Daily Papers

A popular class of defenses against prompt injection attacks on large language models (LLMs) relies on fine-tuning to separate instructions and data, so that the LLM does not follow instructions that might be present with data. We evaluate the robustness of this approach in the whitebox setting by constructing strong optimization-based attacks, and show that the defenses do not provide the claimed security properties. Specifically, we construct a novel attention-based attack algorithm for textual LLMs and apply it to three recent whitebox defenses SecAlign (CCS 2025), SecAlign++, and StruQ (USENIX Security 2025), showing attacks with success rates of up to 85-95\% on unseen prompts with modest increase in attacker budget in terms of tokens. Our findings make fundamental progress towards understanding the robustness of prompt injection defenses in the whitebox setting. We release our code and attacks at https://github.com/nishitvp/better_opts_attacks

Image-based artistic rendering can synthesize a variety of expressive styles using algorithmic image filtering. In contrast to deep learning-based methods, these heuristics-based filtering techniques can operate on high-resolution images, are interpretable, and can be parameterized according to various design aspects. However, adapting or extending these techniques to produce new styles is often a tedious and error-prone task that requires expert knowledge. We propose a new paradigm to alleviate this problem: implementing algorithmic image filtering techniques as differentiable operations that can learn parametrizations aligned to certain reference styles. To this end, we present WISE, an example-based image-processing system that can handle a multitude of stylization techniques, such as watercolor, oil or cartoon stylization, within a common framework. By training parameter prediction networks for global and local filter parameterizations, we can simultaneously adapt effects to reference styles and image content, e.g., to enhance facial features. Our method can be optimized in a style-transfer framework or learned in a generative-adversarial setting for image-to-image translation. We demonstrate that jointly training an XDoG filter and a CNN for postprocessing can achieve comparable results to a state-of-the-art GAN-based method.

Pretrained language models sometimes possess knowledge that we do not wish them to, including memorized personal information and knowledge that could be used to harm people. They can also output toxic or harmful text. To mitigate these safety and informational issues, we propose an attack-and-defense framework for studying the task of deleting sensitive information directly from model weights. We study direct edits to model weights because (1) this approach should guarantee that particular deleted information is never extracted by future prompt attacks, and (2) it should protect against whitebox attacks, which is necessary for making claims about safety/privacy in a setting where publicly available model weights could be used to elicit sensitive information. Our threat model assumes that an attack succeeds if the answer to a sensitive question is located among a set of B generated candidates, based on scenarios where the information would be insecure if the answer is among B candidates. Experimentally, we show that even state-of-the-art model editing methods such as ROME struggle to truly delete factual information from models like GPT-J, as our whitebox and blackbox attacks can recover "deleted" information from an edited model 38% of the time. These attacks leverage two key observations: (1) that traces of deleted information can be found in intermediate model hidden states, and (2) that applying an editing method for one question may not delete information across rephrased versions of the question. Finally, we provide new defense methods that protect against some extraction attacks, but we do not find a single universally effective defense method. Our results suggest that truly deleting sensitive information is a tractable but difficult problem, since even relatively low attack success rates have potentially severe societal implications for real-world deployment of language models.

Retouching images is an essential aspect of enhancing the visual appeal of photos. Although users often share common aesthetic preferences, their retouching methods may vary based on their individual preferences. Therefore, there is a need for white-box approaches that produce satisfying results and enable users to conveniently edit their images simultaneously. Recent white-box retouching methods rely on cascaded global filters that provide image-level filter arguments but cannot perform fine-grained retouching. In contrast, colorists typically employ a divide-and-conquer approach, performing a series of region-specific fine-grained enhancements when using traditional tools like Davinci Resolve. We draw on this insight to develop a white-box framework for photo retouching using parallel region-specific filters, called RSFNet. Our model generates filter arguments (e.g., saturation, contrast, hue) and attention maps of regions for each filter simultaneously. Instead of cascading filters, RSFNet employs linear summations of filters, allowing for a more diverse range of filter classes that can be trained more easily. Our experiments demonstrate that RSFNet achieves state-of-the-art results, offering satisfying aesthetic appeal and increased user convenience for editable white-box retouching.

White balance (WB) is one of the first photo-finishing steps used to render a captured image to its final output. WB is applied to remove the color cast caused by the scene's illumination. Interactive photo-editing software allows users to manually select different regions in a photo as examples of the illumination for WB correction (e.g., clicking on achromatic objects). Such interactive editing is possible only with images saved in a RAW image format. This is because RAW images have no photo-rendering operations applied and photo-editing software is able to apply WB and other photo-finishing procedures to render the final image. Interactively editing WB in camera-rendered images is significantly more challenging. This is because the camera hardware has already applied WB to the image and subsequent nonlinear photo-processing routines. These nonlinear rendering operations make it difficult to change the WB post-capture. The goal of this paper is to allow interactive WB manipulation of camera-rendered images. The proposed method is an extension of our recent work afifi2019color that proposed a post-capture method for WB correction based on nonlinear color-mapping functions. Here, we introduce a new framework that links the nonlinear color-mapping functions directly to user-selected colors to enable {\it interactive} WB manipulation. This new framework is also more efficient in terms of memory and run-time (99\% reduction in memory and 3times speed-up). Lastly, we describe how our framework can leverage a simple illumination estimation method (i.e., gray-world) to perform auto-WB correction that is on a par with the WB correction results in afifi2019color. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/mahmoudnafifi/Interactive_WB_correction.

Recent text-to-image diffusion models have demonstrated an astonishing capacity to generate high-quality images. However, researchers mainly studied the way of synthesizing images with only text prompts. While some works have explored using other modalities as conditions, considerable paired data, e.g., box/mask-image pairs, and fine-tuning time are required for nurturing models. As such paired data is time-consuming and labor-intensive to acquire and restricted to a closed set, this potentially becomes the bottleneck for applications in an open world. This paper focuses on the simplest form of user-provided conditions, e.g., box or scribble. To mitigate the aforementioned problem, we propose a training-free method to control objects and contexts in the synthesized images adhering to the given spatial conditions. Specifically, three spatial constraints, i.e., Inner-Box, Outer-Box, and Corner Constraints, are designed and seamlessly integrated into the denoising step of diffusion models, requiring no additional training and massive annotated layout data. Extensive results show that the proposed constraints can control what and where to present in the images while retaining the ability of the Stable Diffusion model to synthesize with high fidelity and diverse concept coverage. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/Sierkinhane/BoxDiff.

Modern learning frameworks often train deep neural networks with massive amounts of unlabeled data to learn representations by solving simple pretext tasks, then use the representations as foundations for downstream tasks. These networks are empirically designed; as such, they are usually not interpretable, their representations are not structured, and their designs are potentially redundant. White-box deep networks, in which each layer explicitly identifies and transforms structures in the data, present a promising alternative. However, existing white-box architectures have only been shown to work at scale in supervised settings with labeled data, such as classification. In this work, we provide the first instantiation of the white-box design paradigm that can be applied to large-scale unsupervised representation learning. We do this by exploiting a fundamental connection between diffusion, compression, and (masked) completion, deriving a deep transformer-like masked autoencoder architecture, called CRATE-MAE, in which the role of each layer is mathematically fully interpretable: they transform the data distribution to and from a structured representation. Extensive empirical evaluations confirm our analytical insights. CRATE-MAE demonstrates highly promising performance on large-scale imagery datasets while using only ~30% of the parameters compared to the standard masked autoencoder with the same model configuration. The representations learned by CRATE-MAE have explicit structure and also contain semantic meaning. Code is available at https://github.com/Ma-Lab-Berkeley/CRATE .

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

We introduce the Adversarial Confusion Attack, a new class of threats against multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Unlike jailbreaks or targeted misclassification, the goal is to induce systematic disruption that makes the model generate incoherent or confidently incorrect outputs. Practical applications include embedding such adversarial images into websites to prevent MLLM-powered AI Agents from operating reliably. The proposed attack maximizes next-token entropy using a small ensemble of open-source MLLMs. In the white-box setting, we show that a single adversarial image can disrupt all models in the ensemble, both in the full-image and Adversarial CAPTCHA settings. Despite relying on a basic adversarial technique (PGD), the attack generates perturbations that transfer to both unseen open-source (e.g., Qwen3-VL) and proprietary (e.g., GPT-5.1) models.

We propose a new defense mechanism against adversarial attacks inspired by an optical co-processor, providing robustness without compromising natural accuracy in both white-box and black-box settings. This hardware co-processor performs a nonlinear fixed random transformation, where the parameters are unknown and impossible to retrieve with sufficient precision for large enough dimensions. In the white-box setting, our defense works by obfuscating the parameters of the random projection. Unlike other defenses relying on obfuscated gradients, we find we are unable to build a reliable backward differentiable approximation for obfuscated parameters. Moreover, while our model reaches a good natural accuracy with a hybrid backpropagation - synthetic gradient method, the same approach is suboptimal if employed to generate adversarial examples. We find the combination of a random projection and binarization in the optical system also improves robustness against various types of black-box attacks. Finally, our hybrid training method builds robust features against transfer attacks. We demonstrate our approach on a VGG-like architecture, placing the defense on top of the convolutional features, on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Code is available at https://github.com/lightonai/adversarial-robustness-by-design.

Adversarial attacks on image models threaten system robustness by introducing imperceptible perturbations that cause incorrect predictions. We investigate human-aligned learned lossy compression as a defense mechanism, comparing two learned models (HiFiC and ELIC) against traditional JPEG across various quality levels. Our experiments on ImageNet subsets demonstrate that learned compression methods outperform JPEG, particularly for Vision Transformer architectures, by preserving semantically meaningful content while removing adversarial noise. Even in white-box settings where attackers can access the defense, these methods maintain substantial effectiveness. We also show that sequential compression--applying rounds of compression/decompression--significantly enhances defense efficacy while maintaining classification performance. Our findings reveal that human-aligned compression provides an effective, computationally efficient defense that protects the image features most relevant to human and machine understanding. It offers a practical approach to improving model robustness against adversarial threats.

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

Recent work has shown it is possible to construct adversarial examples that cause an aligned language model to emit harmful strings or perform harmful behavior. Existing attacks work either in the white-box setting (with full access to the model weights), or through transferability: the phenomenon that adversarial examples crafted on one model often remain effective on other models. We improve on prior work with a query-based attack that leverages API access to a remote language model to construct adversarial examples that cause the model to emit harmful strings with (much) higher probability than with transfer-only attacks. We validate our attack on GPT-3.5 and OpenAI's safety classifier; we can cause GPT-3.5 to emit harmful strings that current transfer attacks fail at, and we can evade the safety classifier with nearly 100% probability.

Safety alignment is critical for the ethical deployment of large language models (LLMs), guiding them to avoid generating harmful or unethical content. Current alignment techniques, such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning from human feedback, remain fragile and can be bypassed by carefully crafted adversarial prompts. Unfortunately, such attacks rely on trial and error, lack generalizability across models, and are constrained by scalability and reliability. This paper presents NeuroStrike, a novel and generalizable attack framework that exploits a fundamental vulnerability introduced by alignment techniques: the reliance on sparse, specialized safety neurons responsible for detecting and suppressing harmful inputs. We apply NeuroStrike to both white-box and black-box settings: In the white-box setting, NeuroStrike identifies safety neurons through feedforward activation analysis and prunes them during inference to disable safety mechanisms. In the black-box setting, we propose the first LLM profiling attack, which leverages safety neuron transferability by training adversarial prompt generators on open-weight surrogate models and then deploying them against black-box and proprietary targets. We evaluate NeuroStrike on over 20 open-weight LLMs from major LLM developers. By removing less than 0.6% of neurons in targeted layers, NeuroStrike achieves an average attack success rate (ASR) of 76.9% using only vanilla malicious prompts. Moreover, Neurostrike generalizes to four multimodal LLMs with 100% ASR on unsafe image inputs. Safety neurons transfer effectively across architectures, raising ASR to 78.5% on 11 fine-tuned models and 77.7% on five distilled models. The black-box LLM profiling attack achieves an average ASR of 63.7% across five black-box models, including the Google Gemini family.

With the maturity of depth sensors, the vulnerability of 3D point cloud models has received increasing attention in various applications such as autonomous driving and robot navigation. Previous 3D adversarial attackers either follow the white-box setting to iteratively update the coordinate perturbations based on gradients, or utilize the output model logits to estimate noisy gradients in the black-box setting. However, these attack methods are hard to be deployed in real-world scenarios since realistic 3D applications will not share any model details to users. Therefore, we explore a more challenging yet practical 3D attack setting, i.e., attacking point clouds with black-box hard labels, in which the attacker can only have access to the prediction label of the input. To tackle this setting, we propose a novel 3D attack method, termed 3D Hard-label attacker (3DHacker), based on the developed decision boundary algorithm to generate adversarial samples solely with the knowledge of class labels. Specifically, to construct the class-aware model decision boundary, 3DHacker first randomly fuses two point clouds of different classes in the spectral domain to craft their intermediate sample with high imperceptibility, then projects it onto the decision boundary via binary search. To restrict the final perturbation size, 3DHacker further introduces an iterative optimization strategy to move the intermediate sample along the decision boundary for generating adversarial point clouds with smallest trivial perturbations. Extensive evaluations show that, even in the challenging hard-label setting, 3DHacker still competitively outperforms existing 3D attacks regarding the attack performance as well as adversary quality.

Auto white balance (AWB) is applied by camera hardware at capture time to remove the color cast caused by the scene illumination. The vast majority of white-balance algorithms assume a single light source illuminates the scene; however, real scenes often have mixed lighting conditions. This paper presents an effective AWB method to deal with such mixed-illuminant scenes. A unique departure from conventional AWB, our method does not require illuminant estimation, as is the case in traditional camera AWB modules. Instead, our method proposes to render the captured scene with a small set of predefined white-balance settings. Given this set of rendered images, our method learns to estimate weighting maps that are used to blend the rendered images to generate the final corrected image. Through extensive experiments, we show this proposed method produces promising results compared to other alternatives for single- and mixed-illuminant scene color correction. Our source code and trained models are available at https://github.com/mahmoudnafifi/mixedillWB.

Deep Neural Networks have created a paradigm shift in our ability to comprehend raw data in various important fields ranging from computer vision and natural language processing to intelligence warfare and healthcare. While DNNs are increasingly deployed either in a white-box setting where the model internal is publicly known, or a black-box setting where only the model outputs are known, a practical concern is protecting the models against Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. We propose BlackMarks, the first end-to-end multi-bit watermarking framework that is applicable in the black-box scenario. BlackMarks takes the pre-trained unmarked model and the owner's binary signature as inputs and outputs the corresponding marked model with a set of watermark keys. To do so, BlackMarks first designs a model-dependent encoding scheme that maps all possible classes in the task to bit '0' and bit '1' by clustering the output activations into two groups. Given the owner's watermark signature (a binary string), a set of key image and label pairs are designed using targeted adversarial attacks. The watermark (WM) is then embedded in the prediction behavior of the target DNN by fine-tuning the model with generated WM key set. To extract the WM, the remote model is queried by the WM key images and the owner's signature is decoded from the corresponding predictions according to the designed encoding scheme. We perform a comprehensive evaluation of BlackMarks's performance on MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet datasets and corroborate its effectiveness and robustness. BlackMarks preserves the functionality of the original DNN and incurs negligible WM embedding runtime overhead as low as 2.054%.

Recent advancements in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) have shown groundbreaking capabilities across diverse multimodal tasks. However, these models remain vulnerable to adversarial jailbreak attacks, where adversaries craft subtle perturbations to bypass safety mechanisms and trigger harmful outputs. Existing white-box attacks methods require full model accessibility, suffer from computing costs and exhibit insufficient adversarial transferability, making them impractical for real-world, black-box settings. To address these limitations, we propose a black-box jailbreak attack on LVLMs via Zeroth-Order optimization using Simultaneous Perturbation Stochastic Approximation (ZO-SPSA). ZO-SPSA provides three key advantages: (i) gradient-free approximation by input-output interactions without requiring model knowledge, (ii) model-agnostic optimization without the surrogate model and (iii) lower resource requirements with reduced GPU memory consumption. We evaluate ZO-SPSA on three LVLMs, including InstructBLIP, LLaVA and MiniGPT-4, achieving the highest jailbreak success rate of 83.0% on InstructBLIP, while maintaining imperceptible perturbations comparable to white-box methods. Moreover, adversarial examples generated from MiniGPT-4 exhibit strong transferability to other LVLMs, with ASR reaching 64.18%. These findings underscore the real-world feasibility of black-box jailbreaks and expose critical weaknesses in the safety mechanisms of current LVLMs

Hallucination in large language models (LLMs) can be detected by assessing the uncertainty of model outputs, typically measured using entropy. Semantic entropy (SE) enhances traditional entropy estimation by quantifying uncertainty at the semantic cluster level. However, as modern LLMs generate longer one-sentence responses, SE becomes less effective because it overlooks two crucial factors: intra-cluster similarity (the spread within a cluster) and inter-cluster similarity (the distance between clusters). To address these limitations, we propose a simple black-box uncertainty quantification method inspired by nearest neighbor estimates of entropy. Our approach can also be easily extended to white-box settings by incorporating token probabilities. Additionally, we provide theoretical results showing that our method generalizes semantic entropy. Extensive empirical results demonstrate its effectiveness compared to semantic entropy across two recent LLMs (Phi3 and Llama3) and three common text generation tasks: question answering, text summarization, and machine translation. Our code is available at https://github.com/BigML-CS-UCLA/SNNE.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

We question the current evaluation practice on diffusion-based purification methods. Diffusion-based purification methods aim to remove adversarial effects from an input data point at test time. The approach gains increasing attention as an alternative to adversarial training due to the disentangling between training and testing. Well-known white-box attacks are often employed to measure the robustness of the purification. However, it is unknown whether these attacks are the most effective for the diffusion-based purification since the attacks are often tailored for adversarial training. We analyze the current practices and provide a new guideline for measuring the robustness of purification methods against adversarial attacks. Based on our analysis, we further propose a new purification strategy improving robustness compared to the current diffusion-based purification methods.

It is now a common business practice to buy access to large language model (LLM) inference rather than self-host, because of significant upfront hardware infrastructure and energy costs. However, as a buyer, there is no mechanism to verify the authenticity of the advertised service including the serving hardware platform, e.g. that it is actually being served using an NVIDIA H100. Furthermore, there are reports suggesting that model providers may deliver models that differ slightly from the advertised ones, often to make them run on less expensive hardware. That way, a client pays premium for a capable model access on more expensive hardware, yet ends up being served by a (potentially less capable) cheaper model on cheaper hardware. In this paper we introduce \textbf{hardware and software platform inference (HSPI)} -- a method for identifying the underlying architecture and software stack of a (black-box) machine learning model solely based on its input-output behavior. Our method leverages the inherent differences of various architectures and compilers to distinguish between different types and software stacks. By analyzing the numerical patterns in the model's outputs, we propose a classification framework capable of accurately identifying the used for model inference as well as the underlying software configuration. Our findings demonstrate the feasibility of inferring type from black-box models. We evaluate HSPI against models served on different real hardware and find that in a white-box setting we can distinguish between different s with between 83.9% and 100% accuracy. Even in a black-box setting we are able to achieve results that are up to three times higher than random guess accuracy.

With the rapidly increasing application of large language models (LLMs), their abuse has caused many undesirable societal problems such as fake news, academic dishonesty, and information pollution. This makes AI-generated text (AIGT) detection of great importance. Among existing methods, white-box methods are generally superior to black-box methods in terms of performance and generalizability, but they require access to LLMs' internal states and are not applicable to black-box settings. In this paper, we propose to estimate word generation probabilities as pseudo white-box features via multiple re-sampling to help improve AIGT detection under the black-box setting. Specifically, we design POGER, a proxy-guided efficient re-sampling method, which selects a small subset of representative words (e.g., 10 words) for performing multiple re-sampling in black-box AIGT detection. Experiments on datasets containing texts from humans and seven LLMs show that POGER outperforms all baselines in macro F1 under black-box, partial white-box, and out-of-distribution settings and maintains lower re-sampling costs than its existing counterparts.

Despite the improved accuracy of deep neural networks, the discovery of adversarial examples has raised serious safety concerns. Most existing approaches for crafting adversarial examples necessitate some knowledge (architecture, parameters, etc.) of the network at hand. In this paper, we focus on image classifiers and propose a feature-guided black-box approach to test the safety of deep neural networks that requires no such knowledge. Our algorithm employs object detection techniques such as SIFT (Scale Invariant Feature Transform) to extract features from an image. These features are converted into a mutable saliency distribution, where high probability is assigned to pixels that affect the composition of the image with respect to the human visual system. We formulate the crafting of adversarial examples as a two-player turn-based stochastic game, where the first player's objective is to minimise the distance to an adversarial example by manipulating the features, and the second player can be cooperative, adversarial, or random. We show that, theoretically, the two-player game can con- verge to the optimal strategy, and that the optimal strategy represents a globally minimal adversarial image. For Lipschitz networks, we also identify conditions that provide safety guarantees that no adversarial examples exist. Using Monte Carlo tree search we gradually explore the game state space to search for adversarial examples. Our experiments show that, despite the black-box setting, manipulations guided by a perception-based saliency distribution are competitive with state-of-the-art methods that rely on white-box saliency matrices or sophisticated optimization procedures. Finally, we show how our method can be used to evaluate robustness of neural networks in safety-critical applications such as traffic sign recognition in self-driving cars.

Although large language models (LLMs) are typically aligned, they remain vulnerable to jailbreaking through either carefully crafted prompts in natural language or, interestingly, gibberish adversarial suffixes. However, gibberish tokens have received relatively less attention despite their success in attacking aligned LLMs. Recent work, AmpleGCG~liao2024amplegcg, demonstrates that a generative model can quickly produce numerous customizable gibberish adversarial suffixes for any harmful query, exposing a range of alignment gaps in out-of-distribution (OOD) language spaces. To bring more attention to this area, we introduce AmpleGCG-Plus, an enhanced version that achieves better performance in fewer attempts. Through a series of exploratory experiments, we identify several training strategies to improve the learning of gibberish suffixes. Our results, verified under a strict evaluation setting, show that it outperforms AmpleGCG on both open-weight and closed-source models, achieving increases in attack success rate (ASR) of up to 17\% in the white-box setting against Llama-2-7B-chat, and more than tripling ASR in the black-box setting against GPT-4. Notably, AmpleGCG-Plus jailbreaks the newer GPT-4o series of models at similar rates to GPT-4, and, uncovers vulnerabilities against the recently proposed circuit breakers defense. We publicly release AmpleGCG-Plus along with our collected training datasets.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success due to their exceptional generative capabilities. Despite their success, they also have inherent limitations such as a lack of up-to-date knowledge and hallucination. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is a state-of-the-art technique to mitigate these limitations. The key idea of RAG is to ground the answer generation of an LLM on external knowledge retrieved from a knowledge database. Existing studies mainly focus on improving the accuracy or efficiency of RAG, leaving its security largely unexplored. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. We find that the knowledge database in a RAG system introduces a new and practical attack surface. Based on this attack surface, we propose PoisonedRAG, the first knowledge corruption attack to RAG, where an attacker could inject a few malicious texts into the knowledge database of a RAG system to induce an LLM to generate an attacker-chosen target answer for an attacker-chosen target question. We formulate knowledge corruption attacks as an optimization problem, whose solution is a set of malicious texts. Depending on the background knowledge (e.g., black-box and white-box settings) of an attacker on a RAG system, we propose two solutions to solve the optimization problem, respectively. Our results show PoisonedRAG could achieve a 90% attack success rate when injecting five malicious texts for each target question into a knowledge database with millions of texts. We also evaluate several defenses and our results show they are insufficient to defend against PoisonedRAG, highlighting the need for new defenses.

As an essential processing step in computer vision applications, image resizing or scaling, more specifically downsampling, has to be applied before feeding a normally large image into a convolutional neural network (CNN) model because CNN models typically take small fixed-size images as inputs. However, image scaling functions could be adversarially abused to perform a newly revealed attack called image-scaling attack, which can affect a wide range of computer vision applications building upon image-scaling functions. This work presents an image-scaling attack detection framework, termed as Decamouflage. Decamouflage consists of three independent detection methods: (1) rescaling, (2) filtering/pooling, and (3) steganalysis. While each of these three methods is efficient standalone, they can work in an ensemble manner not only to improve the detection accuracy but also to harden potential adaptive attacks. Decamouflage has a pre-determined detection threshold that is generic. More precisely, as we have validated, the threshold determined from one dataset is also applicable to other different datasets. Extensive experiments show that Decamouflage achieves detection accuracy of 99.9\% and 99.8\% in the white-box (with the knowledge of attack algorithms) and the black-box (without the knowledge of attack algorithms) settings, respectively. To corroborate the efficiency of Decamouflage, we have also measured its run-time overhead on a personal PC with an i5 CPU and found that Decamouflage can detect image-scaling attacks in milliseconds. Overall, Decamouflage can accurately detect image scaling attacks in both white-box and black-box settings with acceptable run-time overhead.

Vision-language pre-training (VLP) models have shown vulnerability to adversarial examples in multimodal tasks. Furthermore, malicious adversaries can be deliberately transferred to attack other black-box models. However, existing work has mainly focused on investigating white-box attacks. In this paper, we present the first study to investigate the adversarial transferability of recent VLP models. We observe that existing methods exhibit much lower transferability, compared to the strong attack performance in white-box settings. The transferability degradation is partly caused by the under-utilization of cross-modal interactions. Particularly, unlike unimodal learning, VLP models rely heavily on cross-modal interactions and the multimodal alignments are many-to-many, e.g., an image can be described in various natural languages. To this end, we propose a highly transferable Set-level Guidance Attack (SGA) that thoroughly leverages modality interactions and incorporates alignment-preserving augmentation with cross-modal guidance. Experimental results demonstrate that SGA could generate adversarial examples that can strongly transfer across different VLP models on multiple downstream vision-language tasks. On image-text retrieval, SGA significantly enhances the attack success rate for transfer attacks from ALBEF to TCL by a large margin (at least 9.78% and up to 30.21%), compared to the state-of-the-art.

Neural network-based image classifiers are powerful tools for computer vision tasks, but they inadvertently reveal sensitive attribute information about their classes, raising concerns about their privacy. To investigate this privacy leakage, we introduce the first Class Attribute Inference Attack (CAIA), which leverages recent advances in text-to-image synthesis to infer sensitive attributes of individual classes in a black-box setting, while remaining competitive with related white-box attacks. Our extensive experiments in the face recognition domain show that CAIA can accurately infer undisclosed sensitive attributes, such as an individual's hair color, gender, and racial appearance, which are not part of the training labels. Interestingly, we demonstrate that adversarial robust models are even more vulnerable to such privacy leakage than standard models, indicating that a trade-off between robustness and privacy exists.

Perceptual similarity metrics have progressively become more correlated with human judgments on perceptual similarity; however, despite recent advances, the addition of an imperceptible distortion can still compromise these metrics. In our study, we systematically examine the robustness of these metrics to imperceptible adversarial perturbations. Following the two-alternative forced-choice experimental design with two distorted images and one reference image, we perturb the distorted image closer to the reference via an adversarial attack until the metric flips its judgment. We first show that all metrics in our study are susceptible to perturbations generated via common adversarial attacks such as FGSM, PGD, and the One-pixel attack. Next, we attack the widely adopted LPIPS metric using spatial-transformation-based adversarial perturbations (stAdv) in a white-box setting to craft adversarial examples that can effectively transfer to other similarity metrics in a black-box setting. We also combine the spatial attack stAdv with PGD (ell_infty-bounded) attack to increase transferability and use these adversarial examples to benchmark the robustness of both traditional and recently developed metrics. Our benchmark provides a good starting point for discussion and further research on the robustness of metrics to imperceptible adversarial perturbations.

We study the black-box attacks on graph neural networks (GNNs) under a novel and realistic constraint: attackers have access to only a subset of nodes in the network, and they can only attack a small number of them. A node selection step is essential under this setup. We demonstrate that the structural inductive biases of GNN models can be an effective source for this type of attacks. Specifically, by exploiting the connection between the backward propagation of GNNs and random walks, we show that the common gradient-based white-box attacks can be generalized to the black-box setting via the connection between the gradient and an importance score similar to PageRank. In practice, we find attacks based on this importance score indeed increase the classification loss by a large margin, but they fail to significantly increase the mis-classification rate. Our theoretical and empirical analyses suggest that there is a discrepancy between the loss and mis-classification rate, as the latter presents a diminishing-return pattern when the number of attacked nodes increases. Therefore, we propose a greedy procedure to correct the importance score that takes into account of the diminishing-return pattern. Experimental results show that the proposed procedure can significantly increase the mis-classification rate of common GNNs on real-world data without access to model parameters nor predictions.

Text-to-image diffusion models may generate harmful or copyrighted content, motivating research on concept erasure. However, existing approaches primarily focus on erasing concepts from text prompts, overlooking other input modalities that are increasingly critical in real-world applications such as image editing and personalized generation. These modalities can become attack surfaces, where erased concepts re-emerge despite defenses. To bridge this gap, we introduce M-ErasureBench, a novel multimodal evaluation framework that systematically benchmarks concept erasure methods across three input modalities: text prompts, learned embeddings, and inverted latents. For the latter two, we evaluate both white-box and black-box access, yielding five evaluation scenarios. Our analysis shows that existing methods achieve strong erasure performance against text prompts but largely fail under learned embeddings and inverted latents, with Concept Reproduction Rate (CRR) exceeding 90% in the white-box setting. To address these vulnerabilities, we propose IRECE (Inference-time Robustness Enhancement for Concept Erasure), a plug-and-play module that localizes target concepts via cross-attention and perturbs the associated latents during denoising. Experiments demonstrate that IRECE consistently restores robustness, reducing CRR by up to 40% under the most challenging white-box latent inversion scenario, while preserving visual quality. To the best of our knowledge, M-ErasureBench provides the first comprehensive benchmark of concept erasure beyond text prompts. Together with IRECE, our benchmark offers practical safeguards for building more reliable protective generative models.

Vision-Language-Action models (VLAs) have recently demonstrated remarkable progress in embodied environments, enabling robots to perceive, reason, and act through unified multimodal understanding. Despite their impressive capabilities, the adversarial robustness of these systems remains largely unexplored, especially under realistic multimodal and black-box conditions. Existing studies mainly focus on single-modality perturbations and overlook the cross-modal misalignment that fundamentally affects embodied reasoning and decision-making. In this paper, we introduce VLA-Fool, a comprehensive study of multimodal adversarial robustness in embodied VLA models under both white-box and black-box settings. VLA-Fool unifies three levels of multimodal adversarial attacks: (1) textual perturbations through gradient-based and prompt-based manipulations, (2) visual perturbations via patch and noise distortions, and (3) cross-modal misalignment attacks that intentionally disrupt the semantic correspondence between perception and instruction. We further incorporate a VLA-aware semantic space into linguistic prompts, developing the first automatically crafted and semantically guided prompting framework. Experiments on the LIBERO benchmark using a fine-tuned OpenVLA model reveal that even minor multimodal perturbations can cause significant behavioral deviations, demonstrating the fragility of embodied multimodal alignment.

Large language models (LLMs) often exhibit systematic preferences for certain answer choices when responding to multiple-choice questions-a behavior known as selection bias. This bias reduces the accuracy and reliability of LLM outputs, limiting their usefulness in decision-critical applications. While prior work has focused on adjusting model inputs or outputs to mitigate this issue, our work takes a fundamentally different approach by identifying and removing the internal sources of bias. We introduce two methods: Bias Node Pruning (BNP), which prunes parameters that contribute to selection bias, and Auxiliary Option Injection (AOI), which introduces an additional answer choice to reduce bias in both white-box and black-box settings. To address the shortcomings of existing evaluation metrics, we propose Choice Kullback-Leibler Divergence (CKLD), a new metric that captures distributional imbalances in model predictions. Experiments on three LLMs across multiple datasets demonstrate that our methods consistently improve answer accuracy while reducing selection bias, providing a robust solution for both open- and closed-source models.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in generating high-quality texts across diverse domains. However, the potential misuse of LLMs has raised significant concerns, underscoring the urgent need for reliable detection of LLM-generated texts. Conventional training-based detectors often struggle with generalization, particularly in cross-domain and cross-model scenarios. In contrast, training-free methods, which focus on inherent discrepancies through carefully designed statistical features, offer improved generalization and interpretability. Despite this, existing training-free detection methods typically rely on global text sequence statistics, neglecting the modeling of local discriminative features, thereby limiting their detection efficacy. In this work, we introduce a novel training-free detector, termed Lastde that synergizes local and global statistics for enhanced detection. For the first time, we introduce time series analysis to LLM-generated text detection, capturing the temporal dynamics of token probability sequences. By integrating these local statistics with global ones, our detector reveals significant disparities between human and LLM-generated texts. We also propose an efficient alternative, Lastde++ to enable real-time detection. Extensive experiments on six datasets involving cross-domain, cross-model, and cross-lingual detection scenarios, under both white-box and black-box settings, demonstrated that our method consistently achieves state-of-the-art performance. Furthermore, our approach exhibits greater robustness against paraphrasing attacks compared to existing baseline methods.

Recent advancements in image synthesis, particularly with the advent of GAN and Diffusion models, have amplified public concerns regarding the dissemination of disinformation. To address such concerns, numerous AI-generated Image (AIGI) Detectors have been proposed and achieved promising performance in identifying fake images. However, there still lacks a systematic understanding of the adversarial robustness of AIGI detectors. In this paper, we examine the vulnerability of state-of-the-art AIGI detectors against adversarial attack under white-box and black-box settings, which has been rarely investigated so far. To this end, we propose a new method to attack AIGI detectors. First, inspired by the obvious difference between real images and fake images in the frequency domain, we add perturbations under the frequency domain to push the image away from its original frequency distribution. Second, we explore the full posterior distribution of the surrogate model to further narrow this gap between heterogeneous AIGI detectors, e.g., transferring adversarial examples across CNNs and ViTs. This is achieved by introducing a novel post-train Bayesian strategy that turns a single surrogate into a Bayesian one, capable of simulating diverse victim models using one pre-trained surrogate, without the need for re-training. We name our method as Frequency-based Post-train Bayesian Attack, or FPBA. Through FPBA, we demonstrate that adversarial attacks pose a real threat to AIGI detectors. FPBA can deliver successful black-box attacks across various detectors, generators, defense methods, and even evade cross-generator and compressed image detection, which are crucial real-world detection scenarios. Our code is available at https://github.com/onotoa/fpba.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown the ability to produce fluent and cogent content, presenting both productivity opportunities and societal risks. To build trustworthy AI systems, it is imperative to distinguish between machine-generated and human-authored content. The leading zero-shot detector, DetectGPT, showcases commendable performance but is marred by its intensive computational costs. In this paper, we introduce the concept of conditional probability curvature to elucidate discrepancies in word choices between LLMs and humans within a given context. Utilizing this curvature as a foundational metric, we present **Fast-DetectGPT**, an optimized zero-shot detector, which substitutes DetectGPT's perturbation step with a more efficient sampling step. Our evaluations on various datasets, source models, and test conditions indicate that Fast-DetectGPT not only surpasses DetectGPT by a relative around 75% in both the white-box and black-box settings but also accelerates the detection process by a factor of 340, as detailed in Table 1. See https://github.com/baoguangsheng/fast-detect-gpt for code, data, and results.

We present Malafide, a universal adversarial attack against automatic speaker verification (ASV) spoofing countermeasures (CMs). By introducing convolutional noise using an optimised linear time-invariant filter, Malafide attacks can be used to compromise CM reliability while preserving other speech attributes such as quality and the speaker's voice. In contrast to other adversarial attacks proposed recently, Malafide filters are optimised independently of the input utterance and duration, are tuned instead to the underlying spoofing attack, and require the optimisation of only a small number of filter coefficients. Even so, they degrade CM performance estimates by an order of magnitude, even in black-box settings, and can also be configured to overcome integrated CM and ASV subsystems. Integrated solutions that use self-supervised learning CMs, however, are more robust, under both black-box and white-box settings.

In recent years, as various realistic face forgery techniques known as DeepFake improves by leaps and bounds,more and more DeepFake detection techniques have been proposed. These methods typically rely on detecting statistical differences between natural (i.e., real) and DeepFakegenerated images in both spatial and frequency domains. In this work, we propose to explicitly minimize the statistical differences to evade state-of-the-art DeepFake detectors. To this end, we propose a statistical consistency attack (StatAttack) against DeepFake detectors, which contains two main parts. First, we select several statistical-sensitive natural degradations (i.e., exposure, blur, and noise) and add them to the fake images in an adversarial way. Second, we find that the statistical differences between natural and DeepFake images are positively associated with the distribution shifting between the two kinds of images, and we propose to use a distribution-aware loss to guide the optimization of different degradations. As a result, the feature distributions of generated adversarial examples is close to the natural images.Furthermore, we extend the StatAttack to a more powerful version, MStatAttack, where we extend the single-layer degradation to multi-layer degradations sequentially and use the loss to tune the combination weights jointly. Comprehensive experimental results on four spatial-based detectors and two frequency-based detectors with four datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attack method in both white-box and black-box settings.

Diffusion models have attracted attention in recent years as innovative generative models. In this paper, we investigate whether a diffusion model is resistant to a membership inference attack, which evaluates the privacy leakage of a machine learning model. We primarily discuss the diffusion model from the standpoints of comparison with a generative adversarial network (GAN) as conventional models and hyperparameters unique to the diffusion model, i.e., time steps, sampling steps, and sampling variances. We conduct extensive experiments with DDIM as a diffusion model and DCGAN as a GAN on the CelebA and CIFAR-10 datasets in both white-box and black-box settings and then confirm if the diffusion model is comparably resistant to a membership inference attack as GAN. Next, we demonstrate that the impact of time steps is significant and intermediate steps in a noise schedule are the most vulnerable to the attack. We also found two key insights through further analysis. First, we identify that DDIM is vulnerable to the attack for small sample sizes instead of achieving a lower FID. Second, sampling steps in hyperparameters are important for resistance to the attack, whereas the impact of sampling variances is quite limited.

Deep learning offers state of the art solutions for image recognition. However, deep models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations in images that are subtle but significantly change the model's prediction. In a white-box attack, these perturbations are generally learned for deep models that operate on RGB images and, hence, the perturbations are equally distributed in the RGB color space. In this paper, we show that the adversarial perturbations prevail in the Y-channel of the YCbCr space. Our finding is motivated from the fact that the human vision and deep models are more responsive to shape and texture rather than color. Based on our finding, we propose a defense against adversarial images. Our defence, coined ResUpNet, removes perturbations only from the Y-channel by exploiting ResNet features in an upsampling framework without the need for a bottleneck. At the final stage, the untouched CbCr-channels are combined with the refined Y-channel to restore the clean image. Note that ResUpNet is model agnostic as it does not modify the DNN structure. ResUpNet is trained end-to-end in Pytorch and the results are compared to existing defence techniques in the input transformation category. Our results show that our approach achieves the best balance between defence against adversarial attacks such as FGSM, PGD and DDN and maintaining the original accuracies of VGG-16, ResNet50 and DenseNet121 on clean images. We perform another experiment to show that learning adversarial perturbations only for the Y-channel results in higher fooling rates for the same perturbation magnitude.