| summary: "CLI reference for `openclaw security` (audit and fix common security footguns)" | |
| read_when: | |
| - You want to run a quick security audit on config/state | |
| - You want to apply safe “fix” suggestions (chmod, tighten defaults) | |
| title: "security" | |
| # `openclaw security` | |
| Security tools (audit + optional fixes). | |
| Related: | |
| - Security guide: [Security](/gateway/security) | |
| ## Audit | |
| ```bash | |
| openclaw security audit | |
| openclaw security audit --deep | |
| openclaw security audit --fix | |
| ``` | |
| The audit warns when multiple DM senders share the main session and recommends **secure DM mode**: `session.dmScope="per-channel-peer"` (or `per-account-channel-peer` for multi-account channels) for shared inboxes. | |
| It also warns when small models (`<=300B`) are used without sandboxing and with web/browser tools enabled. | |
| For webhook ingress, it warns when `hooks.defaultSessionKey` is unset, when request `sessionKey` overrides are enabled, and when overrides are enabled without `hooks.allowedSessionKeyPrefixes`. | |
| It also warns when sandbox Docker settings are configured while sandbox mode is off, when `gateway.nodes.denyCommands` uses ineffective pattern-like/unknown entries, when global `tools.profile="minimal"` is overridden by agent tool profiles, and when installed extension plugin tools may be reachable under permissive tool policy. | |