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| title: GreenProof Verification | |
| emoji: 🌳 | |
| colorFrom: green | |
| colorTo: gray | |
| sdk: docker | |
| app_port: 7860 | |
| pinned: false | |
| # GreenProof verification service | |
| Scores a tree check-in and writes back a confidence, a verdict and a per-signal | |
| breakdown. The only server-side surface in the stack. | |
| ## Why this exists | |
| Everything else in GreenProof is Supabase called directly from the browser. This | |
| service exists for one reason: **a client-computed verification result is | |
| forgeable.** The anon key ships inside the PWA and must be assumed public, so | |
| `confidence`, `verdict` and `signals` are not granted to `authenticated` at the | |
| column level. This process holds the only key that can write them. | |
| `POST /score` takes an id and nothing else. Every input is re-read from the | |
| database and from storage — a caller can ask for a check-in to be scored, but | |
| can never influence what the score is. | |
| ## Endpoints | |
| | Method | Path | Purpose | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | GET | `/health` | liveness, model-loaded, config present | | |
| | POST | `/score` | score one check-in — `{"checkin_id": "..."}` | | |
| | POST | `/advise` | species + care advice — **advisory, never a verdict** | | |
| | POST | `/backfill?limit=50` | score everything still `pending` | | |
| | GET | `/docs` | interactive OpenAPI | | |
| `/advise` is the only endpoint that is not verification. It writes | |
| `species_guess` and `advice` and cannot touch `confidence`, `verdict` or | |
| `signals` — enforced by column grants, and by `pipeline.py` never importing the | |
| advisor. It is also the only endpoint that **spends money** (~3 cents a call), | |
| which is why it can be locked behind `ADVISE_TOKEN`. | |
| ## How a check-in is judged | |
| **Stage 1 — gates.** Disqualifying on their own, run before any scoring. | |
| | Gate | Catches | | |
| |---|---| | |
| | duplicate image (pHash) | resubmitted photo, gallery photo, internet photo | | |
| | GPS radius | right tree, wrong place | | |
| | travel speed | one account submitting from two impossible places | | |
| **Stage 2 — scores.** Continuous 0–1 signals, weighted into a confidence. | |
| | Score | Signal | | |
| |---|---| | |
| | location | distance from the registered point | | |
| | liveness | excess-green vegetation fraction | | |
| | scene match | DINOv2 cosine + ORB/RANSAC inliers vs previous visits | | |
| | growth | canopy and trunk plausibility, not measurement | | |
| Five of the six fraud types in our attack set are caught in stage 1 by ordinary | |
| deterministic code. That is the honest reason the system works, and it is why | |
| overall accuracy is much better than the 54% rank-1 of image matching alone. | |
| ## Honest limits | |
| - Image matching is **corroboration, not identity**. Measured on our own 15 | |
| plants: rank-1 54% against 5% chance, AUC 0.77 — real signal, nowhere near | |
| enough to authorise a payout. It is **bimodal**: near-perfect on distinctive | |
| trees, near-zero inside a dense same-species stand. | |
| - Wide-shot matching works partly off the **background**, not the tree. | |
| - Young bark is smooth; BarkNet's ~94% figures are on **mature** bark. | |
| - Thresholds and weights in `scoring.py` are **provisional**. They are replaced | |
| by weights fitted under leave-one-tree-out cross-validation once real rounds | |
| exist. Nothing is tuned on the data used to report performance. | |
| - A missing signal lowers confidence and routes to a human. It never counts as | |
| zero, and it never fails closed on a genuine visit. Designed to degrade. | |
| ## Configuration | |
| Space → Settings → Variables and secrets: | |
| | Name | Kind | Value | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `SUPABASE_URL` | variable | your project URL | | |
| | `SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY` | **secret** | the `service_role` key | | |
| | `GEMINI_API_KEY` | **secret** | for `/advise` — free tier, the default provider | | |
| | `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` | **secret** | alternative provider, used only if no Gemini key | | |
| | `ADVISOR_PROVIDER` | variable | optional: pin to `gemini` or `anthropic` | | |
| | `ADVISE_TOKEN` | **secret** | any random string; required in `X-Advise-Token` on `/advise` | | |
| | `ALLOWED_ORIGINS` | variable | your Vercel URL | | |
| **The service key must never appear in the frontend.** It can write any verdict | |
| for any tree, and it is the value the whole security model rests on. | |
| **Two providers, one interface.** Advice runs on Gemini's free tier by default, | |
| and falls back to Anthropic if only that key is present. Free tiers have closed | |
| under this project three times mid-build, so a second provider is the cheapest | |
| insurance against a fourth — and switching is one environment variable, not a | |
| code change. | |
| **Setting neither is a supported state, not a failure:** `/score` is unaffected | |
| and `/advise` returns `{"written": false}`. The advisory layer fails soft by | |
| design so it can never take verification down with it. | |
| **`ADVISE_TOKEN` matters on a public Space.** Without it, anyone who finds this | |
| URL and a valid check-in id can spend your Anthropic credit three cents at a | |
| time. `/score` needs no such lock: it costs only our own CPU. | |
| ## Local run | |
| ``` | |
| cd ml | |
| pip install -r requirements.txt | |
| export SUPABASE_URL=... SUPABASE_SERVICE_KEY=... | |
| uvicorn app:app --reload --port 7860 | |
| ``` | |