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| # SecureLens β Threat Model Documentation | |
| ## System Overview | |
| SecureLens is a privacy-preserving medical image diagnostic system. | |
| A client uploads a chest X-ray, features are encrypted using CKKS | |
| Fully Homomorphic Encryption, and the cloud server runs inference | |
| on ciphertexts without accessing plaintext data. | |
| --- | |
| ## Assets Being Protected | |
| | Asset | Sensitivity | Protection Method | | |
| |-------|-------------|-------------------| | |
| | Raw X-ray pixels | Critical | Never transmitted | | |
| | 512-dim feature vector | High | CKKS encrypted | | |
| | Diagnostic result | Medium | Decrypted client-side | | |
| | CKKS secret key | Critical | Client-side only | | |
| | Model weights | Medium | Server-side plaintext | | |
| --- | |
| ## Threat Actors | |
| | Actor | Capability | Goal | | |
| |-------|------------|------| | |
| | Malicious cloud provider | Full server access | Read patient data | | |
| | Network attacker (MITM) | Intercept traffic | Steal X-ray images | | |
| | Server-side attacker | Read server memory | Access patient records | | |
| | Insider threat | Physical server access | View diagnostic data | | |
| --- | |
| ## Attack Vectors and Mitigations | |
| ### 1. Server Data Breach | |
| - **Attack**: Attacker gains full access to cloud server | |
| - **Without FHE**: All patient X-rays exposed | |
| - **With FHE**: Only CKKS ciphertexts stored β mathematically useless without secret key | |
| - **Status**: MITIGATED | |
| ### 2. Network Interception (MITM) | |
| - **Attack**: Attacker intercepts HTTP traffic | |
| - **Without FHE**: Raw feature vectors readable | |
| - **With FHE**: 326KB ciphertext β indistinguishable from random noise | |
| - **Status**: MITIGATED | |
| ### 3. Image Tampering Attack | |
| - **Attack**: Attacker modifies image during transmission | |
| - **Without FHE**: Corrupted image reaches server β wrong diagnosis | |
| - **With FHE**: Image encrypted before transmission β tampering affects only ciphertext noise | |
| - **Status**: MITIGATED (demonstrated in attack demo) | |
| ### 4. Inference Attack on Model Output | |
| - **Attack**: Attacker learns patient features from repeated queries | |
| - **Mitigation**: CKKS noise + rate limiting on API | |
| - **Status**: PARTIALLY MITIGATED | |
| ### 5. Timing Side-Channel | |
| - **Attack**: Measure inference time to infer input characteristics | |
| - **Mitigation**: Consistent O(n) linear inference time | |
| - **Status**: LOW RISK | |
| --- | |
| ## What FHE Does NOT Protect Against | |
| 1. Compromised client device (secret key stolen) | |
| 2. Malicious model weights (server-side poisoning) | |
| 3. Volume analysis (attacker sees number of queries) | |
| 4. Social engineering attacks | |
| --- | |
| ## CKKS Security Parameters | |
| | Parameter | Value | Security Guarantee | | |
| |-----------|-------|-------------------| | |
| | Scheme | CKKS | Approximate HE for real numbers | | |
| | Poly modulus degree | 8192 | 128-bit security level | | |
| | Coefficient modulus | [60,40,40,60] | 3 multiplication levels | | |
| | Global scale | 2^40 | ~10 decimal digits precision | | |
| | Security level | 128-bit | Equivalent to AES-128 | | |
| | Decryption error | ~7Γ10β»βΈ | Negligible for classification | | |
| --- | |
| ## Compliance | |
| - HIPAA: Compliant (no PHI stored on server) | |
| - India DPDP Act 2023: Compliant (sensitive health data encrypted) | |
| - GDPR Article 25: Compliant (privacy by design) |