| # SWF classification rubric (haircut factors for sovereignFiscalBuffer) |
|
|
| Central rubric for classifying sovereign wealth funds under the |
| resilience `sovereignFiscalBuffer` dimension. Supports |
| `scripts/shared/swf-classification-manifest.yaml`. |
|
|
| Every fund in the manifest has three coefficients in its |
| `classification:` block: |
|
|
| ```yaml |
| classification: |
| access: 0..1 |
| liquidity: 0..1 |
| transparency: 0..1 |
| ``` |
|
|
| These multiply together to form the haircut the scorer applies when |
| computing effective SWF months of reserve coverage: |
|
|
| ``` |
| effectiveMonths = rawSwfMonths Γ access Γ liquidity Γ transparency |
| score = 100 Γ (1 β exp(βeffectiveMonths / 12)) |
| ``` |
|
|
| This doc defines **what each coefficient value means** with named |
| tiers + concrete precedents, so: |
|
|
| 1. Every rating in the manifest is defensible by pointing to a |
| tier + precedent. |
| 2. Future manifest PRs that add or revise ratings have an explicit |
| benchmark to evaluate against. |
| 3. A reviewer can audit the manifest without re-deriving the |
| rubric from first principles each time. |
|
|
| **Scope boundary.** This is a methodology doc, not a ground-truth |
| table. The coefficient values live in the manifest YAML; the |
| rubric here explains the semantic tiers those values live on. |
| Revising a fund's rating is a manifest-YAML edit cited against a |
| tier here, not a rubric edit. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Axis 1 β Access |
|
|
| "How directly can the state deploy fund assets into budget support |
| during a fiscal shock?" |
|
|
| Operationalized as a combination of legal mechanism (is there a |
| withdrawal rule?), political clarity (who authorizes deployment?), |
| and historical precedent (has deployment actually happened?). |
| Deployment SPEED (weeks vs months vs years) is the core signal. |
|
|
| | Tier | Value | Meaning | Concrete precedents | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | Nil access | **0.1** | Sanctions, asset freeze, or political paralysis makes deployment effectively impossible within a crisis window | Russia NWF (post-2022 asset freeze), Libya LIA (sanctions + frozen assets), Iran NDFI (sanctions + access concerns). Currently deferred from v1 for this reason. | |
| | Statutorily-gated long-horizon | **0.20** | Withdrawals require statutory supermajority / bicameral-equivalent action; gate has been crossed in extreme cases (single, capped draw under emergency law) but NOT for ordinary stabilization. Distinct from "Intergenerational savings" (0.3) because the gate is *statutory* rather than ruler-discretionary β Council-of-Ministers + parliamentary or constitutional thresholds replace head-of-state direction. | KIA Future Generations Fund (Decree 106 of 1976; Council-of-Ministers + Emir decree required; gate crossed once during COVID for a small capped draw). Phase 1B addition (Plan 2026-04-25-001). | |
| | Intergenerational savings | **0.3** | Pure long-horizon wealth-preservation mandate; no explicit stabilization rule; withdrawal requires ruler / head-of-state / parliamentary discretion with no codified trigger | ADIA (Abu Dhabi, intergenerational mandate, ruler-discretionary); Brunei BIA (deferred candidate) | |
| | Hybrid / constrained | **0.5** | Mandate mixes strategic + savings + partial stabilization; deployment is mechanically possible but constrained by strategic allocation locked to policy objectives (Vision 2030, industrial policy, geopolitical holdings) | PIF (Saudi Arabia, Vision 2030-locked), QIA (Qatar, long-horizon wealth-management with amiri-decree deployment), Mubadala (UAE, strategic + financial hybrid), Ireland ISIF (strategic-development mandate) | |
| | Explicit stabilization with rule | **0.7** | Legislated or rule-based mechanism for fiscal support during specific shock classes, with historical precedent of actual deployment | KIA General Reserve Fund (legislated finance of budget shortfalls from oil-revenue swings). NO GPFG is BORDERLINE β has a fiscal rule capping withdrawal at ~3% expected real return, which is an access MECHANISM but also an access CONSTRAINT (see below). NOTE: GIC is discussed in the alignment table below as a candidate for this tier based on its NIRC framework, but the current manifest rates it 0.6 β so it's a 0.7 *candidate*, not a 0.7 *precedent*. | |
| | Pure automatic stabilization | **0.9** | Deployment triggers automatically when a named macro signal crosses a threshold; stabilization is the primary mandate; political authorization is post-hoc or symbolic | Chile ESSF (deploys when copper revenue falls below a rule-based target); deferred v1 candidate | |
|
|
| ### Edge case β fiscal-rule caps |
|
|
| A fiscal rule like Norway's ~3%-of-expected-real-return withdrawal |
| cap creates an ambiguous access signal: |
|
|
| - **Positive direction**: the rule makes access PREDICTABLE and |
| mechanically available for budget support every year, without |
| political negotiation. |
| - **Negative direction**: the rule CAPS how much can be tapped, |
| so in a severe shock the fund cannot be liquidated beyond the |
| rule. The mechanism protects the savings against panic but |
| rate-limits the stabilization function. |
|
|
| **Rubric treatment**: fiscal-rule-capped funds sit at the 0.5-0.7 |
| boundary. Norway's GPFG at 0.6 (current manifest value) is |
| defensible as "between hybrid-constrained and rule-based |
| stabilization." |
|
|
| ### Edge case β state holding companies |
|
|
| Temasek-style state-holding-company assets can be deployed for |
| fiscal support only via DIVIDEND FLOW, not via primary-asset |
| liquidation (which would disrupt portfolio companies). This |
| mechanism is slow (dividends are typically annual) and bounded |
| (can't exceed portfolio earnings in a shock year). Rubric |
| treatment: 0.3-0.4 tier, NOT the 0.5 hybrid tier β the |
| mechanical deployment path is materially slower than QIA's |
| amiri-decree route. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Axis 2 β Liquidity |
|
|
| "What share of the fund's AUM is in listed public markets and |
| thus liquidatable within days/weeks without fire-sale discount?" |
|
|
| Operationalized as (public equities + listed fixed income + |
| cash) Γ· total AUM, per the fund's most recent published asset |
| mix. When the disclosure is a range (ADIA publishes 55-70%, not |
| an exact ratio), the rubric uses the **upper-bound** of the |
| range β the fund's own public statement is that it COULD be up |
| to that figure, and haircut factors are designed to reward |
| disclosed LIQUIDITY CAPACITY, not the conservative worst case. |
| ADIA's 70% upper bound lands in the 0.7 tier (65-85%); if |
| future ADIA disclosures tighten the range so the upper bound |
| drops below 65%, the rubric directs the rating to 0.5. |
|
|
| | Tier | Value | Meaning | Concrete precedents | |
| |---|---|---|---| |
| | Illiquid-strategic dominant | **0.1** | Primarily domestic strategic holdings + policy banks + political stakes; < 30% public-market. No v1 fund sits here; reserved for future outliers | β (aspirational floor) | |
| | Private + illiquid majority | **0.3** | 30-50% public-market; majority in private equity, real estate, infrastructure, or strategic holdings | PIF (estimated ~40% public, dominated by Aramco + domestic megaprojects). Current manifest values PIF liquidity = 0.4 β AT BOUNDARY, defensible under either 0.3 or 0.5 tier | |
| | Mid-liquid mix | **0.5** | 50-65% public-market with material private sleeve | Mubadala (~50/50 per 2024 annual report); Temasek (~50% listed, ~50% unlisted per Temasek Review 2025); QIA (~60% public) β note current manifest QIA = 0.6, at the boundary of 0.5 and 0.7 tiers | |
| | Majority public | **0.7** | 65-85% public-market with modest private allocation | ADIA (55-70% public-market range per 2024 review, balance in alternatives + real assets) | |
| | Predominantly liquid | **0.9** | 85-95% public-market with modest cash + short-duration sleeves | KIA (~75-85% listed equities + fixed income β boundary 0.7/0.9, current manifest = 0.8); GIC (~90% public per 2024/25 annual report) | |
| | Fully liquid | **1.0** | 100% listed public markets β equities + fixed income + listed real estate. No private at all | GPFG (NBIM 2025 β 100% listed, no private markets) | |
|
|
| ### Edge case β listed real estate |
|
|
| GPFG's listed real estate counts toward its liquidity score; PIF's |
| direct real estate holdings do NOT. The distinction matters for |
| boundary calls (0.7 vs 0.9): listed = liquidatable daily; |
| directly-owned = months to sell at disclosed valuations. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Axis 3 β Transparency |
|
|
| "How well-documented is the fund's governance + financials?" |
|
|
| Operationalized as the Linaburg-Maduell (LM) Transparency Index |
| score, normalized against IFSWF membership status and the |
| granularity of the fund's annual reporting. |
|
|
| The LM index is a 10-point scale (1 = lowest, 10 = highest). IFSWF |
| membership is binary (member / observer / non-member). Annual-report |
| granularity gates tier promotion independently of LM/IFSWF. |
|
|
| | Tier | Value | Meaning | LM benchmark | Concrete precedents | |
| |---|---|---|---|---| |
| | Opaque | **0.1** | No public AUM, no governance reporting, no LM score | LM β€ 1 | Deferred candidates: BIA (Brunei) if LM pins at the floor post-audit | |
| | Partial disclosure | **0.3** | Governance structure published but AUM undisclosed; no asset-mix disclosure; LM 2-4 | LM 2-4 | PIF (audited financials but line-item allocation limited; IFSWF observer not full member; LM ~4 per current manifest) | |
| | Asset-class disclosed | **0.5** | Audited AUM or published ranges, asset-class-level mix, partial IFSWF engagement | LM 5-6 | ADIA (annual review with asset-class ranges, partial IFSWF engagement, LM=6). QIA (limited public disclosure, IFSWF full member with audited filings, LM=5) β QIA currently manifest=0.4 may be marginally under-rated. KIA (LM=6, partial IFSWF engagement) currently manifest=0.4 β arguably under-rated | |
| | Audited AUM + returns | **0.7** | Audited AUM, asset-mix breakdown, benchmark-relative returns disclosed, IFSWF full member | LM 7-8 | GIC (asset-class breakdown + 20-year rolling returns, IFSWF full member, LM=8). Mubadala (audited AUM + asset-mix, IFSWF member, LM=10) β Mubadala LM=10 argues for 0.9 tier; current manifest=0.6 may be under-rated | |
| | Holdings-level | **0.9** | Full asset-class + top-holdings disclosure; regular updates; IFSWF full compliance | LM 9-10 | Temasek (audited NPV + benchmarked returns + top-20 holdings + LM=10, current manifest=0.9 β) | |
| | Full holdings-level daily | **1.0** | Daily returns disclosed, holdings-level reporting, full IFSWF compliance | LM=10 | GPFG (NBIM full audited AUM, daily returns, holdings-level reporting, LM=10, IFSWF full compliance) | |
|
|
| ### Edge case β LM score vs disclosure depth |
|
|
| The LM index measures 10 governance signals (publication of |
| financials, independent audit, public objectives, etc.). A fund |
| can score LM=10 under the index while still publishing only |
| RANGED asset-mix rather than exact holdings (Mubadala, Temasek). |
| The rubric distinguishes these cases: LM=10 + holdings-level |
| disclosure β 0.9-1.0 tier; LM=10 + asset-class-only disclosure β |
| 0.7-0.8 tier. Mubadala's current manifest 0.6 under-rates the |
| LM=10 signal against the rubric. |
|
|
| ### Edge case β sealed filings |
|
|
| KIA files detailed financials to the Kuwaiti National Assembly |
| but the filings are SEALED from public disclosure. Under the |
| rubric this sits at the 0.5 tier (asset-class disclosed + IFSWF |
| engagement) rather than the 0.3 tier (no AUM), because the AUM |
| is audited and disclosed to the oversight body β just not |
| publicly. Current manifest = 0.4 is at the 0.3/0.5 boundary. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## Current manifest Γ rubric alignment (informational, not PR-changes) |
|
|
| Reviewing each of the 8 current manifest values against the |
| rubric tiers. **This PR does NOT edit the manifest.** The |
| column "Rubric tier" shows where the rating falls under this |
| rubric; "Manifest value" is the current YAML value; "Aligned?" |
| flags whether the rating fits the rubric or looks off. |
|
|
| | Fund | Axis | Manifest value | Rubric tier | Aligned? | Notes | |
| |---|---|---:|---|---|---| |
| | GPFG (NO) | access | 0.6 | Rule-constrained stabilization (between 0.5 and 0.7) | β | Fiscal rule caps withdrawal β justifies boundary rating | |
| | GPFG (NO) | liquidity | 1.0 | Fully liquid | β | NBIM 2025 confirms 100% listed | |
| | GPFG (NO) | transparency | 1.0 | Full holdings-level daily | β | LM=10 + full IFSWF compliance | |
| | ADIA (AE) | access | 0.3 | Intergenerational savings | β | No explicit stabilization mandate; ruler-discretionary | |
| | ADIA (AE) | liquidity | 0.7 | Majority public | β | 55-70% public-market per 2024 review | |
| | ADIA (AE) | transparency | 0.5 | Asset-class disclosed | β | LM=6; IFSWF partial engagement | |
| | Mubadala (AE) | access | 0.4 | Hybrid/constrained β below 0.5 tier | β | Current 0.4 is slightly under the 0.5 tier midpoint; 2024 ADQ merger arguably strengthens case for 0.5 | |
| | Mubadala (AE) | liquidity | 0.5 | Mid-liquid mix | β | ~50/50 per 2024 report | |
| | Mubadala (AE) | transparency | 0.6 | Between 0.5 and 0.7 | β | LM=10 + IFSWF member argues for 0.7 (audited AUM + mix + returns); currently under-rated | |
| | PIF (SA) | access | 0.4 | Hybrid/constrained β below 0.5 tier | β | 0.5 tier fits the hybrid-mandate description; 0.4 is conservative. Arguable either way | |
| | PIF (SA) | liquidity | 0.4 | At 0.3/0.5 boundary | β | ~40% public-market sits at the top of 0.3 tier rather than middle of 0.5; 0.3 may be more honest | |
| | PIF (SA) | transparency | 0.3 | Partial disclosure | β | LM ~4 + IFSWF observer-only | |
| | KIA (KW) | access | 0.7 | Explicit stabilization with rule | β | General Reserve Fund's legislated budget-financing mandate is the canonical 0.7 example | |
| | KIA (KW) | liquidity | 0.8 | Between 0.7 and 0.9 | β | 75-85% listed; defensible boundary rating | |
| | KIA (KW) | transparency | 0.4 | At 0.3/0.5 boundary | β | LM=6 + IFSWF partial-engagement argues for 0.5; current 0.4 is at the boundary; 0.5 may be slightly more accurate | |
| | QIA (QA) | access | 0.4 | Hybrid/constrained β below 0.5 tier | β | Long-horizon wealth management with amiri-decree deployment. 0.5 fits the hybrid tier; 0.4 is conservative | |
| | QIA (QA) | liquidity | 0.6 | Between 0.5 and 0.7 | β | ~60% public-market sits at the tier boundary | |
| | QIA (QA) | transparency | 0.4 | At 0.3/0.5 boundary | β | LM=5 + IFSWF full member with audited filings argues for 0.5; current 0.4 is at the boundary | |
| | GIC (SG) | access | 0.6 | Rule-mechanism with NIRC | β | NIRC framework is explicit fiscal-contribution β arguably 0.7 tier (rule-based stabilization with historical precedent); current 0.6 is conservative | |
| | GIC (SG) | liquidity | 0.9 | Predominantly liquid | β | ~90% public per 2024/25 report | |
| | GIC (SG) | transparency | 0.8 | Audited AUM + returns | β | Asset-class + 20-year rolling returns; LM=8 | |
| | Temasek (SG) | access | 0.4 | State holding company β dividend-flow only | β | Mechanical deployment is dividend-bound; 0.3-0.4 tier fits | |
| | Temasek (SG) | liquidity | 0.5 | Mid-liquid mix | β | ~50% listed per 2025 Review | |
| | Temasek (SG) | transparency | 0.9 | Holdings-level | β | Top-20 exposures + LM=10 | |
|
|
| **Summary of rubric-flagged ratings** β 8 coefficients across 5 funds |
| (Mubadala Γ2, PIF Γ2, KIA Γ1, QIA Γ2, GIC Γ1) out of 24 total |
| (8 funds Γ 3 axes): |
|
|
| - Mubadala access 0.4 (arguably 0.5); transparency 0.6 (arguably 0.7) |
| - PIF access 0.4 (arguably 0.5); liquidity 0.4 (arguably 0.3) |
| - KIA transparency 0.4 (arguably 0.5) |
| - QIA access 0.4 (arguably 0.5); transparency 0.4 (arguably 0.5) |
| - GIC access 0.6 (arguably 0.7) |
|
|
| **None of these changes are made in this PR.** The flags are |
| informational β a future manifest-edit PR (PR 4b per the plan) |
| should evaluate each flag, cite the rubric tier, and either |
| confirm the current rating with a stronger rationale or revise |
| it to match the tier. |
|
|
| ### Directional impact of the flagged ratings (if revised upward) |
|
|
| - Mubadala 0.4 β 0.5 on access, 0.6 β 0.7 on transparency: the |
| access Γ transparency product moves from 0.24 to 0.35 (+46%). |
| Combined with unchanged liquidity 0.5: haircut multiplier |
| 0.12 β 0.175. UAE gains material SWF-months. |
| - PIF access 0.4 β 0.5: modest lift. PIF liquidity 0.4 β 0.3: |
| modest dampening. Net: small. |
| - KIA transparency 0.4 β 0.5: haircut multiplier 0.7Γ0.8Γ0.4 |
| = 0.224 β 0.7Γ0.8Γ0.5 = 0.28 (+25%). KW already top-quartile. |
| - QIA access 0.4 β 0.5 + transparency 0.4 β 0.5: QIA haircut |
| 0.096 β 0.15 (+56%). Material lift for QA. |
| - GIC access 0.6 β 0.7: haircut 0.432 β 0.504 (+17%). SG lift. |
|
|
| The directional impact analysis is INFORMATIONAL and should NOT |
| be treated as a decision to revise. Per the plan's anti-pattern |
| note, rubric flags shouldn't be motivated by a target ranking |
| outcome. A future manifest PR should revise ratings because the |
| rubric + cited precedents support the change, not because the |
| resulting ranking looks better. |
|
|
| --- |
|
|
| ## How to use this rubric |
|
|
| ### When adding a new fund to the manifest |
|
|
| 1. Locate each axis value on the tier table. |
| 2. Cite the tier PLUS at least one concrete precedent (annual |
| report page, LM index page, IFSWF profile URL). |
| 3. If the fund sits between two tiers, pick the lower tier and |
| explain the boundary rating in the YAML `rationale:` block. |
| 4. PR review checks: does the rationale's cited evidence actually |
| land the fund at the claimed tier? |
|
|
| ### When revising an existing fund |
|
|
| 1. Cite what EVIDENCE changed: new annual report, LM score |
| revision, IFSWF membership change, mandate amendment. |
| 2. Map the new evidence to a tier per this rubric. |
| 3. Update BOTH the coefficient AND the `rationale:` text in the |
| same PR. |
| 4. For PRs that shift multiple coefficients: run the cohort- |
| sanity audit (see `docs/methodology/cohort-sanity-release-gate.md`) |
| and publish the contribution-decomposition table for the |
| affected countries. |
|
|
| ### When the rubric itself needs revising |
|
|
| Out of scope for a manifest PR. A rubric revision requires: |
|
|
| 1. A separate methodology-decision PR citing the construct gap |
| the revision fixes (e.g., "the current rubric doesn't handle |
| state holding companies well β add a dedicated tier"). |
| 2. Re-evaluation of every existing fund under the new rubric |
| (the rubric and the manifest must stay in lockstep). |
| 3. Cohort-sanity audit snapshot before/after. |
|
|
| ## References |
|
|
| - Manifest: `scripts/shared/swf-classification-manifest.yaml` |
| - Scorer: `server/worldmonitor/resilience/v1/_dimension-scorers.ts` |
| line 1654 (`scoreSovereignFiscalBuffer`) |
| - Saturating transform: `score = 100 Γ (1 β exp(βeffectiveMonths / 12))` |
| - Linaburg-Maduell Transparency Index methodology: |
| https://www.swfinstitute.org/research/linaburg-maduell-transparency-index |
| - IFSWF member directory: https://www.ifswf.org/members |
| - Santiago Principles self-assessments: https://www.ifswf.org/santiago-principles |
|
|