Daily Papers

Existing adaptive-reasoning methods shorten the explicit reasoning a model writes, or skip it by switching modes; either way the answer is still written out token by token. Rather than deciding how much to think, we explore a different paradigm, zero-or-T thinking: a single model either answers from the implicit thinking inside one forward pass, generating no token, or performs full autoregressive reasoning at a cost of T tokens when that is worth paying. We realise it in a hybrid decision model (HDM), where one frozen backbone serves both modes and a lightweight self-routing block chooses between them. The block estimates the value of thinking, the utility the slow mode is expected to add over the fast one, from what that implicit thinking has already produced, and the slow mode runs only where that value exceeds a price λ set per request. Where no per-decision label exists, as in episodic agentic tasks, we introduce Calibrated Decision Policy Optimisation (CDPO), a reinforcement-learning recipe that trains the block from episode-level returns. We evaluate HDM on MMLU-Pro, AGIEval, GPQA-Diamond, JevBench, BANKING77 and MiniWoB. Specifically, on JevBench HDM-4B scores 0.857 against Jev's 0.851 (+0.7%) at a median 0.179\,s against 0.652 (-72.5%). On the agentic venue MiniWoB HDM-27B cuts token cost by 80.1%.

Reasoning large language models (RLLMs) have recently demonstrated remarkable capabilities through structured and multi-step reasoning. While prior research has primarily focused on improving their training and inference strategies, their potential for in-context learning (ICL) remains largely underexplored. To fill this gap, we propose Thinking with Nothinking Calibration (JointThinking), a new ICL paradigm that leverages the structured difference between two reasoning modes, i.e., Thinking and Nothinking, to improve reasoning accuracy. Specifically, our method prompts the model to generate two answers in parallel: one in Thinking mode and the other in Nothinking mode. A second round of Thinking is triggered only when the two initial responses are inconsistent, using a single prompt that incorporates the original question and both candidate answers. Since such disagreement occurs infrequently (e.g., only 6\% in GSM8K), our method performs just one round of reasoning in most cases, resulting in minimal latency overhead. Extensive experiments across multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that JointThinking significantly outperforms few-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) and majority voting with improved answer robustness. Moreover, It achieves comparable in-distribution performance to training-based SOTA method, while substantially outperforming on out-of-distribution tasks. We further conduct a systematic analysis of the calibration mechanism, showing that leveraging different reasoning modes consistently lowers the error rate and highlights the value of structural thinking diversity. Additionally, we observe that the performance gap between actual and ideal reasoning narrows as model size increases in the second round of thinking, indicating the strong scalability of our approach. Finally, we discuss current limitations and outline promising directions for future ICL research in RLLMs.

Long-form text generation remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs), particularly in maintaining coherence, ensuring logical consistency, and preserving text quality as sequence length increases. To address these limitations, we propose SuperWriter-Agent, an agent-based framework designed to enhance the quality and consistency of long-form text generation. SuperWriter-Agent introduces explicit structured thinking-through planning and refinement stages into the generation pipeline, guiding the model to follow a more deliberate and cognitively grounded process akin to that of a professional writer. Based on this framework, we construct a supervised fine-tuning dataset to train a 7B SuperWriter-LM. We further develop a hierarchical Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) procedure that uses Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to propagate final quality assessments and optimize each generation step accordingly. Empirical results across diverse benchmarks demonstrate that SuperWriter-LM achieves state-of-the-art performance, surpassing even larger-scale baseline models in both automatic evaluation and human evaluation. Furthermore, comprehensive ablation studies demonstrate the effectiveness of hierarchical DPO and underscore the value of incorporating structured thinking steps to improve the quality of long-form text generation.

Humans practice slow thinking before performing actual actions when handling complex tasks in the physical world. This thinking paradigm, recently, has achieved remarkable advancement in boosting Large Language Models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks in digital domains. However, the potential of slow thinking remains largely unexplored for robotic foundation models interacting with the physical world. In this work, we propose Hume: a dual-system Vision-Language-Action (VLA) model with value-guided System-2 thinking and cascaded action denoising, exploring human-like thinking capabilities of Vision-Language-Action models for dexterous robot control. System 2 of Hume implements value-Guided thinking by extending a Vision-Language-Action Model backbone with a novel value-query head to estimate the state-action value of predicted actions. The value-guided thinking is conducted by repeat sampling multiple action candidates and selecting one according to state-action value. System 1 of Hume is a lightweight reactive visuomotor policy that takes System 2 selected action and performs cascaded action denoising for dexterous robot control. At deployment time, System 2 performs value-guided thinking at a low frequency while System 1 asynchronously receives the System 2 selected action candidate and predicts fluid actions in real time. We show that Hume outperforms the existing state-of-the-art Vision-Language-Action models across multiple simulation benchmark and real-robot deployments.

Hallucinations in large language models (LLMs) are commonly regarded as errors to be minimized. However, recent perspectives suggest that some hallucinations may encode creative or epistemically valuable content, a dimension that remains underquantified in current literature. Existing hallucination detection methods primarily focus on factual consistency, struggling to handle heterogeneous scientific tasks and balance creativity with accuracy. To address these challenges, we propose HIC-Bench, a novel evaluation framework that categorizes hallucinations into Intelligent Hallucinations (IH) and Defective Hallucinations (DH), enabling systematic investigation of their interplay in LLM creativity. HIC-Bench features three core characteristics: (1) Structured IH/DH Assessment. using a multi-dimensional metric matrix integrating Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking (TTCT) metrics (Originality, Feasibility, Value) with hallucination-specific dimensions (scientific plausibility, factual deviation); (2) Cross-Domain Applicability. spanning ten scientific domains with open-ended innovation tasks; and (3) Dynamic Prompt Optimization. leveraging the Dynamic Hallucination Prompt (DHP) to guide models toward creative and reliable outputs. The evaluation process employs multiple LLM judges, averaging scores to mitigate bias, with human annotators verifying IH/DH classifications. Experimental results reveal a nonlinear relationship between IH and DH, demonstrating that creativity and correctness can be jointly optimized. These insights position IH as a catalyst for creativity and reveal the ability of LLM hallucinations to drive scientific innovation.Additionally, the HIC-Bench offers a valuable platform for advancing research into the creative intelligence of LLM hallucinations.

Hybrid reasoning models such as the Qwen3 series switch between a THINK mode and a NO-THINK mode through a few chat-template tokens. A popular recipe trains such models with reinforcement learning in NO-THINK mode and reports improved reasoning performance. We provide evidence that much of this gain can be explained by thinking leakage: the gain comes largely from partially reactivating the reasoning abilities of the original model's THINK mode instead of learning enhanced reasoning behavior. We train Qwen3-1.7B, 4B, and 8B with GRPO in NO-THINK mode. As accuracy improves, responses become longer and more reflective, are increasingly judged by the original model to resemble its own thinking, and the model's internal activations shift toward its THINK mode. We then investigate at the level of weights, activations, and attention heads: scaling the RL update further elicits THINK-mode behavior and approaches THINK-mode accuracy but does not exceed it; in Qwen3-8B, replacing a low-dimensional THINK-related activation subspace of the RL-trained model with its original-model value removes most of the RL gain, and the reverse exchange transfers a considerable fraction of the gain to the original model; and the RL-induced shift passes through the attention heads that read the empty think block. We further identify a possible mechanism in the GRPO training signal: responses favored by the advantage-weighted update are more THINK-like, and a gradient step computed from this signal moves the model toward its THINK state. Thus, gains in NO-THINK mode can largely reflect reactivation of reasoning abilities already present in the original model.

Multimodal reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs) typically relies on a two-stage process: supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and reinforcement learning (RL). In standard SFT, all tokens contribute equally to the loss, even though reasoning data are inherently token-imbalanced. Long <think> traces overshadow short but task-critical <answer> segments, leading to verbose reasoning and inaccurate answers. We propose SCALe (Scheduled Curriculum Adaptive Loss), which explicitly separates supervision over reasoning and answer segments using dynamic, length-independent weighting. Unlike vanilla SFT, which overweights the <think> segment, SCALe-SFT gradually shifts the focus from <think> to <answer> throughout training via a cosine scheduling policy, encouraging concise and well-grounded reasoning. We evaluate SCALe across diverse benchmarks and architectures. Results show that SCALe consistently improves accuracy over vanilla SFT and matches the performance of the full two-phase SFT + GRPO pipeline while requiring only about one-seventh of the training time, making it a lightweight yet effective alternative. When combined with GRPO, SCALe achieves the best overall performance, highlighting its value both as a standalone method and as a strong foundation for reinforcement refinement.

Reasoning language models increasingly use test-time compute to improve performance, but existing evaluations typically study this compute one question at a time. Yet when multiple problems share an end-to-end cost or latency constraint, models must decide how to divide limited inference compute among them. We introduce an exam-style evaluation framework for studying this setting, in which a model must distribute one shared token budget across questions with different difficulty and point values to maximize its total score. Across several open and frontier reasoning models, we find that models fail to allocate a shared budget strategically across questions of varying difficulties and values. Models behave largely as greedy sequential solvers: they prioritize questions by presentation order, front-load effort on early questions, and remain insensitive to value, with these tendencies becoming more pronounced as the number of questions grows. Explicit planning prompts spread compute more evenly but do not produce value- or difficulty-aware prioritization. The same behavioral pattern extends from mathematical to code reasoning. These findings establish global budget allocation as a distinct capability that is not captured by conventional per-question evaluation and remains a challenge for current reasoning models.

The escalating reliance on revolutionary online web services has introduced heightened security risks, with persistent challenges posed by phishing despite extensive security measures. Traditional phishing systems, reliant on machine learning and manual features, struggle with evolving tactics. Recent advances in deep learning offer promising avenues for tackling novel phishing challenges and malicious URLs. This paper introduces a two-phase stack generalized model named AntiPhishStack, designed to detect phishing sites. The model leverages the learning of URLs and character-level TF-IDF features symmetrically, enhancing its ability to combat emerging phishing threats. In Phase I, features are trained on a base machine learning classifier, employing K-fold cross-validation for robust mean prediction. Phase II employs a two-layered stacked-based LSTM network with five adaptive optimizers for dynamic compilation, ensuring premier prediction on these features. Additionally, the symmetrical predictions from both phases are optimized and integrated to train a meta-XGBoost classifier, contributing to a final robust prediction. The significance of this work lies in advancing phishing detection with AntiPhishStack, operating without prior phishing-specific feature knowledge. Experimental validation on two benchmark datasets, comprising benign and phishing or malicious URLs, demonstrates the model's exceptional performance, achieving a notable 96.04% accuracy compared to existing studies. This research adds value to the ongoing discourse on symmetry and asymmetry in information security and provides a forward-thinking solution for enhancing network security in the face of evolving cyber threats.

Causal language modeling using the Transformer architecture has yielded remarkable capabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) over the last few years. However, the extent to which fundamental search and reasoning capabilities emerged within LLMs remains a topic of ongoing debate. In this work, we study if causal language modeling can learn a complex task such as solving Sudoku puzzles. To solve a Sudoku, the model is first required to search over all empty cells of the puzzle to decide on a cell to fill and then apply an appropriate strategy to fill the decided cell. Sometimes, the application of a strategy only results in thinning down the possible values in a cell rather than concluding the exact value of the cell. In such cases, multiple strategies are applied one after the other to fill a single cell. We observe that Transformer models trained on this synthetic task can indeed learn to solve Sudokus (our model solves 94.21% of the puzzles fully correctly) when trained on a logical sequence of steps taken by a solver. We find that training Transformers with the logical sequence of steps is necessary and without such training, they fail to learn Sudoku. We also extend our analysis to Zebra puzzles (known as Einstein puzzles) and show that the model solves 92.04 % of the puzzles fully correctly. In addition, we study the internal representations of the trained Transformer and find that through linear probing, we can decode information about the set of possible values in any given cell from them, pointing to the presence of a strong reasoning engine implicit in the Transformer weights.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

The soft-thinking paradigm for Large Language Model (LLM) reasoning can outperform the conventional discrete-token Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning in some scenarios, underscoring its research and application value. However, while the discrete-token CoT reasoning pattern can be reinforced through policy optimization algorithms such as group relative policy optimization (GRPO), extending the soft-thinking pattern with Reinforcement Learning (RL) remains challenging. This difficulty stems from the complexities of injecting stochasticity into soft-thinking tokens and updating soft-thinking policies accordingly. As a result, previous attempts to combine soft-thinking with GRPO typically underperform their discrete-token GRPO counterparts. To fully unlock the potential of soft-thinking, this paper presents a novel policy optimization algorithm, SofT-GRPO, to reinforce LLMs under the soft-thinking reasoning pattern. SofT-GRPO injects the Gumbel noise into logits, employs the Gumbel-Softmax technique to avoid soft-thinking tokens outside the pre-trained embedding space, and leverages the reparameterization trick in policy gradient. We conduct experiments across base LLMs ranging from 1.5B to 7B parameters, and results demonstrate that SofT-GRPO enables soft-thinking LLMs to slightly outperform discrete-token GRPO on Pass@1 (+0.13% on average accuracy), while exhibiting a substantial uplift on Pass@32 (+2.19% on average accuracy). Codes and weights are available on https://github.com/zz1358m/SofT-GRPO-master

We present Audio Flamingo 3 (AF3), a fully open state-of-the-art (SOTA) large audio-language model that advances reasoning and understanding across speech, sound, and music. AF3 introduces: (i) AF-Whisper, a unified audio encoder trained using a novel strategy for joint representation learning across all 3 modalities of speech, sound, and music; (ii) flexible, on-demand thinking, allowing the model to do chain-of-thought-type reasoning before answering; (iii) multi-turn, multi-audio chat; (iv) long audio understanding and reasoning (including speech) up to 10 minutes; and (v) voice-to-voice interaction. To enable these capabilities, we propose several large-scale training datasets curated using novel strategies, including AudioSkills-XL, LongAudio-XL, AF-Think, and AF-Chat, and train AF3 with a novel five-stage curriculum-based training strategy. Trained on only open-source audio data, AF3 achieves new SOTA results on over 20+ (long) audio understanding and reasoning benchmarks, surpassing both open-weight and closed-source models trained on much larger datasets.

Multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) exhibit strong general-purpose capabilities, yet still struggle on Fine-Grained Visual Classification (FGVC), a core perception task that requires subtle visual discrimination and is crucial for many real-world applications. A widely adopted strategy for boosting performance on challenging tasks such as math and coding is Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning. However, several prior works have reported that CoT can actually harm performance on visual perception tasks. These studies, though, examine the issue from relatively narrow angles and leave open why CoT degrades perception-heavy performance. We systematically re-examine the role of CoT in FGVC through the lenses of zero-shot evaluation and multiple training paradigms. Across these settings, we uncover a central paradox: the degradation induced by CoT is largely driven by the reasoning length, in which longer textual reasoning consistently lowers classification accuracy. We term this phenomenon the ``Cost of Thinking''. Building on this finding, we make two key contributions: (1) \alg, a simple and general plug-and-play normalization method for multi-reward optimization that balances heterogeneous reward signals, and (2) ReFine-RFT, a framework that combines ensemble rewards with \alg to constrain reasoning length while providing dense accuracy-oriented feedback. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our findings and the proposed ReFine-RFT, achieving state-of-the-art performance across FGVC benchmarks. Code and models are available at https://github.com/jiezhu23/ReFine-RFT{Project Link}.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized decision-making by breaking down complex problems into more manageable language sequences referred to as ``thoughts''. An effective thought design should consider three key perspectives: performance, efficiency, and flexibility. However, existing thought can at most exhibit two of these attributes. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel thought prompting approach called ``Everything of Thoughts'' (XoT) to defy the law of ``Penrose triangle of existing thought paradigms. XoT leverages pretrained reinforcement learning and Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to incorporate external domain knowledge into thoughts, thereby enhancing LLMs' capabilities and enabling them to generalize to unseen problems efficiently. Through the utilization of the MCTS-LLM collaborative thought revision framework, this approach autonomously produces high-quality comprehensive cognitive mappings with minimal LLM interactions. Additionally, XoT empowers LLMs to engage in unconstrained thinking, allowing for flexible cognitive mappings for problems with multiple solutions.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, a cognitive process fundamental to human intelligence, has garnered significant attention in the realm of artificial intelligence and natural language processing. However, there still remains a lack of a comprehensive survey for this arena. To this end, we take the first step and present a thorough survey of this research field carefully and widely. We use X-of-Thought to refer to Chain-of-Thought in a broad sense. In detail, we systematically organize the current research according to the taxonomies of methods, including XoT construction, XoT structure variants, and enhanced XoT. Additionally, we describe XoT with frontier applications, covering planning, tool use, and distillation. Furthermore, we address challenges and discuss some future directions, including faithfulness, multi-modal, and theory. We hope this survey serves as a valuable resource for researchers seeking to innovate within the domain of chain-of-thought reasoning.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

Scaling test-time compute through extended chains of thought has become a dominant paradigm for improving large language model reasoning. However, existing research implicitly assumes that longer thinking always yields better results. This assumption remains largely unexamined. We systematically investigate how the marginal utility of additional reasoning tokens changes as compute budgets increase. We find that marginal returns diminish substantially at higher budgets and that models exhibit ``overthinking'', where extended reasoning is associated with abandoning previously correct answers. Furthermore, we show that optimal thinking length varies across problem difficulty, suggesting that uniform compute allocation is suboptimal. Our cost-aware evaluation framework reveals that stopping at moderate budgets can reduce computation significantly while maintaining comparable accuracy.

Navigating high-stakes dilemmas involving conflicting values is challenging even for humans, let alone for AI. Yet prior work in evaluating the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in such situations has been limited to everyday scenarios. To close this gap, this work first introduces CLASH (Character perspective-based LLM Assessments in Situations with High-stakes), a meticulously curated dataset consisting of 345 high-impact dilemmas along with 3,795 individual perspectives of diverse values. In particular, we design CLASH in a way to support the study of critical aspects of value-based decision-making processes which are missing from prior work, including understanding decision ambivalence and psychological discomfort as well as capturing the temporal shifts of values in characters' perspectives. By benchmarking 10 open and closed frontier models, we uncover several key findings. (1) Even the strongest models, such as GPT-4o and Claude-Sonnet, achieve less than 50% accuracy in identifying situations where the decision should be ambivalent, while they perform significantly better in clear-cut scenarios. (2) While LLMs reasonably predict psychological discomfort as marked by human, they inadequately comprehend perspectives involving value shifts, indicating a need for LLMs to reason over complex values. (3) Our experiments also reveal a significant correlation between LLMs' value preferences and their steerability towards a given value. (4) Finally, LLMs exhibit greater steerability when engaged in value reasoning from a third-party perspective, compared to a first-person setup, though certain value pairs benefit uniquely from the first-person framing.

Recently, there has been significant progress in teaching language models to perform step-by-step reasoning to solve complex numerical reasoning tasks. Chain-of-thoughts prompting (CoT) is by far the state-of-art method for these tasks. CoT uses language models to perform both reasoning and computation in the multi-step `thought' process. To disentangle computation from reasoning, we propose `Program of Thoughts' (PoT), which uses language models (mainly Codex) to express the reasoning process as a program. The computation is relegated to an external computer, which executes the generated programs to derive the answer. We evaluate PoT on five math word problem datasets (GSM, AQuA, SVAMP, TabMWP, MultiArith) and three financial-QA datasets (FinQA, ConvFinQA, TATQA) for both few-shot and zero-shot setups. Under both few-shot and zero-shot settings, PoT can show an average performance gain over CoT by around 12\% across all the evaluated datasets. By combining PoT with self-consistency decoding, we can achieve SoTA performance on all math problem datasets and near-SoTA performance on financial datasets. All of our data and code are released in Github\url{https://github.com/wenhuchen/Program-of-Thoughts}.

Value alignment is essential for building AI systems that can safely and reliably interact with people. However, what a person values -- and is even capable of valuing -- depends on the concepts that they are currently using to understand and evaluate what happens in the world. The dependence of values on concepts means that concept alignment is a prerequisite for value alignment -- agents need to align their representation of a situation with that of humans in order to successfully align their values. Here, we formally analyze the concept alignment problem in the inverse reinforcement learning setting, show how neglecting concept alignment can lead to systematic value mis-alignment, and describe an approach that helps minimize such failure modes by jointly reasoning about a person's concepts and values. Additionally, we report experimental results with human participants showing that humans reason about the concepts used by an agent when acting intentionally, in line with our joint reasoning model.

''Thinking with Images'' has emerged as an effective paradigm for fine-grained visual reasoning: by explicitly zooming into relevant regions and reasoning over crops, models can access local evidence that is difficult to recover from a single global image. However, this benefit comes with redundant tool invocations and longer inference traces. Moreover, when such behaviors are learned mainly from outcome reward, the resulting intermediate crops or visual cues can be noisy or fail to faithfully capture task-relevant visual evidence. In this work, we ask whether the reasoning benefits of ''Thinking with Images'' can be internalized through Thinking with Imagination: an internal process that decides where to look and imagines what visual cues closer inspection would reveal without actually invoking tools. We propose Imagine-OPD, an on-policy self-distillation framework in which a teacher plays the role of a ''Thinking with Images'' reasoner during training: it receives privileged zoomed evidence views derived from annotated regions, and supervises the model's own imagination reasoning trajectories. Imagine-OPD does not require an external teacher or high-quality imagination demonstrations. Experiments on vision-centric benchmarks show that Imagine-OPD achieves the best average performance among compared models while significantly reducing inference overhead compared with ''Thinking with Images'' methods.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

Reasoning traces from chain-of-thought models appear to offer a legible window into how a model arrives at its answer. A growing body of work treats them as such, using LLM judges to diagnose errors, evaluate faithfulness, and provide step-level supervision via process reward models and generative critics. These practices rely on the text of a reasoning step carrying information about its functional role. But does the text actually encode information about which reasoning steps matter? We operationalize the importance of a reasoning step as its advantage: the change in expected reward, e.g., producing the correct final answer, from including that step, estimated via Monte Carlo rollouts. Basing ground truth on these estimates, we evaluate whether LLM judges can identify high-advantage steps and find that sufficiently capable LLMs can outperform a prevalence baseline but fall well short of a noise ceiling. Fine-tuning a model as a step-level critic yields strong improvement for incorrect responses but remains distant from ceiling for correct responses, suggesting that step importance is only partially recoverable from the text of the reasoning trace. Our findings contribute to a growing body of chain-of-thought faithfulness work that cautions against treating the legibility of reasoning traces as interpretability, especially with implications for process reward modeling.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated the effectiveness of scaling test-time computation to enhance reasoning capabilities in multiple tasks. However, LRMs typically suffer from "overthinking" problems, where models generate significantly redundant reasoning steps while bringing limited performance gains. Existing work relies on fine-tuning to mitigate overthinking, which requires additional data, unconventional training setups, risky safety misalignment, and poor generalization. Through empirical analysis, we reveal an important characteristic of LRM behaviors that placing external CoTs generated by smaller models between the thinking token (<think> and </think>) can effectively manipulate the model to generate fewer thoughts. Building on these insights, we propose a simple yet efficient pipeline, ThoughtMani, to enable LRMs to bypass unnecessary intermediate steps and reduce computational costs significantly. We conduct extensive experiments to validate the utility and efficiency of ThoughtMani. For instance, when applied to QwQ-32B on the LiveBench/Code dataset, ThoughtMani keeps the original performance and reduces output token counts by approximately 30%, with little overhead from the CoT generator. Furthermore, we find that ThoughtMani enhances safety alignment by an average of 10%. Since model vendors typically serve models of different sizes simultaneously, ThoughtMani provides an effective way to construct more efficient and accessible LRMs for real-world applications.

Recent advances have shown success in eliciting strong reasoning abilities in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) through rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) with outcome rewards. However, this paradigm typically lacks supervision over the thinking process leading to the final outcome.As a result, the model may learn sub-optimal reasoning strategies, which can hinder its generalization ability. In light of this, we propose SophiaVL-R1, as an attempt to add reward signals for the thinking process in this paradigm. To achieve this, we first train a thinking reward model that evaluates the quality of the entire thinking process. Given that the thinking reward may be unreliable for certain samples due to reward hacking, we propose the Trust-GRPO method, which assigns a trustworthiness weight to the thinking reward during training. This weight is computed based on the thinking reward comparison of responses leading to correct answers versus incorrect answers, helping to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable thinking rewards. Moreover, we design an annealing training strategy that gradually reduces the thinking reward over time, allowing the model to rely more on the accurate rule-based outcome reward in later training stages. Experiments show that our SophiaVL-R1 surpasses a series of reasoning MLLMs on various benchmarks (e.g., MathVisita, MMMU), demonstrating strong reasoning and generalization capabilities. Notably, our SophiaVL-R1-7B even outperforms LLaVA-OneVision-72B on most benchmarks, despite the latter having 10 times more parameters. All code, models, and datasets are made publicly available at https://github.com/kxfan2002/SophiaVL-R1.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their ability to perform complex reasoning tasks, transitioning from fast and intuitive thinking (System 1) to slow and deep reasoning (System 2). While System 2 reasoning improves task accuracy, it often incurs substantial computational costs due to its slow thinking nature and inefficient or unnecessary reasoning behaviors. In contrast, System 1 reasoning is computationally efficient but leads to suboptimal performance. Consequently, it is critical to balance the trade-off between performance (benefits) and computational costs (budgets), giving rise to the concept of reasoning economy. In this survey, we provide a comprehensive analysis of reasoning economy in both the post-training and test-time inference stages of LLMs, encompassing i) the cause of reasoning inefficiency, ii) behavior analysis of different reasoning patterns, and iii) potential solutions to achieve reasoning economy. By offering actionable insights and highlighting open challenges, we aim to shed light on strategies for improving the reasoning economy of LLMs, thereby serving as a valuable resource for advancing research in this evolving area. We also provide a public repository to continually track developments in this fast-evolving field.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate significant reasoning capabilities, particularly through long chain-of-thought (CoT) processes, which can be elicited by reinforcement learning (RL). However, prolonged CoT reasoning presents limitations, primarily verbose outputs due to excessive introspection. The reasoning process in these LLMs often appears to follow a trial-and-error methodology rather than a systematic, logical deduction. In contrast, tree-of-thoughts (ToT) offers a conceptually more advanced approach by modeling reasoning as an exploration within a tree structure. This reasoning structure facilitates the parallel generation and evaluation of multiple reasoning branches, allowing for the active identification, assessment, and pruning of unproductive paths. This process can potentially lead to improved performance and reduced token costs. Building upon the long CoT capability of LLMs, we introduce tree-of-thoughts RL (ToTRL), a novel on-policy RL framework with a rule-based reward. ToTRL is designed to guide LLMs in developing the parallel ToT strategy based on the sequential CoT strategy. Furthermore, we employ LLMs as players in a puzzle game during the ToTRL training process. Solving puzzle games inherently necessitates exploring interdependent choices and managing multiple constraints, which requires the construction and exploration of a thought tree, providing challenging tasks for cultivating the ToT reasoning capability. Our empirical evaluations demonstrate that our ToTQwen3-8B model, trained with our ToTRL, achieves significant improvement in performance and reasoning efficiency on complex reasoning tasks.

Recent advances leverage post-training to enhance model reasoning performance, which typically requires costly training pipelines and still suffers from inefficient, overly lengthy outputs. We introduce Speculative Thinking, a training-free framework that enables large reasoning models to guide smaller ones during inference at the reasoning level, distinct from speculative decoding, which operates at the token level. Our approach is based on two observations: (1) reasoning-supportive tokens such as "wait" frequently appear after structural delimiters like "\n\n", serving as signals for reflection or continuation; and (2) larger models exhibit stronger control over reflective behavior, reducing unnecessary backtracking while improving reasoning quality. By strategically delegating reflective steps to a more capable model, our method significantly boosts the reasoning accuracy of reasoning models while shortening their output. With the assistance of the 32B reasoning model, the 1.5B model's accuracy on MATH500 increases from 83.2% to 89.4%, marking a substantial improvement of 6.2%. Simultaneously, the average output length is reduced from 5439 tokens to 4583 tokens, representing a 15.7% decrease. Moreover, when applied to a non-reasoning model (Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct), our framework boosts its accuracy from 74.0% to 81.8% on the same benchmark, achieving a relative improvement of 7.8%.

Chain-of-thought prompting (e.g., "Let's think step-by-step") primes large language models to verbalize rationalization for their predictions. While chain-of-thought can lead to dramatic performance gains, benefits appear to emerge only for sufficiently large models (beyond 50B parameters). We show that orders-of-magnitude smaller models (125M -- 1.3B parameters) can still benefit from chain-of-thought prompting. To achieve this, we introduce Symbolic Chain-of-Thought Distillation (SCoTD), a method to train a smaller student model on rationalizations sampled from a significantly larger teacher model. Experiments across several commonsense benchmarks show that: 1) SCoTD enhances the performance of the student model in both supervised and few-shot settings, and especially for challenge sets; 2) sampling many reasoning chains per instance from the teacher is paramount; and 3) after distillation, student chain-of-thoughts are judged by humans as comparable to the teacher, despite orders of magnitude fewer parameters. We test several hypotheses regarding what properties of chain-of-thought samples are important, e.g., diversity vs. teacher likelihood vs. open-endedness. We release our corpus of chain-of-thought samples and code.

Today's reasoning models use thinking tokens to attain stronger performance on benchmarks than their instruction-tuned counterparts. It is also generally believed that this more "deliberative" mode should improve alignment and safety, by providing the model a safe space to consider whether its planned answer to a request violates its safety principles. We present evidence that this intuition is not always correct. Across frontier open-weight reasoning models spanning GPT-OSS, Qwen, Olmo, and Phi families, we find that the eventual refusal/compliance outcome is already strongly predictable via a trained head on the first token's hidden representation (0.84-0.95 AUROC and sim88% balanced accuracy for predicting refusal/compliance) before any visible thinking. The thinking process turns out to be more akin to prefix completion than to deliberative revision, with the final outcome rarely changing after the first sim20% of thinking, despite giving the appearance of deliberation at the text level (sim74% of text-level deliberations occur when the response distribution is already locked to one refusal/compliance side). We also find that existing inference-time and training-based safety interventions, despite being motivated by the goal of inducing deliberation, largely shift model behavior toward over-refusal while suppressing already-scarce deliberation signals. Our results suggest that safety behavior in current reasoning models is much less deliberative than commonly assumed, and highlight the need for methods that induce real safety deliberation.

We introduce Graph of Thoughts (GoT): a framework that advances prompting capabilities in large language models (LLMs) beyond those offered by paradigms such as Chain-of-Thought or Tree of Thoughts (ToT). The key idea and primary advantage of GoT is the ability to model the information generated by an LLM as an arbitrary graph, where units of information ("LLM thoughts") are vertices, and edges correspond to dependencies between these vertices. This approach enables combining arbitrary LLM thoughts into synergistic outcomes, distilling the essence of whole networks of thoughts, or enhancing thoughts using feedback loops. We illustrate that GoT offers advantages over state of the art on different tasks, for example increasing the quality of sorting by 62% over ToT, while simultaneously reducing costs by >31%. We ensure that GoT is extensible with new thought transformations and thus can be used to spearhead new prompting schemes. This work brings the LLM reasoning closer to human thinking or brain mechanisms such as recurrence, both of which form complex networks.

While Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting advances LLM reasoning, challenges persist in consistency, accuracy, and self-correction, especially for complex or ethically sensitive tasks. Existing single-dimensional reflection methods offer insufficient improvements. We propose MyGO Poly-Reflective Chain-of-Thought (PR-CoT), a novel methodology employing structured multi-perspective reflection. After initial CoT, PR-CoT guides the LLM to self-assess its reasoning across multiple predefined angles: logical consistency, information completeness, biases/ethics, and alternative solutions. Implemented purely via prompt engineering, this process refines the initial CoT into a more robust and accurate final answer without model retraining. Experiments across arithmetic, commonsense, ethical decision-making, and logical puzzles, using GPT-three point five and GPT-four models, demonstrate PR-CoT's superior performance. It significantly outperforms traditional CoT and existing reflection methods in logical consistency and error correction, with notable gains in nuanced domains like ethical decision-making. Ablation studies, human evaluations, and qualitative analyses further validate the contribution of each reflection perspective and the overall efficacy of our poly-reflective paradigm in fostering more reliable LLM reasoning.

Long chain-of-thought~(CoT) has become a dominant paradigm for enhancing the reasoning capability of large reasoning models~(LRMs); however, the performance gains often come with a substantial increase in reasoning budget. Recent studies show that existing CoT paradigms tend to induce systematic overthinking, unnecessarily coupling reasoning capability with reasoning cost. Most prior approaches reduce token usage through post hoc techniques such as token compression, truncation, or length penalties, without explicitly addressing the core mechanisms of reasoning. We propose Draft-Thinking, which guides models to first learn a concise draft-style reasoning structure that retains only the critical reasoning steps. Through a progressive curriculum learning, the model stably internalizes this efficient reasoning pattern as its capability scales. Moreover, Draft-Thinking introduces adaptive prompting, which elevates reasoning depth to a flexible, model-selectable behavior. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Draft-Thinking substantially reduces reasoning budget while largely preserving reasoning performance; for example, on MATH500, it achieves an 82.6\% reduction in reasoning budget at the cost of only a 2.6\% performance drop.

Language is often considered a key aspect of human thinking, providing us with exceptional abilities to generalize, explore, plan, replan, and adapt to new situations. However, Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents are far from human-level performance in any of these abilities. We hypothesize one reason for such cognitive deficiencies is that they lack the benefits of thinking in language and that we can improve AI agents by training them to think like humans do. We introduce a novel Imitation Learning framework, Thought Cloning, where the idea is to not just clone the behaviors of human demonstrators, but also the thoughts humans have as they perform these behaviors. While we expect Thought Cloning to truly shine at scale on internet-sized datasets of humans thinking out loud while acting (e.g. online videos with transcripts), here we conduct experiments in a domain where the thinking and action data are synthetically generated. Results reveal that Thought Cloning learns much faster than Behavioral Cloning and its performance advantage grows the further out of distribution test tasks are, highlighting its ability to better handle novel situations. Thought Cloning also provides important benefits for AI Safety and Interpretability, and makes it easier to debug and improve AI. Because we can observe the agent's thoughts, we can (1) more easily diagnose why things are going wrong, making it easier to fix the problem, (2) steer the agent by correcting its thinking, or (3) prevent it from doing unsafe things it plans to do. Overall, by training agents how to think as well as behave, Thought Cloning creates safer, more powerful agents.

As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a longstanding problem, and despite much interest over the years it remains unclear whether current AIs have meaningful values. We propose a solution to this problem, leveraging the framework of utility functions to study the internal coherence of AI preferences. Surprisingly, we find that independently-sampled preferences in current LLMs exhibit high degrees of structural coherence, and moreover that this emerges with scale. These findings suggest that value systems emerge in LLMs in a meaningful sense, a finding with broad implications. To study these emergent value systems, we propose utility engineering as a research agenda, comprising both the analysis and control of AI utilities. We uncover problematic and often shocking values in LLM assistants despite existing control measures. These include cases where AIs value themselves over humans and are anti-aligned with specific individuals. To constrain these emergent value systems, we propose methods of utility control. As a case study, we show how aligning utilities with a citizen assembly reduces political biases and generalizes to new scenarios. Whether we like it or not, value systems have already emerged in AIs, and much work remains to fully understand and control these emergent representations.

Does AI understand human values? While this remains an open philosophical question, we take a pragmatic stance by introducing VAPT, the Value-Alignment Perception Toolkit, for studying how LLMs reflect people's values and how people judge those reflections. 20 participants texted a human-like chatbot over a month, then completed a 2-hour interview with our toolkit evaluating AI's ability to extract (pull details regarding), embody (make decisions guided by), and explain (provide proof of) human values. 13 participants left our study convinced that AI can understand human values. Participants found the experience insightful for self-reflection and found themselves getting persuaded by the AI's reasoning. Thus, we warn about "weaponized empathy": a potentially dangerous design pattern that may arise in value-aligned, yet welfare-misaligned AI. VAPT offers concrete artifacts and design implications to evaluate and responsibly build value-aligned conversational agents with transparency, consent, and safeguards as AI grows more capable and human-like into the future.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning allows humans to inspect how large language models reach their answers, and oversee model behaviour. This reasoning comes at an increased inference cost, motivating efficient methods that train models to solve tasks using fewer tokens. However, a common concern is that such training may cause models to skip important reasoning steps, so the CoT no longer faithfully reflects the model's decision. It is unclear whether or when this occurs in practice, since different efficiency methods apply length pressure to models' CoT in distinct ways, and faithfully explaining a model's decision takes more tokens on some tasks than others. To understand these dynamics, we fine-tune a variety of models with three methods that apply length pressure differently, namely a fixed generation budget, a per-example length target, and a group-relative length reward. We evaluate how efficient reasoning affects CoT faithfulness (i.e., how well the CoT reflects model decisions on related inputs) and monitorability (i.e., whether the CoT reveals when input interventions alter the output). We find that it affects faithfulness and monitorability differently. Faithfulness falls in most settings, primarily because the trained models are less consistent. Monitorability is more robust, as models keep acknowledging the influence on their answer even when the CoT is much shorter.

While reasoning-enhanced Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable advances in complex tasks such as mathematics and coding, their effectiveness across universal multimodal scenarios remains uncertain. The trend of releasing parallel "Instruct" and "Thinking" models by leading developers serves merely as a resource-intensive workaround, stemming from the lack of a criterion for determining when reasoning is truly beneficial. In this paper, we propose Dual Tuning, a framework designed to assess whether reasoning yields positive gains for target tasks under given base models and datasets. By jointly fine-tuning on paired Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Direct-Answer (DA) data under controlled prompts, we systematically quantify and compare the gains of both training modes using the proposed metrics, and establish the "Thinking Boundary" to evaluate the suitability of reasoning training across diverse multimodal tasks, including spatial, mathematical, and multi-disciplinary domains. We further explore the impact of reinforcement training and thinking patterns on reasoning suitability, and validate whether the "Thinking Boundary" can guide data refinement. Our findings challenge the "reasoning-for-all" paradigm, providing practical guidance for identifying appropriate data and training strategies, and motivating the development of resource-efficient, adaptive auto-think systems.

The long chain-of-thought (LongCoT) capability is central to the recent breakthroughs achieved by large language models in complex reasoning tasks. However, the accompanying issue of ''underthinking'', where models exhibit shallow reasoning by frequently switching thoughts without sufficient exploration, limits both performance and token efficiency. To address this problem, we propose a simple yet effective reasoning strategy: the SmartSwitch inference framework. This framework can be easily integrated into any large language model as a plug-and-play solution, continuously monitoring the model's reasoning process to detect underthinking and guide it toward deeper exploration of promising but overlooked thoughts. Specifically, the perception module identifies points where thoughts switch and evaluates the potential of the preceding thought using an off-the-shelf process reward model (PRM). If a high-potential thought is found to be prematurely abandoned, the intervention module interrupts the ongoing inference, backtracks to the point before the switch, and inserts a "deepening prompt" to encourage further exploration along that promising path. Extensive experiments on challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the performance of various large language models of different sizes.

Post-training hybrid reasoning models in NoThink mode has attracted growing interest as a way to improve performance while keeping inference fast. However, these gains may draw on thinking behavior already accessible through the base model's Think mode. We formulate this thinking leakage in a causal mediation framework and audit its contribution using bidirectional interventions along a simple base-derived activation direction. Across three models and three post-training methods on competition math benchmarks, we find that leakage is real, causal, and substantial: behavioral and representational analyses reveal shifts toward Think, steering the base model along this direction reproduces most of the post-training accuracy gain, and counter-steering a checkpoint removes a substantial share of what it gains. Across nine aligned checkpoints with positive NoThink gains, the resulting leakage ratio ranges from 42% to 79%. These interventions support a substantial causal contribution of thinking leakage. Our findings show that a post-training method's apparent advantage can therefore reflect greater drift toward Think, obscuring whether it improves capability within NoThink or more effectively re-invokes existing Think behavior.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) plays a crucial role in reasoning for math problem solving. We conduct a comprehensive examination of methods for designing CoT, comparing conventional natural language CoT with various program CoTs, including the self-describing program, the comment-describing program, and the non-describing program. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of programming language on program CoTs, comparing Python and Wolfram Language. Through extensive experiments on GSM8K, MATHQA, and SVAMP, we find that program CoTs often have superior effectiveness in math problem solving. Notably, the best performing combination with 30B parameters beats GPT-3.5-turbo by a significant margin. The results show that self-describing program offers greater diversity and thus can generally achieve higher performance. We also find that Python is a better choice of language than Wolfram for program CoTs. The experimental results provide a valuable guideline for future CoT designs that take into account both programming language and coding style for further advancements. Our datasets and code are publicly available.

Human values are crucial to human decision-making. Value pluralism is the view that multiple correct values may be held in tension with one another (e.g., when considering lying to a friend to protect their feelings, how does one balance honesty with friendship?). As statistical learners, AI systems fit to averages by default, washing out these potentially irreducible value conflicts. To improve AI systems to better reflect value pluralism, the first-order challenge is to explore the extent to which AI systems can model pluralistic human values, rights, and duties as well as their interaction. We introduce ValuePrism, a large-scale dataset of 218k values, rights, and duties connected to 31k human-written situations. ValuePrism's contextualized values are generated by GPT-4 and deemed high-quality by human annotators 91% of the time. We conduct a large-scale study with annotators across diverse social and demographic backgrounds to try to understand whose values are represented. With ValuePrism, we build Kaleido, an open, light-weight, and structured language-based multi-task model that generates, explains, and assesses the relevance and valence (i.e., support or oppose) of human values, rights, and duties within a specific context. Humans prefer the sets of values output by our system over the teacher GPT-4, finding them more accurate and with broader coverage. In addition, we demonstrate that Kaleido can help explain variability in human decision-making by outputting contrasting values. Finally, we show that Kaleido's representations transfer to other philosophical frameworks and datasets, confirming the benefit of an explicit, modular, and interpretable approach to value pluralism. We hope that our work will serve as a step to making more explicit the implicit values behind human decision-making and to steering AI systems to make decisions that are more in accordance with them.

Language models are increasingly being deployed for general problem solving across a wide range of tasks, but are still confined to token-level, left-to-right decision-making processes during inference. This means they can fall short in tasks that require exploration, strategic lookahead, or where initial decisions play a pivotal role. To surmount these challenges, we introduce a new framework for language model inference, Tree of Thoughts (ToT), which generalizes over the popular Chain of Thought approach to prompting language models, and enables exploration over coherent units of text (thoughts) that serve as intermediate steps toward problem solving. ToT allows LMs to perform deliberate decision making by considering multiple different reasoning paths and self-evaluating choices to decide the next course of action, as well as looking ahead or backtracking when necessary to make global choices. Our experiments show that ToT significantly enhances language models' problem-solving abilities on three novel tasks requiring non-trivial planning or search: Game of 24, Creative Writing, and Mini Crosswords. For instance, in Game of 24, while GPT-4 with chain-of-thought prompting only solved 4% of tasks, our method achieved a success rate of 74%. Code repo with all prompts: https://github.com/ysymyth/tree-of-thought-llm.

The explosion in the use of software in important sociotechnical systems has renewed focus on the study of the way technical constructs reflect policies, norms, and human values. This effort requires the engagement of scholars and practitioners from many disciplines. And yet, these disciplines often conceptualize the operative values very differently while referring to them using the same vocabulary. The resulting conflation of ideas confuses discussions about values in technology at disciplinary boundaries. In the service of improving this situation, this paper examines the value of shared vocabularies, analytics, and other tools that facilitate conversations about values in light of these disciplinary specific conceptualizations, the role such tools play in furthering research and practice, outlines different conceptions of "fairness" deployed in discussions about computer systems, and provides an analytic tool for interdisciplinary discussions and collaborations around the concept of fairness. We use a case study of risk assessments in criminal justice applications to both motivate our effort--describing how conflation of different concepts under the banner of "fairness" led to unproductive confusion--and illustrate the value of the fairness analytic by demonstrating how the rigorous analysis it enables can assist in identifying key areas of theoretical, political, and practical misunderstanding or disagreement, and where desired support alignment or collaboration in the absence of consensus.

Emotional support dialogue systems aim to reduce help-seekers' distress and help them overcome challenges. While human valuesx2013core beliefs that shape an individual's prioritiesx2013are increasingly emphasized in contemporary psychological therapy for their role in fostering internal transformation and long-term emotional well-being, their integration into emotional support systems remains underexplored. To bridge this gap, we present a value-driven method for training emotional support dialogue systems designed to reinforce positive values in seekers. Notably, our model identifies which values to reinforce at each turn and how to do so, by leveraging online support conversations from Reddit. We evaluate the method across support skills, seekers' emotional intensity, and value reinforcement. Our method consistently outperforms various baselines, effectively exploring and eliciting values from seekers. Additionally, leveraging crowd knowledge from Reddit significantly enhances its effectiveness. Therapists highlighted its ability to validate seekers' challenges and emphasize positive aspects of their situationsx2013both crucial elements of value reinforcement. Our work, being the first to integrate value reinforcement into emotional support systems, demonstrates its promise and establishes a foundation for future research.

Reasoning LLMs show improved performance with longer chains of thought. However, recent work has highlighted their tendency to overthink, continuing to revise answers even after reaching the correct solution. We quantitatively confirm this inefficiency from the distribution dynamics perspective by tracking Pass@1 for answers averaged over a large number of rollouts and find the model often begins to always produce the correct answer early in the reasoning, making extra reasoning tokens wasteful. To detect and prevent overthinking, we propose a simple and inexpensive novel signal, Entropy After </Think> (EAT), for monitoring and deciding whether to exit reasoning early. By appending a stop thinking token (</think>) and monitoring the entropy of the following token as the model reasons, we obtain a trajectory that decreases and stabilizes when Pass@1 plateaus; thresholding its variance under an exponential moving average yields a practical stopping rule. Importantly, our approach enables adaptively allocating compute based on the EAT trajectory, allowing us to spend compute in a more efficient way compared with fixing the token budget for all questions. Empirically, on MATH500 and AIME2025, EAT reduces token usage by 12 - 22% without harming accuracy. EAT also remains effective in black box settings where logits from the reasoning model are not accessible, and EAT is computed with proxy models: We verified the feasibility via early stopping Llama 70B with a 1.5B model and Claude 3.7 with a local 4B model.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) achieve superior performance by extending the thought length. However, a lengthy thinking trajectory leads to reduced efficiency. Most of the existing methods are stuck in the assumption of overthinking and attempt to reason efficiently by compressing the Chain-of-Thought, but this often leads to performance degradation. To address this problem, we introduce A*-Thought, an efficient tree search-based unified framework designed to identify and isolate the most essential thoughts from the extensive reasoning chains produced by these models. It formulates the reasoning process of LRMs as a search tree, where each node represents a reasoning span in the giant reasoning space. By combining the A* search algorithm with a cost function specific to the reasoning path, it can efficiently compress the chain of thought and determine a reasoning path with high information density and low cost. In addition, we also propose a bidirectional importance estimation mechanism, which further refines this search process and enhances its efficiency beyond uniform sampling. Extensive experiments on several advanced math tasks show that A*-Thought effectively balances performance and efficiency over a huge search space. Specifically, A*-Thought can improve the performance of QwQ-32B by 2.39times with low-budget and reduce the length of the output token by nearly 50% with high-budget. The proposed method is also compatible with several other LRMs, demonstrating its generalization capability. The code can be accessed at: https://github.com/AI9Stars/AStar-Thought.

Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with maintaining accuracy across a sequence of intermediate reasoning steps in mathematical reasoning, leading to error propagation that undermines the final result. The current methodology to mitigate this issue primarily involves using a verifier model to assess the correctness of generated solution candidates, focusing either on the overall reasoning path or on an incomplete reasoning path. By rethinking this approach, we argue that assessing potentials of incomplete reasoning paths could be more advantageous as it guides towards correct final answers, transforming the task into a planning problem. Our proposed verifier, the Outcome-supervision Value Model (OVM), employs outcome supervision for training, offering an efficient and intuitive method for planning by prioritizing steps that lead to accurate conclusions over mere per-step correctness. Furthermore, the OVM eschews the need for labor-intensive annotations on step-level correctness, enhancing its scalability. Our experiments on two multi-step mathematical reasoning datasets, GSM8K and Game of 24, demonstrate the superior performance of the OVM model. Notably, in GSM8K, our OVM-7B model achieves state-of-the-art results among LLMs up to 13B parameters; especially it does not utilize GPT-4 or code execution. These findings offer a novel perspective on the role of outcome supervision in training verifiers for multi-step reasoning tasks and provide theoretical justification for its advantage in value estimation for planning.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Through reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR), large language models have achieved substantial progress in domains with easily verifiable outcomes, such as mathematics and coding. However, when applied to more complex tasks like open-domain question answering, RLVR faces significant challenges due to the difficulty of verifying correctness. The nuanced and ambiguous nature of real-world knowledge makes it difficult to reliably evaluate correctness in these settings, necessitating further abilities that extend beyond mere logical consistency to encompass an understanding and assessment of both external and internal knowledge. Recent work has primarily focused on improving faithfulness, defined as semantic alignment with supporting documents, which can cause models to rely excessively on external sources and diminish their capacity for critical assessment. To address this, we propose the Thinking-supervised Reward Model (TRM), which incorporates sentence-level thinking supervision to endow reward models with critical thinking abilities. Given a query, answer, and supporting documents, TRM first assesses the faithfulness of each answer sentence to the supporting documents, and then applies a reasoning step to evaluate sentence-level correctness. By structuring reward modeling as a sequence of faithfulness, reasoning, and correctness evaluations, TRM encourages models to critically assess and leverage both external and internal knowledge. Experiments on reward signals demonstrate that TRM substantially improves the identification of incorrect sentences, and incorporating TRM into policy optimization leads to significant gains in both answer correctness and usefulness.

The impressive performance of language models is undeniable. However, the presence of biases based on gender, race, socio-economic status, physical appearance, and sexual orientation makes the deployment of language models challenging. This paper studies the effect of chain-of-thought prompting, a recent approach that studies the steps followed by the model before it responds, on fairness. More specifically, we ask the following question: Do biased models have biased thoughts? To answer our question, we conduct experiments on 5 popular large language models using fairness metrics to quantify 11 different biases in the model's thoughts and output. Our results show that the bias in the thinking steps is not highly correlated with the output bias (less than 0.6 correlation with a p-value smaller than 0.001 in most cases). In other words, unlike human beings, the tested models with biased decisions do not always possess biased thoughts.

We consider the question: when a large language reasoning model makes a choice, did it think first and then decide to, or decide first and then think? In this paper, we present evidence that detectable, early-encoded decisions shape chain-of-thought in reasoning models. Specifically, we show that a simple linear probe successfully decodes tool-calling decisions from pre-generation activations with very high confidence, and in some cases, even before a single reasoning token is produced. Activation steering supports this causally: perturbing the decision direction leads to inflated deliberation, and flips behavior in many examples (between 7 - 79% depending on model and benchmark). We also show through behavioral analysis that, when steering changes the decision, the chain-of-thought process often rationalizes the flip rather than resisting it. Together, these results suggest that reasoning models can encode action choices before they begin to deliberate in text.

Recent studies have shown that making a model spend more time thinking through longer Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) enables it to gain significant improvements in complex reasoning tasks. While current researches continue to explore the benefits of increasing test-time compute by extending the CoT lengths of Large Language Models (LLMs), we are concerned about a potential issue hidden behind the current pursuit of test-time scaling: Would excessively scaling the CoT length actually bring adverse effects to a model's reasoning performance? Our explorations on mathematical reasoning tasks reveal an unexpected finding that scaling with longer CoTs can indeed impair the reasoning performance of LLMs in certain domains. Moreover, we discover that there exists an optimal scaled length distribution that differs across different domains. Based on these insights, we propose a Thinking-Optimal Scaling strategy. Our method first uses a small set of seed data with varying response length distributions to teach the model to adopt different reasoning efforts for deep thinking. Then, the model selects its shortest correct response under different reasoning efforts on additional problems for self-improvement. Our self-improved models built upon Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct outperform other distillation-based 32B o1-like models across various math benchmarks, and achieve performance on par with QwQ-32B-Preview.

Multi-agent reasoning systems often use agreement, confidence, or automated scores to decide which messages should shape a final answer. Such filtering assumes that a message likely to be correct is also worth keeping. Yet a wrong answer can contain a useful decomposition, constraint, or scientific principle. We test this distinction with Diverse Hypothesis Deliberation (DHD), a controlled measurement protocol that caches five independently generated messages and replays the same downstream solver, called the integrator, with each message available or hidden. The replay comparison measures a message's trajectory value: whether making the message available helps or harms subsequent reasoning. Across five mathematics and science benchmarks and two openly available model families, gpt-oss-120b and gemma-4-31B-it, wrong-helpful messages appear in every benchmark-model combination. Among wrong-answer messages that change final correctness, more than four in ten changes are helpful in each model. Controlled repeats show that the number of repeatable message effects is unlikely to arise from replay variation alone (p=0.0002). A focused intervention on repeatable wrong-helpful messages finds that the complete message works best, while retaining its reasoning preserves more success than retaining only its answer; the source of the complete-message advantage remains open. Within the same problem, repeated trajectory-value evidence also identifies a better keep-or-remove choice than answer correctness alone. Answer correctness is therefore informative but does not determine trajectory value. DHD measures this missing property and produces reusable labels for learning when agents should listen.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) increasingly rely on reasoning traces with complex internal structures. However, existing work lacks a unified answer to three fundamental questions: (1) what defines high-quality reasoning, (2) how to reliably evaluate long, implicitly structured reasoning traces, and (3) how to use such evaluation signals for reasoning optimization. To address these challenges, we provide a unified perspective. (1) We introduce the ME^2 principle to characterize reasoning quality along macro- and micro-level concerning efficiency and effectiveness. (2) Built on this principle, we model reasoning traces as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and develop a DAG-based pairwise evaluation method, capturing complex reasoning structures. (3) Based on this method, we construct the TRM-Preference dataset and train a Thinking Reward Model (TRM) to evaluate reasoning quality at scale. Experiments show that thinking rewards serve as an effective optimization signal. At test time, selecting better reasoning leads to better outcomes (up to 19.3\% gain), and during RL training, thinking rewards enhance reasoning and performance (up to 3.9\% gain) across diverse tasks. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Simplified-Reasoning/TRM.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has recently strengthened LLM reasoning, but its focus on final answer correctness leaves a critical gap: it does not ensure the robustness of the reasoning process itself. We adopt a simple philosophical view, robust reasoning should remain useful beyond the mind that produced it, and treat reasoning as a form of meaning transfer that must survive truncation, reinterpretation, and continuation. Building on this principle, we introduce Reinforcement Learning with Transferable Reward (RLTR), which operationalizes robustness via transfer reward that tests whether a partial reasoning prefix from one model can guide a separate model to the correct answer. This encourages LLMs to produce reasoning that is stable, interpretable, and genuinely generalizable. Our approach improves sampling consistency while improving final answer accuracy, and it reaches comparable performance in substantially fewer training steps. For example, on MATH500, RLTR achieves a +3.6%p gain in Maj@64 compared to RLVR and matches RLVR's average accuracy with roughly 2.5x fewer training steps, providing both more reliable reasoning and significantly more sample efficient.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has become a powerful post-training paradigm for aligning large language models with human preferences. A core challenge in RLHF is constructing accurate reward signals, where the conventional Bradley-Terry reward models (BT RMs) often suffer from sensitivity to data size and coverage, as well as vulnerability to reward hacking. Generative reward models (GenRMs) offer a more robust alternative by generating chain-of-thought (CoT) rationales followed by a final reward. However, existing GenRMs rely on shallow, vertically scaled reasoning, limiting their capacity to handle nuanced or complex (e.g., reasoning-intensive) tasks. Moreover, their pairwise preference outputs are incompatible with standard RLHF algorithms that require pointwise reward signals. In this work, we introduce Think-RM, a training framework that enables long-horizon reasoning in GenRMs by modeling an internal thinking process. Rather than producing structured, externally provided rationales, Think-RM generates flexible, self-guided reasoning traces that support advanced capabilities such as self-reflection, hypothetical reasoning, and divergent reasoning. To elicit these reasoning abilities, we first warm-up the models by supervised fine-tuning (SFT) over long CoT data. We then further improve the model's long-horizon abilities by rule-based reinforcement learning (RL). In addition, we propose a novel pairwise RLHF pipeline that directly optimizes policies using pairwise preference rewards, eliminating the need for pointwise reward conversion and enabling more effective use of Think-RM outputs. Experiments show that Think-RM achieves state-of-the-art results on RM-Bench, outperforming both BT RM and vertically scaled GenRM by 8%. When combined with our pairwise RLHF pipeline, it demonstrates superior end-policy performance compared to traditional approaches.

Recipes such as s1 and LIMO teach a model to reason with little data by showing it the same thousand or fewer worked solutions many times over. Judged when that training ends, the repetition looks harmless. But reasoning models are often trained again, and we find that repetition leaves their reasoning fragile to that next stage, even when the stage has nothing to do with reasoning. We fine-tuned Qwen3.5-9B-Base on its own correct solutions to competition math problems, either drilling a few hundred of them about eight times each or showing many more once; with the same amount of training, both solve about 95% of held-out problems. A single pass of ordinary instruction tuning leaves the once-trained model where it was, while the drilled one falls to 86.0%, and harsher later stages take it to 59.3% or below. A third model that visited the drilled problems just as often, with a new solution at every visit, was unharmed, so the damage comes from seeing the same texts again rather than from having few problems. The break recurs with a stronger model's traces, in further training runs and on other models and tasks. It is also cheap to undo: the reasoning is suppressed rather than erased, and five updates of reasoning training bring almost all of it back, as does brief training on the reasoning format with almost no mathematics. Fresh solutions prevented the damage, and so did replaying 6.25% of the original solutions in a gentler later stage, so our claim concerns later training without such replay. Sharpening alone does not explain the break, since a model sharpened three-quarters as much without repetition was unharmed. On a skill the base model could not perform within a token budget, repetition mainly cost learning.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) via prompting is the de facto method for eliciting reasoning capabilities from large language models (LLMs). But for what kinds of tasks is this extra ``thinking'' really helpful? To analyze this, we conducted a quantitative meta-analysis covering over 100 papers using CoT and ran our own evaluations of 20 datasets across 14 models. Our results show that CoT gives strong performance benefits primarily on tasks involving math or logic, with much smaller gains on other types of tasks. On MMLU, directly generating the answer without CoT leads to almost identical accuracy as CoT unless the question or model's response contains an equals sign, indicating symbolic operations and reasoning. Following this finding, we analyze the behavior of CoT on these problems by separating planning and execution and comparing against tool-augmented LLMs. Much of CoT's gain comes from improving symbolic execution, but it underperforms relative to using a symbolic solver. Our results indicate that CoT can be applied selectively, maintaining performance while saving inference costs. Furthermore, they suggest a need to move beyond prompt-based CoT to new paradigms that better leverage intermediate computation across the whole range of LLM applications.

Reasoning-enabled VLA policies expose chain-of-thought (CoT) traces that appear to explain and guide their actions, creating a potential interface for runtime safety through reasoning monitoring and correction. In this work, we define and operationalize two evaluation axes for assessing when this interface can improve embodied behavior: correctability, which measures whether unreliable reasoning can be detected and improved during generation, and actionability, which measures whether reasoning corrections produce behaviorally meaningful changes in the intended direction. To enable correctability, we introduce Token-level Reward for Utility-Steered Chain-of-Thought (TRUST), an offline-trained value model that predicts eventual reasoning correctness from partial prefixes and uses these estimates to monitor and selectively steer reasoning generation in frozen VLA policies. On the Alpamayo 1.5 driving VLA, TRUST monitors correctness with 88.9% accuracy and improves reasoning correctness from 75.9% to 90.0%. On a baseline-defined challenging subset in AlpaSim, TRUST reduces collision rate by 30.4% and maximum trajectory error by 11.5% relative to the unsteered policy, outperforming a compute-matched Best-of-4 baseline. On the DeepThinkVLA manipulation VLA, TRUST improves the correctness of grasp-state claims from 69.3% to 90.2% and action-choice claims from 68.8% to 85.9%, yet closed-loop task performance on LIBERO-Plus remains largely unchanged. Empirical analysis reveals intent-consistent behavioral effects in Alpamayo 1.5 but limited effects in DeepThinkVLA, helping interpret these different task-level outcomes. Together, our results show that gains in reasoning correctness do not automatically imply gains in embodied performance, motivating evaluation of correctability and actionability when using CoT as a runtime safety interface.

Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) on chain-of-thought reasoning has become a standard part of language model post-training recipes. A common assumption is that the reasoning chains trained through RLVR reliably represent how a model gets to its answer. In this paper, we develop two metrics for critically examining this assumption: Causal Importance of Reasoning (CIR), which measures the cumulative effect of reasoning tokens on the final answer, and Sufficiency of Reasoning (SR), which measures whether a verifier can arrive at an unambiguous answer based on the reasoning alone. Through experiments with the Qwen2.5 model series and ReasoningGym tasks, we find that: (1) while RLVR does improve task accuracy, it does not reliably improve CIR or SR, calling the role of reasoning in model performance into question; (2) a small amount of SFT before RLVR can be a remedy for low CIR and SR; and (3) CIR and SR can be improved even without SFT by applying auxiliary CIR/SR rewards on top of the outcome-based reward. This joint reward matches the accuracy of RLVR while also leading to causally important and sufficient reasoning. These results show that RLVR does not always lead models to rely on reasoning in the way that is commonly thought, but this issue can be remedied with simple modifications to the post-training procedure.

Ethical decision-making is a critical aspect of human judgment, and the growing use of LLMs in decision-support systems necessitates a rigorous evaluation of their moral reasoning capabilities. However, existing assessments primarily rely on single-step evaluations, failing to capture how models adapt to evolving ethical challenges. Addressing this gap, we introduce the Multi-step Moral Dilemmas (MMDs), the first dataset specifically constructed to evaluate the evolving moral judgments of LLMs across 3,302 five-stage dilemmas. This framework enables a fine-grained, dynamic analysis of how LLMs adjust their moral reasoning across escalating dilemmas. Our evaluation of nine widely used LLMs reveals that their value preferences shift significantly as dilemmas progress, indicating that models recalibrate moral judgments based on scenario complexity. Furthermore, pairwise value comparisons demonstrate that while LLMs often prioritize the value of care, this value can sometimes be superseded by fairness in certain contexts, highlighting the dynamic and context-dependent nature of LLM ethical reasoning. Our findings call for a shift toward dynamic, context-aware evaluation paradigms, paving the way for more human-aligned and value-sensitive development of LLMs.

This study evaluates the performance of OpenAI's o1-preview model in higher-order cognitive domains, including critical thinking, systematic thinking, computational thinking, data literacy, creative thinking, logical reasoning, and scientific reasoning. Using established benchmarks, we compared the o1-preview models's performance to human participants from diverse educational levels. o1-preview achieved a mean score of 24.33 on the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test (EWCTET), surpassing undergraduate (13.8) and postgraduate (18.39) participants (z = 1.60 and 0.90, respectively). In systematic thinking, it scored 46.1, SD = 4.12 on the Lake Urmia Vignette, significantly outperforming the human mean (20.08, SD = 8.13, z = 3.20). For data literacy, o1-preview scored 8.60, SD = 0.70 on Merk et al.'s "Use Data" dimension, compared to the human post-test mean of 4.17, SD = 2.02 (z = 2.19). On creative thinking tasks, the model achieved originality scores of 2.98, SD = 0.73, higher than the human mean of 1.74 (z = 0.71). In logical reasoning (LogiQA), it outperformed humans with average 90%, SD = 10% accuracy versus 86%, SD = 6.5% (z = 0.62). For scientific reasoning, it achieved near-perfect performance (mean = 0.99, SD = 0.12) on the TOSLS,, exceeding the highest human scores of 0.85, SD = 0.13 (z = 1.78). While o1-preview excelled in structured tasks, it showed limitations in problem-solving and adaptive reasoning. These results demonstrate the potential of AI to complement education in structured assessments but highlight the need for ethical oversight and refinement for broader applications.

In recent years, ML researchers have wrestled with defining and improving machine learning (ML) benchmarks and datasets. In parallel, some have trained a critical lens on the ethics of dataset creation and ML research. In this position paper, we highlight the entanglement of ethics with seemingly ``technical'' or ``scientific'' decisions about the design of ML benchmarks. Our starting point is the existence of multiple overlooked structural similarities between human intelligence benchmarks and ML benchmarks. Both types of benchmarks set standards for describing, evaluating, and comparing performance on tasks relevant to intelligence -- standards that many scholars of human intelligence have long recognized as value-laden. We use perspectives from feminist philosophy of science on IQ benchmarks and thick concepts in social science to argue that values need to be considered and documented when creating ML benchmarks. It is neither possible nor desirable to avoid this choice by creating value-neutral benchmarks. Finally, we outline practical recommendations for ML benchmark research ethics and ethics review.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

Reasoning language models frequently overthink: generating extended chains of behaviors such as hedging, approach abandonment, and self contradiction that consume tokens without improving answers. We show that these behaviors are not merely a consequence of length; even when controlling for response length, incorrect traces exhibit higher rates of unproductive self-reflection than correct ones. Addressing this requires identifying where self-reflection helps vs hurts, but obtaining these step-level annotations is costly. We observe that intermediate answer commitments within reasoning traces can provide a cheap proxy: by comparing each final answer candidate in the trace to the ground truth, we can determine whether subsequent reflection is productive without any additional supervision. Building on this insight, we propose DASH (Drift Aware advantage SHaping), which assigns segment-level credit based on whether each reasoning segment leads toward or away from correctness. On competition-level math benchmarks, DASH achieves the highest accuracy where overthinking is prevalent (Average Accuracy: 59.45% vs. 58.1% Dr.GRPO vs. 56.95% GRPO) while reducing overthinking behaviors and achieving more productive self-correction than baselines.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

Reasoning LLMs often spend substantial tokens on long intermediate reasoning traces (e.g., chain-of-thought) when solving new problems. We propose to summarize and store reusable reasoning skills distilled from extensive deliberation and trial-and-error exploration, and to retrieve these skills at inference time to guide future reasoning. Unlike the prevailing reasoning from scratch paradigm, our approach first recalls relevant skills for each query, helping the model avoid redundant detours and focus on effective solution paths. We evaluate our method on coding and mathematical reasoning tasks, and find that it significantly reduces reasoning tokens while improving overall performance. The resulting lower per-request cost indicates strong practical and economic potential for real-world deployment.

Numerous applications of large language models (LLMs) rely on their ability to perform step-by-step reasoning. However, the reasoning behavior of LLMs remains poorly understood, posing challenges to research, development, and safety. To address this gap, we introduce landscape of thoughts-the first visualization tool for users to inspect the reasoning paths of chain-of-thought and its derivatives on any multi-choice dataset. Specifically, we represent the states in a reasoning path as feature vectors that quantify their distances to all answer choices. These features are then visualized in two-dimensional plots using t-SNE. Qualitative and quantitative analysis with the landscape of thoughts effectively distinguishes between strong and weak models, correct and incorrect answers, as well as different reasoning tasks. It also uncovers undesirable reasoning patterns, such as low consistency and high uncertainty. Additionally, users can adapt our tool to a model that predicts the property they observe. We showcase this advantage by adapting our tool to a lightweight verifier that evaluates the correctness of reasoning paths. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/tmlr-group/landscape-of-thoughts.

Compressing long chain-of-thought (CoT) from large language models (LLMs) is an emerging strategy to improve the reasoning efficiency of LLMs. Despite its promising benefits, existing studies equally compress all thoughts within a long CoT, hindering more concise and effective reasoning. To this end, we first investigate the importance of different thoughts by examining their effectiveness and efficiency in contributing to reasoning through automatic long CoT chunking and Monte Carlo rollouts. Building upon the insights, we propose a theoretically bounded metric to jointly measure the effectiveness and efficiency of different thoughts. We then propose LongotimesShort, an efficient reasoning framework that enables two LLMs to collaboratively solve the problem: a long-thought LLM for more effectively generating important thoughts, while a short-thought LLM for efficiently generating remaining thoughts. Specifically, we begin by synthesizing a small amount of cold-start data to fine-tune LLMs for long-thought and short-thought reasoning styles, respectively. Furthermore, we propose a synergizing-oriented multi-turn reinforcement learning, focusing on the model self-evolution and collaboration between long-thought and short-thought LLMs. Experimental results show that our method enables Qwen2.5-7B and Llama3.1-8B to achieve comparable performance compared to DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B, while reducing token length by over 80% across the MATH500, AIME24/25, AMC23, and GPQA Diamond benchmarks. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/yasNing/Long-otimes-Short/.

Generative recommendation models in the OneRec family have been widely deployed in many real-world services, such as short-video, live-streaming, advertising, and e-commerce. However, these generative models can only benefit from the scaling advantage, while their reasoning ability is hard to activate, since we cannot construct meaningful Chain-of-Thought (CoT) sequences consisting of itemic tokens only. Inspired by the success of the reasoning-style ``think before answer'' paradigm in the LLM field, we conduct preliminary studies (i.e., OneRec-Think, OpenOneRec) to explore reasoning capability in generative recommendation. Nevertheless, we notice an unexpected phenomenon: the thinking mode does not show advantages over the non-thinking mode. Drawing insights from recent findings on CoT robustness in multi-modal language models, we argue that effective reasoning in recommendation rests on two factors: perception, the ability to ground itemic tokens in their underlying language semantics, and cognition, the ability to reorganize a user's behavior sequence into coherent latent interest points. We therefore propose OneReason, which includes: (1) strong itemic token perception in pre-training, (2) a three-level cognition-enhanced CoT format for recommendation tasks in SFT, and (3) a specialize-then-unify training recipe in RL to enhance the thinking ability.

Chain-of-thought (CoT), tree-of-thought (ToT), and related techniques work surprisingly well in practice for some complex reasoning tasks with Large Language Models (LLMs), but why? This work seeks the underlying reasons by conducting experimental case studies and linking the performance benefits to well-established sample and computational complexity principles in machine learning. We experimented with 6 reasoning tasks, ranging from grade school math, air travel planning, ..., to Blocksworld. The results suggest that (i) both CoT and ToT benefit significantly from task decomposition, which breaks a complex reasoning task into a sequence of steps with low sample complexity and explicitly outlines the reasoning structure, and (ii) for computationally hard reasoning tasks, the more sophisticated tree structure of ToT outperforms the linear structure of CoT. These findings provide useful guidelines for the use of LLM in solving reasoning tasks in practice.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) allocate substantial inference-time compute to Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, improving performance on mathematics, scientific QA, and tool usage. However, this introduces overthinking: LRMs often reach a correct intermediate solution, continue reasoning, and overwrite it with an incorrect answer. We first demonstrate that oracle stopping--where we inject </think> at every sentence boundary and select the best stopping point in hindsight--improves average accuracy by 8% while reducing thinking tokens by 72%, exposing substantial overthinking. Motivated by this finding, we propose ThinkBrake, which monitors the log-probability margin between the top continuation token and </think> at sentence boundaries, stopping reasoning when this margin narrows. ThinkBrake requires no training and achieves favorable accuracy-efficiency trade-offs across math, scientific QA, and tool usage benchmarks, reducing thinking token usage by up to 30%. Furthermore, we provide theoretical analysis showing that ThinkBrake is equivalent to test-time realignment with a reward bonus for the </think> token.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

As organisations increasingly recognise data as a strategic resource, they face the challenge of translating informational assets into measurable business value. Existing valuation approaches remain fragmented, often separating economic, governance, and strategic perspectives and lacking operational mechanisms suitable for real settings. This paper introduces a unified valuation framework that integrates these perspectives into a coherent decision-support model. Building on two artefacts from the Horizon Europe DATAMITE project, a taxonomy of data-quality and performance metrics, and an Analytic Network Process (ANP) tool for deriving relative importance, we develop a hybrid valuation model. The model combines qualitative scoring, cost- and utility-based estimation, relevance/quality indexing, and multi-criteria weighting to define data value transparently and systematically. Anchored in the Balanced Scorecard (BSC), the framework aligns indicators and valuation outcomes with organisational strategy, enabling firms to assess monetisation potential across Data-as-a-Service, Information-as-a-Service, and Answers-as-a-Service pathways. Methodologically, the study follows a Design Science approach complemented by embedded case studies with industrial partners, which informed continual refinement of the model. Because the evaluation is connected to a high-level taxonomy, the approach also reveals how valuation considerations map to BSC perspectives. Across the analysed use cases, the framework demonstrated flexibility, transparency, and reduced arbitrariness in valuation, offering organisations a structured basis for linking data assets to strategic and economic outcomes.

Recently, diffusion models have garnered significant interest in the field of text processing due to their many potential advantages compared to conventional autoregressive models. In this work, we propose Diffusion-of-Thought (DoT), a novel approach that integrates diffusion models with Chain-of-Thought, a well-established technique for improving the reasoning ability of autoregressive language models. In contrast to autoregressive language models that make decisions in a left-to-right, token-by-token manner, DoT allows reasoning steps to diffuse over time through a diffusion language model and offers greater flexibility in trading-off computation for reasoning performance. Our experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of DoT in multi-digit multiplication, boolean logic, and grade school math problems, with a small diffusion model outperforming a much larger autoregressive model in both efficiency and accuracy. In addition to that, DoT showcases promising self-correction abilities and benefits from existing reasoning-enhancing techniques like self-consistency decoding. Our findings contribute to the understanding and development of reasoning with diffusion language models.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) guides large language models (LLMs) to reason step-by-step, and can motivate their logical reasoning ability. While effective for logical tasks, CoT is not conducive to creative problem-solving which often requires out-of-box thoughts and is crucial for innovation advancements. In this paper, we explore the Leap-of-Thought (LoT) abilities within LLMs -- a non-sequential, creative paradigm involving strong associations and knowledge leaps. To this end, we study LLMs on the popular Oogiri game which needs participants to have good creativity and strong associative thinking for responding unexpectedly and humorously to the given image, text, or both, and thus is suitable for LoT study. Then to investigate LLMs' LoT ability in the Oogiri game, we first build a multimodal and multilingual Oogiri-GO dataset which contains over 130,000 samples from the Oogiri game, and observe the insufficient LoT ability or failures of most existing LLMs on the Oogiri game. Accordingly, we introduce a creative Leap-of-Thought (CLoT) paradigm to improve LLM's LoT ability. CLoT first formulates the Oogiri-GO dataset into LoT-oriented instruction tuning data to train pretrained LLM for achieving certain LoT humor generation and discrimination abilities. Then CLoT designs an explorative self-refinement that encourages the LLM to generate more creative LoT data via exploring parallels between seemingly unrelated concepts and selects high-quality data to train itself for self-refinement. CLoT not only excels in humor generation in the Oogiri game but also boosts creative abilities in various tasks like cloud guessing game and divergent association task. These findings advance our understanding and offer a pathway to improve LLMs' creative capacities for innovative applications across domains. The dataset, code, and models will be released online. https://zhongshsh.github.io/CLoT/.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

The widespread adoption of AI systems in the economy hinges on their ability to generate economic value that outweighs their inference costs. Evaluating this tradeoff requires metrics that account for both performance and costs. We propose a framework grounded in production theory for evaluating language models by combining accuracy and inference cost. We introduce "cost-of-pass", the expected monetary cost of generating a correct solution. We then define the "frontier cost-of-pass" as the minimum cost-of-pass achievable across available models or the "human-expert, using the approximate cost of hiring an expert. Our analysis reveals distinct economic insights. First, lightweight models are most cost-effective for basic quantitative tasks, large models for knowledge-intensive ones, and reasoning models for complex quantitative problems, despite higher per-token costs. Second, tracking this frontier cost-of-pass over the past year reveals significant progress, particularly for complex quantitative tasks where the cost has roughly halved every few months. Third, to trace key innovations driving this progress, we examine counterfactual frontiers: estimates of cost-efficiency without specific model classes. We find that innovations in lightweight, large, and reasoning models have been essential for pushing the frontier in basic quantitative, knowledge-intensive, and complex quantitative tasks, respectively. Finally, we assess the cost-reductions afforded by common inference-time techniques like majority voting and self-refinement, finding that their marginal accuracy gains rarely justify their costs. Our findings underscore that complementary model-level innovations are the primary drivers of cost-efficiency, and our economic framework provides a principled tool for measuring this progress and guiding deployment.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become central to mathematical reasoning in large language models, yet models remain brittle to early errors: a single arithmetic slip or unjustified inference typically propagates uncorrected to an incorrect final answer. We investigate whether training on intentionally flawed reasoning traces can teach models to detect and recover from such errors without degrading standard problem-solving ability. Using competition-level problems from MATH-lighteval, we generate CoT prefixes containing exactly one controlled error, either a calculation error (sign flips, dropped terms) or a reasoning error (misapplied rules, unjustified logical steps), and fine-tune Qwen3-4B with GRPO using a binary final-answer reward. Our Mixed-CoT-RL model matches standard RL on clean problems (41% vs 41%) while substantially outperforming it on problems prefilled with flawed reasoning (24% vs 19%). Notably, clean-only RL fine-tuning degrades robustness below the untuned baseline 19% vs. 20%), indicating that conventional training increases susceptibility to misleading prefills. Among error types, training on reasoning errors yields greater robustness gains than calculation errors alone, with mixed training performing best. These findings demonstrate that exposure to flawed traces during training can improve error-recovery behavior without sacrificing accuracy, suggesting a path toward more robust mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

As Test-Time Scaling emerges as an active research focus in the large language model community, advanced post-training methods increasingly emphasize extending chain-of-thought (CoT) generation length, thereby enhancing reasoning capabilities to approach Deepseek R1-like reasoning models. However, recent studies reveal that reasoning models (even Qwen3) consistently exhibit excessive thought redundancy in CoT generation. This overthinking issue arises from the inherent limitations of conventional outcome-reward reinforcement learning, which systematically overlooks the regulation of intermediate reasoning processes. This paper introduces Serial-Group Decaying-Reward Policy Optimization (S-GRPO), a novel reinforcement learning paradigm that enables models to implicitly evaluate the sufficiency of intermediate reasoning steps, thereby facilitating early exit in CoT generation. Unlike GRPO, which samples multiple possible reasoning paths in parallel (parallel group), S-GRPO only samples one reasoning path and serially selects multiple temporal positions from the path to exit thinking and directly generate answers (serial group). For correct answers within a serial group, rewards gradually decrease based on the exit positions along the reasoning path from front to back. This design encourages the model to produce more accurate and concise thoughts, while also incentivizing early thinking termination when appropriate. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that S-GRPO is compatible with state-of-the-art reasoning models, including Qwen3 and Deepseek-distill. Across diverse benchmarks such as GSM8K, AIME 2024, AMC 2023, MATH-500, and GPQA Diamond, S-GRPO achieves a substantial reduction in sequence length (35.4% - 61.1%) while simultaneously improving accuracy (absolute 0.72% - 6.08%).

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proven to be an effective post-training strategy for enhancing reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs). Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a recent prominent method that encourages models to generate complete reasoning traces before answering, leading to increased token usage and computational cost. Inspired by the human-like thinking process-where people skip reasoning for easy questions but think carefully when needed-we explore how to enable VLMs to first decide when reasoning is necessary. To realize this, we propose TON, a two-stage training strategy: (i) a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage with a simple yet effective 'thought dropout' operation, where reasoning traces are randomly replaced with empty thoughts. This introduces a think-or-not format that serves as a cold start for selective reasoning; (ii) a GRPO stage that enables the model to freely explore when to think or not, while maximizing task-aware outcome rewards. Experimental results show that TON can reduce the completion length by up to 90% compared to vanilla GRPO, without sacrificing performance or even improving it. Further evaluations across diverse vision-language tasks-covering a range of reasoning difficulties under both 3B and 7B models-consistently reveal that the model progressively learns to bypass unnecessary reasoning steps as training advances. These findings shed light on the path toward human-like reasoning patterns in reinforcement learning approaches. Our code is available at https://github.com/kokolerk/TON.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) offers a potential boon for AI safety as it allows monitoring a model's CoT to try to understand its intentions and reasoning processes. However, the effectiveness of such monitoring hinges on CoTs faithfully representing models' actual reasoning processes. We evaluate CoT faithfulness of state-of-the-art reasoning models across 6 reasoning hints presented in the prompts and find: (1) for most settings and models tested, CoTs reveal their usage of hints in at least 1% of examples where they use the hint, but the reveal rate is often below 20%, (2) outcome-based reinforcement learning initially improves faithfulness but plateaus without saturating, and (3) when reinforcement learning increases how frequently hints are used (reward hacking), the propensity to verbalize them does not increase, even without training against a CoT monitor. These results suggest that CoT monitoring is a promising way of noticing undesired behaviors during training and evaluations, but that it is not sufficient to rule them out. They also suggest that in settings like ours where CoT reasoning is not necessary, test-time monitoring of CoTs is unlikely to reliably catch rare and catastrophic unexpected behaviors.

Research idea innovation is a fundamental engine of scientific progress, yet it remains difficult to generate and evaluate in a scalable and controllable way. This challenge lies in its inherently open-ended and multi-objective nature, where ideas should balance novelty, plausibility and feasibility. While recent LLM-based approaches have made progress through carefully designed prompts or agent pipelines, they are constrained by predefined, static ideation workflows. To address this limitation, we propose MindFlow, a framework that explicitly formulates ideation as a graph-structured Flow in Mind, which is composed of modular thinking operators and modeled by a probabilistic mind supernet. Given a research topic, a controller dynamically samples thinking flows to generate candidate ideas. This open-ended problem is optimized using a tournament-based relative ranking, enabling the controller to progressively favor higher-quality thinking flows. We further introduce an evaluation protocol that jointly assesses problem finding and problem solving, going beyond title- or abstractonly judgments. Across diverse topics, MindFlow shows its superiority as an explicit, controllable and optimizable research idea innovator.

In this paper, we introduce the Tree-of-Thought (ToT) framework, a novel approach aimed at improving the problem-solving capabilities of auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). The ToT technique is inspired by the human mind's approach for solving complex reasoning tasks through trial and error. In this process, the human mind explores the solution space through a tree-like thought process, allowing for backtracking when necessary. To implement ToT as a software system, we augment an LLM with additional modules including a prompter agent, a checker module, a memory module, and a ToT controller. In order to solve a given problem, these modules engage in a multi-round conversation with the LLM. The memory module records the conversation and state history of the problem solving process, which allows the system to backtrack to the previous steps of the thought-process and explore other directions from there. To verify the effectiveness of the proposed technique, we implemented a ToT-based solver for the Sudoku Puzzle. Experimental results show that the ToT framework can significantly increase the success rate of Sudoku puzzle solving. Our implementation of the ToT-based Sudoku solver is available on GitHub: https://github.com/jieyilong/tree-of-thought-puzzle-solver.

Reasoning substantially improves language models' ability to solve difficult problems, but long reasoning traces make these gains expensive. Efficient reasoning should express useful analysis in fewer tokens by reducing repetition and text that adds little value to solving the problem. Progress in proprietary models motivates this goal, yet their hidden scratchpads limit direct study of how it is achieved. We investigate whether open-weight models can generate less verbose reasoning by changing the form of their own earlier thoughts, without retraining. Our intervention rewrites prior reasoning into compact state records before pending tool results are revealed, then compares continuations from original and compact histories. Across the tested models, accepted compact histories usually shorten future reasoning; a coding case study also shows less repeated verification after a shared candidate solution. In software-agent deployments, compaction can reduce total spending, although task quality and rewrite-inclusive time depend on the target and compressor. These findings identify reasoning history as one way to reduce future reasoning-token use and motivate model-specific compaction policies evaluated for both efficiency and retained capability.

When presented with questions involving visual thinking, humans naturally switch reasoning modalities, often forming mental images or drawing visual aids. Large language models have shown promising results in arithmetic and symbolic reasoning by expressing intermediate reasoning in text as a chain of thought, yet struggle to extend this capability to answer text queries that are easily solved by visual reasoning, even with extensive multimodal pretraining. We introduce a simple method, whiteboard-of-thought prompting, to unlock the visual reasoning capabilities of multimodal large language models across modalities. Whiteboard-of-thought prompting provides multimodal large language models with a metaphorical `whiteboard' to draw out reasoning steps as images, then returns these images back to the model for further processing. We find this can be accomplished with no demonstrations or specialized modules, instead leveraging models' existing ability to write code with libraries such as Matplotlib and Turtle. This simple approach shows state-of-the-art results on four difficult natural language tasks that involve visual and spatial reasoning. We identify multiple settings where GPT-4o using chain-of-thought fails dramatically, including more than one where it achieves 0% accuracy, while whiteboard-of-thought enables up to 92% accuracy in these same settings. We present a detailed exploration of where the technique succeeds as well as its sources of error.

Recent work has demonstrated that Chain-of-Thought (CoT) often yields limited gains for soft-reasoning problems such as analytical and commonsense reasoning. CoT can also be unfaithful to a model's actual reasoning. We investigate the dynamics and faithfulness of CoT in soft-reasoning tasks across instruction-tuned, reasoning and reasoning-distilled models. Our findings reveal differences in how these models rely on CoT, and show that CoT influence and faithfulness are not always aligned.

When a speaker says ``some students passed'', listeners infer that not all of them did. Reasoning models now let users decide how long a model thinks before it answers, but we do not know what extra thinking does to such everyday inferences. We study this directly: we keep a model's weights fixed, change only how much it thinks, and record which reading it chooses. A second tool cuts the model's own reasoning at successive points and asks for an answer, showing where the reading changes. Thinking makes models read logical words as logic: it cancels the implicatures of some (not all) and or (not both) in most tested open reasoning models and in GPT-5, while context-driven inferences such as indirect answers improve. The trace shows why: models first entertain the enriched reading and cancel it later. Answering from that early reading, an exploratory inference-time remedy, recovers these implicatures without losing literal accuracy. Evaluations of reasoning models should measure how they interpret, not only how accurate they are.

Large Language Models (LLMs) increasingly ship with explicit "thinking modes", yet their counterpart, "no-thinking", has received far less attention. We study LLMs' no-thinking behavior along two axes. a. How to measure no-thinking? Prior work typically defines no-thinking through proxies such as a disabled thinking mode or the absence of long traces. These proxies are unreliable: disabled thinking modes may still emit reasoning, while long traces may contain filler rather than genuine inference. We instead normalize each response into a pre-answer trace and final answer, and evaluate it at three levels: (i) Empty-Thinking Rate for strict answer-only compliance; (ii) instruction-aware Question-Pre-answer Relevance for similarity between the question and pre-answer trace; and (iii) LLM-as-judge Explicit Inference Rate for visible explicit inference. Together, these metrics distinguish answer-only output, relevant but non-inferential text, and explicit inference. b. How does no-thinking vary across tasks and models? We evaluate six prompting interventions on six LLMs across Boolean, multiple-choice, and open-ended questions. We find that explicit no-think controls cannot reliably eliminate visible inference. Models instead exhibit "Thinking Inertia": explicit inference persists even under strict controls and becomes more prevalent as the answer space opens. Accuracy remains stable on Boolean and multiple-choice tasks, whereas open-ended tasks reveal a trade-off between answer-only compliance and task accuracy. Rewriting the same questions across answer spaces shows that supplying candidate answers makes answer-only responses easier to produce. These findings establish no-thinking as a non-trivial capability: stopping explicit reasoning cannot be assumed from model settings or instructions alone and deserves systematic evaluation alongside reasoning ability.

Recent reasoning models through test-time scaling have demonstrated that long chain-of-thoughts can unlock substantial performance boosts in hard reasoning tasks such as math and code. However, the benefit of such long thoughts for system-2 reasoning is relatively less explored in other domains such as perceptual tasks where shallower, system-1 reasoning seems sufficient. In this paper, we introduce LongPerceptualThoughts, a new synthetic dataset with 30K long-thought traces for perceptual tasks. The key challenges in synthesizing elaborate reasoning thoughts for perceptual tasks are that off-the-shelf models are not yet equipped with such thinking behavior and that it is not straightforward to build a reliable process verifier for perceptual tasks. Thus, we propose a novel three-stage data synthesis framework that first synthesizes verifiable multiple-choice questions from dense image descriptions, then extracts simple CoTs from VLMs for those verifiable problems, and finally expands those simple thoughts to elaborate long thoughts via frontier reasoning models. In controlled experiments with a strong instruction-tuned 7B model, we demonstrate notable improvements over existing visual reasoning data-generation methods. Our model, trained on the generated dataset, achieves an average +3.4 points improvement over 5 vision-centric benchmarks, including +11.8 points on V^* Bench. Notably, despite being tuned for vision tasks, it also improves performance on the text reasoning benchmark, MMLU-Pro, by +2 points.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated their impressive abilities in various reasoning and decision-making tasks. However, the quality and coherence of the reasoning process can still benefit from enhanced introspection and self-reflection. In this paper, we introduce Multiplex CoT (Chain of Thought), a method that enables LLMs to simulate a form of self-review while reasoning, by initiating double Chain of Thought (CoT) thinking. Multiplex CoT leverages the power of iterative reasoning, where the model generates an initial chain of thought and subsequently critiques and refines this reasoning with a second round of thought generation. This recursive approach allows for more coherent, logical, and robust answers, improving the overall decision-making process. We demonstrate how this method can be effectively implemented using simple prompt engineering in existing LLM architectures, achieving an effect similar to that of the Learning-Refinement Model (LRM) without the need for additional training. Additionally, we present a practical guide for implementing the method in Google Colab, enabling easy integration into real-world applications.

Recent studies show that the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) can be improved by applying Reinforcement Learning (RL) to question-answering (QA) tasks in areas such as math and coding. With a long context length, LLMs may learn to perform search, as indicated by the self-correction behavior observed in DeepSeek R1. However, this search behavior is often imprecise and lacks confidence, resulting in long, redundant responses and highlighting deficiencies in intuition and verification. Inspired by the Dual Process Theory in psychology, we introduce a simple modification to the QA task that includes four stages: Fast Thinking, where the LLM must answer within a strict token budget; Verification, where the model evaluates its initial response; Slow Thinking, where it refines the initial response with more deliberation; and Summarization, where it distills the refinement from the previous stage into precise steps. Our proposed task improves average accuracy from 24.9% to 27.9% for Qwen2.5-1.5B, and from 45.9% to 49.8% for DeepSeek-R1-Qwen-1.5B. Notably, for Qwen2.5-1.5B, the Fast Thinking mode alone achieves 26.8% accuracy using fewer than 1000 tokens, demonstrating substantial inference efficiency gains. These findings suggest that intuition and deliberative reasoning are distinct, complementary systems benefiting from targeted training.

Hybrid reasoning models can answer directly or spend extra tokens on extended thinking. A practical router should choose between these modes for each query, so easy problems avoid unnecessary reasoning and hard problems receive enough budget to finish the answer. Existing routers move in this direction, but they typically require labeled training data or fix thinking budgets up front, ignoring answer-level evidence from the model itself. We introduce DART, a training-free routing framework that samples two cheap no-think drafts, accepts direct answering when the drafts agree, and predicts a thinking budget from draft entropy when they disagree. Across the main comparisons, DART preserves or improves always-thinking accuracy in most settings while reducing thinking-token use. Accuracy improves by up to +9.0 points on Olympiad-level math and by up to +22.5 points on code under execution-based equivalence, while thinking-token use drops by 32-73%. The Stage~1 signal extends across model scales (0.6B--32B), model families, and API-only hosted settings, with no labeled data and no gradient updates required. Our code is available at https://github.com/js-lee-AI/DART.

Recent work on large language models has demonstrated the use of model-free reinforcement learning (RL) to train reasoning-like capabilities. The emergence of "thinking" through model-free RL is interesting as thinking actions neither produce reward nor change the external world state to one where the agent is more likely to get reward. This paper seeks to build a domain-independent understanding of when model-free RL will lead to such "thinking" as a strategy for reward maximization. To build this understanding, we first introduce a theoretical model which we call a thought Markov decision process (MDP). Thought MDPs minimally extend the classical MDP model to include an abstract notion of thought state and thought action. Using the thought MDP model, we prove the importance of policy initialization in determining whether or not thinking emerges and show formally that thought actions are equivalent to the agent choosing to perform a step of policy improvement before continuing to act. We then show that open-source LLMs satisfy the conditions that our theory predicts are necessary for model-free RL to produce thinking-like behavior. Finally, we hypothesize sufficient conditions that would enable thinking to be learned outside of language generation and introduce a toy domain where a combination of multi-task pre-training and designated thought actions enable more data-efficient RL compared to non-thinking agents.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable progress thanks to Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) on Chain-of-Thoughts (CoTs). However, since long CoTs naturally contain trial and errors and mainstream RLVR approaches choose outcome-correct CoT trajectories for memorization, the redundant explorations in long CoTs are inevitably reinforced, which results in the over-thinking issues of LRMs. Previous attempts to resolve this issue mainly give more advantage to shorter trajectories, yet their learning signals are still outcome-based and cannot reduce the memorization of redundant explorations in long CoTs. Therefore, we propose ThoughtFold, a framework that leverages fine-grained preference learning to mitigate redundant explorations for efficient reasoning. ThoughtFold employs an introspective strategy to identify redundancy within each correct trajectory, which yields a spectrum of candidate sub-trajectories. Leveraging this spectrum, we introduce a masked preference optimization objective that explicitly penalizes redundant explorations and encourages the model to directly bridge essential reasoning segments, effectively folding its reasoning chains into a more concise path. Extensive experiments show that ThoughtFold significantly enhances efficiency. It reduces the token usage of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B by approximately 56% while maintaining state-of-the-art accuracy.

Logical reasoning is a critical benchmark for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs), as it reflects their ability to derive valid conclusions from given premises. While the combination of test-time scaling with dedicated outcome or process reward models has opened up new avenues to enhance LLMs performance in complex reasoning tasks, this space is under-explored in deductive logical reasoning. We present a set of Outcome Reward Models (ORMs) for deductive reasoning. To train the ORMs we mainly generate data using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) with single and multiple samples. Additionally, we propose a novel tactic to further expand the type of errors covered in the training dataset of the ORM. In particular, we propose an echo generation technique that leverages LLMs' tendency to reflect incorrect assumptions made in prompts to extract additional training data, covering previously unexplored error types. While a standard CoT chain may contain errors likely to be made by the reasoner, the echo strategy deliberately steers the model toward incorrect reasoning. We show that ORMs trained on CoT and echo-augmented data demonstrate improved performance on the FOLIO, JustLogic, and ProverQA datasets across four different LLMs.

Recent advances in large language models have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities through Chain of Thought (CoT) prompting, but often at the cost of excessive verbosity in their intermediate outputs, which increases computational overhead. We introduce Sketch-of-Thought (SoT), a novel prompting framework that combines cognitive-inspired reasoning paradigms with linguistic constraints to minimize token usage while preserving reasoning accuracy. SoT is designed as a flexible framework that can incorporate any custom reasoning paradigms based on cognitive science, and we instantiate it with three such paradigms - Conceptual Chaining, Chunked Symbolism, and Expert Lexicons - each tailored to different reasoning tasks and selected dynamically via a lightweight routing model. Through comprehensive evaluation across 15 reasoning datasets with multiple languages and multimodal scenarios, we demonstrate that SoT achieves token reductions of 76% with negligible accuracy impact. In certain domains like mathematical and multi-hop reasoning, it even improves accuracy while using significantly fewer tokens. Our code is publicly available: https://www.github.com/SimonAytes/SoT.

Thinking LLMs solve complex tasks at the expense of increased compute and overthinking on simpler problems, while non-thinking LLMs are faster and cheaper but underthink on harder reasoning problems. This has led to the development of separate thinking and non-thinking LLM variants, leaving the onus of selecting the optimal model for each query on the end user. In this work, we introduce OptimalThinkingBench, a unified benchmark that jointly evaluates overthinking and underthinking in LLMs and also encourages the development of optimally-thinking models that balance performance and efficiency. Our benchmark comprises two sub-benchmarks: OverthinkingBench, featuring simple queries in 72 domains, and UnderthinkingBench, containing 11 challenging reasoning tasks. Using novel thinking-adjusted accuracy metrics, we perform extensive evaluation of 33 different thinking and non-thinking models and show that no model is able to optimally think on our benchmark. Thinking models often overthink for hundreds of tokens on the simplest user queries without improving performance. In contrast, large non-thinking models underthink, often falling short of much smaller thinking models. We further explore several methods to encourage optimal thinking, but find that these approaches often improve on one sub-benchmark at the expense of the other, highlighting the need for better unified and optimal models in the future.

Complex problem-solving requires cognitive flexibility--the capacity to entertain multiple perspectives while preserving their distinctiveness. This flexibility replicates the "wisdom of crowds" within a single individual, allowing them to "think with many minds." While mental simulation enables imagined deliberation, cognitive constraints limit its effectiveness. We propose synthetic deliberation, a Large Language Model (LLM)-based method that simulates discourse between agents embodying diverse perspectives, as a solution. Using a custom GPT-based model, we showcase its benefits: concurrent processing of multiple viewpoints without cognitive degradation, parallel exploration of perspectives, and precise control over viewpoint synthesis. By externalizing the deliberative process and distributing cognitive labor between parallel search and integration, synthetic deliberation transcends mental simulation's limitations. This approach shows promise for strategic planning, policymaking, and conflict resolution.

This study presents a novel learning approach designed to enhance both mathematical reasoning and problem-solving abilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). We focus on integrating the Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and the Program-of-Thought (PoT) learning, hypothesizing that prioritizing the learning of mathematical reasoning ability is helpful for the amplification of problem-solving ability. Thus, the initial learning with CoT is essential for solving challenging mathematical problems. To this end, we propose a sequential learning approach, named SAAS (Solving Ability Amplification Strategy), which strategically transitions from CoT learning to PoT learning. Our empirical study, involving an extensive performance comparison using several benchmarks, demonstrates that our SAAS achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance. The results underscore the effectiveness of our sequential learning approach, marking a significant advancement in the field of mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) improve performance by generating explicit intermediate reasoning traces through increased test-time compute, yet the assumption that longer reasoning is consistently beneficial remains under-examined. While recent evidence shows that additional reasoning can lead models to overthink, we ask: "Once a model has reached the correct answer, does further reasoning refine the solution, or deviate from it?" To study the dynamics after correctness, we introduce a prefix-level trajectory evaluation protocol grounded in reasoning sufficiency, defining the minimum reasoning budget required for a model to first generate the correct answer. This allows us to disentangle verbose overthinking, where additional reasoning is redundant but harmless, from harmful overthinking, where continued reasoning destabilizes an already-correct trajectory. Starting from multimodal benchmarks, we find that many instances considered reasoning-intensive require surprisingly little reasoning. Moreover, stopping at the first correct prefix improves accuracy over standard reasoning up to 21%, revealing that current models are limited not only by their ability to reason, but also by their inability to stop at the right time. Furthermore, while common efficiency strategies like early stopping substantially reduce verbose overthinking (up to 50%), they fail to mitigate harmful overthinking. Failure analysis reveals that correctness deviations are mainly driven by logical drift and visual reinterpretation. Finally, we show that our findings generalize to language-only reasoning benchmarks, highlighting harmful overthinking as a broader reliability risk. Code available at https://simonecaldarella.github.io/thinking-past-the-answer.

Reasoning models enhance performance by tackling problems in a step-by-step manner, decomposing them into sub-problems and exploring long chains of thought before producing an answer. However, applying extended reasoning to every step introduces substantial redundancy, as sub-problems vary widely in difficulty and complexity: a small number of pivotal steps are genuinely challenging and decisive for the final answer, while many others only involve straightforward revisions or simple computations. Therefore, a natural idea is to endow reasoning models with the ability to adaptively respond to this variation, rather than treating all steps with the same level of elaboration. To this end, we propose MixReasoning, a framework that dynamically adjusts the depth of reasoning within a single response. The resulting chain of thought then becomes a mixture of detailed reasoning on difficult steps and concise inference on simpler ones. Experiments on GSM8K, MATH-500, and AIME show that MixReasoning shortens reasoning length and substantially improves efficiency without compromising accuracy.

Being prompted to engage in reasoning has emerged as a core technique for using large language models (LLMs), deploying additional inference-time compute to improve task performance. However, as LLMs increase in both size and adoption, inference costs are correspondingly becoming increasingly burdensome. How, then, might we optimize reasoning's cost-performance tradeoff? This work introduces a novel approach based on computational models of metareasoning used in cognitive science, training LLMs to selectively use intermediate reasoning steps only when necessary. We first develop a reward function that incorporates the Value of Computation by penalizing unnecessary reasoning, then use this reward function with Expert Iteration to train the LLM. Compared to few-shot chain-of-thought prompting and STaR, our method significantly reduces inference costs (20-37\% fewer tokens generated across three models) while maintaining task performance across diverse datasets.

Extensive work has shown that the performance and interpretability of commonsense reasoning can be improved via knowledge-augmented reasoning methods, where the knowledge that underpins the reasoning process is explicitly verbalized and utilized. However, existing implementations, including "chain-of-thought" and its variants, fall short in capturing the introspective nature of knowledge required in commonsense reasoning, and in accounting for the mutual adaptation between the generation and utilization of knowledge. We propose a novel method to develop an introspective commonsense reasoner, Crystal. To tackle commonsense problems, it first introspects for knowledge statements related to the given question, and subsequently makes an informed prediction that is grounded in the previously introspected knowledge. The knowledge introspection and knowledge-grounded reasoning modes of the model are tuned via reinforcement learning to mutually adapt, where the reward derives from the feedback given by the model itself. Experiments show that Crystal significantly outperforms both the standard supervised finetuning and chain-of-thought distilled methods, and enhances the transparency of the commonsense reasoning process. Our work ultimately validates the feasibility and potential of reinforcing a neural model with self-feedback.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet they often suffer from producing unnecessary and verbose reasoning chains. We identify a core aspect of this issue as "invalid thinking" -- models tend to repeatedly double-check their work after having derived the correct answer. To address this specific inefficiency, we move beyond the general principles of Efficacy and Efficiency to propose two new, fine-grained principles: Brevity, which advocates for eliminating redundancy, and Sufficiency, which ensures critical reasoning steps are preserved. Guided by these principles, we introduce LC-R1, a post-training method based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). LC-R1 employs a novel combination of a Length Reward for overall conciseness and a Compress Reward that is specifically designed to remove the invalid portion of the thinking process. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that LC-R1 achieves a significant reduction in sequence length (~50%) with only a marginal (~2%) drop in accuracy, achieving a favorable trade-off point on the Pareto frontier that prioritizes high compression. Our analysis further validates the robustness of LC-R1 and provides valuable insights for developing more powerful yet computationally efficient LRMs. Our code is released at https://github.com/zxiangx/LC-R1.

The Identifiable Victim Effect (IVE) - the tendency to allocate greater resources to a specific, narratively described victim than to a statistically characterized group facing equivalent hardship - is one of the most robust findings in moral psychology and behavioural economics. As large language models (LLMs) assume consequential roles in humanitarian triage, automated grant evaluation, and content moderation, a critical question arises: do these systems inherit the affective irrationalities present in human moral reasoning? We present the first systematic, large-scale empirical investigation of the IVE in LLMs, comprising N=51,955 validated API trials across 16 frontier models spanning nine organizational lineages (Google, Anthropic, OpenAI, Meta, DeepSeek, xAI, Alibaba, IBM, and Moonshot). Using a suite of ten experiments - porting and extending canonical paradigms from Small et al. (2007) and Kogut and Ritov (2005) - we find that the IVE is prevalent but strongly modulated by alignment training. Instruction-tuned models exhibit extreme IVE (Cohen's d up to 1.56), while reasoning-specialized models invert the effect (down to d=-0.85). The pooled effect (d=0.223, p=2e-6) is approximately twice the single-victim human meta-analytic baseline (dapprox0.10) reported by Lee and Feeley (2016) - and likely exceeds the overall human pooled effect by a larger margin, given that the group-victim human effect is near zero. Standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting - contrary to its role as a deliberative corrective - nearly triples the IVE effect size (from d=0.15 to d=0.41), while only utilitarian CoT reliably eliminates it. We further document psychophysical numbing, perfect quantity neglect, and marginal in-group/out-group cultural bias, with implications for AI deployment in humanitarian and ethical decision-making contexts.

For an artificial creative agent, an essential driver of the search for novelty is a value function which is often provided by the system designer or users. We argue that an important barrier for progress in creativity research is the inability of these systems to develop their own notion of value for novelty. We propose a notion of knowledge-driven creativity that circumvent the need for an externally imposed value function, allowing the system to explore based on what it has learned from a set of referential objects. The concept is illustrated by a specific knowledge model provided by a deep generative autoencoder. Using the described system, we train a knowledge model on a set of digit images and we use the same model to build coherent sets of new digits that do not belong to known digit types.

Large language models (LLMs) continue to struggle with mathematical reasoning, and common post-training pipelines often reduce each generated solution to a binary outcome: correct or incorrect. This perspective is limiting in practice, as failures in chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning are frequently structured; solutions may appear convincing while containing subtle logical, algebraic, or numerical flaws. Meanwhile, reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) variants that rely on large reward models or LLM-as-a-judge signals are often expensive, difficult to scale, and unstable to iterate. We propose a lightweight and pragmatic post-training pipeline that targets such structured errors under realistic compute budgets. Starting from supervised fine-tuning (SFT) on MetaMathQA-style CoT data, we introduce a compact MathVerifier that decomposes a candidate solution into a six-dimensional error profile and aggregates it into interpretable wrongness and absurdity scores. These verifier signals serve two roles: (i) mining hard negatives that are near-correct yet structurally flawed, and (ii) defining per-sample importance weights that emphasize the most informative preference pairs. We integrate both into an offline Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) objective via a verifier-guided weighted formulation. Experiments on a 1.5B-parameter Qwen2.5 model show that verifier-guided, weighted DPO yields more targeted improvements than vanilla SFT and unweighted DPO, particularly on problems where solutions are numerically close to correct but logically inconsistent, while avoiding the overhead of training large reward models or relying on external judges.

We introduce Seed1.5-Thinking, capable of reasoning through thinking before responding, resulting in improved performance on a wide range of benchmarks. Seed1.5-Thinking achieves 86.7 on AIME 2024, 55.0 on Codeforces and 77.3 on GPQA, demonstrating excellent reasoning abilities in STEM and coding. Beyond reasoning tasks, the method demonstrates notable generalization across diverse domains. For instance, it surpasses DeepSeek R1 by 8% in win rate on non-reasoning tasks, indicating its broader applicability. Compared to other state-of-the-art reasoning models, Seed1.5-Thinking is a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model with a relatively small size, featuring 20B activated and 200B total parameters. As part of our effort to assess generalized reasoning, we develop two internal benchmarks, BeyondAIME and Codeforces, both of which will be publicly released to support future research. Model trial link: https://www.volcengine.com/experience/ark.

On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD) has recently emerged as an alternative to Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), promising higher accuracy and shorter responses through token-level credit assignment from a self-teacher conditioned on privileged context. However, this promise does not carry over to thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning, where reported accuracy gains shrink and sometimes turn negative. We hypothesize that hindsight supervision can specify better token-level alternatives in short thinking-disabled outputs, but in long thinking-enabled traces it more readily identifies redundancy than supplies better replacements. To test this, we applied OPSD separately to correct and incorrect rollout groups, so that compression and correction can be observed in isolation. Our results show that in thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning, OPSD behaves most reliably as a compression mechanism rather than a correction mechanism: training only on correct rollouts preserves accuracy while substantially shortening responses, whereas training only on incorrect rollouts damages accuracy. In light of these findings, we propose a revised post-training pipeline for thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning: SFT then RLVR then OPSD.

Recent Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex reasoning tasks but often suffer from overthinking, generating overly long and redundant reasoning trajectories. To explore its essence, our empirical analysis reveals that LRMs are primarily limited to recognizing task properties (i.e., difficulty levels) like humans before solving the problem, leading to a one-size-fits-all reasoning process. Inspired by this, a pressing and natural question emerges: Can we explicitly bootstrap such ability to alleviate overthinking in LRMs? In this paper, we propose Think-How-to-Think (TH2T), a novel two-stage fine-tuning strategy that progressively inspires LRMs' difficulty cognition and redundancy cognition of LRMs. Specifically, we first inject difficulty hypnosis into output prefixes to guide the model toward adaptive reasoning depth, trained on a hybrid dataset mixing short and long reasoning paths. Then, we incorporate redundancy hypnosis, which supervises the intermediate reasoning steps to identify and eliminate unnecessary reasoning patterns. Experiments on 7B/14B/32B models demonstrate that TH2T significantly reduces inference costs by over 70% on easy tasks and 40% on hard tasks while maintaining performance stability. The resulting outputs exhibit clear signs of difficulty-aware capabilities and reduced redundancy (e.g., reflection and looping).

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced complex reasoning capabilities, particularly through extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that incorporates mechanisms such as backtracking, self-reflection and self-correction. Despite these developments, the self-correction abilities of LLMs during long CoT reasoning remain underexplored. And recent findings on overthinking suggest that such models often engage in unnecessarily redundant reasoning. In this work, we empirically show that the first reasoning step exerts a disproportionately large influence on the final prediction - errors introduced at this stage can substantially degrade subsequent reasoning quality. This phenomenon is consistently observed across two state-of-the-art open-source reasoning model families: DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3. To address this, we propose an efficient sampling strategy that leverages a reward model to identify and retain high-quality first reasoning steps while discarding suboptimal ones, achieving up to a 70% reduction in inference cost without sacrificing accuracy. Finally, we introduce a new benchmark specifically constructed with deliberately flawed first reasoning steps to systematically evaluate model self-correction capabilities, offering a foundation for future research on robust reasoning in LLMs.

We introduce S1-Bench, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate Large Reasoning Models' (LRMs) performance on simple tasks that favor intuitive system 1 thinking rather than deliberative system 2 reasoning. While LRMs have achieved significant breakthroughs in complex reasoning tasks through explicit chains of thought, their reliance on deep analytical thinking may limit their system 1 thinking capabilities. Moreover, a lack of benchmark currently exists to evaluate LRMs' performance in tasks that require such capabilities. To fill this gap, S1-Bench presents a set of simple, diverse, and naturally clear questions across multiple domains and languages, specifically designed to assess LRMs' performance in such tasks. Our comprehensive evaluation of 22 LRMs reveals significant lower efficiency tendencies, with outputs averaging 15.5 times longer than those of traditional small LLMs. Additionally, LRMs often identify correct answers early but continue unnecessary deliberation, with some models even producing numerous errors. These findings highlight the rigid reasoning patterns of current LRMs and underscore the substantial development needed to achieve balanced dual-system thinking capabilities that can adapt appropriately to task complexity.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming diverse fields and gaining increasing influence as human proxies. This development underscores the urgent need for evaluating value orientations and understanding of LLMs to ensure their responsible integration into public-facing applications. This work introduces ValueBench, the first comprehensive psychometric benchmark for evaluating value orientations and value understanding in LLMs. ValueBench collects data from 44 established psychometric inventories, encompassing 453 multifaceted value dimensions. We propose an evaluation pipeline grounded in realistic human-AI interactions to probe value orientations, along with novel tasks for evaluating value understanding in an open-ended value space. With extensive experiments conducted on six representative LLMs, we unveil their shared and distinctive value orientations and exhibit their ability to approximate expert conclusions in value-related extraction and generation tasks. ValueBench is openly accessible at https://github.com/Value4AI/ValueBench.