Daily Papers

Drone fleets with onboard cameras coupled with computer vision and DNN inferencing models can support diverse applications. One such novel domain is for one or more buddy drones to assist Visually Impaired People (VIPs) lead an active lifestyle. Video inferencing tasks from such drones can help both navigate the drone and provide situation awareness to the VIP, and hence have strict execution deadlines. We propose a deadline-driven heuristic, DEMS-A, to schedule diverse DNN tasks generated continuously to perform inferencing over video segments generated by multiple drones linked to an edge, with the option to execute on the cloud. We use strategies like task dropping, work stealing and migration, and dynamic adaptation to cloud variability, to guarantee a Quality of Service (QoS), i.e. maximize the utility and the number of tasks completed. We also introduce an additional Quality of Experience (QoE) metric useful to the assistive drone domain, which values the frequency of success for task types to ensure the responsiveness and reliability of the VIP application. We extend our DEMS solution to GEMS to solve this. We evaluate these strategies, using (i) an emulated setup of a fleet of over 80 drones supporting over 25 VIPs, with real DNN models executing on pre-recorded drone video streams, using Jetson Nano edges and AWS Lambda cloud functions, and (ii) a real-world setup of a Tello drone and a Jetson Orin Nano edge generating drone commands to follow a VIP in real-time. Our strategies present a task completion rate of up to 88%, up to 2.7x higher QoS utility compared to the baselines, a further 16% higher QoS utility while adapting to network variability, and up to 75% higher QoE utility. Our practical validation exhibits task completion of up to 87% for GEMS and 33% higher total utility of GEMS compared to edge-only.

AI agents execute tens to hundreds of chained LLM calls per task, yet GPU schedulers treat each call as independent, discarding gigabytes of intermediate state between steps and inflating end-to-end latency by 3-8x. We argue that this request-level abstraction is fundamentally mismatched to compound AI workloads, and propose a shift to program-level scheduling: treating the entire agent workflow (not individual inference calls) as the first-class schedulable unit. We present SAGA, a distributed scheduler that implements this abstraction through three mechanisms: (1) Agent Execution Graphs that capture workflow structure to predict KV cache reuse across tool-call boundaries, achieving within 1.31x of Bélády's optimal offline policy; (2) session-affinity batching with work stealing that co-locates correlated requests while maintaining global load balance; and (3) Agent Fair Share, a task-completion-time fairness metric with provable bounded-deviation guarantees. On a 64-GPU cluster serving SWE-bench coding agents and WebArena browser tasks, SAGA reduces task completion time by 1.64x (geometric mean, p < 0.001) over vLLM v0.15.1 with prefix caching and affinity routing, while improving GPU memory utilization by 1.22x and achieving 99.2% SLO attainment under multi-tenant interference. These latency gains come at a quantified cost: approximately 30% lower peak throughput than throughput-optimal batch scheduling, a tradeoff appropriate for the latency-sensitive interactive deployments that dominate compound AI usage. Our results demonstrate that workflow-aware scheduling is essential for efficient compound AI serving.

LLM watermarking has attracted attention as a promising way to detect AI-generated content, with some works suggesting that current schemes may already be fit for deployment. In this work we dispute this claim, identifying watermark stealing (WS) as a fundamental vulnerability of these schemes. We show that querying the API of the watermarked LLM to approximately reverse-engineer a watermark enables practical spoofing attacks, as hypothesized in prior work, but also greatly boosts scrubbing attacks, which was previously unnoticed. We are the first to propose an automated WS algorithm and use it in the first comprehensive study of spoofing and scrubbing in realistic settings. We show that for under $50 an attacker can both spoof and scrub state-of-the-art schemes previously considered safe, with average success rate of over 80%. Our findings challenge common beliefs about LLM watermarking, stressing the need for more robust schemes. We make all our code and additional examples available at https://watermark-stealing.org.

Aligning language models (LMs) with human preferences has become a key area of research, enabling these models to meet diverse user needs better. Inspired by weak-to-strong generalization, where a strong LM fine-tuned on labels generated by a weaker model can consistently outperform its weak supervisor, we extend this idea to model alignment. In this work, we observe that the alignment behavior in weaker models can be effectively transferred to stronger models and even exhibit an amplification effect. Based on this insight, we propose a method called Weak-to-Strong Preference Optimization (WSPO), which achieves strong model alignment by learning the distribution differences before and after the alignment of the weak model. Experiments demonstrate that WSPO delivers outstanding performance, improving the win rate of Qwen2-7B-Instruct on Arena-Hard from 39.70 to 49.60, achieving a remarkable 47.04 length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval 2, and scoring 7.33 on MT-bench. Our results suggest that using the weak model to elicit a strong model with a high alignment ability is feasible.

When large language models are trained on private data, it can be a significant privacy risk for them to memorize and regurgitate sensitive information. In this work, we propose a new practical data extraction attack that we call "neural phishing". This attack enables an adversary to target and extract sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII), e.g., credit card numbers, from a model trained on user data with upwards of 10% attack success rates, at times, as high as 50%. Our attack assumes only that an adversary can insert as few as 10s of benign-appearing sentences into the training dataset using only vague priors on the structure of the user data.

Malicious server (MS) attacks have enabled the scaling of data stealing in federated learning to large batch sizes and secure aggregation, settings previously considered private. However, many concerns regarding client-side detectability of MS attacks were raised, questioning their practicality once they are publicly known. In this work, for the first time, we thoroughly study the problem of client-side detectability.We demonstrate that most prior MS attacks, which fundamentally rely on one of two key principles, are detectable by principled client-side checks. Further, we formulate desiderata for practical MS attacks and propose SEER, a novel attack framework that satisfies all desiderata, while stealing user data from gradients of realistic networks, even for large batch sizes (up to 512 in our experiments) and under secure aggregation. The key insight of SEER is the use of a secret decoder, which is jointly trained with the shared model. Our work represents a promising first step towards more principled treatment of MS attacks, paving the way for realistic data stealing that can compromise user privacy in real-world deployments.

We introduce the first model-stealing attack that extracts precise, nontrivial information from black-box production language models like OpenAI's ChatGPT or Google's PaLM-2. Specifically, our attack recovers the embedding projection layer (up to symmetries) of a transformer model, given typical API access. For under \20 USD, our attack extracts the entire projection matrix of OpenAI's Ada and Babbage language models. We thereby confirm, for the first time, that these black-box models have a hidden dimension of 1024 and 2048, respectively. We also recover the exact hidden dimension size of the gpt-3.5-turbo model, and estimate it would cost under 2,000 in queries to recover the entire projection matrix. We conclude with potential defenses and mitigations, and discuss the implications of possible future work that could extend our attack.

Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus mechanism is popular among current blockchain systems, which leads to an increasing concern about the tremendous waste of energy due to massive meaningless computation. To address this issue, we propose a novel and energy-efficient blockchain system, CrowdMine, which exploits useful crowdsourcing computation to achieve decentralized consensus. CrowdMine solves user-proposed computing tasks and utilizes the computation committed to the task solving process to secure decentralized on-chain storage. With our designed ``Proof of Crowdsourcing Work'' (PoCW) protocol, our system provides an efficient paradigm for computation and storage in a trustless and decentralized environment. We further show that the system can defend against potential attacks on blockchain, including the short-term 51\% attack, the problem-constructing attack, and the solution-stealing attack. We also implement the system with 40 distributed nodes to demonstrate its performance and robustness. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first system that enables decentralized Proof of Useful Work (PoUW) with general user-proposed tasks posted in a permissionless and trustless network.

Despite tremendous success in many application scenarios, the training and inference costs of using deep learning are also rapidly increasing over time. The lottery ticket hypothesis (LTH) emerges as a promising framework to leverage a special sparse subnetwork (i.e., winning ticket) instead of a full model for both training and inference, that can lower both costs without sacrificing the performance. The main resource bottleneck of LTH is however the extraordinary cost to find the sparse mask of the winning ticket. That makes the found winning ticket become a valuable asset to the owners, highlighting the necessity of protecting its copyright. Our setting adds a new dimension to the recently soaring interest in protecting against the intellectual property (IP) infringement of deep models and verifying their ownerships, since they take owners' massive/unique resources to develop or train. While existing methods explored encrypted weights or predictions, we investigate a unique way to leverage sparse topological information to perform lottery verification, by developing several graph-based signatures that can be embedded as credentials. By further combining trigger set-based methods, our proposal can work in both white-box and black-box verification scenarios. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate the effectiveness of lottery verification in diverse models (ResNet-20, ResNet-18, ResNet-50) on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Specifically, our verification is shown to be robust to removal attacks such as model fine-tuning and pruning, as well as several ambiguity attacks. Our codes are available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/NO-stealing-LTH.

For nearly a decade the academic community has investigated backdoors in neural networks, primarily focusing on classification tasks where adversaries manipulate the model prediction. While demonstrably malicious, the immediate real-world impact of such prediction-altering attacks has remained unclear. In this paper we introduce a novel and significantly more potent class of backdoors that builds upon recent advancements in architectural backdoors. We demonstrate how these backdoors can be specifically engineered to exploit batched inference, a common technique for hardware utilization, enabling large-scale user data manipulation and theft. By targeting the batching process, these architectural backdoors facilitate information leakage between concurrent user requests and allow attackers to fully control model responses directed at other users within the same batch. In other words, an attacker who can change the model architecture can set and steal model inputs and outputs of other users within the same batch. We show that such attacks are not only feasible but also alarmingly effective, can be readily injected into prevalent model architectures, and represent a truly malicious threat to user privacy and system integrity. Critically, to counteract this new class of vulnerabilities, we propose a deterministic mitigation strategy that provides formal guarantees against this new attack vector, unlike prior work that relied on Large Language Models to find the backdoors. Our mitigation strategy employs a novel Information Flow Control mechanism that analyzes the model graph and proves non-interference between different user inputs within the same batch. Using our mitigation strategy we perform a large scale analysis of models hosted through Hugging Face and find over 200 models that introduce (unintended) information leakage between batch entries due to the use of dynamic quantization.