Daily Papers

Test-time adaptive out-of-distribution (OOD) detectors update a memory bank from the unlabelled stream. We show this adaptation obeys a provable dynamical law. Modelling bank impurity as a generalized Pólya urn, we prove almost-sure convergence to a mean-field equilibrium whose slope acts as a reproduction number. Below one, impurity stays benign. Above one, the bank is fully poisoned and the detector collapses. The measured admission kernel is affine (R^2 ge 0.996) with slope just below one in every encoder family (a protocol signature), so this detector class is near-critical by design, and across 96 settings the predicted threshold matches the empirical collapse, where ungated dictionaries lose up to 0.163 AUROC. We then prove that a certified admission gate, reading only a frozen reserve, severs the feedback loop and removes the transition at every contamination rate, even adversarially, while controlling false positives label-free. For the complementary static-calibration failure under drift we give CDC, which restores nominal FPR label-free on all tested drift-affected cells. Finally we prove a two-world impossibility theorem. Drift and contamination are indistinguishable without labels, forcing a closed-form power ceiling our procedure approaches. Together these give a complete possibility/impossibility characterization of label-free adaptive OOD detection.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

A common assumption holds that enough observational and interventional data, given to a strong enough predictor, suffices. We report a failure mode that contradicts it. Across hundreds of structural causal models, on identified quantities a strong predictor and a Bayesian baseline both succeed, but on unidentified quantities (the couplings between counterfactual worlds) the predictor collapses to a point, on 28% of models to one no valid model can produce, while the truth is an admissible interval more data never narrows. The gap is structural: prediction cannot represent uncertainty over counterfactual couplings. We cast a world model as a single positive semidefinite coupling kernel K(T,T') over admissible worlds, whose diagonal is the ordinary posterior (what a predictor recovers) and whose off-diagonal is the cross-world coupling it cannot, which every counterfactual reads. The paper is the theory of that off-diagonal. It is real: two states with identical posteriors differ on a cross-world query, and the off-diagonal is the coupling that fixes counterfactuals. It can be bounded: positive semidefiniteness is partial-identifying information the marginals lack, and enforcing it bounds counterfactuals in polynomial time where the exact response-type program is intractable. Logical structure sharpens it: ontology axioms tighten the bound by up to a third, propagating to couplings they never touch. It can be acquired: targeted scars, constraints learned from encountered infeasibilities, close the gap several times faster than untargeted ones. Its full reconstruction is approximate counting of the admissible worlds, tractable below the Sly-Sun threshold and inapproximable above; we do not claim to beat the worst case.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

Autodeleveraging (ADL) is a last-resort loss socialization mechanism for perpetual futures venues. It is triggered when solvency-preserving liquidations fail. Despite the dominance of perpetual futures in the crypto derivatives market, with over \60 trillion of volume in 2024, there has been no formal study of ADL. In this paper, we provide the first rigorous model of ADL. We prove that ADL mechanisms face a fundamental trilemma: no policy can simultaneously satisfy exchange solvency, revenue, and fairness to traders. This impossibility theorem implies that as participation scales, a novel form of moral hazard grows asymptotically, rendering `zero-loss' socialization impossible. On the positive side, we show that three classes of ADL mechanisms can optimally navigate this trilemma to provide fairness, robustness to price shocks, and maximal exchange revenue. We analyze these mechanisms on the Hyperliquid dataset from October 10, 2025, when ADL was used repeatedly to close 2.1 billion of positions in 12 minutes. By comparing production ADL to transparent benchmark allocations, we find that Hyperliquid's production algorithm overshot the minimum trader profit haircut required to cover the shortfall. Our methodology suggests the excess profits lost by profitable traders is between \45.0M and 51.7M. In terms of the positions liquidated, this corresponds to roughly \$653.6M of positions being closed. This comparison also suggests that Binance overutilized ADL far more than Hyperliquid. Our results show both theoretically and empirically that optimized ADL mechanisms can dramatically reduce losses of trader profitability while maintaining exchange solvency.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

A world model is an AI system that simulates how an environment evolves under actions, enabling planning through imagined futures rather than reactive perception. Current world models, however, suffer from visual conflation: the mistaken assumption that high-fidelity video generation implies an understanding of physical and causal dynamics. We show that while modern models excel at predicting pixels, they frequently violate invariant constraints, fail under intervention, and break down in safety-critical decision-making. This survey argues that visual realism is an unreliable proxy for world understanding. Instead, effective world models must encode causal structure, respect domain-specific constraints, and remain stable over long horizons. We propose a reframing of world models as actionable simulators rather than visual engines, emphasizing structured 4D interfaces, constraint-aware dynamics, and closed-loop evaluation. Using medical decision-making as an epistemic stress test, where trial-and-error is impossible and errors are irreversible, we demonstrate that a world model's value is determined not by how realistic its rollouts appear, but by its ability to support counterfactual reasoning, intervention planning, and robust long-horizon foresight.

Humans construct internal world models and reason by manipulating the concepts within these models. Recent advances in AI, particularly chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, approximate such human cognitive abilities, where world models are believed to be embedded within large language models. Expert-level performance in formal and abstract domains such as mathematics and programming has been achieved in current systems by relying predominantly on verbal reasoning. However, they still lag far behind humans in domains like physical and spatial intelligence, which require richer representations and prior knowledge. The emergence of unified multimodal models (UMMs) capable of both verbal and visual generation has therefore sparked interest in more human-like reasoning grounded in complementary multimodal pathways, though their benefits remain unclear. From a world-model perspective, this paper presents the first principled study of when and how visual generation benefits reasoning. Our key position is the visual superiority hypothesis: for certain tasks--particularly those grounded in the physical world--visual generation more naturally serves as world models, whereas purely verbal world models encounter bottlenecks arising from representational limitations or insufficient prior knowledge. Theoretically, we formalize internal world modeling as a core component of CoT reasoning and analyze distinctions among different forms of world models. Empirically, we identify tasks that necessitate interleaved visual-verbal CoT reasoning, constructing a new evaluation suite, VisWorld-Eval. Controlled experiments on a state-of-the-art UMM show that interleaved CoT significantly outperforms purely verbal CoT on tasks that favor visual world modeling, but offers no clear advantage otherwise. Together, this work clarifies the potential of multimodal world modeling for more powerful, human-like multimodal AI.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

This paper argues that the finite horizon paradox, where game theory contradicts intuition, stems from the limitations of standard number systems in modelling the cognitive perception of infinity. To address this issue, we propose a new framework based on Alternative Set Theory (AST). This framework represents different cognitive perspectives on a long history of events using distinct topologies. These topologies define an indiscernibility equivalence that formally treats huge, indistinguishable quantities as equivalent. This offers criterion-dependent resolutions to long-standing paradoxes, such as Selten's chain store paradox and Rosenthal's centipede game. Our framework reveals new intuitive subgame perfect equilibria, the characteristics of which depend on the chosen temporal perspective and payoff evaluation. Ultimately, by grounding its mathematical foundation in different modes of human cognition, our work expands the explanatory power of game theory for long-horizon scenarios.

While extremely powerful and versatile at various tasks, the thinking capabilities of large language models (LLMs) are often put under scrutiny as they sometimes fail to solve problems that humans can systematically solve. However, recent literature focuses on breaking LLM reasoning with increasingly complex problems, and whether an LLM is robust in simple logical reasoning remains underexplored. This paper proposes Absurd World, a benchmarking framework, to test LLMs against altered realism, where scenarios are logically coherent, and humans can easily solve the tasks. Absurd World breaks a real-world model into symbols, actions, sequences, and events, which are automatically altered to create absurd worlds where the logic to solve the tasks remains the same. It evaluates a large collection of models with simple and advanced prompting techniques, and proves that it is an effective tool to determine LLMs' ability to think logically, ignoring the patterns learned from the real world. One can use this framework to extensively test an LLM against a real-world problem to verify whether the LLM's reasoning capability is robust against variations of the task.

The Platonic Representation Hypothesis (PRH) holds that as models scale, representations of heterogeneous networks converge toward a shared model of reality. We propose its sequel and boundary, the Capability Convergence Hypothesis (CCH): under a fixed per-token inference budget, representational convergence does not entail capability convergence. Capability instead converges toward a class, the access-complete hybrid: any architecture holding both a compressive O(1)-state channel and a scalable verbatim-index channel. We anchor it on a witness task, the Newton's-apple problem in an infinite stream, and name three resource walls: a Shannon wall barring any o(Nb)-state architecture, a horizon wall barring any fixed window, and a circuit wall barring fixed-depth attention-only composition (conditional on TC0 != NC1). Under an explicit separability assumption a hybrid crosses all three by paying each wall's price, so capability is strictly super-additive under composition. We separate what we prove from what we conjecture: the access-completeness principle rests on information-theoretic lower bounds and pre-registered experiments, while the field-level convergence trend is an economics-motivated conjecture. We report the first pre-registered small-scale tests under criteria frozen before the data: the predicted scissors gap is measured (exact-retrieval error 0.994 vs. 0.000 once a 64-scalar state gains one global-attention layer), the state-tracking bifurcation lands at the registered boundary, and a conjunction witness shows an irreducibly two-channel solution; one prediction failed with its direction reversed and is reported as such. Representational convergence is given freely by scale; capability convergence must be purchased by access structure.

This research introduces a novel evaluation framework designed to assess large language models' (LLMs) ability to acknowledge uncertainty on 675 fundamentally unsolvable problems. Using a curated dataset of graduate-level grand challenge questions with intentionally unknowable answers, we evaluated twelve state-of-the-art LLMs, including both open and closed-source models, on their propensity to admit ignorance rather than generate plausible but incorrect responses. The best models scored in 62-68% accuracy ranges for admitting the problem solution was unknown in fields ranging from biology to philosophy and mathematics. We observed an inverse relationship between problem difficulty and model accuracy, with GPT-4 demonstrating higher rates of uncertainty acknowledgment on more challenging problems (35.8%) compared to simpler ones (20.0%). This pattern indicates that models may be more prone to generate speculative answers when problems appear more tractable. The study also revealed significant variations across problem categories, with models showing difficulty in acknowledging uncertainty in invention and NP-hard problems while performing relatively better on philosophical and psychological challenges. These results contribute to the growing body of research on artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment by highlighting the importance of uncertainty recognition as a critical component of future machine intelligence evaluation. This impossibility test thus extends previous theoretical frameworks for universal intelligence testing by providing empirical evidence of current limitations in LLMs' ability to recognize their own knowledge boundaries, suggesting new directions for improving model training architectures and evaluation approaches.

Interventional counterfactuals evaluate statements such as "had A been a" by replacing the assignment for A while keeping the unit's exogenous background fixed. Backtracking counterfactuals reverse this logic: they preserve the structural assignments and instead vary background conditions across worlds. This semantics is natural for diagnostic explanation, but full backtracking may be too permissive because every exogenous coordinate can vary. We introduce scope-restricted backtracking counterfactuals, in which the modeler specifies which coordinates may vary while the remainder are shared across worlds. The scope determines the admissible carriers of the contrast, while a cross-world kernel governs the plausibility of their alternative values. We present model-based inference for general scope-restricted backtracking counterfactuals, derive sharp marginal bounds for a specified explanatory query, and establish frontier and compatibility conditions under which this explanatory query admits a modified-value policy representation. A linear-Gaussian example distinguishes local-noise, ancestor, irrelevant-noise, and infeasible explanations across scopes, while an application to the UCI Adult benchmark illustrates kernel specification, sensitivity, and how much of the explanation is carried by the cross-world coupling itself.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

We consider online scheduling on unrelated (heterogeneous) machines in a speed-oblivious setting, where an algorithm is unaware of the exact job-dependent processing speeds. We show strong impossibility results for clairvoyant and non-clairvoyant algorithms and overcome them in models inspired by practical settings: (i) we provide competitive learning-augmented algorithms, assuming that (possibly erroneous) predictions on the speeds are given, and (ii) we provide competitive algorithms for the speed-ordered model, where a single global order of machines according to their unknown job-dependent speeds is known. We prove strong theoretical guarantees and evaluate our findings on a representative heterogeneous multi-core processor. These seem to be the first empirical results for scheduling algorithms with predictions that are evaluated in a non-synthetic hardware environment.

Sharp bounds on two potential-outcome means need not combine into sharp bounds on their difference. We characterize exactly when composition is guaranteed across environments sharing a joint potential-outcome law. For binary treatment and outcome, fix strict selection-probability bounds and interior treatment propensities. Subtracting the full model's sharp mean intervals gives sharp average-treatment-effect bounds for every compatible observed law if and only if the absolute selection bounds coincide across environments. Under this alignment, the complete mean region is rectangular; its endpoints and attaining causal models require O(K) arithmetic operations for K environments. For every mismatch, failure occurs on a relatively open set of positive observed tables at the prescribed propensities and persists under small joint drift. We give computable perturbation certificates and an exact family whose gap is first order in the mismatch. A separate finite-confounding family shows when the lost joint information changes an identified causal sign. These results distinguish local marginal sharpness from joint attainability after combining environments.

As the mathematical capabilities of large language models (LLMs) improve, it becomes increasingly important to evaluate their performance on research-level tasks at the frontier of mathematical knowledge. However, existing benchmarks are limited, as they focus solely on final-answer questions or high-school competition problems. To address this gap, we introduce IMProofBench, a private benchmark consisting of 39 peer-reviewed problems developed by expert mathematicians. Each problem requires a detailed proof and is paired with subproblems that have final answers, supporting both an evaluation of mathematical reasoning capabilities by human experts and a large-scale quantitative analysis through automated grading. Furthermore, unlike prior benchmarks, the evaluation setup simulates a realistic research environment: models operate in an agentic framework with tools like web search for literature review and mathematical software such as SageMath. Our results show that current LLMs can succeed at the more accessible research-level questions, but still encounter significant difficulties on more challenging problems. Quantitatively, Grok-4 achieves the highest accuracy of 52% on final-answer subproblems, while GPT-5 obtains the best performance for proof generation, achieving a fully correct solution for 22% of problems. IMProofBench will continue to evolve as a dynamic benchmark in collaboration with the mathematical community, ensuring its relevance for evaluating the next generation of LLMs.

Wigner's Friend-type paradoxes challenge the assumption that events are absolute -- that when we measure a system, we obtain a single result, which is not relative to anything or anyone else. These paradoxes highlight the tension between quantum theory and our intuitions about reality being observer-independent. Building on a recent result that developed these paradoxes into a no-go theorem, namely the Local Friendliness Theorem, we introduce the Causal Friendliness Paradox, a time-ordered analogue of it. In this framework, we replace the usual locality assumption with Axiological Time Symmetry (ATS), and show that, when combined with the assumptions of Absoluteness of Observed Events (AOE), No Retrocausality (NRC), and Screening via Pseudo Events (SPE), we obtain a causal inequality. We then show that quantum mechanics violates this inequality and is therefore incompatible with at least one of these assumptions. To probe which assumption might be incompatible, we then examine whether AOE in its entirety is essential for this no-go result. We propose a weaker, operational form of AOE that still leads to inequalities that quantum mechanics violates. This result shows that even under relaxed assumptions, quantum theory resists reconciliation with classical notions of absolute events, reinforcing the foundational significance of Wigner's Friend-type paradoxes in timelike scenarios.

The aim of Reverse Mathematics(RM for short)is to find the minimal axioms needed to prove a given theorem of ordinary mathematics. These minimal axioms are almost always equivalent to the theorem, working over the base theory of RM, a weak system of computable mathematics. The Big Five phenomenon of RM is the observation that a large number of theorems from ordinary mathematics are either provable in the base theory or equivalent to one of only four systems; these five systems together are called the 'Big Five'. The aim of this paper is to greatly extend the Big Five phenomenon as follows: there are two supposedly fundamentally different approaches to RM where the main difference is whether the language is restricted to second-order objects or if one allows third-order objects. In this paper, we unite these two strands of RM by establishing numerous equivalences involving the second-order Big Five systems on one hand, and well-known third-order theorems from analysis about (possibly) discontinuous functions on the other hand. We both study relatively tame notions, like cadlag or Baire 1, and potentially wild ones, like quasi-continuity. We also show that slight generalisations and variations of the aforementioned third-order theorems fall far outside of the Big Five.

We consider non-clairvoyant scheduling with online precedence constraints, where an algorithm is oblivious to any job dependencies and learns about a job only if all of its predecessors have been completed. Given strong impossibility results in classical competitive analysis, we investigate the problem in a learning-augmented setting, where an algorithm has access to predictions without any quality guarantee. We discuss different prediction models: novel problem-specific models as well as general ones, which have been proposed in previous works. We present lower bounds and algorithmic upper bounds for different precedence topologies, and thereby give a structured overview on which and how additional (possibly erroneous) information helps for designing better algorithms. Along the way, we also improve bounds on traditional competitive ratios for existing algorithms.