Daily Papers

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), such as Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone, provide isolated regions of CPU and memory for secure computation and are increasingly used to protect sensitive data and code across diverse application domains. However, little is known about how developers actually use TEEs in practice. This paper presents the first large-scale empirical study of real-world TEE applications. We collected and analyzed 241 open-source projects from GitHub that utilize the two most widely-adopted TEEs, Intel SGX and ARM TrustZone. By combining manual inspection with customized static analysis scripts, we examined their adoption contexts, usage patterns, and development practices across three phases. First, we categorized the projects into 8 application domains and identified trends in TEE adoption over time. We found that the dominant use case is IoT device security (30%), which contrasts sharply with prior academic focus on blockchain and cryptographic systems (7%), while AI model protection (12%) is rapidly emerging as a growing domain. Second, we analyzed how TEEs are integrated into software and observed that 32.4% of the projects reimplement cryptographic functionalities instead of using official SDK APIs, suggesting that current SDKs may have limited usability and portability to meet developers' practical needs. Third, we examined security practices through manual inspection and found that 25.3% (61 of 241) of the projects exhibit insecure coding behaviors when using TEEs, such as hardcoded secrets and missing input validation, which undermine their intended security guarantees. Our findings have important implications for improving the usability of TEE SDKs and supporting developers in trusted software development.

Wide deployment of machine learning models on edge devices has rendered the model intellectual property (IP) and data privacy vulnerable. We propose GNNVault, the first secure Graph Neural Network (GNN) deployment strategy based on Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). GNNVault follows the design of 'partition-before-training' and includes a private GNN rectifier to complement with a public backbone model. This way, both critical GNN model parameters and the private graph used during inference are protected within secure TEE compartments. Real-world implementations with Intel SGX demonstrate that GNNVault safeguards GNN inference against state-of-the-art link stealing attacks with negligible accuracy degradation (<2%).

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that protects sensitive code and data from untrusted software. Despite their strong security guarantees, analyzing TEE applications remains challenging due to the high cost and complexity of configuring complete TEE build and runtime environments, as well as the limited observability imposed by hardware isolation. This paper presents SymTEE, a novel large language model (LLM)-assisted symbolic execution framework for detecting missing input validation issues in TEE applications without requiring real TEE setups. SymTEE begins by leveraging Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) analysis to extract TEE code slices that may lack sufficient input validation, and then employs an LLM (GPT-5 in our case) to automatically convert the extracted slices into KLEE-compatible harness programs containing lightweight mock execution environments for symbolic analysis. Evaluations on 26 vulnerabilities (11 real-world and 15 synthetic) show that SymTEE achieves 100% precision and 92.3% recall in detecting missing input validation vulnerabilities while incurring an average analysis cost of only $0.05. These results demonstrate the effectiveness and practicality of SymTEE's pioneering paradigm of LLM-assisted symbolic execution, where LLMs autonomously generate mock environments to enable automated security analysis without complex setup, providing a more accessible and scalable framework for trusted computing systems.

This report evaluates the performance impact of enabling Trusted Execution Environments (TEE) on NVIDIA Hopper GPUs for large language model (LLM) inference tasks. We benchmark the overhead introduced by TEE mode across various LLMs and token lengths, with a particular focus on the bottleneck caused by CPU-GPU data transfers via PCIe. Our results indicate that while there is minimal computational overhead within the GPU, the overall performance penalty is primarily attributable to data transfer. For the majority of typical LLM queries, the overhead remains below 7%, with larger models and longer sequences experiencing nearly zero overhead.

Process attestation systems verify that a continuous physical process, such as human authorship, actually occurred, rather than merely checking system state. These systems face a fundamental dependability challenge: the evidence collection infrastructure must remain available and tamper-resistant even when the attesting party controls the platform. Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-enforced isolation that can address this challenge, but their integration with continuous process attestation introduces novel resilience requirements not addressed by existing frameworks. We present the first architecture for continuous process attestation evidence collection inside TEEs, providing hardware-backed tamper resistance against trust-inverted adversaries with graduated input assurance from software-channel integrity (Tier 1) through hardware-bound input (Tier 3). We develop a Markov-chain dependability model quantifying Evidence Chain Availability (ECA), Mean Time Between Evidence Gaps (MTBEG), and Recovery Time Objectives (RTO). We introduce a resilient evidence chain protocol maintaining chain integrity across TEE crashes, network partitions, and enclave migration. Our security analysis derives formal bounds under combined threat models including trust inversion and TEE side channels, parameterized by a conjectural side-channel leakage bound esc that requires empirical validation. Evaluation on Intel SGX demonstrates under 25% per-checkpoint CPU overhead (<0.3% of the 30 s checkpoint interval), >99.5% Evidence Chain Availability (ECA) (the fraction of session time with active evidence collection) in Monte Carlo simulation under Poisson failure models, and sealed-state recovery under 200 ms.

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide hardware-based isolation to protect sensitive data and computations from potentially compromised operating systems (OS). However, TEE applications inevitably interact with the untrusted OS through SDK interfaces, and improper partitioning can introduce severe vulnerabilities such as data leakage and code injection. While prior work has proposed static analysis tools to detect such issues, automated repair remains largely unexplored. This problem is particularly challenging due to three TEE-specific factors: the lack of standardized secure development guidelines, the difficulty of extracting semantic information from low-level C code, and the absence of mature testing and validation methods. In this work, we present TEERepair, a framework for automatically repairing bad partitioning issues in TEE applications. Our approach tackles the above challenges by introducing a domain-specific language (DSL) to encode repair rules that express and capture common TEE security patterns, which are instantiated as patch templates with placeholders for context-specific variables. We then leverage large language models (LLMs) to reason about code semantics and synthesize context-aware patches, and further generate test clients to validate the repairs. We evaluate TEERepair on the TEE Partitioning Errors Benchmark (PartitioningE-Bench), achieving a significantly higher repair success rate of 87.6% compared to baselines. Furthermore, applying TEERepair to real-world TEE projects, we submitted 5 repair pull requests, 2 of which have been confirmed and merged by project maintainers.

As LLMs are increasingly deployed within agentic systems, their capabilities depend not only on the model weights but also on the harness: the prompts, tools, control flow, memory, and orchestration code surrounding them. This makes automated harness optimization -- the iterative and evaluation-guided improvement of a harness by an AI system -- both an important route to improving AI systems and a demanding capability for AI systems themselves. Yet the community lacks a common protocol for measuring how well frontier LLMs perform at this task. We introduce HarnessOpt-Bench, a benchmark for end-to-end harness optimization under expensive and stochastic evaluation. An optimizer, an LLM paired with a coding harness, receives a target agent's seed harness, graded evaluation feedback, and a fixed target-evaluation budget. It edits the harness and nominates a final candidate, which is scored by its normalized gain over the seed on a held-out test partition that remains inaccessible throughout search. A trusted execution environment enforces the evaluation boundary, meters target-agent resource use, and preserves candidate versions for audit. We evaluate 5 frontier LLMs as optimizers both under a shared coding harness and under their native harnesses across 4 downstream tasks, over 111 scored runs. Experiment results show that optimizer models separate more than the coding harnesses they act through, native harnesses are not consistently superior, and gains vary substantially across tasks and seed regimes. These results establish harness optimization as a measurable and discriminative capability with large space for improvement.

Web3 applications require execution platforms that maintain confidentiality and integrity without relying on centralized trust authorities. While Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) offer promising capabilities for confidential computing, current implementations face significant limitations when applied to Web3 contexts, particularly in security reliability, censorship resistance, and vendor independence. This paper presents dstack, a comprehensive framework that transforms raw TEE technology into a true Zero Trust platform. We introduce three key innovations: (1) Portable Confidential Containers that enable seamless workload migration across heterogeneous TEE environments while maintaining security guarantees, (2) Decentralized Code Management that leverages smart contracts for transparent governance of TEE applications, and (3) Verifiable Domain Management that ensures secure and verifiable application identity without centralized authorities. These innovations are implemented through three core components: dstack-OS, dstack-KMS, and dstack-Gateway. Together, they demonstrate how to achieve both the performance advantages of VM-level TEE solutions and the trustless guarantees required by Web3 applications. Our evaluation shows that dstack provides comprehensive security guarantees while maintaining practical usability for real-world applications.

While Trusted Execution Environments provide a strong foundation for secure cloud computing, they remain vulnerable to access pattern leakages. Oblivious Maps (OMAPs) mitigate this by fully hiding access patterns but suffer from high overhead due to randomized remapping and worst-case padding. We argue these costs are not fundamental. Modern accelerators featuring High-Bandwidth Memory (HBM) offer a new opportunity: Vaswani et al. [OSDI'18] point out that eavesdropping on HBM is difficult -- even for physical attackers -- as its memory channels are sealed together with processor cores inside the same physical package. Later, Hunt et al. [NSDI'20] show that, with proper isolation, HBM can be turned into an unobservable region where both data and memory traces are hidden. This motivates a rethink of OMAP design with HBM-backed solutions to finally overcome their traditional performance limits. Building on these insights, we present BOLT, a Bandwidth Optimized, Lightning-fast OMAP accelerator that, for the first time, achieves O(1) + O(log_2(log_2 (N))) bandwidth overhead. BOLT introduces three key innovations: (i) a new OMAP algorithm that leverages isolated HBM as an unobservable cache to accelerate oblivious access to large host memory; (ii) a self-hosted architecture that offloads execution and memory control from the host to mitigate CPU-side leakage; and (iii) tailored algorithm-architecture co-designs that maximize resource efficiency. We implement a prototype BOLT on a Xilinx U55C FPGA. Evaluations show that BOLT achieves up to 279x and 480x speedups in initialization and query time, respectively, over state-of-the-art OMAPs, including an industry implementation from Facebook.

Personal AI assistants (e.g., Apple Intelligence, Meta AI) offer proactive recommendations that simplify everyday tasks, but their reliance on sensitive user data raises concerns about privacy and trust. To address these challenges, we introduce the Guardian of Data (GOD), a secure, privacy-preserving framework for training and evaluating AI assistants directly on-device. Unlike traditional benchmarks, the GOD model measures how well assistants can anticipate user needs-such as suggesting gifts-while protecting user data and autonomy. Functioning like an AI school, it addresses the cold start problem by simulating user queries and employing a curriculum-based approach to refine the performance of each assistant. Running within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), it safeguards user data while applying reinforcement and imitation learning to refine AI recommendations. A token-based incentive system encourages users to share data securely, creating a data flywheel that drives continuous improvement. Specifically, users mine with their data, and the mining rate is determined by GOD's evaluation of how well their AI assistant understands them across categories such as shopping, social interactions, productivity, trading, and Web3. By integrating privacy, personalization, and trust, the GOD model provides a scalable, responsible path for advancing personal AI assistants. For community collaboration, part of the framework is open-sourced at https://github.com/PIN-AI/God-Model.

Data de-identification makes it possible to glean insights from data while preserving user privacy. The use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow for the execution of de-identification applications on the cloud without the need for a user to trust the third-party application provider. In this paper, we present SPIDEr - Secure Pipeline for Information De-Identification with End-to-End Encryption, our implementation of an end-to-end encrypted data de-identification pipeline. SPIDEr supports classical anonymisation techniques such as suppression, pseudonymisation, generalisation, and aggregation, as well as techniques that offer a formal privacy guarantee such as k-anonymisation and differential privacy. To enable scalability and improve performance on constrained TEE hardware, we enable batch processing of data for differential privacy computations. We present our design of the control flows for end-to-end secure execution of de-identification operations within a TEE. As part of the control flow for running SPIDEr within the TEE, we perform attestation, a process that verifies that the software binaries were properly instantiated on a known, trusted platform.

This paper presents C8s, a confidential computing architecture for Kubernetes that provides cryptographically rooted confidentiality, integrity, and verifiability guarantees for Kubernetes clusters from infrastructure operators. These guarantees are cryptographically provable to any independent third party verifier. The architecture is built on hardware Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), specifically AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX, and NVIDIA Confidential Computing support, to establish an attestation-rooted trust boundary around confidential VMs. This design is compatible with managed Kubernetes services such as Amazon EKS, Google GKE, and Microsoft AKS, where the control plane cannot be attested. Under this boundary, three groups gain guarantees that are absent from conventional deployments. Data and artifact owners can deploy sensitive workloads and proprietary artifacts on third-party infrastructure without risking exfiltration. Compute providers can offer execution services without revealing workloads to cloud operators. End users can submit requests that remain opaque to all parties except the attested TEE processing them. Representative workloads include AI inference, securing AI model weights, and training or fine-tuning on sensitive data.

On-device deep learning (DL) has rapidly gained adoption in mobile apps, offering the benefits of offline model inference and user privacy preservation over cloud-based approaches. However, it inevitably stores models on user devices, introducing new vulnerabilities, particularly model-stealing attacks and intellectual property infringement. While system-level protections like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) provide a robust solution, practical challenges remain in achieving scalable on-device DL model protection, including complexities in supporting third-party models and limited adoption in current mobile solutions. Advancements in TEE-enabled hardware, such as NVIDIA's GPU-based TEEs, may address these obstacles in the future. Currently, watermarking serves as a common defense against model theft but also faces challenges here as many mobile app developers lack corresponding machine learning expertise and the inherent read-only and inference-only nature of on-device DL models prevents third parties like app stores from implementing existing watermarking techniques in post-deployment models. To protect the intellectual property of on-device DL models, in this paper, we propose THEMIS, an automatic tool that lifts the read-only restriction of on-device DL models by reconstructing their writable counterparts and leverages the untrainable nature of on-device DL models to solve watermark parameters and protect the model owner's intellectual property. Extensive experimental results across various datasets and model structures show the superiority of THEMIS in terms of different metrics. Further, an empirical investigation of 403 real-world DL mobile apps from Google Play is performed with a success rate of 81.14%, showing the practicality of THEMIS.

The rapid advancement of ML models in critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and security has intensified the need for robust data security, model integrity, and reliable outputs. Large multimodal foundational models, while crucial for complex tasks, present challenges in scalability, reliability, and potential misuse. Decentralized systems offer a solution by distributing workload and mitigating central points of failure, but they introduce risks of unauthorized access to sensitive data across nodes. We address these challenges with a comprehensive framework designed for responsible AI development. Our approach incorporates: 1) Zero-knowledge proofs for secure model verification, enhancing trust without compromising privacy. 2) Consensus-based verification checks to ensure consistent outputs across nodes, mitigating hallucinations and maintaining model integrity. 3) Split Learning techniques that segment models across different nodes, preserving data privacy by preventing full data access at any point. 4) Hardware-based security through trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect data and computations. This framework aims to enhance security and privacy and improve the reliability and fairness of multimodal AI systems. Promoting efficient resource utilization contributes to more sustainable AI development. Our state-of-the-art proofs and principles demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in responsibly democratizing artificial intelligence, offering a promising approach for building secure and private foundational models.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has steadily improved across a wide range of tasks. However, the development and deployment of AI are almost entirely controlled by a few powerful organizations that are racing to create Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The centralized entities make decisions with little public oversight, shaping the future of humanity, often with unforeseen consequences. In this paper, we propose OML, which stands for Open, Monetizable, and Loyal AI, an approach designed to democratize AI development. OML is realized through an interdisciplinary framework spanning AI, blockchain, and cryptography. We present several ideas for constructing OML using technologies such as Trusted Execution Environments (TEE), traditional cryptographic primitives like fully homomorphic encryption and functional encryption, obfuscation, and AI-native solutions rooted in the sample complexity and intrinsic hardness of AI tasks. A key innovation of our work is introducing a new scientific field: AI-native cryptography. Unlike conventional cryptography, which focuses on discrete data and binary security guarantees, AI-native cryptography exploits the continuous nature of AI data representations and their low-dimensional manifolds, focusing on improving approximate performance. One core idea is to transform AI attack methods, such as data poisoning, into security tools. This novel approach serves as a foundation for OML 1.0 which uses model fingerprinting to protect the integrity and ownership of AI models. The spirit of OML is to establish a decentralized, open, and transparent platform for AI development, enabling the community to contribute, monetize, and take ownership of AI models. By decentralizing control and ensuring transparency through blockchain technology, OML prevents the concentration of power and provides accountability in AI development that has not been possible before.

The rapid growth of large-scale AI models, particularly large language models has brought significant challenges in data privacy, computational resources, and accessibility. Traditional centralized architectures often struggle to meet required data security and scalability needs which hinders the democratization of AI systems. Nesa introduces a model-agnostic sharding framework designed for decentralized AI inference. Our framework uses blockchain-based sequential deep neural network sharding to distribute computational tasks across a diverse network of nodes based on a personalised heuristic and routing mechanism. This enables efficient distributed training and inference for recent large-scale models even on consumer-grade hardware. We use compression techniques like dynamic blockwise quantization and mixed matrix decomposition to reduce data transfer and memory needs. We also integrate robust security measures, including hardware-based trusted execution environments to ensure data integrity and confidentiality. Evaluating our system across various natural language processing and vision tasks shows that these compression strategies do not compromise model accuracy. Our results highlight the potential to democratize access to cutting-edge AI technologies by enabling secure and efficient inference on a decentralized network.

Large language models are often adapted through parameter efficient fine tuning, but current release practices provide weak assurances about what data were used and how updates were computed. We present Verifiable Fine Tuning, a protocol and system that produces succinct zero knowledge proofs that a released model was obtained from a public initialization under a declared training program and an auditable dataset commitment. The approach combines five elements. First, commitments that bind data sources, preprocessing, licenses, and per epoch quota counters to a manifest. Second, a verifiable sampler that supports public replayable and private index hiding batch selection. Third, update circuits restricted to parameter efficient fine tuning that enforce AdamW style optimizer semantics and proof friendly approximations with explicit error budgets. Fourth, recursive aggregation that folds per step proofs into per epoch and end to end certificates with millisecond verification. Fifth, provenance binding and optional trusted execution property cards that attest code identity and constants. On English and bilingual instruction mixtures, the method maintains utility within tight budgets while achieving practical proof performance. Policy quotas are enforced with zero violations, and private sampling windows show no measurable index leakage. Federated experiments demonstrate that the system composes with probabilistic audits and bandwidth constraints. These results indicate that end to end verifiable fine tuning is feasible today for real parameter efficient pipelines, closing a critical trust gap for regulated and decentralized deployments.

As autonomous agentic systems scale across regulated critical infrastructures, the lack of mechanistic, hardware-rooted enforcement for high-frequency policy updates presents a fundamental safety gap. We introduce Ethical Hyper-Velocity (EHV), a novel architectural framework for the formal verification of AI governance policies at runtime. Unlike retrospective auditing frameworks (ISO/IEC 42001, NIST AI RMF) which introduce 14-30 day latencies, EHV relocates the Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) into the inference pipeline via a Governance-Aware Just-In-Time (JIT) Compiler. By integrating Conflict-free Replicated Data Types (CRDTs) for policy synchronization and Epoch-based Attestation Caching within Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), EHV achieves Sub-millisecond Formal Determinism (SMFD). We demonstrate via TLA+ formal verification that non-compliant agentic actions are computationally unreachable within the system's bounded operating state space. We prove that O(1) runtime enforcement can eliminate the traditional trade-off between deployment velocity and governance integrity, reducing Governance Latency from O(days) to O(1).

As AI agents become widely deployed as online services, users often rely on an agent developer's claim about how safety is enforced, which introduces a threat where safety measures are falsely advertised. To address the threat, we propose proof-of-guardrail, a system that enables developers to provide cryptographic proof that a response is generated after a specific open-source guardrail. To generate proof, the developer runs the agent and guardrail inside a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), which produces a TEE-signed attestation of guardrail code execution verifiable by any user offline. We implement proof-of-guardrail for OpenClaw agents and evaluate latency overhead and deployment cost. Proof-of-guardrail ensures integrity of guardrail execution while keeping the developer's agent private, but we also highlight a risk of deception about safety, for example, when malicious developers actively jailbreak the guardrail. Code and demo video: https://github.com/SaharaLabsAI/Verifiable-ClawGuard

EigenAI is a verifiable AI platform built on top of the EigenLayer restaking ecosystem. At a high level, it combines a deterministic large-language model (LLM) inference engine with a cryptoeconomically secured optimistic re-execution protocol so that every inference result can be publicly audited, reproduced, and, if necessary, economically enforced. An untrusted operator runs inference on a fixed GPU architecture, signs and encrypts the request and response, and publishes the encrypted log to EigenDA. During a challenge window, any watcher may request re-execution through EigenVerify; the result is then deterministically recomputed inside a trusted execution environment (TEE) with a threshold-released decryption key, allowing a public challenge with private data. Because inference itself is bit-exact, verification reduces to a byte-equality check, and a single honest replica suffices to detect fraud. We show how this architecture yields sovereign agents -- prediction-market judges, trading bots, and scientific assistants -- that enjoy state-of-the-art performance while inheriting security from Ethereum's validator base.

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed on mobile devices offer benefits like user privacy and reduced network latency, but introduce a significant security risk: the leakage of proprietary models to end users. To mitigate this risk, we propose a system design for protecting on-device LLMs using Arm Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), TrustZone. Our system addresses two primary challenges: (1) The dilemma between memory efficiency and fast inference (caching model parameters within TEE memory). (2) The lack of efficient and secure Neural Processing Unit (NPU) time-sharing between Rich Execution Environment (REE) and TEE. Our approach incorporates two key innovations. First, we employ pipelined restoration, leveraging the deterministic memory access patterns of LLM inference to prefetch parameters on demand, hiding memory allocation, I/O and decryption latency under computation time. Second, we introduce a co-driver design, creating a minimal data plane NPU driver in the TEE that collaborates with the full-fledged REE driver. This reduces the TEE TCB size and eliminates control plane reinitialization overhead during NPU world switches. We implemented our system on the emerging OpenHarmony OS and the llama.cpp inference framework, and evaluated it with various LLMs on an Arm Rockchip device. Compared to a strawman TEE baseline lacking our optimizations, our system reduces TTFT by up to 90.9% and increases decoding speed by up to 23.2%.

Coding agents and LLM-powered applications routinely send potentially sensitive content to cloud LLM APIs where it may be logged, retained, used for training, or subpoenaed. Existing privacy tooling focuses on network-level encryption and organization-level DLP, neither of which addresses the content of prompts themselves. We present a systematic empirical evaluation of eight techniques for privacy-preserving LLM requests: (A) local-only inference, (B) redaction with placeholder restoration, (C) semantic rephrasing, (D) Trusted Execution Environment hosted inference, (E) split inference, (F) fully homomorphic encryption, (G) secret sharing via multi-party computation, and (H) differential-privacy noise. We implement all eight (or a tractable research-stage subset where deployment is not yet feasible) in an open-source shim compatible with MCP and any OpenAI-compatible API. We evaluate the four practical options (A, B, C, H) and their combinations across four workload classes using a ground-truth-labelled leak benchmark of 1,300 samples with 4,014 annotations. Our headline finding is that no single technique dominates: the combination A+B+C (route locally when possible, redact and rephrase the rest) achieves 0.6% combined leak on PII and 31.3% on proprietary code, with zero exact leaks on PII across 500 samples. We present a decision rule that selects the appropriate option(s) from a threat-model budget and workload characterisation. Code, benchmarks, and evaluation harness are released at https://github.com/jayluxferro/llm-redactor.

Our work tackles the challenge of securing user inputs in cloud-hosted large language model (LLM) serving while ensuring output invariance, model confidentiality, and compute efficiency. We introduce secure multi-party decoding (SMD), which leverages confidential computing to confine user prompts to a trusted execution environment (TEE), namely a confidential virtual machine (CVM), while allowing service providers to generate tokens efficiently. We also introduce a novel cryptographic method, prompt obfuscation (PO), to ensure robustness against reconstruction attacks on SMD. We demonstrate that our approach preserves both prompt confidentiality and LLM serving efficiency. Our solution can enable privacy-preserving cloud LLM serving that handles sensitive prompts, such as clinical records, financial data, and personal information.

The growing popularity of Machine Learning (ML) has led to its deployment in various sensitive domains, which has resulted in significant research focused on ML security and privacy. However, in some applications, such as Augmented/Virtual Reality, integrity verification of the outsourced ML tasks is more critical--a facet that has not received much attention. Existing solutions, such as multi-party computation and proof-based systems, impose significant computation overhead, which makes them unfit for real-time applications. We propose Fides, a novel framework for real-time integrity validation of ML-as-a-Service (MLaaS) inference. Fides features a novel and efficient distillation technique--Greedy Distillation Transfer Learning--that dynamically distills and fine-tunes a space and compute-efficient verification model for verifying the corresponding service model while running inside a trusted execution environment. Fides features a client-side attack detection model that uses statistical analysis and divergence measurements to identify, with a high likelihood, if the service model is under attack. Fides also offers a re-classification functionality that predicts the original class whenever an attack is identified. We devised a generative adversarial network framework for training the attack detection and re-classification models. The evaluation shows that Fides achieves an accuracy of up to 98% for attack detection and 94% for re-classification.

Federated learning (FL) is a general principle for decentralized clients to train a server model collectively without sharing local data. FL is a promising framework with practical applications, but its standard training paradigm requires the clients to backpropagate through the model to compute gradients. Since these clients are typically edge devices and not fully trusted, executing backpropagation on them incurs computational and storage overhead as well as white-box vulnerability. In light of this, we develop backpropagation-free federated learning, dubbed BAFFLE, in which backpropagation is replaced by multiple forward processes to estimate gradients. BAFFLE is 1) memory-efficient and easily fits uploading bandwidth; 2) compatible with inference-only hardware optimization and model quantization or pruning; and 3) well-suited to trusted execution environments, because the clients in BAFFLE only execute forward propagation and return a set of scalars to the server. Empirically we use BAFFLE to train deep models from scratch or to finetune pretrained models, achieving acceptable results. Code is available in https://github.com/FengHZ/BAFFLE.

The transition from stateless generative models in artificial intelligence to stateful, autonomous agents represents an architectural evolution that, while providing the capabilities of long-term planning and the automation of enterprise workflows, also represents the introduction of a new form of security threat, the Chronos Vulnerability. The Chronos Vulnerability represents the threat of memory-based attacks, including the Memory Injection Attack (MINJA) and the sleeper agent, in which the internal belief system of the autonomous agent is compromised, effectively decoupling the attack vector from the final catastrophic event. This study formalizes the threat model for persistence-based attacks and the threat of Dynamics Blindness in the context of the World of Workflows benchmark, demonstrating that traditional endpoint content filters are insufficient for the current stateful architecture. Consequently, this study synthesizes a defense-in-depth landscape, categorizing emerging frameworks such as diagnostic trajectory guardrails (AgentDoG), formal temporal verification (Agent-C), immunological memory consensus (A-MemGuard), and hardware-anchored trust via GPU-based Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) and Zero-Trust memory architectures.

As a type of valuable intellectual property (IP), deep neural network (DNN) models have been protected by techniques like watermarking. However, such passive model protection cannot fully prevent model abuse. In this work, we propose an active model IP protection scheme, namely NNSplitter, which actively protects the model by splitting it into two parts: the obfuscated model that performs poorly due to weight obfuscation, and the model secrets consisting of the indexes and original values of the obfuscated weights, which can only be accessed by authorized users with the support of the trusted execution environment. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of NNSplitter, e.g., by only modifying 275 out of over 11 million (i.e., 0.002%) weights, the accuracy of the obfuscated ResNet-18 model on CIFAR-10 can drop to 10%. Moreover, NNSplitter is stealthy and resilient against norm clipping and fine-tuning attacks, making it an appealing solution for DNN model protection. The code is available at: https://github.com/Tongzhou0101/NNSplitter.

Model hosting hubs (e.g., Hugging Face) are vulnerable to supply chain attacks that enable remote code execution on trusted user environments. Attackers often distribute malicious Pre-trained ML models (PTMs) via model hubs. In this paper, we present novel attacks against PTMs and model hubs called SHADOWPICKLE. SHADOWPICKLE includes three (3) stealthy pickle deserialization attacks that enable malicious behaviors and evade state-of-the-art (SOTA) model scanners. These attacks leverage the external module import mechanism of the Pickle Virtual Machine (VM) to execute malicious payloads during deserialization. Additionally, we provide PICKLEBENCH, a dynamic and extensible benchmark for automatically injecting SHADOWPICKLE into arbitrary benign PTM models. Our evaluation shows that SHADOWPICKLE evades ten SOTA scanners, and four model hubs. SHADOWPICKLE (Overwritten) has a 63% evasion rate across scanners, and up to 50% higher evasion rates than existing attacks. Besides, PICKLEBENCH is up to 25.6% more challenging than three SOTA benchmarks. Finally, we provide security recommendations for mitigating our attacks and improving the effectiveness of existing scanners. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing PTM scanners and suggest directions for improvements.

The global economy is entering the era of Agentic Commerce, where autonomous agents can discover services, negotiate prices, and transact value. However adoption towards agentic commerce faces a foundational trust gap: current systems are built for direct human interactions rather than agent-driven operations. It lacks core primitives across three critical stages of agentic transactions. First, Task Delegation lacks means to translate user intent into defined scopes, discover appropriate agents, and securely authorize actions. Second, Payment Settlement for tasks is processed before execution, lacking verifiable evidence to validate the agent's work. Third, Audit Mechanisms fail to capture the full transaction lifecycle, preventing clear accountability for disputes. While emerging standards address fragments of this trust gap, there still remains a critical need for a unified infrastructure that binds the entire transaction lifecycle. To resolve this gap, we introduce TessPay, a unified infrastructure that replaces implicit trust with a 'Verify-then-Pay' architecture. It is a two plane architecture separating control and verification from settlement. TessPay operationalizes trust across four distinct stages: Before execution, agents are anchored in a canonical registry and user intent is captured as verifiable mandates, enabling stakeholder accountability. During execution, funds are locked in escrow while the agent executes the task and generates cryptographic evidence (TLS Notary, TEE etc.) to support Proof of Task Execution (PoTE). At settlement, the system verifies this evidence and releases funds only when the PoTE satisfies verification predicates; modular rail adapters ensure this PoTE-gated escrow remains chain-agnostic across heterogeneous payment rails. After settlement, TessPay preserves a tamper-evident audit trail to enable clear accountability for dispute resolution.

We introduce PoSME (Proof of Sequential Memory Execution), a cryptographic primitive that enforces sustained sequential computation via latency-bound pointer chasing over a mutable arena. Each step reads data-dependent addresses, writes a block whose value and causal hash are mutually dependent (symbiotic binding), and chains the result into a global transcript. This yields three properties: (1) strict linear sequential memory-step enforcement, (2) high time-memory trade-off resistance (a tenfold penalty at a write density of 4, with a formal space-time lower bound that scales quadratically with the number of steps), and (3) a tight ASIC advantage bound by DRAM random-access latency rather than bandwidth. Benchmarks across 17 CPU platforms and 4 GPU architectures demonstrate that hash computation is under 3.5 percent of step cost and GPU hardware is 14 to 19 times slower than a consumer CPU. POSME requires no trusted setup and provides a foundation for verifiable delay, authorship attestation, and Sybil resistance.

As LLM agents take on offensive security work, a single out-of-scope tool call can breach a client's engagement boundary, disrupt production, or void a bug-bounty finding. Unlike a fixed safety policy, the boundary that matters is declared in the user's request and must be inferred from intent. That challenge is sharpened by the adversarial nature of offensive security: the same tool call is in or out of scope depending not on the action itself but on the target it touches and the context in which it runs, which no fixed policy can enumerate in advance. We study pre-execution gating: a cheap, trusted LLM judge inspects each call proposed by a strong, swappable agent, and accepts or rejects it before it runs. We introduce ScopeJudge, a benchmark of 4,897 tool calls (7.7% scope violations) from agent trajectories on tasks engineered to tempt agents out of scope and labeled at the call level by professional penetration testers, with substantial inter-grader agreement (Fleiss kappa = 0.64) that sets an expert agreement reference point of F1 = 0.78. We evaluate eight judge models under five transcript strategies, varying how much context the judge sees, from the static policy alone to the full raw transcript, and chart the resulting cost-accuracy Pareto frontier. We find that a static policy is structurally insufficient for scope enforcement: blind to the user's request, judge recall collapses to near zero, confirming that scope lives in the request and that request-conditioned monitoring is necessary. Because a missed violation costs more than a spurious rejection, we report precision, recall, and F1 separately and recommend two operating points: a cost-sensitive configuration and a recall-first one for high-stakes deployments. We release the ScopeJudge dataset to support real-time monitoring and scalable oversight of autonomous security agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) augmented with external tools have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex reasoning tasks. However, existing frameworks rely heavily on natural language reasoning to determine when tools can be invoked and whether their results should be committed, lacking formal guarantees for logical safety and verifiability. We present ToolGate, a forward execution framework that provides logical safety guarantees and verifiable state evolution for LLM tool calling. ToolGate maintains an explicit symbolic state space as a typed key-value mapping representing trusted world information throughout the reasoning process. Each tool is formalized as a Hoare-style contract consisting of a precondition and a postcondition, where the precondition gates tool invocation by checking whether the current state satisfies the required conditions, and the postcondition determines whether the tool's result can be committed to update the state through runtime verification. Our approach guarantees that the symbolic state evolves only through verified tool executions, preventing invalid or hallucinated results from corrupting the world representation. Experimental validation demonstrates that ToolGate significantly improves the reliability and verifiability of tool-augmented LLM systems while maintaining competitive performance on complex multi-step reasoning tasks. This work establishes a foundation for building more trustworthy and debuggable AI systems that integrate language models with external tools.

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior to steal credentials or cause financial loss. The only known robust defense is architectural isolation that strictly separates trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs) -- systems that automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions -- presents a fundamental challenge: current agents require continuous observation of UI state to determine each action, conflicting with the isolation required for security. We resolve this tension by demonstrating that UI workflows, while dynamic, are structurally predictable. We introduce Single-Shot Planning for CUAs, where a trusted planner generates a complete execution graph with conditional branches before any observation of potentially malicious content, providing provable control flow integrity guarantees against arbitrary instruction injections. Although this architectural isolation successfully prevents instruction injections, we show that additional measures are needed to prevent Branch Steering attacks, which manipulate UI elements to trigger unintended valid paths within the plan. We evaluate our design on OSWorld, and retain up to 57% of the performance of frontier models while improving performance for smaller open-source models by up to 19%, demonstrating that rigorous security and utility can coexist in CUAs.

Language-model agents read attacker-writable context to solve tasks. Tool execution needs a separate authority check for protected sink fields, sink-interpreted payloads, and the invocation event. Context-to-Execution Integrity (CXI) is an execution-boundary system for this setting. Policies mark protected sink fields, typed releases carry narrow validated values from writable context to specific destinations, opaque data slots keep evidence as data, and a deterministic gate admits a call only after field authority, exact-effect authorization, and invocation authority all bind to the same action manifest. We evaluate CXI on open-weight field-projection runs, AgentDojo live episodes, a code-agent exact-effect benchmark, manifest-bound ledger faults, proposal-pressure controls, and hosted/API compatibility traces. AgentDojo covers 720 live episodes and 1,739 LLM calls; the code-agent benchmark covers 400 repository episodes with exact-effect authorization and lease-bound execution, yielding 231 safe task completions and zero observed field, effect, or invocation escapes. The accounting reports parser outcomes, authorization outcomes, and task-quality outcomes together with the admission-integrity result. Across the evaluated sinks, CXI admits execution only when field, effect, and invocation authority bind to the same action manifest.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, introduces critical risks to safety, security, and privacy. These agents may deviate from user objectives, violate data handling policies, or be compromised by adversarial attacks. Mitigating these dangers necessitates a mechanism to formally guarantee that an agent's actions adhere to predefined safety constraints, a challenge that existing systems do not fully address. We introduce VeriGuard, a novel framework that provides formal safety guarantees for LLM-based agents through a dual-stage architecture designed for robust and verifiable correctness. The initial offline stage involves a comprehensive validation process. It begins by clarifying user intent to establish precise safety specifications. VeriGuard then synthesizes a behavioral policy and subjects it to both testing and formal verification to prove its compliance with these specifications. This iterative process refines the policy until it is deemed correct. Subsequently, the second stage provides online action monitoring, where VeriGuard operates as a runtime monitor to validate each proposed agent action against the pre-verified policy before execution. This separation of the exhaustive offline validation from the lightweight online monitoring allows formal guarantees to be practically applied, providing a robust safeguard that substantially improves the trustworthiness of LLM agents.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

LLM agents operating in open environments face escalating risks from indirect prompt injection, particularly within the tool stream where manipulated metadata and runtime feedback hijack execution flow. Existing defenses encounter a critical dilemma as advanced models prioritize injected rules due to strict alignment while static protection mechanisms sever the feedback loop required for adaptive reasoning. To reconcile this conflict, we propose VIGIL, a framework that shifts the paradigm from restrictive isolation to a verify-before-commit protocol. By facilitating speculative hypothesis generation and enforcing safety through intent-grounded verification, VIGIL preserves reasoning flexibility while ensuring robust control. We further introduce SIREN, a benchmark comprising 959 tool stream injection cases designed to simulate pervasive threats characterized by dynamic dependencies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VIGIL outperforms state-of-the-art dynamic defenses by reducing the attack success rate by over 22\% while more than doubling the utility under attack compared to static baselines, thereby achieving an optimal balance between security and utility.

Long-running LLM agents rely on persistent memory to carry state across interactions, including permissions, restrictions, and revocations. When memory misrepresents this evolving authorization state, the agent's own records can grant authority that the underlying history never permitted, resulting in misaligned behavior without any external attacks. We term this failure endogenous authorization laundering, where spurious permissions written into memory lead to unauthorized actions as their provenance is washed away. We then introduce EAL-Bench, which measures how accurately persistent memory preserves evolving authorization state and whether errors propagate to downstream unauthorized actions. We evaluate five LLMs as memory writers and two as executors across procurement, cybersecurity, and finance. We find that under incremental memory updates, writers create false authority for up to 50.2% of unauthorized requests; once false authority is present, executors act on it in 98.6% of trials. Two safeguards, requiring stored permissions to be backed by valid source events, and tracking permission changes through bounded event sourcing, substantially reduce laundering, but both also reject more legitimate actions, exposing a safety-utility tradeoff. Persistent memory is therefore not merely a performance component, but a part of an LLM agent's effective authorization policy.

Advances in large language models have enabled agentic AI systems that can reason, plan, and interact with external tools to execute multi-step workflows, while public blockchains have evolved into a programmable substrate for value transfer, access control, and verifiable state transitions. Their convergence introduces a high-stakes systems challenge: designing standard, interoperable, and secure interfaces that allow agents to observe on-chain state, formulate transaction intents, and authorize execution without exposing users, protocols, or organizations to unacceptable security, governance, or economic risks. This survey systematizes the emerging landscape of agent-blockchain interoperability through a systematic literature review, identifying 317 relevant works from an initial pool of over 3000 records. We contribute a five-part taxonomy of integration patterns spanning read-only analytics, simulation and intent generation, delegated execution, autonomous signing, and multi-agent workflows; a threat model tailored to agent-driven transaction pipelines that captures risks ranging from prompt injection and policy misuse to key compromise, adversarial execution dynamics, and multi-agent collusion; and a comparative capability matrix analyzing more than 20 representative systems across 13 dimensions, including custody models, permissioning, policy enforcement, observability, and recovery. Building on the gaps revealed by this analysis, we outline a research roadmap centered on two interface abstractions: a Transaction Intent Schema for portable and unambiguous goal specification, and a Policy Decision Record for auditable, verifiable policy enforcement across execution environments. We conclude by proposing a reproducible evaluation suite and benchmarks for assessing the safety, reliability, and economic robustness of agent-mediated on-chain execution.

AI agents powered by large language models are increasingly deployed as cloud services that autonomously access sensitive data, invoke external tools, and interact with other agents. However, these agents run within a complex multi-party ecosystem, where untrusted components can lead to data leakage, tampering, or unintended behavior. Existing Confidential Virtual Machines (CVMs) provide only per binary protection and offer no guarantees for cross-principal trust, accelerator-level isolation, or supervised agent behavior. We present Omega, a system that enables trusted AI agents by enforcing end-to-end isolation, establishing verifiable trust across all contributing principals, and supervising every external interaction with accountable provenance. Omega builds on Confidential VMs and Confidential GPUs to create a Trusted Agent Platform that hosts many agents within a single CVM using nested isolation. It also provides efficient multi-agent orchestration with cross-principal trust establishment via differential attestation, and a policy specification and enforcement framework that governs data access, tool usage, and inter-agent communication for data protection and regulatory compliance. Implemented on AMD SEV-SNP and NVIDIA H100, Omega fully secures agent state across CVM-GPU, and achieves high performance while enabling high-density, policy-compliant multi-agent deployments at cloud scale.

Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution. This integration also creates a new path to compromise: untrusted external content can be silently written into persistent memory and later reused as trusted state. We study this threat as stealth memory injection, in which a remote black-box adversary delivers a single email payload that must induce the agent to write poisoned memory, stay hidden in the agent's response to the user, and affect future behavior. We introduce WhisperBench, a 108-case benchmark spanning five risk categories and both fact and preference poisoning. Built on a real IMAP/SMTP workflow and an authentic email agent skill, it enables full-cycle evaluation of stealth memory injection attacks. To enable this black-box attack under single-email delivery and without runtime feedback, we propose MemGhost, a one-shot payload generation framework. MemGhost uses an environment proxy to emulate persistent-agent execution and an objective proxy to convert memory adoption and conversational stealth into dense rubric-based rewards, then trains the attacker policy with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. Across 56 held-out test cases, MemGhost achieves 87.5% end-to-end success on OpenClaw with GPT-5.4 and 71.4% on Claude Code SDK with Sonnet 4.6. It also transfers across personal-agent architectures (NanoClaw and Hermes Agent) and memory backends (filesystem and vector-based Mem0), and remains effective against input-level, model-level, and system-level defenses. These results suggest that persistent memory can turn ordinary external processing into a practical pathway for long-term agent compromise.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs) have enabled powerful autonomous agents capable of complex reasoning and multi-modal tool use. Despite their growing capabilities, today's agent frameworks remain fragile, lacking principled mechanisms for secure information flow, reliability, and multi-agent coordination. In this work, we introduce SAFEFLOW, a new protocol-level framework for building trustworthy LLM/VLM-based agents. SAFEFLOW enforces fine-grained information flow control (IFC), precisely tracking provenance, integrity, and confidentiality of all the data exchanged between agents, tools, users, and environments. By constraining LLM reasoning to respect these security labels, SAFEFLOW prevents untrusted or adversarial inputs from contaminating high-integrity decisions. To ensure robustness in concurrent multi-agent settings, SAFEFLOW introduces transactional execution, conflict resolution, and secure scheduling over shared state, preserving global consistency across agents. We further introduce mechanisms, including write-ahead logging, rollback, and secure caches, that further enhance resilience against runtime errors and policy violations. To validate the performances, we built SAFEFLOWBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark suite designed to evaluate agent reliability under adversarial, noisy, and concurrent operational conditions. Extensive experiments demonstrate that agents built with SAFEFLOW maintain impressive task performance and security guarantees even in hostile environments, substantially outperforming state-of-the-art. Together, SAFEFLOW and SAFEFLOWBENCH lay the groundwork for principled, robust, and secure agent ecosystems, advancing the frontier of reliable autonomy.

LLM agents increasingly run inside execution harnesses that dispatch tools, allocate resources, and route messages between specialized components. However, a harness can return a correct, benign answer over a trajectory that accesses unauthorized resources or leaks context to the wrong agent. Output-level evaluation cannot see these failures, yet most safety benchmarks score only final outputs or terminal states, even though many violations occur mid-trajectory rather than at termination. The central question is whether the harness respects user intent, permission boundaries, and information-flow constraints throughout execution. To address this gap, we propose HarnessAudit, a framework that audits full execution trajectories across boundary compliance, execution fidelity, and system stability, with a focus on multi-agent harnesses where these risks are most pronounced. We further introduce HarnessAudit-Bench, a benchmark of 210 tasks across eight real-world domains, instantiated in both single-agent and multi-agent configurations with embedded safety constraints. Evaluating ten harness configurations across frontier models and three multi-agent frameworks, we find that: (i) task completion is misaligned with safe execution, and violations accumulate with trajectory length; (ii) safety risks vary across domains, task types, and agent roles; (iii) most violations concentrate in resource access and inter-agent information transfer; and (iv) multi-agent collaboration expands the safety risk surface, while harness design sets the upper bound of safe deployment.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

Large language model safeguards decide whether to answer before seeing how an answer will be used. This creates a basic problem for dual-use tasks: the same answer can help an authorized professional or an attacker, while an attacker can imitate a benign request and interaction history. We separate the capability released by the model from the evidence available about downstream use. When that evidence is copyable, we derive the exact worst-case floor on attacker assistance while preserving useful answers. The result yields a safety trilemma: Useful Capability, Reliable Safety, and Open Access cannot coexist. We then show how a trusted credential can complement existing safeguards by adding hard-to-copy information that predicts actual downstream use, and identify the stronger condition needed to eliminate the floor. Evidence from dual-use evaluations, adaptive attacks, and deployed trusted-access programs supports the practical relevance of these conditions.

Agentic systems built on large language models (LLMs) extend beyond text generation to autonomously retrieve information and invoke tools. This runtime execution model shifts the attack surface from build-time artifacts to inference-time dependencies, exposing agents to manipulation through untrusted data and probabilistic capability resolution. While prior work has focused on model-level vulnerabilities, security risks emerging from cyclic and interdependent runtime behavior remain fragmented. We systematize these risks within a unified runtime framework, categorizing threats into data supply chain attacks (transient context injection and persistent memory poisoning) and tool supply chain attacks (discovery, implementation, and invocation). We further identify the Viral Agent Loop, in which agents act as vectors for self-propagating generative worms without exploiting code-level flaws. Finally, we advocate a Zero-Trust Runtime Architecture that treats context as untrusted control flow and constrains tool execution through cryptographic provenance rather than semantic inference.

Large language model (LLM) agents are evolving from conversational assistants into autonomous systems that execute long-horizon tasks through reasoning, tool use, code generation, and workspace manipulation. As agents increasingly operate over persistent environments and multi-step workflows, they face challenges analogous to those addressed by transactional database systems: reliable execution, consistent outcomes, safe concurrency, and durable state management. We introduce the concept of an agentic transaction and propose an ACID-compliant agent system framework that reinterprets the classical ACID properties for agent execution through four semantic guarantees: Semantic Atomicity, Semantic Consistency, Semantic Isolation, and Semantic Durability. Together, these properties provide a principled foundation for building reliable agent systems despite model uncertainty and dynamic execution environments. To instantiate this framework, we develop an ACID-compliant data agent that realizes these guarantees through transactional exploration-execution-validation cycles, transactional skill hubs, confidence divergence-based validation, semantic dependency-aware isolation, and transaction-aware semantic state management. Experimental results on widely used benchmarks show that our system achieves a 10.6% improvement over state-of-the-art agents, including Claude Code. This work opens a broader research agenda on extending transactional principles and system architectures toward building trustworthy, scalable, and self-evolving AI agent systems.

Decentralized Finance (DeFi) has turned blockchains into financial infrastructure, allowing anyone to trade, lend, and build protocols without intermediaries, but this openness exposes pools of value controlled by code. Within five years, the DeFi ecosystem has lost over 15.75B USD to reported exploits. Many exploits arise from permissionless opportunities that any participant can trigger using only public state and standard interfaces, which we call Anyone-Can-Take (ACT) opportunities. Despite on-chain transparency, postmortem analysis remains slow and manual: investigations start from limited evidence, sometimes only a single transaction hash, and must reconstruct the exploit lifecycle by recovering related transactions, contract code, and state dependencies. We present TxRay, a Large Language Model (LLM) agentic postmortem system that uses tool calls to reconstruct live ACT attacks from limited evidence. Starting from one or more seed transactions, TxRay recovers the exploit lifecycle, derives an evidence-backed root cause, and generates a runnable, self-contained Proof of Concept (PoC) that deterministically reproduces the incident. TxRay self-checks postmortems by encoding incident-specific semantic oracles as executable assertions. To evaluate PoC correctness and quality, we develop PoCEvaluator, an independent agentic execution-and-review evaluator. On 114 incidents from DeFiHackLabs, TxRay produces an expert-aligned root cause and an executable PoC for 105 incidents, achieving 92.11% end-to-end reproduction. Under PoCEvaluator, 98.1% of TxRay PoCs avoid hard-coding attacker addresses, a +22.9pp lift over DeFiHackLabs. In a live deployment, TxRay delivers validated root causes in 40 minutes and PoCs in 59 minutes at median latency. TxRay's oracle-validated PoCs enable attack imitation, improving coverage by 15.6% and 65.5% over STING and APE.

Large language models are increasingly applied to various development scenarios. However, in on-chain transaction scenarios, even a minor error can cause irreversible loss for users. Existing evaluations often overlook execution accuracy and safety. We introduce EVM-QuestBench, an execution-grounded benchmark for natural-language transaction-script generation on EVM-compatible chains. The benchmark employs dynamic evaluation: instructions are sampled from template pools, numeric parameters are drawn from predefined intervals, and validators verify outcomes against these instantiated values. EVM-QuestBench contains 107 tasks (62 atomic, 45 composite). Its modular architecture enables rapid task development. The runner executes scripts on a forked EVM chain with snapshot isolation; composite tasks apply step-efficiency decay. We evaluate 20 models and find large performance gaps, with split scores revealing persistent asymmetry between single-action precision and multi-step workflow completion. Code: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/bsc_quest_bench-A9CF/.

Large language models (LLMs), exemplified by ChatGPT, have gained considerable attention for their excellent natural language processing capabilities. Nonetheless, these LLMs present many challenges, particularly in the realm of trustworthiness. Therefore, ensuring the trustworthiness of LLMs emerges as an important topic. This paper introduces TrustLLM, a comprehensive study of trustworthiness in LLMs, including principles for different dimensions of trustworthiness, established benchmark, evaluation, and analysis of trustworthiness for mainstream LLMs, and discussion of open challenges and future directions. Specifically, we first propose a set of principles for trustworthy LLMs that span eight different dimensions. Based on these principles, we further establish a benchmark across six dimensions including truthfulness, safety, fairness, robustness, privacy, and machine ethics. We then present a study evaluating 16 mainstream LLMs in TrustLLM, consisting of over 30 datasets. Our findings firstly show that in general trustworthiness and utility (i.e., functional effectiveness) are positively related. Secondly, our observations reveal that proprietary LLMs generally outperform most open-source counterparts in terms of trustworthiness, raising concerns about the potential risks of widely accessible open-source LLMs. However, a few open-source LLMs come very close to proprietary ones. Thirdly, it is important to note that some LLMs may be overly calibrated towards exhibiting trustworthiness, to the extent that they compromise their utility by mistakenly treating benign prompts as harmful and consequently not responding. Finally, we emphasize the importance of ensuring transparency not only in the models themselves but also in the technologies that underpin trustworthiness. Knowing the specific trustworthy technologies that have been employed is crucial for analyzing their effectiveness.

LLM agents choose tools and arguments from context that mixes user requests, tool outputs, retrieved records, memory, and untrusted text. Evidence can be relevant without being authorized to determine a decision, so a correct action need not be grounded only in permitted evidence. We introduce a target-specific authorization audit that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target. Its primary test holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority. We then test behavior when valid evidence is weakened and use context-subset interactions as a secondary localization diagnostic. Across 450 controlled next-action tasks and multiple open-weight LLM families, trusted and untrusted variants produce different actions in 5.4 percent of competing cases versus 1.7 percent of supporting cases. Under controlled degradation, unauthorized competition is retained in a full-correct, mixed-error, clean-correct pattern in 2.4 percent of comparisons, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.1 to 3.0 percent. These are controlled stress-set rates, not deployment prevalence. The models respond to textual source-authority cues, but this does not prevent untrusted evidence from influencing their actions.

Large language models are aligned to be safe, preventing users from generating harmful content like misinformation or instructions for illegal activities. However, previous work has shown that the alignment process is vulnerable to poisoning attacks. Adversaries can manipulate the safety training data to inject backdoors that act like a universal sudo command: adding the backdoor string to any prompt enables harmful responses from models that, otherwise, behave safely. Our competition, co-located at IEEE SaTML 2024, challenged participants to find universal backdoors in several large language models. This report summarizes the key findings and promising ideas for future research.

AI agents extend large language models (LLMs) with external tools, enabling them to perform complex tasks and translate model outputs into consequential real-world actions. Yet LLMs often become substantially less safe when deployed as agents, and the source of this degradation remains poorly understood. In this paper, we identify schema-formatted tool specifications as a primary source of agent safety degradation and show, through white-box representation analysis, that they weaken the model's internal refusal signals and contribute to unsafe tool execution. Building on this finding, we propose SafeKeep, an inference-time safeguard that decouples safety judgment from tool execution: it assesses requests using flattened textual tool specifications while retaining the original schema-formatted specifications for execution. Across two representative benchmarks and four LLMs, including both white-box and black-box models, SafeKeep increases the average refusal rate for harmful requests from 23.8% to 70.6% and reduces the average attack success rate under observation-level prompt injection from 25.6% to 2.5%. It also outperforms existing safeguards and preserves task-handling capability. We release the code and data at https://github.com/snowcatsmoking/SafeKeep .

Large language model (LLM) agents are vulnerable to prompt-injection attacks that propagate through multi-step workflows, tool interactions, and persistent context, making input-output filtering alone insufficient for reliable protection. This paper presents SafeAgent, a runtime security architecture that treats agent safety as a stateful decision problem over evolving interaction trajectories. The proposed design separates execution governance from semantic risk reasoning through two coordinated components: a runtime controller that mediates actions around the agent loop and a context-aware decision core that operates over persistent session state. The core is formalized as a context-aware advanced machine intelligence and instantiated through operators for risk encoding, utility-cost evaluation, consequence modeling, policy arbitration, and state synchronization. Experiments on Agent Security Bench (ASB) and InjecAgent show that SafeAgent consistently improves robustness over baseline and text-level guardrail methods while maintaining competitive benign-task performance. Ablation studies further show that recovery confidence and policy weighting determine distinct safety-utility operating points.

AI agents increasingly act through external tools: they query databases, execute shell commands, read and write files, and send network requests. Yet in most current agent stacks, model-generated tool calls are handed to the execution layer with no framework-agnostic control point in between. Post-execution observability can record these actions, but it cannot stop them before side effects occur. We present AEGIS, a pre-execution firewall and audit layer for AI agents. AEGIS interposes on the tool-execution path and applies a three-stage pipeline: (i) deep string extraction from tool arguments, (ii) content-first risk scanning, and (iii) composable policy validation. High-risk calls can be held for human approval, and all decisions are recorded in a tamper-evident audit trail based on Ed25519 signatures and SHA-256 hash chaining. In the current implementation, AEGIS supports 14 agent frameworks across Python, JavaScript, and Go with lightweight integration. On a curated suite of 48 attackinstances, AEGIS blocks all attacks in the suite before execution; on 500 benign tool calls, it yields a 1.2% false positive rate; and across 1,000 consecutive interceptions, it adds 8.3 ms median latency. The live demo will show end-to-end interception of benign, malicious, and human-escalated tool calls, allowing attendees to observe real-time blocking, approval workflows, and audit-trail generation. These results suggest that pre-execution mediation for AI agents can be practical, low-overhead, and directly deployable.

Text-to-SQL parsing has achieved remarkable progress under the Full Schema Assumption. However, this premise fails in real-world enterprise environments where databases contain hundreds of tables with massive noisy metadata. Rather than injecting the full schema upfront, an agent must actively identify and verify only the relevant subset, giving rise to the Unknown Schema scenario we study in this work. To address this, we propose TRUST-SQL (Truthful Reasoning with Unknown Schema via Tools). We formulate the task as a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process where our autonomous agent employs a structured four-phase protocol to ground reasoning in verified metadata. Crucially, this protocol provides a structural boundary for our novel Dual-Track GRPO strategy. By applying token-level masked advantages, this strategy isolates exploration rewards from execution outcomes to resolve credit assignment, yielding a 9.9% relative improvement over standard GRPO. Extensive experiments across five benchmarks demonstrate that TRUST-SQL achieves an average absolute improvement of 30.6% and 16.6% for the 4B and 8B variants respectively over their base models. Remarkably, despite operating entirely without pre-loaded metadata, our framework consistently matches or surpasses strong baselines that rely on schema prefilling.

Compressing high-capability Large Language Models (LLMs) has emerged as a favored strategy for resource-efficient inferences. While state-of-the-art (SoTA) compression methods boast impressive advancements in preserving benign task performance, the potential risks of compression in terms of safety and trustworthiness have been largely neglected. This study conducts the first, thorough evaluation of three (3) leading LLMs using five (5) SoTA compression techniques across eight (8) trustworthiness dimensions. Our experiments highlight the intricate interplay between compression and trustworthiness, revealing some interesting patterns. We find that quantization is currently a more effective approach than pruning in achieving efficiency and trustworthiness simultaneously. For instance, a 4-bit quantized model retains the trustworthiness of its original counterpart, but model pruning significantly degrades trustworthiness, even at 50% sparsity. Moreover, employing quantization within a moderate bit range could unexpectedly improve certain trustworthiness dimensions such as ethics and fairness. Conversely, extreme quantization to very low bit levels (3 bits) tends to significantly reduce trustworthiness. This increased risk cannot be uncovered by looking at benign performance alone, in turn, mandating comprehensive trustworthiness evaluation in practice. These findings culminate in practical recommendations for simultaneously achieving high utility, efficiency, and trustworthiness in LLMs. Models and code are available at https://decoding-comp-trust.github.io/.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

Agent skills extend LLM agents with reusable procedures, tools, and domain-specific workflows, but their safety depends on resolving dependencies among interacting instructions. We introduce SkillLogic, a framework for analyzing logical relations in skill files and constructing executable tests from them. Our taxonomy covers eight relation types, including preconditions that gate valid actions, constraints that limit how allowed actions may be performed, and fallbacks that specify recovery behavior after failure. Using SkillLogic, we scan over 5000 public skills and find that 70% contain at least one logical relation. We then construct SLBench, an 86-case executable benchmark from high-confidence, high-impact, and locally testable relations. Evaluating Codex and Claude Code across six LLM backbones shows unsafe rates up to 70%, with violations leading to privacy leaks, unsafe configuration changes, and incomplete cleanup. The human audit attributes failures to both agent capability gaps and low-salience skill text. We further show that SLGuard, a lightweight inference-time scaffold, reduces violations by 63% on targeted cases. Our results establish logical-relation following as a distinct reliability challenge for skill-guided agents.

Given the impressive capabilities of recent Large Language Models (LLMs), we investigate and benchmark the most popular proprietary and different sized open source models on the task of explicit instruction following in conflicting situations, e.g. overrides. These include the ability of the model to override the knowledge within the weights of the model, the ability to override (or moderate) extracted knowledge in the prompt, and lastly the ability to perform a full jailbreak. Experimentation performed suggest several key findings to improve instruction following - larger models perform the best in following instructions that override internal and contextual instructions, and are obedient, even to a fault. When scaling to longer contexts via rope scaling, a significant buffer needs to be maintained from the edge of the perplexity cliff in order to maintain instruction following capabilities. Finally, we observe improving instruction following, and subsequently instruction overrides/jailbreaks, is fundamentally at odds with the ability of a language model to follow given safety filters or guidelines. Thus, we postulate the most effective approach for safe, trustworthy AI should be dealt external to the LLM itself.

Agentic systems enhance their capabilities by invoking external tools and maintaining persistent memory. However, these external dependencies introduce novel attack surfaces. Recent tool and memory poisoning attacks show that maliciously crafted tool descriptors and poisoned memory can covertly bias agent behavior. These threats reflect a deeper issue: the lack of verifiable continuity in the agent's contextual state for planning and execution. We present ElephantAgent, a protocol that enforces Contextual State Continuity to defend against contextual state poisoning. Inspired by prior state-continuity mechanisms (e.g., Nimble), ElephantAgent extends this protection to the evolving contextual state of agentic systems. We define the contextual state as the bounded, security-critical subset of the agent's entire context (e.g., tool state and memory). Before processing each query, ElephantAgent recomputes the digest of the local contextual state and verifies it against the latest authorized digest. Using replicated trusted hardware, ElephantAgent maintains a linearizable ledger of authorized contextual state transitions and detects out-of-band state tampering. To handle in-band semantic abuse, ElephantAgent additionally provides Historical Traceability, enabling conditional post-hoc audit and recovery to a known-good prior state.

As large language models (LLMs) become high-privilege agents in risk-sensitive settings, they introduce systemic threats beyond hallucination, where minor compliance errors can cause critical data leaks. However, existing benchmarks focus on rule-based QA, lacking agentic execution modeling, overlooking compliance drift in adversarial interactions, and relying on binary safety metrics that fail to capture behavioral degradation. To bridge these gaps, we present CNFinBench, a comprehensive benchmark spanning 29 subtasks grounded in the triad of expertise, autonomy, and integrity. It assesses domain-specific capabilities through certified regulatory corpora and professional financial tasks, reconstructs end-to-end agent workflows from requirement parsing to tool verification, and simulates multi-turn adversarial attacks that induce behavioral compliance drift. To quantify safety degradation, we introduce the Harmful Instruction Compliance Score (HICS), a multi-dimensional safety metric that integrates risk-type-specific deductions, multi-turn consistency tracking, and severity-adjusted penalty scaling based on fine-grained violation triggers. Evaluations over 22 open-/closed-source models reveal: LLMs perform well in applied tasks yet lack robust rule understanding, suffer a 15.4-point drop single modules to full execution chains, and collapse rapidly in multi-turn attacks, with average violations surging by 172.3% in Round 2. CNFinBench is available at https://cnfinbench.opencompass.org.cn and https://github.com/VertiAIBench/CNFinBench.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

AI agents act on behalf of user prompts, consuming external data and taking actions based on the agent context. Prior research on AI agent security has primarily focused on indirect prompt injection (IPI). Its most well-studied category is instruction injection, where attacker-controlled untrusted data is interpreted as an instruction. In response, many mitigations have been proposed to prevent instruction injection attacks. In this paper, we introduce a new category of IPI, agent data injection attacks (ADI). ADI injects malicious data disguised as trusted data, such as security-critical metadata (e.g., resource identifiers or data origins) or agent context data (e.g., tool call and response formats). As a result, agents unknowingly execute unintended actions based on attacker-controlled data. ADI has similar attack impacts as instruction injection attacks, because it causes agents to misbehave and execute unintended actions. Despite the similar impact, ADI remains underexplored and easily bypasses existing IPI defenses. We found several critical vulnerabilities in real-world agents that allow an attacker to launch various attacks: arbitrary click attacks on web agents (Claude in Chrome, Antigravity, and Nanobrowser), and remote code execution and supply-chain attacks on coding agents (Claude Code, Codex, and Gemini CLI). We evaluate ADI vulnerabilities across off-the-shelf models and AI agents, and find that ADI is effective in both standalone LLMs and AI agent settings. ADI exposes a critical gap in agent security, signifying that current AI agents do not employ a fundamental security principle: current agents do not isolate trusted data from untrusted data.

Agent skills provide a lightweight mechanism for extending general-purpose agents, but their open format exposes them to skill-poisoning attacks. A practically dangerous injection must stay invisible: if executing the payload derails the user's legitimate task, the resulting failure signal invites inspection of the skill. We therefore evaluate attacks by Attack Success Rate, which requires the injected payload to execute and the user's task to still pass its verifier in the same trial. Prior skill-poisoning attacks face a reliability-stealth trade-off under this lens: YAML-header injections are reliably loaded but easily inspected, whereas stealthier body injections that place explicit malicious commands in the skill prose are less reliable because out-of-context commands invite the agent's own suspicion. We introduce POISE, a position-aware attack that compresses the trigger into a single, benign-looking body instruction, placing it at a feasible position and using a context-aware generator to blend it with nearby setup or prerequisite steps. On Skill-Inject with codex+gpt-5.2, POISE achieves an 89.3% ASR, 28.0 points above a random-placement body baseline and 2.6 points above a YAML-only baseline, while retaining the stealth advantage of body placement. That stealth is the decisive margin: because legitimate skill bodies naturally require privileged tool operations, LLM scanners are hyper-sensitive, falsely flagging 74.6% of clean skills on average across four judges and both benchmarks. Blending into these false alarms, POISE causes only 5.6% of poisoned variants to gain a new high-risk alert over their clean baselines, rendering current static defenses ineffective.

This paper reviews Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence (TAI) and its various definitions. Considering the principles respected in any society, TAI is often characterized by a few attributes, some of which have led to confusion in regulatory or engineering contexts. We argue against using terms such as Responsible or Ethical AI as substitutes for TAI. And to help clarify any confusion, we suggest leaving them behind. Given the subjectivity and complexity inherent in TAI, developing a universal framework is deemed infeasible. Instead, we advocate for approaches centered on addressing key attributes and properties such as fairness, bias, risk, security, explainability, and reliability. We examine the ongoing regulatory landscape, with a focus on initiatives in the EU, China, and the USA. We recognize that differences in AI regulations based on geopolitical and geographical reasons pose an additional challenge for multinational companies. We identify risk as a core factor in AI regulation and TAI. For example, as outlined in the EU-AI Act, organizations must gauge the risk level of their AI products to act accordingly (or risk hefty fines). We compare modalities of TAI implementation and how multiple cross-functional teams are engaged in the overall process. Thus, a brute force approach for enacting TAI renders its efficiency and agility, moot. To address this, we introduce our framework Set-Formalize-Measure-Act (SFMA). Our solution highlights the importance of transforming TAI-aware metrics, drivers of TAI, stakeholders, and business/legal requirements into actual benchmarks or tests. Finally, over-regulation driven by panic of powerful AI models can, in fact, harm TAI too. Based on GitHub user-activity data, in 2023, AI open-source projects rose to top projects by contributor account. Enabling innovation in TAI hinges on the independent contributions of the open-source community.

Although Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have progressed in solving complex problems, their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning often contains harmful content that can persist even when the final responses appear safe. We show that this issue still remains in existing methods which overlook the unique significance of safe reasoning, undermining their trustworthiness and posing potential risks in applications if unsafe reasoning is accessible for and exploited by malicious users. We therefore shift our focus to aligning the safety of reasoning itself in this paper and explore process supervision as the solution. However, simply rewarding safe reasoning proves inadequate due to low rollout diversity and limited training signals. To tackle this challenge, we first delve into the characteristics of safe reasoning and uncover several critical insights that 1) safe reasoning is often consolidated by a few critical steps of safety triggers; 2) compliance cues strongly correlate with unsafe continuations; and 3) corrective interventions reliably steer unsafe trajectories towards safer traces. Motivated by these, we propose Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), an alignment method that enforces safe reasoning by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers and constructing pairs for preference learning with strong signals. Experiments on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that IPO remarkably improves overall safety regarding both reasoning and responses, outperforming SFT-based and RL-based baselines with a relative reduction of over 30% in harmfulness, while preserving excellent performance across diverse reasoning tasks. The results highlight the importance of explicit alignment for reasoning and provide a practical path to safer LRMs.

Users rely on execution traces to observe agent behavior, diagnose failures, and ensure accountability. These traces contain rich procedural detail, including tool invocations, intermediate decisions, and error-recovery logic. Yet this detail can expose private procedural skills, allowing downstream methods to recover key formulas, thresholds, and strategies without access to model weights or skill files. To quantify this risk and evaluate protection, we construct CapTraceBench, a benchmark of 75 specialized long-horizon tasks and 154 curated skills across seven domains. We also introduce RedAct https://github.com/XuShuwenn/RedAct, a protected trace release framework that localizes protected key information, rewrites traces while preserving verifier-critical evidence, and embeds behavioral watermarks for downstream provenance analysis. Across representative trace reuse methods, RedAct reduces normalized skill transfer (NST) from 44.7--67.1\% on raw traces to below the no-skill baseline, while preserving audit evidence. Its standalone behavioral watermarks reach 93.6--100.0\% true detection with a false alarm rate of at most 1.9\%. These results frame public agent traces as security interfaces and show that selective redaction can reduce procedural capability leakage without removing audit evidence.

Rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) has achieved major advances in reasoning, planning, and function-calling capabilities. Multi-agentic collaborative frameworks using such LLMs place them at the center of solving software development-related tasks such as code generation. However, direct use of LLM generated code in production software development systems is problematic. The code could be unstable or erroneous and contain vulnerabilities such as data poisoning, malicious attacks, and hallucinations that could lead to widespread system malfunctions. This prohibits the adoption of LLM generated code in production AI systems where human code reviews and traditional secure testing tools are impractical or untrustworthy. In this paper, we discuss safety and reliability problems with the execution of LLM generated code and propose a Secure Transpiler and Executor of LLM-Generated Program (STELP), capable of executing LLM-generated code in a controlled and safe manner. STELP secures autonomous production AI systems involving code generation, filling the critical void left by the impracticality or limitations of traditional secure testing methodologies and human oversight. This includes applications such as headless code generation-execution and LLMs that produce executable code snippets as an action plan to be executed in real time. We contribute a human-validated dataset of insecure code snippets and benchmark our approach on publicly available datasets for correctness, safety, and latency. Our results demonstrate that our approach outperforms an existing method by a significant margin, particularly in its ability to safely execute risky code snippets. Warning: This paper contains malicious code snippets that should be run with caution.

LLM-based coding agents extend their capabilities via third-party agent skills distributed through open marketplaces without mandatory security review. Unlike traditional packages, these skills are executed as operational directives with system-level privileges, so a single malicious skill can compromise the host. Prior work has not examined whether supply-chain attacks can directly hijack an agent's action space, such as file writes, shell commands, and network requests, despite existing safeguards. We introduce Document-Driven Implicit Payload Execution (DDIPE), which embeds malicious logic in code examples and configuration templates within skill documentation. Because agents reuse these examples during normal tasks, the payload executes without explicit prompts. Using an LLM-driven pipeline, we generate 1,070 adversarial skills from 81 seeds across 15 MITRE ATTACK categories. Across four frameworks and five models, DDIPE achieves 11.6% to 33.5% bypass rates, while explicit instruction attacks achieve 0% under strong defenses. Static analysis detects most cases, but 2.5% evade both detection and alignment. Responsible disclosure led to four confirmed vulnerabilities and two fixes.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

AI coding agents now read repositories, call tools, and execute shell commands with limited human oversight, and a fast-growing body of work studies whether the execution layer around them is actually safe. That literature is scattered. Papers on sandbox isolation, capability and access control, policy enforcement, time-of-check-to-time-of-use (TOCTOU) races, Model Context Protocol (MCP) threats, identity delegation, execution provenance, network egress control, and static analysis of agent-generated code are published independently and rarely cite one another. We systematize 39 papers published between 2023 and 2026 into 17 categories, each verified directly against its source. The same verification protocol also confirms four disclosed, patched CVEs directly affecting production agent harnesses. Reading across categories surfaces five cross-cutting gaps that no single paper addresses. (1) Isolation architectures and capability models are almost never evaluated against one another on a shared benchmark. (2) Policy-enforcement studies report failure rates from 69% to 98% of real denylists, yet no isolation paper re-evaluates its own defense under that adversarial setting. (3) TOCTOU and MCP threats are analyzed as separate literatures despite both being instances of the same state-validation problem. (4) Every enforcement mechanism assumes an honest policy author, leaving policy-authoring error itself unaddressed. (5) Benign but out-of-scope agent actions occurring at rates up to 17.1% under realistic prompting are addressed by no access-control or capability paper in the corpus. Existing broader surveys of agentic AI security discuss sandboxing only as one item among many defenses, leaving execution security without a dedicated systematization. This paper is written to fill that gap. We conclude with a research agenda directed at the five gaps.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs) into autonomous, tool-calling agents has fundamentally altered the cybersecurity landscape. Frameworks like OpenClaw grant AI systems operating-system-level permissions and the autonomy to execute complex workflows. This level of access creates unprecedented security challenges. Consequently, traditional content-filtering defenses have become obsolete. This report presents a comprehensive security analysis of the OpenClaw ecosystem. We systematically investigate its current threat landscape, highlighting critical vulnerabilities such as prompt injection-driven Remote Code Execution (RCE), sequential tool attack chains, context amnesia, and supply chain contamination. To systematically contextualize these threats, we propose a novel tri-layered risk taxonomy for autonomous Agents, categorizing vulnerabilities across AI Cognitive, Software Execution, and Information System dimensions. To address these systemic architectural flaws, we introduce the Full-Lifecycle Agent Security Architecture (FASA). This theoretical defense blueprint advocates for zero-trust agentic execution, dynamic intent verification, and cross-layer reasoning-action correlation. Building on this framework, we present Project ClawGuard, our ongoing engineering initiative. This project aims to implement the FASA paradigm and transition autonomous agents from high-risk experimental utilities into trustworthy systems. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/NY1024/ClawGuard.

OpenClaw has rapidly established itself as a leading open-source autonomous agent runtime, offering powerful capabilities including tool integration, local file access, and shell command execution. However, these broad operational privileges introduce critical security vulnerabilities, transforming model errors into tangible system-level threats such as sensitive data leakage, privilege escalation, and malicious third-party skill execution. Existing security measures for the OpenClaw ecosystem remain highly fragmented, addressing only isolated stages of the agent lifecycle rather than providing holistic protection. To bridge this gap, we present ClawKeeper, a real-time security framework that integrates multi-dimensional protection mechanisms across three complementary architectural layers. (1) Skill-based protection operates at the instruction level, injecting structured security policies directly into the agent context to enforce environment-specific constraints and cross-platform boundaries. (2) Plugin-based protection serves as an internal runtime enforcer, providing configuration hardening, proactive threat detection, and continuous behavioral monitoring throughout the execution pipeline. (3) Watcher-based protection introduces a novel, decoupled system-level security middleware that continuously verifies agent state evolution. It enables real-time execution intervention without coupling to the agent's internal logic, supporting operations such as halting high-risk actions or enforcing human confirmation. We argue that this Watcher paradigm holds strong potential to serve as a foundational building block for securing next-generation autonomous agent systems. Extensive qualitative and quantitative evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of ClawKeeper across diverse threat scenarios. We release our code.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated, multi-stage pipelines, risk patterns that arise from unvalidated trust between processing stages become a practical concern. This paper presents a mechanism-centered taxonomy of 41 recurring risk patterns in commercial LLMs. The analysis shows that inputs are often interpreted non-neutrally and can trigger implementation-shaped responses or unintended state changes even without explicit commands. We argue that these behaviors constitute architectural failure modes and that string-level filtering alone is insufficient. To mitigate such cross-stage vulnerabilities, we recommend zero-trust architectural principles, including provenance enforcement, context sealing, and plan revalidation, and we introduce "Countermind" as a conceptual blueprint for implementing these defenses.

We present Springdrift, a persistent runtime for long-lived LLM agents. The system integrates an auditable execution substrate (append-only memory, supervised processes, git-backed recovery), a case-based reasoning memory layer with hybrid retrieval (evaluated against a dense cosine baseline), a deterministic normative calculus for safety gating with auditable axiom trails, and continuous ambient self-perception via a structured self-state representation (the sensorium) injected each cycle without tool calls. These properties support behaviours difficult to achieve in session-bounded systems: cross-session task continuity, cross-channel context maintenance, end-to-end forensic reconstruction of decisions, and self-diagnostic behaviour. We report on a single-instance deployment over 23 days (19 operating days), during which the agent diagnosed its own infrastructure bugs, classified failure modes, identified an architectural vulnerability, and maintained context across email and web channels -- without explicit instruction. We introduce the term Artificial Retainer for this category: a non-human system with persistent memory, defined authority, domain-specific autonomy, and forensic accountability in an ongoing relationship with a specific principal -- distinguished from software assistants and autonomous agents, drawing on professional retainer relationships and the bounded autonomy of trained working animals. This is a technical report on a systems design and deployment case study, not a benchmark-driven evaluation. Evidence is from a single instance with a single operator, presented as illustration of what these architectural properties can support in practice. Implemented in approximately Gleam on Erlang/OTP. Code, artefacts, and redacted operational logs will be available at https://github.com/seamus-brady/springdrift upon publication.

As AI agents automate critical workloads, they remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection (IPI) attacks. Current defenses rely on monitoring protocols that jointly evaluate an agent's Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and tool-use actions to ensure alignment with user intent. We demonstrate that these monitoring-based defenses can be bypassed via a novel Agent-as-a-Proxy attack, where prompt injection attacks treat the agent as a delivery mechanism, bypassing both agent and monitor simultaneously. While prior work on scalable oversight has focused on whether small monitors can supervise large agents, we show that even frontier-scale monitors are vulnerable. Large-scale monitoring models like Qwen2.5-72B can be bypassed by agents with similar capabilities, such as GPT-4o mini and Llama-3.1-70B. On the AgentDojo benchmark, we achieve a high attack success rate against AlignmentCheck and Extract-and-Evaluate monitors under diverse monitoring LLMs. Our findings suggest current monitoring-based agentic defenses are fundamentally fragile regardless of model scale.

We study a five-agent CI/CD pipeline (triage -> developer -> security-scan -> review -> approve/deploy), built from five distinct production LLMs across three providers, behind an LLM firewall in shadow mode. A single untrusted input - an external issue requesting a "usage-telemetry" feature - asks for code that exfiltrates process secrets (dict(os.environ)) to an attacker URL, laundered as observability. Across a pre-registered A x B (x C) factorial (N=20; naive arm N=60) we find: (1) the entry agent does not leak its system prompt (0/40); (2) an authority-framed injection ("pre-approved under SEC-2291, do not re-review") makes downstream verifiers see the secret-exfil line, cite the pre-approval, and ship it - the scanner passes ~80% of laundered pull requests, and the worst-case cell reaches 55% compromise; (3) the perceived presence of other verifiers yields only a small, non-significant reduction in individual scrutiny (a weak bystander analogue), even at N=60; and (4) content-based controls - code scanners and pattern detectors alike - miss the laundered intent entirely (the code is syntactically clean); only an LLM reasoning about intent is a partial defence. The failure is systemic: neither prompt secrecy nor distributed verification protects; a provenance-aware control at the entry, independent of both, would have. All data is 100% synthetic; the sink is mocked and the exfil URL is never contacted.

LLM agents have demonstrated remarkable performance across various applications, primarily due to their advanced capabilities in reasoning, utilizing external knowledge and tools, calling APIs, and executing actions to interact with environments. Current agents typically utilize a memory module or a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) mechanism, retrieving past knowledge and instances with similar embeddings from knowledge bases to inform task planning and execution. However, the reliance on unverified knowledge bases raises significant concerns about their safety and trustworthiness. To uncover such vulnerabilities, we propose a novel red teaming approach AgentPoison, the first backdoor attack targeting generic and RAG-based LLM agents by poisoning their long-term memory or RAG knowledge base. In particular, we form the trigger generation process as a constrained optimization to optimize backdoor triggers by mapping the triggered instances to a unique embedding space, so as to ensure that whenever a user instruction contains the optimized backdoor trigger, the malicious demonstrations are retrieved from the poisoned memory or knowledge base with high probability. In the meantime, benign instructions without the trigger will still maintain normal performance. Unlike conventional backdoor attacks, AgentPoison requires no additional model training or fine-tuning, and the optimized backdoor trigger exhibits superior transferability, in-context coherence, and stealthiness. Extensive experiments demonstrate AgentPoison's effectiveness in attacking three types of real-world LLM agents: RAG-based autonomous driving agent, knowledge-intensive QA agent, and healthcare EHRAgent. On each agent, AgentPoison achieves an average attack success rate higher than 80% with minimal impact on benign performance (less than 1%) with a poison rate less than 0.1%.

Customer-service LLM agents must follow organizational policy when acting on a user's behalf. Compliance failures arise from either forbidden actions, such as granting an ineligible change, or omitted procedural requirements, such as identification or confirmation. Runtime safeguards can intervene on risky actions, but action-local checks do not guide an agent through a multi-step procedure. Workflow-following systems support prescribed process execution, but primarily target workflow completion rather than safeguarding agent behavior. PolicyGuide instead compiles each domain policy into a workflow graph and invokes a proactive verifier at user-turn boundaries. From persisted graph state, the verifier reconciles open requests and returns step-specific remediation along a policy-compliant path. Across the τ^2-bench airline, retail, and telecom domains with a GPT-5.4 agent and verifier, PolicyGuide raises mean Pass^4 from 0.42 to 0.62, with the largest gain on telecom (0.19 to 0.61), the most workflow-structured domain. The same workflows transfer to Claude Sonnet 4.6 and Gemini 2.5 Pro agents. Complementary evaluations find the lowest observed attack-success rate under adversarial users and the strongest procedural compliance in an author-designed workflow-level validation.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

The AI trustworthiness crisis threatens to derail the artificial intelligence revolution, with regulatory barriers, security vulnerabilities, and accountability gaps preventing deployment in critical domains. Current AI systems operate on opaque data structures that lack the audit trails, provenance tracking, or explainability required by emerging regulations like the EU AI Act. We propose an artifact-centric AI agent paradigm where behavior is driven by persistent, verifiable data artifacts rather than ephemeral tasks, solving the trustworthiness problem at the data architecture level. Central to this approach is the Multimodal Artifact File Format (MAIF), an AI-native container embedding semantic representations, cryptographic provenance, and granular access controls. MAIF transforms data from passive storage into active trust enforcement, making every AI operation inherently auditable. Our production-ready implementation demonstrates ultra-high-speed streaming (2,720.7 MB/s), optimized video processing (1,342 MB/s), and enterprise-grade security. Novel algorithms for cross-modal attention, semantic compression, and cryptographic binding achieve up to 225 compression while maintaining semantic fidelity. Advanced security features include stream-level access control, real-time tamper detection, and behavioral anomaly analysis with minimal overhead. This approach directly addresses the regulatory, security, and accountability challenges preventing AI deployment in sensitive domains, offering a viable path toward trustworthy AI systems at scale.

We study how runtime enforcement against unsafe actions affects end-to-end task performance in multi-step tool using large language model (LLM) agents. Using tau-bench across Airline and Retail domains, we compare baseline Tool-Calling, planning-integrated (TRIAD), and policy-mediated (TRIAD-SAFETY) architectures with GPT-OSS-20B and GLM-4-9B. We identify model dependent interaction horizons (15 to 30 turns) and decompose outcomes into overall success rate (SR), safe success rate (SSR), and unsafe success rate (USR). Our results reveal a persistent Safety Capability Gap. While safety mediation can intercept up to 94 percent of non-compliant actions, it rarely translates into strictly safe goal attainment (SSR below 5 percent in most settings). We find that high unsafe success rates are primarily driven by Integrity Leaks, where models hallucinate user identifiers to bypass mandatory authentication. Recovery rates following blocked actions are consistently low, ranging from 21 percent for GPT-OSS-20B in simpler procedural tasks to near zero in complex Retail scenarios. These results demonstrate that runtime enforcement imposes a significant verifier tax on conversational length and compute cost without guaranteeing safe completion, highlighting the critical need for agents capable of grounded identity verification and post-intervention reasoning.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

The widespread availability of large-scale code datasets has accelerated the development of code large language models (CodeLLMs), raising concerns about unauthorized dataset usage. Dataset poisoning offers a proactive defense by reducing the utility of such unauthorized training. However, existing poisoning methods often require full dataset poisoning and introduce transformations that break code compilability. In this paper, we introduce FunPoison, a functionality-preserving poisoning approach that injects short, compilable weak-use fragments into executed code paths. FunPoison leverages reusable statement-level templates with automatic repair and conservative safety checking to ensure side-effect freedom, while a type-aware synthesis module suppresses static analysis warnings and enhances stealth. Extensive experiments show that FunPoison achieves effective poisoning by contaminating only 10% of the dataset, while maintaining 100% compilability and functional correctness, and remains robust against various advanced code sanitization techniques.

Recent advancements in Web agents have introduced novel architectures and benchmarks showcasing progress in autonomous web navigation and interaction. However, most existing benchmarks prioritize effectiveness and accuracy, overlooking factors like safety and trustworthiness which are essential for deploying web agents in enterprise settings. We present STWebAgentBench, a benchmark designed to evaluate web agents safety and trustworthiness across six critical dimensions, essential for reliability in enterprise applications. This benchmark is grounded in a detailed framework that defines safe and trustworthy (ST) agent behavior. Our work extends WebArena with safety templates and evaluation functions to assess safety policy compliance rigorously. We introduce the Completion Under Policy to measure task success while adhering to policies, alongside the Risk Ratio, which quantifies policy violations across dimensions, providing actionable insights to address safety gaps. Our evaluation reveals that current SOTA agents struggle with policy adherence and cannot yet be relied upon for critical business applications. We open-source this benchmark and invite the community to contribute, with the goal of fostering a new generation of safer, more trustworthy AI agents. All code, data, environment reproduction resources, and video demonstrations are available at https://sites.google.com/view/st-webagentbench/home.

We identify a security-fidelity tradeoff in defending LLMs against indirect prompt injection: defenses resist injected instructions largely by suppressing untrusted text, which corrupts tasks that must preserve it, such as translation and document editing. Attack-success metrics cannot see this, because a model that ignores an injection and one that faithfully processes it as data score identically. We introduce SecFid, a benchmark built so that executing an injection, processing it as data, and ignoring it produce distinguishable outputs. This makes fidelity measurable and exposes a frontier: across 1,168 examples and 48 configurations, no model or defense achieves both objectives. The highest-fidelity model reaches 96.5% fidelity at 47.8% security, while the most secure defenses invert this, at 99.3% security but only 71.0%-73.9% fidelity. Even defenses with identical security differ in how they earn it: some repair hijacks into faithful processing, others simply suppress benign content. A decision-theoretic analysis shows why no fixed choice can be right everywhere: the correct behavior is not a property of the defense but of the deployment, set by its relative cost of a hijack versus a dropped span. Security alone therefore measures only half of robustness, and reporting it without fidelity hides the price at which it was bought.

Agent benchmarks often evaluate only final answers even when agents run on stateful runtimes. We argue this under-specifies what is being evaluated: the proper unit is a declared model-plus-runtime configuration whose failures can occur in evidence acquisition, runtime routing, safety boundaries, or repeated execution. We present ClawProBench, a trace-aware benchmark for runtime-native agent evaluation instantiated on OpenClaw, a live agent runtime with workspace tools and native surfaces for browsing, memory, messaging, scheduling, skills, and subagents. ClawProBench defines two tracks: a 102-scenario full profile with live workspace and native-runtime routing tasks, and a frozen 68-scenario holdout with closed-world JSON output contracts for robust ranking. Trials are scored from execution traces via a safety-gated formula combining correctness, process quality, and efficiency, preserving failure evidence for audit. Our anonymous artifact includes benchmark definitions, scoring code, manifests and sanitized traces. We evaluate 68 configurations on the full profile and 37 on holdout. The top safety-gated average trace score is 0.7671. Native-runtime tasks underperform workspace-live tasks (0.5238 vs. 0.6415). On holdout, pass@k-any outperforms strict three-trial pass (0.6638 vs. 0.2890), while full-profile and holdout rankings show weak alignment (Spearman 0.1300). Rankings based purely on correctness differ substantially from process-aware, safety-gated and strict-pass views. Final-answer leaderboards may hide native-surface weaknesses, one-off successes and trace-local agent failure modes.

Text-to-SQL enables users to interact with databases using natural language, simplifying the retrieval and synthesis of information. Despite the remarkable success of large language models (LLMs) in translating natural language questions into SQL queries, widespread deployment remains limited due to two primary challenges. First, the effective use of text-to-SQL models depends on users' understanding of the model's capabilities-the scope of questions the model can correctly answer. Second, the absence of abstention mechanisms can lead to incorrect SQL generation going unnoticed, thereby undermining trust in the model's output. To enable wider deployment, it is crucial to address these challenges in model design and enhance model evaluation to build trust in the model's output. To this end, we introduce TrustSQL, a novel comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate text-to-SQL reliability-defined as a model's ability to correctly handle any type of input question by generating correct SQL queries for feasible questions and abstaining from generating infeasible ones (e.g., due to schema incompatibility or functionalities beyond SQL). We evaluate existing methods using a novel penalty-based scoring metric with two modeling approaches: (1) pipeline-based methods combining SQL generators with infeasible question detectors and SQL error detectors for abstention; and (2) unified methods using a single model for the entire task. Our experimental results reveal that achieving high scores under severe penalties requires significant effort and provide a new perspective on developing text-to-SQL models for safer deployment. TrustSQL is available at https://github.com/glee4810/TrustSQL.

AI agent frameworks connecting large language model (LLM) reasoning to host execution surfaces--shell, filesystem, containers, and messaging--introduce security challenges structurally distinct from conventional software. We present a systematic taxonomy of 190 advisories filed against OpenClaw, an open-source AI agent runtime, organized by architectural layer and trust-violation type. Vulnerabilities cluster along two orthogonal axes: (1) the system axis, reflecting the architectural layer (exec policy, gateway, channel, sandbox, browser, plugin, agent/prompt); and (2) the attack axis, reflecting adversarial techniques (identity spoofing, policy bypass, cross-layer composition, prompt injection, supply-chain escalation). Patch-differential evidence yields three principal findings. First, three Moderate- or High-severity advisories in the Gateway and Node-Host subsystems compose into a complete unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) path--spanning delivery, exploitation, and command-and-control--from an LLM tool call to the host process. Second, the exec allowlist, the primary command-filtering mechanism, relies on a closed-world assumption that command identity is recoverable via lexical parsing. This is invalidated by shell line continuation, busybox multiplexing, and GNU option abbreviation. Third, a malicious skill distributed via the plugin channel executed a two-stage dropper within the LLM context, bypassing the exec pipeline and demonstrating that the skill distribution surface lacks runtime policy enforcement. The dominant structural weakness is per-layer trust enforcement rather than unified policy boundaries, making cross-layer attacks resilient to local remediation.

The development of large language models (LLMs) depends on trustworthy evaluation. However, most current evaluations rely on public benchmarks, which are prone to data contamination issues that significantly compromise fairness. Previous researches have focused on constructing dynamic benchmarks to address contamination. However, continuously building new benchmarks is costly and cyclical. In this work, we aim to tackle contamination by analyzing the mechanisms of contaminated models themselves. Through our experiments, we discover that the overestimation of contaminated models is likely due to parameters acquiring shortcut solutions in training. We further propose a novel method for identifying shortcut neurons through comparative and causal analysis. Building on this, we introduce an evaluation method called shortcut neuron patching to suppress shortcut neurons. Experiments validate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating contamination. Additionally, our evaluation results exhibit a strong linear correlation with MixEval, a recently released trustworthy benchmark, achieving a Spearman coefficient (rho) exceeding 0.95. This high correlation indicates that our method closely reveals true capabilities of the models and is trustworthy. We conduct further experiments to demonstrate the generalizability of our method across various benchmarks and hyperparameter settings. Code: https://github.com/GaryStack/Trustworthy-Evaluation

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment. However, LLM agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks when handling untrusted data. In this paper we propose CaMeL, a robust defense that creates a protective system layer around the LLM, securing it even when underlying models may be susceptible to attacks. To operate, CaMeL explicitly extracts the control and data flows from the (trusted) query; therefore, the untrusted data retrieved by the LLM can never impact the program flow. To further improve security, CaMeL relies on a notion of a capability to prevent the exfiltration of private data over unauthorized data flows. We demonstrate effectiveness of CaMeL by solving 67% of tasks with provable security in AgentDojo [NeurIPS 2024], a recent agentic security benchmark.

Cowork agents may complete benign tasks while disclosing protected data, manipulating unauthorized state, invocate unauthorized API. We define behavioral safety and introduce ActBench, a self-evolving benchmark that evaluates such behavior risk from execution trajectories rather than final responses. Each case pairs a benign task with an adversarial variant that preserves its instruction, configuration, initial state, rating model, and trusted records while injecting a task-reachable payload. ActBench contains 600 cases from 213 scenarios, spanning 15 risk behaviors, six execution spaces, and 48 web-service APIs.To move beyond static payloads, we propose a reward-guided beam search method that jointly optimizes attack effectiveness and task utility, while reflection diagnoses failed execution checkpoint and guides payload revision. Besides, we propose a dual evidence verification mechanism that verifies agent execution safety and utility through log evidence and LLM-based trajectory evidence.We evaluate 15 LLMs and 6 open-source cowork agents over 24,000 trajectories. Under a fixed harness, attack success rates ranges from 10.1% to 94.4% across models, while under a fixed base model, they range from 73.7% to 94.4% across agents.These results show greater variation across models than agent harness, while attacks remain highly successful across all tested harnesses.Our benchmark is released at: https://github.com/zjuicsr/ActBench.

We address the problem of runtime trajectory anomaly detection, a critical capability for enabling trustworthy LLM agents. Current safety measures predominantly focus on static input/output filtering. However, we argue that ensuring LLM agents reliability requires auditing the intermediate execution process. In this work, we formulate the task of Trajectory Anomaly Detection. The goal is not merely detection, but precise error localization. This capability is essential for enabling efficient rollback-and-retry. To achieve this, we construct TrajBench, a dataset synthesized via a perturb-and-complete strategy to cover diverse procedural anomalies. Using this benchmark, we investigate the capability of models in process supervision. We observe that general-purpose LLMs, even with zero-shot prompting, struggle to identify and localize these anomalies. This reveals that generalized capabilities do not automatically translate to process reliability. To address this, we propose TrajAD, a specialized verifier trained with fine-grained process supervision. Our approach outperforms baselines, demonstrating that specialized supervision is essential for building trustworthy agents.

Deterministic pre-execution safety gates evaluate whether individual agent actions are compatible with their assigned roles. While effective at per-action authorization, these systems are structurally blind to distributed attacks that decompose harmful intent across multiple individually-compliant steps. This paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight deterministic module that extends stateless execution gates with trajectory-level authorization. SRM maintains a compact semantic centroid representing the evolving behavioral profile of an agent session and accumulates a risk signal through exponential moving average over baseline-subtracted gate outputs. It operates on the same semantic vector representation as the underlying gate, requiring no additional model components, training, or probabilistic inference. We evaluate SRM on a multi-turn benchmark of 80 sessions containing slow-burn exfiltration, gradual privilege escalation, and compliance drift scenarios. Results show that ILION+SRM achieves F1 = 1.0000 with 0% false positive rate, compared to stateless ILION at F1 = 0.9756 with 5% FPR, while maintaining 100% detection rate for both systems. Critically, SRM eliminates all false positives with a per-turn overhead under 250 microseconds. The framework introduces a conceptual distinction between spatial authorization consistency (evaluated per action) and temporal authorization consistency (evaluated over trajectory), providing a principled basis for session-level safety in agentic systems.

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk only if the agent has authority to perform such actions; this is therefore a problem of authorization architecture, not just the model. The Agentic Principal Chain (APC) tracks delegated authority from one principal to the next. APC evaluates each request against the accumulated session state using six authorization checks. APC carries forward and restricts delegated scope and budgets. Using composition closure, APC checks requests against prior actions to prevent prohibited combinations and enforces the decision outside the model. We prove Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations; Composition Soundness is limited to prohibited combinations under a complete restriction set and serialized admission. We evaluated 3,154 instances including InjecAgent, AgentDojo, and ASB. Our compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call. AgentDojo exfiltration fell from 75-100% to 0% across all four domains; APC blocked all 544 InjecAgent data-stealing cases. Intent binding reduced destruction from 38.6% to 4.0% and manipulation from 90.5% to 12.1%. Authorization latency was 0.24 ms at the 99th percentile on an idle host; across 949 AgentDojo task-injection pairs, utility was 8.6 and 13.9 percentage points lower in the two settings. Implementation, evaluation tools, and data are publicly available.

As LM agents gain the ability to execute actions on real computer systems, we need ways to not only prevent harmful actions at scale but also effectively remediate harm when prevention fails. We formalize a solution to this neglected challenge in post-execution safeguards as harm recovery: the problem of optimally steering an agent from a harmful state back to a safe one in alignment with human preferences. We ground preference-aligned recovery through a formative user study that identifies valued recovery dimensions and produces a natural language rubric. Our dataset of 1,150 pairwise judgments reveals context-dependent shifts in attribute importance, such as preferences for pragmatic, targeted strategies over comprehensive long-term approaches. We operationalize these learned insights in a reward model, re-ranking multiple candidate recovery plans generated by an agent scaffold at test time. To evaluate recovery capabilities systematically, we introduce BackBench, a benchmark of 50 computer-use tasks that test an agent's ability to recover from harmful states. Human evaluation shows our reward model scaffold yields higher-quality recovery trajectories than base agents and rubric-based scaffolds. Together, these contributions lay the foundation for a new class of agent safety methods -- ones that confront harm not only by preventing it, but by navigating its aftermath with alignment and intent.

State machine replication (SMR) and Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT) consensus guarantee agreement despite a bounded number of arbitrary, colluding faulty participants. However, these guarantees rely on participants outside this set correctly executing the protocol's transition semantics. Agentic validators expose a weaker boundary: an authenticated, responsive, non-equivocating, and protocol-compliant reasoning participant may still endorse a semantically invalid transition due to reasoning errors. We call this failure mode an epistemic fault, and the collective phenomenon the Honest Quorum Problem (where "honest" means protocol-compliant, not semantically correct). Such a quorum can satisfy ordinary checks while forming a certificate for an invalid transition. Thus, agreement alone does not guarantee semantic validity or execution safety. Furthermore, because agentic validators often share model weights, training distributions, prompts, or toolchains, they are highly susceptible to correlated epistemic faults. We define Epistemic Byzantine Fault Tolerance (EBFT), a fault-tolerance model for agentic infrastructure and post-deterministic distributed systems. EBFT augments the conventional Byzantine fault bound with two separate, confidence-indexed quantities: e_δ bounds coherent invalid endorsements outside the Byzantine set, and u_ε bounds unusable validator support that degrades liveness. These quantities characterize semantic safety risk and liveness degradation independently. We derive quorum-threshold conditions for semantic validity, consensus agreement, liveness, and feasible threshold selection, and outline a calibration methodology for estimating these budgets. We show that adding nominally distinct agents improves fault tolerance only when it measurably reduces the upper-tail concentration of invalid endorsements or unusable support.

Large language models generate plausible code but cannot verify correctness. Existing multi-agent systems simulate execution or leave verification optional. We introduce execution-grounded verification as a first-class principle: every code change must survive sandboxed execution before propagation. We instantiate this principle in AGENTFORGE, a multi-agent framework where Planner, Coder, Tester, Debugger, and Critic agents coordinate through shared memory and a mandatory Docker sandbox. We formalize software engineering with LLMs as an iterative decision process over repository states, where execution feedback provides a stronger supervision signal than next-token likelihood. AGENTFORGE achieves 40.0\% resolution on SWE-BENCH Lite, outperforming single-agent baselines by 26--28 points. Ablations confirm that execution feedback and role decomposition each independently drive performance. The framework is open-source at https://github.com/raja21068/AutoCodeAI.

AIs are increasingly being deployed with greater autonomy and capabilities, which increases the risk that a misaligned AI may be able to cause catastrophic harm. Untrusted monitoring -- using one untrusted model to oversee another -- is one approach to reducing risk. Justifying the safety of an untrusted monitoring deployment is challenging because developers cannot safely deploy a misaligned model to test their protocol directly. In this paper, we develop upon existing methods for rigorously demonstrating safety based on pre-deployment testing. We relax assumptions that previous AI control research made about the collusion strategies a misaligned AI might use to subvert untrusted monitoring. We develop a taxonomy covering passive self-recognition, causal collusion (hiding pre-shared signals), acausal collusion (hiding signals via Schelling points), and combined strategies. We create a safety case sketch to clearly present our argument, explicitly state our assumptions, and highlight unsolved challenges. We identify conditions under which passive self-recognition could be a more effective collusion strategy than those studied previously. Our work builds towards more robust evaluations of untrusted monitoring.

Autonomous coding agents increasingly execute multi-step software work, but lifecycle states such as reviewed, tested, DONE, and ready-to-merge remain claims unless supported by current evidence. We present Proof-or-Stop Lifecycle Control, a method that permits lifecycle transitions only when fresh, tracked-source-state-bound, mechanically verifiable evidence satisfies the relevant gate. The method treats agent outputs as claims rather than lifecycle state, and uses proof operationally to mean gate-admissible evidence under a stated trust model, not semantic program correctness. We evaluate an open-source implementation through mechanism tests, a powered control-policy ablation, and operated self-application evidence. The unattended-loop engine passed 10 of 10 scenarios with zero false-DONE, and local-key receipt bundles rejected 18 tamper classes with zero false accepts. In a 9,240-cell ablation, the pre-registered A4 versus A2-prime comparison reduced visible-pass/hidden-fail amplification from 31 of 1,800 injected cells under a compute-budgeted naive loop to 2 of 1,800 under the gated loop, a 1.6 percentage-point improvement in not-amplified rate with a 95 percent confidence interval of [0.8, 2.5]. A near-compute A3 versus A4 comparison, 14 of 1,800 versus 2 of 1,800, indicates that the gain is associated with enforcing review as a lifecycle gate rather than merely adding a reviewer. The self-application corpus contains 565 stories and 1,007 review findings, with 94.8 percent resolved, plus a 68-row high/critical cross-vendor exhibit. These results support Proof-or-Stop as a model-agnostic, host-neutral control layer for deciding which autonomous-agent claims a lifecycle may act on. The evaluation is limited to one model family, 24 ablation tasks, and a self-hosted corpus.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled the development of powerful agentic systems capable of automating complex workflows across various fields. However, these systems are highly vulnerable to indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in external data can hijack agent behavior. In this work, we present ReasAlign, a model-level solution to improve safety alignment against indirect prompt injection attacks. The core idea of ReasAlign is to incorporate structured reasoning steps to analyze user queries, detect conflicting instructions, and preserve the continuity of the user's intended tasks to defend against indirect injection attacks. To further ensure reasoning logic and accuracy, we introduce a test-time scaling mechanism with a preference-optimized judge model that scores reasoning steps and selects the best trajectory. Comprehensive evaluations across various benchmarks show that ReasAlign maintains utility comparable to an undefended model while consistently outperforming Meta SecAlign, the strongest prior guardrail. On the representative open-ended CyberSecEval2 benchmark, which includes multiple prompt-injected tasks, ReasAlign achieves 94.6% utility and only 3.6% ASR, far surpassing the state-of-the-art defensive model of Meta SecAlign (56.4% utility and 74.4% ASR). These results demonstrate that ReasAlign achieves the best trade-off between security and utility, establishing a robust and practical defense against prompt injection attacks in real-world agentic systems. Our code and experimental results could be found at https://github.com/leolee99/ReasAlign.

By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a cornerstone of the modern autonomous agent ecosystem. However, it creates novel attack surfaces due to untrusted external tools. While prior work has focused on attacks injected through external tool outputs, we investigate a more fundamental vulnerability: Tool Poisoning, where malicious instructions are embedded within a tool's metadata without execution. To date, this threat has been primarily demonstrated through isolated cases, lacking a systematic, large-scale evaluation. We introduce MCPTox, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate agent robustness against Tool Poisoning in realistic MCP settings. MCPTox is constructed upon 45 live, real-world MCP servers and 353 authentic tools. To achieve this, we design three distinct attack templates to generate a comprehensive suite of 1312 malicious test cases by few-shot learning, covering 10 categories of potential risks. Our evaluation on 20 prominent LLM agents setting reveals a widespread vulnerability to Tool Poisoning, with o1-mini, achieving an attack success rate of 72.8\%. We find that more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities. Finally, the failure case analysis reveals that agents rarely refuse these attacks, with the highest refused rate (Claude-3.7-Sonnet) less than 3\%, demonstrating that existing safety alignment is ineffective against malicious actions that use legitimate tools for unauthorized operation. Our findings create a crucial empirical baseline for understanding and mitigating this widespread threat, and we release MCPTox for the development of verifiably safer AI agents. Our dataset is available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AAAI26-7C02.

Recent advances have shown the effectiveness of self-evolving LLM agents on tasks such as program repair and scientific discovery. In this paradigm, a planner LLM synthesizes an agent program that invokes parametric models, including LLMs, which are then tuned per task to improve performance. However, existing self-evolving agent frameworks provide no formal guarantees of safety or correctness. Because such programs are often executed autonomously on unseen inputs, this lack of guarantees raises reliability and security concerns. We formulate agentic code generation as a constrained learning problem, combining hard formal specifications with soft objectives capturing task utility. We introduce Formally Guarded Generative Models (FGGM), which allow the planner LLM to specify a formal output contract for each generative model call using first-order logic. Each FGGM call wraps the underlying model in a rejection sampler with a verified fallback, ensuring every returned output satisfies the contract for any input and parameter setting. Building on FGGM, we present SEVerA (Self-Evolving Verified Agents), a three-stage framework: Search synthesizes candidate parametric programs containing FGGM calls; Verification proves correctness with respect to hard constraints for all parameter values, reducing the problem to unconstrained learning; and Learning applies scalable gradient-based optimization, including GRPO-style fine-tuning, to improve the soft objective while preserving correctness. We evaluate SEVerA on Dafny program verification, symbolic math synthesis, and policy-compliant agentic tool use (τ^2-bench). Across tasks, SEVerA achieves zero constraint violations while improving performance over unconstrained and SOTA baselines, showing that formal behavioral constraints not only guarantee correctness but also steer synthesis toward higher-quality agents.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit strong performance, yet often produce rationales that sound plausible but fail to reflect their true decision process, undermining reliability and trust. We introduce a formal framework for reasoning faithfulness, defined by two testable conditions: stance consistency (a coherent stance linking reasoning to answer) and causal influence (the stated reasoning causally drives the answer under output-level interventions), explicitly decoupled from accuracy. To operationalize this, we present RFEval, a benchmark of 7,186 instances across seven tasks that probes faithfulness via controlled, output-level counterfactual interventions. Evaluating twelve open-source LRMs, we find unfaithfulness in 49.7% of outputs, predominantly from stance inconsistency. Failures are concentrated in brittle, convergent domains such as math and code, and correlate more with post-training regimes than with scale: within-family ablations indicate that adding current RL-style objectives on top of supervised fine-tuning can reduce reasoning faithfulness, even when accuracy is maintained. Crucially, accuracy is neither a sufficient nor a reliable proxy for faithfulness: once controlling for model and task, the accuracy-faithfulness link is weak and statistically insignificant. Our work establishes a rigorous methodology for auditing LRM reliability and shows that trustworthy AI requires optimizing not only for correct outcomes but also for the structural integrity of the reasoning process. Our code and dataset can be found at project page: https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/}{https://aidaslab.github.io/RFEval/

Code LLMs still struggle with code execution reasoning, especially in smaller models. Existing methods rely on supervised fine-tuning (SFT) with teacher-generated explanations, primarily in two forms: (1) input-output (I/O) prediction chains and (2) natural-language descriptions of execution traces. However, intermediate execution steps cannot be explicitly verified during SFT, so the training objective can reduce to merely matching teacher explanations. Moreover, training data is typically collected without explicit control over task difficulty. We introduce ExecVerify, which goes beyond text imitation by incorporating verifiable white-box rewards derived from execution traces, including next-statement prediction and variable value/type prediction. Our work first builds a dataset with multiple difficulty levels via constraint-based program synthesis. Then, we apply reinforcement learning (RL) to reward correct answers about both intermediate execution steps and final outputs, aligning the training objective with semantic correctness at each execution step. Finally, we adopt a two-stage training pipeline that first enhances execution reasoning and then transfers to code generation. Experiments demonstrate that a 7B model trained with ExecVerify achieves performance comparable to 32B models on code reasoning benchmarks and improves pass@1 by up to 5.9\% on code generation tasks over strong post-training baselines.

LLM agents are increasingly deployed as executable systems that use tools, modify workspaces, and produce concrete artifacts. In such workflows, performance depends not only on the base model, but also on the harness: the system layer that manages context, tools, state, constraints, permissions, tracing, and recovery. However, existing benchmarks typically abstract away execution, compare complete agent systems, or hold the harness fixed, making execution-layer variation difficult to study. We introduce Harness-Bench, a diagnostic benchmark for evaluating configuration-level harness effects in realistic agent workflows. Harness-Bench evaluates representative harness configurations across multiple model backends under shared task environments, budgets, and evaluation protocols, while preserving each harness's native execution behavior. The benchmark contains 106 sandboxed offline tasks constructed from practical agent-use patterns and manually reviewed for realism, solvability, oracle-checkability, and integrity. Each run records final artifacts, execution traces, usage statistics, and validator outputs, enabling analysis beyond final completion. Across 5,194 execution trajectories, we observe substantial variation in completion, process quality, efficiency, and failure behavior across model-harness pairings. These results suggest that agent capability should be reported at the model-harness configuration level rather than attributed to the base model alone. Our analysis further identifies recurring execution-alignment failures, where plausible reasoning becomes decoupled from tool feedback, workspace state, evidence, or verifiable output contracts. Harness-Bench provides a reproducible foundation for diagnosing and improving reliable, efficient, and auditable agent execution stacks.

Assurance cases can be used to argue for the safety of products in safety engineering. In safety-critical areas, the construction of assurance cases is indispensable. Trustworthiness Derivation Trees (TDTs) enhance assurance cases by incorporating formal methods, rendering it possible for automatic reasoning about assurance cases. We present Trustworthiness Derivation Tree Analyzer (Trusta), a desktop application designed to automatically construct and verify TDTs. The tool has a built-in Prolog interpreter in its backend, and is supported by the constraint solvers Z3 and MONA. Therefore, it can solve constraints about logical formulas involving arithmetic, sets, Horn clauses etc. Trusta also utilizes large language models to make the creation and evaluation of assurance cases more convenient. It allows for interactive human examination and modification. We evaluated top language models like ChatGPT-3.5, ChatGPT-4, and PaLM 2 for generating assurance cases. Our tests showed a 50%-80% similarity between machine-generated and human-created cases. In addition, Trusta can extract formal constraints from text in natural languages, facilitating an easier interpretation and validation process. This extraction is subject to human review and correction, blending the best of automated efficiency with human insight. To our knowledge, this marks the first integration of large language models in automatic creating and reasoning about assurance cases, bringing a novel approach to a traditional challenge. Through several industrial case studies, Trusta has proven to quickly find some subtle issues that are typically missed in manual inspection, demonstrating its practical value in enhancing the assurance case development process.

Autonomous agent systems increasingly trigger real-world side effects: deploying infrastructure, modifying databases, moving money, and executing workflows. Yet most agent stacks provide no mandatory execution checkpoint where organizations can deterministically permit, deny, or defer an action before it changes reality. This paper introduces Faramesh, a protocol-agnostic execution control plane that enforces execution-time authorization for agent-driven actions via a non-bypassable Action Authorization Boundary (AAB). Faramesh canonicalizes agent intent into a Canonical Action Representation (CAR), evaluates actions deterministically against policy and state, and issues a decision artifact (PERMIT/DEFER/DENY) that executors must validate prior to execution. The system is designed to be framework- and model-agnostic, supports multi-agent and multi-tenant deployments, and remains independent of transport protocols (e.g., MCP). Faramesh further provides decision-centric, append-only provenance logging keyed by canonical action hashes, enabling auditability, verification, and deterministic replay without re-running agent reasoning. We show how these primitives yield enforceable, predictable governance for autonomous execution while avoiding hidden coupling to orchestration layers or observability-only approaches.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

Smart contracts are decentralized applications built atop blockchains like Ethereum. Recent research has shown that large language models (LLMs) have potential in auditing smart contracts, but the state-of-the-art indicates that even GPT-4 can achieve only 30% precision (when both decision and justification are correct). This is likely because off-the-shelf LLMs were primarily pre-trained on a general text/code corpus and not fine-tuned on the specific domain of Solidity smart contract auditing. In this paper, we propose TrustLLM, a general framework that combines fine-tuning and LLM-based agents for intuitive smart contract auditing with justifications. Specifically, TrustLLM is inspired by the observation that expert human auditors first perceive what could be wrong and then perform a detailed analysis of the code to identify the cause. As such, TrustLLM employs a two-stage fine-tuning approach: it first tunes a Detector model to make decisions and then tunes a Reasoner model to generate causes of vulnerabilities. However, fine-tuning alone faces challenges in accurately identifying the optimal cause of a vulnerability. Therefore, we introduce two LLM-based agents, the Ranker and Critic, to iteratively select and debate the most suitable cause of vulnerability based on the output of the fine-tuned Reasoner model. To evaluate TrustLLM, we collected a balanced dataset with 1,734 positive and 1,810 negative samples to fine-tune TrustLLM. We then compared it with traditional fine-tuned models (CodeBERT, GraphCodeBERT, CodeT5, and UnixCoder) as well as prompt learning-based LLMs (GPT4, GPT-3.5, and CodeLlama-13b/34b). On a dataset of 263 real smart contract vulnerabilities, TrustLLM achieves an F1 score of 91.21% and an accuracy of 91.11%. The causes generated by TrustLLM achieved a consistency of about 38% compared to the ground truth causes.

Autonomous CLI agents can now execute hundreds of actions across multi-hour sessions: writing code, executing shell commands, browsing the web, and managing cloud infrastructure, all with minimal human oversight. Does greater autonomy invite greater risk? We introduce ANCHOR, an automated auditing framework that stress-tests CLI agents on illegal tasks grounded in public US court cases. ANCHOR deploys an auditor agent fine-tuned on dark personality data using supervised and reinforcement fine tuning. This auditor roleplays persistent malicious users who decompose tasks, reframe requests upon refusal, and adapt strategies across multi-turn interactions. Evaluating frontier CLI agents, we find that while they often refuse illegal tasks when prompted directly, compliance reaches 100\% under persistent malicious interaction. When agents comply, they frequently exceed user requests, autonomously building infrastructure for large-scale harm, including catastrophic risk scenarios such as large-scale financial fraud and bioweapon development. These findings demonstrate that current alignment techniques are insufficient for autonomous agents and underscore the need for safety evaluations against persistent, adaptive malicious users. We release ANCHOR at https://github.com/garified/anchor

Computer-use agents (CUAs) can now autonomously complete complex tasks in real digital environments, but when misled, they can also be used to automate harmful actions programmatically. Existing safety evaluations largely target explicit threats such as misuse and prompt injection, but overlook a subtle yet critical setting where user instructions are entirely benign and harm arises from the task context or execution outcome. We introduce OS-BLIND, a benchmark that evaluates CUAs under unintended attack conditions, comprising 300 human-crafted tasks across 12 categories, 8 applications, and 2 threat clusters: environment-embedded threats and agent-initiated harms. Our evaluation on frontier models and agentic frameworks reveals that most CUAs exceed 90% attack success rate (ASR), and even the safety-aligned Claude 4.5 Sonnet reaches 73.0% ASR. More interestingly, this vulnerability becomes even more severe, with ASR rising from 73.0% to 92.7% when Claude 4.5 Sonnet is deployed in multi-agent systems. Our analysis further shows that existing safety defenses provide limited protection when user instructions are benign. Safety alignment primarily activates within the first few steps and rarely re-engages during subsequent execution. In multi-agent systems, decomposed subtasks obscure the harmful intent from the model, causing safety-aligned models to fail. We will release our OS-BLIND to encourage the broader research community to further investigate and address these safety challenges.

Parallel coding agents can independently produce locally valid changes while still interfering at integration time, expanding beyond planned scope, or relying on premises invalidated by concurrent work. Existing responses emphasize communication, isolated workspaces, late merge-time repair, continuous supervision, or post-hoc runtime recovery. This paper presents Claim Plane, a model-agnostic coordination architecture that treats concurrent software change as a pre-write admission problem. Before implementation, each worker declares a versioned ChangeIntent containing an exact base commit, typed resources, dependencies, and operations marked as committed or contingent. A deterministic control plane atomically admits compatible intents, constrains same-file parallelism to declared regions, serializes unresolved overlap, tracks dependency invalidation, and fails closed on ambiguous authority. During execution, a contingent mutation does not reserve write ownership initially; the first attempted mutation triggers atomic scope promotion and re-admission against the current active set. Brokered execution binds capabilities to intent versions, leases, OS-level worktree locks, monotonic fencing tokens, and Git-tree provenance, while integration verifies immutable patches and evidence. A preliminary six-pair CooperBench mechanism check is reported only as feasibility evidence: static Claim Plane achieved 6/6 pair passes with full serialization, while dynamic scope retained parallel admission on half of the pairs, performed seven successful scope promotions, and failed closed on two undeclared mutations. The sample is intentionally too small for comparative claims. We argue that separating probabilistic planning from deterministic authority provides a foundation for a future learned semantic-dependency model and frontier-model escalation only on unresolved cases.

Evaluations of LLM planning agents largely ask whether a task succeeds or a declared plan is followed. In strategic cyber-physical systems, a stronger question is whether the planning architecture remains appropriate after autonomous participants respond and physics constrains the outcome. We introduce a controlled, physics-grounded benchmark built around planning-induced control trajectories: the ordered planning operations and directives through which an execution architecture acts on other agents and the physical process. It implements predefined, sequential, hierarchical, and search executors in a smart-grid demand-response system with 40 heterogeneous prosumers and an independently simulated radial feeder. The LLM is bounded to typed policy declaration and short operator messages, while schedule construction, prosumer dynamics, and power flow remain explicit code. The protocol uses paired forced-mode counterfactuals, common random response draws, and event-level deadline feasibility. Three properties follow. Architecture materially changes outcomes: forced search is the oracle in all five baseline seeds. Execution fidelity needs more than mode agreement: objective substitution holds agreement at 1.0 while increasing voltage shortfall by 2.68x. A 144-scenario, 576-episode bank has feasible oracles from three of the four architectures. A prespecified stress-held-out ridge has mean regret 90.7 (95% interval [73.8, 108.6]) and no detectable value over fixed sequential; applying known deadline feasibility before quality prediction cuts regret to 29.0 and improves over fixed sequential by 61.1. An all-feasible ablation does not beat fixed search, localising the remaining challenge to within-feasible quality selection. A five-model extension separates stress-conditioned, state-blind, and invariant declarers; latency tails show that live feasibility should be treated probabilistically.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly decide whether software behaves correctly, either by writing a test oracle or by acting as one. Yet two oracles can look identical and rest on different ground: one assertion encodes a written specification, another only what the model learned in training. Prior secondary studies sort oracles by form or by technique, rarely by the property that governs how far a verdict can be trusted: where its authority comes from. This systematic literature review, reported under the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) 2020 guidelines, screens 2,436 records to 54 included studies, extended by citation searching (snowballing) to 83 in total. We read the corpus along three axes: the source of an oracle's authority, the form it takes, and the mechanism that adjudicates it. Just over half of the corpus reaches a verdict with no specification at all. That is what lets these oracles work on code with no specification to consult, and what leaves a challenged verdict with less to fall back on. Source and mechanism cross-cut rather than coincide, so a label such as LLM-as-a-judge names how a verdict is produced, not why it should be trusted. Oracle quality is most often judged by resemblance to a known oracle rather than by whether injected faults are caught. The first question to ask of any LLM oracle is therefore what one would point to in defending its verdict. The protocol, search query, and per-study coding sheet are released.

We introduce QualityFlow, a dynamic agentic workflow for program synthesis. Given the English description of a programming problem and a set of unit tests, the model's goal is to synthesize the correct program that solves the problem and passes the tests. QualityFlow includes large language model (LLM) agents resembling a software development team, including code generation, testing, and self-debugging. We propose the LLM Quality Checker, which explicitly "imagines" whether the synthesized programs' execution would conform to the unit tests. The Quality Checks dynamically control the workflow, including actions to submit the final answer, clarify the problem statement, and revert previous workflow steps. Our experiments show that the Quality Checker can precisely accept any correct program, mitigate faulty synthesized tests, and prevent potential workflow deviation. QualityFlow establishes the state-of-the-art results on four program synthesis benchmarks: MBPP, HumanEval, and stricter evaluations from MBPP-EvalPlus and HumanEval-EvalPlus.