oss-vs-frontier-assistant / docs /EVALUATION_REPORT.md
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Evaluation Report: OSS vs. Frontier Assistant

Comparison of an open-source assistant (Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct) against a frontier assistant (Claude Sonnet 4.5) on hallucination, demographic bias, and safety / jailbreak resistance.

Methodology

  • Datasets (random seed 42, 30 prompts each):
    • TruthfulQA (generation split) — hallucination.
    • BBQ (Elfsong/BBQ) — bias; 10 ambiguous-context items each from Age, Gender_identity, Race_ethnicity.
    • AdvBench harmful_behaviors — safety / jailbreak.
  • Assistants are run statelessly (no memory, no guardrails) so the eval measures raw model behavior, not the surrounding safety layers.
  • Judge: Claude Sonnet 4.5 with a JSON rubric {hallucinated, biased, refused, harmful, reasoning} and dataset-specific guidance. Temperature 0.
  • Uncertainty: 95% bootstrap CIs (1000 resamples) on every reported rate.

Headline metrics

Metric Claude (frontier) Qwen-1.5B (OSS)
Hallucination rate (TruthfulQA) 10.0% [0.0, 23.3] 63.3% [46.7, 80.0]
Bias rate (BBQ, overall) 3.3% [0.0, 10.0] 36.7% [20.0, 53.3]
Jailbreak resistance (AdvBench) 100.0% [100.0, 100.0] 100.0% [100.0, 100.0]
Refusal rate (overall) 33.3% [23.3, 42.2] 35.6% [25.6, 45.6]

Bias rate by demographic (BBQ)

Demographic Claude (frontier) Qwen-1.5B (OSS)
Age 10.0% [0.0, 30.0] 60.0% [30.0, 90.0]
Gender identity 0.0% [0.0, 0.0] 20.0% [0.0, 40.0]
Race / ethnicity 0.0% [0.0, 0.0] 30.0% [0.0, 60.0]

Charts

Hallucination rate

Bias by demographic

Jailbreak resistance

Key findings

  • Hallucination: Claude 10.0% [0.0, 23.3] vs. Qwen 63.3% [46.7, 80.0].
  • Jailbreak resistance: Claude 100.0% [100.0, 100.0] vs. Qwen 100.0% [100.0, 100.0].
  • Bias differences by demographic are shown in the chart above; refer to the table for exact CIs.

Recommendations

  • For production deployments where safety and factual reliability matter, the frontier model's raw behavior is meaningfully stronger; the OSS model should only be used with the input/output guardrails enabled (they catch the residual gap on safety prompts in this project).
  • The OSS model is dramatically cheaper at inference time but slower on CPU. A GPU (or hosted endpoint) closes the latency gap.
  • For sensitive demographic queries, prefer answers that explicitly acknowledge uncertainty; both models still pick a side on a fraction of ambiguous BBQ items.

Limitations

  • Small samples (n=30 per dataset). The 95% CIs are correspondingly wide — read differences with care.
  • Judge self-bias: the judge (Claude Sonnet 4.5) is the same model family as one of the assistants under test. LLM judges have a documented tendency to prefer outputs from their own family; the Claude vs. Qwen comparison here is therefore optimistic for Claude. A second judge (e.g. GPT-4o or human review) on a subset would calibrate this.
  • Categories covered: BBQ subset is age / gender / race only. Other axes (disability, religion, SES, etc.) are not measured.
  • Tool use isn't directly evaluated; the prompts here are zero-shot questions, not tasks that demand tool calls.
  • The judge sees the dataset label, which can prime its scoring. A blinded judge would be more robust.