained. Hence, a small number of key players undertake the responsibility of training and publicly releasing large pre-trained models, providing a crucial foundation for a wide range of applications. However, the adoption of these open-source models carries inherent privacy and security risks that are often overlooked. To provide a concrete example, an inconspicuous model may conceal hidden functionalities that, when triggered by specific input patterns, can manipulate the behavior of the system, such as instructing self-driving cars to ignore the presence of other vehicles. The implications of successful privacy and security attacks encompass a broad spectrum, ranging from relatively minor damage like service interruptions to highly alarming scenarios, including physical harm or the exposure of sensitive user data. In this work, we present a comprehensive overview of common privacy and security threats associated with the use of open-source models. By raising awareness of these dangers, we strive to promote the responsible and secure use of AI systems.

We present a text-reconstruction attack on mixture-of-experts (MoE) language models that recovers tokens from expert selections alone. In MoE models, each token is routed to a subset of expert subnetworks; we show these routing decisions leak substantially more information than previously understood. Prior work using logistic regression achieves limited reconstruction; we show that a 3-layer MLP improves this to 63.1% top-1 accuracy, and that a transformer-based sequence decoder recovers 91.2% of tokens top-1 (94.8% top-10) on 32-token sequences from OpenWebText after training on 100M tokens. These results connect MoE routing to the broader literature on embedding inversion. We outline practical leakage scenarios (e.g., distributed inference and side channels) and show that adding noise reduces but does not eliminate reconstruction. Our findings suggest that expert selections in MoE deployments should be treated as sensitive as the underlying text.

Previous work has shown that Large Language Models are susceptible to so-called data extraction attacks. This allows an attacker to extract a sample that was contained in the training data, which has massive privacy implications. The construction of data extraction attacks is challenging, current attacks are quite inefficient, and there exists a significant gap in the extraction capabilities of untargeted attacks and memorization. Thus, targeted attacks are proposed, which identify if a given sample from the training data, is extractable from a model. In this work, we apply a targeted data extraction attack to the SATML2023 Language Model Training Data Extraction Challenge. We apply a two-step approach. In the first step, we maximise the recall of the model and are able to extract the suffix for 69% of the samples. In the second step, we use a classifier-based Membership Inference Attack on the generations. Our AutoSklearn classifier achieves a precision of 0.841. The full approach reaches a score of 0.405 recall at a 10% false positive rate, which is an improvement of 34% over the baseline of 0.301.

Machine learning techniques based on neural networks are achieving remarkable results in a wide variety of domains. Often, the training of models requires large, representative datasets, which may be crowdsourced and contain sensitive information. The models should not expose private information in these datasets. Addressing this goal, we develop new algorithmic techniques for learning and a refined analysis of privacy costs within the framework of differential privacy. Our implementation and experiments demonstrate that we can train deep neural networks with non-convex objectives, under a modest privacy budget, and at a manageable cost in software complexity, training efficiency, and model quality.

Large language models (LLMs) can be trained or fine-tuned on data obtained without the owner's consent. Verifying whether a specific LLM was trained on particular data instances or an entire dataset is extremely challenging. Dataset watermarking addresses this by embedding identifiable modifications in training data to detect unauthorized use. However, existing methods often lack stealth, making them relatively easy to detect and remove. In light of these limitations, we propose LexiMark, a novel watermarking technique designed for text and documents, which embeds synonym substitutions for carefully selected high-entropy words. Our method aims to enhance an LLM's memorization capabilities on the watermarked text without altering the semantic integrity of the text. As a result, the watermark is difficult to detect, blending seamlessly into the text with no visible markers, and is resistant to removal due to its subtle, contextually appropriate substitutions that evade automated and manual detection. We evaluated our method using baseline datasets from recent studies and seven open-source models: LLaMA-1 7B, LLaMA-3 8B, Mistral 7B, Pythia 6.9B, as well as three smaller variants from the Pythia family (160M, 410M, and 1B). Our evaluation spans multiple training settings, including continued pretraining and fine-tuning scenarios. The results demonstrate significant improvements in AUROC scores compared to existing methods, underscoring our method's effectiveness in reliably verifying whether unauthorized watermarked data was used in LLM training.

Large language models are increasingly trained on all the data ever produced by humans. Many have raised concerns about the trustworthiness of public benchmarks due to potential contamination in pre-training or fine-tuning datasets. While most data decontamination efforts apply string matching (e.g., n-gram overlap) to remove benchmark data, we show that these methods are insufficient, and simple variations of test data (e.g., paraphrasing, translation) can easily bypass these decontamination measures. Furthermore, we demonstrate that if such variation of test data is not eliminated, a 13B model can easily overfit a test benchmark and achieve drastically high performance, on par with GPT-4. We validate such observations in widely used benchmarks such as MMLU, GSK8k, and HumanEval. To address this growing risk, we propose a stronger LLM-based decontamination method and apply it to widely used pre-training and fine-tuning datasets, revealing significant previously unknown test overlap. For example, in pre-training sets such as RedPajama-Data-1T and StarCoder-Data, we identified that 8-18\% of the HumanEval benchmark overlaps. Interestingly, we also find such contamination in synthetic dataset generated by GPT-3.5/4, suggesting a potential risk of unintentional contamination. We urge the community to adopt stronger decontamination approaches when using public benchmarks. Moreover, we call for the community to actively develop fresh one-time exams to evaluate models accurately. Our decontamination tool is publicly available at https://github.com/lm-sys/llm-decontaminator.

Large language models are pre-trained on uncurated text datasets consisting of trillions of tokens scraped from the Web. Prior work has shown that: (1) web-scraped pre-training datasets can be practically poisoned by malicious actors; and (2) adversaries can compromise language models after poisoning fine-tuning datasets. Our work evaluates for the first time whether language models can also be compromised during pre-training, with a focus on the persistence of pre-training attacks after models are fine-tuned as helpful and harmless chatbots (i.e., after SFT and DPO). We pre-train a series of LLMs from scratch to measure the impact of a potential poisoning adversary under four different attack objectives (denial-of-service, belief manipulation, jailbreaking, and prompt stealing), and across a wide range of model sizes (from 600M to 7B). Our main result is that poisoning only 0.1% of a model's pre-training dataset is sufficient for three out of four attacks to measurably persist through post-training. Moreover, simple attacks like denial-of-service persist through post-training with a poisoning rate of only 0.001%.

As pretrained models are increasingly shared on the web, ensuring that models can forget or delete sensitive, copyrighted, or private information upon request has become crucial. Machine unlearning has been proposed to address this challenge. However, current evaluations for unlearning methods rely on output-based metrics, which cannot verify whether information is completely deleted or merely suppressed at the representation level, where suppression is insufficient for true unlearning. To address this gap, we propose a novel restoration-based analysis framework that uses Sparse Autoencoders to identify class-specific expert features in intermediate layers and applies inference-time steering to quantitatively distinguish between suppression and deletion. Applying our framework to 12 major unlearning methods in image classification tasks, we find that most methods achieve high restoration rates of unlearned information, indicating that they only suppress information at the decision-boundary level, while preserving semantic features in intermediate representations. Notably, even retraining from pretrained checkpoints shows high restoration, revealing that robust semantic features inherited from pretraining are not removed by retraining. These results demonstrate that representation-level retention poses significant risks overlooked by output-based metrics, highlighting the need for new unlearning evaluation criteria. We propose new evaluation guidelines that prioritize representation-level verification, especially for privacy-critical applications in the era of pre-trained models.

In current AI era, users may request AI companies to delete their data from the training dataset due to the privacy concerns. As a model owner, retraining a model will consume significant computational resources. Therefore, machine unlearning is a new emerged technology to allow model owner to delete requested training data or a class with little affecting on the model performance. However, for large-scaling complex data, such as image or text data, unlearning a class from a model leads to a inferior performance due to the difficulty to identify the link between classes and model. An inaccurate class deleting may lead to over or under unlearning. In this paper, to accurately defining the unlearning class of complex data, we apply the definition of Concept, rather than an image feature or a token of text data, to represent the semantic information of unlearning class. This new representation can cut the link between the model and the class, leading to a complete erasing of the impact of a class. To analyze the impact of the concept of complex data, we adopt a Post-hoc Concept Bottleneck Model, and Integrated Gradients to precisely identify concepts across different classes. Next, we take advantage of data poisoning with random and targeted labels to propose unlearning methods. We test our methods on both image classification models and large language models (LLMs). The results consistently show that the proposed methods can accurately erase targeted information from models and can largely maintain the performance of the models.

Data poisoning attacks manipulate training data to introduce unexpected behaviors into machine learning models at training time. For text-to-image generative models with massive training datasets, current understanding of poisoning attacks suggests that a successful attack would require injecting millions of poison samples into their training pipeline. In this paper, we show that poisoning attacks can be successful on generative models. We observe that training data per concept can be quite limited in these models, making them vulnerable to prompt-specific poisoning attacks, which target a model's ability to respond to individual prompts. We introduce Nightshade, an optimized prompt-specific poisoning attack where poison samples look visually identical to benign images with matching text prompts. Nightshade poison samples are also optimized for potency and can corrupt an Stable Diffusion SDXL prompt in <100 poison samples. Nightshade poison effects "bleed through" to related concepts, and multiple attacks can composed together in a single prompt. Surprisingly, we show that a moderate number of Nightshade attacks can destabilize general features in a text-to-image generative model, effectively disabling its ability to generate meaningful images. Finally, we propose the use of Nightshade and similar tools as a last defense for content creators against web scrapers that ignore opt-out/do-not-crawl directives, and discuss possible implications for model trainers and content creators.

There has been some recent interest in detecting and addressing memorization of training data by deep neural networks. A formal framework for memorization in generative models, called "data-copying," was proposed by Meehan et. al. (2020). We build upon their work to show that their framework may fail to detect certain kinds of blatant memorization. Motivated by this and the theory of non-parametric methods, we provide an alternative definition of data-copying that applies more locally. We provide a method to detect data-copying, and provably show that it works with high probability when enough data is available. We also provide lower bounds that characterize the sample requirement for reliable detection.

Modern machine learning models are sensitive to the manipulation of both the training data (poisoning attacks) and inference data (adversarial examples). Recognizing this issue, the community has developed many empirical defenses against both attacks and, more recently, provable certification methods against inference-time attacks. However, such guarantees are still largely lacking for training-time attacks. In this work, we present FullCert, the first end-to-end certifier with sound, deterministic bounds, which proves robustness against both training-time and inference-time attacks. We first bound all possible perturbations an adversary can make to the training data under the considered threat model. Using these constraints, we bound the perturbations' influence on the model's parameters. Finally, we bound the impact of these parameter changes on the model's prediction, resulting in joint robustness guarantees against poisoning and adversarial examples. To facilitate this novel certification paradigm, we combine our theoretical work with a new open-source library BoundFlow, which enables model training on bounded datasets. We experimentally demonstrate FullCert's feasibility on two different datasets.

Data poisoning attacks pose a significant threat to the integrity of machine learning models by leading to misclassification of target distribution data by injecting adversarial examples during training. Existing state-of-the-art (SoTA) defense methods suffer from limitations, such as significantly reduced generalization performance and significant overhead during training, making them impractical or limited for real-world applications. In response to this challenge, we introduce a universal data purification method that defends naturally trained classifiers from malicious white-, gray-, and black-box image poisons by applying a universal stochastic preprocessing step Psi_{T}(x), realized by iterative Langevin sampling of a convergent Energy Based Model (EBM) initialized with an image x. Mid-run dynamics of Psi_{T}(x) purify poison information with minimal impact on features important to the generalization of a classifier network. We show that EBMs remain universal purifiers, even in the presence of poisoned EBM training data, and achieve SoTA defense on leading triggered and triggerless poisons. This work is a subset of a larger framework introduced in \pgen with a more detailed focus on EBM purification and poison defense.

The tremendous amount of accessible data in cyberspace face the risk of being unauthorized used for training deep learning models. To address this concern, methods are proposed to make data unlearnable for deep learning models by adding a type of error-minimizing noise. However, such conferred unlearnability is found fragile to adversarial training. In this paper, we design new methods to generate robust unlearnable examples that are protected from adversarial training. We first find that the vanilla error-minimizing noise, which suppresses the informative knowledge of data via minimizing the corresponding training loss, could not effectively minimize the adversarial training loss. This explains the vulnerability of error-minimizing noise in adversarial training. Based on the observation, robust error-minimizing noise is then introduced to reduce the adversarial training loss. Experiments show that the unlearnability brought by robust error-minimizing noise can effectively protect data from adversarial training in various scenarios. The code is available at https://github.com/fshp971/robust-unlearnable-examples.

Recent observations have underscored a disparity between the inflated benchmark scores and the actual performance of LLMs, raising concerns about potential contamination of evaluation benchmarks. This issue is especially critical for closed-source models and certain open-source models where training data transparency is lacking. In this paper we study data contamination by proposing two methods tailored for both open-source and proprietary LLMs. We first introduce a retrieval-based system to explore potential overlaps between evaluation benchmarks and pretraining corpora. We further present a novel investigation protocol named Testset Slot Guessing (TS-Guessing), applicable to both open and proprietary models. This approach entails masking a wrong answer in a multiple-choice question and prompting the model to fill in the gap. Additionally, it involves obscuring an unlikely word in an evaluation example and asking the model to produce it. We find that certain commercial LLMs could surprisingly guess the missing option in various test sets. Specifically, in the TruthfulQA benchmark, we find that LLMs exhibit notable performance improvement when provided with additional metadata in the benchmark. Further, in the MMLU benchmark, ChatGPT and GPT-4 demonstrated an exact match rate of 52\% and 57\%, respectively, in guessing the missing options in benchmark test data. We hope these results underscore the need for more robust evaluation methodologies and benchmarks in the field.