| { |
| "schema_version": 1, |
| "title": "Repro: The (Marginal) Value of a Search Ad — Repeated Second-price Auctions", |
| "emoji": "chart", |
| "space_id": "snaykey/repro-spa-binary-feedback", |
| "paper": { |
| "openreview_id": "UflglraWRa" |
| }, |
| "tags": [ |
| "icml2026-repro", |
| "paper-UflglraWRa" |
| ], |
| "updated_at": "2026-07-25T22:40:00+00:00", |
| "root": { |
| "slug": "index", |
| "title": "Repro: The (Marginal) Value of a Search Ad — Repeated Second-price Auctions", |
| "file": "pages/index.md", |
| "children": [ |
| { |
| "slug": "executive-summary", |
| "title": "Executive summary", |
| "file": "pages/executive-summary/page.md", |
| "children": [] |
| }, |
| { |
| "slug": "claim-1-thm1-spa-binary-regret", |
| "title": "Under binary feedback, the proposed algorithm for repeated second-price auctions achieves regret O(√(dT) log³T + d log⁵T), where d is the feature dimension and T the horizon (Theorem 1).", |
| "file": "pages/claim-1-thm1-spa-binary-regret/page.md", |
| "children": [] |
| }, |
| { |
| "slug": "claim-2-thm2-lower-bound", |
| "title": "A matching minimax lower bound of Ω(√(dT)) holds for T ≥ d², even when the bidder has perfect knowledge of the competing-bid CDF (Theorem 2).", |
| "file": "pages/claim-2-thm2-lower-bound/page.md", |
| "children": [] |
| }, |
| { |
| "slug": "claim-3-spa-vs-fpa-binary", |
| "title": "Under binary feedback, second-price auctions admit Õ(√(dT)) regret while first-price auctions are limited to Õ(T^(2/3)) regret, showing the payment rule strictly improves achievable regret (Section on regret comparison).", |
| "file": "pages/claim-3-spa-vs-fpa-binary/page.md", |
| "children": [] |
| }, |
| { |
| "slug": "claim-4-full-info-both-sqrt", |
| "title": "Under full-information feedback, both second-price and first-price auctions achieve the same Õ(√(dT)) regret rate, so the SPA advantage is specific to the binary-feedback setting (Section on regret comparison).", |
| "file": "pages/claim-4-full-info-both-sqrt/page.md", |
| "children": [] |
| }, |
| { |
| "slug": "claim-5-interval-splitting-hob", |
| "title": "Section 3 introduces an interval-splitting technique to estimate the highest-other-bid (HOB) directly from the observed payment in a won second-price auction (Section 3).", |
| "file": "pages/claim-5-interval-splitting-hob/page.md", |
| "children": [] |
| }, |
| { |
| "slug": "conclusion", |
| "title": "Conclusion", |
| "file": "pages/conclusion/page.md", |
| "children": [] |
| } |
| ] |
| } |
| } |
