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Integra World Monitor (AGPL-3.0, self-hosted) nello Space: pagina, menu, e arricchimento notizie per la AI (part 3)
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# WorldMonitor β€” Agent Authentication (auth.md)
How agents authenticate with the WorldMonitor API and MCP server
(`https://worldmonitor.app/mcp`), per the WorkOS **auth.md** spec:
<https://workos.com/auth-md>. Discovery is open; data calls need a bearer token
or API key.
**Before anything else β€” send a descriptive `User-Agent`** (e.g.
`mytool/1.0 (+https://yoursite.example)`). Default HTTP-library UAs (`curl/*`,
`python-requests/*`, empty/short strings) may be challenged with an HTML 403 by
the edge firewall before your request reaches the API β€” a 403 does not mean the
endpoint is missing or your credentials are wrong.
## Discover
Learn the auth requirements from one unauthenticated request, then follow the
chain:
1. Call any data method without credentials; read the `WWW-Authenticate` header:
```
401 Unauthorized
WWW-Authenticate: Bearer resource_metadata="https://worldmonitor.app/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource"
```
2. `GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource` (RFC 9728) β†’ the `resource` id and
its `authorization_servers`.
3. `GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server` (RFC 8414) β†’ the OAuth endpoints
plus the `agent_auth` block that points back here:
```json
{ "issuer": "https://worldmonitor.app",
"agent_auth": {
"skill": "https://worldmonitor.app/auth.md",
"register_uri": "https://worldmonitor.app/oauth/register",
"claim_uri": "https://worldmonitor.app/oauth/authorize",
"identity_types_supported": ["anonymous"],
"anonymous": { "credential_types_supported": ["access_token"],
"claim_uri": "https://worldmonitor.app/oauth/authorize" } } }
```
Metadata is per-host: `issuer` and endpoints match the origin you fetched
(`worldmonitor.app` or `api.worldmonitor.app`).
## Pick a method
`identity_types_supported` advertises **`anonymous`** β€” register without
asserting a user identity; a human consents interactively at authorization (see
[Claim](#claim)). Two credentials:
- **`access_token`** (anonymous) β€” OAuth 2.1 bearer via Dynamic Client
Registration + authorization-code + PKCE (see [Register](#register)). For
interactive agents such as Claude.
- **`api_key`** β€” *not* anonymous: a signed-in user mints it from the dashboard,
so it carries that identity. For headless, server-to-server use.
**`identity_assertion` is not supported.** No pre-issued identity assertion (e.g.
an `urn:ietf:params:oauth:token-type:id-jag` id-jag token) is exchanged for
credentials β€” there is no identity or token-exchange endpoint. Identity is always
established interactively.
## Register
**RFC 7591 Dynamic Client Registration** at the `register_uri`:
```
POST /oauth/register {"client_name":"My Agent","redirect_uris":["https://claude.ai/api/mcp/auth_callback"]}
β†’ 201 {"client_id":"…","token_endpoint_auth_method":"none","grant_types":["authorization_code","refresh_token"]}
```
`redirect_uris` are allowlisted (Claude callbacks + `http://localhost` /
`http://127.0.0.1` on any port). Clients are public β€” no secret; use PKCE
(`S256`). **API-key path:** start at <https://worldmonitor.app/pro>, then use
the signed-in dashboard's API Keys settings to self-issue or revoke keys β€” no
registration call.
## Claim
Anonymous agents are claimed **at authorization time**, not via a separate
endpoint β€” so `agent_auth.claim_uri` is the authorization endpoint itself. Start
the authorization-code flow with a PKCE challenge:
```
GET /oauth/authorize?response_type=code&client_id=…&code_challenge=…&code_challenge_method=S256&scope=mcp
```
The user signs in and approves; that binds the issued token to their account. For
API keys the claim is implicit β€” the key belongs to its dashboard creator.
## Use the credential
Exchange the code for a bearer token, then send it on every request:
```
POST /oauth/token grant_type=authorization_code&code=…&code_verifier=…&client_id=…
β†’ {"access_token":"…","token_type":"Bearer","expires_in":3600,"refresh_token":"…"}
POST /mcp Authorization: Bearer <access_token> (or) X-WorldMonitor-Key: <api_key>
```
The same credentials authorize the REST API. Catalog:
<https://worldmonitor.app/.well-known/api-catalog>.
## Errors
- **401** β€” missing/expired/invalid credential; response carries
`WWW-Authenticate: Bearer … resource_metadata="…"` β€” restart at
[Discover](#discover). Over MCP the JSON-RPC code is `-32001`.
- **400** β€” `invalid_redirect_uri` (outside the allowlist),
`unsupported_grant_type` (only `authorization_code` / `refresh_token` /
`client_credentials`), or `invalid_grant` (expired/consumed/revoked token).
- **429** β€” registration/token endpoints are rate-limited per IP; back off.
## Revocation
- **Expiry** β€” access tokens last 1 hour, refresh tokens 7 days; let them lapse
to de-authorize an agent.
- **User revoke** β€” a signed-in user revokes an agent from the dashboard's API
Keys or Connected MCP Clients settings; start at <https://worldmonitor.app/pro>.
The token is then rejected with `401`
/ `invalid_grant`.
- **Refresh rotation** β€” refresh tokens rotate on every use with token-family
revocation, so a stolen token dies once the real client next refreshes.
No standalone machine revocation endpoint β€” revoke via the dashboard or let the
credential expire.