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| /** | |
| * Strip an IPv4-mapped IPv6 prefix so comparisons work consistently. | |
| * Node often reports socket addresses as `::ffff:1.2.3.4` behind dual-stack | |
| * listeners; this returns the bare `1.2.3.4`. | |
| */ | |
| export function normalizeIp(ip: string): string { | |
| if (!ip) return ip; | |
| const match = ip.match(/^::ffff:(\d{1,3}(?:\.\d{1,3}){3})$/i); | |
| return match ? match[1] : ip; | |
| } | |
| /** Minimal request shape needed for client-IP resolution (framework-agnostic). */ | |
| export interface RequestLike { | |
| ip?: string; | |
| socket?: { remoteAddress?: string }; | |
| headers: Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>; | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * Resolve the real client IP. X-Forwarded-For is client-controllable, so it is only | |
| * honored when the request actually arrives from a configured trusted proxy. With no | |
| * trusted proxies, the direct socket address is used (prevents XFF spoofing). Shared by | |
| * ApiKeyGuard (allowedIps whitelist) and the throttler (per-client rate-limit bucket). | |
| */ | |
| export function resolveClientIp(req: RequestLike, trustedProxies: string[]): string { | |
| const socketIp = normalizeIp(req.socket?.remoteAddress || req.ip || ''); | |
| if (!trustedProxies || trustedProxies.length === 0) { | |
| return socketIp; | |
| } | |
| const isTrusted = (ip: string): boolean => trustedProxies.some(proxy => ipMatches(ip, proxy)); | |
| // Only trust the forwarded chain if the immediate peer is a trusted proxy. | |
| if (!isTrusted(socketIp)) { | |
| return socketIp; | |
| } | |
| const forwarded = req.headers['x-forwarded-for']; | |
| if (!forwarded) { | |
| return socketIp; | |
| } | |
| const hops = (Array.isArray(forwarded) ? forwarded.join(',') : forwarded) | |
| .split(',') | |
| .map(hop => normalizeIp(hop.trim())) | |
| .filter(Boolean); | |
| // Walk right-to-left and return the first hop that is not a trusted proxy: | |
| // the closest address the trusted infrastructure actually observed. | |
| for (let i = hops.length - 1; i >= 0; i--) { | |
| if (!isTrusted(hops[i])) { | |
| return hops[i]; | |
| } | |
| } | |
| return socketIp; | |
| } | |
| function ipv4ToInt(ip: string): number | null { | |
| const parts = ip.split('.'); | |
| if (parts.length !== 4) return null; | |
| let result = 0; | |
| for (const part of parts) { | |
| if (!/^\d{1,3}$/.test(part)) return null; | |
| const octet = Number(part); | |
| if (octet > 255) return null; | |
| result = result * 256 + octet; | |
| } | |
| return result >>> 0; | |
| } | |
| /** | |
| * True if `ip` equals or falls within `target`, where `target` is either an | |
| * exact IP or an IPv4 CIDR (e.g. `172.18.0.0/16`). IPv4-mapped IPv6 inputs are | |
| * normalized first. Malformed input yields `false` rather than throwing. | |
| */ | |
| export function ipMatches(ip: string, target: string): boolean { | |
| const candidate = normalizeIp((ip || '').trim()); | |
| const ref = (target || '').trim(); | |
| if (!ref.includes('/')) { | |
| return normalizeIp(ref) === candidate; | |
| } | |
| const [range, bitsRaw] = ref.split('/'); | |
| const bits = Number(bitsRaw); | |
| if (!Number.isInteger(bits) || bits < 0 || bits > 32) return false; | |
| const ipInt = ipv4ToInt(candidate); | |
| const rangeInt = ipv4ToInt(normalizeIp(range)); | |
| if (ipInt === null || rangeInt === null) return false; | |
| if (bits === 0) return true; | |
| const mask = (0xffffffff << (32 - bits)) >>> 0; | |
| return (ipInt & mask) === (rangeInt & mask); | |
| } | |