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+## Training Plan Design U.S. Marine Corps
+
+Limited Dissemination Control: None PCN 144 000324 00
+
+## Foreword
+
+Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 7-20A.1, *Training Plan Design*, provides guidance to Marine leaders regarding how to create a standards-based unit training program. It introduces unit training management (UTM) roles and responsibilities, beginning with the unit commander and unit training planners. Building on Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 7-20A, Unit Training Guide, this publication explains how to use the Systems Approach to Training and Education process to plan unit training. The unit training plan, centered on the unit's mission-essential task list and applicable training and readiness standards, is the foundation for the unit's training management process. Creating the training plan begins with a comprehensive analysis of mission requirements, policies and directives, and unit capabilities. The ongoing Systems Approach to Training and Education process provides a mindset for approaching UTM. It ensures training aligns with standards and progresses to meet the unit's readiness requirements. This publication has been prepared for leaders primarily at the battalion/squadron level and above throughout the Fleet Marine Force. However, all leaders can apply the philosophy contained herein, regardless of unit size. This publication reflects the methodology and techniques developed to improve the Marine Corps' overall training effort. It may also be used as a reference for instruction to train leaders how to conduct and evaluate unit training design and management. In conjunction with MCTP 7-20A, MCRP 7-20A.1 and the associated family of MCRPs supersede MCTP 8-10A, *Unit Training Management Guide*, dated 25 November 1996 with erratum dated 2 May 2016 and change 1, dated 4 April 2018; and MCTP 8-10B, How to Conduct Training, dated 10 August 2005 with erratum dated 2 May 2016 and change 1, dated 4 April 2018. Reviewed and approved this date.
+
+Director, Policy and Standards Division, Training and Education Command Publication Control Number: 144 000324 00 Limited Dissemination Control: None
+
+## Appendix
+
+A. Commander's Training Guidance Example
+
+## Glossary: Abbreviations And Acronyms References And Related Publications Chapter 1. Training Plan Design Intent
+
+Marine Corps Reference Publication 7-20A.1, *Training Plan Design*, is the conception and articulation of a framework for developing a training program to achieve the commander's mission-essential tasks (METs). Through years of deployments, executing similar missions in the same area of operations, and externally levied mission requirements, the process of training plan design has become overly burdened and bloated with non-essential elements. This publication resets the requirements and re-introduces fundamental steps to designing training plans. It will help leaders at all levels fully understand their specific roles and responsibilities in training plan design. This publication reinforces a comprehensive training approach highlighted within Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 7-20A, *Unit Training Guide,* and complements other reference publications identified in Figure 1-1.
+
+## Mcrp 7-20A.4 Evaluations And Assessments Mcrp 7-20A.5 Training Data Management
+
+Leaders at every level are responsible for training their Marines to succeed in their assigned tasks. Planning training to achieve success in combat is a challenge that involves balancing requirementsfrom Service-directed individual training and education to individual and collective training events (ITE/CTE)to support the unit's accomplishment of its missionessential task list (METL). Available time is always a limiting factor for a planner, and poorly constructed training plans will inevitably squander time.
+
+## Introduction To How To Plan Training
+
+Training plans are guided by the Systems Approach to Training and Education (SATE) model, as described in MCTP 7-20A. The SATE model is applied during conceptual, functional, and detailed planning to produce one or more of the following types of training plans:
+
+- *Conceptual*. A long-range training plan, campaign plan.
+- *Functional*. A mid-range training plan, staff section plans.
+- *Detailed*. Short-range training plans.
+Training planners, typically within the operations section, design a training plan that establishes the training continuum for the unit to progress from the current level to the desired readiness state. Training readiness requirements are based on the objectives established in the unit's METL and the commander's training guidance (CTG). Training planners analyze all inputs, including desired outcomes, to organize and prioritize the numerous competing constraints, restraints, and requirements. Planners design individual components of the training plan and develop the associated output products. The unit implements the training plan through conducting events and exercises to achieve training and readiness (T&R) standards associated with each MET, and then balancing and adjusting the plan against resource constraints and competing requirements to most effectively achieve the commander's desired outcomes. Continuous evaluation of the training plan throughout all planning phases is necessary to determine plan effectiveness through individual and unit performance indicators and state of overall unit training readiness.
+
+## Roles And Responsibilities For Planning Training
+
+The unit commander is responsible for training. The commander and unit staff at every echelon of command deliberately build training plans to ensure units are trained and prepared to conduct core and assigned METs. Commanders will make use of assigned personnel as they see fit to plan unit training. Examples of staff members typically engaged in planning for training are
+
+- Operations officer/operations chief. - Executive officer/company operations chief/company gunnery sergeant. - Training officer. - Logistics Officer. - Maintenance officer. - Safety officer. - Operations and Tactics instructor. - Intelligence and Tactics instructor. - Weapons and Tactics instructor.
+
+## Training Plans
+
+Unit training plans serve as the guiding set of documents to direct unit preparations and provide unity of effort in support of MET proficiency. The training plan provides structure, enabling a unit to maintain focus on prioritized tasks (see Table 1-1). In conjunction with this structure, the use of the SATE model allows for continuous evaluation and adjustment due to circumstances such as poor individual or unit performance, a change in assigned tasks, budget or funding constraints, or emerging concepts and technologies requiring additional focus on established standards. In this manner, properly designed and implemented training plans are flexible enough to support incomplete, unclear, or changing situations. Training plans are constructed to
+
+- Achieve core and assigned MET proficiency for deploying units. - Sustain core MET proficiency in the case of force providing units not in a training, exercise,
+and employment plan (TEEP) deployment schedule.
+
+Training Plan (Conceptual Planning)
+Type
+Training plan for deployment readiness
+Training plan for sustainment
+Who
+Units WITH an assigned/scheduled deployment
+Units WITHOUT an assigned/scheduled deployment
+Purpose
+Attain unit core and assigned MET readiness
+Attain and sustain unit core MET readiness
+Focus
+Core and assigned METs
+Core METs
+- T&R manuals - Higher headquarters (HHQ) orders and directives
+Governing Documents
+- T&R manuals - Force generation order - Marine expeditionary unit order - Theater entry requirements
+Duration
+Assumption of command to relief of command +30
+Assumption of command to relief of command +30
+- MCCRE
+Evaluation
+- Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation
+(MCCRE)
+- Mission rehearsal exercise (MRX) - Service-level training exercise - Marine expeditionary unit certification exercise
+Components
+- Mission and METL/list of CTEs - Commander's training guidance - Training schedule
+- Mission and METL/list of CTEs - Commander's training guidance - Training schedule
+
+Lengthy and complex training plans lead to uncertainty during execution. The Marine Corps trains to prepare for war. As training relates to the principles of war, the most important elements to consider should be a clearly stated objective, economy of forces and resources, and simplicity. The outcome of a well-crafted training plan is an easily executable, well-designed, and thorough plan that is understood by all and provides the most highly trained Marines that available time allows.
+
+## Documenting The Training Plan
+
+Each component of a unit's training plan serves to ensure that the entire unit is progressing toward the commander's end state for training. Collectively, it provides guidance to the unit for the conduct of training. The Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS) unit training module is the service program of record for documenting all aspects of the unit training life-cycle and facilitates service reporting with the Defense Readiness Reporting System. As a repository for all elements of the training plan, it is the most efficient manner for units to share and disseminate unit training plans and documents. Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1553.3 Unit Training Management Program establishes Marine Corps policy for the use of MCTIMS to document unit training.
+
+## Chapter 2. Training Plan Development
+
+The purpose of a training plan is to develop the necessary steps based on problem framing and the CTG to prepare the unit to accomplish its mission. A training plan organizes resources and events, ensures all individual and collective requirements are accounted for, provides guidance to subordinate individuals and units, and affords subordinate leaders the required time to train and prepare their Marines. To meet the stated purpose, a training plan must be more than a simple schedule. A training plan includes the following components:
+
+- Mission statement and METL or list of CTEs that support the unit METL. - CTG. - Training schedule.
+These collective components achieve the stated purpose of a unit's training plan (see Figure 2-1). Each component is an input that shapes the development of subordinate training plans. Training plans are developed, at a minimum, by battalion-/squadron-level commands and higher. The HHQ commander approves the unit's training plan to ensure the unit commander's initial assessment, prioritization, and guidance are feasible and support the HHQ mission. Additionally, unit commanders may further direct that subordinate units also develop their own training plans in support of the HHQ plan.
+
+## Mission And Mission-Essential Task List
+
+Problem framing is conducted at every level of command as the first step in building a training plan. Inputs to this process are the HHQ training plans, an assessment of current unit proficiency, and orders and directives applicable to training plan development. The output of this process is a unit mission statement and a METL or list of evaluation coded T&R events that support the unit METL. This effectively informs the unit and subordinate commands which specific tasks must be trained and for which specific purpose.
+
+## Commander's Training Guidance The Ctg Is A Brief Document Consisting Of At Least The Three Following Sections:
+
+- Training philosophy. - Training priorities. - Commander's guidance.
+The CTG drives the planning process and allows the commander to convey guidance and direction specific to how the unit will conduct training. The CTG is a concise statement from the commander to the entire unit. It is meant to be read in its entirety by all members of the command and applied every time the unit conducts training. Training philosophy specifically addresses how the unit and subordinate elements will conduct events and exercises. Training priorities define what, when, and where training will occur across the command. Commander's guidance addresses why the unit is training and the desired end state. It also provides guidance on how the unit will identify risks and develop mitigating controls. Knowing the desired end state and understanding its purpose allow subordinate unit and training leaders to determine how training will be conducted. Understanding the purpose also directly correlates to decentralized planning and execution via mission-style ordersthe basics of maneuver warfare. Planners and leaders use the CTG to determine how to apply limited time, money, and resources to achieve the commander's desired end state.
+
+Training Schedule The training schedule is a graphic representation of events along a timeline used to visually depict a unit's training plan. It is a tool used to plan and execute daily training, as well as individual events and exercises. The training schedule is a perpetual timeline that depicts events at the level of the associated training plan, including applicable events from the HHQ training plan. Subordinate units use HHQ training schedules to populate their respective training plans. The training schedule assists units with
+
+- Projecting unit training events and requirements. - Sequencing progressive training objectives to build unit capability. - Identifying, allocating, and prioritizing resources. - Providing unity of effort and support coordination. - Synchronizing staff section milestones affecting the interaction of man, train, and equip
+readiness indicators.
+- Identifying responsible individuals for specific tasks. - Associating specific T&R standards to training events and training objectives. - Directing planning, preparation, and execution of training. - Assigning responsible individuals to specific tasks.
+The training schedule contains events that inform units across higher and adjacent commands, such as
+
+- Major events and exercises. - Service- or locally directed training requirements. - Unit-planned events and exercises.
+Training schedules provide the requisite details for executing events and exercises. Developing training schedules allows for the critical thought and analysis required to forecast all requirements and plan accordingly.
+
+## Analyze
+
+Inputs into the *analyze* phase include the HHQ training plan, global force management requirements, and other orders and directives that are applicable to training plan development. Examples of these inputs are
+
+- Force generation process. - MCCRE order. - Service-directed individual training and education requirements. - Local orders (Marine expeditionary force [MEF], major subordinate command, etc.). - Marine Corps task list. - Applicable T&R manuals. - HHQ tasking. - TEEP. - Flight hours available/ranges/ammunition/resources. - Training area/range safety requirements.
+The outputs of the *analyze* phase are a unit mission statement, approved command echelon METL with supporting CTEs, initial overall risk assessment and risk management guidance, and a commander's assessment.
+
+Mission The HHQ mission statement, as a component of the overall HHQ training plan, defines the task and purpose the HHQ commander expects the unit to be capable of accomplishing. This statement, taken in context with specified and implied tasks from HHQ, assists the unit commander in developing the unit mission statement. The mission statement clearly and succinctly states what the unit commander expects the unit to be able to accomplish. The unit mission statement is published in the MCTIMS unit training module.
+
+Mission-Essential Task List and List of Collective Training Events Battalion/squadron and higher commands will review the service-provided METL. Community T&R manuals list core and core-plus METs from the Marine Corps task list. The unit commander will review the community approved core and consider core-plus METs. Mission-essential tasks assigned by HHQ are added to this list. This complete list of core and assigned METs comprise the unit METL. In addition to the METL, all commands will designate CTEs with associated T&R events at their echelon of command. This list of CTEs is constructed by associating specific CTEs to each MET through analysis. Points of reference for associating CTEs to METs are the T&R manual, MCTIMS task master module, and the planner's experience. Each CTE will designate the METs it supports.
+
+However, the commander should use experience to confirm the list of CTEs is complete. The METL and associated CTEs are published in the MCTIMS *unit training* module (see Figure. 2-2).
+
+## Mission  +  Metl
+
+Prior to creating a New METL or Editing the current METL, **YOU AND SUBORDINATE COMMANDER'S MUST** review Commander's Assessment to ensure the **New Event** column does not contain any green check marks. If green check marks exist, click the green check mark icon to accept
+
+Edit
+METL
+Edit
+Mission Statement
+Title
+#
+Task Set
+Status
+Source Type
+The Marine Expeditionary Force is postured as the
+MCT 5.5
+Conduct Joint and Combined Operations
+MEF (Core)
+C
+Marine Corps globally responsive, expeditionary, and fully scalable MAGTF, capable of generating, deploying,
+MCT 3
+Employ Firepower
+MEF (Core)
+C
+and employing ready forces and formations for crisis
+MCT 1.14
+Conduct Stability Operations
+MEF (Core)
+C
+response, foward presence, major combat operations,
+MCT 1.12.1
+Conduct Amphibious Operations
+MEF (Core)
+C
+and campaigns. Additionally, if directed, serves as the core of a joint task force to conduct operations across
+MCT 1.1.2
+Provide Forces
+MEF (Core)
+C
+the range of military operations.
+MCT 1.10
+Conduct Crisis Response
+MEF (Core)
+C
+MCT 1.12.3
+Conduct Prepositioning Operations
+MEF (Core)
+C
+MCT 1.3.1
+Conduct Maneuver
+MEF (Core)
+C
+HHQ Mission
+
+Commander's Assessment After the mission and METL are published, the commander performs an assessment to determine the unit's current proficiency level for each associated CTE. Ideally, this assessment is based on direct observations of performance. Because time constraints may make sufficient direct observation infeasible, all inputs should be considered by the commander. Examples of other inputs are recent evaluations and assessments, operational observations and knowledge, and the stated sustainment interval for CTEs per the T&R manual. The commander's assessment will help to determine a starting point for the overall training plan. This assessment should be recorded utilizing the MCTIMS *unit training* module.
+
+At the conclusion of the *analyze* phase, the commander will have all required information to begin designing the CTG and applying it to the TEEP. The mission statement and METL shape which events must be trained and which requirements must be met. The CTG also establishes how training and readiness requirements will be prioritized in planning an execution. The commander's assessment helps to determine the starting point as it relates to the level of events to be trained, as well as the development of an overall risk assessment and RM guidance.
+
+## Design
+
+Inputs into the *design* phase are the unit mission statement, the METL and associated CTEs, and the commander's assessment. These inputs are used in conjunction with doctrinal references to create the CTG. The three components of the CTGtraining philosophy, training priorities, and commander's guidancewill be written during the design phase and shape the develop phase.
+
+Training Philosophy The commander conveys fundamentals of training within the training philosophy to guide the command throughout the planning and execution of training events and exercises. This philosophy is meant to be applied throughout the training continuum and across each event and exercise. The fundamentals of training detailed in MCTP 7-20A are a starting point for commanders to build their own training philosophy tailored to their unit's specific requirements and expectations for how training will be conducted.
+
+Training Priorities The commander establishes priorities for training to guide the command toward specific training objectives. These priorities will place increased emphasis on specific areas that the commander identifies and sequence what the commander deems most important. This is not meant to exclusively be a regurgitation of the unit METL, but can also include type of operations, warfighting functions, specific environments or conditions, and training resources.
+
+Commander's Guidance The commander communicates specific training guidance to ensure all members of the command understand expectations. This can be conveyed in relation to the unit's strengths, weaknesses, safety and risk concerns, and how the unit intends to improve weaknesses and reinforce strengths. This may be easily conveyed by listing the unit's strengths and weaknesses as they relate to training and stating an overall purpose, method, and end state for the training plan. The CTG continually shapes the training of the entire unit. This document is the commander's means of conveying thoughts and priorities for unit training. The CTG is a standalone document published for maximum visibility for all Marines to read. Priorities laid out in the CTG help align and sequence events and resources in the TEEP.
+
+## Develop
+
+The TEEP is the final component of the unit training plan. During the *develop* phase, the unit training planner will gather all known requirements and milestones into the existing TEEP along a timeline. Events on the HHQ training plan involving the unit will be added to the TEEP as appropriate. The phases of the force generation process and major unit milestones, such as a change of operational control or deployment, will be overlaid onto the TEEP to depict when specific events and actions will be conducted. Examples of specific events and actions tied directly to phases of the force generation process are when the unit will begin training assigned METs and when formal evaluations and assessments will take place. The TEEP should include all events at the command echelon, and all events the command is responsible for coordinating, arranging, and certifying on behalf of subordinate units. The events described below should be included in the TEEP.
+
+Major Events and Exercises Major events and exercises are training events involving the entire unit that the unit is mandated by order or policy to conduct, such as
+
+- MCCRE. - Mission rehearsal exercise. - Service Level Training Exercise.
+These higher-level exercises provide the framework around which other training can be planned and provide milestones identifying when a unit should reach an established level of proficiency.
+
+Directed Requirements Directed requirements are administrative events and inspections that the unit is directed to conduct. These events require some or all of the unit's participation in order to prepare and conduct, or they may affect the remainder of the unit's ability to conduct concurrent operations. Examples of directed requirements are
+
+- Field supply and maintenance analysis office inspection. - Supply-logistics analysis program inspection. - Joint limited technical inspection.
+Unit Planned Events Unit planned events are the remaining events and exercises on a unit TEEP. While some events in this category are also mandated by policy and orders, the difference is that the unit will decide when and how to accomplish these events. While a unit's HHQ and MCOs direct when a unit conducts a MCCRE, no such direct guidance exists for events and exercises in this category. Unit planned events may include:
+
+- Collective training.
+ Deploy for training.  Command post exercise.  Field exercise.
+- Individual training and education.
+ Core.  Pre-deployment training.  Non-core (ancillary).
+- Professional military education. - Military occupational specialty progression. - Functional training.
+ Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear decontamination.  Fire support team.
+The *develop* phase ends with the publication of the TEEP. A unit TEEP should depict all events in which the unit will participate, in part or in whole, and also events the command is responsible for coordinating for subordinate units. A TEEP may be a stand-alone document created and published using standard office products during training plan development. In the MCTIMS unit training module, all events can be created, published, and assigned to subordinate units in unit calendars that are accessible to all Marines.
+
+## Implement
+
+Once all components of the training plan are constructed, the plan is published and implemented through conducting events and exercises. Marine Corps reference publication 7-20A.2, Event & Exercise Design, explains the procedures for designing ITE and exercises.
+
+## Evaluate
+
+Typically, the training plan is evaluated only after it is published and implemented as a series of training events and exercises. Evaluation at the end of the SATE process provides valuable performance indicators of the training plan's effectiveness observed as actual impacts on unit readiness and the safety risks planned and unplanned. If the unit is not performing individual or collective events to prescribed standards, the training plan must be adjusted to provide opportunities for remediation. Evaluation throughout the SATE process is also important. The planning process should be evaluated at every stage to ensure that the training plan will meet the training objectives as it is being developed. The desired end state of the training plan is to safely achieve a desired state of unit readiness as measured against the unit's METL and associated T&R standards. The outputs of each phase of the SATE process are evaluated to ensure they align with this end state. By identifying problems early in planning, the unit ensures resources are efficiently applied to events and exercises as the training plan is executed.
+
+## Chapter 3. Training Schedule Development
+
+The training schedule is the vehicle that transitions training objectives in the training plan into executable ITEs and CTEs. Training schedules are constructed at echelons directed by the battalion or squadron CTG. Training schedules provide the requisite detail for executing the training plan (see Table 3-1).
+
+Training Schedules
+Type
+Conceptual
+Functional
+Detailed
+Who
+Battalion/squadron or higher
+Company/battery/detachment (as directed by HHQ)
+Platoon or lower (as directed by HHQ)
+Sequence commander's training objectives
+Sequence priorities
+Purpose
+Planning guidance for event/exercise designers and unit leaders
+Associate specific T&R events to objectives.
+Establish detailed timelines
+Provide preparation guidance to unit leaders for unit preparation.
+Focus
+Commander's training objectives
+CTEs
+ITEs and CTEs
+Conceptual training plan
+Functional training schedule
+Governing Documents
+HHQ training plan Core & assigned METs
+T&R manuals
+T&R manuals
+Duration
+18-24 months
+1-6 months, per commander's direction
+1-60 days, per commander's direction
+
+The HHQ commander's training guidance will direct the duration and frequency of submission for unit training schedules. An example battle rhythm of training schedule submission is quarterly submission of conceptual training schedules, with weekly detailed training schedule submission at the company/battery level.
+
+## Analyze
+
+The inputs for the *analyze* phase of training schedule creation are the mission statement and METL, CTG, and the HHQ training plan. Analysis of these inputs will identify and sequence training objectives and requirements. The *analyze* phase ends with a prioritized list of known requirements and training objectives. Units should pay special attention to resource availability and resource request timelines during the analyze phase. Funding and processing for some training resources require significant lead times.
+
+## Design
+
+During the *design* phase of training schedule creation, training objectives are added to the conceptual training schedule. Training objectives are clustered and sequenced into events and exercises and placed along the timeline where openings occur. These events are conceptualized and associated with ITEs and CTEs. Community T&R manuals, the T&R and task master modules in MCTIMS, and the experience of the individual creating the schedule are reference points for ITE and CTE association. Each ITE and CTE contain internally and externally supported and supporting events. Associated events and events with like or similar conditions are combined, or "stacked," creating the opportunity for training at multiple unit echelons. Planned training that incorporates multiple echelons affords units the opportunity to sustain proficiency in lower-level ITEs and CTEs as higherlevel training is conducted, such as platoon-level support by fire during a company deliberate attack. Each ITE and CTE lists the resources required for execution. In the case of simulation and simulators, the T&R community-approved suitability and sequence codes for simulation and simulators will also be listed. Resources listed in each inclusive ITE and CTE are aggregated into a list encompassing the entire training event. Once identified, units coordinate for the required resources, determine the availability and quantity, and submit support requests. Typical resource requirements for training events include
+
+- Ranges and training areas/facilities. - Ammunition forecast/requirement/request. - Life support (food, head facilities, etc.). - Transportation. - Command and control or networks. - Simulators/simulations. - Home station training enablers. - Exercise control and support. - Funding and fiscal considerations. - Safety requirements. - Administrative requirements.
+The output of the *design* phase is a completed, functional training schedule. Functional training schedules are built and aggregated at echelons designated by the commander. Functional training schedules transition objectives from the conceptual TEEP into executable events along a timeline. Functional training schedules lay out weekly and/or daily operations, and assign specific T&R events to TEEP-identified objectives. Functional training schedules should cover one to six months, as directed by the commander. They serve to
+
+- Ensure objectives are being met. - Sequence priorities. - Associate specific T&R events to objectives. - Provide planning guidance to event/exercise designers for event/exercise development. - Provide guidance to leaders for unit preparation.
+The completed functional training schedule serves as an input for developing detailed training schedules and helps shape the specific elements contained within.
+
+## Develop
+
+Detailed training schedules are developed by breaking down each event into subordinate parts to identify and sequence each step that must be planned for and accomplished. Training schedules are developed by adding the pertinent details to each event that will enable execution. Detailed training schedules may include
+
+- Start and end date/time. - Uniform and equipment required. - Location of event. - Individual(s) responsible. - Weapons draw time. - Vehicle staging instructions.
+Detailed training schedules are built and aggregated at echelons designated by the commander. They not only inform subordinate small unit leaders, but also are a method to ensure all circumstances have been planned and accounted for. They provide the specifics and details of events laid out in the HHQ functional training schedule. Detailed training schedules lay out day-to-day and hour-to-hour operations, and account for the use of time and resources to support training and will include all details necessary for the execution of events. Every small unit develops detailed training schedules continually and executes training based on this sound planning. The commander determines the battle rhythm of producing and submitting detailed training schedules. Benefits to building and following deliberately planned detailed training schedules include the following:
+
+- Training accounts for all possible outcomes. - Training is thoroughly planned and sequenced to achieve the desired outcomes. - Subordinates are aware of expectations.
+Detailed training schedules should be published and posted for maximum visibility. They inform subordinates of expectations and allow them the time to prepare appropriately for events. The unit calendar in MCTIMS facilitates efficient training schedule management, event documentation, and completion tracking in a single location accessible by the unit's Marines. Training schedules published in MCTIMS may be efficiently managed, made available to the unit's Marines and HHQ. This method allows for simple HHQ aggregation of subordinate schedules.
+
+## Implement
+
+The training schedule is implemented through the execution of events. Training schedules, as with operational missions, may be time- or conditions-based. Flexibility should be built into timelines to account for both remediation and unforeseen events such as logistical shortfalls or issues with training areas and facilities.
+
+## Evaluate
+
+As a component of the training plan, the training schedule is evaluated throughout the SATE process. It is checked for alignment with the unit's and HHQ training plans to ensure the training event schedule leads the unit to achieve its readiness objectives. Training schedule evaluation continues as each training event and exercise is conducted. Training schedules should allow for adjustments. Poor unit or individual performance indicates a need for remediation, while easily meeting and exceeding standards would indicate a need for more challenging conditions or advanced events. Leaders must communicate the hazards and risks as a part of their evaluations. This includes modifications to the unit's risk assessment as changes occur.
+
+## Conclusion
+
+Properly constructed training schedules make efficient use of time and resources by reducing redundancies through properly aligning subordinate plans with those of HHQ. Units will build one training plan at a level dependent on their respective echelon of command. These plans are informed, reviewed, and approved by their respective HHQ to enable unity of effort and unity of command as it relates to the unit's training goals and objectives. The desired end state is that Marines and units are ready to train to their assigned tasks. This end state requires a thorough and deliberate training process, based on the SATE process and accounting for all requirements.
+
+## Appendix A. Commander's Training Guidance Example
+
+| From:   | Commanding Officer            |
+|---------|-------------------------------|
+| To:     | All Hands                     |
+| Subj:   | COMMANDER'S TRAINING GUIDANCE |
+| Ref:    |                               |
+
+Encl:
+
+## 1. Training Philosophy. (The Commander's Vision For How The Unit Will Conduct Training.)
+
+Questions for consideration:
+
+- How will the command implement the fundamentals (see MCTP 7-20A) to guide training? - How will the command develop leaders? - How will the command implement evaluations (standards-based)?
+All leaders are responsible for the unit's training. I expect every member of this command to be masters of the tasks associated with their billets and ensure that the Marines under their charge are prepared to assume the duties of their leaders. We will train with the personnel we havethe absence of a commander, leader, or primary staff member is never a valid reason to delay or cancel training. No single person in this command is more important than the command as a whole. We will be judged on our ability to accomplish our mission at any given time regardless of the personnel we have on hand. We will achieve mission success through the conduct of standards-based, mission-oriented training that simulates the operational environment we are expected to operate in to the greatest extent possible. Every training evolution will be evaluated according to established training and readiness (T&R) standards; when we believe we are proficient, we will invite evaluation from outside the unit being evaluated to validate our progress. I will base my assessments of our progress on training completion and evaluation records; thus, it is imperative that we maintain accurate records in MCTIMS that provide an accurate picture of our readiness.
+
+Training will be progressive, building in complexity as our proficiency increases. Leaders must develop training to build Marines from their current proficiency. Training will be continuous, woven into everything we do. Opportunities to turn every-day, routine duties and tasks into training must be leveraged. Everything we do is a training opportunity, from basic morning accountability to non-illuminated, combined-arms live fire.
+
+2. Training Priorities.
+
+METs are the prescribed readiness objectives the unit must achieve. The commander prioritizes training that supports the METL.
+
+## Questions For Consideration:
+
+- What is the commander's bid for success in training? - How will the unit allocate constrained resources? - How will the unit leverage alternate training capabilities (e.g., simulations)? - Is the focus in planning for training on resource constraints, warfighting functions, specific
+environments or conditions, or training resources?
+My priorities are that we will be able to support major operations through the conduct of offensive and defensive operations. We will be masters of offensive and defensive operations beyond basic proficiency, both day and night, across each of the warfighting functions. To accomplish this, I have prioritized the following focus areas:
+
+- Small unit tactics. - Command and control. - Fires integration.
+We will be prepared to conduct such operations from amphibious shipping and ashore. Due to the limited nature of amphibious resources, we will leverage the available simulators and simulations to maximize training opportunities and build proficiency where live capabilities are not available and resources are limited.
+
+## 3. Commander's Guidance. Questions For Consideration:
+
+- How does the unit reinforce its strengths? How does the unit improve weaknesses? - Where does the commander see the greatest risk in training? What is the commander's
+guidance for managing risk and ensuring safety in training?
+- What is the unit "prepare for, conduct, and implement" feedback from evaluations
+(standards-based, timing in the training plan, preparation of evaluators)?
+- What is the commander's intent for training (purpose, method, end state) that subordinate
+leaders can use to plan and execute training?
+Our strengths are a clear mission and the individual Marines that comprise our rankstheir spirit, work ethic, and aggressiveness. Our greatest weakness is the loss of trained billet-holders due to personnel turnover. We will address our weaknesses through the development and execution of a clear and focused training plan to ensure our Marines and units are thoroughly trained in their individual and collective tasks. We will achieve this by working to maximize every potential for training and conducting a progressively more complex training plan. Each event should build on the last. As training complexity increases, we must be aware of the inherent increases in risk. It is imperative that we train our leaders and Marines to identify risks and make smart decisions to mitigate these risks. My desired end state is that our unit is capable of successfully accomplishing any mission assigned in support of major operations
+
+## References And Related Publications Joint Issuances
+
+DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
+
+## Other Instructions
+
+Navy/Marine Corps Departmental Publication (NAVMC)
+1553.1_
+Marine Corps Instructional Systems Design/Systems Approach to Training and Education Handbook
+
+## Marine Corps Publications
+
+Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
+
+Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)
+1
+Warfighting
+5
+Planning
+7
+Learning
+Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP)
+7-20A
+Unit Training Guide
+Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)
+7-20A.2
+Event and Exercise Design
+7-20A.3
+Marine Corps Simulations Training Guide
+7-20A.4
+Evaluations and Assessments
+7-20A.5
+Training Data Management
+Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)
+1553.10
+MCTIMS SOP
+1553.3_
+Unit Training Management Program
+3500.11G
+Service-Level Training Exercise Program (SLTE-P)
+3501.1_
+Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE)
+5100.29_
+Marine Corps Safety Management System
+
+A non-cost copy of this document is available at:
+https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/MCPEL/
+
+## Copyright Information
+
+This document is a work of the United States Government and the text is in the public domain in the United States. Subject to the following stipulation, it may be distributed and copied:
+
+
+Copyrights to graphics and rights to trademarks/Service marks included in this document are reserved by original copyright or trademark/Service mark holders or their assignees, and are used here under a license to the Government and/or other permission.
+
+The use or appearance of United States Marine Corps publications on a non-Federal
+Government website does not imply or constitute Marine Corps endorsement of the distribution service.

markdown/misc/dhs-threat-2020.md

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+## Homeland Threat Assessment October 2020
+
+With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values
+
+## Contents
+
+3
+6
+Foreword
+Structure of the HTA
+Threats:
+    Cyber
+8
+    Foreign Influence Activity
+10
+    Economic Security
+14
+    Terrorism
+17
+    Transnational Criminal Organization
+21
+    Illegal Immigration
+23
+    Natural Disasters
+25
+
+## Foreword
+
+In my role as Acting Secretary, I receive intelligence, operational, law enforcement, and other information on a daily basis. This Homeland Threat Assessment (HTA), the first of its kind for the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), draws upon all sources of information and expertise available to the Department, including from intelligence, law enforcement, and our operational Components. The result is a "Whole-of-DHS" report on the threats to the Homeland. This HTA is as close as the American people will get to seeing and understanding the information that I see as Secretary and that our employees see in their national security missions. As you read through the HTA you should have faith in knowing that these threats were identified using the best intelligence, operational information, and employee knowledge available to the Department.
+
+## Identifying Threats Using A Whole-Of-Dhs Approach
+
+The men and women serving in our operational Components are the experts in their national security and homeland security missions, making their insights critical in threat identification and prevention. Our operational Components provided information about the threats they see and combat in performance of their mission. DHS is the first and last line of defense against many threats facing our
+"DHS has a vital mission: to secure the nation from the many threats we face. This requires the dedication of more than 240,000 employees in positions that range from aviation and border security to emergency response, from cybersecurity analyst to chemical facility inspector. Our duties are wide-ranging, and our goal is clear - keeping America safe."
+country. Our ability to mitigate these threats is predicated on our ability to understand them and to inform the American people. I hope all Americans take a moment to review this HTA and visit DHS.gov to learn how they can protect themselves from these threats.
+
+## Today's Threat Environment
+
+Combatting terrorism will always be a priority to the Department of Homeland Security. Foreign terrorist organizations (FTO) still have the intent to attack the Homeland within and from beyond our borders. In the 19 years since September 11th, 2001, the United States Government (USG), DHS, and our foreign partners have taken the fight directly to those responsible for the attacks on that day, and to other FTOs who seek to destroy our country based on an ill-informed and twisted ideology. We have enhanced our ability to identify and prevent individuals affiliated with these organizations from traveling or immigrating to the United States. We have enhanced security and processes at our airports, ports of entry, and beyond our borders. We have built the world's greatest counterterrorism ecosystem to keep Americans safe. More specifically, DHS has partnered with other USG agencies and foreign governments to raise the baseline for screening and vetting in the United States. In the last few years we have enhanced existing vetting programs, created the National Vetting Center (NVC), expanded biographic and biometric information sharing programs, and enacted national-level policies requiring foreign governments to share essential information for vetting purposes or face potential travel restrictions. Trade and economic security is Homeland Security. We are increasingly concerned about the threat posed by nation state actors in an emerging era of great power competition. DHS
+is specifically concerned with the direct and indirect threat posed to the Homeland by the People's Republic of China (PRC). The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-led PRC is challenging America's place as the world's global and economic leader. Threats emanating from China include damaging the U.S. economy through intellectual property theft, production and distribution of counterfeit goods, and unfair trade practices. DHS has a mandate to mitigate these threats and we will do so with a clear-eyed view that China is a long-term strategic competitor to the U.S. Domestic violent extremism is a threat to the Homeland. As Americans, we all have the right to believe whatever we want, but we don't have a right to carry out acts of violence to further those beliefs. The Department works with other Government, non-Government, and private sector partners to prevent individuals from making this transition from protected speech to domestic terrorism reflected by violence. As Secretary, I am concerned about any form of violent extremism. That is why we design our programs to be threat agnostic - ensuring that we can combat a broad range of domestic threats. However, I am particularly concerned about white supremacist violent extremists who have been exceptionally lethal in their abhorrent, targeted attacks in recent years. I am proud of our work to prevent terrorizing tactics by domestic terrorists and violent extremists who seek to force ideological change in the United States through violence, death, and destruction.
+
+" With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our Homeland, and our values."
+Exploitation of Lawful and Protected Speech and Protests. During the course of developing the HTA we began to see a new, alarming trend of exploitation of lawful protests causing violence, death, and destruction in American communities. This anti-government, anti-authority and anarchist violent extremism was identified by DHS in September 2019 when we published our Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence. As the date of publication of this HTA, we have seen over 100 days of violence and destruction in our cities. The co-opting of lawful protests led to destruction of government property and have turned deadly. Indeed, DHS law enforcement officers suffered over 300 separate injuries and were assaulted with sledgehammers, commercial grade fireworks, rocks, metal pipes, improvised explosive devices, and more. This violence, perpetrated by anarchist extremists and detailed in numerous public statements that remain available on the DHS website, significantly threatens the Homeland by undermining officer and public safety as well as our values and way of life. While the HTA touches on these issues, we are still in the nascent stages of understanding the threat this situation poses to Americans, the Homeland, and the American way of life. Cyber security threats from nation-states and non-state actors present challenging threats to our Homeland and critical infrastructure. DHS has a critical mission to protect America's infrastructure, which includes our cyberinfrastructure. We are concerned with the intents, capabilities, and actions of nation-states such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Nation-state targeting of our assets seeks to disrupt the infrastructure that keeps the American economy moving forward and poses a threat to national security. On top of the threats to critical infrastructure, cybercriminals also target our networks to steal information, hold organizations hostage, and harm American companies for their own gain.
+
+transit, to U.S. border communities, and to our officers and agents who encounter migrants when they enter the United States. To mitigation this threat we instituted enhanced restrictions at our borders, limited travel to only essential travelers and implemented a Center for Disease Control (CDC) order that protects Americans from COVID-19. Natural occurrences continue to harm the life and property of Americans. In 2020 alone we have storm season that has many Americans in our c wildfire season that has Nation-states will continue to try to undermine American elections. Threats to our election have been another rapidly evolving issue. Nation-states like China, Russia, and Iran will try to use cyber capabilities or foreign influence to compromise or disrupt infrastructure related to the 2020 U.S. Presidential election, aggravate social and racial tensions, undermine trust in U.S. authorities, and criticize our elected officials. Perhaps most alarming is that our adversaries are seeking to sway the preferences and perceptions of U.S. voters using influence operations. Americans need to understand this threat and arm themselves with all information available to avoid falling prey to these tactics.
+
+seen an unprecedented taken the livelihoods of Gulf states and a histori
+
+caused devastation on the West Coast. Americans in-between our coasts also face the threat of natural disasters from a variety of causes. On top of the threat to life and safety, these events have devastating impacts on local and national economies. The Department is at the forefront of providing information to help Americans prepare, and we stand ready to respond after these events occur.
+
+While Russia has been a persistent threat by attempting to harm our democratic and election systems, it is clear China and Iran also pose threats in this space. The IC's Election Threat Update from August 2020 and Microsoft's announcement of cyber-attacks from China, Russia, and Iran provide further evidence of this threat and underscore the importance in public and private partnerships to secure democratic processes. DHS's #Protect2020 website can help you understand the threat to our elections and increase your preparedness and awareness. Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)
+conti lives.
+
+Likewise, a foreign-born virus reached our shores in 2020. COVID-19 is the most recent and deadly, in a list of infectious diseases that have threatened the lives of Americans. We have seen unprecedented impact to life, health, and public safety from COVID-19 and taken action to prevent our healthcare system from being overburdened from COVID-19 patients. DHS was at the forefront mitigating threat and we took decisive action to restrict air and sea travel from disease hot-spots, close our land borders to non-essential travel, provide lifesaving PPE to Americans, prevent fraudulent PPE from entering our supply chains, and identify fraudsters who are trying to exploit this situation for their own personal gain.
+
+## Conclusion
+
+nue to profit at the expense of American Mexican cartels and other TCOs will continue to smuggle hard narcotics like fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamine into our communities, contributing to an alarming level of overdoses in the United States. No American community is immune from the impact of these drugs. Furthermore, cartels will continue to use dangerous human smuggling methods to facilitate migrants to our borders, putting these migrants and our officers and agents at significant risk given the current COVID-19 pandemic. The threat of illegal and mass migration to the United States. Traditional migration push factors like insecurity and economic conditions continue to push individuals north to the United States. While we are addressing illegal migration through a network of initiatives, we are concerned that during a pandemic this poses a more specific threat to the migrants, the communities they As you read the HTA you will become more acutely aware of the threats facing the American people, the Homeland, and the American way of life. You will also gain a clearer picture of the broad mission of the Department of Homeland Security. It is my privilege and honor to serve as the Acting Secretary of an organization whose employees willingly and bravely put themselves in harm's way every day to protect us all. The men and women of the Department live up to our motto: With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our Homeland, and our values.
+
+## Structure Of The Threat Assessment
+
+The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the first and last line of defense against the many threats facing our country. Our ability to mitigate these threats is predicated on our ability to understand them and to inform the American people. The DHS Homeland Threat Assessment1
+(HTA) identifies the primary threats facing the United States of America at and inside our borders. This Assessment draws upon all sources of information and expertise available to the Department, including from intelligence, law enforcement, and our operational components.
+The purpose of the HTA is to provide the American people with an overview of the information collected and analyzed by DHS employees around the world and provided to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The HTA is primarily informed by intelligence analysis prepared by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and by the Component intelligence offices, which identified the leading security threats to the Homeland based on a review of all-source intelligence information and analysis. Given the array of potential issues, I&A's scoped its analysis to focus on key threats covered by the intelligence elements of the Department, which expert analysts considered most likely and with the potential to significantly affect U.S. security. The HTA was also informed by the expertise and insights of the Department's Operational Components, which assess and respond to threats on a daily basis, as well as the informed views of the DHS Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY), which leads threat identification and prevention activities.
+
+This inaugural HTA presents a holistic look
+from across the Department and provides
+the American people with the most
+complete, transparent, and candid look at
+the threats facing our Homeland. It breaks
+down the major threats to the Homeland in
+the following sections:
+
+1. The Cyber Threat to the Homeland 2. Foreign Influence Activity in the
+Homeland
+3. Threats to U.S. Economic Security 4. The Terrorist Threat to the Homeland 5. Transnational Criminal Organization
+Threats to National Security
+6. Illegal Immigration to the United
+States
+7. Natural Disasters
+WE STAND READY TO RISE AND FACE THE NEXT CHALLENGE THAT THREATENS OUR HOMELAND.
+
+## The Cyber Threat To The Homeland
+
+Cyber threats to the Homeland from both nation-states and non-state actors will remain acute. U.S. critical infrastructure faces advanced threats of disruptive or destructive cyber-attacks. Federal, state, local, tribal and territorial governments, as well as the private sector, will experience an array of cyber-enabled threats designed to access sensitive information, steal money, and force ransom payments.
+
+## Nation State Threats
+
+Russiawhich possesses some of the most sophisticated cyber capabilities in the world
+can disrupt or damage U.S. critical infrastructure networks via cyber-attacks. Russian state-affiliated actors will continue targeting U.S. industry and all levels of government with intrusive cyber espionage to access economic, policy, and national security information to further the Kremlin's strategic interests.
+
+-
+Russia probably can conduct cyber-attacks
+that would result in at least localized effects over hours to days and probably is developing capabilities that would cause more debilitating effects.
+-
+We expect Russian cyber actors to use a range of capabilities including social engineering, publicly known software and hardware vulnerabilities, poorly configured networks,
+and sophisticated "zero-day" attacks that exploit security weaknesses in software.
+-
+Under Russian law, the Federal Security Service (FSB) can compel Russian firms doing business in the United Statesor Russians working with U.S. firmsto comply with FSB information sharing and operational mandates, presenting additional routes for cyber espionage.
+China already poses a high cyber espionage threat to the Homeland and Beijing's cyber-attack capabilities will grow. Chinese cyber actors almost certainly will continue to engage in wide-ranging cyber espionage to steal intellectual property2 and personally identifiable information (PII) from U.S. businesses and government agencies to bolster their civil-military industrial development, gain an economic advantage, and support intelligence operations. China possesses an increasing ability to threaten and potentially disrupt U.S. critical infrastructure.
+
+-
+We expect China's cyber operations against U.S. companies to focus on the critical manufacturing, defense industrial base, energy, healthcare, and transportation sectors.
+-
+Beijing has targeted information technology and communications firms whose products and services support government and private-sector networks worldwide, while concurrently advocating globally for Chinese information technology companies that could serve as espionage platforms.
+-
+Under China's 2017 National Intelligence Law, Beijing can compel businesses based in China and Chinese citizens living abroad to provide intelligence to the Chinese government.
+-
+We remain concerned about China's intent to
+compromise U.S. critical infrastructure in order to cause disruption or destruction.
+-
+China's efforts to dominate the 5G world pose new challenges to U.S. efforts to national security, privacy, resistance to malign influence, and human rights. The exponential increases in speed, connectivity, and productivity could render American systems particularly vulnerable to Chinese cyber threats.
+While Russia and China are the most capable nation-state cyber adversaries, Iranian and North Korean cyber actors also pose a threat to U.S. systems, networks, and information. Iran continues to present a cyber espionage threat and is developing access in the Homeland that could be repurposed for destructive cyber-attacks.  North Korean cyber capabilities, while sophisticated, probably will remain confined to criminal generation of revenue. If Pyongyang's intent changes, however, it probably could quickly build capabilities to conduct broader espionage activity or threaten infrastructure with disruptive cyber-attacks.
+
+## Cybercrime
+
+activities, including efforts to target voter registration systems; to compromise election system supply chains; to exploit poor cybersecurity practices on protected election systems or networks; or to hack official election websites or social media accounts.
+
+Cybercriminals increasingly will target U.S. critical infrastructure to generate profit, whether through ransomware, e-mail impersonation fraud, social engineering3, or malware. Underground marketplaces that trade in stolen information and cyber tools will continue to thrive and serve as a resource, even for sophisticated foreign adversaries.
+
+-
+Unidentified cyber actors have engaged in suspicious communications with the U.S. Census public-facing network over at least the last year, including conducting vulnerability scans and attempting unauthorized access. Cyber activity directed at the U.S. Census could include attempts to gain illicit access to census-gathered bulk data;
+to alter census registration data; to compromise the census infrastructure supply chain; or conducting denial-of-service attacks.
+-
+Ransomware attackswhich have at least doubled since 2017often are directed against critical infrastructure entities at the state and local level by exploiting gaps in cybersecurit
+-
+Victims of cybercriminal activity in 2018 reported over $2.7 billion in lossesmore than twice the amount lost in 2017. This figure does not represent the full scope of loss because some victims do not report incidents.
+
+## Cyber Threat To The U.S. Democratic Processes Opportunity For Cyber Actors To Exploit Covid-19
+
+Both cybercriminals and nation-state cyber actors
+motivated by profit, espionage, or disruptionwill
+exploit the COVID-19 pandemic by targeting the U.S.
+healthcare and public health sector; government
+response entities, such as the U.S. Department
+of Health and Human Services and the Federal
+Emergency Management Agency; and the broader
+emergency services sector.
+
+Some state or non-state actors likely will seek to use
+cyber means to compromise or disrupt infrastructure
+used to support the 2020 U.S. Presidential election
+and the 2020 U.S. Census. Given the national
+importance of these events, any related cyber
+activitiesor mere claims of compromisemight
+fuel influence operations aimed at depressing voter
+turnout or census participation, misinforming about
+democratic processes, or shaping perceptions about
+the integrity or outcome of the election or census
+(see subsequent section regarding Foreign Influence
+in the Homeland).
+
+-
+Cybercriminals most likely will deploy ransomware for financial gain, whereas nation-state cyber actors might seek to capture insights into U.S. response plans and scientific information related to testing, therapeutics, and vaccine development.
+-
+Advanced persistent threat or other malicious cyber actors likely will target election-related infrastructure as the 2020 Presidential election approaches, focusing on voter PII, municipal or state networks, or state election officials directly. Operations could occur throughout the 2020 election cyclethrough pre-election activities, Election Day, and the post-election period.
+-
+We expect that cybercriminals and nation-state cyber actors will target victims in the United States with COVID-19-themed spear-phishing e-mails, which we already have observed overseas. These e-mails appear to claim to be from official government sources, including the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the U.S. Department of State.
+-
+Adversaries' cyber capabilities vary greatly as does the cyber defensive posture of electoral boards to stymie such actors. Adversaries could attempt a range of election interference
+2On Thursday, September 17, 2020, FBI Director Wray described China's unmatched success in stealing American intellectual property as "the greatest transfer of wealth in the history of the world." U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Annual Hearing on Threats to the Homeland.
+
+## Foreign Influence Activity In The U.S.
+
+Foreign influence activity will target U.S. foreign and domestic policy, international events such as COVID-19, and democratic processes and institutions, including the 2020 Presidential election. Russia is the likely primary covert influence actor and purveyor of disinformation and misinformation within the Homeland. We assess that Moscow's primary objective is to increase its global standing and influence by weakening Americadomestically and abroadthrough efforts to sow discord, distract, shape public sentiment, and undermine trust in Western democratic institutions and processes.
+
+## Amplifying U.S. Socio-Political Division
+
+-
+Russian influence actors will continue using overt and
+covert methods to aggravate social and racial tensions, undermine trust in U.S. authorities, stoke political resentment, and criticize politicians who Moscow views as anti-Russia. Although some of this activity might
+4 Proxy Website: Foreign news outlets, think tanks, and investigative journalist websites on behalf of foreign governments or foreign government-linked businessmen and oligarchs in a non-overt or non-attributed way and that echo foreign government narratives, talking points, and disinformation. State media often cite these proxy websites and portray them as credible and independent sources of information.
+
+be framed in the context of the U.S. electionseemingly in support of or opposition to political candidates we assess that Moscow's overarching objective is to weaken the United States through discord, division, and distraction in hopes that America becomes less able to challenge Russia's strategic objectives.
+
+-
+Russian influence actors will engage in media manipulationacross social media platforms, proxy
+websites4, and traditional media, to
+include state-controlled outletsto
+exacerbate U.S. social, political, racial,
+and cultural fault lines.5
+-
+Russian actors will attempt to undermine national unity and sow seeds of discord that exploit perceived grievances within minority communities, especially among African Americans. Russian influence actors often mimic target audiences and amplify both sides of divisive issues to maximize discord, tailoring messaging to specific communities to "push and pull" them in different ways.
+-
+The Russian government promulgates misinformation, threats, and narratives intended to incite panic or animosity among social and political groups. For example, Russian actors amplified narratives such as U.S. law
+-
+Russian online influence actors spread misinformation and conspiracy theories about the origin of COVID-19, claiming it is a U.S.-engineered biological weapon that U.S. military officials spread in China.
+enforcement ignoring ICE detention requests and releasing an illegal immigrant accused of rape; assaults on supporters and opponents of the President; and portrayals of U.S. law enforcement as racially biased. Russian influence actors also have exploited national tragedies, such as the 2017 mass shooting in Las Vegas, and protest movementssometimes magnifying both a protest and a counter-protestsuch as the 2017 protest activity in Charlottesville.
+
+## Covid-19 Influence Narratives
+
+Chinese operatives probably are waging disinformation campaigns using overt and covert tacticsincluding social media trolls to shift responsibility for the pandemic to other countries, including the United States. China might increase its influence activities in response to what it views as anti-China statements from the U.S. Government over China's role in the pandemic.
+
+Russian online influence actors are advancing misleading or (what they perceive as) inflammatory narratives about the COVID-19 pandemic probably to stoke fear, undermine the credibility of the U.S. government, and weaken global perceptions of America. Moscow probably will study the American public's reaction to its COVID-19 disinformation to improve future influence campaigns aimed at shaking public confidence in Washington, which it can unleash opportunistically during a crisis, hostilities, or a period of degraded relations.
+
+-
+Since August 2019, more than 10,000 suspected fake Twitter accounts have been involved in a coordinated influence campaign with suspected ties to the Chinese Government. Among these are hacked accounts from users around the world that post messaging and disinformation about the COVID-19 pandemic and other topics of interest to China.
+-
+Russian online influence actors have claimed that the U.S. President is incapable of managing the COVID-19 crisis and sought to exacerbate public concerns by amplifying content critical of the U.S. response to the public health crisis and the economic downturn. In contrast, the actors highlighted China's and Russia's alleged success against the COVID-19 outbreak and praised
+-
+China's Foreign Ministry, state media, and official Twitter accounts promote overt narratives claiming the coronavirus may have originated in the United States, criticize the U.S. pandemic response, and publicize
+
+## Foreign Influence Definitions:
+
+Foreign Influence. Any covert, fraudulent, deceptive, or unlawful activity of foreign governmentsor persons acting on their behalfundertaken with the purpose or effect of influencing, undermining confidence in, or adversely affecting U.S. democratic processes or institutions or otherwise affecting socio-political sentiment or public discourse to achieve malign objectives.
+
+-
+Covert Influence: Activities in which a foreign government hides its involvement, including the use of agents of influence, covert media relationships, cyber influence activities, front organizations, organized crime groups, or clandestine funds for political action.
+-
+Overt Influence: Activities that a foreign government conducts openly or has clear ties to, including the use of strategic communications, public diplomacy, financial support, and some forms of propaganda.
+-
+Disinformation: A foreign government's deliberate use of false or misleading information intentionally directed at another government's decisionmakers and decision-making processes to mislead the target, force it to waste resources, or influence a decision in favor of a foreign government's interests.
+-
+Misinformation: Foreign use of false or misleading information. Misinformation is broader than disinformation because it targets a wide audience rather than a specific group.
+President Putin's COVID-19 plan and Russia's ample supply of tests.
+
+China's COVID-19-related medical assistance to U.S. cities and states. China has doubled the number of official government posts disseminating false narratives about COVID-19 and has carried out persistent and large-scale disinformation and influence operations that correlate with diplomatic messaging.
+
+-
+China most likely will continue amplifying narratives supportive of its pandemic response while denigrating U.S. official criticism that Beijing views as tarnishing its global image.
+Iranian online influence actors are employing inauthentic social media networks, proxy news websites, and state media outlets to amplify false narratives that seek to shift responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic to the United States and other Western nations. Tehran probably will continue to malign the United States for enforcing economic sanctions, arguing these sanctions hinder Iran's ability to put forward an appropriate public health response to the pandemic.
+
+-
+Iranian actors have spread COVID-19 disinformation and false narratives through videos, cartoons, and news stories from state media outlets on popular social media platforms to appeal to U.S. and Western audiences.
+-
+Iranian operatives have covertly used proxy networks and sites to advance narratives suggesting that the United States created the virus as a bioweapon, that Western media is spreading lies about COVID-19 in Iran, and that the Iranian response to the pandemic was better
+than that of the United States.
+
+## 2020 U.S. Presidential Election
+
+Ahead of the 2020 U.S. elections, adversaries are using covert and overt influence measures to try to sway U.S. voters' preferences and perspectives about candidates, political parties, policies, and the electoral process itself. Influence actors will adjust their goals and tactics as the election nears. Russia uses online influence operations in its attempt to sway U.S. voter perceptions. As noted earlier, although some Russian influence activity appears to be in support of or in opposition to specific political candidates, Moscow's overarching objective is to undermine the U.S. electoral process and weaken the United States through discord, division, and distraction in hopes America becomes less able to challenge Russia's strategic objectives.
+
+-
+Russian online influence actors have attacked
+or praised multiple 2020 U.S. Presidential candidatesincluding candidates of both major political parties.  Russia uses divisive measures to disrupt the electoral process including denigrating former Vice President Biden and what it sees as an anti-Russia "establishment"as part of a broader effort to divide and destabilize America. Russian online influence actors' have opined on a wide swath of socio-political issues relevant to the 2020 elections.
+
+
+
+Russian online influence actors probably will engage in efforts to discourage voter turnout
+and to suppress votes in the 2020 U.S. election using methods they have deployed since at least 2016. Before the 2016 U.S. Presidential election, Russian trolls directed messages at specific audiences with false information about the time, manner, or place of voting to suppress votes. Russian influence actors also posed as U.S. persons and discouraged African
+
+## Evolving Influence Tradecraft And Targeting
+
+Russian influence actors are evolving
+their methods of interacting with
+target U.S. audiences and obfuscating
+detection of their online influence
+activity.
+
+-
+We expect that influence actors will evolve their ability to create and operate fake social-media accounts, thereby obfuscating their online influence activity.
+-
+Russian influence actors likely will use U.S.-based servers and other computer infrastructureincluding virtual private networksto mask their location, obscure login activity, and prevent account banning.
+-
+Russian influence actors probably will leverage artificial intelligence to automate the creation and distribution of memes with socially divisive messages on social media. Previously, Russian actors mass produced politically themed picture memes called "demotivators," some of which they produced under the guise of U.S. activist groups.
+Americans, Native Americans, and other minority voters from participating in the 2016 election.
+
+Ahead of the election, China likely will continue using overt and covert influence operations to denigrate the U.S. Presidential Administration and its policies and to shape the U.S. domestic information environment in favor of China. China will further use its traditional "soft power" influence toolkitovert economic measures and lobbyingto promote U.S. policies more aligned with China's interests. Iran will continue to promote messages supporting its foreign policy objectives and to use online influence operations to increase societal tensions in the United States. Tehran most likely considers the current U.S. Administration a threat to the regime's stability. Iran's critical messaging of the U.S. President almost certainly will continue throughout 2020. Russian influence actors see divisive issues regarding the 2020 Census, such as the consideration of adding a citizenship question, as an opportunity to target a fundamental democratic process. In addition to potential cyber operations, Russia might use social media messagingmuch like it does in the context of US electionsto attempt to discourage public participation in the census, to promote a loss of confidence in census results, or to undermine trust in public institutions.
+
+## Influencing State And Local Governments
+
+sister city, Wuhan, 450,000 surgical masks and 1,350 coverall protective suits. Pittsburgh also established a GoFundMe account that raised over $58,000 to support Wuhan response efforts by providing medical supplies.
+
+Foreign governmentsprincipally Chinaseek to cultivate influence with state and local leaders directly and indirectly, often via economic carrots and sticks such as informal and legal or social agreements that seek to promote cultural and commercial ties. Chinese officials calculate that U.S. state- and local-level officials enjoy a degree of diplomatic independence from Washington and may leverage these relationships to advance policies that are in China's interest during times of strained relations.
+
+-
+In Chicago, Chinese officials leveraged local and state official relationships to push pro-Chinese narratives. Also, a Chinese official emailed a Midwestern state legislator to ask that the legislative body of which he was a member pass a resolution recognizing that China has taken heroic steps to fight the virus.
+-
+China views a state or locality's economic challengesincluding healthcare challenges due to COVID-19as a key opportunity to create a dependency, thereby gaining influence. Beijing uses Chinese think tanks to research which U.S. states and counties might be most receptive to China's overtures.
+-
+During the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak, Beijing leveraged sister city relationships with U.S. localities to acquire public health resources. In February, Pittsburgh shipped its
+-
+The Chinese government invites U.S. officials and business leaders on carefully choreographed trips to China, promising them lucrative investment projects and business deals. Although visits this year largely have been postponed due to COVID-19, the Chinese government probably will continue to cultivate state and local relationships virtually and by offering enticements, which might include bailing out U.S. companies, investing in real estate in economically hard-hit areas, and selling medical equipment and supplies at reduced cost.
+
+## Threats To U.S. Economic Security Covid-19 Effects On Economic Security And Health Security
+
+The COVID-19 pandemic has destabilized U.S. supply chains and introduced opportunities for economic competitors to undermine the United States. This will lead to dramatic and sustained disruptions to the global economy and could challenge U.S. economic and supply chain security.
+
+-
+In response to measures to control cross-border flows of people and goods, which have significantly disrupted international trade and supply chains, countries will invest in domestic industries and in countries they consider more reliable suppliers, considering the ability to control illicit activity and protect intellectual property rights. Varying social distancing and lockdown policies will continue to strain and disrupt goods supply chains at multiple levels.
+-
+Access to personal protective equipment (PPE) and pharmaceuticals sourced from abroad or that depend on global supply chains will remain especially vulnerable to disruptions due to sustained demand, foreign government actions to secure these supplies for their countries' use, and the length of time required to reconstitute these production capabilities elsewhere.
+-
+Counterfeiters and other malicious actors have exploited the high demand for essential goods
+during the outbreak by selling substandard or non-approved PPE, vitamins, medicines, and other goods to desperate customers, posing a threat to public health and undermining legitimate businesses. Many manufacturers and distributors have failed to verify that the goods they are selling meet performance specifications. China has been a particularly persistent source of such counterfeit goods.
+-
+Targeting illicit Chinese manufacturers who produced and disseminated fraudulent or prohibited COVID-19 PPE and medical supplies to the United States has resulted in the seizure of over 1,000,000 FDA-prohibited COVID-19 test kits and 750,000 counterfeit masks.
+-
+China is collecting information on U.S. supply chain shortages and is using the COVID-19 crisis to build additional leverage with the United States, given that Beijing controls many critical
+commodities. China could exploit future shortages of critical supplies by conditioning their provision on U.S. acquiescence in other matters important to Beijing.
+
+The political nature of international critiques regarding COVID-19 responses may depress reporting in future public health crises. This highlights the importance of the Global Health Security Agenda and need for continued effort to drive increased participation.
+
+-
+Several countries employed denial and deception efforts to conceal COVID-19 statistics and/or limit COVID-19 testing to maintain a low case count. Countries that were transparent in reporting their COVID-19 case count have occasionally been the subject of criticism by adversarial countries. These influence operations may induce countries to limit transparency during future outbreaks, increasing the risk that outbreaks will turn into pandemics as they will not be addressed robustly while still locally or regionally contained.
+
+## Exploiting U.S. Academic Institutions And Research
+
+China will continue seeking U.S. research and expertise vital to its economic and military advancement by using a wide range of government, non-government, and private actors and platforms. Chinawhich has mobilized vast resources to support its industrial development and defense goalswill continue exploiting U.S. academic institutions and the visa system to transfer valuable research and intellectual property (IP) that Beijing calculates will provide a military or economic advantage over the United States and other nations.  Beijing uses some visiting professors, scholars, and students in the United States as non-traditional collectors (NTCs)individuals who conduct their espionage-like activities by exploiting open systems rather than clandestinelyby virtue of their participation in targeted research and development activities. These NTCs most often include a subset of graduate- and post-graduatelevel researchers studying in certain science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields. Although some NTCs are unwitting, by U.S. industry, academia, and local governments of China's tactics for acquiring technology and IPwe expect NTCs will adjust their methods, including by taking different paths to travel to the United States or shifting their studies abroad while still aiming to collect sensitive U.S. information and intellectual property.
+
+others are cognizant of their role and some have admitted to stealing research from U.S. institutions to advance Chinese research. These non-traditional collectors depart the United States and return to China, taking research and materials without the consent of the academic institutions, often deliberately hiding the material prior to their departure to prevent its detection.
+
+## Foreign Investment In The United States
+
+-
+In January 2020, a Chinese post-graduate researcher in Boston was indicted for allegedly attempting to smuggle stolen vials of biological research; he stated that he planned to bring them to China to conduct research
+in his own laboratory and publish the results under his own name.
+Although Chinese foreign direct investment in the United States over the last two years has decreased from record highs, China will continue to pursue select investment in the United States to gain new technologies that it cannot produce domestically, to develop its own industrial base, and to secure access to critical supply chains.
+
+-
+Some Chinese firms will adapt to enhanced U.S. national security vetting of foreign direct investmentintroduced as part of the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA)by using new types of investment structures and new legal methods. Foreign companies seeking to invest in U.S. businesses might bolster efforts to obfuscate their links to intelligence or security services, such as by using cutout organizations for acquisitions.
+
+## Threats To U.S. Supply Chain Integrity
+
+-
+In June 2020, a Chinese student was arrested at Los Angeles International Airport for visa fraud, having failed to disclose on his visa application that he was an Officer in the People's Liberation Army (PLA). During an outbound interview with U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), he admitted to providing access to research from a California university to the PLA. He said that his supervisorthe director of his military university laboratory in Chinainstructed him to observe the university's layout and bring the information to replicate it in China.
+China and Russia will continue to represent the top threats to U.S. supply chain security, given the sophisticated intelligence and cyber capabilities they can use to infiltrate trusted suppliers and vendors to target equipment and systems. Criminal actors also will engage in efforts to compromise supply chains, with such methods as inserting malicious code in a third party's software to conduct operations against firms that use the software. Criminal and state actors also attempt to compromise supply chains through protectionist measures and by exploiting rapid procurement procedures at the local, state, and federal level during disasters.
+
+China's government-run talent recruitment programs facilitate licit and illicit transfer of U.S. technology, IP, and know-how to further China's Science and Technology development and military modernization. The programs recruit overseas academics, scientists, and other experts and reward them for stealing proprietary information and delivering it to the Chinese government to gain an advantage over the United States. Recipient contracts in many cases require them to keep the terms secret and transfer IP rights to the sponsoring Chinese institution. Some program participants are incentivized or obligated to establish "shadow laboratories" in China that mirror U.S. taxpayer-funded research to provide China with early insights into U.S. research before discoveries are shared globally. Several U.S. professors selected by these programs have been charged with crimes, including fraud and theft of trade secrets.
+
+-
+We are especially concerned about adversaries' exploitation of information and communications technology (ICT) supply chains given that the goods that rely on these supply chains play a vital role in most aspects of life. Some actors might exploit ICT through "white labeling"rebranding equipment or altering equipment's visual appearance to obfuscate the original manufacturerto get compromised goods into supply chains.
+Now that the U.S. government is aware of these methods of exploiting academic institutions and research, Beijing's strategy will likely change. Considering the issuance of Presidential Proclamation 10043 banning the entry of certain students associated with China's military-civil fusion strategyas well as increased awareness
+
+-
+As Chinese firms become more competitive globally and achieve market dominance in
+key sectors, the United States will be less able to source and supply key goods and services that are not dependent on Chinese investment or suppliers.
+
+-
+The United States and other nations competing for globally scarce resources during disasters, will struggle to keep up with economies that lower quality standards and requisition U.S. subsidiaries manufacturing facilities to hoard supplies. During the COVID-19 outbreak, Chinese state-owned enterprises were encouraged to convert manufacturing without having
+the capacity or quality control to produce medical supplies and equipment. In addition to quality control issues, Chinese suppliers export products under one licensed company's name but source their products from second, third or fourth factories with little to no traceability down the chain of supply. In March, a Canadian manufacturer of face masks with factories in China, reported the Chinese government requisitioned all production and nothing was being exported.
+-
+China began accumulating critical medical supplies rather than ship them to buyers in other countries - indicating apparent knowledge of the outbreak and efforts to hoard critical medical supplies.
+
+## Violations Of U.S. Trade Laws And Policies
+
+China will remain the leading source of U.S.
+
+trade policy violations. Actions by China-based criminal organizations will continue to present the principal challenge to U.S. enforcement of trade laws and policies in the year ahead, despite progress in U.S.-China negotiations aimed at addressing this issue.
+
+-
+Chinese entities' infringement on the IP rights of U.S. entities costs the U.S. economy as much as $600 billion annually and adversely impacts U.S. industries and competitiveness.
+-
+In Fiscal Year 2019, DHS seized more counterfeit goods originating from China than any other country. Counterfeit goods from China and Hong Kong pose the greatest challenge to IP enforcement and present health and safety risks to the public due to the sub-standard quality of most counterfeit products.
+
+## The Terrorist Threat To The Homeland
+
+Ideologically motivated lone offenders and small groups pose the most likely terrorist threat to the Homeland, with Domestic Violent Extremists presenting the most persistent and lethal threat. Foreign terrorist organizations will continue to call for Homeland attacks but probably will remain constrained in their ability to direct such plots over the next year. Iran will maintain terrorist capabilities, including through proxies such as Lebanese Hizballah, as an option to deter the United States from taking action Tehran considers regime-threatening.
+
+## Violent Extremism In The United States
+
+incite violence, intimidate targets, and promote their violent extremist ideologies.
+
+-
+Simple tacticssuch as vehicle ramming, small arms, edged weapons, arson, and rudimentary improvised explosive devices (IEDs)probably will be most common. However, lone offenders could employ more sophisticated means, to include advanced and/or high-consequence IEDs and using crude chemical, biological, and radiological materials.
+The primary terrorist threat inside the United States will stem from lone offenders and small cells of individuals, including Domestic Violent Extremists6
+(DVEs) and foreign terrorist-inspired Homegrown Violent Extremists7 (HVEs). Some U.S.-based violent extremists have capitalized on increased social and political tensions in 2020, which will drive an elevated threat environment at least through early 2021. Violent extremists will continue to target individuals or institutions that represent symbols of their grievances, as well as grievances based on political affiliation or perceived policy positions.
+
+-
+While ISIS and other Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) have called for attacks in the West using "all available means," biologicalfocused attempts would likely involve crudely produced toxins and poisons. Similarly, during the COVID-19 outbreak, domestic extremists have called for the spread of the SARS-CoV-2
+virus through unsophisticated means. While significant expertise and infrastructure limits the threat by low-level actors, even rudimentary actions can result in economically significant costs and incite fear without a corresponding risk to health.
+The domestic situation surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic creates an environment that could accelerate some individuals' mobilization to targeted violence or radicalization to terrorism. Social distancing may lead to social isolation, which is associated with depression, increased anxiety, and social alienation. Similarly, work disruptions, including unexpected unemployment and layoffs, can also increase risk factors associated with radicalization to violence and willingness to engage in acts of targeted violence.
+
+-
+Violent extremist media almost certainly will spread violent extremist ideologies, especially via social media, that encourage violence and influence action within the United States.
+Some DVEs and other violent actors8 might target events related to the 2020 Presidential campaigns, the election itself, election results, or the post-election period. Such actors could mobilize quickly to threaten or engage in violence. Violence related to government efforts to mitigate the COVID-19 pandemic and amidst otherwise ongoing lawful protests has exacerbated the typical
+
+-
+Violent extremists will continue their efforts to exploit public fears associated with COVID-19 and social grievances driving lawful protests to
+election-season threat environment.
+
+-
+Some DVEs have heightened their attention to election- or campaign-related activities, candidates' public statements, and policy issues connected to specific candidates, judging from domestic terrorism plots since 2018 targeting individuals based on their actual or perceived political affiliations.
+-
+Open-air, publicly accessible parts of physical election infrastructure, such as campaignassociated mass gatherings, polling places, and voter registration events, would be the most likely flashpoints for potential violence.
+Among DVEs, racially and ethnically motivated violent extremistsspecifically white supremacist extremists9 (WSEs)will remain the most persistent and lethal threat in the Homeland. Spikes in other DVE threats probably will depend on political or social issues that often mobilize other ideological actors to violence, such as immigration, environmental, and police-related policy issues.
+
+-
+WSEs have demonstrated longstanding intent to target racial and religious minorities, members of the LGBTQ+ community, politicians, and those they believe promote multi-culturalism and globalization at the expense of the WSE identity. Since 2018, they have conducted more lethal attacks in the United States than any other DVE movement.
+-
+Some WSEs have engaged in outreach and networking opportunities abroad with
+This chart depicts DVE and homegrown violent extremists (HVEs) attacks in the US since 2018
+that posed a threat to life, based on DHS data. 2019 was the most lethal year for domestic violent extremism in the United States since the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995.  We are still evaluating data for incidents occurring in 2020. VEs perpetrated 16 attacks, killing 48, whereas HVEs conducted
+5 attacks and killed 1 person. Among DVE actors, WSEs conducted half of all lethal attacks (8 of 16), resulting in the majority of deaths (39 of 48).  All the DVE attackers had a dominant violent extremist ideology, with many motivated by multiple violent extremist ideologies or violent extremist ideologies unconnected to global violent extremist groups.
+
+like-minded individuals to expand their violent extremist networks. Such outreach might lead to a greater risk of mobilization to violence, including traveling to conflict zones.
+
+-
+Other racially or ethnically motivated violent extremists could seek to exploit concerns about social injustice issues to incite violence and exploit otherwise peaceful protests movements.
+Another motivating force behind domestic terrorism that also poses a threat to the Homeland is anti-government/anti-authority violent extremism.
+
+-
+These violent extremists, sometimes influenced by anarchist ideology, have been associated with multiple plots and attacks, which included a significant uptick in violence against law enforcement and government symbols in 2020.  This ideology is also exploited by hostile nation-states, which seek to promote it through disinformation campaigns and sow additional chaos and discord across American society.
+-
+Anti-government and/or anti-authority violent extremists are likely to be emboldened by a perceived success exploiting otherwise peaceful protest movements and concealing violent tactics. These violent extremists are increasingly
+taking advantage of large protest crowds to conduct violence against government officials, facilities, and counter-protestors.
+
+-
+The primary threat to the Homeland from FTOs probably will manifest as "inspired" attacks. FTOs seek to inspire violent extremism in the United States and continue to use social media and other online platforms to call for attacks against the United States. Despite territorial defeats in Iraq and Syria, ISIS continues to draw support from HVEs in the United States and the group's global calls for attacks have intensified since the death last year of senior leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.
+-
+We also remain particularly concerned about the impacts from COVID-19 where anti-government and anti-authority violent extremists could be motivated to conduct attacks in response to perceived infringement of liberties and government overreach as all levels of government seek to limit the spread of the coronavirus that has caused a worldwide pandemic.
+-
+Transportation infrastructureespecially the aviation sectoralmost certainly will
+remain a primary target for terrorists plotting overseas. While terrorists continue to pursue flight school training and the use of insiders, plotting against domestic aviation targets most likely will remain aspirational among FTOs and their supporters over the next year.
+-
+Ideologies driven by such DVE's often are
+reinforced by a variety of online content, including conspiracy theories and political commentary they view as controversial. Current events that DVEs perceive as infringing on their worldviews often contribute to periods of increased ideologically motivated violence, including recently during the COVID-19 pandemic and nationwide lawful protests.
+-
+Terrorists and other criminal actors might look to unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) to threaten critical infrastructure. In 2019, there were nearly 4,000 reports of unique incidents of UAS activity near U.S. critical infrastructure or public gatherings. Although we have no indication that any of these events were terrorism-related, it is possible that malicious or criminal actors will turn to UAS tactics.
+
+## Iran And Lebanese Hizballah
+
+-
+The domestic threat environment is rapidly evolving. Operational reporting shows that DHS law enforcement officers suffered over 300 separate injuries while they were present during months of nightly unrest in Portland, Oregon. This is but one example among many across the country, including in Brooklyn, New York, and Kenosha, Wisconsin, where law enforcement officers have been injured or killed.  These increasingly pervasive incidents highlight the threat of anarchist violence that has accelerated in our cities in recent months.
+
+## Foreign Terrorist Threats
+
+Iran will continue to develop and maintain terrorist capabilities as an option to deter the United States from taking what Tehran considers regimethreatening actions or to retaliate for such activity, real or perceived. The Government of Iran and its proxy, Lebanese Hizballah (LH), have demonstrated the intent to conduct an array of operations in the Homeland.  Iran or LH could advance an attack plotwith little to no warningin response to heightened tensions. The U.S. Government in recent years has arrested several individuals acting on behalf of the Government of Iran or LH who have conducted surveillance indicative of contingency planning for lethal attacks in the U.S.
+
+## Weapons Of Mass Destruction And Other Chemical, Biological, Radiological, And Nuclear Threats
+
+The overall global WMD threat will continue Foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), including al-Qa'ida and the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham
+(ISIS), will maintain interest in attacking the Homeland but we expect the primary threat from these groups to remain overseas in the coming year due to sustained U.S. counterterrorism pressure. Nevertheless, these groups can adapt quickly and resurge, and terrorists overseas will continue to probe for vulnerabilities in U.S. immigration and border security programs. Collectively, vulnerabilities may create an illegal migration environment that FTOs could exploit to facilitate the movement of affiliated persons towards the United States.
+to rise in 2021. Spurred by continued capability expansion, modernization, low yield weapons development, eroding international norms, information proliferation, emerging drone concerns and increasing actor awareness; the risk of intentional chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear incidents in the homeland and abroad has likely increased.
+
+-
+Biological threats (deliberate, accidental, and naturally occurring) are more diverse and continue to expand with increased global interconnectivity and rapid advances in biotechnology, genomics, and other legitimate-use capabilities that could introduce
+risks to global health and food security and the potential for adversaries to develop novel biological warfare agents. Notably, the biological agent attribution shortfalls coupled with the now known devastating impacts may lead to a resurgence of state and non-state biological weapon pursuits.
+-
+Chemical threats are particularly notable as we continue in the most significant and sustained period of chemical weapons use in decades. The publicity of emerging chemical weapons compounds and increases in information availability is evolving the chemical threat landscape.  This global trend could manifest as an increased domestic threat.
+-
+Radiological attacks are less likely, guidelines for hazards and safe handling of radiation sources reduce the likelihood of radiological attacks; however, actors driven by extremist ideology could pose a threat if they have knowledge
+and access of locations to aid radioactive materials acquisition. The major licensed users of radioactive material in the United States are in the energy, healthcare, and construction sectors with larger activity sources protected by physical security measures. The amount of radioactive material in use is not expected to increase in the short term.
+-
+Nuclear threats remain enduring and will remain largely unchanged. The number of nuclear weapons states will probably remain unchanged over the next year. Concerns remain related to lower yield weapons development and regional expansion of nuclear capabilities by several nuclear weapons states and the subsequent increasing risks of weapons loss or nuclear conflict that could have global impacts. Non-state actors continue to face
+significant barriers to acquiring special nuclear material for use in an improvised nuclear device, but vulnerabilities remain. Experts do, however, estimate the rate of nuclear security improvement around the globe has decreased since 2018. The COVID-19 pandemic has drawn government resources away from normal functions, similar to resource shifts observed globally in military and other defense sectors; nuclear security may also be vulnerable to resource shifts which could increase risks of theft or sabotage of nuclear facilities. Domestic and foreign-based non-state actors attempting to steal special nuclear material for use in a nuclear weapon will continue to pose a threat to the Homeland.
+
+## Tco Threats To U.S. Security
+
+Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)especially those based in Mexicowill continue to undermine public health and safety in the Homeland and threaten U.S. national security interests.  They represent an acute and devastating threat to public health and safety in the Homeland and a significant threat to U.S. national security interests. Beyond their complicity in the 71,000 drug overdose deaths in the U.S. last year, TCOs destabilize partner nations, decrease citizen confidence in good governance, foment corruption, and destroy confidence in the international banking system. Countering these organizations' malign activities will remain an enduring challenge to US safety and security. TCOs will continue to take advantage of illegal migration flows to enter the United States and attempt to exploit legal immigration avenues. Criminal elements attempting to provide a level of legitimacy to their illicit immigration claims by intermingling with migrants travelling to the US Southwest border pose an intrinsic risk to the U.S. lawful immigration system.
+
+## Mexico-Based Cartels
+
+retail-level drug distribution and sales for Mexican TCOsvie for access to new users, the United States may face increased criminal violence in some parts of the country. Social distancing lockdown measures, however, probably will moderate any increase in the near term, as opportunistic crimes become less frequent.
+
+Among TCOs, Mexico-based cartels pose the greatest threat to the Homeland because of their ability to control territoryincluding along the U.S. Southwest Borderand co-opt parts of government, particularly at a state and local level.
+
+Although COVID-19 has disrupted some cartel operations, their ability to move large quantities of illicit goods into and throughout the Homeland remains largely intact.
+
+## Illicit Drugs
+
+-
+Of the Mexico-based TCOs, the Sinaloa and Jalisco New Generation Cartel (CJNG) networks pose the greatest cross-border drug smuggling threat in the near-term; they dominate the lucrative trafficking of cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, and methamphetamine to the United States.
+The COVID-19 pandemic has slowed the pace of drug trafficking into the United States; however, the threat of illicit drugsincluding the rates of overdoseswill persist as traffickers adapt and drug compositions become more potent.  TCOs continue to distribute synthetic narcotics such as fentanyl and methamphetamine.
+
+-
+Mexican TCO fracturing, disruption of previous drug supply chains, and territorial disputes especially over important cross-border plazasalmost certainly will lead to increased violence in Mexico, along the U.S. Southwest Border, in the year ahead. Mexican border states experienced nearly 12,000 homicides in 2019, most of which involved TCOs.
+-
+As U.S.-based gangssome of which provide
+-
+Potent opioid narcotics like fentanyl and heroin almost certainly will continue to cause alarming levels of overdose in the United States over the next year.  The use of stimulant drugs like methamphetamine and cocaine will continue, and distributors will explore new markets in the United States beyond major transportation hubs and regional cities.
+-
+TCOs engaged in the manufacturing of fentanyl and methamphetamine will likely experience mid-term disruption due to COVID-19 response measures that may hinder their receipt of chemicals from international suppliers. Production and transportation of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana also has been affected by travel restrictions and stay-at-home orders within the Western Hemisphere.
+
+## Human Smuggling
+
+Mexico-based cartels play an influential role in human smuggling, often facilitating illicit migration over and near the border. Mexico-based drug cartels control large sections of territory just south of the United States southwest land border and have traditionally taxed human smugglers and traffickers to move migrants through their areas of operation. Since the COVID-19 pandemic began, these criminal groups have continued efforts to facilitate the movement of migrants throughout most of their routes.
+
+## Exploitation Of Others For Profit
+
+Criminal elements will continue to exploit others to facilitate their pursuit of illicit profits.
+
+-
+Human traffickingboth sex trafficking and forced laborremains a significant issue. Top threats include sex trafficking and juvenile sex
+trafficking, domestic labor trafficking and indentured servitude, and goods imported into the United States that were produced by forced labor.  These illicit activities often have a nexus to criminal organizations, such as those operating illicit massage businesses or engaged in exploitation of migrant and undocumented populations.
+
+-
+Child exploitation is also a significant issue. Top threats in this area include the proliferation of online Child Sexual Abuse Material, live streaming of child sexual exploitation, online enticement and extortion,
+and child sex trafficking.
+-
+Criminal networks engage in multiple types of illicit financial activities to maintain affirmative control of their proceeds, including bulk cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering (TBML), third party money laundering (3PML), virtual currency-based money laundering and fraud, and transnational financial fraud schemes. The top threats in the illicit finance area are Chinese TCOs, money laundering organizations specializing in supporting drug trafficking organizations, Colombian money brokers, West African TCOs, and cyber hacking groups.
+
+## Illegal Immigration To The United States
+
+The duration and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic will shape migration to the U.S. Southwest Border into 2021, along with traditional push and pull factors stemming from weak economic and political conditions in the region. COVID-19's impact on Caribbean nations increases the chance of a mass migration event from Cuba or Haiti. Although the majority of migrants do not pose a national security or public safety threat, pathways used by migrants to travel to the United States have been exploited by threat actors. As a result, surges of migrants could undermine our ability to effectively secure the border without adversely impacting other parts of the immigration system.
+
+## Illegal Immigration Via Land
+
+The duration and severity of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States and within Central and South America and the Caribbean will shape illegal immigration to the U.S. Southwest Border, exacerbating the underlying economic and political conditions in the region. As COVID-19-related restrictions on mobility ease, we are seeing an increase in illegal immigration flows to pre-pandemic levels.
+
+remain key drivers of U.S.-bound migration from the Caribbean and Central and South America, especially as COVID-19-related citizen mobility restrictions ease in the region. Seasonal weather changes and perceptions of U.S. and Mexican immigration and enforcement policies and measures also will shape migration patterns as inter-governmental division and inconsistent messaging continue to impede Congressionally mandated immigration enforcement policies.
+
+## Human Trafficking
+
+-
+Illegal immigration flows within the Western Hemisphere have begun to increase after a short-term decline in response to the world-wide COVID-19 pandemic and countries instituting border transit restrictions. Over the
+medium term, mass migration might occur if the economies of the Caribbean, Central and South American countries continue to decline and if the health and humanitarian response capabilities continue to deteriorate due to COVID-19. Mass migration especially might occur if these negative conditions are coupled with an economic resurgence in the United States.
+Human traffickers continue to use force, fraud, and coercion against millions of victims worldwide, as many of them attempt to gain entry to the United States via the southwest land border. Many victims never seek assistance from law enforcement because of language barriers, fear of retaliation from their traffickers and/or fear of law enforcement. This allows traffickers to force victims into labor or commercial sexual exploitation. Traffickers continue to target people they believe to be susceptible for a wide variety of reasons including but not limited to psychological or emotional vulnerability, economic hardship, natural disasters, political instability or a lack of a social safety net.
+
+-
+COVID-19-related international travel restrictions that many countries have instituted have curtailed some illegal immigration from outside the Western Hemisphere. When these measures are lifted, there will be sporadic illegal immigration into and through the region.
+-
+Increased illegal immigration to the U.S. Southwest Border will require United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to re-examine how resources are properly aligned at the Southwest Border, likely impacting the larger asylum system. Increasing numbers of
+-
+Weak job markets, high crime rates, and governmental or non-state repression will
+apprehensions will lead to an increased number of fear claims, requiring USCIS to dedicate additional resources to protection screenings and away from addressing case backlogs such as the asylum case backlog.
+
+-
+Social distancing requirements could continue to affect work taking place in detention facilities along the Southwest border. Budgetary impediments towards immigration enforcement and lack of bipartisan support of detention measures continue to undermine U.S. immigration enforcement policies. Such inconsistent practices continue to lead to
+the release of dangerous criminal aliens and absconders who may then commit additional crimes when they might otherwise have been expeditiously detained and removed from the United States.
+-
+Since 2014, DHS has experienced repeated illegal immigration surges at the Southwest Border. DHS anticipates that the number of apprehensions at the border will significantly climb post-pandemic, with the potential for another surge as those who were previously prevented from seeking entry into the United States arrive at the border and as poor economic conditions around the world fuel migration. This high volume of illegal immigration, including unprecedented numbers of family units and unaccompanied alien children arrivals, stretch government resources, and create a humanitarian and border security crisis that cripples the immigration system.
+-
+Record migration at the Southwest Border took up limited U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detention resources, drove increases in the agency's average daily population (ADP), resulted in decreased interior arrests (including arrests of criminals), and forced ICE to balance its critical public safety mission in the interior with its support for DHS efforts to secure the border. As the pandemic subsides, ICE will conduct additional enforcement operations to uphold its public safety mission and address the growing fugitive backlog.
+-
+DHS projects that until fundamental changes are made to the immigration enforcement process, including legislation that addresses current legal loopholes that incentivize high levels of illegal immigration, the United States will periodically experience additional humanitarian and border security crises.
+
+## Illegal Immigration At Sea
+
+The impact of COVID-19 very likely will affect maritime migration from both migrant origin and transit countries in the Caribbean through 2021. Weak socio-economic conditions in Cuba, political instability and food insecurity in Haiti, and the uncertainty of COVID-19 impacts in the region will increase the chances of a maritime mass migration event, although the overall risk remains low.
+
+-
+Interviews of interdicted migrants reveal that some still desire to come to the United States, regardless of the risk posed by COVID-19, rather than face the deteriorating economic conditions in their home
+countries.
+-
+Measures such as border closures, quarantines, and a reduction in legitimate vessel traffic can disrupt migrant flows; however, increased food insecurity and unemployment, reduced economic opportunities, a lack of medical infrastructure, and other second- and third-order effects in migrants' home countries serve as likely push factors resulting in increased maritime migration to the United States.
+-
+In the event of increased maritime migration, the U.S. Coast Guard and USCIS will need to increase interdiction and screening resources in the region. This could result in the reallocation of limited resources, impacting the ability to conduct other operations.
+
+## Natural Disasters
+
+Natural disasterswhich refer to all types of severe weather, including floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, wildfires, and winter stormsremain an ongoing threat to the nation. These disasters pose a significant threat to human health and safety, property, critical infrastructure, and homeland security while subjecting the nation to frequent periods of insecurity, disruption, and economic loss. Over the last year, the United States has faced the COVID-19 crisis while simultaneously dealing with numerous natural disasters. These natural disasters require the Department to readjust its priority focus, as resources continue to be reallocated to focus on responding to multiple natural disasters, while continuing to handle its traditional roles and responsibilities.
+
+## Hurricanes
+
+the same. Federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial officials, along with the private sector and non-governmental organizations, must continue to partner together to fulfill their respective missions and help disaster survivors.
+
+## Wildfires
+
+Wildland fires pose a major threat to lives, property, and ecosystem integrity. Wildfires increase the likelihood of adverse impacts, including flooding, erosion, reduced water quality, loss of key wildlife habitat, and other ecological and economic impacts.
+
+Hurricanes pose a persistent hazard to life and property.  DHS assesses that hurricanes will continue to pose a hazard for the United States and its territories in the coming months. While their individual impact varies based on the intensity and duration of the storms, hurricanes are one of nature's most destructive forces, which can cause enormous damage and may precipitate mudslides, flash floods, storm surges, and wind and fire damage.  Severe weather events associated with hurricanes can have widespread impacts across multiple states, take lives, damage or destroy property, and impact the nation's economic capability. They have the potential to overwhelm the emergency response and recovery capabilities of the affected state(s) and may require the sustained deployment of Federal assets.
+
+-
+Thus far in 2020, there have been 94 large fires,
+which have burned approximately 5.37 million acres throughout the West.  September alone saw 87 large fires burning simultaneously uncontained from the West Coast to the Rocky Mountains, with over 25 Fire Management Assistance Grants approved. Wildfires not only pose a threat to key infrastructure, housing, and public safety but also contribute to poor air quality.
+-
+The 2020 season has been the second most active Atlantic hurricane season on record, behind only the 2005 season.  This season was the first to see seven named tropical cyclones make landfall in the continental United States before September, which became the most active September on record with 10 tropical or subtropical storms.
+-
+Efforts to undertake better and more active land management will be needed at every level of government in order to reduce the annual threat of wildfires.  Such challenges cannot be addressed simply within the federal government, but must also involve state and private actors to better prepare to minimize the impacts of wildfires.
+-
+As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Nation continues to face unprecedented challenges as we respond to the compounding issues surrounding the 2020 hurricane season. Although the operating environment has changed the mission of helping people before, during, and after disasters remains
+WITH HONOR AND INTEGRITY, WE WILL SAFEGUARD THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, OUR HOMELAND, AND OUR VALUES

markdown/misc/dod-dna.md

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+# The Department Of Defense Dna Registry And The U.S. Government Accounting Mission
+
+Brion C. Smith
+
+## Strategic Plan 2005-2010 Principal Goals:
+
+... according to AFDIL
+
+1. Expand and accelerate accounting efforts worldwide.
+Optimize case processing volume, turn-around time, and results integration
+2. Achieve unity of U.S. Government accounting efforts.
+Policy, command/control and resource planning designed to meet requirement
+
+## 3. Maintain Personnel Recovery Capabilities That Meet Current And Future Joint, Interagency, And Coalition Requirements.
+
+Identify future requirements, see Goal 2
+
+4. Reinforce confidence in U.S. Government personnel accounting with our national constituency.
+Credentials and visibility
+5. Develop and maintain a skilled, diverse workforce with the tools to succeed.
+Competitive employer, stable work environment, develop a career track
+6. Leverage technology to enhance personnel accounting and recovery.
+Screen and focus efforts, *research* is not a "dirty word," confidential disclosure agreements
+
+## Dod Dna Registry: History And Organization Mission(S) Facilities People Funding Dpmo Strategic Goals
+
+" The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs is authorized to establish policies and requirements for the use of DNA analysis to aid in the identification of remains.  The Assistant Secretary may establish a registry to carry out those policies and meet those requirements.  The registry may include a DNA identification laboratory and an appropriate specimen repository."
+Donald .J. Atwood, DSD
+16 December 1991
+- 10 USC 176 and 177
+- DoDD 5154.24 and DoDI 5154.30
+In December 1991, AFDIL sent a team to the U.S Army Central Identification Laboratory-Hawaii (CILHI) to develop a strategy for AFDIL support of CILHI casework. And in 1992, with the establishment of Joint Task Force - Full Accounting (JTF-FA), the CILHI requested through the U.S. Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel that AFDIL scale-up operations to increase case output . With approval from ASD (HA), initial funding was made available from the U.S. Army Casualty and Memorial Affairs Operations Center (CMAOC).
+
+## 1994 - Conflicting Mitochondrial Dna Test Results On Cilhi Cases Between Two Laboratories
+
+1.
+DASD (POW/MIA) chaired meeting to clarify potential problems encountered with mtDNA for human remains identification in Department of Defense in March 1994
+2.
+ASD (Health Affairs) acknowledged as responsible for QA of mtDNA testing for human remains identification in February 1995
+3.
+Working Group developed standards for mtDNA testing which were accepted by Defense Science Board in July 1995
+4.
+As part of the Defense Science Board recommendations a DNA Quality Assurance Sub-Committee of the AFIP Scientific Advisory Board was created in August 1995 to meet annually.
+LTG Kevin Kiley, TSG EA for AFIP
+
+## Brac "Dis-Establish Afip" "Afme To Dover Afb"
+
+LTG Peach Taylor, TSG EA for AFME?
+
+## Personnel Accounting Armed Forces Medical Examiner
+
+JFAADD
+Joint Federal Agencies Antiterrorism DNA Database Humanitarian Mass Fatality Incidents Forensic Research
+
+## National Security Tedac Tedac Ngic Ngic
+
+Armed Forces Repository of Specimen Samples for the Identification of Remains The Repository now contains over
+4,500,000 cards Inside one of the 200 C freezers at AFRSSIR
+
+## - 1396 Samples In Fy2003 - 2414 Samples In Fy2004 - 2254 Samples In Fy2005* With A 99% Success Afmes Dna Casework Army Hrc Funding And Jpac Samples Joint Federal Agencies Antiterrorism Dna Database Joint Federal Agencies Antiterrorism Dna Database Joint Federal Agencies Antiterrorism Dna Database Jfaadd Jfaadd
+
+- 7,000 detainee samples processed
+- 10,000 inbound from OIF/OEF
+
+Gillette Complex
+(AFDIL)
+The AFRSSIR occupies 11,025 sq ft at the UPS
+Building.  This includes hallways, restrooms, and common areas.
+
+## 11,025 Sq Ft (Ups Bldg)
+
+The AFDIL and DNA Division Administration currently occupies about 33,600 sq ft at the Gillette Building.
+30,000 sq ft (Bldg 101, 2nd Floor) 1,600 sq ft (Bldg 102, 2nd Floor)
+2,000 sq ft (Bldg 101, 1st Floor)
+
+## Ups Building (Afrssir) Dod Dna Registry Dod Dna Registry
+
+Repository AFMES Support Administrative & Logistics Support Facility Scientific Staff Software Development Equipment Facility
+
+## Accreditation
+
+American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors
+(ASCLD - LAB Certification)
+College of American Pathologists
+(CAP Basic Laboratory and Molecular Biology)
+DoD DNA Oversight Committee
+(Part of DoD QA Program (DSB 1995) and reports to ASD(HA)
+AFIP Scientific Advisory Board
+
+# Target: National Association Of Medical Examiners
+
+Software Development
+
+## Facts:
+
+- The premier forensic DNA laboratory in the world combined with a creative information technology capacity to provide global connectivity and database management
+
+- Providing services to DoD and non-DoD federal agencies in
+support of personnel accounting, defense, law enforcement*, humanitarian, national security and intelligence missions - 97% contractor staff with ability expand and contract - All activities in leased facilities
+- The whole is greater than the sum of the parts - fragmentation would leave the nation less prepared for a major event.
+
+## Strategic Plan 2005-2010 Principal Goals: ... According To Afdil 1. Expand And Accelerate Accounting Efforts Worldwide.
+
+Is more sample processing necessary or is a more interactive casework relationship with JPAC required?
+
+## 2. Achieve Unity Of U.S. Government Accounting Efforts.
+
+AFDIL is a highly complex organization already serving multiple agencies and missions through-out the federal government - arguably a model for operational quality, scientific focus, and fiscal efficiency
+
+## 3. Maintain Personnel Recovery Capabilities That Meet Current And Future Joint, Interagency, And Coalition Requirements.
+
+AFDIL already provides services to most other federal agencies that would be involved in the development of a national personnel recovery architecture (NTSB, AFMES, CID, DHS/NTSB/HD, FBI).
+
+## 4. Reinforce Confidence In U.S. Government Personnel Accounting With Our National Constituency.
+
+Renew charter of DoD Oversight Committee without future reliance on AFIP Scientific Advisory Board*, support credentialing efforts at both organization level (ASCLD, NAME) and individual level (ABC).
+
+## 5. Develop And Maintain A Skilled, Diverse Workforce With The Tools To Succeed.
+
+Establish pay parity with other federal laboratories, evaluate civil service versus contractor staffing models, consider impact of BRAC recommendations
+
+## 6. Leverage Technology To Enhance Personnel Accounting And Recovery.
+
+AFDIL is very successful in leveraging research funding and issues to address personnel accounting issues (NIJ, ARP, FBI, OGAs).

markdown/misc/furmanski.md

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+# A Guide To The Amerithrax Documents: I. Amount Of Attack Materials And Requirements For Production
+
+by Martin Furmanski MD, Member of the CACNP Scientists' Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons1 Abstract: A review of 2,750 pages of recently declassified FBI documents from the Amerithrax case is examined with special consideration to the question whether the 2001 Postal anthrax attack material could have originated from the United States Army Medical Research Institute for Infections Diseases (USAMRIID).  This assessment is hampered by the redactions present.   It is concluded that the amount of spores needed for the attack material was considerable, compared to the stocks usually produced and held at USAMRIID.  However, it is found that there were several possible avenues whereby sufficient quantities of virulent *Bacillus anthracis* (Ba) of the RMR1029 genomic pattern could have been grown or diverted for use in the attack letters.  It also is concluded that there were sufficient facilities and expertise at USAMRIID to allow for the purification and drying of the agent material used in the 2001 Postal attack letters.  Suggestions for additional investigations are offered. Author's Bio: Martin Furmanski MD holds a degree in microbiology from Stanford University and an MD from UCLA School of Medicine. He is a board-certified clinical and anatomic pathologist.  He is a member of the Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation Scientist's Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons.  He has published on the history and effects of chemical and biological weapons.
+
+
+1 This document represents solely the work of Dr. Furmanski and is not a product of the CACNP Scientists' Working Group as a whole.
+
+# A Guide To The Amerithrax Documents: I. Amount Of Attack Materials And Requirements For Production
+
+by Martin Furmanski MD, Member of the CACNP Scientists' Working Group on Chemical and Biological Weapons2 Introduction:
+On Feb 19, 2010, the US DOJ announced the closing of the Amerithrax case, and released a 96 page summary and 2,720 pages of declassified FOIA FBI documents.  The 96 page summary presented its scientific and technical conclusions but offered little elaboration or documentation.
+
+Review of the 2,720 pages of the declassified FOIA FBI documents reveals significant scientific and technical elements had been investigated but that were not addressed in detail in the DOJ Summary.   A fuller examination of these elements would appear to be of great significance in the resolution of the 2001 anthrax attacks.
+
+ Since the NAS has been charged with investigating the scientific aspects of the Amerithrax investigation, identification of certain specific issues appears warranted.
+
+This paper is an effort to identify one of these issues, and specifically to provide a framework for further documentary investigation to resolve them using references in the FBI FOIA documents.  Occasional reference to other documents will be made when appropriate.
+
+This paper acknowledges that the DOJ has concluded that Dr Ivins was solely responsible for the anthrax letter attacks and that he prepared the attack material at his laboratory at the USAMRIID facilities at Ft Detrick MD.  It will assume that RMR-1029 was the seed stock of the attack material, pending the NAS study group investigation of this issue.  It will acknowledge the DOJ assertion that the attack material was not directly diverted from RMR-1029, based on the trace element findings of silicon, but will examine an alternate hypothesis, because significant amounts of RMR-1029 and other anthrax material at USAMRIID remain unaccounted for.
+
+Acknowledging the DOJ positions is not meant necessarily to accept its conclusion, but to act as a framework to determine what scientific information is available in the FBI FOIA documents to support or disprove this conclusion.  This paper will draw no conclusions regarding the guilt or innocence of Bruce Ivins.
+
+## Note On Materials Examined And Redactions:
+
+
+This paper uses as its primary material the 96 page summary released 19Feb2010, officially available at: http://www.justice.gov/amerithrax/ and the 2,720 pages of DOJ/FBI declassified FOIA documents released on 19Feb2010 and officially available at: http://foia.fbi.gov/foiaindex/amerithrax.htm .
+
+The FBI FOIA documents consists primarily of FBI generated reports of interviews or summaries of ongoing investigations, dating from late 2001 to late 2009. On occasion copies of supporting documents collected as part of the investigation are provided, but frequently they are mentioned but omitted.  The material originates essentially exclusively from investigations at the USAMRIID campus or in Fredrick, MD.  No materials originating from other facilities which were known to possess RMR1029 or its components, such as Dugway Proving Ground and Battelle, are present in the documents.  No scientific reports from any collaborating laboratories are present.
+
+Essentially all of the FBI generated documents are redacted to some extent, sometimes quite extensively.  By law, redactions need to be justified by citation of one or more exemptions under the FOIA statute.
+
+  It is clear that except for Ivins and two or three other individuals known to be deceased, all individual's names and all gender-specific pronouns, and other identifying information such as addresses and social security numbers have been redacted. These redactions are justified by marginal b6, b7C and b7D notations in the redacted documents, indicating the exemption.  Because the FBI reports exist in a typeface that has constant spacing, often the number of letters in a subject's surname can be determined. No attempt to identify the identity of individuals whose names have been redacted will be undertaken in this paper, but this fact will be used on one occasion to strengthen the association between two separate interviews involving the custody of a fermentor at USAMRIID.
+
+There are often redactions involving text or entries evidently not involving only the identity of individuals.  Sometimes these are short and can be identified by context as specific locations within the USAMRIID campus and laboratories, though because this type of redaction is inconsistently applied between the BEI and USAMRIID series of files, one can often determine locations by cross-reference.  Quite frequently these redactions are noted with the b6, b7C and b7D "personal privacy" exemptions, which seems inappropriate.
+
+Often the redactions are quite extensive, involving most or all of a paragraph.
+
+Generally, these carry the 'personal privacy' exemption notations, which seems unlikely. In some cases the redacted material can be reasonably surmised to be of scientific character from the context and the unredacted portions.  These redactions may have been made because of security issues at USAMRIID or sensitive technical or national security issues.    Examination of these redacted passages may be of importance scientifically, and the NAS should consider appeal of the FOIA redaction, or address the issue by examination of the original documents by NAS personnel with appropriate security clearances.
+
+There is a larger issue regarding the robustness of the material in the FBI FOIA
+documents.  Although extensive, they are a selection of a much larger archive, estimated to be over 50,000 pages.  Many documents that would be of interest are mentioned in the available documents but are not included in them.  Also, many documents focus on investigations relating to Bruce Ivins, and these are predominantly dated after mid 2005 when he fell under increasing suspicion by the FBI. Amount of attack material and requirements for its production.
+
+One example of a statement in the DOJ Summary that requires further scientific and technical elucidation is the statement: "15. A leading anthrax researcher who assisted the investigation expressed his expert opinion that 100 ml would have been required to create sufficient material to be used in one letter, for a total of 500 ml for the five letters.  Nonetheless, we cannot say with certainty how much material was used in the letters."1
+This unattributed statement is far from rigorous: for instance the attack material in Senate letters was qualitatively and quantitatively distinct from that in the NYC/FL media letters.  Moreover, no characterization of the nature of the "500mls" is given: it is not specified whether this relates to original media volume, or a product volume, and if so, after what degree of concentration or purification. Letter Payload It would appear that a rational estimate of the weight of the attack material can be made, based on the known concentrations of the attack material and the fact that representative examples of both mailings, the Leahy and *NY Post* letters, were apparently recovered unopened2. However, an official statement of the amount of powder in these letters has not been made.  The unopened Leahy letter has been reported as containing
+0.871 grams3 but no value for the *NY Post* letter has been made public.  The Canadian Letter Threat study determined a letter containing 1.0 gram of powder was a reasonable letter payload because it could not be detected by external palpation4. Other estimates of letter capacity have been in the 1-2 gram range.
+
+One can conclude from the DOJ summary and other official characterizations of the letter material5 that the concentration of the Senate attack material was 2.10 x 10^12
+CFU/gm, and the NYC/FL attack material was 4.60 x 10^10 CFU/gm6.  This is a 45-fold difference.
+
+One can calculate that the Senate mailings would have required at least 2 x
+0.871 gms =1.74 gms, or 3.64 x 10^12 CFUs. This estimate will be used in this paper as a reasonable approximation of the amount required.  It is recognized that the actual amounts used in the two Senate mailings might be slightly lower if the Leahy letter overestimated the payload of the Daschle letter, or slightly higher if the Leahy letter had lost significant material in the automated postal handling prior to its discovery and/or if it underestimated the payload of the Daschle letter.
+
+The payload of the "first mailing" of the  NYC/FL "media" letters is less certain, firstly because the amount present in the NY Post Letter has not been released, and secondly because the total number of letters sent is uncertain.  Only two letters addressed to NYC media outlets were recovered (to Tom Brokaw of NBC, and to the *NY Post*), and a third letter to AMI Media in Florida is also officially assumed to have been sent because of the cases of inhalation anthrax and the extensive contamination at the AMI building.  The DOJ summary refers to five attack letters.  However, an independent epidemiological investigation has proposed that two additional letters to NYC media outlets may have been sent (to ABC News and Dan Rather of CBS News) because of cases of cutaneous anthrax that developed in an employee and an employee's child at those offices7.
+
+Assuming an average letter payload of 1 gram, the 'first mailings' to NYC/FL would have required between 3 and 5 grams, or between  1.4 and 2.3 x 10^11 CFUs.  The actual amount may be lower if only 3 letters were sent with less than 1 gram each, or higher if 5 letters were sent with more than 1 gram each.  But it appears that the first mailing to NYC/FL Media required at least an order of magnitude fewer spores than the second mailing to the US Senate. Production parameters for Bacillus anthracis (Ba) spores used in the mailings By the standards of anthrax material kept on hand at USAMRIID, the anthrax material used in the letter attacks was large.  The approximate 2 grams of pure Ba spores (roughly 3.8 x 10^12 spores) used in the letter attacks exceeded the largest single batch of pure Ba spores that USAMRIID had produced in house (the batch designated RMR1030),
+which took 13 weeks to produce8. An examination of how this much material might have been produced or diverted is appropriate. Solid Media  Ba Spore Production:
+At USAMRIID virulent Bacillus anthracis (Ba) spores were occasionally produced by harvest from solid media (Petri dishes), typically Sheep Blood Agar (SBA). However, this method produced spores that were 'clumpy,' and contained vegetative cell and media debris that persisted on the spores despite procedures to purify and concentrate9.  Moreover, the amount of spores harvested per Petri dish was apparently small compared to those available from liquid culture.  No data on spore yield per plate is available in the FBI FOIA documents for calculation, but it was stated by Ivins that production of the letter attack material from solid media was impractical because of the large number of Petri dishes that would have been required10.
+
+However, plates containing virulent Ba were apparently abundant at USAMRIID.
+FBI FOIA documents indicate each aerosol challenge trial in building 1412 at USAMRIID produced approximately 180 Petri dishes growing RMR1029 per day and such challenge trials were often performed three days a week11.  These Petri dishes and other materials containing Ba from multiple challenge tests were frequently allowed to accumulate in the containment area and to grow-out for many days or weeks after examination and before the infectious waste was autoclaved12. The FBI calculated that the accumulated post-challenge material after aerosol testing for 3 or more animals would have been sufficient to create the letter fill material13, though the calculations for this determination are not explained or provided.  Since at most only about 24 ml of RMR1029 challenge material would be issued for a 3 animal test, and the letters would have required at least 100 ml of undiluted RMR1029 (see below) , the bulk of the requirements for the letter fill under this estimation would have been accounted for by the overgrown assay plates in this scenario.
+
+The FBI devoted considerable efforts to determine if this material might have been diverted either in bulk to make the attack material or in smaller amounts to act as seed for further culture14.  This investigation revealed faults in the automated security system in building 1412, specifically that the key-card security system in building 1412 showed system faults and/or evidence that individuals 'piggy-backed' through the control points in about 50% of the cases, but concluded that access to the internal containment area could probably be determined for each entrant15.
+
+In addition, it appears that on occasion 'hot' trash was not autoclaved before being removed from the containment area, and remained in the basement storage area before being autoclaved before leaving building 141216.  This basement area was also considered 'hot' but its access was apparently controlled by a single keycard access point and maintenance as well as technical/professional employees had access.  The FOIA documents do not present a detailed investigation of the security of this area.
+
+It appears that on occasion 'anti-foam' agents were added to the aerosol generator in the aerosol challenge apparatus in building 1412, and the FBI undertook extensive questioning of USAMRIID employees about the frequency this occurred and the antifoam agents utilized.  Due to redactions, it is impossible to determine if silicon containing antifoam agents were used, and, if so, in what amounts and how frequently. No data is present in the current FBI FIOA documents regarding if silicon containing antifoam agents might influence the silicon content of the Ba organisms plated from the AGI material.
+
+Large numbers of agar plates were handled in the main bacteriology division laboratories in building 1425 as well.  Single series of experiments could routinely generate hundreds of plates containing Ba17.
+
+Liquid Flask Ba spore Production Parameters: At USAMRIID virulent Bacillus anthracis (Ba) spores were routinely produced by harvest from solid media or by liquid media in shaker flasks.  For significant amounts, the shaker flask method was used because it produced a larger quantity of cleaner spores than solid medium. The standard production run at USAMRIID was made with 2-liters of liquid Leighton and Doi medium, shaken in eight 250 ml aliquots in eight flasks.  Good objective data on the yields of this method are available in documents recording the production of RMR1030, a batch of concentrated Ba spores used for aerosol challenge tests in the late 1990s, and produced by 2-liter liquid media batches at USAMRIID, in Ivins' lab. Yields were variable and not predictable, with 10% to 20% unsatisfactory runs produced even by experienced technicians including Ivins himself18.  Unsatisfactory runs were discarded.
+Some 2 liter flask runs yielded after gradient purification as much as  ~ 3.5 to 4.0 (3.46,3.97)  x 10^11 CFUs per 2 liter run, but based on a larger sample of 'acceptable' runs, (the yield of 13 individual runs that produced RMR1030), the average yield was 2.3
+x 10^11 spores per 2 liter run.19 Based on these numbers, if the Senate letters originated from 2-liter liquid medium runs, it would take about 16 (sixteen) successful 2-liter runs. These runs would have required a total of 32 liters of starting medium, and would have taken 16 to 19 weeks at the usual rate of one run per week, depending on how many unsatisfactory runs occurred.  After purification liquid flask produced spores could be concentrated to any desired volume, but they were typically stored in phenol in concentrations ~1.3 x
+10^10 cfu/ml (ie RMR 1030)20.  The Senate letters would have required 277 mls of purified, concentrated liquid flask produced spores, such as RMR 1030. RMR1030, the largest pool of liquid medium spores produced at USAMRIID, was originally only 250 ml in volume. If the NYC/FL letters originated from 2-liter liquid medium runs, it would take one 2-liter run (~2.3 x 10^11 spores). On several occasions Ivins addresses spore preparation and the requirements for the attack letters in interviews with the FBI.  These are rough estimates, based on 2.0 to 2.5 grams per letter, and do not specifically address the 45-fold difference in concentration between the NYC/FL and the Senate letters.  He concludes that it would take ~ 100 liters of liquid medium culture or ~ 300 ml of  "Dugway material" (ie RMR1029) to fill the five letters21.  These 'ballpark' estimates were echoed by another USAMRIID worker22. Fermentor production of Ba spores: Ba Spore production at Dugway Proving Grounds (DPG): Dugway Proving Grounds (DPG) produces Ba spores by fermentor.  Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) sent to USAMRIID for RMR1029 indicated they were produced in a counter top fermentor 10 liters or less in capacity23.  Ivins recalled that the DPG fermentors were 8-10 liter capacity24.  The DOJ summary refers to "12 ten-liter fermentor grown lots.25"  Ivins' logs for the production of RMR 1029 are heavily redacted, but from the available data, each fermentor run at DPG could produce at least 3 x 10^12 total spores with some runs achieving 5 x 10^12 spores26 before processing at USAMRIID.
+Due to redactions, the yield after processing at USAMRIID is uncertain, but one 5 x 10
+^12 run apparently produced 3.8 x 10^12 cfu after processing (76% yield)27.  The average yield per DPG run after processing cannot be determined because of the redactions. Therefore enough Ba spores for the two Senate letters might have been produced by a single production run of a counter-top fermentor of the size used at Dugway. Dugway spores were sent to USAMRIID to provide challenge material, beginning in 1997 for the creation of RMR 1029.  Seven shipments transferring a total of 13
+production runs were sent to USAMRIID.  The final (7th) Dugway shipment, containing the single 13th production run was received at USAMRIID in 1997 but was not included in the final RMR1029 product because Ivins reported it could not be purified to an acceptable degree.  Ivins reported he had 'set it aside' for destruction by autoclaving, but could not recall actually doing so, nor were records kept of such destruction28.  It was apparently common practice to retain samples of spores indefinitely at USAMRIID, so is possible that this material might have been retained and been available in 2001. It is doubtful that this final production run of spores from DPG could have been processed into the Senate letter attack material, even if, after having been found unsatisfactory for incorporation into RMR 1029, it could have been processed to the high concentration and purity of the Senate attack material.  It is uncertain if would have had the  polymorphic genetic signature of RMR1029, because it is not clear if this polymorphism was due to polymorphism in the seed culture used in the fermentors at DPG, or if (as seems more likely) it was the result of the admixing of multiple runs of DPG material with multiple single-colony origin 2-liter batches of Ba Ames grown at USAMRIID.  It would have a Carbon-14 (C-14) profile older than that reported for the attack material, which was officially reported as placing the age of the attack material as within 2 years of late 200129 (ie it would have had to have been grown after late 1999).
+However, the ability of the C-14 data to exclude dates of production in the 1997-1999 range may not have been robust, because the C-14 data, known in late 2001, did not prevent the FBI investigation from pursuing the possibility that RMR1029 itself may have been directly diverted to constitute the attack material as late as mid 200430, during a period when Steven Hatfill was suspected of diverting RMR1029 from the aerobiology building waste.  It may also be significant that the 2010 DOJ Summary does not include the C-14 data in its scientific characterization of the attack materials.  A clarification of the significance of the reported C-14 data should be undertaken. Although no sample of Ba spores yet reported had a silicon content as high as the attack material, the highest value reported was from a Dugway fermentation Ba product, so the
+13th batch may have had a high silicon content. Fermentor production of Ba at USAMRIID USAMRIID had several fermentors in the Bacteriology Division labs in Building 1425, though the exact location is unclear because of redactions in the FBI documents and the lack of a floorplan for reference.  It appears that they were located in or adjacent to the B3 suite BSL-3 containment facility31. USAMRIID workers did not produce virulent Ba spores in these fermentors, because it was considered too dangerous in a metropolitan area32.  These fermentors were used for producing attenuated strains of Ba and nonpathogenic organisms. Although equipment records are apparently incomplete, there were several fermentors of varying sizes at USAMRIID in 2001, including 150-liter, 20-liter and 5-liter New Brunswick models.  The 150-liter model occupied a dedicated room and was large, noisy, and could not have been operated in an unobtrusive fashion33. The 20-liter New Brunswick fermentor had been in use in 2000 in a vaccine project, which apparently did not involve Ivins34.  Little other information on this 20-liter fermentor appears in the documents. Considerable information is available regarding the 5-liter  New Brunswick Bio-Flo 3000 fermentor. This Brunswick Bio-Flo 3000 was a unit that had been acquired by USAMRIID in Jan 1990 and was on Bruce Ivins' personal 'hand receipt' indicating it was purchased for use by his laboratory team and was under his direct control35.  This fermentor was used by Ivins in the 1990s to grow genetically modified organisms for the production of the Recombinant Protective Antigen (rPA) anthrax vaccine that was his major professional endeavor at USAMRIID.  This fermentor is mentioned specifically in his patent for the rPA vaccine36. The patent specifies that antifoam C was added to the culture medium37.
+Antifoam C is a commercial antifoam agent manufactured by Dow Corning and contains silicone38. In the rPA vaccine work, Ivins did not use this fermentor to produce spores, since the genetically modified Sterne strain used to produce Protective Antigen (PA) for the rPA vaccine was non-sporogenic39. However, an entry in one of Ivins' laboratory notebooks seems to indicate he did use this fermentor to attempt to produce virulent Ba spores on at least one occasion 40.  Prior to the 2001 anthrax attacks, Ivins was the technical representative to DPG for the project where DPG produced virulent Ba Ames spores for RMR102941, and Ivins received the protocols for production of virulent Ba Ames in small fermentors42.
+The 5-liter Brunswick fermentor produced little noise when running, and standard operating procedures for fermentors at USAMRIID included the automatic addition of Mazu, an anti-foam agent into the fermentors43. Mazu is a silicon-containing anti-foam agent44. The physical location of this 5-liter fermentor just prior to the 2001 letter attacks was investigated but due to extensive redactions in the available record, it is unclear what the FBI determined.  It appears that Ivins reported he had lent the instrument to an entity whose identity is redacted (presumably another investigator at USAMRIID) on an undisclosed date45.  It appears that the reported recipient of the instrument may have denied ever having possession of it46.  The location of this fermentor, its condition, and its capability of producing the attack material in late 2001 should be clarified by a suitable examination of the unredacted FBI record. Assuming that the final concentration that the 5-liter fermentor at USAMRIID could achieve was proportional to that of the 10 liter fermentors at DPG, it might produce ~ 1.9  x 10^12 spores per 5-liter run. Therefore enough material for the Senate letters might have been produced in two runs of the 5.0 liter fermentor at USAMRIID. Diversion of USAMRIID Ba for attack culture seed Prior to fall 2001, considerable amounts of Ba (hundreds but not thousands of containers) were stored at USAMRIID without inventory control in common storage areas accessible by all authorized workers at USAMRIID47.  Also, Ba challenge material, including significant volumes of RMR1029, which were normally held at the main USAMRIID building, 1425, was regularly transferred to the aerosol test building 1412, for use in aerosol testing. These transfers consisted of  concentrated or diluted RMR1029 material and there were significant unused portions of the challenge material that remained in building 1412 for extended periods of time under imperfect security.  This has been discussed above in the section of agar growth of Ba spores. Essentially all USAMRIID employees stated that, prior to the 9-11 attacks, it would not have been difficult for someone who worked at USAMRIID to clandestinely remove viable virulent pathogens from the containment labs and transport them off of the USAMRIID campus. Diversion and alteration of RMR1029 for attack material This paper will now examine the opportunities to divert significant proportions of RMR1029 for direct processing into the attack material.  This is because very significant amounts of RMR1029 and associated USAMRIID "wild type" Ames Ba spores appear to be unaccounted for. The DOJ contends that the attack material could not be a direct diversion of RMR 1029 itself because the attack material contained a high percentage (65 to 78%) of spores with high silicon content in the spore coat and RMR1029 showed essentially none (0 of 300
+spores examined)48. The report contends that this difference is due to growth of lowsilicon containing RMR1029 seed material in a cultural environment that resulted in the incorporation of high levels of silicon into a high percentage of the spores in the attack material.  Incorporation of silicon into the spore coat from growth medium is a process that has been shown to occur in Bacillus species including Ba. The identification of silicon in spores forming within vegetative cells in the attack material strongly supports the contention that the silicon was incorporated from the culture medium49. This scenario has two weaknesses.  The first is that it does not quantitatively explain either the very high percentage of high-silicon spores in the attack material, nor the apparent absence of high-silicon spores in RMR1029. Despite efforts to duplicate the attack material, no preparations of over 30% have been made or found in collected samples of Ba spores. Several samples of spores from DPG have been reported as containing from 11% to 29% high silicon spores.  RMR 1030, a preparation pooled from thirteen 2-liter liquid cultures of Ba grown at USAMRIID contained 6% high silicon spores50.  Since RMR1029 was originally pooled from both DPG and USAMRIID
+material in approximately a 85%/15% ratio, one would have expected it should have had ~ 20% high silicon spores (range perhaps 10% to 25%).  Even if the DPG component of RMR1029 had no high-silicon spores, the USAMRIID component should have contributed ~ 1% to the final mixture, and been detectable in the 300 spores examined. The other weakness is that a sample of RMR 1029 suitable for silicon determination was apparently not obtained from USAMRIID by the FBI until 3Jun2004, and so may not have been representative of RMR 1029 in 2001 when the attack material was prepared. An alternative explanation for the wide discordance in silicon content between the attack material and the 2004 RMR1029 sample is that the original RMR1029 had a moderate percentage of high-silicon spores (10-25%) and in 2001 underwent a manipulation that selectively enhanced high-silicon spores in the attack material and depleted them in the residual RMR1029 container.  Such a differential purification may have been the unintended result of decanting or pipetting from a sedimented RMR1029 flask, or the result of centrifugation and division of a stratified pellet. Centrifuged pellets of Ba are known to demonstrate a banded appearance. A discussant at the 25Sep2009 NAS meeting suggested that graded manipulation of the number of high-silicon spores in a sample might be possible because a series of samples designated "evidence" showed progressive results from 18% to 1.2%51.  This series and any other similar data should be investigated for applicability to this hypothesis. The perpetrator may also have subjected the original RMR 1029 material to more sophisticated, deliberate manipulations, such as additional gradient purifications, to introduce 'red herrings' in the trace materials left on the Senate attack material. The perpetrator was skilled in avoiding leaving forensic traces (there were no significant hair, fiber or human DNA traces on the letters) and the NYC/FL material was clearly left crude (and possibly deliberately contaminated with *B subtillis*) to mimic an amateur's efforts.  It may be significant that Ivins spontaneously suggested to the FBI that they look for traces of gradient material in the attack material52. A novel manipulation may have inadvertently differentially separated the silicon bearing spores.  An inquiry into what trace materials were found in the attack material should be made. As long as a residual fraction of the original RMR1029 pool remained, the genetic polymorphisms that defined the qualitative genetic signature of RMR 1029 would be retained in both components despite an alteration of the profile of the silicon in the spore populations. It should be noted that RMR 1029 was maintained at a concentration of ~ 2.5 to 3.9 x
+10^10 cfu/ml53, and therefore would have required at least ~ 93-146 ml to be used to produce the material in the two Senate letters, and perhaps more if the process was inefficient or had failed runs.  Although the inventory of RMR 1029 provided by Ivins to the FBI is untrustworthy, it lists the volume of RMR1029 as being 369 ml prior to the
+2001 letter attacks54, though it may have been 100 ml more because of an arithmetical error.  Withdrawal of one or more 100-150 ml aliquots to prepare the attack material could have greatly depleted the component of high-silicon spores in the residual RMR1029 if that 100 ml aliquot was highly enriched in high-silicon spores. The above speculations would not be particularly compelling except that a very significant amount of RMR 1029 is unaccounted for, and significant amounts of 'wild type' Ames grown at USAMRIID are also unaccounted for. The inventory record of RMR1029 was imperfect.  Ivins had created RMR1029 and was its custodian.  He initially stated in early 2002 that he kept precise records of its creation and distribution and that it was completely accounted for55.  However, the log of RMR1029 distributions he provided to the FBI in February 200356 contained a 100 ml arithmetical error logged in a 22Feb2000 distribution that resulted in 100 ml of RMR 1029 being unaccounted for in this log. Later, Ivins maintained that the RMR 1029
+distribution log was only an estimation and not a measured inventory57. This discrepancy resulted in an FBI investigation to trace the distribution of RMR1029 by cross-checking lab notebooks of the recipients of RMR 1029 with Ivins' log.  This determined that at the time of the 2001 mailings there was a total of 220 ml of RMR-
+1029 that was unaccounted for58.   This investigation is summarized in the DOJ summary but only fragmentary and redacted portions are present in the current collection of FBI FOIA documents, wherein Ivins addresses some of the specific  inconsistencies by invoking evaporation and stating in some instances he centrifuged and concentrated RMR1029 before shipping to Battelle59. Based upon the distribution log and the FBI investigation of distribution of RMR1029, there is a sufficient amount of RMR1029 unaccounted for at the time of the letter attacks to supply the attack letter material. If a substantial portion of the original RMR1029 had been diverted to produce the attack material in late 2001, Ivins would have potentially faced a significant shortfall of challenge material for the challenges anticipated for late 2001, 2002 and 2003, for which RMR1029 had been prepared.  In fact, Ivins sometime in 2001 requested additional spores be obtained from Dugway60.  According to Ivins' log of RMR1029, and correcting for the 100 ml arithmetical error, there should have been 469 ml of RMR1029 remaining at the time of the letter attacks in Sep/Oct 2001, nearly half of the original 1,000 mls.  A determination of the date and examination of the justification of this order for DPG spores should be made. Perhaps pertinent to this point, a further FBI investigation revealed that essentially all of what must have been a very substantial amount of Ba spore production by Ivins' two technicians at USAMRIID was also unaccounted for61.  Both of Ivins' technicians thought that their Ba spore production was to augment or replace an exhausted or dwindling supply of RMR1029, and one understood she had been hired primarily to make spores. In the 16 months between the letter attacks and the end of  the RMR1029 log, Ivins records a total of 281 mls of RMR1029 released. The 281 mls of RMR 1029 would amount to ~ 10^13 spores, which could be produced by 43 successful 2 liter liquid cultures of Ba, perhaps a year's production of Ivins' lab, considering the 10-20% rate of unsatisfactory cultures. It may be significant that the spore production in Ivins' lab may have just been sufficient to meet this demand. The DOJ summary states that RMR1029 never was modified from its creation by additions62, though it offers no supporting evidence.  The above scenario does not require additions to the RMR1029 flask, though additions to it of cultures containing few or no high silicon spores would dilute any residual concentration of high-silicon spores. Perhaps significantly, there is an episode in the FOIA documents that suggests that RMR may have been diluted and Ivins may have been altering RMR1029 by adding spores as late as mid 2004. The FBI obtained the entire RMR1029 flask on 3Jun2004 and it containing about 75
+ml63.  The Naval Medical Research Center (NMRC) determined that its concentration was approximately tenfold lower than Ivins' log stated it should have been (~10^9 instead of ~10^10 cfu/ml).  A 25 ml portion of RMR1029 was then returned to Ivins for continued use at USAMRIID, and the remainder retained at NMRC64. Apparently the FBI
+informed him of the low count from NMRC on 13Jan2005.  On 16Feb2005 Ivins replied that he had tested the returned portion, and that it was only about 20-30% less concentrated than usual, and the FBI report related that Ivins stated that it was not a problem because they added more spores for the aerosol challenge65.  While this is apparently an admission of adding spores to RMR1029, Ivins later denied he added spores to the returned RMR1029 material.  Since challenge material was typically diluted from RMR1029 before use, the FBI report may have misinterpreted Ivins referring to a lower dilution factor as a physical addition.  Or Ivins may have been untruthful.  The FBI confronted Ivins with the discordance in concentrations more forcefully on 31Mar2005, and suggested that a significant amount of RMR1029 might have been diverted and replaced with water. He denied adding spores to the returned RMR1029 material, and suggested the NMRC concentration value was in error. Ivins stated that since its return, he had provided 25ml in a successful animal challenge test, which would indicate it was not 10^9 cfu/ml66.  Ivins' RMR1029 stock was not exhausted, however, because Ivins and an FBI agent (apparently a trained microbiologist) immediately determined the concentration of  Ivins' RMR1029 stock in parallel assays, and confirmed Ivins' higher concentration67.  The FBI agent secured Ivins' residual RMR1029 stock at this point.
+Further documents reveal additional studies were planned on all available samples of RMR1029 to resolve this issue, but no resolution is presented68.
+
+Ivins stated in 2008 that the FBI accused him of diverting and/or altering RMR102969. Another factor to be considered is that Carbon-14 data from the attack material was reported as indicating it had been grown within 2 years of 2001.  As discussed above in the context of the unused 13th batch of  Dugway spores, the ability of the C-14 data to exclude origin in 1997-1999 needs clarification. Drying of Spores The attack spore material was dried and the Senate attack material was fine enough to be spontaneously aerosolized by the opening of the letter in Senator Daschle's office.  The DOJ summary states that the spores had a mass median diameter of between 22 and 38 microns, indicating that they commonly did form aggregates when aerosolized (individual spores are barrel shaped, roughly 1 x 1.5  microns).   The DOJ summary reports no indication of special treatment or 'weaponization' was identified70. Dry spores at USAMRIID Ba spore material was very seldom dried at USAMRIID.  Rare instances of drying very small amounts of virulent strains of Ba were noted, but these were dried only after sterilization by radiation, and were for antigen production for in vitro test systems71.  A
+highly redacted entry suggests live Ba might have been dried in very small amounts72. When it was reported that Dugway Proving Grounds (DPG) produced dry, virulent Ba spores, that fact surprised many USAMRIID employees.  There is no direct information regarding the DPG spore drying process or program in the FBI FOIA materials. USAMRIID employees reported that it was thought that Battelle did work with dried Ba material73, but no details were offered and no additional information is present in the FBI
+FOIA documents regarding Battelle. USAMRIID had contemplated initiating aerosol challenges using dry, virulent Ba spore preparations, and this project had proceeded to initial laboratory work using dried nonpathogenic organisms, but the program was terminated before any dry virulent Ba spores were handled. The reason for the termination was stated by some USAMRIID employees as being 'dual use' concerns under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 74, but others offered different [redacted] explanations75.  There is no technical information available on the proposed method of drying or equipment used in this initial program, but it apparently some equipment was obtained and some activity took place in the aerobiology building, 1412, rather than at the main bacteriology department in building 1425.  This may have been a project of the Aerobiology Division rather than the Bacteriology Division of USAMRIID. Ivins' knowledge of this program, that contemplated use and possibly production of dry virulent Ba spores at USAMRIID, is unclear from the FOIA record.  Interviews regarding the history and organization of this project are highly redacted, but Ivins name, which generally is not redacted, does not appear in these documents. When asked he denied any knowledge of it76.  However, one of the USAMRIID employees who described the project at length stated it was initiated to test the 'breakthrough point' of the new rPA vaccine, and that discussions had addressed the options of obtaining dry Ba spores from DPG or producing them in-house at USAMRIID.  Although Ivins was an employee of the bacteriology division rather than the aerobiology division of USAMRIID, he was one of the essential personnel involved in  aerosol Ba challenges at USAMRIID, providing the challenge Ba material and personally participating in every challenge in the Aerobiology Division building 1412.  Moreover, the new rPA vaccine was his personal career project, and he was the technical liaison for spore procurement between USAMRIID and DPG. A CDC informant apparently informed about both DPG and USAMRIID procedures assumed that Ivins had knowledge about DPG's methods to dry Ba spores77. A further exploration of Ivins knowledge base on drying Ba spores should be undertaken. Methods of Drying Spores There are a variety of potential methods to dry Ba spores.  Some apparently can be done with minimal equipment, others require specialized instruments.  Industrial scale drying is often done with spray-dryers, but no spray-drying apparatus was present at USAMRIID.  Attention has focused on instruments called lyophilizers, which might be used to dry Ba spores, and were present at USAMRIID. Lyophilizers at USAMRIID Lyophilizers are also termed 'freeze dryers' and classically operate by freezing a sample and then allowing the water in the sample to sublimate away under a vacuum and be trapped in an adjacent 'cold trap' where the water vapor is again frozen.  Lyophilizers are often used in this mode to preserve some bacterial cultures and other biological samples. However, Ba spores are damaged by freezing.  Many large lyophilizers can be adjusted so that the sample compartment is kept at any desired temperature, and the liquid water vapor evaporated under reduced atmospheric pressure and trapped in an adjacent cold trap.  This mode might better be characterized 'vacuum drying'. Two types of lyophilizers were present at USAMRIID.  There were many small units generically termed 'Speed-Vacs' which are counter-top instruments for lyophilizing small volumes of material.  Typically they can accommodate  multiple small tubes holding 2 milliliters or less, freeze the contents and subject them to centrifugation under vacuum.  Because it is likely that the wet spore aliquots used to create the Senate letter fills would have been at least 50 or 100 ml in volume, were not frozen, and because centrifugation presents a significant aerosolization hazard, the use of Speed-Vacs has generally been discounted. The other type of lyophilizer is a large, batch lyophilizer capable of containing and evaporating several liters of fluid in a single run.  Present in the USAMRIID bacteriology division was a Vertis 12XL "Freeze Mobile" Condenser Trap Unit equipped with an attached Vertis HL600 3-shelf UniTop specimen chamber.  This is a mobile one-piece unit mounted on wheels and is the size and general appearance of a 'stacked' clothes washer/dryer appliance.  The specimen compartment can contain up to 15 liters of fluid to be dried in 125 ml bottles, and it temperature can be independently controlled.  The condenser is capable of evaporating ~8 liters of fluid in 24 hours. This large Vertis lyophilizer was on Dr Ivins' 'hand receipt' indicating it had been purchased for his laboratory in 1996 and was under his control.  It was apparently kept in the hallway between the B3 BSL-3 containment suite and the B5 BSL-2 general bacteriology laboratory in building 1425.  Ivins had used it in the rPA vaccine project in the 1990s to lyophilize non-viable biological products, and was trained and experienced in its use. Conclusions There appears to have been sufficient resources at USAMRIID to account for the production or diversion of sufficient material for the letter attack payloads. The NYC/FL letters might have been grown in a single, routine 2 liter batch at USAMRIID without attracting any attention.  The Senate material, although requiring an order of magnitude more material, had several potential sources.  A fermentor apparently existed in the USAMRIID lab that was capable of growing the attack material in two production runs. Unmonitored RMR 1029 waste from aerosol challenge tests in building 1412 was sufficient in quantity to be diverted into the attack material, and was not tightly secured. There was sufficient material unaccounted for in the RMR 1029 flask itself to account for the Senate attack materials, and sufficient Ba Ames material unaccounted for in the USAMRIID lab to account for the shortfall from such a diversion.
+
+There appears to be adequate facilities for the drying of the attack material.  It
+
+may be that little equipment would be required outside of normal laboratory facilities, but a large capacity versatile lyophilizer was present that might have been used.
+
+
+Suggestions 1. Official confirmation of the amount of letter material in the Leahy letter and *NYC Post* letters should be sought. 2. Examination of the record for scientific data relating to chemical traces on the attack material, such as residua from residual media, gradient purifications, or effects of drying methods.  Any trace residua should be correlated with established procedures and available reagents at USAMRIID and other laboratories of significance. 3. The results from (2) above should be correlated with the corresponding results from FBI sponsored attempts to duplicate the letter fill materials. 4. Further elucidation of the details of the quantitative distribution of high-silicon spores in various samples of interest, such as the attack materials, and the several samples of RMR1029 itself.  Particular attention ought to be made to procure as wide a selection of samples as possible to determine sampling errors. 5. Similar quantitative determinations of the incidence of high-silicon spores be made on the silicon distribution in representative samples of Dugway fermentor and USAMRIID 2-liter batches of spores. 6. Investigation of the possible differential partition of high and low silicon spores by various methods such as sedimentation, centrifugation, or division of centrifuged pellets. The origin of the graded series of Dugway materials alluded to in the NAS presentation be determined for its relevancy to this issue.
+
+
+7. The confidence values for C-14 age of the attack material and of other significant materials, such as RMR 1029 should be determined and clarified.  The significance of this data to the forensics of the attack material should be clarified. 8. The operational status and location of the 5-liter fermentor in late 2001 should be determined and clarified. 9. Location and operational status of the large Vertis 12XL 'Freeze Mobile" in late 2001 be determined. 10. The alleged 'dilution' of RMR 1029 in mid 2004 be resolved by a full examination of the record. 11.  A review of the records of production of Ba Ames strain by Ivins' technicians to determine the amount of unaccounted for Ames and the dates of its production. 12. A determination of the date and examination of the justification for Ivins' 2001 order for additional DPG spores should be made. 13. A review of information regarding Ivins' knowledge of Ba drying techniques, and particularly his contact with the dry-spore challenge program at USAMRIID should be made. ENDNOTES
+1DOJ Summary, Footnote 15, page 29 (PDF page 33)
+
+2 UCLA Department of Epidemiology School of Public Health, Bioterrorism website:
+
+"Exposure Letters" states the *New York Post* letter was handled but not opened:
+accessed 11Apr2010 at: http://www.ph.ucla.edu/EPI/bioter/detect/antdetect_letters_a.htm
+3 Broad WJ and Johnston D. "Anthrax Sent Through Mail Gained Potency by the Letter"
+NYTimes 7May2002.
+
+4 Kournikakis B et al.  Risk Assessment of Anthrax Threat Letters. Defence R&D Canada Technical Report DRES-TR-2001-048 Sept 2001.  Available online at: http://www.anthraxinvestigation.com/canadiananthraxstudysep01.pdf
+5 United States Department of Justice Science Anthrax Press Briefing, Monday August
+18, 2008.  Transcript accessed 11 April 2010 at: http://www.fredericknewspost.com/media/pdfs/FBI_0818_afternoon_bfg.pdf
+6 DOJ summary pg 14 (PDFpg 19).
+
+7 UCLA Department of Epidemiology School of Public Health, Bioterrorism website:
+
+"Exposure Letters: Seven Letters Sent" gives details of this hypothesis: accessed
+11Apr2010 at: http://www.ph.ucla.edu/EPI/bioter/detect/antdetect_letters_a.htm
+8 USAMRIID #16 PDFpg 73, 74: FBI review Ivins' lab notebooks 15May2004: summary of Jan 1997 entry: "The current batch of Ames spores (RMR 1030) took 13 production runs...He noted that 13 runs had yielded 3 x 10^12 spores."
+
+9 BEI#1 PDFpg4: 23Jan2002 interview with Bruce Ivins:
+
+"..the spores in the DASCHLE letter were of fermentation quality.  The spores were very clean compared to Bacillus anthracis produced on agar which would contain messy residue." BEI#1PDFpg24: Ivins interview 12Feb2003:
+"IVINS thinks that most of the people at USAMRIID use broth to grow Ba although he can't say for certain how everyone else there grows their spores.  Although Ba can be grown on agar, nicer spores are produced in broth, and they can be purified more easily and are "hotter". ...
+Spores grown up on agar are dirtier than broth grown.  IVINS does not know if this is because the spores pickup debris from the agar of if there are media components on the surface of the spore.  No matter how agar grown spores are washed, some agar always remains on the spores." BEI#2PDFpg 61: 1Mar2007 Interview with USAMRIID employee:
+"SBA [Sheep Blood Agar] leaves blood residue on the spores, and liquid spore preparations are easier to clean."
+10 BEI#1PDFpg24: Ivins interview 12Feb2003:
+
+"If one needs to purify more than a very small amount of Ba, it is difficult to use agar as you would need numerous plates."
+11 USARMIID#15 PDFpg 15: Interview with USAMRIID employee, 9Mar2004:
+
+"Challenges were run three (3) days per week with thirty (30) rabbits per day.
+Two (2) dilutions of anthrax were prepared per rabbit for each challenge, and three (3) Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA) plates were cultured per dilution. [redacted] noted that a total of approximately 180 TSA plates were cultured per day when animal challenges were being conducted."
+12 USARMIID#15 PDFpg 16: Interview with USAMRIID employee, 9Mar2004:
+
+"After the plates had been left in the incubator overnight, they would be completely covered with growth.  The plates were then read in the morning following the challenge.  After the plates were read, they were placed into a bag and clearly marked with what pathogen was in the bag, what strain the pathogen was, and who the investigator was.  The bags would remain in room [redacted] until nearly overflowing, or until the number of bags in the room became an obstruction.  The bags often sat in room [redacted] for several days or weeks prior to being removed.  [redacted] noted that [he] was fascinated with how much growth appeared on the plates after several days or weeks.  The bags were then taken to the basement to be autoclaved." USAMRIID#8 PDFpg 77: Washington Field Office Summary Report 11Jan2006:
+"It was documented during several interviews that Ivins' group did not keep room
+[redacted] very clean and tidy.  Post-challenge agar plates were left on counters, the incubators were left full of material, samples in the refrigerator were not disposed of in a timely manner, and "hot" trash was allowed to build up for weeks prior to being autoclaved.  One former military aerobiology technician [redacted] commented that [redacted] had to clean Ivins' trash himself out of safety concerns.  [redacted] said that the civilians at USAMRIID did not take safety seriously.  [redacted] commented that when [redacted] looked at the agar plates that had sat in the biohazard trash bags for several days or weeks in 115, they were covered with bacterial growth."
+13 USAMRIID#20 PDFpg 30: 20May2004 Report investigative project re access to postchallenge Ames from Aerobiology Division USARIID:
+"It was estimated based on spore concentrations of material used that any aerosol challenge involving greater than or equal to three animals would constitute enough available Ba to have assemble the anthrax-laced letters."
+14 BEI#1 PDFpg 45: 17 April 2003: telephonic interview with Bruce Ivins:
+
+"After his telephonic conversation with SA [redacted] on 4/15/2003, IVINS feels sick over the fact that the material used in the anthrax mailings cold have come from a stock made from the BA aerosol challenge trash."
+15 USAMRIID#4 PDFpg16: Summary of results of initiatives, 29Mar2006:
+
+"For all of the days when access points were recorded for employees who used the containment area to work with aerosol challenges, at least three of the five access points were recorded together.  There was therefore always some indication that the employee used the change room or keypad to enter the containment area.  In approximately 50% of the cases, one or two of the access points were missing (ie 3 of 5, or 4 of 5 points recorded).  ... Never on a day when an employee was assigned to work in the containment area was he/she shown only to have entered and exited the building on that day." USAMRIID#4 PDFpg20: Summary of results of initiatives, 29Mar2006:
+"Anomalies indicate that the employee may have piggybacked through a missing
+
+access point with another individual, or the system might not have read a keycard swipe
+of keypad code properly."
+
+       "The amount of anomalies evident on the spreadsheet imply that there were most
+
+likely incidences of piggybacking and/or system faults through use of the change rooms into the containment area of Building 1412 on these dates."
+"The initiatives described above demonstrate a significant difference between
+expected keycard access data for employees using the containment area of Building 1412, and the actual data for employees during several Ba aerosol challenges between 9/1998 and 8/2001."
+16 USAMRIID#8 PDFpg81: Washington Field Office Summary Report 11Jan2006:
+
+"Information obtained from interviews indicated that standard protocol is and
+was for the post-challenge plates to be autoclaved in the challenge labs prior to disposal in the basement, meaning that this material should have been autoclaved twice.  Several technicians stated that this was not always the practice.  All material on the hot side of building [redacted] was considered to be 'hot', and it was the opinion of several technicians that the PIs and their staff were not concerned if material was autoclaved before leaving a room or lab for disposal.  The main concern was that material was autoclaved in the basement before leaving the hot side of the building."
+17 USAMRIID#15 PDFpg 45: Interview with previous USAMRIID employee 6Apr2004:
+
+"There could have been large numbers of agar plates in labs at the given time without sending up a red flag.  In serial sacrifice experiments, a group of animal was exposed to a pathogen.  A few animals were removed and sacrificed on a time table to determine the bacterial load over time. [long redaction] Ten-fold dilution were prepared for each organ.  Five to seven plates were prepared per organ.  They would sacrifice three to five animals per time point, so there were hundreds of plates per serial sacrifice experiment."
+18 BEI#2 PDFpg15.
+
+19 FBI FOIA USAMRIID #16 PDFpg 73, 74: FBI review Ivins' lab notebooks
+15May2004: summary of Jan 1997 entry:
+ "The current batch of Ames spores (RMR 1030) took 13 production runs...He noted that 13 runs had yielded 3 x 10^12 spores." Also see USAMRIID#1PDFpg 64 for same info.
+
+20 FBI FOIA USAMRIID #16 PDF pg 73.
+
+21 BEI#1 PDFpg 14: (2/26/2002)  "Ivins noted that the ratio of spores to media for B
+anthracis in a liquid preparation is approximately 10^8 spores per ml.  Therefore, it would take 20 liters of media to make two grams of spores." BEI#1 PDFpg 24: (2/12/2003) Ivins interview:
+"IVINS did the following calculation estimates to determine how much of the Dugway spores would have been missing if they had been used in the anthrax mailings. 2.0-2.5 grams of material were present in each letter with a 10^8 spore concentration.  In order to achieve that spore concentration, 80-100 L of runs would have been necessary and approximately 300 ml of the Dugway material would have been required.  This amount of missing material would have been noticed."  [MF note: this takes above estimate and multiplies it by 4 or 5 for the 4 or 5 letters].
+
+22 USAMRIID#8 PDFpg 9: 18Aug2005 interview with ex-UAMRIID employee:
+
+"...the individual would have needed to grow hundreds of liters in order to have
+
+the amount of organism used in these mailings.  Someone would have noticed this happening."
+23 USAMRIID#17PDFpg 49: FBI summary of Ivins' lab notebooks 14July2004:
+
+"Also contained within the notebook was a Dugway procedure for anthrax spore
+preparation in bench top fermenters.  This standard operating procedure (SOP) draft outlined the culture and processing methods used for preparation of Ba spores in less than 10 liter quantities."
+24 BEI#1 PDFpg 23.
+
+25 DOJ Amerithrax Investigation Summary, PDF pg 30, summary report pg 26.
+
+26 USAMRIID#16 pg 76: Dugway Shipments:
+
+5th shipment: 7/21/97 52 ml: 3 x 10^12 total spores
+
+
+8/2/97 51 ml;  3 x 10^12 total spores
+   USAMRIID#16 pg 77: Dugway Shipments: [date redacted]
+6th shipment: 8/4/97  5 x 10^12 total spores:
+   USAMRIID#16pg81: Dugway shipments:
+7/11/97 60ml: 5 x 10 ^12  total spores
+
+7/17/97  80ml:  3.25 x 10^12 total spores
+27 USAMRIID#16 pg 77: Dugway Shipments: [date redacted]
+
+6th shipment: 8/4/97  5 x 10^12 total spores:
+
+
+yield apparently 3.8 x 10^12 spores
+
+28 BEI#2 PDFpg12-13: Ivins interview 31Mar2005:
+
+29 United States Department of Justice Science Anthrax Press Briefing, Monday August
+18, 2008.  Transcript accessed 11 April 2010 at: http://www.fredericknewspost.com/media/pdfs/FBI_0818_afternoon_bfg.pdf
+30 USAMRIID#20 PDFpg 30: 20May2004 Report investigative project re access to postchallenge Ames from Aerobiology Division USARIID:
+"Data from aerosol challenges involving Bacillus anthracis (Ba) from the time period August 1998 to Sep 1999 was analyzed to determine potential windows of opportunity for removal of post-challenge Ames during a ten day period following each aerosol challenge.  It was estimated based on spore concentrations of material used that any aerosol challenge involving greater than or equal to three animals would constitute enough available Ba to have assemble the anthrax-laced letters."
+31 BEI#1 PDFpg 86: Interview with IVINS 7May2004
+
+"IVINS took the interviewing agents past the autoclave crash door for suite B3, showed how this suite connected to B4, and showed the fermentation room.  Two of the fermentors visible in the room have been purchased in the last 3 years or so."
+32 USAMRIID #8 PDFpage 27: interview with USAMRIID employee 3 Oct 21005:
+
+ "...Ba Ames has never been fermented at USAMRIID.  It would have been too dangerous to have grown Ba Ames in a fermentor." BEI#2 PDFpg 7-8: Ivins interview 31Mar2005:
+"IVINS related that while USAMRIID had fermenters, to his knowledge they were never used to grow any virulent select agents, including Bacillus anthracis.  The fermenters were used only to grow non-virulent bacteria, such as Bacillus subtilis. ..."
+"...He explained that using a multi-gallon fermenter for this purpose would have been out of the question due to the potentially catastrophic results of an accidental spill of such a large quantity of anthrax.  IVINS believed it would be simply too dangerous to produce virulent anthrax in a metropolitan area using a fermenter because of the large quantity yielded."
+33 USAMRIID #5 PDFpage 2: FBI periodic report 29Sep2006:
+"Fermentor:
+Identification and tracking of fermentors in place at USAMRIID positively identified one fermentor as having been in place in Building [redacted] Room [redacted] around the time of the anthrax mailings.  Additional fermentors of interest have been identified for location, materials used, and operator with an undetermined final disposition date.  The fermentors ranged in volume from 150 liters to 5-liters.  The two largest fermentors were manufactured by New Brunswick Inc, and were not portable. These cold not likely have been used in a discreet manner.  The 5-L fermentor also manufactured by New Brunswick was lent to [redacted] by Bruce Ivins.  [redacted] indicated the New Brunswick fermentors were likely to predate 2001.  Further analysis would be required to determine which fermentors were up and running between 9/11/01 and 10/9/01." Also see: USAMRIID#3b PDFpage 91-96  09/07/2006 Status Report on Tracking and ID of Fermentors at USAMRIID.  For an update on fermenter tracking.
+
+34 USAMRIID#3b PDFpage 93  09/07/2006  Status Report on Tracking and ID
+Fermentors:
+"20-liter Fermentor: Room [redacted]:
+
+
+The New Brunswick fermentor, no MMCN Number, no Stock Number was located
+in [redacted].  Operators included: [redacted] and [redacted]. [redacted] recalled that in 2000, [redacted] run a New Brunswick 20-liter fermentor which involved a vaccine study pertaining to the growth of delta-Ames or delta-Sterne."
+35 BEI#4PDFpg 8: materials recovered from Ivins' residence under search warrant
+1Nov2007 included a copy of a USAMRIID hand receipt from 1997 with this entry.
+
+36 USAMRIID #7 PDFpage 59: Patent # 6,387,665, patent page 5:
+
+"The fermentations describe here were carried out using a New Brunswick Bio-
+Flo 3000 equipped with a 5.0 liter working volume glass vessel and stainless steel headplate and hemispherical bottom cooling dish. ..."
+37 USAMRIID #7 PDFpage 60: Patent # 6,387,665, patent page 6:
+
+ "..fermentations were carried out ... with no pH control or additions other than antifoam C."
+38 Product Information: Silicone Antifoams: Dow Corning Antifoam C:
+accessed 11Apr2010 at: http://www3.dowcorning.com/DataFiles/090007c880012087.pdf
+39 USAMRIID #7 PDFpage 58: Patent # 6,387,665, patent page 4.
+
+40 USAMRIID#8 PDFpg 21: FBI report of 28Sep2005,  including review of Laboratory Notebook Review Project:
+"On page four of notebook [redacted] Ivins detailed a procedure in which he grew five liters of Ba (strain unknown) to give to [redacted].  None of the rats died after being injected with this preparation and Ivins speculated he had harvested the Ba too early."
+41 USAMRIID#4 PDFpg 105: Interview with a USAMRIID employee 22Feb2008:
+
+"[redacted] also recalled that prior to the Sept 11, 2001 time frame IVINS was USAMRIIDs technical representative to DPG pertaining to a project whereby DPG was contracted out to produce large quantities of wet Ba spores."
+42 USAMRIID#17PDFpg 49: FBI summary of Ivins' lab notebooks 14July2004:
+
+"Also contained within the notebook was a Dugway procedure for anthrax spore preparation in bench top fermenters.  This standard operating procedure (SOP) draft outlined the culture and processing methods used for preparation of Ba spores in less than 10 liter quantities."
+43 USAMRIID#4 PDFpage 89, 90: 14Jan2008 interview at Ft Detrick:
+
+"[redacted] advised that the 5 L fermentor, when operational, did not produce a whole lot of noise."
+"When using the fermentors, [redacted] recalled that it was standard operating procedures when growing Ba to use anti-foam in order to reduce the buildup of bubbles or foam that would occur during the fermentation process.  [redacted] explained that anti-foam would be automatically pumped into the fermentor to reduce the amount of bubbles.  [redacted] recalled that the old brand name for anti-foaming agent was called Mazu and believed that Mazu may have been sold out or taken over by a newer company possibly called Sigma."
+44 BASF Technical Bulletin: MAZU DF 204 Defoamer.  Accessed 8April2010 at:
+http://www2.basf.us/businesses/chemicals/performance/pdfs/Mazu_DF_204.pdf
+45 USAMRIID #5 PDFpage 2: FBI periodic report 29Sep2006:
+
+"The 5-L fementor also manufactured by New Brunswick was lent to [redacted]
+by Bruce Ivins." [MFnote: the name redacted in this quote appears to contain 6 letters].
+
+46 USAMRIID #5 PDFpage 67: Interview with USAMRIID employee [MF note: from length of redactions, probably male with a 6-letter surname].  1/8/2007
+"[redacted] advised [redacted] spoke to [long redaction] concerning the five (5)
+liter fermentor.  Per [redacted] had previously told an interviewing Postal Inspector that USAMRIID employee BRUCE IVINS lent the 5L fermentor to [redacted] [WFO NOTE: see 279-WF-222936-POI, Serial 1487].  [redacted] clarified [redacted] at the time IVINS lent the fermentor was [long redaction] and not [redacted].  [redacted] did not work for [redacted] until after [redacted] left USAMRIID, circa [redacted].  [redacted reiterated IVINS never lent [redacted] the 5L fermentor, [redacted] has never seen it at USAMRIID, nor does [redacted] maintain any paperwork associated with same."
+47BEI#2 PDFpg 15-16: 31March2005 Interview with Bruce Ivins:
+
+"IVINS advised that prior to the fall 2001 anthrax attacks, suite B3 contained an extensive number of tubes and flasks containing liquid anthrax spores.  When asked how many such containers were stored in the room, he advised there were 'hundreds of containers of all sizes, but probably not thousands.'  There was no common labeling scheme or protocol for these containers - they were labeled by the individual researchers to whom they belonged.  Each researcher had the discretion to label the containers as he/she saw fit.  Many of the containers which held Ames anthrax spores were labeled'Ames.'  As an example, IVINS noted the flask containing RMR 1029 was labeled as 'Ames.'  There was no inventory of the flasks and tubes.  The walk-in refrigerator in B3 contained shelves which were always filled with flasks and tubes of spores." USAMRIID#8 PDFpg 4: 18Aug2005 Interview with ex-USAMRIID employee:
+"[redacted] noted that at [redacted] USAMRIID [redacted] there were no general logs maintained with would show how much organism was grown from the samples, or records to reflect how much of the grown organism was used in testing, and then subsequently destroyed. ..."
+48 Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, "Anthrax Investigation: Silicon Mystery Endures in Solved Anthrax Case" (News of the Week) *Science* vol 327 no 5972 pg 1435, 19Mar2010.
+
+49 United States Department of Justice Science Anthrax Press Briefing, Monday August
+18, 2008. Briefing page 13: Transcript accessed 11 April 2010 at: http://www.fredericknewspost.com/media/pdfs/FBI_0818_afternoon_bfg.pdf
+"DR MICHAEL: ...Again, in the letter materials the silicon and oxygen were colocated on the spore coat, within the spore.  In fact, we found some vegetative cells that were going through the sporulation process and the spore within the mother cell had this same signature."
+50 Joseph Michael (Sandia National Laboratory), "Microscopy/Weaponization of Bacillus anthracis" presented at: Scientific Review of FBI Anthrax Investigation: Second Committee Meeting, Friday September 25, 2009. Data on percentages of high-silicon spores in this paragraph taken from audio recording of Scientific Review of FBI Anthrax Investigation: Second Committee Meeting, Friday September 25, 2009, Day 2: Part 1: accessed 12Apr2010 at: http://nationalacademies.org/newsroom/nalerts/20090925.html
+51 Joseph Michael (Sandia National Laboratory), "Microscopy/Weaponization of Bacillus anthracis" presented at: Scientific Review of FBI Anthrax Investigation: Second Committee Meeting, Friday September 25, 2009. Discussion of this series of samples is taken from audio recording of: Day 2: Part 1: accessed 12Apr2010 at: http://nationalacademies.org/newsroom/nalerts/20090925.html
+52 BEI#1PDFpg 24: Bruce Ivins interview 12 Feb 2003:
+
+"Double purified material needs to have a chromatogram done to determine whether it was run through a gradient.  A trace of the gradient would remain on the material and should be indicated by a peak on the chromatogram.  Some possible gradients include sucrose, hypaque, renografin (which became known as renocal but may not be manufactured any longer), or phycoll."
+53 The starting concentration of RMR1029 was 3 x 10^13 spores in 1,000 cc, or 3.0 x
+
+10^10 cfu/ml.
+
+   BEI#3 PDFpgs 97-108: Spore Preparation Forms  dated Oct 1997 to Apr 2001:
+Starting concentration for RMR1029 varies from 2.5 to 3.9 x 10^10 cfu/ml.
+
+54 BEI#1 PDFpg 39: Reference Material Receipt Record entry for 27Aug2001.
+
+55 BEI#1 DPFpg 7: Ivins interview 31Jan2002:
+
+" Ivins stated that Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah usually makes the spore
+preparations used in animal challenges at USAMRIID. Ivins maintains a detailed inventory of all these spore production preparations that have been sent from Dugway. All of this inventory is accounted for."
+56 BEI#1 PDFpgs 38,39: Reference Material Receipt Record 22Oct1997 to 18Feb2003
+
+57 Ref: BEI#1: PDFpg 107-108: Ivins interview 13Jan2005:
+
+"IVINS record of the dissemination of Reference Material Receipt (RMR) 1029, the Ames spores which were a combination of Dugway produced spores and the spores made by IVINS, was kept only for the purpose of allowing the researchers to estimate how much of the material was left so they would not run out of spores for aerosol challenges.  The record was not kept as any kind of precise inventory for security reasons.  The amounts of remaining material were only estimates and were not accurately measured for each entry."
+58 DOJ Amerithrax Investigation Summary, PDF pg 31, summary report pg 27 footnote
+10.
+
+59 USAMRIID#19 PDFpg 7,8: Ivins interview 8Sep2004:
+
+"IVINS explained that the discrepancies between the volume removed from RMR1029 for the May and June 2001 shipments to Battelle [redacted] and [redacted] respectively) and the volume actually shipped in May and June 2001 [redacted and [redacted] respectively) were due to the fact that IVINS centrifuged the samples and reduced their overall volume prior to shipment to Battelle...."
+"When asked about a [redacted] discrepancy in this record, IVINS explained that evaporation over the years as well as math error would account for this missing volume. IVINS stated that RMR 1029 could have lost up to [redacted] a year and this would not be unusual because it is not stored in an air tight container..."
+60 USAMRIID#19 PDFpg 8: Ivins interview 8Sep2004:
+
+"When USAMRIID was getting low on RMR 1029 spores, they contracted Dugway in 2001 to produce additional spores."
+61 DOJ Amerithrax Investigation Summary, PDF pg 32, summary report pg 28 footnote
+11.
+
+62 DOJ Amerithrax Investigation Summary, PDF pg 32, summary report pg 28:
+
+"In fact, the investigation revealed that there were never any additions to RMR1029 after its creation in October 1997."
+63 BEI#2 PDF pgs 29-32: 1Apr2005: Lab Check of Concentration of RMR1029 re Naval Lab discrepancy
+64 BEI#2 PDF pgs 29-32: 1Apr2005: Lab Check of Concentration of RMR1029 re Naval Lab discrepancy
+65 BEI#1 PDFpg 118: telephone call from Ivins 16Feb2005:
+
+"On a separate issue, IVINS verified that he found RMR1029 to be 2.4 x 10^10
+cfu/ml and not 2.4 x 10^9 cfu/ml after it was returned to him from FBI custody. IVINS said that the viability was only down 20-30%, not 90%, and that they were able to fix the problem by adding more spores for the aerosol challenge for [redacted]."
+66 BEI#2 PDFpg 14-15: Ivins Interview 31Mar2005:
+"IVINS was questioned concerning the viability of RMR 1029 after the FBI returned RMR 1029 to IVNS due to a conflict between his earlier representations that its concentration was 10^10 colony forming units (cfu) per milliliter (ml) and the Navy Medical Research Center's (NMRC's) evaluation that the concentration was 10^9 cfu/ml.
+
+"IVINS stated that the concentration of RMR 1029 was either 2.4 x 10^10 cfu/ml or 2.5 x 10^10 cfu/ml when he checked it after it was returned by the FBI.  IVINS advised that he has never observed RMR 1029 drop below approximately 3.5 c 10^10 cfu/ml during its existence.  He also said he did not add any more spores to the RMR 1029 material after the FBI returned it to him.  When asked whether it would have been possible for someone to take some of the anthrax slurry out of the RMR1029 flask and replace it with water without detection, he responded in the affirmative.
+
+"IVINS could offer no explanation other than "technical error" for the discrepancy between his and NMRC's conflicting measurements of the concentration of RMR 1029.  When asked to opine as to what may have caused such  drop in viability, IVINS said he did not know.  IVINS was highly skeptical of the FBI's claim that the concentration of RMR1029 was really 10^9.  He explained that after the FBI gave RMR1029 back to him, he used 25ml for an animal challenge conducted by USAMRIID researcher [redacted].  IVINS said he would not have been able to perform this "animal spray" if the concentration of RMR 1029 had been 10^9 because this concentration would have been too low to challenge the vaccine."
+
+67 BEI#2 PDF pgs 29-32: 1Apr2005: Lab Check of Concentration of RMR1029 re Naval Lab discrepancy
+68 USAMRIID#20 PDFpg 82-85: 6Jan2005: FBI internal document:
+
+Plans for 'percentage viability' assay to be done on all RMR1029 samples.
+
+   BEI#2 PDFpg 88: 6/19/2007: Navy Lab report(? Or old report request?) of conc of
+RMR1029: Redacted data from 14Feb2005.
+
+69 BEI#6 PDFpg 39: 6Feb2008: Email to an FBI informant (identity redacted) from IVINS:
+"They accuse me of diluting, altering or adulterating an important preparation of anthrax material."
+70 DOJ Amerithrax Summary PDFpg18, summary page 14.
+
+
+71 USAMRIID#3b PDFpg 51: Interview with USAMRIID employee 26Apr2006
+
+72 USAMRIID#4, PDFpg114: Interview with ex-USAMRIID employee 11Apr2008:
+
+"[long redaction] did in fact dry/lyophilize very  small amounts of Ba but nothing remotely close to the quantity of Ba powder recovered from the anthrax-laced letter mailings."
+73 USAMRIID#3b PDFpg 50: Interview with USAMRIID employee 26Apr2006:
+
+"[redacted] advised to [redacted] knowledge there was no 'dry work" conducted at USAMRIID, rather it was well known that Battelle was involved in 'dry work.'"
+74 USAMRIID#21 PDFpg 13: Interview 23Jan2007: USAMRIID employee
+
+"Due to [redacted] previous experience with the [long redaction] was originally tasked by [long redaction] believes that [she] worked on this project for about [long redaction] that they had to stop working with dried powder aerosolization due to its duel [sic: FBI misspelling] use implications."
+"[redacted] worked on this project alone in building 1412 suite [redacted] (only
+
+parts of this suite are classified as a containment area)."
+Follows heavily redacted passages about duration of study and who was
+knowledgeable and where lab notebooks should be. USAMRIID#21 PDFpg 5-6: 16Jan2007 interview with USAMRIID employee.
+"When referring to the dry aerosol study that was conducted by the [long
+redaction] described it as a side project which occurred over a relatively short period of time. [redacted] believed it was [long redaction] explained that [long redaction].  The purpose of this project was to bridge the gap between use of wet aerosolization techniques as the model for studying a disease which in the real world would be caused by a dry aerosol.  [redacted] elaborated that if conducting aerosol vaccine challenges using a wet suspension of Ba spores did not accurately reflect a disease (eg inhalational anthrax) caused by a dry aerosol then the results of the model had limited value.  The purpose of the bridging study was to demonstrate that a wet aerosol vaccine challenge was a suitable model.  [long reaction] USAMRIID [long redaction] was directed by [redacted] to attempt to aerosolize [redaction].  Work performed by [redacted] on this project was conducted in room [redacted] of building [long redaction] designated area at the time."
+"[redacted] explained that during this project [redacted] inquired about possibility of using a dried biological agent.  However, the administration at USAMRIID denied the use of dried biological agents due to their dual use perception. [long redaction] considered this project just another of [long redaction]."
+"[redacted] convey that there were discussions [redacted] about attaining dried Bacillus anthracis (Ba).  Discussions detailed that [redaction] could be contracted to provide this material.  There was also discussion as to whether or not the material acquired would need to be milled, and if so, from where would a mill be obtained. [redacted] described that the use of dried agents was deemed out of the question by the administration due to its dual use implications."
+"[redacted] has no recollection of discussions about dried agents between [long redaction] at USAMRIID.  [long redaction] spoke about the dry aerosol project, but to [redacted] knowledge this was the only individual from [redacted] spoke to about this project.  [redacted] believes the project was shut down [long redaction]..."
+"[redacted] does not recall there being a cease and desist order, however the project died on its own when the word came down that there would be no dried biological agents used.  [redacted] admitted that [long redaction] due to the applicability and relevance that this project had with actual threat dynamics."
+
+
+75 USAMRIID#1 PDFpg 25: Interview USAMRIID employee 15Feb2005:
+
+"[redacted] concerns about the dried Bg work were not necessarily ethical concerns. [long redaction] The International Convention says that as long as the work is on pathogenesis or vaccine efficacy, the work is not considered offensive in nature" USAMRIID#21 PDFpg 15: 31Jan2007 interview USAMRIID employee:
+"[redaction] a project aimed at evaluating the feasibility of conducting a dry aerosol Bacillus anthracis (Ba) vaccine challenge was initiated.  The purpose of the study was to determine the breakthrough point for the recombinant protective antigen (rPA) Ba vaccine, in other words, what concentration of Ba spores would cause the vaccine to fail. Using the wet aerosol systems in place at the time, a high enough concentration of Ba spores could not be achieved.  However, generation of a dry aerosol of Ba spores was expected to provide a sufficient concentration of spores thus achieving this breakthrough point.  Additionally, a dry aerosol more closely resembles the type of Ba exposure a soldier on the battle field [sic: FBI spelling error] would likely encounter.  For these reasons, [redacted] felt that to demonstrate the true efficacy of the vaccine, they needed to evaluate it against this more applicable threat.
+
+"[redacted] indicated that the dried aerosol project never got off the ground.
+Some equipment was purchased and only preliminary experiments were performed using inert dusts or avirulent simulants.  The project was ended because [very long redaction] and as a result, the dry aerosol work didn't need to be completed.  Discussions about possible sources for dried Ba took place.  Specifically, discussion as to whether spores would be produced at USAMRIID or obtained externally through DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS ensued.  [redacted] recalled no discussion with other departments at USAMRIID about producing dried Ba. [long redaction]."
+"[long redaction] was good at "playing with equipment" and was interested in
+
+trying to develop the capability to generate dry aerosols at USAMRIID. [remaining
+paragraph redacted]."
+
+       "[redacted] dried Bacillus globigii (Bg) from Dugway Proving Ground and
+
+indicated that [long redaction] indicated that some preliminary work may have been done with the Bg from Dugway."
+76 BEI#2 PDFpg 5: Ivins Interview 31Mar2005.
+
+
+77 BEI#7, PDFpg 132-133: 18Aug2008 Telephone interview with CDC employee re Ivins: Had been contacted previously 27Mar2008 but wanted to add info:
+"[redacted] went on to discuss the several methods of drying that were possibly used by IVNS to dry the spores.  [redacted] suggested acetone drying as a possibility. Acetone drying was a common practice at Dugway Proving Ground (DPG).  IVINS, having worked closely with researchers at DPG, would have had knowledge of this practice."

markdown/misc/ic-ahi.md

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+## Executive Summary
+
+ DNI Haines and DDCIA Cohen established the IC Experts Panel on Anomalous Health Incidents (AHIs)
+to help elucidate potential causal mechanisms of the AHIs affecting US Government personnel. The panel comprised experts from inside and outside the US Government with expertise in relevant areas of science, medicine, and engineering. The panel did not examine questions related to attribution of AHIs to an actor, including the question of whether a foreign actor may be involved. The panel's findings are one of several inputs that will inform the IC's work on AHIs moving forward.
+
+## Methodology And Scope
+
+ Information sources. Access to information was central to the panel's process. In response to a request from DNI Haines, departments and agencies provided the panel with dozens of briefings and more than 1000 classified documents on a range of scientific, medical, and intelligence topics. This information included the findings of compartmented programs sensitive intelligence reporting, and AHI incident reports and trend analyses. Affected individuals also shared their personal experiences and medical records.
+
+ **Potential causal mechanisms.** As a starting point, the panel examined the plausibility of five potential causal mechanisms identified by the IC: acoustic signals, chemical and biological agents, ionizing radiation, natural and environmental factors, and radiofrequency and other electromagnetic energy. Throughout the study, the panel worked to identify possible mechanisms and to avoid bias for or against any of these hypotheses. The panel did not examine in detail combinations of mechanisms, although it judged some combinations, particularly those involving chemical or biological agents, to be worthy of further exploration.
+
+ Core characteristics. To narrow the problem, the panel assessed the potential for each mechanism to account for reported aspects of those AHIs that were particularly difficult to explain through other means. The panel's focus on these incidents should not be interpreted as diminishing the importance of other incidents. Four "core characteristics" were prominent among these AHIs: the acute onset of audio-vestibular sensory phenomena, sometimes including sound or pressure in only one ear or on one side of the head; other nearly simultaneous signs and symptoms such as vertigo, loss of balance, and ear pain; a strong sense of locality or directionality; and the absence of known environmental or medical conditions that could have caused the reported signs and symptoms.
+ Plausibility. The panel considered a mechanism to be feasible if all members agreed there was at least some credible evidence that it was technically and practically feasible in each of five areas-- a concealable source that could generate the required stimulus; propagation of the stimulus to an individual; coupling of the stimulus to the human body; ability of the coupling to cause biological effects;
+Classified By: Derived From: Declassify On:
+and ability of the biological effects to explain the reported clinical signs and symptoms--and other evidence did not exclude the mechanism.
+
+## Findings
+
+ The panel reached six main findings. Some are limited by knowledge gaps or assessments that could be resolved or tested through implementing the recommendations in the next section.
+
+ *The signs and symptoms of AHIs are genuine and compelling.* The panel bases this assessment on incident reports, medical data from affected individuals and interviews with their physicians, and interviews with affected individuals themselves. Some incidents have affected multiple persons in the same space, and clinical samples from a few affected individuals have shown early, transient elevations in biomarkers suggestive of cellular injury to the nervous system. The reported signs and symptoms of AHIs are diverse and may be caused by multiple mechanisms, but no case should be discounted. Prompt medical evaluation and care is particularly important; many individuals who have been treated immediately after an event have improved.
+
+ A subset of AHIs cannot be easily explained by known environmental or medical conditions and could be due to external stimuli. Although some signs and symptoms of AHIs are common in known medical conditions, the combination of the four core characteristics is distinctly unusual and unreported elsewhere in the medical literature, and so far have not been associated with a specific neurological abnormality. Several aspects of this unique neurosensory syndrome make it unlikely to be caused by a functional neurological disorder. The location dependence and sudden onset and offset, for example, argue for a stimulus that is spatially and temporally discrete. The perception of sound and pain within only one ear suggests the stimulation of its mechanoreceptors, a specific cranial nerve, or nuclei in the brainstem, all of which mediate hearing and balance. The lack of other symptoms also helped rule-out known medical conditions.
+ Pulsed electromagnetic energy, particularly in the radiofrequency range, plausibly explains the core characteristics, although information gaps exist. There are several plausible pathways involving various forms of pulsed electromagnetic energy, each with its own requirements, limitations, and unknowns. For all the pathways, sources exist that could generate the required stimulus, are concealable, and have moderate power requirements. Using nonstandard antennas and techniques, the signals could be propagated with low loss through air for tens to hundreds of meters, and with some loss, through most building materials.
+
+of these biological systems has been credibly demonstrated in cells and tissues, and persons accidentally
+
+exposed to radiofrequency signals described sensations similar to the core characteristics.
+
+However, there is a dearth of systematic research on the effects of the relevant electromagnetic signals on humans.
+
+ Ultrasound also plausibly explains the core characteristics, but only in close-access scenarios and with information gaps. The required energy can be generated by ultrasonic arrays that are portable, and produce a tight beam. Ultrasound propagates poorly through air and building materials, restricting its applicability to scenarios in which the source is near the target, It could couple to the body through the external auditory canal, interstitial spaces, or the vestibular apparatus of the inner ear. Ultrasound is used to open the blood-brain barrier in medical procedures, and acoustic stimulation of the aforementioned anatomical areas could produce symptoms consistent with AHIs. Studies of "ultrasound sickness" and related audiovestibular symptoms have reached mixed conclusions, but the panel was presented with
+
+independent, first-hand accounts in which researchers were exposed to high-power ultrasound beams and subsequently experienced some of the core characteristics.
+
+ Psychosocial factors alone cannot account for the core characteristics, although they may cause some other incidents or contribute to long-term symptoms. No known psychosocial factors explain the core characteristics, and the incidents exhibiting these characteristics do not fit the majority of criteria used to discern mass sociogenic illness. However, psychosocial factors may compound some of the incidents with core characteristics. Other incidents could be due to hypervigilance and normal human reactions to stress and ambiguity, particularly among a workforce attuned to its surroundings and trained to think about security. Some of these reactions could lead to functional neurological disorders or worsen the effects of existing conditions.
+
+ Ionizing radiation, chemical and biological agents, infrasound, audible sound, ultrasound propagated over large distances, and bulk heating from electromagnetic energy are all implausible explanations for the core characteristics in the absence of other synergistic stimuli. These mechanisms are unlikely, on their own, to account for the required effects or are technically or practically infeasible.
+
+Ionizing radiation, for example, produces known biological effects that are easily measured and inconsistent with the core characteristics, and chemical or biological agents alone would not cause the reported location-dependence or directionality.
+
+## Recommendations
+
+ The panel offers seven main recommendations to help the US Government better understand, prevent, and manage AHIs. Implementing these recommendations will require a coordinated approach because the challenges and solutions transcend organizational boundaries. Panelists emphasize the importance of appropriate classification, privacy, and security controls on research and information that may result. Four recommendations are of especially high priority:
+
+-
+ Data. Collect and coordinate incident and medical data across the US Government using
+a strengthened uniform database structure and enhanced standardized data, building on
+ and other efforts. Correlate comprehensive patient data with structured
+incident data, and strengthen the capacity for timely investigation of events. To protect the data,
+
+
+-
+ Biomarkers. Identify and validate new biomarkers that are more specific and more
+sensitive for diagnosis and triage of AHIs, to reduce reliance on traumatic brain injury (TBI) biomarkers, which were validated for a specific and possibly different clinical condition. Test for the presence of these biomarkers as soon as possible after an event, ideally within hours.
+-
+ Detectors.
+
+-
+ Communications. Develop a coordinated communications strategy to inform and
+educate the US Government workforce. Prompt and forthright communication can help lessen
+the effects of psychosocial factors and functional neurological disorders, regardless of cause. It can also build trust, strengthen resilience, and promulgate and protective or mitigation strategies.
+
+ Three recommendations are longer-term priorities:
+
+-
+ Clinical measurements. Develop better methods for taking objective clinical
+measurements of vestibular, inner ear, and cognitive function and make them practical for use
+in the field and at locations where AHIs occur. Collect patient histories and measurements within hours of an event when possible.
+-
+ Biological effects.
+-
+ Devices to aid research.
+
+## A Closing Note
+
+ The panel was moved by the experiences of individuals affected by AHIs. They deserve the best possible care, as well as appreciation for their sacrifices. Panelists were also greatly impressed with the many members of the IC and broader US Government with whom they engaged. The panel feels fortunate to have supported their work.

markdown/misc/intelbud.md

@@ -0,0 +1,578 @@
+# Foreign And Military Intelligence Book I
+
+FINAL REPORT
+OF THE
+SELECT COMMITTEE
+TO STFDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
+WITH RESPECT TO
+INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
+UNITED STATES SENATE
+TOGETHER WITH
+ADDITIONAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND SEPARATE
+VIEWS
+APRIL 26 (legislative day, APRIL 14),1976
+U.S. GoVERNMENT PIUNTING OFFICE
+WASHINGTON : 1976
+Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $5.35
+tions in DIA. There has been a similar potential pr<?blem in NSA, although it has provoked fa! less concern than DIA smce NSA must also serve national and tactIcal needs. In 1961 the JCS at!e?TIpted to gain control of that agency,49 and in recent years some <:rItI<:B at the other extreme have suggested taking NSA out of DOD, ~mce I! serves many non-military needs. The entIr~ pr?ble~ of dealing WIth. the mutual relations of national and tactIcal mtellIgence may ~ clarified as the DCI assumes the additional authority granted to hIm by the President's Executive Order of F.ebrua!y 1S! 1976.
+
+.
+
+While establishment of a Pentagon mtellIgence c~ar m.th~ form of the new Deputy Secretary may reduce fragt?enta~lOn ~Ithm t?-e d.epartment and improve the coherence of mI~tar:y mtellIgence, It WIll probably have a major im!>act on the coordmatmg r?le o~ the DCI.
+
+Given that the overwhelmmg volume of total U.S. mtellIgence collection and production occurs within DOD, th~ .Deputy Secret~ry could become, in effect, a second DCI: The defimt~~n of the r~latIOn between these two officials will be the smgle mO!lt crI~lCal factor m toplevel organization for management of natIonal mtellIgence.
+
+4-. Requirement8 for Oongre88ional Oversight.
+
+.
+
+If Congress- attempts to exe!cise mo~ comprehe.nsI.ve and detailed oversight of intelligence agenCIes, the bIggest Issue I!l lIkely to be what information the exec-ntive branch should make av~tllable. On defense intelligence there is likely to be less ofa problem If Congress conce~
+trates on issues of intelligence process rather than substance. Ther~ IS, of course, a limit as to how far it is possible to eyaluate the former ~Ith
+out considering the latter. Therefore, norms wIl! have. to be. estabhsh~d about what kinds of material (for exalXlple1 fimsh~d mtell~g;ence) WIll be subject to scrutiny by Q0I?-gress on.a routme baSIS. PrOVIsIon should also be made to keep basIC mformatI<!n on budgets and reso.urce allocation in a clear and available form m the Pent~gon, obtamable bI
+the oversight committee on demand. More conSIstent and th?roug documentation of the. chain of command could al8(') be requU"(;d m internal correspondence (thus avo!~ing the:r;>roblem. of "unattrl~ut
+wble" records of controversial deCISIOns turnmg up m the files, I.e., unsigned directives or cables which cannot clearly be traced to an authoritative source).
+
+.
+
+.
+
+If independent ongoing <!versight O! the substance of defense m~lligence is the goal, an ove:r~Ight corm~nttee sh(;mld have st;aff expertI~
+in several areas: (1) PolItIcal, to ~eIgh the rIsks. and gams of certam programs and targets; (2) ScientIfic a~d Techmcal, t<! ~valuate sensOrs; (3) Economic, to judge cost-effect~veness; (~) MIlItary, to consider non-national strategIc and tactIcal reqUIrements of DOD
+intelligence.
+
+## Xvi. Disclosure Of Budget Information On The Intelligence Community'
+
+~t.t~e present t~e the aggregate amount spent for the intelligen~
+actIVItIes of the Umted States Government is classified. The individual budgets for the C~ntral Intel~gen~e ~gency, the National Security Agency, and certam other umts wIthm the Department of Defense which gather national intelligence are likewise classified.
+
+The budgets for these agencies-which spend billions of dollars annually-are kept not only from the American people but also from most Members of Congress. This secrecy prevents the public and most
+~em?ers of Congress from knowing how much is spent on national mtelligence and from determining whether that amount is consistent with other national needs and priorities. It prevents the public and most Members of Congress from knowing how much is spent by each of the national intelligence agencies and from determining whether that alloca~ion among agencies is appropriate. Because funds for these agenCIes are concealed in the budgets of o.ther agencies, the public and most Members of Congress cannot be certam that funds in the open appropriations are used for the purposes for which they were approprIated. No item in the overall federal budget is above suspicion as ~ hiding place for intelligence agency funds. 1 Finally and most serIOusly, the present system of secrecy is inconsistent with the constitutional provision. which states:
+No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.2
+1 During the recent debate in the House of Representatives on the publication of the CIA's budget Congressman Kooh described an encounter with DCI Helms in which Congressman Koch asked about -the size of the CIA budget and the num:
+ber of CIA employees, questions that DCI Helms told Congressman K0Ch "we don't ans~er." As Congressman Koch described it, he then asked Mr. Helms "Are you tellmg me that I, a Member of Congress, do not have the right to know what the budget is, so that when I vote, I do not know what I am voting on?" DCI Helms said, "Ye!'l ... The item is placed in some other larger item, and you do not know." Congressman Koch then asked, "Do you mean that it might be included under Social Security?", to which DCI Helms replied, "We have not used that one yet, but that is not a bad idea." Congo Rec. H9359, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of ReP., Kpcp. )
+and policy issu()s involved, see "Tbe CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution,"
+84 Yale Law *Journal* 608 (1975), "Fiscal Oversight of the Central Intelligence Agency: Can Accountability and Oonfidentiality Coexist?" 7 New York University Jourritll,'-of International Law *and Politics* 493 (1974), and "Cloak and Ledger:
+Is CIA Funding Constitutional?" 2 Hastings Oonstitutional Law *Quarterly* 717
+(1975).
+
+## A. The Present Budgetary Process For Intelligence Community Agencies And Its Consequences
+
+At present, the Director of Central ~ntel1igenc~ subl!1its ~o the President recommendations for a consolIdated natIOllal IntellIgence program budget. The consolidated national intelligEmce budget, as well as the budget requests from the various agencies within the intelligence community, are reviewed by the Office of Man~gement and BudO"et (OMB) in the "same detail that [OMB] reVIews the b
+.
+
+b h
+"3 A f budget requests of any other executIve ranc agency.
+
+s ormer OMB Director Roy Ash described it:
+The specific amounts of the CIA's approved appropriations request an~ the identification of th~ approl?riation estimates in the PreSIdent's annual Budget, wIthm whICh these amounts are included, are formally provided by the Director o~ O~B
+to the chairmen of the Senate and House ApprOprIatIOns Committees.4
+.
+
+In the past, special subcommittees of the House and Sena~ Appropriations Committees have considered the .C~A budget. In closed session' the chairman of the House ApproprIatIOns CommIttee noted that hi~ subcommittee "tried and tried and tried to hold the secrecy of these matters as closely as we could.:' 5
+-
+These practices have ?een changIng .. T?e entIre House Defense Appropriation SubcommIttee now scrutImzes the CI1\ b.udget. In September of 1975 the Chairman of the House ApproprIatlOn~ Committee invited all the Members of the House of Representat~ve~ to review the executive session hearings of the Defense ApprOprIatIOns Subcommittee on the CIA's budget, although Members had to agree not to remove any documents from the room" not to take notes, and llot to reveal the classified information to 'unauthorized persons."
+While the Chairman invited this review by the Members, the full
+.. House Appropriations Committee voted not to receive figures on the CIA's budget from the Defense A~propriatio~s Subcommittee.
+
+Np,;ther the Sena,t.e AppronrIatIOns CommIttee as a whole nor the Senate as a whole is informed, even in se?ret s~sion, of. the budget:
+figures for the CIA. NSA or certain other lJ!-te~hgenre um!s.
+
+Once the subcommittees of the ApproprIatIons Co.mmIttee, agree upon bhe level of funding for the intelligence agenCIes,. these fUl!-ds are concealed in appropriation requests for other agenCIes on WhICh the full Appropriations Committees and Senate and House of Representatives vote.
+
+. .
+
+.
+
+After congressional approval of these appropna~lOns, the. chaIrmen of the Senate and House Appropriatio~s CommIttees notI,fy the Office of Management and Bud,q:et of the SIze and true locatIOn of intelligence agency funds. Funds for the CIA are then transferred
+3 Letter from Roy Ash to Senator Proxmire, 4/29/74, quoted in Congo R:Ci S9604, daily ed., *tI/4/74,* remarks of ~en, P~oxmire. It might b~ argued t :s the intelligence budgets should be reVIewed III even greater detaIl h~ ?M~ in neither the Congress as a whole nor the public can ~ntly. partIcIpa e tIle process of reviewing and debating the budget requests ill thIS area.
+
+- Ash letter, 4/29/74.
+
+U t"l 1974
+5 Congo Rec. H9363, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Mahon..
+
+n I
+, even the names of members of these special subcommittees were WIthheld from the public.
+
+to the CIA from these appropriations.s Former OMB Director Ash noted:
+rhe transfer of funds to CIA . . . is accomplished by the Issuance of Treasury documents routinely used for the transfer of funds from one government agency to another. The amount and timing of these transfers, ... are approved by OMB.7
+. This whole pr?cess tr~ats the CIA and other intelligence agencies ill a mann.er radIcally dIfferent from other highly sensitive agencies o~ t~e Umted States Government, such as the Atomic Energy CommISSIOn and the pepartment of Defense. While intelligence agency budgets ~ay reqUIre somewhat different handling, it is important that any speCIal approach reflect real needs justifying departure from the careful processes which Congress has developed over the years for maintaining its power over the purse.
+
+## B. The Constitutional Requirement
+
+. The present budgetary process apparently violates Article 1 SectIon9, Clause '7 of the Constitution, which reads:
+'
+No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations, made by Law; and a regular Statemen~ and ACC01Int of the Receipts and Expenditures of all publIc Money shall be published from time to time.
+
+This constitutional provision was intended to insure that Congress
+~ould control the governmental purse and that the public would be Informed of how Congress and the Executive spend public funds.s In keeping with this constitutional mandate, Congress enacted 31
+U.S.C. 66b (a), which provides that:
+the Secretary of the Treasury shall prepare such reports for t~e inforylllation of the Presiodent, the Congress, 'and the publIc, as WIll present the results of the financial operrutions of the Government.
+
+6 This is done pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 403f which autIlorizes the CIA to transfer to. and receive from other government agencies funds as approved by the OMB.
+
+Ash letter, 4/29/74. Under established procedures, funds approved by OMB
+for transfer to the CIA are limited to the amounts which tIle chairmen of the Senate and House Appropriations Committees specified to OMB.
+
+8 See D. Robertson, Debates ana Other Proceedings ot the Convention ot Virginia, 1788 .(Richmond, 1805), p. 326. The Chancellor of New York asked if the public were more anxious about any thing under heaven than the expenditUre of their moneY?" 2 J. Elliot, Debates in the SeveraZ States' Conventions on the Adoption ot the Federal *Constitution,* (Philadelphia: 'J. B. Lippencott, 1836), p.347.
+
+.
+
+The clause was implemented during the first Congress. The act creating the Treasury Department required the Treasurer to annually present each House of Congress with "fair and accurate copies of all accounts" and a "true and perfect account of the state of the Treasury." Act of Sept. 2, 1789, Chapter 12, Section I, I Statute 65, This Act was replaced by 31 U.S.C. 1029, which provides, "It shall be tIle duty of the Secretary of the Treasury annually to lay before Congress ... an accurate, combined statement of the receipts and expenditures during the last preceding fiscal year of all public monies." The receipts, wherever practicable, we!"e to he divided hy ports, districts, and states, and the expenditures by each separate head of appropriation.
+
+Fulfilling its charge, the Treasury DepaI4tment publishes a Oombi;wd Statement of Receipt8, Expenditure8, and Balance8 of *the* Dn~ted State8 G01Jernment, which is recognized as the offi:cial p~biication of the details ~f .receipt 'and outlay data:Wlth whIch all other.r~ports con~nmg similar dJai'ba must be m agreement. In addItIOn to servmg t~e needs of Congress, [the report i8 U8ed b?{] the general pubZw in its continuing review of the operatwnB of Government.
+
+[Emphasis added.] 9
+The *Oombined Statement,* however, contains. no entry for the Ce~
+tral Intelligence .A:gency, the National Secunty Agency or c.ertam other intelligence units within the Department of Defense .. WhIle the figure for total funds received and ~xpended by the Umted ~tates Government isaccurake, some funds hsted 'as expended by partIcular agencies 'are, in fact, merely tmnsferred from them to the Central Intelligence Agency.
+
+William Colby, former Director o~ th~ 9IA, has argued t~at ~he
+-
+present practice is constitutional, mam~ammg that the ConstItutIon permits concealment of funds f~r agenCIes such as the C~A: Not only does this posi,tion ignore the plam text o~ th~ Clause, but I~ IS n~ supported by the deb~tes, ~ither at ~he ConstitutIOIl!al ConventIOn or m the ratifying conventIOns m the V'arlOUS States.
+
+Mr. Colby'sargument relies .chiefly on t?-e fact. that when the State ment and Account Clause was mtroduced It prOVIded for annual publication of the account, but it was subsequently amended to allow congressional discretion over timing.10
+The amendment was intended, however, not to perI~llt concealment of expenditures from the full Cong:ess and the AmerIcan I?eople,. but rather to insure that the informatIOn would be .made aV!J:Ilable In a fashion permitting its thorough comprehensIOn.
+
+1
+
+1 NeIther p~o
+ponents nor opponents of the amendment argued agamst the assertion draft [of the Constitution]. The language ~rst sugg~ted by George Mi~n woul~
+have required an annual account of publIc expendltures. J"nmes Ma~lson, ho~
+ever argued for making a change to require reporting 'from time to time,' Ma~
+son ~:x;plained that the intenJt of his amendment was to 'l'~ve e~ough to the mscretion of the Legislature.' Patrick Henry opposed the MadIso~ 'language b~US~
+it made concealment possible. But w.hen the debate wa-s over, It was the MadISO
+view that prevailed.'~
+.
+
+Mr. 00lby 'also argued that the provision allowing Congress lto.keep theIr p~
+ceeding-asecret demonstrated the intent of the Fr3JIDers to prOVIde fo~ .concea ment. That provision, unlike the Statement and Account Clause explICItly provides for secrecy; moreover, the Statement and Account. Claus.e guarantees an accounting for aU puiblic money. For a fuller treatment of thIS arg-UInent, see
+"The CIA's Secret Funding and the Constitution,:' Yale *L..J.* 608.(1975).
+
+e It could be argued that the constitutional reqUlrement.Ig not vlOlated ~s th Combined Statement provides an accurate total for recelpts and expendlturest Under this theory .all government funds could be appropriated to one governme~
+agency and secretly transferred to the other agen.cies: As long ~s the total afJrb -
+priated and expended were published, the constItutlOnal reqUIrement wou e fu~il~: Farrand, Records of the FetlerwZ *Oonvention* of 1787 New Haven: Yale UniYersity Press, 1966), pp. 618-19.
+
+that the people had a "right to know" how their funds were being spent.u It should also be noted that the proponents of congressional discretion did not argue that secrecy was needed. Rather they contended that leaving the interval of publication to be fixed by Congress would result in fuller disclosure, since no agency would be forced to publish an incomplete report to meet an inflexible and unrealistic deadlineY
+A fixed schedule would result in statements that would be "incomplete" 14 or "too general to be satisfactory." 15 The proponents of the amendment ridiculed the possibility that granting Congress discretion would mean that information would be concealed. forever; Congress would publish the reports at regular, frequent intervals.16
+It has been implied that the constitutional requirement has been met, at least in the House of Representatives, in that all Members can examine the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee's executive session hearings on the CIA budget.n As one Member of the House noted:
+Secrecy in Government is distasteful to a free society, but preservation of our free society demands that we maintain a prudent cloak over vital intelligence operations, so long as the Representatives of the people have the right to examine what is covered-as they do in this situation.18
+Knowledge on the part of *all* of Congress, would satisfy part of the constitutional requirpment. As Justice Story noted. one of the purposes of the constitutional requirements is :
+to secure regularity, punctuality and fidelity in the disbursements of the public money ... it is highly proper, that Congress should possess the power to decide how and when any money should be applied for these purposes. If it were otherwise, the executive would 'possess an unbounded power over the public purse of the nation .... The power to control and direct the appropriations constitutes a most useful and salutary check upon profusion and extravagance, as well as upon corrupt influence and public speculation. . . . It is wise to interpose in a republic, every restraint, by which the public treasure, the common fund of all, should be applied with unshrinking honesty to such objects as legitimately belong to the common defense and the general welfare.19
+But even if all of Congress had the information now held by the subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees, the Constitution would still be violated. The Constitntion requires that the *public* know how its funds are being spent. The Constitution requires that the statement and account be made public "from time to time." 20 This re-
+.
+
+.
+
+d t make congressional responsibility "more I'rement was Impose
+0
+d th t'
+qu
+"21 b
+11 win the people to check Congress an
+. e execu lve perfect y a. o.
+
+f?;
+f' f.ormati.on on what "money IS expended, through the pubhcatIOdnb.o mh t authority." 22 As Chancellor Livingfor what purposes, an Y w a st.on pointed out:
+.
+
+y will give up to your state legislature everythmg dear
+. and valuable' but you will give no power to Congress, ~ecause
+'t rna be abused' you will give them no revenue, ecause
+~he Jblic treasur~s may be squandered. Bl.:!-t do you ~ot see her~ a ca ital check ~ Congress are to publ~sh, from tIme to f a~count of their receipts and expendItures. These may
+~:~~l~;ared together; and if the former, year after year, e~
+ceed the latter, the co~ruPtiondwi11 be tetect~d, and the pe.op e may use the c.onstitutIonal mo eo re ress.
+
+.
+
+.
+
+The debates and later commentary indicate that the cQnshtutIO~al
+.
+
+reqUlremen t was designed to all.ow citizens t.o chart the course .of PO~ICy
+., f t I
+penditures-t.o determme, thr.ough an exammatIOn 0 gh'ernmen. a ex t defense and t.o.o little for example, whether t.o.o muc m.oney IS spen:-
+h uld be allocated
+~~l :~~~~:~s~~:~i!~~i~~~d~h~~i~~h~:mh~~~n :.o~~t ~obyent~1:;:c~
+e.o Ie with C.ongress, to determl'Il.e w et er expen I ~.
+
+f
+~tiJe c~nf.orm to the intent .of the apprQpria~~n. Pubhca~lO~ fy f~f~~~
+priations and expenditures w.ould a~s.o 'provl d an .opp~~ un~ were for pe.ople to ascertain if both appr.oprratIOns an expen 1 ure c.onst~tuti.onal purposels.
+
+24 h h l;nf.ormation .on appr.opriations It IS h.owever unc ear ow muc
+'U
+bI" h d N
+and expenditu~ is required by the. C.ons~ituti.on to ~e pu l!s:erlio~
+.one at the Constituti.onal ConventIOn dlsaftzood WIt:!: t~e hilling"
+~:!;\:f:~dp~~~Pdi:~f~u~~ ~~:~r~o;ri~~i~~ ;d:;p~nditu~~
+of n.onsensitive g.overnmen~al ag~ncles, there IS a hmIt t.o the amo
+.of detail which can be pubhshed.
+
+2511
+ted. a stand-
+The Su reme Court in United States v. Robel, sUf?;ges
+.
+
+d h hP might !be used to fix the constituti.onal reqUlrement partIcuar W' IC
+.
+
+.
+
+f th b dget w.ould damage n'alarly when claims that pubhcrutI.on .0
+e u
+'d t to'ts 'tizens ti.onal security are. raised ~ainst the ?,.ov;::en!: a:la~un~1 of reto publish from tIme to tlIDe a regu ar
+. me
+'" 2 J. Story, Sec. 1348, pp. 222--223.
+
+.. Ibid.
+
+23 2 J. Elliot, p. 345.
+
+1
+ntators on the Constitution wrote
+.. Rs David Ramsey, one of the ear Y comme r than those set forth If Congress applied any funds for purposes. othe Th Clause provides in the Constitution, they would have efxctheed~ ~~::{ ~~~~s'whOe pay, are to be information so that "[t]he people 0
+e.
+
+~~
+judges how far their money is properly apPchedi'
+on the subject of the Federal
+"An address to the Freemen of South ll;ro l.na
+.
+
+St t p. 374
+Com,titution;" in Pamphlets on the ConstttutlOn of the Umted
+"a es,
+(Pro 6~~~u~~ ~~
+S:a~\~l~~~!~;~~~~:: ;?~~~~h S:o~~~J~ed,.isavailable under the F~edom of Information Act.
+
+25&389 U.S. 258 (1967).
+
+ceipts and expenditures .of all public m.oney. The Court held that
+''when legitimate concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a substantial burden on First Amendment activities, C.ongress must achieve its gQal by means which 'have the least drastic impact on the c.ontinued Vitality of First Amendment freedoms." 26
+Under this test the c.onstitutionality of a level of discl.osure .of inf.ormation .on expenditures depends on whether there is another system of greater discl.osure which, without endangering nati.onal security, w.ould have a "less drastic" impact .on the public's right t.o know how its funds are being spent. It is clear, however, that the present secrecy surr.ounding the appropriations and expenditures for intelligence-particularly the inflation .of unspecified appropriatiQns ill which funds for intelligence are concealed-vitiates the constituti.onal guarantee.27 Under the present system neither the public nQr the C.ongress as a whole kn.ows h.ow much is beillg spent on natiQnal intelligence.or by each intelligence agency. In addition, both Congress as a whole and the public are "deceived'" as one Senat.or put it,28 about the
+"true" size .of other agency budgets. As certain unspecified general appr.opriati.ons c.ontain funds which are secretly transferred to the CIA, it is impossible for m.ost Members of Congress .or the public to kn.ow the exact am.ount .of money which actually is destined for any g.overnment agency.29 C.ongress is thus unable to set pri.orities through the allocation .of funds,30 or to determine if expenditures by the executive conform to congressional intent and are being spent wisely and well. Members .of the public cannot determine with any confidence whether they agree willi C.ongress' allocatiQn .of res.ources and cannot m.onit.or expenditures by the executive branch.
+
+26 389 U.S. 258, 268. While the public's right to information on governmental expenditures has not been accO'rded the "preeminent" status of the First Amendment, the test is an appropriate place to begin an analysis.
+
+lIT As Justice Black wrote, "The guarding of military and diplomatic secrets at the expense of informed representative government provides no real security for our republic." New Yorlc Time8 00. v. Unite(l *States,* 403 U.S. 713 at 719 (1971). In th'e same case, Justice Stewart wrote, "In the absence of the governmental checks and balances present in other areas of our national life, the only effective restraint upon executive policy and power in the area of national defense and international affairs may be in an enli~htened citizenry." *[(t.* at 728. Justice Stewart's remarks apply equally well to the exercises of power by the Congress.
+
+28 Congo Rec. S9602, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Proxmire.
+
+29 Congo Rec., H9361, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Evans. As Congressman Evans recently noted, the secrecy surrounding th'ese funds for the intelligence community is infectious: "When we are tucking it away in another pocket in the budget, we are also making a secret of something else that should not be a secret."
+30 *See e.g.,* Congo Rec;, H9372, daily ed., 10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Leggett. Congressman Leggett noted, "How can we 'oversee' in any fu-shion if we have no knowledge of the Agency's command on our resources? How can we set budgetaTy priorities in a meaningful fashion, if we have no basis for comparing intelligence with unemployment, health, or other competing program areas?"
+
+## C - .Alternatives To Concealing Intelligence Budgets From Con- Gress And The Public
+
+Within certain limits, Congress has the. power to det.ermine ho~
+information about the receipts and expendItures of publIc moneys IS
+made available to the public.31
+-
+Congress could choos,,: to p~blish CIA or NSAbudg~t~ and expenditures, for example, m detail.equal to those of nonsel"!-sItIve ~gen
+cies. This approach, however, mIght threaten ~he secunty of mtelligence operations or agents. Congress ha~ avaIlable ~noth~r. ~odel for budget disclosure to protect the securIty of certam actIvItIes.
+
+Since 1793, certain agencies, such as the AEC, the F~I, and the Department of State have been appropriated funds speCIfically for
+"confidential purposes," which for seeuri~y reasons, are exempt from normal accounting procedures.32 In each mstance, ho~ever, C~mgress appropriates funds to the agen~y ?irectl~ a~d pU~~lCly spec~fies the small percentage of the approprIatIOn whIch. IS for confidentIal P:urposes" and thus exempt from nor:qJ.al accountmg proce?-ures. Drawmg on this practice Congress obviously could publish detaIled budgets for the intelligence' agencies while providing a lump sum to each for "confidential purposes."
+ld bI" h Congress could also devise other models. Congress cou pu IS
+only the total appropriated to each int~lligence agency.ss As the Special Senate Committee To Study QuestIOns Relate4 to ~ecret and Confidential Documents 34 suggested in 1973, the publIcatIOn of such funds should provide members ~ith. the minimal information they should have about our mtellige~ce ope~a
+tions. Such information would also end, th~ pra?tIce of m-
+Hating certain budget figures for use to hIde mtelhgence costs and would insure that all Members wopld know the true cost of each budget item they must vote upon.
+
+m. Oincinnati Soap 00. v. Unitea *State8,* 301 U.S. 308 (193&). In fixin~ the level of detail revealed, however, a congress~onal decis~on cannot overnde a constitutional requirement such as that of Article 1, SectIOn 9, Clause 7, particularly as one purpose of that requirement was to serve as a check on Co~gress.
+
+so The first such statute authorized special procedures for sums relatmg to foreign ''intercourse or treaty." By the Act of February 9, 1793, Congress provided: "that in all cases, where any sum or sums of money h~ve "issned, or shall hereafter isuP, from the treasury, for the purposes of mtercourEe or treaty, the President shall be, and he hereby is authorized to cause the, same to be duly settled annually with the accounting officers of the Treasury m the manner following, that is to say; by causing the same to be acc~)Unt.ei .for, specifically in 'all inStJances wherein the expenditures thereof may, m, hlS Judgment be made public; and by making a certificate or certificates, or causmg the Secr~~
+tary of State to make a certificate or certificates of the amount of such expendI- tures as he may think it advisable not to specify; and every su<;.h certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the sum or sums therem expre~sed to have been expended." [Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, sec. 2, 1 Stat. 300, codified as 31 U.S.C. 107 (1970).J
+TJ:e Sp~cia~ Committee recommended that the Appropriations CommIttee ItemIze the Defense Department appropriations bill in order that the "total sums proposed to be appropriated for intelligence activities by each of the following agencies: Central Intelligence Agency, Defense .Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National ReconnaIssance Office, and any separate intelligence units within the Army, Navy, and Air Force" could be revealed.s5
+Finally, th~ Congress. could decide. that only the total budget figure for natIOnal mtellIgence be publIshed. This would be the aggregate of funds provided to CIA, NSA, DIA, and the national intelligence components in the Departments of Defense, State, and Jre3:sury. Alth<?ugh there ma:r be problems defining w~at constitutes natIOnal mtellIgence," the DIrector of Central IntellIgence already prepares a national intelligence budget. The Director could, with the appropriate congressional committees determine what agencies or departments would be included.36
+The secrecy presently surrounding intelligence expenditures vitiates the constitutional guarantee. Even publishing one figure-the total appropriations and expenses for national intelligence-would have a salutory effect. It would eliminate the inflation of figures presently in the Budget and in the Combined Statement resulting from the concealment of. intelligence agency funds in other agency appropriations and ~xpendItures. Congress would be able to establish its priorities by placmg the amount appropriated for national intelligence activities against other claims on the public purse; the public could make its own independent judgment about priorities.aT
+~s Se~ator ~roxmir,,: noted, publication of the aggrega.te budget for natIonal mtellIgence mIght also have the effect of deterrmg potential adversaries by showing that the United States Government continues to spend sizeable amounts on intelligence.38 As former DCI and Secretary of Defense Schlesinger noted, publication of this figure might also
+85 The Committee specifically did not request that any line items be revealed, although they did recommend the publication of the total number of personnel employed by each agency.
+
+36 The Senate Select Committee has proposed an oversight committee which would have jurisdiction over authorization for national intelligence activities of the United States Government, S. 93--2893.
+
+.., Former Director Colby has argued that publication of the CIA budget would
+not aid the public in any way. As he put it, "Knowledge of the Agency budget would not enable the public to make a judgment on the appropriateness of the amount without the knowledge of the product and the ways it is obtained."
+(William Colby testimony, House Select Committee on Intelligence, 8/4/75, p. 123.)
+.
+
+36 Congo Rec. S9603, daily ed., 6/4/74, Remarks of Senator Proxmire. However, as Senator Pastore noted, if the public figure declined "then the Russians and the Chinese Communists know that we are doing less, and that might let them become more audacious." *la,* at S9605.
+
+decrease speculation about the budget and focus the debate on intelligence on more significant issues.39
+Finally, the disclosure of any figures on intelligence expenditures might well increase the effectiveness of oversight of the intelligence agencies by both individual members of Congress and by the appropriately charged congressional committees. Members of the House might be encouraged to inspect executive session hearings on intelligence agency budgets; 40 members of the oversight committees of both houses might be spurred to review the proposed budgets more closely, in anticipation of a possible debate on the figures. 41
+
+## D. The Effect Upon National Security Of Varying Levels Of Budget Disclosure
+
+Even given the constitutional requirement, any disclosure of budgetary information on agencies in the Intelligence Community has been strongly resisted. In responding to a proposal for the publication of the total sum budgeted for the. national intelligence community, Senator Stennis noted that:
+[I] f it becomes law and is carried out, [it] would, as its practical effect, virtually destroy 80 to 90 percent of the effectiveness of much of our most important work in the field of intelligence.42
+And Congressman Burlison told the House that if an amendment which provided for publication of the total figure budgeted for the CIA were adopted, "i [t] will totally paralyze the intelligence community." 43
+An examination of the effect on national security of publication of any data on the intelligence community budgets is difficult, in part beCause the examination itself must not be allowed to jeopardize the national security. Given the constitutional guarantee, however, the burden of proof must fall on those who would deny this information to
+.. During testimony before the Senate Select Committee, Mr. Schlesinger was asked whether there was a good reason for actually publishing a budget figure.
+
+He replied: "Only in that the public debate at the present time covers so wide a range that if you had an official number, the debate would tend to die down and focus on something more significant than whether we're spending $11 billion on intelligence." (James Schlesinger testimony, 2/2/76, p. 54.)
+Mr. Schlesinger was later asked whether he thought there was any chance of convincing the American people or the enemy of the truthfulness of any figure that is published, to which Mr. Schlesinger replied: "I do not believe that you could persuade the Soviets that that is a truthful figure, but I am not sure that that is our objective. Whether or not you could persuade the American public, I
+think there is a large segment of the American public that would be persuaded. ... " SchleSinger, 2/2/76, p. 56.)
+the public. The possible effects on the national security of certain levels of budget dIsclosure are examined below.44
+
+## 1. The Effect On Nation?L Security Of Publication Of The National Intell1Gence Oomrnumty Budget Many I!1Diyiduals Familiar With The Intelligence Community Agree
+
+~h~t publIcatIOn of a gross figure for national intelli!!ence would not m Itse~f, dan:age the national security.
+
+I:>
+, DUrIng Ius confir!nation hearings as Director of Central Intelligence' James Schlesmger, former Secretary of Defense and past head
+~f tl~e OMB, told Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr., in regard to the publIcatIon <?f the gross figure for national intelligence: "I think that the securIty concerns are minimal. The component figures I would be more concer!1ed about but .for t~e gross national intellige~ce program figures, I thmk we could lIve WIth that on a security basis, yes." 45
+. Former DCI HelI?-s t?ld the Senate Select Committee that because It .was so larg~, publIcatIOn of a single figure for national intelligence mIght be "satIsfactory." 46
+While it p.as b~en s~ggested that the publication of even a total for th~ natIOnal mtelhgence budget would aid our enemies,41 Mr.
+
+,~chlesl1lger to~d the Senate Select Committee that our enemies already know I~l the first place and it's broadly published. All that you would have IS a confirmed official figure for information. That is
+.44 There are. many pos~~ble variants of budget disclosure running from the full dIsclosure polIcy governIng such government agencies as the Department of Agric~lture, throug~ the bUdge~ d~sclosure utilized by the FBI and AEe which pro-
+VIdes for a specIfic appropnatIOn of funds for "confidential" purposes which are exempted from normal accounting reqUirements, to the possible disclosure of an aggregate figure for each national intelligence agency or for national intelligence as. a 'Y"hole. The Committee has not attempted to analyze the constitutional implIcatIOns and effect on national security of each, but has focused on the disclosure
+?f th~ global sum for national intelligence and the aggregate budgets of each Intelhgence agency.
+
+: Q~oted in Congo Re~., S9603, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. Proxmire.
+
+Rlchard Helms testImony, *1130/76,* pp. 36,37. Because the figure is so large the introd~;~ion of expensive. collection systems would not result in a "conspic~
+uous b~mp In the budget WhlCh would alert hostile powers to new activities by the Umte~ St:;ttes. For 51 ful1er discussion of this argument and its relationship to the publIcatIon of the CIA's aggregate budget, see pp. 378-381.
+
+John Clarke, a former Comptroller of the CIA and an advisor to DCI Colby was -asked about the effects of publication of the total national intelligence budget and specifically whether publication of the figure would disclose the existence
+?of, Or the start of, a high-cost technical collection systf'm. Mr. Clarke responded I have not run the studies on this, but I would be very hard pressed to find' ~
+ca.se that I could supPort. The budget figures don't reflect that. They are down.
+
+HIstorically, at. least .they have bE>~n down inside of a larger figure and it doesn't really pop out In a bIg way. And It can be explained away." (John Clarke testimony, 2/5/76, p. 47.)
+41 See e.g. p. 376 .
+
+more or less in the public domain anyhow without public confirmation.
+
+without official confirmation." 48
+'
+Mr. Schlesinger described for the Select Committee the impact of publishing the total national intelligence budget:
+I am not so concerned about that from the security aspect as some people are. I'm not sure I recommend it, but I'm not so concerned about it from the security aspect.
+
+It could do some good in that there are some inflated notions around about how much the United States Government is actually spending on intelligence, and if you had an official statement, I think that would put the total amount of expenditures in better context for the public.4sa
+
+13. The Effect on National Seowity of Disclosure of the Total Appropriated to or Expended by Each National Intelligence Agency
+Publication of the total of the CIA's budget or of the other agencies'
+budgets has also been opposed. In a Freedom of Information Act suit, DCI Colby argued against publication of the Agency's budget total, as follows:
+Publication of eieher the CIA budget or the expenditures made by CIA for any given year would show the amounts planned to be expended or in fact expended for objects of a confidential, extraordinary or emergency nature. This information would be of considerable value to a potentially hostile foreign government. For example, if the total expenditures made by the Agency for any particular year were publicized, these disclosures, when taken with other information publicly available ... would enable such governments to refine their estimates of the activities oia major component of the United States intelligence community, including specifically the personnel strength, technological capabilities, clandestine operational activities, and the extent of the United States Government intelligence analysis and dissemination machinery ....
+
+The subsequent pUblicrution of simiLar daita for 'Other fiscal years . . . would enable a potentially hostile power to refine its estimat.es of trends in the United States Government intelligence efforts.
+
+He continued:
+The business of intelligence is to a large extent a painstaking collection of data and the formation of conclusions utilizing a multitude of bits and pieces of information. The revelation of one such piece, which might not appear to be of significance to anyone not familiar with the process of intelligence analy-
+<S Schlesinger. 2/2/76. p. 52. Mr. Schlesinger noted that. as the Intelligence Community has "no constituenC'y," it b>ndR to be "blam('d for one t.hing or another," and "if you had an openly publish('d figure . . . there would be pressure within the Congress at budget mark-up time to take a 15 percent or 20 percent whack at it just for good measure and ... there is no way of having a public debate about the merits of intelligence." *lrI.* at 51-52. Mr. Schlesinger's argument implies that Congress as a whole should not be given information because it should not be allowed to exercise its control over the purse.
+
+sis (and which, therefore, might not arguably be said to be damaging to the national security) would, when combined with other similar data, make available ... information of great use and which would result in significant damage to the national security of the United States.
+
+He provided the following example of the impact on the nation's security of publication of the CIA's budget:
+If it were learned that CIA expenditures have increased significantly in anyone given year, but that there has beep.
+
+no increase in Agency personnel ( apparent from traffic, cars in the parking lots, etc.) it would be possible to make some reasonable estimates and conclusions to the effect that, for example, CIA had developed a costly intelligence collection system which is technological rather than manpower intensive; and that such system is operational. Knowledge readily availa;bleat the time about reconnaissance aircraft photography, and other technology, can result in a more accurate analysis ,about a new collection system which would enable a potentially hostile power to take steps to counter its effectiveness . . . the development of the U-2 aircraft as an effective collection device wou1d not have been possible if the CIA
+budget had been a matter of public knowledge. Our budget u:creased significantl:y during the development phase of that alrcraft. Thrut fact, If publIc, would have aJttractedattention .... If itihad 'been supplemented by knowledge (Iavailable perhaps from technical magazines, industry rumor, or advanced espionage techniques) that funds were being committed to a major aircraft manuacturer and to a manufacturer of sophisticated mapping cameras, the correct conclusion would have been simple to draw. The U.S. manufacturers in question ... would have become high priority intemgence
+;targets .... And I'm sure that ,the Soviets would have taken steps earlier to ,acquire a capability to destroy very -highaltitude aircraft. They did indeed take these steps, with eventual success, but only sometime after the 'aircraft 'began operating over their territory-that is, once they had knowledge of a U.S. intelligence project.49
+A close examination of Mr. Colby's statement raises a number of questions as to the effecJt of publication of the CIA's aggregate budget.
+
+Although Mr. Colby notes that the CIA's total budget figure would allow governments to "refine their estimates of the activities of a major component of the Un~ted States intelligence community," he provides no evidence of *h010* the publication of this one figure would increase the other government's knowledge of, for example, the clan-
+Action No. 75-0676, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Pp. 3-5. Other knowledgeable figures have reached different conclusions about the effect. of publishing the CIA's budget. For example, Elliot Richardson, pre!'ently Secretary of (1ommerce and formerly Secr('tary of Defense, hqs stated that publication of the amount of the CIA's expenditures would not be damaging to the national security.
+
+destine DperatiDnal activities *'Of* the CIA.50 There wDuld, *'Of* CDUrse~
+be SDme "refinement" if it were knuwn that the CIA's budget was
+$X milliDns rather than $X + 1 milliDns. Such refinement goes 'On at all times, but the questiDn is whether such a gain by hostile powers is sufficient to justify 'Overriding the cDnstitutiQnal reQui~ement tha~ the American peQple be told hDW their funds are spent. Havmg an offiCIally acknDwledged budget tQtal does nut signal tD a hostile PQwer manpuwer levels in the Clandestine Service, let alQne the number *'Of* deep CDver agents. Having an 'Officially acknowledged aggregate figure does not reveal the CQst 'Of a reconnaissance vehicle, let alQne its technical capability.
+
+.
+
+Mr. CDlby has maintained that 'One-time publicatiDn 'Of the total amQunt budgeted for the CIA would set a precedent and that infDnnutiQn revealed thrDugh successive publicatiDn WQuld prDvide hostile pDwers with insights intQ United States intelligence activities.
+
+Of particular importance is Mr. Colby's. claim that successive disclosures 'Of .the CIA's aggregate budget WQuld eliminate the effectiveness *'Of* ma;or technicrt.l cQllection systems like the U-2. A change in the CIA's tQtal budget frDm 'One year to the next may be due tQ a number
+'Of faotors: inflatiDn, cutbacks in -activities, 'a major reorganizlatiQn, or long term gains in efficiency, fQr example. Assuming that an increase in the CIA's budget alerted hoStile PQwers to some change in the Agency's activities, it would nQt in itself reveal what the new aotivity was-a new CQvert aetion proiect, mQre materi,al procurement, 'Or an increase in analytical capwbility through mechanizatiQn. For Mr.
+
+CQlby's argument tQ be valid nQt 'Only must the hostile power be able 'accuraJbe.ly tQ determine what the ,activity is--fDr instance, a new reconnaissance system-bnt that power WQuld have tD gain, cQvertly, an enQrmQUS amount 'Of tightly guarded inrormation, sw:~h as the techno-
+IQgical capabilities 'Of the vehicle and the surveillance systems which it cDntained.51 It WQuld seem that a hostile PQwer able to gain that informatiQn wouJd be ruble tQ discover t,he total 'Of the CIA's budget, a much mQre widely knQwn figure. The possibility that a hostile power mav pieree all the barriers designed to limit disseminatiQn
+'Of clQsely held infDrmatiQn cannQt be used tQ ;ustify denying the American peQple infQrmatiDn which the CDnstitutiDn guarantees them, and which is widely published, and which must be assumed tQ be within the grasp 'Of hostile PQwers.
+
+It is far frQm clear, mDreQVer. that the develQpment and intrDductiQn *'Of* a majQr new system will be annQunced by a change in the Agency's total budget.
+
+The CIA budget may be large enQugh not tQ change substantially when a new system CQmes 'On line. A preliminary analysis *'Of* past CIA
+budgets has indicated that majQr new activities have nDt always resulted in "bumps" and that SDme "bumps" in the budget still are nDt
+50 Mr. Colby's statement ignores the fact that figures for the CIA budget are already widely publicized. although not officiallY confirmed. In this regard. it is interesting to note that the Central Intelligence Agency withdrew its objection to the far more detailed budget diselosure in The OIA and the Oult of IntelUgenoe by Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks.
+
+~r:r~~iie~ti~~~~~.52 Because *'Of* the impDrtance 'Of expensive techth"
+.
+
+b - ms, hDwever, the Select CQmmittee believes that e CQnSpICUDUS ump" argument deserves fulle st d b th f
+~::{!g::: ~h~~gigrtt~es,~ Pfirticulfarly in.light .of t.h~ re~ufts If t.h~ p~;bli~
+by the Committee. ga e gure 'Or natIOnal IntellIgence recQmmended Finally .. the. claims abDut damage tD the national securit resultin frDm pubhcatlOn of the ao-gregate figure for each . t lr y g must be viewed in the light *'Of* far mDre detailed ~~de c~~~:~i~ge~c~
+~Dsure *'Of* the budgets Q.f 'Other a.gencies vital tD the natiDnal sec~~it~
+fo nQ~mQus amounts *'Of* InfOrmatIOn have been prDvided tQ the publlc'
+At~ri~taE~~r~DC~!~i:i~~ 'Of t~d pelPartmenft *'Of* Defense an~ th~
+and d db' e ISC Qsure '0 funds apprDprIated t'
+jxpen e 1 these agencies did not and dDes not reveal vltal na ab:t ~hcrets.
+
+s SenatQr Symingt?n noted, "There's nDthing secret G-5A " But '''k costl *iIf* a f~chlear aIrcraft carrier 'Or the CDSt of the th'
+nDwe geD
+e CDSt does not eaual knQwledO"e *'Of* hQW
+edf} W~~fDhs 'Operate Dr how .they ~Quld be utilized." Similariy,knDwl-
+1ge
+} ~ 'Overall ~Qst *'Of* IntellIgence does nDt in any way entail the rfune eats.e '0
+InlfDrmatlOn ~bout how the variDus -intelligence groups c lOn, 'Or p an tQ functIOn." 54
+
+## E. The Argument That Publicatiqn *'Of* Any Infdrmatidn Will Inevitably Result In Demands Fdr Further Infdrmatidn -
+
+lis~i:e 'Opponents *'Of* budget discl.osure., while admitting that pube g agg~egat~llfigures fDr the IntellIgence community Dr intelli ftc~~i~~g;rCIeSh fi nQt h~r~ na~iQnal security, have argued that pub:
+d t il A nl!C
+gures WIll mevItably lead tQ demands fDr ever mDre g:n~e; s IrectDr Colby tolc1 the HDUse Select CDmmittee 'On Intellie aI.s prQ ably wDuld grDW. What dDes it include 2 What d ryeDver b
+, 'Once the budget total is revealed, the demand fDr
+~Des It e~clude ~ Why did it gQ up ~ Why did 't d .
+
+2 I
+It wDrth It? HQW dQes it wQrk? .
+
+I gQ 'Own. s
+52 One series of activities which did b'
+Agency's activities in Laos, which we~:u:I~:rlYu~P III ~e CIA's budge! was the U.S. but were kept secret from the Am'
+nlown
+0 powers hostile to the
+53 If encan peop e for many y a new systems would be revealed by "b .".
+
+e rs.
+
+tion other than denying all information on 3~s III td~e CIA's budget a solupeople might be found J
+.
+
+expen ItlIres to the American figure could be based ~n :~~~l S~~l\~~:~';en~a~ s~fge~t:1 that the published dollars which could be spent. while obli'
+y e rather than on the the years, actual outlays "tend to gatlOns may fluctuate dramatically over
+(S~hJeSinger, *2/2176,* p. 55.)
+_
+move smoothly over a period of years."
+117 Congo Rec., p. S42925 remarks of S
+S
+.
+
+gett o~ the House Armed Se~vices Committ:~' nJ:U:~~' ~s Congressman Leg-
+CommIttee Report of about 4000
+t
+.
+
+e ave a book here, the they talk about the money for th~~~ ~ ~h~ D~p~rtment of Defense in whieh works? The answer is: no.
+
+- -
+II ye
+0 we know how the SAM-D
+"We have the details of the money for Th'l d
+..
+
+we know what the money is actually used f
+?a~ an , and It IS spelled out. But do
+"We can go through the FBI b or .
+
+O.
+
+The answer is: no." (Cong. Rae udi{i37~o~ \hat dtelll0lIs what they are doing?
+
+Leggett.)
+."
+al y e.,
+/1/75, remarks of Rep.
+
+There would be revelations ... which would gradually reduce the unknown to a smaller and smaller part of the total, permitting foreign intelligence services tc? concentrate their efforts in the areas where we would least hke to attract
+. their attention.
+
+.
+
+.
+
+We-and I specifically mean in this instance both Intelhgence professionals and Members of Congress-would h~ve an acute problem when the matter of our budget arose In the floor of the House or Senate. Those who knew the facts would have two unpleasant choi?es--to remain.silent in the face of all questions and allegatIOns, however maccurate, or to attempt to keep the debate on accurate grOlmds by at least hinting at the full story.
+
+.
+
+Mv concern that one revelation will lead to another IS based on more than a "feeling." The atomic weapons bu~get was considered very sensitive, and the Manhattan. ProJect was concealed completely during World War.II. WIth the est~b
+lishment of the AEC however, the deciSIOn was made to Include in the 194'7 budget a one-line.item for the weapons account. That limitation was short-hved. By 19'74, a 15-page breakout and discussion of the Atomic Weapons Program was being published. Were the intelligence budget ~o uIl:dergo a similar experience, major aspects of our mtelhgence strategy, capabilities and successes would be revealed.55
+.
+
+p. ~!~ator McClellan described the consequences of publishing the total budget for national intelligence. "That is when you intend to put the camel's nose under the tent. That is the beginning. That is the wedge. You say you do not want to know all the details and how the money is spent. But, if you get the overall figures of one billion dollars or half-a-billion dollars or five billion, or w.hatever, then how are you going to know, how can you evaluate, how can you Judge or. n:ake .an intelligl'nt judgment on whether that is too much or too little, .whether It IS bemg expended wisely or unwisely, except when you can get the detaIls? .
+
+.
+
+"How? You cannot know. And, if you receive these figures and If you end thIS
+ignorance as to the total amount, next you will want to end the. i~orance as to the different agenCies and how it is spent, an~ t~rough whom It IS spent. Next will want to end the ignorance of what It IS spent for. Nex~ you want to end the ignorance of how that intelligence is procurpd. There IS no end to it." (Cong Rec. S9609, daily ed., 6/4/74, remarks of Sen. McClellan:)
+.
+
+During the same debate Senator Humphrey noted that 'Yhlle .he d~d not oppose tbe purpose of the disclosure of the total budget for natl?nal mteillgence,
+"the problem is it is sort of like loose string or a ball of twme, so. to speak, that starts to unravel." *(ld.* at S9606, remarks of Sen. Humphrey.) Dunng a more recent House debate on the publication of the CIA's budget, Congref'sman !Otlllg described such publicrttion as "the first baby step." (Cong. Rec. H9376, dallyed.,
+10/1/75, remarks of Rep. Young.)
+As James Schlesinger told the Splect Committee, "But onpof the problems here is the camel's nose under the ed~e of the tent, and I think that th~t is the fundamental problem in the area. There are very few people who ca~ a~tlculately argue tbat the publication of those figures in and of themgelves, If It stopp.ed there would be harmful. The argument is that then the pressure would buIld up t~ do somethhi.g else, that once you have publish~d for example the .. , budget. that the pressures would build up to reveal tbe kmds of systems tIl.at are bemg bought for tbat money, and it is regarded as the first steD down a slIDperY
+slope for those who worry' about those kinds of things." (Schlesinger, 2/2/76, p.53.)
+Ther~ are several problems with this argument. While there obviously WIll be pressure, the problem as Mr. Helms agreed "is not insuperable." 56 For many years Congress has refused to reveal the figures tor t~e national i~telligence budget and the aggregate budgets of the Intelhgence. agenCIes. It seems ~likely that given this past history, Congre~ WIll suddenly reverse Itself and fail to protect information
+~hose dIsclosure w~uld harm the national security. Much more likely IS. that Congress WIll, as Senator Church proposed, "establish very stringe~t rules when it came to handling the money figures." 57
+More Importantly, as Congressman Koch noted:
+The real fear on bOth sides of the aisle that some have expressed is.' '~Gee, if we do that, that is the first step."
+Maybe It IS, but, whatever the second step is, it is what this House wants it to be, and if this House decides that this is the last step, so be it. If the House decides that it wants to have more information it will have to have a vote on it.
+
+What is wrong with that? That is what is called the democratic system. We are sent here to be part of that system. 58
+. It is i~structiv~ to note in this context the amount of budgetary InfOrmatIOn prOVIded on the Atomic Energy Commission. That information has constantly ~ncreas~d: Y~t each step of the way, Congress has had the opportumty to lImIt dIsclosure and chose not to. This experience confirms congressional control over the process. More importantly the national security was not harmed by disclosure of a substantial amount of budgetary information about an -agency and a weapons program crucial to the defense of the United States.
+
+Finally, the argument is without limits. It could be used to justify mu?h great~r secrecy. It could be used to justify the withholding of allmformatlOn on the Defense Department because information which the Congress wis~es ~ protect .would _~ threatened by pressures caused by the pubhcatIOn of any rnformatIon on that Department.
+
+## F. The Argument That The United States Should Not Publish Information Of Its I:R.""Telligence Budget Since No Other Govern- Ment In The World Does
+
+. I~ has. also been argued that the United States should not publish Its rntellIgence budget when no other government in the world does. 59
+Yet as Congressman Moss noted:
+I point out to those Members who do not know the difference between this country and others, and the fact that we
+'become un.ique in disclosing this that, thank God, we do become umque. We have grO!W1l great and maintained our strength as an open society and we should continue to be an open society to the maximum consistent with our true security requirements.
+
+I t the Russians 0'1' the Chinese
+, I dO' *nDt* w;~~.: ~~~~~: !. the operatiDn Qf t~e variQus Dr even Qur rr.l ts under their QffiCIal secrets agencies Df theIr gye~en to realize the strength that we acts and ather 'areas. wan us d f ad electorate.so gain rDman alert electorate an m Qrm
+
+## G. Summary And Cdnclusidn
+
+-
+.
+
+tl vern the Central Intelli-
+The budget procedures Whld: presen e~!~lli nee cDmmunity p'regence Agency and Dther agenCIes of t~l as the ~ublic from knD'Ylllg vent most Membe~s of Congress a~f ';;~~e a ncies or even hQW much hQW much m~)lley ~s spent by ant 1 In adltion mQst Members of is spent on mtelhgen~ as a ;
+0. e. d ,about the ~pprQpriations and Congress and the pl1bhc 'are ecelve
+.
+
+hose bud t'I"OIl-Q are inflated d
+f -'-h gQvernment aO"P.]lCles w b V
+"':
+expen Itures 0
+Ot,; er
+.
+
+.
+
+o~ mmunit The faIlure to proto conceal funds fQ!" the mtelhgen~ 00
+th~ Congre6S prevents vide this illform~tlOn 'tdth.e PUb~I~ti~~ at;:d violates Article 1, Seceither from effectIvely or e;rmg pno t
+9 Clause 7 which proVIdes that:
+.
+
+IOn ,
+'
+b t CQnse No MDney shall be. d~awn frDm thL;:~~~d~ r~~u~~r State~
+quence Qf ApproprlatIQnS made .by d' E
+d;tures 'Of all ent and Account O'f the ReceIpts an.
+
+xpe~ 1
+
+~lblic MQney shall be published frQm tIme to' tIme.
+b!"
+t"
+Qf the aO"o'!'eo-ate figure fQr The CQmmittee finds that, p~ lCa I(n f the cQ:Stit:tiQnal requirenatiDnal intelligence would be~ to' :.a IS {securitv. While substantial ment .and WQul.d nDbt da~ge i t~ ~~l~i;~etween the cQnstitutiQnal requestIOns remam a Qut.
+
+~ re a 10.
+
+the Committee recommends the quirement and the D!atlOnal secunty, fi The CDmmittee alsO' recannual publication Qf the aggreg3:~~eefs~~dy the effects of publis~ng Qmmends that ~ny succ~ssor cQmm h 'bI d ts of the intelligence agenCIes.
+
+more detailed mformatIOn Qn 't e
+11 ge
+
+## Xvii. Testing And Use Of Chemical And Biologi- Cal Agents By The Intelligence Community
+
+Under its mandate 1 the Select CQmmittee has studied the testing and use Qf chemical and biDIQgical agents by intelligence agencies. Detailed descriptiQns Qf the prQgrams cQnducted by intelligence agencies invO'lving chemical and biQlQgical agents will be included in a separately published appendix *to'* the .senate .select CQmmittee's repQrt. This sectiO'n *O'f* the repO'rt will discuss the ratiO'nale fQr the prO'grams, their mO'nitO'ring and cO'ntrQl, and what the CO'mmittee's investigatiQn has revealed abO'ut the relatiO'nships amO'ng the intelligence agencies and about their relations with other gO'vernment agencies and private institutions and individuals. 2
+Fears that countries hostile *to'* the United States would use chemical and biological agents against Americans or America's allies led to the develDpment Df a defensive prDgram designed *to'* discDver techniques for American intelligence agencies *to'* detect 'and COlmteract chemical and biological agents. The defensive orientation soon became secondary as the possible use of these agents to obtain information from, or gain control over, enemy agents became apparent.
+
+Research and developnient programs to find materials which could be used to alter human behavior were initiated in the late 1940s and early 1950s. These experimental programs originally included testing O'f drugs involving witting human subjects, and culminated in tests using unwitting, nQnvolunteer human subjects. These tests were designed to determine the potential effects of chemical or biO'logical agen,ts when used O'perationally against individuals unaware that they had received a drug.
+
+The testing programs were considered highly sensitive by the intelligence agencies administering them. Few people, even within the agencies, knew of the programs and there is no evidence that either the executive branch 0'1' CQngress were ever informed of them. The highly compartmented nature of these programs may be explained in part by an O'bservatiQn made by the CIA InspectO'r General that, "the knQwledge that the Agency is engaging in unethical and illicit activiate (Section 2(4) and (8;
+"(c) The adequacy of executive branch and congressional oversight of intelligence activities (Section 2(7) and (11 ;
+"(d) The adequacy of existing laws to safeguard the rights of American citizens (Section 2(13) )."
+a The details of these programs may never 'be known. The programs were highly compartmented. Few records were kept. What little documentation existed for the CIA's principal program was destroyed early in 1973.

markdown/misc/lake.md

@@ -0,0 +1,370 @@
+## Reliable And Relevant National Communications System By
+
+Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Lake United States Army National Guard COL James H. Thomas Project Advisor This SRP is submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the Master of Strategic Studies Degree.  The views expressed in this student academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
+
+U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
+
+## Report Documentation Page Omb No. 0704-0188
+
+Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
+
+1. REPORT DATE
+03 MAY 2004
+2. REPORT TYPE
+3. DATES COVERED
+  -
+5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
+4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
+Reliable and Relevant National Communications System
+5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
+6. AUTHOR(S)
+Timothy Lake
+5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
+8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
+REPORT NUMBER
+
+## 7. Performing Organization Name(S) And Address(Es) U.S. Army War College,Carlisle Barracks,Carlisle,Pa,17013-5050
+
+9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
+10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)
+11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT
+NUMBER(S)
+
+## 12. Distribution/Availability Statement Approved For Public Release; Distribution Unlimited 13. Supplementary Notes 14. Abstract See Attached File. 15. Subject Terms
+
+16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:
+17. LIMITATION OF
+ABSTRACT
+18. NUMBER
+OF PAGES
+26
+19a. NAME OF
+RESPONSIBLE PERSON
+a. REPORT
+unclassified
+b. ABSTRACT
+unclassified
+c. THIS PAGE
+unclassified
+
+## Abstract
+
+AUTHOR:
+Lieutenant Colonel Timothy L. Lake
+TITLE:
+Reliable and Relevant National Communications System
+FORMAT:
+Strategy Research Project
+DATE:
+19 March 2004
+PAGES: 26
+CLASSIFICATION:  Unclassified
+The National Communications System is a federal government command and control emergency communications system that requires a complete, comprehensive review and emerging technological overhaul to ensure its reliability and relevance.  Since its establishment in the early 1960s, the system has gone through several organizational restructurings and System upgrades.  With our nation under increased terrorist threats within our borders, the reliability of the National Communications System is under extreme scrutiny.  In 2002, a Presidential Directive transferred oversight of the organization from the Department of Defense to the newly established Department of Homeland Security.
+
+This paper will analyze the current National Communications System, review its origins and recommend emerging technological improvements to support the National Security Council. It also will review the needs of federal, state and local governments, and then recommend implementation of emerging technological capabilities to enhance system reliability and relevance.  Today, more than ever before, the commercial telecommunications infrastructure provides critical communications connectivity for our government's daily operations as well as emergency communications.  The roles of civilian communications companies and their infrastructure also will be analyzed as it applies to emergency national communications support.
+
+## Reliable And Relevant National Communications System The National Communications System
+
+The National Communications System (NCS) is a federal government command and control emergency communications system that requires a complete, comprehensive review and emerging technological overhaul.  The NCS was established to unify control of federal, state and commercial communication systems to better serve the Office of the President, the National Security Council, the Department of Defense and other federal, state and local governmental agencies during times of peace, emergencies or periods of operational concerns. Over the past three years, the NCS critical infrastructure has failed to provide uninterrupted communications support at all levels of the government during critical times of need.  The terrorist events of September 11, 2001, and the northeastern states power grid failure in August 2003 are recent national events that reaffirm the requirement to leverage emerging technologies to streamline and integrate our nation's communications system at all levels of government as well as to improve our critical civilian telecommunications infrastructure.
+
+This paper analyzes the current National Communications System, reviews its origins, and recommends emerging technological improvements to support the National Security Council and the National Homeland Security Council, both of which advise the President on Homeland Defense.  It will define the issues that government and the private sector must address in order to ensure that National Security and Emergency Preparedness telecommunication services will be available in times of crisis for the President, other national leaders, state governors, and the emergency preparedness and response community.  This paper will review the needs of federal, state and local governments, and then recommend implementation of emerging technological capabilities to enhance system reliability and relevance.
+
+## Telecommunications
+
+"The largest Interconnected machine in the world is the telephone system. Every country on the face of this planet has a telecommunications infrastructure. Most businesses depend heavily on their use of telecommunications, not just for sales, but also for the entire operation. A poor or non-existent telecommunications system, even for a short period of time can often generate significant revenue lost, and do immeasurable damage to your reputation."1
+Over the past 150 plus years telecommunications have played an intricate role in our nation's industrial and governmental growth?  Today, telecommunications remain at the core of our nation's domestic growth and support to our global influence.  Telecommunications is the infrastructure that supports our national elements of power on a daily basis.  That is the support of our diplomacy negotiations, economic maneuvers, information dissemination, and the command and control of our military.
+
+Telecommunication is defined as any transmission, emission, or reception of signs, signals, writing, images and sounds or information of any nature by wire, radio, optical or other electromagnetic system.2  Commercial telecommunication networks provide today approximately 95 percent of the communication requirements critical to the support of our national security.  Communications have played a vital role in Presidential decision-making since the development of the telegraph in 1843.  President Abraham Lincoln walked across the White House lawn to visit the War Department Army Signal Corps telegraph office almost daily during the major campaigns of the Civil War.  He spent hours reading messages and sending orders to his generals.3  During the Spanish-American War, President William McKinley established the first War Room in the White House, and equipped it with telegraphic instruments, telephones, and war maps so that he could follow the progress of American troops and the American fleet in and around Cuba.  On the eve of World War II, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill installed a direct telephone link between their offices to enable the two leaders to have direct communications.4
+
+## Why A National Communications System
+
+The need for a reliable communication system came to the attention of our national leaders when President John F. Kennedy and his National Security Council experienced procedural and technical delays in communicating critical information to federal agencies, and Soviet Union leadership during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  The United States was hours away from an authorized decision to execute air strikes, and a land invasion of Cuba.  After a 12-hour delay, communication between President Kennedy and Soviet Premier Khrushchev finally lowered tensions and established the foundation for an agreement to avert a possible nuclear catastrophe.5
+President John F. Kennedy directed his National Security Adviser, McGeorge Bundy, to establish a communications capability that would support Presidential decision-making.  The Presidential mandate was for the communications system to focus on national and international interconnectivity and survivability. 6  On August 21, 1963, a National Security Action Memorandum was published establishing the National Communications System.7
+
+## Brief History Of The National Communications System
+
+The rapid technological development of telecommunications and our reliance on its infrastructure to meet our daily needs have resulted in both organizational and technological system changes over the past 43 years.  The NCS is responsible for ensuring that national security and emergency preparedness communications function successfully, including interconnectivity and survivability during times of congestion or when the networks have been damaged or destroyed.
+
+The world events during the Reagan Administration inspired major improvements in national security and emergency telecommunications.  The pace of technological change provided a growth opportunity for system improvements and new opportunities for diversity and deregulation.  Due to the growing number of commercial telecommunication companies and the break-up of the Bell Telephone Company, Congress, the courts and the regulatory agencies began instituting new telecommunication requirements.  To ensure compliance as well as availability of emerging technology and its support to the NCS, President Ronald Reagan in 1982 created the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC) with Executive Order 12383.  The NSTAC was established as the executive agent to oversee the NCS and to provide industry-based analyses and recommendations to the President and the executive branch regarding policy and enhancements to national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications.8
+The NSTAC provides analyses and recommendations on policy and technical issues related to telecommunications, information systems, information assurance, information protection, and national security and emergency preparedness concerns. NSTAC is comprised of up to 30 Presidential appointed telecommunication and industry leaders.  Table 1 depicts the current NSTAC organization.
+
+     LOCKHEED MARTIN  (Chair)      BELLSOUTH  (Vice Chair)
+AT&T
+BANK OF AMERICA
+BOEING
+CISCO SYSTEMS
+CSC
+DELL
+EDS
+LUCENT
+MICROSOFT
+MOTOROLA
+NORTEL
+ORACLE
+RAYTHEON
+ROCKWELL
+QWEST
+NORTHROP GRUMMAN
+SAIC
+SBC
+SPRINT
+TELEDESIC
+TRW
+UNISYS
+USTA
+VERISIGN
+VERIZON
+WORLDCOM
+President Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order (E.O.) 12472 in April 1984, which superceded President Kennedy's Memorandum on the NCS.  This executive order assigned the NCS with the support of 23 Federal departments and agencies (see table 2) the mission to assist the President; the NSC; the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy; and the Director, Office of Management and Budget in coordinating the planning for and the assurance of systems capability.  The NSC was directed to have the capability to support national security and emergency preparedness communications for the Federal Government under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attacks, recovery and reconstruction. The executive order also assigned the NCS the responsibility of ensuring the national telecommunications infrastructure is developed and capable of meeting the needs of our nation. This remains the core responsibility of the NCS.9
+
+| Department of State                 | Department of Treasure                 |
+|-------------------------------------|----------------------------------------|
+| Department of Defense               | Department of Justice                  |
+| Department of Interior              | US Department of Agriculture           |
+| Department of Commerce              | Health and Human Services              |
+| Department of Transportation        | Department of Energy                   |
+| Department of Veteran Affairs       | Central Intelligence Agency            |
+| Federal Emergency Management Agency | The Joint Staff                        |
+| General Services Administration     | NASA                                   |
+| Nuclear Regulatory Commission       | National Telecom and Information admin |
+| National Security Agency            | US Postal Services                     |
+| Federal Communications Commission   | Federal Reserve Board                  |
+
+The numerous executive orders and presidential memorandums reinforce the significant roles the NCS performs for our national security and homeland defense.  The NCS has enhanced its capabilities throughout its 43-year history to meet the demands of our changing environment and to continue providing proactive solutions to our current and future communication requirements (see table 3).
+
+As a result of September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, President George W. Bush issued Executive Orders 13228 and 13231 redefining the role of the NCS in national and homeland security.  Executive Order 13228 established the White House Office of Homeland Security and tasked the Office of Homeland Security to coordinate efforts to protect critical public and private owned information systems within the United States for terrorist attacks.  The Office of Homeland Security is also mandated to coordinate the efforts that would ensure the rapid restoration of telecommunications and critical information systems after disruption by a terrorist threat or attack.10
+The establishment of the President's Critical Infrastructure Protection Board with Executive Order 13231 renamed the NCS Committee of Principals as the Committee for National Security and Emergency Preparedness Communications and assigned the group as a permanent standing committee in the Office of Homeland Security.  Executive Order 13231 reiterated the reporting functions and responsibilities established in Executive Order 12472.11
+
+| 1962                                  | Executive Order 10995   | Establishment of the Director of          |
+|---------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------------------|
+| Telecommunications Manager            |                         |                                           |
+| 1963                                  | Presidential Memorandum |                                           |
+| NSAM 252                              |                         |                                           |
+| Establishment of the NCS              |                         |                                           |
+| 1970                                  | Executive Order 11556   | Establishment of Office OTP (of           |
+| Telecommunications Policy)            |                         |                                           |
+| 1982                                  | Executive Order 12382   | Establishment of NSTAC (National Security |
+| Telecommunications advisory Committee |                         |                                           |
+| 1984                                  | Executive Order 12472   | Establishment of NS/EP Telecom            |
+| 1998                                  | Exec. Order 12656       | Primary guidance for the NS/EP            |
+| 2001                                  | Exec. Order 13228       | Establishment of OHS                      |
+| 2001                                  | Exec. Order 13231       | Establishment of CIP                      |
+
+In 2003, The Office of the President published three National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD), also referred to as Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD). NSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents; NSPD-7, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection; and NSPD-8, National Preparedness are directives establishing policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to prevent and respond to threats or actual domestic terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies.
+
+## Current Systems
+
+The NCS became part of the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection Directorate of the Department of Homeland Security in March 2003.12  The NCS currently provides national security and emergency preparedness priority telecommunications service to Federal, State, and local governments, industry and other authorized national security and emergency preparedness organizations.  The NCS Critical Infrastructure Protection Division provides the following priority telecommunications services:
+Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) is a government managed program that utilizes the commercial communication infrastructure to provide emergency phone service to federal, state and local governments, as well as industry, and non-governmental organization personnel in performing national security and emergency preparedness missions. It provides users with emergency access and priority call processing in the public switch telephone network.  It is an emergency telecommunication capability to be used during periods of natural or man made emergency or crisis that causes congestion on the public switch telephone network.  GETS telephone service is designed to be used when national security and emergency preparedness personnel are unable to complete emergency calls through normal telecommunication means.13
+GETS is necessary because of the increasing reliance on telecommunications.  The economic viability and technical feasibility of such advances as nationwide fiber optic networks, high-speed digital switching, and intelligent features have revolutionized the way we communicate.  This growth has been accompanied by an increased vulnerability to system failures.  Although backup systems are in place, disruptions in service can still occur.  Recent events have shown that natural disasters, power outages, fiber cable cuts, and software problems can have catastrophic impact on the telephone services of entire regions. Additionally, congestion in the public switched telephone network, such as the well-documented "Mother's Day phenomenon," can prevent access to circuits.  However, during times of emergency, crisis, or war, personnel with national security and emergency preparedness missions need to know that their calls will be processed and completed more often than routine calls.
+
+GETS addresses this basic requirement.  Using regulatory enhancements on existing commercial technology, GETS allows the national security and emergency preparedness community to communicate over existing public switched telephone network infrastructure with a high likelihood of call completion during the most severe conditions or high-traffic congestion and disruption. The result is a cost effective, easy to use telephone service that is accessed through a simple dialing plan and Personal Identification Number card verification methodology, similar to a commercial calling card.  GETS is maintained in a constant state of readiness and provides a cost-effective means to overcome network outages through such methods as enhanced routing and priority treatment.14
+Wireless Priority Service (WPS) is a White House directed service in response to the events of September 11, 2001, to be used by key leaders during emergency situations.  The WPS provides an end-to-end nationwide wireless priority communications capability to key national security and emergency preparedness personnel during natural or man-made disasters or emergencies that cause congestion or network outages in the public switch telephone network.  The WPS is complementary to, and is expected to be used in conjunction with the GETS to ensure a high probability of call completion in both the wire line and wireless portions of the public switch telephone network.15
+Telecommunication Service Priority (TSP) system is the regulatory, administrative, and operational system authorizing and providing for priority provisioning and restoration of critical national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications circuits.  Critical circuits are defined as those that are critical to maintaining a state of readiness for, responding to, or managing telecommunications during an event or crisis that could cause harm to the population, damage to property, or threaten the security of the United States.  As a result of natural or manmade disasters, telecommunications service vendors may become overwhelmed with requests for new telecommunications services and requirements to restore existing telecommunications services.  The TSP Program provides service vendors with a Federal Communications Commission mandate for prioritizing service requests by identifying those services critical to national security and emergency preparedness.  A telecommunications service with a TSP assignment is assured of receiving full attention by the service vendor before a non-TSP service.16
+Emergency Notification Service (ENS) Pilot is designed to provide alternative emergency notification and information to critical national security and emergency preparedness decision makers and other Federal, State and local governmental officials, including public health and safety personnel, and emergency command centers using multiple communication channels. Emergency notification is distinguished from emergency alerting in that notification targets specific individuals or groups of individuals and may require confirmation for specific communications.17
+SHAred RESource (SHARES) High Frequency (HF) Radio Program  provides a single, interagency emergency message handling system by bringing together existing HF radio resources of federal, state and industry organizations when normal communications are destroyed or unavailable for the transmission of national security and emergency preparedness information.18  SHARES is one of the first national emergency systems managed by the NCS.  It provides both data and voice, however it uses dated technology and network architectures.
+
+## Information Sharing And Homeland Security
+
+Our nation's communication infrastructure contributes to every aspect of homeland security and is a vital foundation for the homeland security information gathering efforts.  Every government official performing homeland security missions depends upon information and information technology.
+
+Although American information technology is the most advanced in the world, our country's information systems do not adequately support the homeland security mission. Today, there is no single agency or computer network that integrates all homeland security information nationwide.  Instead, much of the information exists in databases scattered among federal, state and local agencies.  Databases used for law enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and public health surveillance have not been connected in ways that allow us to recognize information gaps.  As a result, government agencies storing terrorism information have not been able to systematically share that information with other agencies.19
+We need a communication system that enables the sharing of essential homeland security information to national security and emergency preparedness responder.  This information must be shared "horizontally" across each level of government, and "vertically" among federal, state, and local governments, as well as private industry.  As the NCS transitions to a more robust next generation voice and data network, it must be prepared to support the expanded daily requirements foreseen by homeland security network requirements and emergency responders.
+
+## Primary Oversight
+
+Today federal, state, and local governments are attempting to develop survivable, interoperable communication infrastructures to support national security and emergency preparedness.  Throughout the history of this great nation, the strategic management of the National Communications System became the responsibility of the federal government coupled with emerging technological recommendations from the NSTAC and the commercial telecommunications community.  However, the operational requirements and capabilities placed upon the state and local emergency responders are not always interoperable with their federal counterparts.
+
+Throughout the history of the NCS, the national communications requirements and capabilities have been transferred among the War Department, Office of the President, Department of Defense, and now transferred to the Department of Homeland Security.  As primary responsibility of the NCS has transferred between federal departments, the Department of Defense was always required to execute managerial oversight of the National Communications System day-to-day operations.  The director of the Defense Communications Agency is dual-hatted as Manager, National Communications System.20  The Director, Defense Communications Agency now Defense Information System Agency, focuses on both international command and control as well as national.  Very rarely did the Defense Information System Agency focus on state and local emergency preparedness communications capabilities or requirements.
+
+Today, management responsibility of the NCS has been transferred to the newly established Department of Homeland Security. 21  With this transfer, federal, state and local governments now have a domestic focused communications requirement management team that will focus on assisting federal as well as state and local emergency responders interoperable communication concerns.
+
+## Enhance The System
+
+The events of September 11, 2001 reaffirmed the requirement for enhanced technological improvements in the National Communications System because of public switch telephone network saturation.  Two years later, the August 2003 northeastern states' power grid failure highlighted a system failure based on the infrastructure power requirements.  Both events limited communications service to critical national security and emergency preparedness personnel.
+
+Although some improvements were made as a result of lessons learned from these events, federal, state, and local governments are again requesting that the National Communications System enhance its capabilities to ensure reliable connectivity during emergencies.  The telecommunication services that support national security and emergency preparedness depend on a national telecommunications infrastructure that provides timely, continuous, assured, robust and reliable communications between the President, his security councils, and the federal departments and agencies during a national security emergency, as defined in Executive Order 12656.  Our national infrastructure has to support and enable national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications by wire, radio, fiber optic, or other electromagnetic means provided by commercial, government, and privately owned telecommunications provides.  The required capabilities must assure flexibility, adaptability, interoperability, and seamless connectivity at any location either fixed or mobile. The government emergency telecommunications system must be expanded to include mobile state and local governmental emergency responders, as well as critical private business responders.
+
+ National security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services must help support a continuous telecommunications readiness.  We must poses the ability to respond, and manage any event or crisis that degrades or threatens the national security and emergency preparedness of the United States or which could cause harm to the population or loss of property.  We must prepare to minimize the damage and recover from any future terrorist attacks that occur despite our best efforts at prevention.  Past experience has shown that preparedness efforts are key to providing an effective response to major terrorist incidents and natural disasters.  Therefore, we need a comprehensive national system to bring together and command all necessary response assets quickly and effectively.
+
+## Leveraging Emerging Technology
+
+Over the past decade the government has transitioned from its dependency on government controlled, dedicated communication support provide by various federal agencies to a more cost effective, dynamic architecture that uses shared commercial telecommunication infrastructures.  As technological advancements continue to evolve, the convergence of today's voice and data networks will fundamentally change the technology and security environment in which national security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services are provided. Today, the public switch network is beginning to support next generation interconnection for fixed and mobile voice communications, as well as both fixed and mobile internet-data communications.  As more mobile data and voice users communicate over the commercial network with these current and emerging communications devices, the current types of communication equipment and service provided to national security and emergency preparedness responders will also require replacement if reliable services are to be available in the foreseeable future.  New services and capabilities are being developed that may be useful or desired by the President, other national and state leaders as well as private industry.  With the next generation networks, these new communication services will be streamlined into a converged seamless data and voice architectural network.  Pat Gelsinger, Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer Intel Corporation, commented about the future of Communications:
+"The convergence of computing and communications will bring a new level of productivity to business, reducing costs and extending the reach of communications across the globe, opening up new opportunities on a scale we can't imagine today.  Intel is committed to accelerating towards this future, through continued technology advancements and close collaboration with industry and governments worldwide."22
+The technological developments that are driving the convergence of today's voice and data networks are largely positive.  These developments are enabling capabilities and services that were not considered a decade ago and are driving innovation.  The developments of the emerging next generation network technologies for which these services will be provided are currently outpacing the current advancements in national security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services.  Telecommunications convergence refers to the merging of traditional circuit switched networks with packet-based networks as they, along with wireless, cable, satellite, and other networks, evolve into the next generation network.  The next generation network will transport voice, data and video information over a common packetbased transmission medium.23  This transformation to package switching and IP technology will be accompanied by numerous new applications and services.  To pioneer this transformation, Homeland Security Secretary Tom Ridge appointed the Department's Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, Robert Liscouski as Manager of the National Communications System.
+
+As the new manager, Mr. Liscouski was also granted $141 million dollars from the President's fiscal year 2004 budget to support development and deployment of emerging next generation network communication capabilities.24
+
+## Transformation Challenges With Next Generation Network
+
+The migration of voice traffic from the conventional circuit-switched network to packetswitched networks has begun.  The large-scale shift in network structure from circuit switched to packet switched networks using Internet Protocol (IP) technology will have a wide range impact on national security and emergency preparedness telecommunications services. Telecommunications services such as the Government Emergency Telecommunication Service and the Telecommunication Service Priority were developed based on the public switch telephone network architecture.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency and the state and local emergency management agencies' all have developed emergency response activities that rely heavily on the public switch telephone network.  The challenge facing the National Communication System and the national security and emergency preparedness community is the continued support of their missions through the transition into the next generation network. Today's missions are accomplished through primarily voice services, and the transition to package technology is requiring the development of new applications and services.25
+Standards development will be critical as industry and the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee ensures that national security and emergency preparedness protocols and priorities are integrated into the next generation network architecture.  Table 4 depicts perceived national security and emergency preparedness functional requirements in the next generation network.
+
+NS/EP Telecommunication Services
+Functional Requirements
+Description
+Enhanced Priority Treatment
+Services supporting NS/EP missions must be provided priority treatment over other traffic.
+Secure Networks
+Networks must have protection against corruption of, or unauthorized access to, traffic and control, including expanded encryption techniques and user authentication, as appropriate.
+Non-Traceability
+Selected users must be able to use NS/EP services without risk of usage being traced (i.e., without risk of user or location being identified).
+Restorability
+Should a disruption occur, services must be capable of being reprovisioned, repaired, or restored to required service levels on a priority basis.
+International Connectivity
+Services must provide access to and egress from international carriers.
+Interoperability
+Services must interconnect and interoperate with other selected government or private facilities, systems, and networks.
+Mobility
+The communications infrastructure must support transportable, redeployable, or fully mobile communications (e.g., personal communications service, cellular, satellite, high frequency radio).
+Ubiquitous Coverage
+Services must be readily accessible to support the national security leadership and inter- and intra-agency emergency operations, wherever they are located.
+Survivability / Endurability
+Services must be robust to support surviving users under a broad range of circumstances, from the widespread damage of a natural or man-made disaster up to and including nuclear war.
+Voice Band Service
+The service must provide voice band service in support of presidential and other communications.
+Broadband1 Service
+The service must provide broadband service in support of NS/EP missions (e.g., video, imaging, web access, multimedia).
+Scaleable Bandwidth
+NS/EP users must be able to manage the capacity of the communications services to support variable bandwidth requirements.
+Affordability
+Services must leverage network capabilities to minimize cost (e.g., use of existing infrastructure, commercial off-the-shelf technologies, services).
+Reliability / Availability
+Services must perform consistently and precisely according to their design requirements and specifications, and must be usable with high confidence.
+
+For the foreseeable future the current voice and data networks will coexist and operate with tomorrow's emerging architecture.  The converging networks will provide an expanded set of existing and new telecommunication services that will benefit national security and emergency preparedness personnel.  However, the process of convergence will impact the provision of national security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services traditionally provided by the public switched telephone network.
+
+## Recommendations
+
+To assure reliability of the next generation network and to mitigate challenges, the Office of Manager, National Communication System should:
+
+-
+Identify a dual use multipurpose mobile phone or PDA that can support our national security and emergency preparedness community with both voice and date communications.  The instrument must be capably of using the emerging terrestrial base public switch communication network via IP packet switch, and have the capability to utilize satellite technology to facilitate assured connectivity.
+-
+Continue working with national standards organizations to ensure required telecommunications functional requirements are integrated in the developing next generation wireless standards.
+-
+Expand the technical expertise currently on the staff to include greater representation of Internet technology specialist.  This will assist in future system development,
+deployment, and management.  The expansion of technical expertise should also reduce the overarching dependence, and influence of independent telecommunication contractors that are profit base.
+-
+Encourage the telecommunication industry and Internet provides to continue evaluating the Internet interoperability with the public switch telephone and the evolving next generation network technologies.  We must ensure that appropriate protocols and software enhancements are in the public switch networks to provide priority services to our national security and emergency preparedness community.
+-
+Assess the interoperability between circuit switching, packet switching and the next generation network architecture to minimize or eliminate future risk with system reliability and availability during support to the national security and emergency preparedness community.
+-
+Replace SHARES, the current terrestrial means of communications for emergency response with a mobile satellite capability.
+-
+Integrate emerging High Altitude Airship technology as well as commercial and Department of Defense satellites into its national emergency preparedness
+architecture.  Space based transmissions support stations can argument the ground mobile and fixed telecommunication infrastructure, which is subject to regional incident or system malfunctions.
+
+## Conclusion
+
+In times of crisis, the national leadership depends on assured national security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services, but the unprecedented scope and pace of changes unfolding in the telecommunications sector of the nation's critical information infrastructure places such assured services at risk.  The transformation of voice communication over traditional circuit switched networks to packet switched networks using Internet Protocol (IP) has begun.  This shift in network structure will impact our current national security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services.  National security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services such as the Government Emergency Telecommunication Service and the Telecommunication Service Priority program were all developed to work on the public switch telephone network architecture.  The Federal Emergency Management Agency, as well as state and local governments emergency management agencies' response activities depend heavily on the public switch telephone network.  The current challenge facing the National Communication System and our national security and emergency preparedness community is the assurance of continued priority support by the commercial infrastructure during the convergence and transformation into the next generation package switch network IP architecture.
+
+WORD COUNT=4636
+
+## Endnotes
+
+1 Global Enterprise Network Limited, Global Telecommunications System and Support
+"The Largest Interconnected Machine in the World," 6 January 2004; available from <http://www.gentelecom.net/home.htm>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2004.
+
+2 American National Standards, Telecom Glossary 2000, "Telecommunication," 6
+January 2004; available from <http://www.atis.org/tg2k/>; Internet; accessed 6 January 2004.
+
+3 Richard T. Loomis, A History of the National Communications System: The First 25
+Years, 1963-1988 (Arlington: the MITRE Corporation, 1990), IV.
+
+4 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, Leadership Excellence in Technology, 1963-1998 (Arlington: National Communications System, 1998), 2.
+
+5 McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Random House, 1998), 438-445.
+
+6 Loomis, 2.
+
+7 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, "Background and History," 1
+March 2003; available from <http://www.ncs.gov/ncs/html/NCSHistoryBkgrd.html>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.
+
+8 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, NSTAC, "Fact Sheet," 12
+October 2003; available from <http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/nstac.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.
+
+9 Executive Order 12472, "Assignment of National Security and Emergency Prepared Telecommunications Functions," 28 February 2003; available from <http://www.ncs.gov/NCS/HTML/EO-12472%20with%20EO-13286%20changes.htm>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.
+
+10 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, Ensuring Essential Communications for the Homeland, (Arlington: Office of the Manager, National Communications System), FY2002, 3.
+
+11 Ibid., 3. 12 DefenseLINK News, "National Communications System Joins Homeland Security Department," 10 March 2003; available from < http:/www.defence,ink.mil/news/mar2003 >; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.
+
+13 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, GETS Program Information,
+"The GETS Concept," 29 December 2003; available from
+<http://www.gets.ncs.gov/program_info.html>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.
+
+14 Ibid.
+
+15 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, "Wireless Priority Service,"
+24 November 2003; available from <http://wps.ncs.gov/index_body.html>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.
+
+16 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, "Telecommunication Service Priority," 4 December 2003; available from <http://www.tsp.ncs.gov/index_body.html>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.
+
+17 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, "Emergency Notification Service," June 2003; available from <http://www.ens.ncs.gov>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.
+
+18 Office of the Manager, National Communications System, "Overview, SHARES HF
+Radio Program," June 2003; available from <http://www.ncs.gov/shares/overview.htp>; Internet; accessed 25 January 2004.
+
+19 Office of Homeland Security, National Strategy for Homeland Security, "Information Sharing and Systems" (Washington, D.C.: Office of Homeland Security, July 2002), 55.
+
+20 Loomis, 5. 21 John Graves, Project Manager, National Communications System; Interview by author, 10 October 2003.
+
+22 Pat Gelsinger, Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer Intel Corporation,
+"The future of Communications," 3 February 2004; available from <http://www.intel.com/technology>; Internet; accessed 3 Feb 2004.
+
+23 Business Communications Review, Next Generation Networks, "Convergence & IP",3
+Feb 2004; available from <http://www.bcr.com/ngn/tracks/convergence asp>; Internet; accessed 3 February 2004.
+
+24 Telecom News, "*National Security and Emergency Preparedness"* Office of the Manager, National Communication System, Issue 1, 2004, 1, 2.
+
+25 Graves. 26 Contract Data Requirements List B001, *Future Service Plan VIII, Volume III*, 20 June
+2003, 13.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+American National Standards. Telecom Glossary 2000, "Telecommunication."
+<http://www.atis.org/tg2k/>. Internet. Accessed 6 January 2004.
+
+Bundy, McGeorge. *Danger and Survival: Cuban Missile Crisis*. New York: Random House,
+1998.
+
+Business Communications Review. Next Generation Networks. "Convergence & IP." 3 February
+2004. Available from <http://www.bcr.com/ngn/tracks/convergence.asp>. Internet. Accessed 3 February 2004.
+
+Campen, Alan D. *The First Information War*. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1992. Contract Data Requirements List B001. *Future Service Plan VIII, Volume III*, 20 June 2003.
+
+DefenseLINK News. "National Communications System Joins Homeland Security Department."
+10 March 2003. Available from <http:/www.defenselink.mil/news/mar2003>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.
+Executive Order 12472. "Assignment of National Security and Emergency Prepared
+Telecommunications Functions." 28 February 2003. Available from <http://www.ncs.gov/ NCS/HTML/EO-12472%20with%20EO-13286%20changes.htm>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.
+Gelsigner, Pat, Senior Vice President and Chief Technology Officer Intel Corporation, "The
+Future of Communications." 3 February 2003. Available from <http://www.intel.com/technology>. Internet. Accessed 3 February 2004.
+Global Enterprise Network Limited. Global Telecommunications System and Support. "The
+Larges Interconnected Machine in the World." Available from <http://www.gentelecom.net/home>. Internet. Accessed 6 January 2004.
+Graves, John, Project Manager, National Communications System. Interview by Author, 10
+October 2003.
+Loomis, Richard T.  A History of the National Communications System: The First 25 Years,
+1963-1988. Arlington: the MITRE Corporation, 1990.
+
+Office of Manager, National Communications System. Government Emergency
+Telecommunication Services Program Information. "The GETS Concept." 29 December 2003. Available from <http://www.gets.ncs.gov/program_info.html>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.
+Office of the Manager. National Communications System. "Background and History." 1 March
+2003. Available from <http://www.ncs.gov/ncs/html/NCSHistoryBkgrd.html>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.
+
+Office of the Manager. National Communications System. "Overview, SHARES HF Radio
+Program." June 2003. Available from <http://www.ncs.gov/shares/overview.htm>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.
+Office of the Manager. National Communications System. "Telecommunication Service Priority."
+4 December 2003. Available from <http://www.tsp.ncs.gov/index_body.html>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.
+Office of the Manager. National Communications System. "Wireless Priority Service." 24
+November 2003. Available from <http://wps.ncs.gov/index_body.html>. Internet. Accessed 25 January 2004.
+Office of the Manager. National Communications System. Ensuring Essential Communications
+for the Homeland. Arlington: Office of the Manager, National Communications System, 2002.
+Office of the Manager. National Communications System. Leadership Excellence in
+Technology, 1963-1998. Arlington: Office of the Manager, National Communications System, 1998.
+Office of the Manager. National Communications System. NSTAC "Fact Sheet." 12 October
+2003. Available from <http://www.ncs.gov/nstac/nstac.htm>. Internet. Access 25 January 2004.
+Telecom News. "*National Security and Emergency Preparedness"* Office of the Manager, National Communication System, Issue 1, 2004.
+
+U.S. Office of Homeland security. National Strategy for Homeland Security. Information Sharing
+and Systems. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Homeland Security, July 2002.

markdown/misc/leftwing.md

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+(U//FOUO) Leftwing Extremists Likely to Increase Use of Cyber Attacks over the Coming Decade IA-0141-09
+UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
+
+
+(U//FOUO)  Leftwing Extremists Likely to Increase Use of Cyber Attacks over the Coming Decade
+26 January 2009
+(U)  Prepared by the Strategic Analysis Group, Homeland Environment and Threat Analysis Division.
+
+
+(U)  Scope (U//FOUO)  This product is one of a series of intelligence assessments published by the DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) Strategic Analysis Group to facilitate a greater understanding of the emerging threats to the United States. The information is provided to federal, state, and local counterterrorism and law enforcement officials so they may effectively deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States. (U//FOUO)  This assessment examines the potential threat to homeland security from cyber attacks conducted by leftwing extremists, a threat that DHS/I&A believes likely will grow over the next decade.  It focuses on the more prominent leftwing groups within the animal rights, environmental, and anarchist extremist movements that promote or have conducted criminal or terrorist activities (see Appendix).  This assessment is intended to alert DHS policymakers, state and local officials, and intelligence analysts monitoring the subject so they can better focus their collection requirements and analysis. (U//FOUO)  The key assumptions underpinning this report include:
+- (U//FOUO)  Cyber attack capabilities will continue to proliferate and be readily available.
+
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Some cyber attack capabilities will continue to outpace countermeasures.
+
+
+(U)  **LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION NOTICE:** This product contains Law Enforcement Sensitive (LES) information.  No portion of the LES information should be released to the media, the general public, or over non-secure Internet servers.  Release of this information could adversely affect or jeopardize investigative activities.
+
+FOUO information and is not to be released to the public, the media, or other personnel who do not have a valid need-to-know without prior approval of an authorized DHS official.  State and local homeland security officials may share this document with authorized security personnel without further approval from DHS.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Leftwing extremists will continue to focus on what they consider
+economic targets.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Economic enterprises and other organizations will become more
+dependent on advanced information technologies.
+
+(U)  Source Summary Statement
+
+(U//FOUO)  This assessment reflects primarily intelligence reporting from federal, state, and local agencies at the Unclassified//For Official Use Only level.  Key judgments are based largely on field agent reporting considered highly reliable and on law enforcement finished intelligence.  By design, the judgments use an estimative analytic approach.  DHS subject-matter experts in the areas of domestic leftwing extremism and cyber technologies provided support for threat and trend analysis.  In addition, DHS/I&A examined leftwing extremist media for evidence pointing to ideological shifts or changes in motivation and intent.  Government crime data specific to leftwing extremist cyber attacks are unavailable, but DHS/I&A assesses that open source and other data accurately frame leftwing extremist goals and motivations, although some of the sources may have provided information intended to deceive or mislead.  Other open source information included business journals and research institute reports.
+
+
+(U)  Key Findings (U//FOUO)  DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) judges that a number of
+emerging trends point to leftwing extremists maturing and expanding their cyber attack
+capabilities over the next decade with the aim of attacking targets in the United States.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  The potential for economic damage, the individually-initiated and
+anonymous nature of cyber attacks, and the perception that cyber attacks are nonviolent align well with the ideological beliefs, strategic objectives, and tactics of many leftwing extremists.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  The increasing reliance of commercial businesses and other
+enterprises on cyber technologies, including interconnected networks and remote access, creates new and expanding vulnerabilities that technically-savvy leftwing extremists will exploit.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  The proliferation of cyber technologies and expertise as well as the
+public availability of online hacking tools and "hackers-for-hire" offer leftwing extremists incentives to adopt a cyber attack strategy.
+(U)  Appeal of Cyber Attacks (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that cyber attacks are attractive options to leftwing extremists who view attacks on economic targets as aligning with their nonviolent,
+"no-harm" doctrine and tactic of "direct action."
+- (U//FOUO)  Their no-harm doctrine includes claiming to ensure the safety of
+humans, animals, and the environment even as they attack businesses and associated operations.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Many leftwing extremists use the tactic of direct action to inflict
+economic damage on businesses and other targets to force the targeted organization to abandon what the extremists deem objectionable.  Direct actions range from animal releases, property theft, vandalism, and cyber attacksall of which extremists regard as nonviolentto bombings and arson.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  The North American Earth Liberation Front Press Office, the media
+arm of the Earth Liberation Front (ELF), published the following guidance for
+activists: "By inflicting as much economic damage as possible, the ELF can allow a given entity to decide if it is in their [sic] best economic interest to stop
+destroying life for the sake of profit." (U//FOUO)  Lone wolves and small cells can conduct highly-effective cyber attacks consistent with the strategy of leaderless resistance that many leftwing extremists embrace.  DHS/I&A assesses that this facet of leftwing extremist operational strategy
+
+will further encourage some extremists to improve their cyber attack capabilities and possibly encourage recruitment of individuals with sophisticated cyber skills into their trusted circles.  Furthermore, extremists can apply their cyber skills in support of a number of different leftwing movements, a capability that is consistent with the frequent shifting of individuals among movements.
+
+(U)  Leaderless Resistance
+
+(U//FOUO)  Leaderless resistance stresses the importance of individuals and small cells operating independently and anonymously outside of formalized organizational structures or leadership in order to increase operational security and avoid detection.  Postings on extremist websites and other online media forums offer guidance on objectives, tactics, and target selection.  Followers are encouraged to self-train, promote their own objectives, and conduct attacks on their own initiative.
+
+ (U)  The most common leftwing extremist cyber attacks (particularly within the animal rights movement) in the past several years have included deletion of user accounts, flooding a company's server with e-mails, and other types of e-mail assaults intended to
+force businesses to exhaust resources.
+- (U//FOUO)  On 13 July 2007, an animal rights extremist hacked into a
+U.S. company's computer system and deleted more than 300 associates' user accounts.  To restore the accounts, the perpetrator demanded that the company
+sell its shares in a corporation that conducts tests using animal subjects.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  In October 2005, animal rights extremists launched an e-mail attack
+against a Milwaukee, Wisconsin firm that held stock in an animal testing laboratory.  The firm subsequently sold its shares in the laboratory, with losses it estimated at approximately $1.4 million.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  In late April 2005, animal rights extremists overwhelmed a
+U.S. company's computer server with e-mail, which the company claims resulted in a loss of approximately $1.25 million.
+
+(U)  Attractive Strategy for the Future (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A judges that the cyber attack option will become increasingly attractive to leftwing extremists as companies' reliance on cyber technologies grows.
+DHS/I&A also assesses that these extremists will improve their cyber attack capabilities
+by keeping pace with emerging technologies and overcoming countermeasures that develop over the period of this assessment.
+(U)  Increasing Reliance on Cyber Technologies (U//FOUO)  Businesses and other enterprises rely on interconnected computer networks
+for operational continuity, storage of vital data, and communications, introducing
+vulnerabilities that leftwing extremists could exploit.  For example, the use of integrated systems and remote access creates opportunities for computer intrusion and data theft
+through poorly-monitored or unsecured connections.  In this target rich environment,
+cyber attacks likely will become an increasingly attractive option, particularly on businesses and industries that extremists consider high-priority targets.
+
+- (U)  The logging industry, a principal target for environmental extremists and an
+industry not traditionally associated with cyber technologies, now relies on integrated systems to support forestry operations.
+
+- (U)  The farming industry also is experiencing a growth in the use of advanced
+technologies, such as Global Positioning Systems and remote sensing, to cut costs and manage crop production.  The agricultural industry often is a target of environmental extremists who oppose genetically-modified crop production.
+
+(U)  Proliferation of Cyber Attack Tools and Expertise (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A believes that the availability of cyber technologies and expertise such as online hacking tools and hackers-for-hire provides leftwing extremists with resources to augment their own homegrown cyber attack capabilities.  Resources and capabilities for successful cyber attacks are becoming more accessible to the public as evidenced by online advertisements for hacking services and software.  A simple online search provides users with numerous links to discussion forums and websites that offer hacking tutorials and information regarding exploitable system vulnerabilities. In addition, illegal file-sharing sites allow pirated copies of hacking software to be freely
+exchanged.
+- (U//FOUO)  In October 2007, law enforcement authorities discovered a group
+advertising hacking services to customers seeking passwords to the e-mail accounts of spouses, employees, and business competitors.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  A website identified early in 2008 originating in the United States
+provided customers the ability to purchase and download hacking tools and malicious codes as well as video tutorials on how to use the software. (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A believes that the emerging trend exhibited by some leftwing
+extremists of posting hacking-related materials on their websites signifies their intent
+to develop more robust cyber strategies over the coming decade.
+
+- (U)  *The Anarchist Cookbook*, continually updated and revised in online versions
+and accessible on numerous anarchist, animal rights, and environmental websites, contains several chapters focusing on hacking techniques and tutorials.
+
+
+| (U)                                           |
+|-----------------------------------------------|
+| "hacking" and "activism," using cyber         |
+| technologies to achieve a political end.      |
+| Hacktivism includes website defacement,       |
+| denial-of-service attacks, hacking into the   |
+| target's network to introduce malicious       |
+| software, information theft, insider attacks, |
+| economic sabotage, and other malicious        |
+| Internet-based activities.                    |
+
+- (U)  Popular anarchist Internet
+groups such as The HacktivistUSPER
+and Internet Liberation FrontUSPER
+promote hacking as a means of direct action and publish links to hacking resources on their websites.
+
+(U)  Potential Targets
+
+(U//FOUO)  Based on an analysis of previous limited attacks, both cyber and noncyber, and on the prospective growing advantages of cyber attacks in the future, DHS/I&A judges that potential targets likely will expand to include a broader set of organizations
+and critical infrastructure that extremists associate with harming animals and degrading the natural environment, as well as icons of capitalism and authority.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  In addition, DHS/I&A judges that leftwing extremists will build
+upon the perceived success of previous, noncyber attacks on secondary targets organizations with business links to a primary targetand increasingly will attack secondary and possibly tertiary targets.  One animal rights extremist website claims that attacks on secondary businesses have resulted in more than 200 companies severing ties with the primary target organization.  Secondary targets in previous, noncyber attacks have included financial partners and suppliers
+associated with the principal target organization.
+
+(Provider of office supplies to HLS;
+attacked throughout April and May
+2008 by extremist animal rights groups.)
+
+(U//FOUO)  The international nature of many types of cyber attacks means that many more attackers will be available to attack a greater number of distant targets, including those in the United States.  A recent study of noncyber attacks demonstrates that a majority of leftwing extremists previously have focused their efforts locally and limited their targeting to within 30 miles of where they live; global connectivity, however, makes the distance between the cyber attacker and the target irrelevant.
+
+
+- (U)  One extremist animal rights group's monthly newsletter stated that
+
+in today's technological age, computer systems are the real front doors to companies.  So instead of chaining ourselves together in the physical doorways of businesses we can achieve the same effect from the comfort
+[sic] our armchairs.
+
+(U)  Potential Indicators (U//FOUO)  The following highlight a range of signposts that may expose leftwing extremists' intenteither domestically or abroadto develop more robust cyber attack strategies:
+- (U//FOUO)  Increasing number of statements by leftwing extremists advocating
+the use of cyber attack techniques.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Increasing number of communiques published on leftwing extremist
+websites claiming credit for cyber attacks.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Suspicious cyber attack activity or increased frequency, creativity, or
+severity against traditional primary, secondary, and tertiary targets of leftwing extremists.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Evidence that leftwing extremist groups or activists are recruiting or
+attempting to acquire the services of individuals with cyber capabilities.
+
+(U)  Cyber Attack Terms (U)  Cyber attacks are malicious acts that degrade the availability, integrity, or security of data.  Cyber attack techniques are constantly evolving; some examples include the following:
+
+- (U)  Unauthorized intrusions into computer networks and systems. - (U)  Website defacement or subtle changes to web pages in order to disseminate false
+information.
+- (U)  Information theft, computer network exploitation, and extortion. - (U)  Denial-of-service attacks, typically by overwhelming the resources of the system.
+- (U)  The introduction of malicious software into a computer network.
+
+
+(U)  Reporting Notice: (U)  DHS encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to DHS and the FBI.  The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9685 or by e-mail at NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov.  For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC.  The NICC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9201 or by e-mail at NICC@dhs.gov.  The FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm.  When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. (U)  For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document please contact the DHS/I&A Production Branch at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov, IA.PM@dhs.sgov.gov, or IA.PM@dhs.ic.gov.
+
+(U)  **Tracked by:** CRIM-040600-01-05, TERR-060100-01-05, TERR-060800-01-05
+
+## (U)  Appendix: Leftwing Extremists
+
+ (U//FOUO)  DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis defines leftwing extremists as
+groups or individuals who embrace radical elements of the anarchist, animal rights, or
+environmental movements and are often willing to violate the law to achieve their objectives.  Many leftwing extremist groups are not hierarchically ordered with defined members, leaders, or chain of command structures but operate as loosely-connected underground movements composed of "lone wolves," small cells, and splinter groups.
+- (U//LES)  Animal rights and environmental *extremists* seek to end the perceived
+abuse and suffering of animals and the degradation of the natural environment perpetrated by humans.  They use non-violent and violent tactics that, at times, violate criminal law.  Many of these extremists claim they are conducting these
+activities on behalf of two of the most active groups, the Animal Liberation Front and its sister organization, the Earth Liberation Front.  Other prominent groups
+include Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty; and chapters within the Animal
+Defense LeagueUSPER, and Earth First!USPER.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  *Anarchist extremists* generally embrace a number of radical
+philosophical components of anticapitalist, antiglobalization, communist,
+socialist, and other movements.  Anarchist groups seek abolition of social, political, and economic hierarchies, including Western-style governments and large business enterprises, and frequently advocate criminal actions of varying scale and scope to accomplish their goals.  Anarchist extremist groups include
+entities within CrimethincUSPER, the Ruckus SocietyUSPER ,and Recreate 68 USPER.

markdown/misc/mccone-repro.md

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+Aurhority ~/v ~ 9f:7 'f,b/
+I')._
+-. ~
+B~'- I  Y \R\ Dat~-/(t...l._
+
+## Telephone Call From :Mr Mc Cone
+
+M said he would be leaving to be away over the weekend unless there is reason for him to stay. Does Sec have anything he wants to review before he leaves. Sec asked if M went to Cabinet and M g said no. Sec said he thinks we should keep our eyes on the Profumo business - has impression the full story is not available to us. Sec said Fairbanks filed a report on the Ward business a while back so M might want to have his people check on this. Things will come out at the trial that will affect the govt. M agreed and said also the Philby thing has to be considered. Sec said there is a rumor he might be in Yemen. M said they are pretty sure he is behind the Iron Curtain.
+
+M said they sent someone to the Yemen and he got back to Jidda.
+
+Chemical warfare experts are there and we will have some solid info in a day or two.
+
+M said they have for some time tried to determine whether the Soviets were actually photographing and the extent they were from satellites. M said it has been determined they have been and we have good reproductions of what they are getting. Sec saw that this a. m. M will brief the Pres Tues. 21,000 passes over the US since Sputnik I. M wants to build it up and see how we use it in the event they confront us.
+
+M mentioned no travel to Cuba- on the other hand nothing would please him more than to have insurance agents walking around -press people. Can't we have a little latitude. Sec wants to look at it and thinks we should - will look at it personally at M's request. M said Crimmons is the man here. Sec said it is hard for us to do more than we want others to do. Sec will be in touch. M back Sunday night.
+
+Sec said the trip was tiring but the Pres was superb. M said Khrushchev's speech was interesting re test ban and he is having his people explore it. Sec thinks we are in the midst of events we don - t know all about. Sec said M should tell his fellows to consider why are not

markdown/misc/nie-climate.md

@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
+# Climate Change And International Responses Increasing Challenges To Us National Security Through 2040
+
+NIC-NIE-2021-10030-A
+
+# Climate Change And International Responses Increasing Challenges To Us National Security Through 2040
+
+## Key Takeaway
+
+We assess that climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to US national security interests as the physical impacts increase and geopolitical tensions mount about how to respond to the challenge.  Global momentum is growing for more ambitious greenhouse gas emissions reductions, but current policies and pledges are insufficient to meet the Paris Agreement goals.  Countries are arguing about who should act sooner and competing to control the growing clean energy transition.  Intensifying physical effects will exacerbate geopolitical flashpoints, particularly after 2030, and key countries and regions will face increasing risks of instability and need for humanitarian assistance.
+
+- As a baseline, the IC uses the US Federal Scientific community's high confidence in global projections of
+temperature increase and moderate confidence in regional projections of the intensity of extreme weather and other effects during the next two decades.  Global temperatures have increased 1.1 C since pre-industrial times and most likely will add 0.4 C to reach 1.5 C around 2030.
+- The IC has moderate confidence in the pace of decarbonization and low to moderate confidence in how
+physical climate impacts will affect US national security interests and the nature of geopolitical conflict, given the complex dimensions of human and state decisionmaking.
+Key Judgment 1: Geopolitical tensions are likely to grow as countries increasingly argue about how to accelerate the reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions that will be needed to meet the Paris Agreement goals.  Debate will center on who bears more responsibility to act and to payand how quicklyand countries will compete to control resources and dominate new technologies needed for the clean energy transition.  Most countries will face difficult economic choices and probably will count on technological breakthroughs to rapidly reduce their net emissions later.  China and India will play critical roles in determining the trajectory of temperature rise.
+
+Key Judgment 2: The increasing physical effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate cross-border geopolitical flashpoints as states take steps to secure their interests.  The reduction in sea ice already is amplifying strategic competition in the Arctic over access to its natural resources.  Elsewhere, as temperatures rise and more extreme effects manifest, there is a growing risk of conflict over water and migration, particularly after 2030, and an increasing chance that countries will unilaterally test and deploy large-scale solar geoengineeringcreating a new area of disputes.
+
+Key Judgment 3: Scientific forecasts indicate that intensifying physical effects of climate change out to 2040 and beyond will be most acutely felt in developing countries, which we assess are also the least able to adapt to such changes.
+These physical effects will increase the potential for instability and possibly internal conflict in these countries, in some cases creating additional demands on US diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and military resources.  Despite geographic and financial resource advantages, the United States and partners face costly challenges that will become more difficult to manage without concerted effort to reduce emissions and cap warming.
+
+## Scope Note
+
+This National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is in response to a Presidential tasking to assess the national security impacts of climate change.  While climate change effects are forecast to intensify in the latter half of the 21st
+century and continue well beyond 2100, based on current emissions trends and technologies, this NIE assesses the near- (510 years) and medium-term (1020 years) geopolitical implications abroadwe do not assess impacts to
+the homeland or DOD facilities.  We assume the following during the next 20 years:
+
+- No precipitating world event that would devastate industrial activity will occur that sharply and permanently
+reduces greenhouse gas emissions.
+The scientific content of this NIE, both the observed climate effects to date and the modeled future impacts, were reviewed by the US Federal science agencies on the Climate Security Advisory Council (CSAC).  The CSAC is a partnership between the IC and the Federal science community established by Congress to better understand and anticipate the ways climate change affects US national security interests.  It includes the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, the Department of the Interior/US Geological Survey, the Office of Naval Research, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the National Science Foundation.
+
+The IC relies on the broad consensus of scientific studies, modeling, and forecasts from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the US National Climate Assessment, and US Federal science agencies as the baseline to assess the geopolitical implications of climate change.  We are aware of, but in this estimate do not rely on, the small minority scientific perspectives on climate change ranging from those who consider it nonexistent to those who view it as a near-term existential threat to humanity.
+
+## Confidence Levels
+
+The IC uses as a baseline the US Federal scientific community's high confidence in global projections of temperature increase and moderate confidence in regional projections of the intensity of extreme weather and other effects during the next two decades.
+
+The IC has moderate confidence in the pace of decarbonizing the energy sector, given how historically entrenched and slow moving energy systems have been to change and the difficulty of predicting technological breakthroughs.  Our confidence decreases after 2030 because government and private sector policies and investments have the potential to drive a more rapid transition.
+
+The IC has low to moderate confidence in assessing how climate change effects could cascade in ways that affect US national security interests as well as the timing and location of potential geopolitical tension, given the complex dimensions of human and state decisionmaking and the challenge of connecting climate, weather, and sociopolitical models.
+
+# Climate Change And International Responses Increasing Challenges To Us National Security Through 2040
+
+## Discussion
+
+Reports from US Federal science agencies and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) indicate that the burning of fossil fuels has increased the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and raised global average surface temperatures about 1.1 degrees Celsius (C) over pre-industrial levels.
+Temperature rise has accelerated, and every decade since the 1960s has been hotter than the previous one, according to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.
+
+International diplomatic efforts since the late 1980s have centered on understanding and mitigating the effects a changing climate poses to human security.  The 2015
+Paris Agreement for the first time established a global goal of limiting temperature rise to "well below 2 C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 C" by 2100, concluding that this would "significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change."  US Government and other scientists argue that the risks grow as the temperature rises and could be catastrophic and nonlinear after 2 C if there are tipping points in the Earth's system.  (*See Annex B.*)
+
+- In the Paris Agreement, more than 190 countries
+agreed to submit updated plansknown as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC)
+every five years that should outline increased commitments to peak and reduce their emissions.
+NDCs are voluntary and have no enforcement mechanism for non-compliance.
+- Developing countrieswhich have long argued
+that they should not have to limit emissions because they were late in industrializing, need to use fossil fuels to grow economically, and have historically emitted fewer greenhouse gases
+
+## Trajectory Of Climate Change
+
+The current trajectory of growing global CO2
+emissions would cause global temperaturesat 1.1 C over pre-industrial levels nowto add 0.4 C and cross the 1.5 C threshold by about 2030, according to modeling from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and surpass 2 C by around mid-century.  Many of the physical effects are projected to increase in intensity, frequency, and speed. To change that trajectory, the IPCC estimates that global emissions would have to drop sharply in the next decade and reach net zero by around 2050 to limit warming to 1.5 C, or reach net zero by about 2070 to limit warming to 2 C.
+
+signed on to the Paris Agreement in part because it did not require country-specific emissions reduction targets.  In addition, developed countries pledged to mobilize $100 billion a year by 2020 to help developing countries mitigate and adapt to climate change.
+
+## Pressure To Decarbonize Will Increase Geopolitical Tensions
+
+Key Judgment 1: Geopolitical tensions are likely to
+grow as countries increasingly argue about how to
+accelerate the reductions in net greenhouse gas
+emissions needed to meet Paris Agreement goals.
+Debate will center on who bears more responsibility to
+act and to payand how quicklyand countries will
+compete to control resources and dominate new
+technologies required for the clean energy transition.
+Most countries will face difficult economic choices and
+
+probably will count on technological breakthroughs to rapidly reduce their net emissions later.  China and India will play critical roles in determining the trajectory of temperature rise.
+
+## Policies Not Driving Decarbonization Fast Enough
+
+Given current government policies and trends in technology development, we judge that collectively countries are unlikely to meet the Paris goals because high-emitting countries would have to make rapid progress toward decarbonizing their energy systems by transitioning away from fossil fuels within the next decade, whereas developing countries would need to rely on low-carbon energy sources for their economic development.  Quickening the pace and trajectory of the energy transition will depend on reducing key countries' continued dependence on fossil fuels; investing in research, development, and deployment of low-carbon technologies for specific sectors that are hard to decarbonize; and enacting policies to incentivize renewable energy sources.
+
+The current pace of transition to low- or zero-emission clean energy sources is not fast enough to avoid temperatures rising above the Paris goal of 1.5 C.
+Global energy demand is expected to increase by more than 18 percent by 2040, according to the International Energy Agency's (IEA) modeling of current policies, with fossil fuel use also growing and continuing to account for only a modestly smaller share of supply even though solar, wind, and other clean sources will grow more quickly, particularly after 2030.
+
+- To achieve the 1.5 C goal through shifts in energy,
+coal use would need to decline, oil use would need to fall immediately rather than plateau in the 2030s, and natural gas consumption would have to peak this decade, according to IEA data and modeling.
+- Fossil fuels will be difficult to replace because the
+large sunk costs of established production systems make them competitively priced, existing
+distribution networks offer advantages of flexibility and reach, and scaling alternatives to the level
+necessary to replace them is difficult.  Industrial and transportation sectors will struggle to reduce their reliance on fossil fuels because these sectors are the most dependent on the high energy density that fossil fuels provide.
+
+- Solar photovoltaic and wind generation almost
+certainly will increase worldwide because they are on average the cheapest form of energy to add to an electricity grid in many countriesparticularly when
+factoring in installation and lifetime operating expenses.  Accelerating the speed and scale of their
+deployment would require new manufacturing capacity, changes to electricity grids and markets, and development of more advanced batteries to provide power when there is no sun or wind.
+- Nuclear and hydropower are forecast to maintain,
+at most, their current modest shares of energy supply.  Some countries are planning to expand
+
+nuclear power generation, but others plan to reduce it because of safety concerns and high costs.  The development of small modular nuclear reactors may lead to renewed expansion; given long lead times in production, any notable increase in capacity would occur during the latter part of the period of this estimate.
+
+World leaders are increasingly concerned that a window is closing on the opportunity to reduce emissions before irreversible damage to the climate occurs, and many are responding to public and global pressure to act more ambitiously.  A growing number of countries are imposing or increasing carbon taxes to discourage emissions and increase the cost competitiveness of clean energy sources and carbon dioxide removal.  In addition, private and public investment in these areas is rapidly increasing.
+
+- By summer 2021 more than 90 countriescovering
+more than 40 percent of global emissionshad submitted updated NDCs.  Several had pledged to
+
+## Carbon Dioxide Removal Key To Meeting Paris Goals
+
+Most countries are delaying major emissions cuts until closer to their net-zero target year, which means that breakthroughs, commercialization, and incentives related to carbon dioxide removal (CDR) technologies will be critically important for meeting their goals.  Australia, China, the EU, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States are leading R&D efforts and pilot projects, according to the Global Carbon Capture Sequestration Institute, but deployment sufficient to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement is contingent on either technological breakthroughs that sharply reduce costs or government support through subsidies and taxes that raise the costs of fossil fuels.  Currently, there is no large-scale market use for CO2.
+
+- Major hydrocarbon producing countries in Europe, led by Norway and the United Kingdom, probably are
+best positioned for large-scale CDR deployment during the next decade because of government policy and regulatory regimes to support its growth, including carbon-pricing schemes.
+- The United States has several advantages that position it to become a leader in CDR.  US companies are investing
+heavily and have experience using CDR to enhance oil and gas yields.  In addition, the United States is home to almost half the world's operating carbon capture facilities and has large geologic storage capacity, including natural gas reservoirs and saline aquifers, according to the US Geological Survey (USGS).
+- More countries probably will invest in and tout CDR as key to offsetting their emissions and prolonging fossil
+fuel production and consumption.  Oil and gas companies are increasing their R&D in CDR for similar reasons.
+reach net zero emissions, including Brazil, Chile, the EU, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom by 2050, and China by 2060.
+
+- In March, the European Central Bank announced
+plans for new capital requirements for banks that
+have high levels of climate risks on their accounts, and in April, the United Kingdom passed legislation codifying its emissions target.  In July, the EU unveiled its emissions reduction roadmap.
+- However, few other countries have enshrined these
+targets into law or have detailed plans on how to get there.  For example, industry analysts estimate a carbon price as high as $100 per ton would be needed
+to accelerate a shift to clean energy.  In addition, we assess that some countries are using a pledge to mask a lack of seriousness.
+China and India will play critical roles in determining the trajectory of temperature rise.  They are the firstand fourth-largest emitters, respectively, and both are growing their total and per capita emissions, whereas the United States and EUas the second- and thirdlargestare declining.  Both China and India are incorporating more renewable and low-carbon energy sources, but several factors will limit their displacement of coal.  They need to modernize their grids, have sunk costs that make it relatively cheaper to use coal compared with other energy sources, want to minimize reliance on fuel imports for national security reasons, and are trying to appease domestic constituencies who rely on the coal industry for jobs.
+
+- China accounts for about 30 percent of global
+emissions and has pledged to peak before 2030, but modest emissions reduction targets in its 14th Five Year Plan (20212025) in 2021 put that into question.  China has not publically articulated detailed plans for meeting its 2060 net-zero-emissions target; to do so, we assess that
+Beijing would need to follow through on President Xi Jinping's pledge at the US Climate Summit in April to phase out coal consumption.
+- India almost certainly will increase its emissions as it
+develops economically. Indian officials have not
+committed to a net-zero target date and have instead called on countries with larger economies to reduce emissions.
+
+## Arguing About Who Bears Responsibility To Act
+
+The cooperative breakthrough of the Paris Agreement may be short lived as countries struggle to reduce their emissions and blame others for not doing enough.  The Paris Agreement allows countries to self-report emissions data, which means that increased transparency, monitoring, and consistency in reporting will be necessary to accurately measure and assess which countries are meeting their commitments.
+
+- We assess that the longstanding diplomatic divide
+between expected contributions from developed versus developing countries will persist.  Most developing countries almost certainly will continue
+to submit conditional targets, arguing that developed countries must provide substantial financial assistanceas called for in the Paris Agreement technology transfers, and aid in capacity building for
+them to reach their NDC goals.
+- Developing countries will continue to press for
+more money to mitigate and adapt to climate change, arguing that developed countries' failure to mobilize $100 billion a year starting in 2020 has hampered their ability to take serious action.
+
+Financial needs will grow as the physical effects intensify; the UN estimates that developing countries will need upwards of $300 billion in annual investment by 2030 just to adapt.
+
+- In addition, countries probably will continue to
+present favorable data or compare their reductions against a chosen baseline year to their benefit.
+Russia's target is baselined to 1990 levelsat the height of the Soviet Union's economic activity and before Russia's economic collapse in the 1990s
+which allows it to appear ambitious in meeting its goal.  Brazil updated its NDC in 2020 by
+recalculating its 2005 baseline number upwards, allowing it to claim it is still on track to meet its goal.
+
+## Growing Competition Over Key Minerals And Technologies
+
+Competition will grow to acquire and process minerals and resources used in key renewable energy technologies.  China is in a strong position to compete;
+it currently controls more than half the global processing capacity for many of these minerals, according to the USGS and industry reporting, including rare earths for wind turbines and electric vehicle motors; polysilicon for solar panels; and cobalt, lithium, manganese, and graphite for electric vehicle batteries.  China is able to process these at reduced cost mainly because of its lower
+
+environmental standards, lower labor costs, and inexpensive power.
+
+Countries will increasingly compete over developing
+renewable energy technologies to become leading
+exporters and gain market share as the energy
+transition picks up speed.  This competition
+potentially will enable technological breakthroughs
+that could speed up decarbonization.
+
+- The decarbonization of the electricity sector,
+combined with the electrification of transportation, will require countries to upgrade and expand their grids.  Under current policies, the global electric vehicle stock is projected to grow twentyfold by 2030 and account for 7 percent of the global fleet, according to the IEA.
+- Deployment of utility-scale solar and wind
+technologies in remote areas is likely to require
+ultra-high-voltage transmission lines to move the
+power to cities.  China is the world's leading supplier of advanced grid components for ultrahigh-voltage systems, such as transformers, circuit breakers, and inverters, which we assess creates
+cyber vulnerability risks.
+- Private firms and governments in China, the EU,
+Japan, Russia, and the United States are increasing R&D efforts on emerging energy technologies to
+
+## Petrostates Fear Transition Risk In International Decarbonization Efforts
+
+We assess that most countries that rely on fossil fuel exports to support their budgets will continue to resist a quick transition to a zero-carbon world because they fear the economic, political, and geopolitical costs of doing so.  US and Western efforts to push these countries to speed up the energy transition could complicate bilateral relations and force tradeoffs with other national security priorities.
+
+- Russian President Vladimir Putin only recently acknowledged the economic damage from climate change.
+Russia generated almost 30 percent of state revenue in 2020 from fossil fuel companies, including $40 billion in gas sales to Europe.
+- More than 20 countries rely on fossil fuels for greater than 50 percent of total export revenues, and most will
+continue to struggle to diversify their sources of export revenue because of entrenched political interests, endemic corruption, and the lack of economic and legal institutions.  Most already face major governance and instability challenges, with Algeria, Chad, Iraq, and Nigeria most at risk from falling fossil fuel prices because they have higher break-even prices, according to industry reporting.
+- A decline in fossil fuel revenue would further strain Middle Eastern countries that are projected to face more
+intense climate effectssuch as very high heat and extended droughtsbecause it will reduce available resources needed to adapt or build more resilient infrastructure.
+provide additional zero- to low-carbon options, such as green hydrogen, floating offshore wind, and small modular nuclear reactors.  The potential to gain an edge in markets that could be worth hundreds of billions to trillions of dollars is fueling increasingly intense competition.
+
+## Use Of Contentious Economic Tools To Advance Climate Interests
+
+Countries most likely will wield contentious financial and economic tools to advance climate policies and defend their national economies.  Some countries are looking to impose costs on foreign goods produced in countries with relatively weak carbon reduction standards to protect domestic producers who are complying with more stringent standards.
+
+- The EU plans to propose a new Carbon Border
+Adjustment Mechanism for implementation as early as 2023, to protect EU firms in certain sectors
+from competing with companies from countries
+with weaker climate rules and emissions prices, according to open-source reporting.
+
+- Australia, China, India, Russia, South Africa, and
+Ukraine have criticized the use of such mechanisms as a disguised form of protectionism.
+
+## Climate Change Effects Exacerbating Geopolitical Flashpoints
+
+Key Judgment 2: The increasing physical effects of climate change are likely to exacerbate cross-border geopolitical flashpoints as states take steps to secure their interests.  The reduction in sea ice already is amplifying strategic competition in the Arctic over access to its natural resources.  Elsewhere, as temperatures rise and more extreme effects manifest, there is a growing risk of conflict over water and migration, particularly after 2030, and an increasing chance that countries will unilaterally test and deploy large-scale solar geoengineeringcreating a new area of geopolitical disputes.
+
+## Growing Strategic Competition In The Arctic
+
+We assess that Arctic and non-Arctic states almost
+certainly will increase their competitive activities as
+the region becomes more accessible because of
+warming temperatures and reduced ice.  Competition
+will be largely economic but the risk of
+miscalculation will increase modestly by 2040 as
+commercial and military activity grows and
+opportunities are more contested.
+
+- Diminishing sea ice probably will increase access to
+shipping routes that can reduce trade times between Europe and Asia by about 40 percent for some vessels.  In addition, onshore oil and natural gas deposits, as well as an estimated $1 trillion
+worth of precious metals and minerals will become more available, but some high-cost offshore oil and gas projects could become unprofitable if the energy transition speeds up.
+- Warming ocean temperatures probably will push
+Bering Sea fish stocks northward into the Arctic Ocean, according to a NOAA study, which could increase commercial and illegal fishing activity in the region and exacerbate regional disputes between Arctic and non-Arctic states over fishing rights.
+- Coastal erosion and thawing permafrost will
+damage critical infrastructure.  Massive investment in infrastructure would be needed to maximize the
+economic potential of the region, ranging from new ports to mining, offering foreign powers an
+opportunity to gain a foothold by investing in new infrastructure and rebuilding and hardening existing infrastructure.
+
+Military activity is likely to increase as Arctic and non-
+Arctic states seek to protect their investments, exploit
+new maritime routes, and gain strategic advantages
+over rivals.
+
+The increased presence of China and other non-Arctic states very likely will amplify concerns among Arctic states as they perceive a challenge to their respective security and economic interests.  China, France, India, Japan, South Korea, and the United Kingdom have released Arctic strategies mostly focused on economic opportunities, but some address security issues, which has prompted Russian policymakers to repeatedly state since 2018 that non-Arctic countries do not have a military role in the region.
+
+Contested economic and military activities will increase the risk of miscalculation, and deescalating tensions is likely to require the adaptation of existing or creation of new forums to address bilateral or multilateral security concerns among Arctic states.  Although the scope of the Arctic Councilthe leading intergovernmental forum promoting cooperation among Arctic statesspecifically excludes military security, Russia intends to broach security concerns with the other Arctic states while chairing the council from 2021 to 2023, according to Russian officials' public statements, and may propose alternate forums to discuss those issues.
+
+## Increased Strains Over Water And Migration
+
+Outside the Arctic, we judge that transboundary tensions probably will increase over shared surface and groundwater basins as increased weather variability exacerbates preexisting or triggers new water insecurity in many parts of the world.  Forecasted climate change effects on local and regional weather
+including loss of glaciers and more frequent and extreme droughts and floodswill make water management, resource allocation, and service provision more complex and difficult, and probably more contentious.  Although scientific forecasts are not precise enough to pinpoint likely flashpoints, we assess that several areas are at high risk.
+
+- Pakistan relies on downstream surface water from
+heavily glacier-fed rivers originating in India for
+much of its irrigation, and requires frequent data
+from India on river discharges in order to provide advanced warning to evacuate villages and prepare for flooding.
+- The Mekong River basin already is an area of
+growing dispute over dam building, largely by China, that threatens the smooth flow of water for agriculture and fishing on which other countries rely heavily, particularly Cambodia and Vietnam.
+- In the Middle East and North Africa, about
+60 percent of surface water resources are transboundary and all countries share at least one aquifer, according to the World Bank.  Several
+aquifers are also vulnerable to salt water intrusion, even from minor rises in sea levels, increasing the potential for conflict.
+- Some key bodies for resource management, such as
+the Nile Basin Initiative, will increasingly become sidelined unless they develop enforcement
+mechanisms to cajole cooperative behavior among states.  Nearly half the world's 263 international
+river basinsencompassing about half the global populationlack cooperative management agreements to help defuse tensions in shared
+basins, according to the UN, and most existing agreements are not flexible enough to address
+disruptions in weather patterns and reduced water flow caused by climate change.
+
+We judge that cross-border migration probably will increase as climate effects put added stress on internally displaced populations already struggling under poor governance, violent conflict, and environmental degradation.  Triggers for increased migration are likely to include droughts, more intense cycloneswith accompanying storm surgesand floods.  Given the multiple factors that drive migration and the uncertainties in regional climate models, we are unable to project total numbers of climate migrants.
+However, countries and displaced people will increasingly see climate change as a driver, and it will contribute to instability when it upsets socioeconomic, political, and demographic dynamics, and strains ties between originating and receiving countries.
+
+- Around 10 percent of the population of Bangladesh
+lives along exposed coastal areas vulnerable to sea level rise and saltwater intrusion, and the country is projected to add more than 20 million people by 2040.  Since 1993, India has been erecting a fence along its 4,000-kilometer border with Bangladesh.
+- Displaced populationsespecially from small
+island nationswill increasingly demand changes
+to international refugee law to consider their claims and provide protection as climate migrants or refugees, and affected populations will fight for
+legal payouts for loss and damages resulting from climate effects.
+- The need for investments in adaptation technologies
+to manage water stress and reduce a potential driver
+of migration could create expanded markets for advanced technologies, such as water storage and reuse systems.  The UN's Global Commission on Adaptation calculates that a $1.8 trillion investment
+by 2030 in early warning systems, resilient infrastructure, dryland agricultural crop production, mangroves, and water resource management would yield more than $7 trillion of benefits in avoided costs from climate change effects.
+
+## Risk Of Unilateral Geoengineering Increasing
+
+We assess there is a growing risk that a country would unilaterally test and possibly deploy large-scale solar geoengineering technologies as a way to counter intensifying climate effects if it perceived other efforts to limit warming to 1.5 C had failed.  Without an international agreement on these technologies, we assess that such a unilateral effort probably would cause blowback.  Geoengineering intentionally cools the planet by reflecting a fraction of solar radiation back to space or allowing thermal radiation to escape, but it does not address other climate effects such as ocean acidification.  A large-scale deployment of stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI)which mimics the natural cooling effect of a volcanic eruption by adding small reflective particles to the upper stratospherecould have a global impact.  Another technologymarine cloud brighteninguses aerosols to increase cloud reflectivity to cool ocean temperatures on a more localized scale.
+
+- Large-scale geoengineering could be internationally
+disruptive because of its potential to substantially affect the Earth's biosphere, which would change global weather patterns and provide climate benefits to some regions at the expense of others. Depending on the scale and location of deployment, it could change weather systems in the United States.
+- Researchers in several countries, including
+Australia, China, India, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, as well as several
+EU members, are exploring geoengineering techniques.  We assess that the lack of any countrylevel dialogue or governance body to set regulations and enforce transparency over research increases the
+possibility that state or nonstate actors will independently develop or deploy the technology possibly covertlyin a manner that risks conflict if other nations blame them for a weather disaster they believe was caused by geoengineering.
+
+## Highly Vulnerable Countries Of Concern
+
+Key Judgment 3: Scientific forecasts indicate that intensifying physical effects of climate change out to 2040 and beyond will be most acutely felt in developing countries, which we assess are also the least able to adapt to such changes.  These physical effects will increase the potential for instability and possibly internal conflict in these countries, in some cases creating additional demands on US diplomatic, economic, humanitarian, and military resources.  Despite geographic and financial resource advantages, the United States and partners face hard and costly challenges that will become more difficult to manage without concerted efforts to reduce emissions and cap warming.
+
+- The IC identified 11 countries and two regions of
+great concern from the threat of climate change.
+These countries of concern are highly vulnerable to
+the physical effects and lack the capacity to adapt, suggesting that building resilience to climate change in these countries would be especially helpful in mitigating future risks to US interests.
+- Five of the 11 countries are in South and East Asia
+Afghanistan, Burma, India, Pakistan, and North Korea; four countries are in Central America and the Caribbean**Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,** and Nicaragua; **Colombia** and **Iraq** round out the list.
+- Climate change is also likely to increase the risk of
+instability in countries in Central Africa and small island states in the Pacific, which clustered together form two of the most vulnerable areas in the world.
+
+
+- More broadly, developing countries are likely to
+need to adapt to a mix of challenges that climate change will exacerbate.  Ineffective water governance in developing countries will increase their vulnerability to climate effects, undermining livelihoods and health.  Some will face new or more
+intense diseases and lower yields from existing staples of their agriculture.  In addition, insurgents and terrorists may benefitwe assess that most of
+the countries where al-Qa'ida or ISIS have a
+presence are highly vulnerable to climate change.
+
+## Select Countries Of Concern
+
+We assess that the 11 countries especially are likely to face warming temperatures, more extreme weather, and disruption to ocean patterns that will threaten their energy, food, water, and health security.
+Intensifying and more frequent heat waves and droughts will create water supply volatility and probably strain their electric utility operations, while growing economies and populations will increase electricity demands to handle rising temperatures.
+
+- Warm countries that rely on thermoelectric
+power plants for electricity generation are
+particularly vulnerable because more frequent and intense droughts and higher evaporation rates from rising temperatures are likely to interrupt their access to water to cool power plants.  Rising temperatures also make the plants
+less efficient and more costly to operate.
+- For the fifth consecutive year, prolonged dry spells
+and excessive rains have devastated maize and bean crops in Central America's dry corridor.  Yields for these and other crops in Guatemala, Honduras, and
+Nicaragua are projected to decline significantly because of climate change, according to a UN study, raising the prospect of food insecurity and a drop in crucial export commodities.
+- More frequent and intense cyclones are likely to
+contaminate water sources and increase vector populations and the diseases they transmit in
+several of the 11 countries.  Models suggest dengue
+incidence probably will increase in Afghanistan,
+Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Iraq, and Pakistan, according to scientific studies.
+- Rising temperatures and increased precipitation
+probably will amplify mosquito and diarrheal disease outbreaks in South Asian and Central American countries, worsening health outcomes and causing additional loss of life, according to
+scientific studies and the WHO.
+- Climate change probably will accelerate the loss
+of biodiversitythe variability among all living
+organismsfaster than at any point in human history, leading to more extinctions of plants and animals that can no longer survive in their traditional habitats and risking ecosystems that global populations rely on for food and medicinal production.
+We judge that the 11 countries especially will lack the financial resources or governance capacity to adapt to climate change effects, heightening the risk of instability-induced migration and displacement flowsincluding to the US southern borderand increasing their already substantial needs for foreign aid and humanitarian assistance.  Foreign governments, international institutions, and private investment can offer financial aid, technical expertise, and climate adaptation technologies to alleviate some of these difficultiessuch as food and water insecurity and urban povertybut in the 11 countries, these efforts are likely to be hindered by poor governance, weak infrastructure, endemic corruption, and a lack of physical access.
+
+- Several factors have made an outsized contribution
+to countries' declining adaptive capacity, including
+being heavily dependent on imported energy and external resources for health services, and having low electricity access.
+- Climate change is likely to contribute to economic
+and social stress and become an increasing
+migration push factor, especially for poor farmers in Central America, who make up 30 percent of the
+
+working population.  Climate-induced population movements into cities are likely to compound factors of social or political instability, such as uncontrolled urbanization, high rates of unemployment, and growing slums.
+
+- Diminished energy, food, and water security in the
+11 countries probably will exacerbate poverty, tribal or ethnic intercommunal tensions, and dissatisfaction with governments, increasing the risk of social, economic, and political instability.
+
+## Regional Arcs Of Vulnerability
+
+Climate change is likely to increase the risk of instability in countries in Central Africa and small island states in the Pacific.  These countries are all highly exposed to climate change and have little adaptive capacity.  In addition, they are clustered together to create regions in which the United States or its allies may be called upon to provide humanitarian aid, settle disputes, or accept migrants. Climate change most likely will slow economic and human development in **Central Africa**, a region that already is conflict-prone and heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance.  Countries in the region are highly exposed to increased droughts, flash flooding, and related environmentally driven diseases, and also rank among the lowest in the world in access to education, electricity, health, and sanitation.
+
+- Under-resourced and ill-equipped militaries will
+face severe strains when they are called upon to
+respond to more natural disasters in their own and neighboring countries.
+Low-lying **Pacific Islands** are highly vulnerable to climate change because of their minimal adaptive capacity and high exposure to tropical storms and rising sea levels.  Although no island nation is forecast to disappear by 2040, about 20 percent of their landmass is projected to face annual wave flooding from higher seas that will damage infrastructure and threaten food and water security because of saltwater intrusion of
+
+groundwater resources, according to a 2018 study by NOAA and USGS.
+- Climate change also may hasten the collapse of
+commercial fisheries that already are under severe
+strain from overfishing, according to the Pacific
+Community, which will harm local diets and economies.  Regional fish consumption is three-tofive times the global average, foreign fishing
+licenses make up a large share of government revenue, and onshore processing provides jobs,
+according to a UN study.
+Finally, we assess that many other countries are comparatively more exposed and have fewer resources to adapt to climate change effects, although some probably will experience opportunities that mitigate their challenges.1 The following are illustrative examples:
+
+- More variable precipitation is likely to widen
+China's southnorth water disparity, challenging its ability to irrigate agricultural areas in its waterdeficient northeast and further drive its dam construction on rivers upstream from neighboring countries.  However, it is likely to have the financial and technological resources to compete successfully in markets for solar and other clean energies and limit the damage from climate impacts, such as more intense cyclones and river flooding.
+- North Korea's poor infrastructure and resource
+management probably will weaken its ability to cope with increased flooding and droughts, exacerbating the country's chronic food shortages. Increasing extremes in seasonal weather variations may reduce reservoir water stores during droughts while damaging infrastructure during the rainy monsoon season.
+- Saudi Arabia will face moderate exposure and has
+some ability to adapt, while Iran probably will face more frequent droughts, intense heat waves, and expanding desertification that, combined with poor water management, will lower food production and
+
+##
+
+increase import costs during the coming decades, increasing the risk of instability, localized conflict, and displacement.
+
+- Egypt is less exposed to climate change effects than
+many countries, and Brazil and Mexico have
+greater capacity to adapt to such changes.
+- Russia is likely to experience infrastructure damage
+from permafrost thaw, more frequent and intense
+wildfires, and increased erosion.  Moreover, existing agricultural regions probably will experience longer and more frequent droughts. Russia, however, will benefit from the opening of Arctic trade routes and may benefit from longer
+growing seasons to increase crop production in other regions.
+The United States and others, however, are in a relatively better position than other countries to deal with the major costs and dislocation of forecasted change, in part because they have greater resources to adapt, but will nonetheless require difficult adjustments.  Climate impacts such as excessive heat, flooding, and extreme storms will prove increasingly costly, require some military shifts, and increase demands for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.  Adjusting to such changes will often be wrenching, and populations will feel negative effects in their daily lives that will become more difficult to reverse without successful efforts to reduce net emissions and cap warming temperatures.  The impacts will be massive even if the worst human costs can be avoided. The energy transition is already rapidly shifting investment, creating new industries while devastating others.
+
+- The United States and key states in the developed
+world have greater technological capability and financial resources to adapt to climate change, and are likely to realize some benefits in terms of technological competitiveness and agriculture.
+Should warmer temperatures and longer growing seasons yield lower heating costs and increased
+agricultural production, most of the beneficiaries outside Russia are likely to be in the high latitudes,
+such as Canada and Scandinavian countries.
+- Climate effects are likely to compel militaries in
+areas prone to coastal flooding and saltwater
+inundation to alter operations, and changes to
+ocean temperature and chemistry probably will require changes to maritime requirements and sensors, according to a National Defense
+University report.2
+- Affected militaries also probably will have to adapt
+acquisition requirements and expend resources to harden or rebuild critical infrastructure.  The
+United Kingdom is expecting increased calls to respond to humanitarian disasters and is preparing equipment and designing its forces for a world that is 2-4 C warmer than it was in the late 19th
+century, according to a UK Ministry of Defense
+study released in March.3  Although militaries will
+absorb these expenses in normal recapitalization programs spread over decades, the costs to adapt will force tradeoffs with other modernization priorities.
+
+## . Annex A: Events That Would Change Our Assessment
+
+This NIE's key judgments are based on assessments regarding the speed of the energy transition away from fossil fuels and deployment of CDR technologies, the trajectory of intensifying physical effects from climate change, and countries' responses to these effects in ways that increase tension and affect US national security.  The following four scenarios highlight some of the developments that could alter our main judgments and their underlying assumptions.
+
+A major breakthrough in and large-scale deployment of zero-carbon energy or CDR technologies would alter our assessment that the global energy transition is not on pace to meet the Paris Agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5 C.  Multiple venture-backed startup companies could utilize their capitalcombined with improved computational and materials scienceto develop a breakthrough in nuclear fusion, a near endless source of energy that governments have been researching since the 1950s without success.  In addition, the discovery of a cheap CDR technique or a new and highly profitable use for CO2 could create a market incentive for companies and countries to remove CO2 from the atmosphere on a large enough scale to spur a deep decarbonization pathway that results in the globe reaching net zero emissions well before 2050.
+
+A global climate disaster that mobilizes massive collective action from all countries and populationssuch as clear evidence that we are nearing a tipping point in the Earth's system faster than expectedwould alter our assessment that countries are going to argue about who bears more responsibility to act.  New observations could indicate the irreversible and significantly faster than expected melting of Greenland and the West and East Antarctic glacierswhich currently are modeled to raise sea levels by upwards of a quarter meter by 2040, and more than one meter by 2100 under a high emissions scenariocould threaten hundreds of millions of people living in coastal communities.  Alternatively, new evidence could emerge indicating the near term collapse of the Atlantic Meridional Overturning Circulation (AMOC) that risks altering North Atlantic air temperatures in excess of 7 C; current observations give scientists high confidence that climate change is weakening the AMOC, a critical part of Earth's climate system that transfers warm water northward and cold water southward.
+
+Overt military action, especially by a non-Arctic state, that significantly escalates tension in the region and results in a sidelining of Arctic diplomacy would challenge our judgment that increased activity in the Arctic, while raising the possibility of miscalculation, is unlikely to result in outright conflict because of the harsh operating environment and existing mechanisms for cooperation.  Persistent challenges to Russia's supremacy of the Northern Sea Route by a non-Arctic state's military could result in armed conflict with Russia if diplomatic negotiations had stalled and foreign militaries continued to operate in what Moscow views as its territorial waters.  Alternatively, if a non-Arctic state, especially China, were to begin regular, large-scale military operations in the area to protect an economic foothold in the region, the risk of conflict with Arctic states could increase and contribute to a buildup of forces.
+
+A successful geoengineering deployment at scale that results in global cooling without negatively disrupting weather patterns would challenge our judgment that unilateral deployment without global consensus would raise international tensions and risk blowback.  A country fearing the existential threat from sea level rise could initiate a geoengineering program that begins to dim the planet and artificially reduces global temperatures.  After witnessing the successful demonstration, other states might support increased geoengineering, both to avert the worst aspects of climate impacts and to avoid having to transition away from fossil fuels.  Given the lingering environmental impact of emissions and the risk of a massive climate shock from accumulated emissions if the geoengineering program suddenly ceased, countries probably would continue to gradually decarbonize energy production and pursue CDR so they could wean off geoengineering.
+
+##
+
+# Annex B: The Progress Of Climate ModelingView From The Chair Of The Us Interagency Group On Integrative Modeling
+
+Scope Note: DOE's Director of Earth and Environmental Sciences Division authored this annex because he is a member of the Climate Security Advisory Council (CSAC) and chairs the Interagency Group on Integrative Modeling, which coordinates US
+Government modeling efforts in support of the US Global Change Research Program.
+
+Today's computer climate models trace their origins to the 1950s and the development of prototype atmospheric circulation models to estimate the distribution of nuclear fallout after an explosion.  In 1967, NOAA established a climate group that produced the first model-based simulations showing that a doubling of CO2 could lead to significant warming of the Earth's climate.  Ultimately, projections from these and other early modeling capabilities led to the formation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). As of this year, more than 30 major climate-modeling centers worldwide make multi-decadal projections, each with access to a supercomputer of at least 10-petaflop capacity.  The United States and Europe have the most advanced models, the most notable being NSF's National Center for Atmospheric Research, NOAA's Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory, NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies, DOE's national laboratoryled modeling efforts, Germany's Max Planck Institute for Meteorology, and the UK Met Office's Hadley Center.  Australia, Canada, China, Japan, and Switzerland also have modeling centers. Climate modeling is coordinated worldwide by the World Climate Research Programme (WCRP), which is sponsored by the UN World Meteorological Organization, International Council for Science, and UNESCO.  WCRP helps scientists exchange information on various model capabilities and strategies.  The IPCC produces a climate assessment every seven years using the 'all inclusive' approach by combining predictions from all modeling centers worldwide.
+The US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), on the other hand, produces the National Climate Assessment every four years using only US models.  The USGCRP coordinates efforts across the US climate modeling community to learn from each other and avoid unnecessary duplication.
+
+## Increasing Complexity And Fidelity
+
+The evolution of climate models has been one of increasing complexity run on faster and larger computers.  The first climate models examined how the Earth's energy balance and atmosphere might vary over time, and only considered atmospheric physics and rudimentary representations of the oceans and land.  In time, scientists added more detail, such as ocean and land chemistry and biology. By 1990, better computers meant models could run at 400-kilometer (km) spatial resolutions and make generalized projections showing that rising levels of atmospheric CO2 increased regional and global temperatures.  However, these models could not display extreme weather eventssuch as hurricane impacts on citiesbecause of coarse resolutions, and they did not include other complicated feedbacks caused by other greenhouse gases or changes in the biosphere, such as permafrost thaw, ice sheet melt, or deforestation.
+
+Climate models have advanced remarkably in the past 15 years.  By 2005, faster computers allowed climate models to run at 150-km resolution, enabling the representation of some details of human activities such as large-scale energy infrastructure and agriculture impacts.  By 2010, the first petaflop-scale supercomputers and new scientific findings from field experiments allowed the inclusion of biogeochemical and hydrological processes.  By 2015, melting of glaciers and shelving were included, allowing for better sea level rise predictions, along with greater detail on marine fisheries.
+
+In 2018, climate models began to include the role of humans and human systemsa major step forward in assessing climate effects on human securityallowing them to examine the connections between climate, socioeconomics, global agriculture, infrastructure, and trade on targeted resolutions of 50 km or less.  By 2020, US researchers were testing various methodologies to evaluate the risks and benefits of climate interventions, such as geoengineering.
+
+## Evaluating For Accuracy
+
+Scientists are continually testing models for their accuracy in predictions.  Climate models operate by solving a very large set of sophisticated equations for three-dimensional grids in the atmosphere and oceans.  The land surface is more difficult because of the incredible variety of watersheds, ecosystems and glaciers, but modeling centers with the world's fastest computers are incorporating variable grid sizes for land features, like glaciers, to obtain more accurate sea level rise projections. Scientists use a 'hindcasting' technique to test and evaluate the accuracy of models.  They run the model from several decades in the past and compare its projections to real world and long-term observable data from NASA's remote sensing satellites, NOAA's ground-based monitors, and many other US and international agencies.  Hindcasting has shown that models are robust in describing climate warming on continental scales, but not as accurate in projecting regional phenomena, such as the details of Arctic sea ice retreat, evolving coastal precipitation patterns, and impacts of storms on human systems.  In general, there is reduced accuracy when models project more localized.
+
+## Reducing Uncertainty
+
+Current research on reducing uncertainty out to 2050 focuses on two key areas, those caused by overly simplistic or missing representation of processes and interrelationships, and spatial grids that are not yet small enough to address key questions.  The first set of uncertainties includes: (a) cloudaerosol interactions; (b) medium-term modes of variability such as El Nino/La Nina that influence global precipitation patterns and severe droughts; (c) cryosphere changes such as permafrost thaw, sea ice coverage, and land ice melt that influence methane release and sea-level rise; and (d) extreme events that impact built infrastructures and populations.  Longer-term projections are also sensitive to scenarios of future policies to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
+
+Scientists target the second source of uncertainty about spatial resolution by adding details to heterogeneous systems within smaller grids and porting the models to increasingly powerful computers.  In general, the more powerful the computer, the higher the possible resolution.  Most modeling centers are currently operating with 25-km resolution, with the exception of a DOE model that will operate at 3-km resolution by the end of this year.  With the understanding of key questions from policymakers, warfighters, and the IC, science agencies steer their investments to tackle and reduce one or more of these uncertainties.
+
+Climate scientists perform tens to hundreds of ensemble runs for each climate simulation, where each run has slight perturbations on the same initializing data or small changes in parameterizations, in order to reduce the uncertainty that comes with incorporating larger numbers of complicated and uncertain equations.  A modeling center will then produce an average of all the ensemble runs and compile a best estimate of the future climate.  Each modeling center has a slightly different approach in how they construct their modelsuch as parameterizations, grid size, and number of ensemble runswhich means the climate projections from one modeling center may differ from another center.
+
+## Future Work On Attribution And Tipping Points
+
+Since climate change is increasing extreme weather event trends, a growing field is trying to answer the question of what fraction of an individual event can be attributed to climate change.  Improvements in big data collection and processing, along with more advanced computers, most likely will advance our knowledge of attribution.  In addition, scientists are working to improve models to better answer the question of when a given component of either the regional or global climate system will approach or pass a tipping point, an area of high importance given the risks associated with itthe state of science currently is still unable to adequately answer this question.
+
+
+## Annex C: Challenges Of Projecting The Macroeconomic Impacts Of Climate Change
+
+The macroeconomic impacts of climate change out to 2040 are highly uncertain because of the divergent estimates and methodological approaches employed in a wide range of economic models, including different assumptions, baselines, time horizons, and variables.  The future economic impacts of climate change will also depend in large part on the extent to which policies and actions mitigate these potential impacts, further complicating longer-term estimates of costs and benefits.
+
+A key variable is the potential for technological breakthroughs that substantially favor varying mixes of energy production and distribution and of carbon removal and storage.  In recent years, a growing number of studies have argued that pursuing mitigation and adaptation measures can also provide opportunities to spur economic growth, potentially by more than the dislocations and disruptions projected for some economic sectors, such as oil and gas.
+
+- Other economic and many climate experts argue that existing assessments of the potential future economic risks
+of climate change underestimate many of these risks, possibly greatly.  In particular, they argue that widely used models omit many factors that are difficult to quantify, discount future costs and benefits, and fail to consider climate thresholds, tipping points, or the dynamic impact of numerous shocks.
+- Some researchers argue that the physical impacts of climate change, including the destruction of infrastructure
+and physical capital, disruptions in global supply chains, and more unpredictable food commodity supply
+cycles, could lead to more output and price variability and pose significant additional challenges in forecasting
+macroeconomic impacts.
+As a result, we judge that state and nonstate actors will increasingly push for regulations mandating climate change related risk disclosure in the financial system to protect against these macroeconomic impacts.  The United States will have opportunities to influence regulatory frameworks and reporting standards.
+
+
+This page intentionally left blank.
+
+
+climate change; www. Atalnticcouncil.org/blogs/energysource/a-new-security-challenge-the-geopolioticalimplications-of-climate-change/.com, Accessed 6 April 2021.
+
+2 Academic report, National Defense University; Richard Pittenger and Robert Gagoisan; OCT 2003; Global Warming Could Have a Chilling Effect on the Military.
+3 UK Ministry of Defence, "Ministry of Defence: Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach," March
+2021.

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+## National Security Space Strategy
+
+UNCLASSIFIED SUMMARY
+
+
+## (U) Preface
+
+During the past 50 years, U.S. leadership in space activities has benefited the global economy, enhanced our national security, strengthened international relationships, advanced scientific discovery, and improved our way of life. Space capabilities provide the United States and our allies unprecedented advantages in national decision-making, military operations, and homeland security.  Space systems provide national security decision-makers with unfettered global access and create a decision advantage by enabling a rapid and tailored response to global challenges. Moreover, space systems are vital to monitoring strategic and military developments as well as supporting treaty monitoring and arms control verification.  Space systems are also critical in our ability to respond to natural and man-made disasters and monitor longterm environmental trends.  Space systems allow people and governments around the world to see with clarity, communicate with certainty, navigate with accuracy, and operate with assurance. Maintaining the benefits afforded to the United States by space is central to our national security, but an evolving strategic environment increasingly challenges U.S. space advantages.  Space, a domain that no nation owns but on which all rely, is becoming increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.  These challenges, however, also present the United States with opportunities for leadership and partnership.  Just as the United States helped promote space security in the 20th century, we will build on this foundation to embrace the opportunities and address the challenges of this century. The National Security Space Strategy charts a path for the next decade to respond to the current and projected space strategic environment.  Leveraging emerging opportunities will strengthen the U.S. national security space posture while maintaining and enhancing the advantages the United States gains from space. Our strategy requires active U.S. leadership enabled by an approach that updates, balances, and integrates all of the tools of U.S. power.  The Department of Defense (DoD) and the Intelligence Community (IC), in coordination with other departments and agencies, will implement this strategy by using it to inform planning, programming, acquisition, operations, and analysis.
+
+## The Strategic Environment
+
+"The now-ubiquitous and interconnected nature of space capabilities and the world's growing dependence on them mean that irresponsible acts in space can have damaging consequences for all of us."
+
+- 2010 National Space Policy
+Space is vital to U.S. national security and our ability to understand emerging threats, project power globally, conduct operations, support diplomatic efforts, and enable global economic viability.  As more nations and non-state actors recognize these benefits and seek their own space or counterspace capabilities, we are faced with new opportunities and new challenges in the space domain.
+
+The current and future strategic environment is driven by three trends - space is becoming increasingly congested, *contested,* and *competitive.* Space is increasingly *congested*.  Growing global space activity and testing of China's destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) system have increased congestion in important areas in space.  DoD tracks approximately 22,000 man-made objects in orbit, of which 1,100 are active satellites (see Figure 1).  There may be as many as hundreds of thousands of additional pieces of debris that are too small to track with current sensors.  Yet these smaller pieces of debris can damage satellites in orbit.
+Today's space environment contrasts with earlier days of the space age in which only a handful of nations needed to be concerned with congestion.  Now there are approximately 60 nations and government consortia that own and operate satellites, in addition to numerous commercial and academic satellite operators (see Figure 2).  This congestion -
+along with the effects of operational use, structural failures, accidents involving space systems, and irresponsible testing or employment of debris-producing destructive ASATs
+- is complicating space operations for all those that seek to benefit from space. Increased congestion was highlighted by the 2009 collision between a Russian government Cosmos satellite and a U.S. commercial Iridium satellite.  The collision created approximately 1,500 new pieces of trackable space debris, adding to the more than 3,000 pieces of debris created by the 2007 Chinese ASAT test.  These two events greatly increased the cataloged population of orbital debris.
+Another area of increasing congestion is the radiofrequency spectrum.  Demand for radiofrequency spectrum to support worldwide satellite services is expected to grow commensurate with the rapid expansion of satellite services and applications.  As many as 9,000 satellite communications transponders are expected to be in orbit by 2015.  As the demand for bandwidth increases and more transponders are placed in service, the greater the probability of radiofrequency interference and the strain on international processes to minimize that interference.
+
+Space is increasingly *contested* in all orbits.  Today space systems and their supporting infrastructure face a range of man-made threats that may deny, degrade, deceive, disrupt, or destroy assets.  Potential adversaries are seeking to exploit perceived space vulnerabilities.  As more nations and non-state actors develop counterspace capabilities over the next decade, threats to U.S. space systems and challenges to the stability and security of the space environment will increase. Irresponsible acts against space systems could have implications beyond the space domain, disrupting worldwide services upon which the civil and commerical sectors depend. Space is increasingly *competitive*.  Although the United States still maintains an overall edge in space capabilities, the U.S. competitive advantage has decreased as market-entry barriers have lowered (see Figure 3).  The U.S. technological lead is eroding in several areas as expertise among other nations increases.  International advances in space technology and the associated increase in foreign availability of components have put increased importance on the U.S. export control review process to ensure the competitiveness of the U.S. space industrial base while also addressing national security needs. U.S. suppliers, especially those in the second and third tiers, are at risk due to inconsistent acquisition and production rates, long development cycles, consolidation of suppliers under first-tier prime contractors, and a more competitive foreign market.  A decrease in specialized suppliers further challenges U.S. abilities to maintain assured access to critical technologies, avoid critical dependencies, inspire innovation, and maintain leadership advantages.  All of these issues are compounded by challenges in recruiting, developing, and retaining a technical workforce.
+
+## Strategic Objectives
+
+In executing the National Space Policy, our National Security Space Strategy seeks to maintain and enhance the national security benefits we derive from our activities and capabilities in space while addressing and shaping the strategic environment and strengthening the foundations of our enterprise.  The U.S. defense and intelligence communities will continue to rely on space systems for military operations, intelligence collection, and related activities; access to these capabilities must be assured.  We must address the growing challenges of the congested, contested, and competitive space environment while continuing our leadership in the space domain. Our strategy is derived from the principles and goals found in the National Space Policy and builds on the strategic approach laid out in the National Security Strategy.
+Specifically, our national security space objectives are to:
+
+- Strengthen safety, stability, and security in space; - Maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the
+United States by space; and
+- Energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security.
+We seek a safe space environment in which all can operate with minimal risk of accidents, breakups, and purposeful interference.  We seek a stable space environment in which nations exercise shared responsibility to act as stewards of the space domain and follow norms of behavior.  We seek a secure space environment in which responsible nations have access to space and the benefits of space operations without need to exercise their inherent right of self-defense. We seek to ensure national security access to space and use of space capabilities in peace, crisis, or conflict.  We seek to meet the needs of national leaders and intelligence and military personnel, irrespective of degradation of the space environment or attacks on specific systems or satellites.  Enhancing these benefits requires improving the foundational activities of our national security space enterprise - including our systems, our acquisition processes, our industrial base, our technology innovation, and our
+space professionals. A resilient, flexible, and healthy space industrial base must underpin all of our space activities.  We seek to foster a space industrial base comprised of skilled professionals who deliver those innovative technologies and systems that enable our competitive advantage.  Our space system developers, operators, and analysts must deliver, field, and sustain national security space capabilities for the 21st century.
+
+
+## Strategic Approaches
+
+"To promote security and stability in space, we will pursue activities
+consistent with the inherent right of self-defense, deepen cooperation
+with allies and friends, and work with all nations toward the
+responsible and peaceful use of space."
+
+                      - 2010 National Security Strategy
+
+The National Security Space Strategy draws upon all elements of national power and requires active U.S. leadership in space.  The United States will pursue a set of interrelated strategic approaches to meet our national security space objectives:
+
+- Promote responsible, peaceful, and safe use of space; - Provide improved U.S. space capabilities; - Partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and
+commercial firms;
+- Prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports U.S.
+national security; and
+- Prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment.
+
+## Promoting Responsible, Peaceful, And Safe Use Of Space
+
+"All nations have the right to use and explore space, but with this
+right also comes responsibility.  The United States, therefore, calls
+on all nations to work together to adopt approaches for responsible
+activity in space to preserve this right for the benefit of future
+generations."
+                       -  2010 National Space Policy
+
+As directed in the National Space Policy, the United States will promote the responsible,
+peaceful, and safe use of space as the foundational step to addressing the congested and
+contested space domain and enabling other aspects of our approach.  We will encourage
+allies, partners, and others to do the same.  As more nations, international organizations,
+and commercial firms field or aspire to field space capabilities, it is increasingly
+important that they act responsibly, peacefully, and safely in space.  At the same time,
+they must be reassured of U.S. intentions to act likewise.  We will encourage responsible
+behavior in space and lead by the power of our example.  Moreover, U.S. diplomatic
+engagements will enhance our ability to cooperate with our allies and partners and seek
+common ground among all space-faring nations.
+
+The United States will support development of data standards, best practices,
+transparency and confidence-building measures, and norms of behavior for responsible
+space operations.  We will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if
+
+they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies.  We believe setting pragmatic guidelines for safe activity in space can help avoid collisions and other debris-producing events, reduce radiofrequency interference, and promote security and stability in the space domain - all of which are in the interests of all nations.
+Shared awareness of spaceflight activity must improve in order to foster global spaceflight safety and help prevent mishaps, misperceptions, and mistrust.  The United States is the leader in space situational awareness (SSA) and can use its knowledge to foster cooperative SSA relationships, support safe space operations, and protect U.S. and allied space capabilities and operations.
+DoD will continue to improve the quantity and quality of the SSA information it obtains and expand provision of safety of flight services to U.S. Government agencies, other nations, and commercial firms.  DoD will encourage other space operators to share their spaceflight safety data.  DoD, in coordination with other government agencies, will seek to establish agreements with other nations and commercial firms to maintain and improve space object databases, pursue common international data standards and data integrity measures, and provide services and disseminate orbital tracking information, including predictions of space object conjunction, to enhance spaceflight safety for all parties.
+
+## Providing Improved U.S. Space Capabilities
+
+"Being able to deliver capability cost-effectively when it is needed improves mission effectiveness, provides leadership with flexibility in making investments, and precludes gaps in necessary capabilities."
+- 2009 National Intelligence Strategy U.S. space capabilities will continue to be fundamental for national security.  DoD and the IC will identify, improve, and prioritize investments in those capabilities that garner the greatest advantages.  We will develop, acquire, field, operate, and sustain space capabilities to deliver timely and accurate space services to a variety of customers, from soldiers to national decision-makers.  We will enhance interoperability and compatibility of existing national security systems, across operational domains and mission areas, to maximize efficiency of our national security architecture; we will ensure these characteristics are built into future systems.  We will ensure that data collection and products are released at the lowest possible classification to maximize their usefulness to the user community. Ensuring U.S. capabilities are developed and fielded in a timely, reliable, and responsive manner is critical for national decision-makers to act on time-sensitive and accurate information, for military forces to plan and execute effective operations, and for the IC to enable all of the above with timely indications and warning.  Improving our acquisition processes, energizing the U.S. space industrial base, enhancing technological innovation, and deliberately developing space professionals are critical enablers to maintaining U.S. space leadership. In cooperation with our industrial base partners, DoD and the IC will revalidate current measures and implement new measures, where practicable, to stabilize program acquisition more effectively and improve our space acquisition processes.  We will reduce programmatic risk through improved management of requirements.  We will use proven best practices of systems engineering, mission assurance, contracting, technology maturation, cost estimating, and financial management to improve system acquisition, reduce the risk of mission failure, and increase successful launch and operation of our space systems. Mission permitting, we will synchronize the planning, programming, and execution of major acquisition programs with other DoD and IC processes to improve efficiencies and overall performance of our acquisition system and industrial base.  DoD and the IC will evaluate the requirements and analysis of alternatives processes to ensure a range of affordable solutions is considered and to identify requirements for possible adjustment. The requirements process must produce combinations of material and non-material solutions.  Realistic cost and schedule estimates must inform the President's annual budget request.  Human resources processes must provide the right personnel for successful execution.
+We seek to foster a U.S. space industrial base that is robust, competitive, flexible, healthy, and delivers reliable space capabilities on time and on budget.  DoD and the IC, in concert with the civil space sector, will better manage investments across portfolios to ensure the industrial base can sustain those critical technologies and skills that produce the systems we require.  Additionally, we will continue to explore a mix of capabilities with shorter development cycles to minimize delays, cut cost growth, and enable more rapid technology maturation, innovation, and exploitation. A key aspect of energizing the U.S. space industrial base is to reform U.S. export controls to address technology security and global competitiveness.  Export controls have a farreaching impact on national security interests, as they help deter illicit efforts by others to obtain and use the materials, technology, and know-how that are vital to our national security.  Export controls, however, can also affect the health and welfare of the industrial base, in particular second-tier and third-tier suppliers.  Reforming export controls will facilitate U.S. firms' ability to compete to become providers-of-choice in the international marketplace for capabilities that are, or will soon become, widely available globally, while strengthening our ability to protect the most significant U.S. technology advantages.  In particular, as new opportunities arise for international collaboration, a revised export control system will better enable the domestic firms competing for these contracts.  Revised export control policies will address U.S. firms' ability to export space-related items generally available in the global marketplace, consistent with U.S. policy and international commitments. We will continue to pursue, adapt, and evolve the unique technologies, innovative exploitation techniques, and diverse applications that give the United States its strategic advantage in space.  The United States seeks to maintain and enhance access to those global and domestic technologies needed for national security space systems.  We will do so by expanding technology partnerships with the academic community, industry, U.S. and partner governments, mission customers, and other centers of technical excellence and innovation, consistent with U.S. policy, technology transfer objectives, and international commitments.  To advance the science and technology that enables U.S.
+
+space capabilities, we will continue to assess global technology trends to find emerging technologies and potential breakthroughs.  We will explore new applications of current technologies and the development of unique, innovative technologies and capabilities. We will improve the transition of scientific research and technology development to the operational user and into major system acquisition.  To the extent practicable, we will also facilitate the incorporation of these capabilities and technologies into appropriate domestic space programs. People are our greatest asset.  To support the range of national security space activities, we will develop current and future national security space professionals - our "space cadre" - who can acquire capabilities, operate systems, analyze information, and succeed in a congested, contested, and competitive environment.  We will build a more diverse and balanced workforce among military, civilian, and contractor components.  These professionals must be educated, experienced, and trained in the best practices of their field - whether it is planning, programming, acquisition, manufacturing, operations, or analysis. We will continue to encourage students at all levels to pursue technical coursework as a foundation for space-related career fields.  Working with other departments and agencies, we will synchronize our science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) education initiatives with sound education investments to ensure an ample supply of space professionals with appropriate skills and capabilities.  We will encourage our space professionals to participate in STEM outreach and mentoring programs. We will continue to develop structured personnel development programs to expand, track, and sustain our space expertise, employing focused education and training as well as purposeful utilization of our people to offer a broad range of experiential opportunities. We will further professional development by growing, rewarding, and retaining scientific and technical expertise and professional leadership.  We will support an entrepreneurial ethos by encouraging initiative, innovation, collaboration, resourcefulness, and resilience.
+As national security space priorities shift, we will continue to educate and train the workforce to align with new priorities.
+
+## Partnering With Responsible Nations, International Organizations, And Commercial Firms
+
+"[E]xplore opportunities to leverage growing international and commercial expertise to enhance U.S. capabilities and reduce the vulnerability of space systems and their supporting ground infrastructure."
+- 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review The evolving strategic environment allows for additional opportunities to partner with responsible nations, international organizations, and commercial firms.  DoD and the IC will continue to partner with others to augment the U.S. national security space posture across many mission areas.  This includes looking for opportunities to leverage or work in conjunction with partnerships pursued by U.S. Government civil space agencies.  By sharing or exchanging capabilities, data, services, personnel, operations, and technology, we can ensure access to information and services from a more diverse set of systems - an advantage in a contested space environment.  We will promote appropriate cost-sharing and risk-sharing partnerships to develop and share capabilities.  Decisions on partnering will be consistent with U.S. policy and international commitments and consider cost, protection of sources and methods, and effects on the U.S. industrial base.
+Partnering with other nations also is essential to ensuring global access to the radiofrequency spectrum and related orbital assignments and promoting the responsible, peaceful, and safe use of outer space.  Nations gain international acceptance of their use of the radiofrequency spectrum and satellite orbits through the International Telecommunication Union (ITU).  Registering satellite networks with the ITU can help prevent and, if necessary, address radiofrequency interference.
+
+The United States will lead in building coalitions of like-minded space-faring nations and, where appropriate, work with international institutions to do so.  With our allies, we will explore the development of combined space doctrine with principles, goals, and objectives that, in particular, endorse and enable the collaborative sharing of space capabilities in crisis and conflict.  We will seek to expand mutually beneficial agreements with key partners to utilize existing and planned capabilities that can augment U.S. national security space capabilities.  We will pursue increased interoperability, compatibility, and integration of partner nations into appropriate DoD and IC networks to support information sharing and collective endeavors, taking affordability and mutual benefit into account.  At the same time, U.S. military and intelligence personnel will ensure the appropriate review and release of classified information to enhance partner access to space information. We will actively promote the sale of U.S.-developed capabilities to partner nations and the integration of those capabilities into existing U.S. architectures and networks.
+Posturing our domestic industry to develop these systems will also enable the competitiveness of the U.S. industrial base. We will explore sharing space-derived information as "global utilities" with partnered nations.  As we do today with the positioning, navigation, and timing services of the Global Positioning System, we will provide services derived from selected space systems and enhance those services through partnerships.  We will continue to share SSA
+information to promote responsible and safe space operations.  We will also pursue enhanced sharing of other space services such as missile warning and maritime domain awareness.  We may seek to establish a collaborative missile warning network to detect attacks against our interests and those of our allies and partners. Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will continue to enable access to a more diverse, robust, and distributed set of space systems and provide easily releasable data.
+Strategic partnerships with commercial firms will be pursued in areas that both stabilize costs and improve the resilience of space architectures upon which we rely.  Innovative approaches will be explored for their utility in meeting government performance requirements in a cost-effective and timely manner.  We will rely on proven commercial capabilities to the maximum extent practicable, and we will modify commercial capabilities to meet government requirements when doing so is more cost-effective and timely for the government.  We will develop space systems only when there is no suitable, cost-effective commercial alternative or when national security needs dictate.
+
+## Preventing And Deterring Aggression Against Space Infrastructure That Supports U.S. National Security
+
+"U.S. forces must be able to deter, defend against, and defeat aggression by potentially hostile nation-states.  This capability is fundamental to the nation's ability to protect its interests and to provide security in key regions."
+- 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review Given the degree to which the United States relies on space systems and supporting infrastructure for national security, we must use a multilayered approach to prevent and deter aggression.  We seek to enhance our national capability to dissuade and deter the development, testing, and employment of counterspace systems and prevent and deter aggression against space systems and supporting infrastructure that support U.S.
+national security.
+Many elements of this strategy contribute to this approach.  We will: support diplomatic efforts to promote norms of responsible behavior in space; pursue international partnerships that encourge potential adversary restraint; improve our ability to attribute attacks; strengthen the resilience of our architectures to deny the benefits of an attack;
+and retain the right to respond, should deterrence fail. DoD and the IC will support the diplomatic and public diplomacy efforts of the Department of State to promote the responsible use of space and discourage activities that threaten the safety, stability, and security of the space domain.  We will also work with the Department of State and other appropriate U.S. Government agencies to strengthen alliances with other space-faring nations and pursue partnerships with commercial firms and international organizations. We will improve our intelligence posture - predictive awareness, characterization, warning, and attribution - to better monitor and attribute activities in the space domain. Thus, SSA and foundational intelligence will continue to be top priorities, as they underpin our ability to maintain awareness of natural disturbances and the capabilities, activities, and intentions of others.  We will also enable and develop intelligence professionals who can provide greater scope, depth, and quality of intelligence collection and analysis. We will seek to deny adversaries meaningful benefits of attack by improving costeffective protection and strengthening the resilience of our architectures.  Partnerships with other nations, commercial firms, and international organizations, as well as alternative U.S. Government approaches such as cross-domain solutions, hosted payloads, responsive options, and other innovative solutions, can deliver capability, should our space systems be attacked.  This also will enable our ability to operate in a degraded space environment. Finally, the United States will retain the right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail.  We will use force in a manner that is consistent with longstanding principles of international law, treaties to which the United States is a party, and the inherent right of self defense.
+
+## Preparing To Defeat Attacks And Operate In A Degraded Environment
+
+"Increase assurance and resilience of mission-essential functions
+enabled by commercial, civil, scientific, and national security
+spacecraft
+            and
+                  supporting
+                              infrastructure
+                                              against
+                                                       disruption,
+degradation,
+              and
+                    destruction,
+                                  whether
+                                            from
+                                                   environmental,
+mechanical, electronic, or hostile causes."
+                   - 2010 National Space Policy
+
+We believe it is in the interests of all space-faring nations to avoid hostilities in space.
+In spite of this, some actors may still believe counterspace actions could provide
+military advantage.  Our military and intelligence capabilities must be prepared to "fight
+through" a degraded environment and defeat attacks targeted at our space systems
+and supporting infrastructure.  We must deny and defeat an adversary's ability to achieve
+its objectives.
+
+As we invest in next generation space capabilities and fill gaps in current capabilities, we
+will include resilience as a key criterion in evaluating alternative architectures.
+Resilience can be achieved in a variety of ways, to include cost-effective space system
+protection, cross-domain solutions, hosting payloads on a mix of platforms in various
+orbits, drawing on distributed international and commercial partner capabilities, and
+developing and maturing responsive space capabilities.  We will develop the most
+feasible, mission-effective, and fiscally sound mix of these alternatives.
+
+To make the most effective use of space protection resources, we will identify and
+prioritize protection for vital space missions supporting national security requirements.
+We will implement cost-effective protection commensurate with threat, system use, and
+impact of loss - applied to each segment of our space systems and supporting
+infrastructure.
+
+To enhance resilience, we will continue to develop mission-effective alternatives,
+including land, sea, air, space, and cyber-based alternatives for critical capabilities
+currently delivered primarily through space-based platforms.  In addition, we will
+seek to establish relationships and agreements whereby we can access partner
+capabilities if U.S. systems are degraded or unavailable. We will be prepared to
+use these capabilities to ensure the timely continuity of services in a degraded
+space environment.
+
+Preparing for attacks must extend to the people and processes relying on space information, operating our space systems, and analyzing space-derived information.  We will improve the ability of U.S. military and intelligence agencies to operate in a denied or degraded space environment through focused education, training, and exercises and through new doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).
+
+
+## Implementation
+
+Consistent with the guidance provided by the President in the National Space Policy, DoD and the IC will implement the National Security Space Strategy by using it to inform future planning, programming, acquisition, operations, and analysis guidance. DoD and the IC will work with other U.S. Government agencies and departments, as well as foreign governments and commercial partners, to update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of U.S. power.  We will evolve policies, strategies, and doctrine pertaining to national security space. Implementation plans will be developed based on feasibility and affordability assessments and cost, benefit, and risk analyses.  Further, the impact of plans on manning, operations, and programs will be understood prior to implementation.  As stated in the National Security Strategy, our ability to achieve long-term goals for space depends upon our fiscal responsibility and making tough choices, such as between capability and survivability.
+
+## Conclusion - A New Type Of Leadership
+
+"Our national security strategy is, therefore, focused on renewing
+American leadership so that we can more effectively advance our
+interests in the 21st century.  We will do so by building on the sources
+of our strength at home, while shaping an international order that can
+meet the challenges of our time."
+                    - 2010 National Security Strategy
+
+The United States will retain leadership in space by strengthening our posture at home and collaborating with others worldwide.  Just as U.S. national security is built upon maintaining strategic advantages, it is also increasingly predicated on active U.S. leadership of alliance and coalition efforts in peacetime, crisis, and conflict.
+Active U.S. leadership in space requires a whole-of-government approach that integrates all elements of national power, from technological prowess and industrial capacity to alliance building and diplomatic engagement.  Leadership cannot be predicated on declaratory policy alone.  It must build upon a willingness to maintain strategic advantages while working with the international community to develop collective norms, share information, and collaborate on capabilities. U.S. leadership in space can help the United States and our partners address the challenges posed by a space domain that is increasingly congested, contested, and competitive.  Our strategy seeks to address this new environment through its set of interrelated approaches:
+
+- We seek to address *congestion* by establishing norms, enhancing space situational
+awareness, and fostering greater transparency and information sharing.  Our
+words and deeds should reassure our allies and the world at large of our intent to act peacefully and responsibly in space and encourage others to do the same.
+- We seek to address the *contested* environment with a multilayered deterrence
+approach.  We will support establishing international norms and transparency and
+confidence-building measures in space, primarily to promote spaceflight safety but also to dissuade and impose international costs on aggressive behavior.  We
+will improve and protect vital U.S. space capabilities while using interoperability,
+compatibility, and integration to create coalitions and alliances of responsible space-faring nations.  We will improve our capability to attribute attacks and seek
+to deny meaningful operational benefits from such attacks.  We will retain the
+right and capabilities to respond in self-defense, should deterrence fail.
+- We seek to address *competition* by enhancing our own capabilities, improving our
+acquisition processes, fostering a healthy U.S. industrial base, and strengthening collaboration and cooperation.
+Our objectives are to improve safety, stability, and security in space; to maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by space; and to energize the space industrial base that supports U.S. national security.  Achieving these objectives will mean not only that our military and intelligence communities can continue to use space for national security purposes, but that a community of nations is working toward creating a sustainable and peaceful space environment to benefit the world for years to come.

markdown/misc/oge-cia.md

@@ -0,0 +1,202 @@
+# ~ Office Of Government Ethics
+
+fJ 1201 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 500
+"'~ Washington, DC 20005-3917
+
+# -I>.,Y1\Fen'T ~
+
+July 27,2010
+Tracking No.: OGE FOIA FY 10/59 (admin. appeal of FY 10/52)
+The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) has reviewed its initial determination in response to your July 9, 2010 administrative appeal under the Freedom of Information Act
+(FOIA).
+
+Upon review, OGE is providing an unredacted copy of the record you requested, specifically the Letter for Steven G. Bradbury, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, from Marilyn L. Glynn, General Counsel, OGE (February 9,2006).
+
+The official responsible for this FOIA determination is the undersigned. This constitutes the final OGE action on your July 12,2010 FOIA request as administratively appealed.
+
+DonW.Fox General Counsel Enclosure
+
+# Unired Srates ~ Office Of Government Ethics
+
+1201 New York Avenue, NW, Suire 500
+Washington, DC 20005-3917
+February 9, 2006
+Steven G. Bradbury Acting Assistant Attorney General Office of Legal Counsel Department of Justice Washington, DC 20530
+Dear Mr. Bradbury:
+This is in response to the request of your office for the views of the Office of Government Ethics (OGE) with respect to a recent letter from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) seeking a legal opinion.
+
+The CIA letter, dated February 2,
+2006, disagrees with an interpretation of 18 U.S.C.
+
+ 207(c) that is reflected in OGE Informal Advisory Letter 03 x 9 as well as in oral advice that OGE provided to the CIA last year.
+
+Specifically, OGE
+has advised that
+18
+U.S.C.
+
+
+207(c)
+applies to representational contacts with employees of an individual's former agency, even if those employees are serving on a detail to another agency in which the individual did not serve.
+
+The CIA argues that section 207(c)
+applie~ only to contacts with an individual's own former agency, which does not include contacts by a former CIA
+employee with current CIA
+employees who are serving on detail to another agency in the Intelligence Community.
+
+In our view, this conclusion would be inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statute.
+
+In the first place, section 207 (c) is not written in terms of a bar on contacts with the individual's former "agency."
+Rather, the statute covers contacts with
+"any officer or employee" of the individual's former agency, in connection with any matter in which the individual seeks official action by "any officer or employee" of the former agency.
+
+The CIA does not dispute that its detailees remain CIA employees.
+
+Therefore, as long as a former senior CIA employee is contacting a current CIA
+employee and is seeking official action from a current CIA
+employee, it does not appear relevant, under the terms of the statute, whether the current CIA employee is serving on a detail to another agency.
+
+This conclusion follows from the unambiguous language of section 207 (c) itself, even apart from the special provision on detailees found in 18 U.S.C.  207(g)
+1
+Section 207 (g)
+confirms this conclusion.
+
+This provision states that detailees from one agency to another agency are deemed employees of both for the duration of the detail.
+
+Thus, applying the plain meaning of this provision, a contact with a current CIA employee on detail to another agency would be deemed a contact with an employee of both the CIA and the other agency at the same time.
+
+The CIA argues that section 207(g) should be read as being applicable only for the purpose of determining what is a former senior employee's former agency.
+
+However, section 207(g) begins rr [f) or purposes of this section, rr i. e. , for purposes of section 207 generally, not just for one limited purpose.
+
+The CIA also points to another provision, section 207 (i) (1), which defines
+"officer or employee"
+for the specific purpose of specifying when the President, Vice President and Members of Congress may not be contacted, under various provisions of section 207; the CIA suggests that if Congress had intended to include detailees among those who could not be contacted in certain circumstances, Congress would have addressed the subject likewise in section 207 (i) .
+
+Apart from the fact that section
+207 (i) (1)
+addresses a very spe~ific and unique issue that is irrelevant to the subject of detailees -- i.e., the coverage of conticts with elected officials who generalli are not treated as officers or employees under the conflict of interest laws, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
+
+
+202 (c)
+it also is significant that the provision uses the phrase "shall include," which usually i~
+not a term of limitation. See Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction 231
+(2000).
+
+Moreover, Congress would have had no reason to include the detailee language in a provision, such as section 207(i) (1), that is limited to the meaning of officer or
+1 We note the CIA's secondary argument that its details are so unique that they do not really constitute details within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
+
+
+207 (g).
+
+Even if this argument were correct (which is by no means apparent to OGE) , it would not change the fact that the CIA detailees remain CIA employees.
+
+The plain meaning of section 207(c), therefore, still would prohibi t a former senior employee of the CIA from contacting these current CIA employees in connection with a matter in which the former employee seeks official action from a current CIF~
+employee, without regard to the operation of section 207(g).
+
+be of the sole purpose of specifying who may not it were Congress' intent to address the status all purposes under section 207.
+
+employee for contacted, if detailees for The CIA also argues that its interpretation is supported by the legislative history and purposes of section 207.
+
+In our view, however, the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, as described above.
+
+There is, therefore, no need either to resort to the legislative history or to engage in the exercise of discerning which interpretation best serves the various purposes that have been ascribed to section 207
+by: various sources over the years.
+
+See,~, United States v. Medico Indus., Inc., 784 F.2d 840, 844 (1986)
+(section 207 grew out of certain legislative concerns "but is not limited to themn).
+
+Nevertheless, we db believe that aGE's view is more consistent with the legislative history of the statute.
+
+Prior to 1989, the CIA's arguments would have had more force.
+
+The statute then applied only to particular matters that were
+"pendingn before the individual's former "department or agencyn or in which the fo~mer "department or agency" at least had "a direct and substantial interest."
+However, section 207 (c)
+was amended by the Ethics Reform Act of 1989, largely in response to the Nofziger case, in which the defendant argued that he lacked knowledge that his former agency had a direct and substantial interest in a particular matter at the time when he contacted an employee of the agency.
+
+See United States v. Nofziger, 878 F.2d
+442 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
+
+As Senator Levin explained, U[wJe correct that misinterpretation in this bill by including a knowing standard only for the act of making the communication with the intent to influence and state that the offense is committed if the former employee seeks official action by an agency or department employee. n
+135
+Congressional Record S15954
+(November 17, 1989) (emphasis added).
+
+The CIA's interpretation would come close to reinstating the requirement that the matter be pending before the individual's former agency (or at least be one in which the former agency has an interest) r rather than merely a matter in which the individual is seeking action from an employee of the former agency.
+
+We also believe that aGE's interpretation serves the general legislative purpose, identified by the CIA, of preventing misuse of influence or the appearance thereof.
+
+One certainly could envision circumstances in which a former senior CIA employee might have the opportunity to use his or her former position to influence a current CIA
+employee on detail to another agency in the Intelligence Community.
+
+A former CIA
+official undoubtedly is more likely than a member of the general public to know current CIA employees on detail, or at least to have a common network of CIA associates. 2
+Moreover, one could anticipate situations in which a current CIA detailee would be inclined, consciously or unconsciously, to accord greater weight or attention to the views of someone whose credentials include recent service in a senior CIA position.
+
+The CIA cites also the rule of lenity in support of a narrower reading of the statute.
+
+However, it does not appear to us that the rule of lenity is applicable here.
+
+As described above, we believe OGE' s view is compelled by the unambiguous language of the statute, and is consistent with the history and purposes of the statute.
+
+Consequently, there is "no 'grievous ambigui ty or uncertainty in the language and structure' of the statute" sufficient to invoke the rule of lenity.
+
+16 Op. O.L.C.
+
+59,
+64
+(1992)
+(quoting Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S.
+
+453,
+463 (1991)).
+
+Finally, guidance on the CIA argues that this subject in the the lack of express OGE
+past supports the CIA's
+2
+CIA states that it is "unlikely" that former senior CIA
+employees would know whether an employee at another agency happens to be a CIA detailee.
+
+We are in no position to guess how likely it is that a former senior CIA employee would know whether a particular official at another agency in the Intelligence Community is a CIA detailee.
+
+When the CIA first consulted with OGE about this question, we were advised that CIA
+detailees wore badges clearly identifying them as CIA employees, even" while they were on detail; more recently, however, we were advised that the Intelligence Community is moving to a single badge system for employees of various agencies, so it will no longer be possible to distinguish CIA detailees by their badges.
+
+Apart (rom any such factual circumstances I
+however, it is not clear that section 207 (c)
+even would apply to situations in which the" former CIA senior employee does not know that the person he or she is contacting at another agency is actually a CIA
+detailee.
+
+Despite the post-Nofziger amendments, section 207(c) still reads,
+"any person who knowingly makes, with the intent to influence, any communication to" or appearance before any officer or employee of the department or agency in which such person served" (emphasis added).
+
+interpretation.
+
+The simple answer is that OGE did not find it necessary to address this subject in writing until we were presented with the question, posed by a private attorney, in
+03 x 9.
+
+Until contacted by the CIA concerning this question in the Fall of 2005, we were not aware that any agency was advising former senior employees that they could contact agency employees on detail to another agency.
+
+In conclusion, we commend the CIA
+for promptly disseminating new guidance to its employees once the agency determined that prior guidance was inconsistent with 03 x 9.
+
+We also appreciate the difficulties faced by the agency, especially given its extensive use of details.
+
+Nevertheless, we are convinced that the plain meaning of section 207(c)
+and
+(g)
+cannot.support the CIA's preferred interpretation.
+
+If you have any questions concerning this matter, feel free to contact me, at 202-482-9292, or Rick Thomas of -my staff, at
+202-482-9278.
+
+Sincerely,
+~(--'l~
+~
+Marilyn L. Glynn General Counsel RThomas/RT (fw)\
+CN 4-4
+AG 1-42
+AGt~-29
+Reaa File Doug Chapman Patricia Franklin
+~arilyn Bennett

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+(U//FOUO) Rightwing Extremism:
+Current Economic and Political
+Climate Fueling Resurgence in
+Radicalization and Recruitment
+
+IA-0257-09
+
+(U//FOUO)  Rightwing Extremism: Current Economic and Political Climate Fueling Resurgence in Radicalization and Recruitment
+7 April 2009
+(U)  Prepared by the Extremism and Radicalization Branch, Homeland Environment Threat Analysis Division.  Coordinated with the FBI.
+
+
+(U)  Scope (U//FOUO)  This product is one of a series of intelligence assessments published by the Extremism and Radicalization Branch to facilitate a greater understanding of the phenomenon of violent radicalization in the United States.  The information is provided to federal, state, local, and tribal counterterrorism and law enforcement officials so they may effectively deter, prevent, preempt, or respond to terrorist attacks against the United States.  Federal efforts to influence domestic public opinion must be conducted in an overt and transparent manner, clearly identifying United States Government sponsorship.
+
+should be released to the media, the general public, or over non-secure Internet servers.  Release of this information could adversely affect or jeopardize
+
+(U)  Key Findings (U//LES)  The DHS/Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) has no specific
+information that domestic rightwing* terrorists are currently planning acts of violence,
+but rightwing extremists may be gaining new recruits by playing on their fears about several emergent issues.  The economic downturn and the election of the first African American president present unique drivers for rightwing radicalization and recruitment.
+- (U//LES)  Threats from white supremacist and violent antigovernment groups
+during 2009 have been largely rhetorical and have not indicated plans to carry out violent acts.  Nevertheless, the consequences of a prolonged economic
+downturnincluding real estate foreclosures, unemployment, and an inability
+to obtain creditcould create a fertile recruiting environment for rightwing extremists and even result in confrontations between such groups and government authorities similar to those in the past.
+
+- (U//LES)  Rightwing extremists have capitalized on the election of the first
+African American president, and are focusing their efforts to recruit new members, mobilize existing supporters, and broaden their scope and appeal through propaganda, but they have not yet turned to attack planning. (U//FOUO)  The current economic and political climate has some similarities to the
+1990s when rightwing extremism experienced a resurgence fueled largely by an economic recession, criticism about the outsourcing of jobs, and the perceived threat to U.S. power and sovereignty by other foreign powers.
+- (U//FOUO)  During the 1990s, these issues contributed to the growth in the
+number of domestic rightwing terrorist and extremist groups and an increase in violent acts targeting government facilities, law enforcement officers, banks, and infrastructure sectors.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Growth of these groups subsided in reaction to increased
+government scrutiny as a result of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and
+disrupted plots, improvements in the economy, and the continued U.S. standing
+as the preeminent world power. (U//FOUO)  The possible passage of new restrictions on firearms and the return of military veterans facing significant challenges reintegrating into their communities could lead to the potential emergence of terrorist groups or lone wolf extremists capable of carrying out violent attacks.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Proposed imposition of firearms restrictions and weapons bans
+likely would attract new members into the ranks of rightwing extremist groups, as well as potentially spur some of them to begin planning and training for violence against the government.  The high volume of purchases and stockpiling of weapons and ammunition by rightwing extremists in anticipation of restrictions and bans in some parts of the country continue to be a primary
+concern to law enforcement.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Returning veterans possess combat skills and experience that are
+attractive to rightwing extremists.  DHS/I&A is concerned that rightwing
+extremists will attempt to recruit and radicalize returning veterans in order to boost their violent capabilities.
+(U)  Current Economic and Political Climate (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that a number of economic and political factors are
+driving a resurgence in rightwing extremist recruitment and radicalization activity. Despite similarities to the climate of the 1990s, the threat posed by lone wolves and small
+terrorist cells is more pronounced than in past years.  In addition, the historical election of an African American president and the prospect of policy changes are proving to be a driving force for rightwing extremist recruitment and radicalization.
+- (U)  A recent example of the potential violence associated with a rise in rightwing
+extremism may be found in the shooting deaths of three police officers in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on 4 April 2009.  The alleged gunman's reaction reportedly was influenced by his racist ideology and belief in antigovernment
+conspiracy theories related to gun confiscations, citizen detention camps, and a Jewish-controlled "one world government."
+
+(U)  Exploiting Economic Downturn (U//FOUO)  Rightwing extremist chatter on the Internet continues to focus on the economy, the perceived loss of U.S. jobs in the manufacturing and construction sectors, and home foreclosures.  Anti-Semitic extremists attribute these losses to a deliberate
+conspiracy conducted by a cabal of Jewish "financial elites."  These "accusatory" tactics are employed to draw new recruits into rightwing extremist groups and further radicalize
+those already subscribing to extremist beliefs.  DHS/I&A assesses this trend is likely to accelerate if the economy is perceived to worsen.
+(U)  Historical Presidential Election (U//LES)  Rightwing extremists are harnessing this historical election as a recruitment tool.  Many rightwing extremists are antagonistic toward the new presidential administration and its perceived stance on a range of issues, including immigration and citizenship, the expansion of social programs to minorities, and restrictions on firearms
+ ownership and use.  Rightwing extremists are increasingly galvanized by these concerns and leverage them as drivers for recruitment.  From the 2008 election timeframe to the present, rightwing extremists have capitalized on related racial and political prejudices in expanded propaganda campaigns, thereby reaching out to a wider audience of potential sympathizers.
+
+
+- (U//LES)  Most statements by rightwing extremists have been rhetorical, expressing concerns about the election of the first African American president, but stopping short of calls for violent action.  In two instances in the run-up to the election, extremists appeared to be in the early planning stages of some threatening activity targeting the Democratic nominee, but law enforcement interceded.
+
+
+(U)  Revisiting the 1990s
+
+(U//FOUO)  Paralleling the current national climate, rightwing extremists during the 1990s exploited a variety of social issues and political themes to increase group visibility and recruit new members.  Prominent among these themes were the militia movement's opposition to gun control efforts, criticism of free trade agreements (particularly those with Mexico), and highlighting perceived government infringement on civil liberties as well as white supremacists' longstanding exploitation of social issues such as abortion, inter-racial crimes, and same-sex marriage.  During the 1990s, these issues contributed to the growth in the number of domestic rightwing terrorist and extremist groups and an increase in violent acts targeting government facilities, law enforcement officers, banks, and infrastructure sectors.
+
+(U)  Economic Hardship and Extremism
+
+(U//FOUO)  Historically, domestic rightwing extremists have feared, predicted, and anticipated a cataclysmic economic collapse in the United States.  Prominent antigovernment conspiracy theorists have incorporated aspects of an impending economic collapse to intensify fear and paranoia among like-minded individuals and to attract recruits during times of economic uncertainty.  Conspiracy theories involving declarations of martial law, impending civil strife or racial conflict, suspension of the U.S. Constitution, and the creation of citizen detention camps often incorporate aspects of a failed economy.  Antigovernment conspiracy theories and "end times" prophecies could motivate extremist individuals and groups to stockpile food, ammunition, and weapons. These teachings also have been linked with the radicalization of domestic extremist individuals and groups in the past, such as violent Christian Identity organizations and extremist members of the militia movement.
+
+
+(U//FOUO)  Perceptions on Poverty and Radicalization (U//FOUO)  Scholars and experts disagree over poverty's role in motivating violent radicalization or terrorist activity.  High unemployment, however, has the potential to lead to alienation, thus increasing an individual's susceptibility to extremist ideas.  According to a 2007 study from the German Institute for Economic Research, there appears to be a strong association between a parent's unemployment status and the formation of rightwing extremist beliefs in their childrenspecifically xenophobia and antidemocratic ideals.
+
+(U)  Illegal Immigration (U//FOUO)  Rightwing extremists were concerned during the 1990s with the perception
+that illegal immigrants were taking away American jobs through their willingness to work at significantly lower wages.  They also opposed free trade agreements, arguing that these arrangements resulted in Americans losing jobs to countries such as Mexico. (U//FOUO)  Over the past five years, various rightwing extremists, including militias and white supremacists, have adopted the immigration issue as a call to action, rallying point,
+and recruiting tool.  Debates over appropriate immigration levels and enforcement policy
+generally fall within the realm of protected political speech under the First Amendment,
+but in some cases, anti-immigration or strident pro-enforcement fervor has been directed
+against specific groups and has the potential to turn violent. (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that rightwing extremist groups' frustration over a
+perceived lack of government action on illegal immigration has the potential to incite individuals or small groups toward violence.  If such violence were to occur, it likely would be isolated, small-scale, and directed at specific immigration-related targets.
+- (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A notes that prominent civil rights organizations have
+observed an increase in anti-Hispanic crimes over the past five years.
+
+- (U)  In April 2007, six militia members were arrested for various weapons and
+explosives violations.  Open source reporting alleged that those arrested had discussed and conducted surveillance for a machinegun attack on Hispanics.
+
+- (U)  A militia member in Wyoming was arrested in February 2007 after
+communicating his plans to travel to the Mexican border to kill immigrants
+crossing into the United States.
+
+(U)  Legislative and Judicial Drivers (U//FOUO)  Many rightwing extremist groups perceive recent gun control legislation as a
+threat to their right to bear arms and in response have increased weapons and ammunition stockpiling, as well as renewed participation in paramilitary training exercises.  Such activity, combined with a heightened level of extremist paranoia, has the potential to facilitate criminal activity and violence.
+- (U//FOUO)  During the 1990s, rightwing extremist hostility toward government
+was fueled by the implementation of restrictive gun lawssuch as the Brady Law that established a 5-day waiting period prior to purchasing a handgun and the
+1994 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act that limited the sale of various types of assault riflesand federal law enforcement's handling of the confrontations at Waco, Texas and Ruby Ridge, Idaho.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  On the current front, legislation has been proposed this year requiring mandatory registration of all firearms in the United States.  Similar legislation was introduced in 2008 in several states proposing mandatory tagging and registration of ammunition.  It is unclear if either bill will be passed into law;
+nonetheless, a correlation may exist between the potential passage of gun control legislation and increased hoarding of ammunition, weapons stockpiling, and paramilitary training activities among rightwing extremists. (U//FOUO)  Open source reporting of wartime ammunition shortages has likely spurred rightwing extremistsas well as law-abiding Americansto make bulk purchases of ammunition.  These shortages have increased the cost of ammunition, further exacerbating rightwing extremist paranoia and leading to further stockpiling activity.
+Both rightwing extremists and law-abiding citizens share a belief that rising crime rates attributed to a slumping economy make the purchase of legitimate firearms a wise move at this time. (U//FOUO)  Weapons rights and gun-control legislation are likely to be hotly contested subjects of political debate in light of the 2008 Supreme Court's decision in District of Columbia v. Heller in which the Court reaffirmed an individual's right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, but left open to debate the precise contours of that right.  Because debates over constitutional rights are intense, and parties on all sides have deeply held, sincere, but vastly divergent beliefs, violent extremists may attempt to co-opt the debate and use the controversy as a radicalization tool.
+
+(U)  Perceived Threat from Rise of Other Countries (U//FOUO)  Rightwing extremist paranoia of foreign regimes could escalate or be magnified in the event of an economic crisis or military confrontation, harkening back to the "New World Order" conspiracy theories of the 1990s.  The dissolution of Communist countries in Eastern Europe and the end of the Soviet Union in the 1990s led some rightwing extremists to believe that a "New World Order" would bring about a world government that would usurp the sovereignty of the United States and its Constitution, thus infringing upon their liberty.  The dynamics in 2009 are somewhat similar, as other countries, including China, India, and Russia, as well as some smaller, oil-producing states, are experiencing a rise in economic power and influence.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Fear of Communist regimes and related conspiracy theories characterizing the U.S. Government's role as either complicit in a foreign invasion or acquiescing as part of a "One World Government" plan inspired extremist members of the militia movement to target government and military facilities in past years.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Law enforcement in 1996 arrested three rightwing militia members in Battle Creek, Michigan with pipe bombs, automatic weapons, and military
+
+ordnance that they planned to use in attacks on nearby military and federal facilities and infrastructure targets.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Rightwing extremist views bemoan the decline of U.S. stature and
+have recently focused on themes such as the loss of U.S. manufacturing capability to China and India, Russia's control of energy resources and use of these to pressure other countries, and China's investment in U.S. real estate and corporations as a part of subversion strategy.
+
+(U)  Disgruntled Military Veterans (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that rightwing extremists will attempt to recruit and radicalize returning veterans in order to exploit their skills and knowledge derived from military training and combat.  These skills and knowledge have the potential to boost the capabilities of extremistsincluding lone wolves or small terrorist cellsto carry out violence.  The willingness of a small percentage of military personnel to join extremist groups during the 1990s because they were disgruntled, disillusioned, or suffering from the psychological effects of war is being replicated today.
+- (U)  After Operation Desert Shield/Storm in 1990-1991, some returning military
+veteransincluding Timothy McVeighjoined or associated with rightwing
+extremist groups.
+
+-  (U)  A prominent civil rights organization reported in 2006 that "large numbers
+of potentially violent neo-Nazis, skinheads, and other white supremacists are now
+learning the art of warfare in the [U.S.] armed forces."
+
+- (U//LES)  The FBI noted in a 2008 report on the white supremacist movement
+that some returning military veterans from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have joined extremist groups.
+
+(U//FOUO)  Lone Wolves and Small Terrorist Cells (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that lone wolves and small terrorist cells embracing violent rightwing extremist ideology are the most dangerous domestic terrorism threat in the United States.  Information
+from law enforcement and nongovernmental organizations indicates lone wolves and small terrorist cells have shown intentand, in some cases, the capabilityto commit violent acts.
+- (U//LES)  DHS/I&A has concluded that white supremacist lone wolves pose the most
+significant domestic terrorist threat because of their low profile and autonomyseparate from any formalized groupwhich hampers warning efforts.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Similarly, recent state and municipal law enforcement reporting has warned of the
+dangers of rightwing extremists embracing the tactics of "leaderless resistance" and of lone
+wolves carrying out acts of violence.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Arrests in the past several years of radical militia members in Alabama, Arkansas,
+and Pennsylvania on firearms, explosives, and other related violations indicates the emergence of small, well-armed extremist groups in some rural areas.
+(U)  Outlook (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A assesses that the combination of environmental factors that echo the 1990s, including heightened interest in legislation for tighter firearms restrictions and returning military veterans, as well as several new trends, including an uncertain economy and a perceived rising influence of other countries, may be invigorating rightwing extremist activity, specifically the white supremacist and militia movements. To the extent that these factors persist, rightwing extremism is likely to grow in strength. (U//FOUO)  Unlike the earlier period, the advent of the Internet and other informationage technologies since the 1990s has given domestic extremists greater access to information related to bomb-making, weapons training, and tactics, as well as targeting of
+individuals, organizations, and facilities, potentially making extremist individuals and
+groups more dangerous and the consequences of their violence more severe.  New technologies also permit domestic extremists to send and receive encrypted communications and to network with other extremists throughout the country and abroad, making it much more difficult for law enforcement to deter, prevent, or preempt a violent extremist attack. (U//FOUO)  A number of law enforcement actions and external factors were effective in limiting the militia movement during the 1990s and could be utilized in today's climate.
+- (U//FOUO)  Following the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah federal
+building in Oklahoma City, the militia movement declined in total membership and in the number of organized groups because many members distanced
+themselves from the movement as a result of the intense scrutiny militias received
+after the bombing.
+
+-  (U//FOUO)  Militia membership continued to decline after the turn of the
+millennium as a result of law enforcement disruptions of multiple terrorist plots linked to violent rightwing extremists, new legislation banning paramilitary training, and militia frustration that the "revolution" never materialized.
+
+- (U//FOUO)  Although the U.S. economy experienced a significant recovery and
+many perceived a concomitant rise in U.S. standing in the world,  white
+supremacist groups continued to experience slight growth. (U//FOUO)  DHS/I&A will be working with its state and local partners over the next
+several months to ascertain with greater regional specificity the rise in rightwing extremist activity in the United States, with a particular emphasis on the political,
+economic, and social factors that drive rightwing extremist radicalization.
+(U)  Reporting Notice: (U)  DHS encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to DHS and the FBI.  The DHS National Operations Center (NOC) can be reached by telephone at
+202-282-9685 or by e-mail at NOC.Fusion@dhs.gov.  For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC.  The NICC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9201 or by e-mail at NICC@dhs.gov.  The FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm.  When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact. (U)  For comments or questions related to the content or dissemination of this document, please contact the DHS/I&A Production Branch at IA.PM@hq.dhs.gov, IA.PM@dhs.sgov.gov, or IA.PM@dhs.ic.gov. (U)  **Tracked by:** CRIM-040300-01-05, CRIM-040400-01-05, TERR-010000-01-05

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+## Strategic Influence Operations - The Information Connection
+
+by COL BRAD M. WARD
+UNITED STATES ARMY
+The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.
+
+U.S. Army War College CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013
+
+## Report Documentation Page
+
+Public reporting burder for this collection of information is estibated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burder to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.
+
+1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 07-04-2003
+
+| 2. REPORT TYPE                                              |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------|
+| xx-xx-2002 to xx-xx-2003                                    |
+| 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE                                       |
+| Strategic Influence Operations - The Information Connection |
+| Unclassified                                                |
+| 6. AUTHOR(S)                                                |
+| Ward, Brad M. ; Author                                      |
+| 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS                 |
+| U.S. Army War College                                       |
+| Carlisle Barracks                                           |
+| Carlisle, PA17013-5050                                      |
+| 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS            |
+| ,                                                           |
+| 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT                     |
+| APUBLIC RELEASE                                             |
+| ,                                                           |
+| 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES                                     |
+| 14. ABSTRACT                                                |
+| See attached file.                                          |
+| 15. SUBJECT TERMS                                           |
+| 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:                             |
+| 17. LIMITATION                                              |
+| OF ABSTRACT                                                 |
+| Same as Report                                              |
+| (SAR)                                                       |
+| a. REPORT                                                   |
+| Unclassified                                                |
+| b. ABSTRACT                                                 |
+| Unclassified                                                |
+| c. THIS PAGE                                                |
+| Unclassified                                                |
+| 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER                                         |
+| 5b. GRANT NUMBER                                            |
+| 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER                                  |
+| 5d. PROJECT NUMBER                                          |
+| 5e. TASK NUMBER                                             |
+| 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER                                        |
+| 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT                           |
+| NUMBER                                                      |
+| 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S)                            |
+| 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT                                |
+| NUMBER(S)                                                   |
+| 19. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON                              |
+| Rife, Dave                                                  |
+| RifeD@awc.carlisle.army.mil                                 |
+| 18.                                                         |
+| NUMBER                                                      |
+| OF PAGES                                                    |
+| 41                                                          |
+| 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER                                       |
+| International Area Code                                     |
+| Area Code Telephone Number                                  |
+| DSN                                                         |
+
+Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
+Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39.18
+
+## Abstract
+
+AUTHOR:
+COL Brad M. Ward
+TITLE: Strategic Influence Operations - The Information Connection FORMAT:
+Strategy Research Project
+DATE:
+07 April 2003
+  PAGES: 41
+CLASSIFICATION:  Unclassified
+The intent of this paper is to analyze and highlight the U.S. government's (USG) current approach to conducting strategic influence operations within the international envrionment. Strategic influence is the confluence of information entities integrated withing the interagency integration process concerning public diplomacy, public affairs and international military information (DOD Psychological Operations).  Specifically, this paper will conduct a comparative analysis of the fundamental approaches that the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), and the National Security Council/White House (NSC/WH) utilize internationally, and provide recommendations that magnifies informational techniques to further U.S. strategic objectives.
+
+## Preface
+
+This paper is a culmination of a life-long project to increase our countries influence capability abroad, through peacetime and crisis.  It became more focused when I was provided the opportunity to serve as the senior military advisor to the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and specifically to serve on the Presidentially mandated International Public Information Secretariat from 1999 through 2002. Over the past three years, the concept for strategic influence has matured and has begun to orchestrate the synergy required to further promote and explain our national goals and objectives to foreign audiences.
+
+I would like to thank William V. Parker and the members of the Department of State's International Public Information Secretariat for providing me the opportunity to expand my professional horizons and personal experience in the world of "Washington Beltway" politics and international public diplomacy.  Thanks are also due to all the former members of the Department of Defense's Office of Strategic Influence and specifically to BG Simon P. Worden for developing a strategic vision that created a safer America through the use of information and technology, and for his professional bravery in attempting to execute this strategy. Special kudos to Reggie Brown and members of the NIC's Perception Management Threat Panel; you did great work; hopefully someone will listen and learn. Special thanks to Mr. Frank Jones and the professionals within ASD-SOLIC for providing me the opportunity to experience strategic reality first hand. Thanks to COL (R) Tom Timmes, the U.S. government's premiere functional expert and historian on psychological and influence operations, for his knowledge and tutelage on the interagency process. Finally, I owe a special dept of gratitude to my wife Janet for putting up with my idiosyncrasies, terrible work hours and months deployed away from home.
+
+## Strategic Influence - The Information Connection Introduction
+
+There is a battle in progress that is far subtler than strategic bombing missions, commando direct action raids against Al Qa 'ida camps or the partisan political wrangling connected to America's global war on terrorism. This battle is the "war of the words," which is designed to capture the minds of the world's citizenry, influence their attitudes and behaviors and produce responses favorable to U.S. policy. In this world of globalization and instantaneous data dissemination, it is often said the human mind "has no firewall."1 But in reality, there is a wall dividing the perceptions and beliefs of the West verses those of emerging nations, failing states and the radical Islamists from the Middle East/North Africa, Southwest Asia and the Pacific.  America is losing this "war of the words" because of our overdependence on technology, inability or interest to understand the ethnic driving forces and motivations of nonwestern populations and cultures, and our domestic culture of political correctness.  These shortfalls, coupled with a consensus-based, lethargic governmental process have resulted in ineffective governmental guidelines and "cookie-cutting" procedures that favor short-term, politically acceptable techniques and informational responses.
+
+American leaders, in concert with our British allies, are working with the United Nations to develop and maintain favorable attitudes abroad concerning U.S. and coalition military actions in Afghanistan and other parts of the world.  Concurrently, the U.S. government is attempting to execute other national priorities such as potential regime change and disarmament in Iraq and a National Missile Defense System as well as minimize potential hostilities on the Korean peninsula simultaneously. But does our government have the political will and possess the informational capability to develop, coordinate, synchronize and then explain our national strategy to the world with favorable results, much less enter into an adversary's information decision cycle to minimize hostile acts against the United States?
+
+This paper will address and compare historical and current informational and influence programs; examine the structures and inter-governmental approaches to strategic influence;
+and argue that their enduring values may not remain valid. It will conclude by discussing the derivative of strategic influence for the future.
+
+## Background
+
+Strategic influence operations have historically been a government's ability to further its national strategic goals and objectives internationally through an integrated, synchronized and Interagency-vetted information campaign using the tools of public diplomacy, public affairs and international Military Information (DoD Psychological Operations) as its media. This has been undertaken within the framework of the National Security Council and the Departments of Defense and State.  In our American form of democracy, strategic influence is and will remain the inherent responsibility of the President of the United States and his appointed cabinet to craft and execute the "U.S. Grand Strategy" directed at influencing foreign target audiences. This "Grand Strategy" is a combination of domestic and international objectives designed to accomplish both short and long-term policy objectives.
+
+Since the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001 (9-11), the United States has had to restructure its global strategy, transitioning to a "capabilities based approach."2 Most significantly, the previous U.S. threat based strategy, has proved lacking due to the asymmetric threats posed by non-state actors who have demonstrated and continue to demonstrate that traditional diplomatic means and previously valued methods of deterrence are ineffective3 in ensuring American and allied security. In assessing our capabilities, the National Intelligence Community (NIC) and principally, Department of State's Office of Strategic Communication (OSC), has determined that the U.S. is severely lacking in the area of information and influence operations with respect to three major areas:  its ability to develop systematic informational approaches with central control and functional leadership; its ability to integrate technological innovations within government; and a dedicated interagency analytical structure or fusion cell with a dissemination capability.
+
+Most importantly, the USG lacks the political will to establish a single organization designed to serve as the conduit for USG informational policy development and dissemination within the globalized environment.  These critical shortfalls have become more visible since 9- 11 and the USG is attempting to correct these weaknesses through bold interagency coordination efforts and the establishment of a central communication mechanism. The nexus for these initiatives is the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC)
+within the National Security Council system, which tasked with analyzing and developing proactive a series of programmatic responses in support of the President's policies.
+
+In the 2002 National Security Strategy, President Bush highlighted that "the gravest threat our nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology.4" (WAYS) As the interagency process restructures and organizes for the War on Terrorism, it is essential that the USG review its capabilities and establish a doctrinal approach for information development and dissemination. Presently, the SCPPC has established a combined fusion cell which integrates various agencies' (State, Defense, CIA, USAID) analytical capabilities to conduct appropriate levels of target audience analysis prior to campaign and product development.  The fusion cell is chartered to develop both short and long-term informational based programs in support of current policy. These product based programs are then integrated into a synchronized informational strategy where key leaders provide information to domestic and foreign target audiences utilizing full spectrum media.  The key to success for future informational programs will be its analytical basis using a metric based approach for measuring of effectiveness both domestically and abroad.
+
+The U.S. government has had limited strategic and operational informational successes in promoting its policies on the War on Terrorism internationally.  Those successes is has had have been when the interagency was able to completely integrate policy goals and objectives into a single information campaign, collectively executed within a specific timeline. While emphasis is being placed on establishing an operational capability within the SCPCC and Office of Global Communication-Coalition Information Center (OGC-CIC), certain key communicators within the interagency as still satisfied with the "status quo" and are reluctant to give up their limited power base.  During the President's State of the Union address on 3 February 2003, he highlighted specific funding which should address some of the shortfalls mentioned in this paper. One of the essential steps mentioned was allocating $3.384 billion to be used for such programs as hiring additional personnel, improving information technology and additional funding for educational and cultural exchange programs.  Additionally, $565.5 million will be allocated to the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG), including $30 million to initiate a new Arabic-language satellite TV network to counter the effects of Al Jazerra and other Islamic media.
+
+The following sections will provide a historical prospective of information procedures within the USG, discuss control mechanisms and then touch upon current informational initiatives.
+
+## Historical Attempts At National-Level Information Coordination
+
+Between World War I and 1986, there were, at least six instances where the USG created national level Information or Influence type committees. "Communicators, unlike most military leaders, understood World War I was a totally new mechanized, mass conflict, requiring the use of mass communications to succeed.  Populations were mobilized and, "taught" to hate the enemy, and respond emotionally to atrocities, even if invented or exaggerated. Domestic and international opinion would be molded following the declaration of war in April 1917; President Woodrow Wilson authorized the Committee of Public Information, more popularly known as the Creel Committee for its leader George Creel.  Creel's inflammatory efforts and propagandizing rhetoric reshaped American public opinion on Germany, transforming a once highly respected ethnic group into one to be feared, and reviled.  Creel's committee used every means of communications available to shape opinion, as well as to control, centralize, and even censor information (1917-1919).  The committee's objectives were to encourage loyalty and unity at home while promoting understanding and support of U.S. foreign policy objectives abroad.  To accomplish its objectives, the Committee established "country bureaus" to focus its efforts and created numerous overseas offices to distribute literature and audio/visual products. The Committee employed motion pictures, sponsored tours, held mass rallies, and distributed millions of posters, leaflets, newspapers and sign boards. The most famous domestic product of the Creel committee's work was the "four-minute men" program which generated thousands of speeches in public theaters, schools and various organizations across the U.S. reaching an audience in excess of 314 million. 5 The "four minute men" was a series of politically designed speeches and addresses which were designed to garner favorable public opinion and could be completed in four minutes. Criticism of the committee's and Wilson's tactics may be justified, but these techniques proved highly effective in galvanizing forces to defeat the enemy."6
+In 1919, with the end of World War I and the dissolution of the Creel Committee, the first and most ambitious attempt to develop a national security coordination system was proposed by Franklin D. Roosevelt, then Secretary of the Navy. The proposal met a quick death due to bureaucratic infighting and lack of "perceived need" in a time of peace.
+
+Shortly before Pearl Harbor, now President Roosevelt established the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) and designated Colonel William Donovan as its first director. The COI was responsible for espionage, propaganda and subversion.  Colonel Donovan established two separate divisions for his organization: Research and Analysis and Foreign Information Service (FIS). The FIS was a psychological warfare division charged with explaining the objectives and goals of the United States throughout the world with the exception of Latin America.  FIS used information from the wire services on its eleven commercial short-wave radio stations and broadcasted over 300 programs per week into Europe and Asia. In June 1942, the president by executive order dissolved the COI and created the Office of War Information (OWI) and the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Major responsibility for overt psychological warfare shifted to OWI (which later became the United States Information Agency), while responsibility for covert psychological warfare belonged to the OSS - under the control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the war's end, a newly established interagency organization, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee became responsible for psychological warfare policy and planning for peacetime and wartime.7
+Following WW II, with U.S. national strategy transitioning to containment of the Soviet Union, the USG established three overlapping and similar national level boards and Committees that addressed foreign information programs and psychological planning as an outgrowth of the Cold War in general and the Korean War in particular.  The first, the Psychological Operations Coordinating Committee, was established by NSC59/1 in March 1950; the second was the Psychological Strategy Board created by executive order in April 1951 and headed by Mr. Gordon Gray, former Secretary of the Army; and the third was the Operations Coordinating Board which was established by executive order in September 1953 and continued until 1961. All three interagency organizations were responsible for the formulation of policies and plans for a USG information program directed at foreign governments in time of peace and the formulation of policies for a national-level psychological warfare program during peace, crisis, and the initial stages of war. 8
+The conflict in Vietnam spawned no less than four national level psychological operations committees between 1955 and 1972, but the last instance was the short-lived Psychological Operations Committee created in July 1986 by the NSC pursuant to NSDD 130.  The committee was responsible for establishing national psychological operations (PSYOP) guidelines and to define the roles and relationships of the agencies involved.  The committee ceased meeting in early 1987. 9
+
+## Control Of The Informational Environment
+
+Control of the informational environment at the strategic level has always been the critical requirement for our national leaders. These efforts underscore all others in importance at the domestic level and internationally during time of crisis.  Various administrations have attempted to consolidate strategic information into a concise and executable strategy through various presidential directives, National Security Decision Directives (NSDD's), Presidential Decision Directives (PDD's) and most recently, National Security Presidential Directives (NSPD's). Numerous government entities, to include the White House (Executive Office of the President - EOP), National Security Council (NSC), Departments of State, Defense, Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and most recently, the White House's Office of Global Communication (OGC) and Homeland Security, have attempted to establish mechanisms to develop, coordinate, synchronize and execute a proactive multi-dimensional information capability,10 but to no avail.
+
+As the government restructures, it is essential that we review all previous practices, current directives and capabilities concerning the USG's ability to conduct influence operations across the informational spectrum. Primacy of effort must be directed towards effective management within the interagency process, and thereby affect and shape the international information environment to support the U.S. national strategy for the War on Terrorism and beyond.
+
+## Political Realities And Current Initiatives
+
+The U.S. government consists of over forty separate and independent bureaus and agencies; each with separate charters, budgets, agendas, personalities and unique bureaucratic cultures.  These agencies often possess separate and distinct educational and training requirements, promotion criteria for advancement, and, with the exception of the Department of Defense, none attempt to formally initiate their personnel into the interagency process through advanced schooling and assignments.
+
+Is it naive to believe that the U.S. government is incapable of executing an interagency vetted influence campaign?  Is it possible, that the USG is not effective due to long standing bureaucratic ineptitudes, political correctness, historic jealousy or trivial differences between appointed officials?  Throughout the history of our government, key or select communicators have always retained levels of influence not necessarily equal to their rank or position within institutions.  These select individuals will continue to shape the informational environment to either the advancement or detriment of our policies until a formalized process is developed, where analysis is fully considered and integrated throughout the interagency and then executed collectively.
+
+The combination of information development and distribution, social anthropological analysis, technological innovations, and influence present our nation it's most challenging mission in decades.  Since 9-11 we face a paradigm shift, requiring a restructuring of our government's ability to analyze and develop a grand strategy, and then concretize that strategy into concepts and policies designed to deal with the asymmetric challenges presented to us during this time of crisis.  Numerous USG studies, directives and proposed legislation such as the 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Managed Information Dissemination, Congressional proposals such as the Hyde-Lantos bill to provide the U.S. government with an enhanced strategic information and public diplomacy capability, DoD's formation and dissolution the Office of Strategic Influence (OSI) and previously initiated and presently revalidated presidential directives (e.g.,PDD-68,  International Public Information) continue to be inadequately supported.
+
+The following sections will provide a overview concerning the development of the interagency process and briefly discuss current USG organizations and initiatives presently operating today.
+
+## National Security Council
+
+During World War II, President Roosevelt still controlled the information flow and policy development through ad hoc organizations and working groups for policy coordination.  The Congress identified this organizational shortfall and imposed upon President Truman by enacting the National Security Act, a coordination mechanism designed to assist the President in quickly addressing foreign and domestic national security issues.
+
+"There is hereby established a council to be know as the National Security Council...the function of the Council shall be to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security."11
+This act established two separate and distinct entities, the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. The Council's mission was to permanently synchronize and coordinate the USG's national defense and foreign affairs policies through the use of the elements of national power.  While the National Security Council has coordinated policy and provided various levels of oversight, it has never been granted full authority to direct policy independently.
+
+Presently, the National Security Council system consists of the NSC, the Principals Committee (consisting of the National Security Advisor, Secretaries of Defense, State and Treasury, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff and most recently, the Director, Homeland Security), the Deputies Committee (includes the deputies fore mentioned senior officials he feels required for the DC and the Deputy Attorney General, Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, Deputy Chief of Staff to the President for Policy, Chief of Staff to the Vice President and the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs), six regional policy coordinating committees, and eleven functional policy coordinating committees. Most recently, the Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee was formed on 15 September of 2002,.  Under the National Security Presidential Directive -1, each Policy Coordinating Committee will be chaired by an official of Under or Assistant Secretary Rank.
+
+Within all organizations of the NSC system and primarily the Policy Coordinating Committees, the greatest weakness lies in the system's ability to routinely transfer and coordinate information as well as develop a synchronized influence program.  While a department or agency may be assigned to chair a Policy Coordinating Committee, it possesses no tasking authority over the interagency or its resources for the accomplishment of his mission. Simultaneously, the chair may also possess neither tasking nor directive authority within his own organization. The lack of central tasking authority has always presented the greatest challenge for policy implementation. Numerous failures or ineffective actions have occurred when the chair is not capable of gaining or maintaining consensus among the interagency participants.
+
+Secondarily, the chair must understand those capabilities internal to the various bureaus and capitalize on their "intra-agency" strengths and weaknesses.
+
+## Interagency Process
+
+The interagency process provides a means to facilitate policy coordination and development. "The interagency process is designed to ensure that information and options are developed and passed up the line and that decisions and guidance are passed back down to staffs which must write orders and oversee their execution." 12
+Within the U.S. government, the interagency process is a living organism, one which possesses no firm structure or doctrine and occasionally consumes its participants. The process itself is a direct reflection of the President, is emphasis, that is, his level of trust and comfort with the political appointees and his philosophy on government.  Under each administration, governmental agencies are provided general guidance through directives (e.g., PDDs, NSPDs) as to how the President would like national security policy to be conducted.  These documents establish basic guidelines for agency interoperability on specific subjects, but may fail to provide lead actors with interagency tasking authority and resources to accomplish the mission.
+
+Depending on the priority identified by senior leaders or by the placement of key personnel in charge of interagency working groups, individual agencies may not provide support to the process. Some agencies may not deem it to participate fully in the interagency process or key agencies may be left out completely due to the lead organization's lack of understanding of the value various agencies can contribute.
+
+Within the interagency process, the NSC senior directors can be tasked by the National Security Advisor, Principals Committee (PC) or the Deputies Committee (DC) to establish exploratory working groups based on regional orientation or specific subjects such as terrorism, human rights or non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effects (WMD/E).  Based on the group findings and importance, the PC/DC can elect to establish a Policy Coordinating Committee (PCC) with a functional lead identified in accordance with NSPD 113.
+
+## International Public Information (Ipi)
+
+Within NSPD 1 was signed by President Bush, he revalidated and maintained select PDD's from the previous administration, one of which was PDD-68, International Public Information (IPI) and the organizations formal structure it created. One of the organizations created was the IPI Secretariat which was established on April 30th 1999, and which continues as PDD-68 has been revalidated under NSPD-1. The premise for the PDD was that dramatic changes in the global information environment (GIE) required the USG to implement a more deliberate and well-developed international public information strategy in promoting our American values and interests.
+
+IPI activities resulting from the PDD were undertaken to address only foreign target audiences because of Smith/Mundt Act restrictions as well as its informational and influence programs were designed to truthfully depict USG foreign policy. These activities were designed to enhance USG information efforts within the interagency, multilaterally and with NGOs while neither misleading nor compromising the integrity or independence of non-governmental organizations.  Within its charter, the IPI Secretariat's mission statement required it to "improve our ability to coordinate independent public diplomacy, public affairs, and overt International Military Information (IMI) efforts, and to ensure that they are more successfully integrated into foreign and national security policy-making."14
+Before to the PDD was signed by President Clinton, significant interagency turf battles were conducted to determine who would be the proponent for this Secretariat and maintain overall control and influence of its activities.  Initially, IPI was to be placed under the NSC due to the Clinton administration's philosophy of the NSC being more operational in nature.  However, during a series of PC and DC meetings, it was determined that the Department of State should be the lead agency since USIA had been dissolved and its personnel and responsibilities were incorporated into State.  Initially, IPI activities were placed under the functional control of the International Operations Bureau, but then were transferred to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs for direct control and resourcing.
+
+Initially, State was less than enthusiastic about filling the required slots in the Secretariat and providing resources to this organization primarily because of internal conflicts and philosophical differences between appointed officials even though an Interagency Working Group (IWG) at the NSC was established to execute the PDD. Eventually, State and DoD came to a joint agreement on IPI and allocated personnel and resources to the Secretariat in August 1999.
+
+The five members of the Secretariat, augmented by personnel from ASD/SOLIC and the Joint Staff were immediately thrown into a diplomatic crisis and began facilitating interagency efforts to develop and execute a vetted influence campaign directed against Slobodan Milosevic and his government within the Former Yugoslavian Republic (FYR).  This influence campaign was designed to destabilize his regime and promote democracy and free elections within the FYR.  Numerous interagency activities were planned and coordinated to include establishing the "Ring Around Serbia" where State, DoD, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) and other USG government agencies established a ring of independent news radio stations within the adjacent countries. This "ring" provided the FYR citizens with unbiased news and factual information on international activities.  Additionally, a series of "internet cafes" were funded by the IWG and established for anti-Miloshavic and pro-democracy supporters throughout the region to promote democratic values and support electoral reform within the region. A series of FYR key communicators were identified and provided equipment and passwords to protected IIP websites where they could download the most current information of USG and western policy pronouncements against Milosevic and disseminate it to local audiences.
+
+Capitalizing on these early achievements, a formalized series of IPI interagency templates were developed for conducting influence campaigns. These templates included time sequencing for Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO), mechanisms to coordinate and synchronize international public diplomacy and public affairs events, and a process to integrate U.S. government and non-governmental programs and activities in support of USG actions and objectives. Subsequent IPI facilitated information events were successful and because of this, IPI was immediately tasked by various NSC staff directorates to assist in the conduct of additional USG
+information programs. These programs crossed over both functional and regional equities and encompassed operations which included peacekeeping/peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, immigration control, counter-drug, counter-terrorism, and refugee/detainee operations.  IPI worked within and facilitated several regional IWGs, assisted in the development and execution of USG-directed counter-propaganda and counter-hostile information campaigns and served as members in the National Intelligence Community (NIC) sponsored Perception Management Threat Panel (PMTP).
+
+As the success and utility of the IPI Secretariat spread throughout the interagency,  it became the designated NSC IWG facilitator for the Serbian War Crimes Tribunal and the West African Peace Initiatives program. Using its experience and improved methodology, the Secretariat developed with appropriate funding and executed a US/UK bi-lateral influence campaign within West Africa to support efforts of the United Nations and UNAMSIL. Specifically, these influence programs were designed to magnify and synchronize UN and NGO sponsored humanitarian initiatives, promote the Disarmament, Demobilization Reintegration (DDR) process. Concurrently, IPI conducted a series of host nation and NGO coordinated multi-media informational programs that explained and promoted current USG and international policies using both traditional and non-traditional dissemination methods. Simultaneously, IPI developed and conducted a series of counter-disinformation programs against Liberia's President Charles Taylor and the criminal insurgent group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).  Overall, the influence campaign was very successful.  To date, the UN sponsored War Crimes Tribunal is being conducted within Sierra Leone and Guinea; over 50,000 insurgents surrendered to their West African governments and were integrated into the DDR process; and Charles Taylor and the RUF's power and influence has been minimized in the region and internationally.
+
+After the attack on 9-11, the Department of State has not fully capitalized on the proven capabilities of the IPI Secretariat and its methodology.  Previous lessons learned have been ignored and IPI's ability to influence activities within the interagency and around the world may have been lost.  IPI continues to be part of State's Office of Strategic Communications (OSC), and will now serve as the secretariat for the NSC's Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC).  The IPI Secretariat continues to function, but the NSC and DoS need to capitalize on its personnel's experience and interagency communication methodology and reinforce its successes with adequate personnel and resources to effectively execute America's message.
+
+## Office Of Strategic Influence (Osi)
+
+"If you know the enemy and know yourself; you need not fear the results in a hundred battles. If you know yourself, and not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.15
+Sun Tzu While the Office of Strategic Influence was primarily a DoD initiative, and should normally fall under the Department of Defense, it is key to mention it within the confines of the interagency because the history of the organization and the actions which occurred prior to OSI being dissolved may occur again.
+
+After 9-11, international sympathy was expressed for the innocent civilian loss of life, but world opinion concerning the United States, primarily from within the Muslim world, was at its lowest level in measurable history. In numerous governmental and independent surveys conducted, the consensus from the Muslim "man on the street" was that the U.S. deserved to be "knocked off their pedestal" because of its pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian/Arab policies.  How could this have happened, why do they hate us and what we can do to change these perceptions became the buzz of the "Beltway?"
+For weeks following the terrorist attacks on 9-11, the interagency process was in chaos and significant disagreements existed as to the informational mechanisms required, but most importantly, how to respond. Every government agency was scrambling, each had its own concept or approach for responding to the crisis, and in many cases key government agencies, working unilaterally, would have more than one approach, all uncoordinated at the intra-agency and interagency level.
+
+Key individuals within DoD and the USG understood the asymmetric threats directed against the United States, and the potential long-term implications of not only responding to the hostile foreign information environment, but the requirement to influence it through proactive informational programs and positive reinforcing actions. In November 2001, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) stood up the Office of Strategic Influence under the direct supervision of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P).  OSI was designed to provide DoD with a series of information policy options and programs that conducted worldwide and target specific analysis and opinion polls. OSI was also tasked to initiate programs that countered hostile propaganda, misinformation and disinformation directed against the United States and its allies from foreign sources.  The organization was composed of civilian and military personnel with interagency, informational, technological and regional expertise and placed under the direction of Brigadier General Simon P. Worden, a highly experienced influence specialist, astro-scientist and technologist from USSPACECOM.
+
+From its inception, OSI did not have to contend with normal bureaucratic growth pains. Its organization had a robust operational budget, and its activities and programs were integrated and vetted in the interagency at the Under and Assistant Secretary level. The organization, working closely with the multiple government agencies developed new concepts for, and capitalized on, ongoing informational programs that promoted democratic values and initiatives, supported and highlighted international educational reform programs. It also participated in the conduct of international surveys to determine the root cause and effect for international perceptions of hate and distain directed against the United States.
+
+Informed speculation has it that while OSI was highly successful in determining its baseline mission requirement against the GWOT and beginning to execute pro-US influence programs abroad, it was not capable of protecting itself from political "rice bowl" issues and petty jealousies. When a series of coordinated press releases with intentionally leading disinformation hit the media on the February 20, 2002, a media feeding frenzy against OSI ensued. DoD decided to close the office rather than counter the internally spread disinformation and take corrective actions to eliminate leaks and security violations.
+
+Since OSI was dissolved, no other organization within the interagency has attempted to identify, coordinate, synchronize and conduct long-term, analytically based, influence programs in support of the U.S. government in the global environment.
+
+## Broadcasting Board Of Governors (Bbg)
+
+The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is an independent organization authorized
+"to direct and supervise" all civilian broadcasting activities of the U.S. Government.16 The BBG
+views this independence as "an embrace of the idea that all of our broadcasted are journalists" and a reaffirmation of broadcasting's role "as a voice of human rights and democratic freedoms with new global challenges and priorities to address." 17 Components of the BBG include the federally funded International Broadcasting Bureau (IBB), Voice of America (VOA), Office of Cuba Broadcasting (Radio and TV Marti), WORLDNET Television and administration of appropriated funds for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) and Radio Free Afghanistan (RFA). Current BBG program funds exceed $450 million in 2002. Its multiple programs are transmitted in sixty-one languages to an estimated audience of over 100 million persons throughout the world.
+
+When it was part of USIA, the BBG leadership worked closely with Congress to design the International Broadcasting Act of 1994 (IBA) to include and provide the following:
+
+1. NEWS WHICH IS CONSISTENTLY RELIABLE AND AUTHORITATIVE, ACCURATE,
+OBJECTIVE, AND COMPREHENSIVE;
+2. A BALANCED AND COMPREHENSIVE PROJECTION OF THE UNITED STATES
+THOUGHT AND INSTITUTIONS, REFLECTING THE DIVERSITY OF THE UNITED STATES CULTURE AND SOCIETY;
+3. CLEAR AND EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION OF THE POLICIES OF THE UNITED
+STATES GOVERNMENT AND RESPONSIBLE DISCUSSION AND OPINION ON THOSE POLICIES;
+4. PROGRAMMING TO MEET NEEDS WHICH REMAIN UNSERVED BY THE TOTALITY
+OF MEDIA VOICES AVAILABLE TO THE PEOPLE OF CERTAIN NATIONS;
+5. INFORMATION ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS IN EACH SIGNIFICANT PART OF THE
+WORLD;
+6. A VARIETY OF OPINIONS AND VOICE WITHIN PARTICULAR NATIONS AND
+REGIONS PREVENTED BY CENSORSHIP OR REPRESSIONS FROM SPEAKING TO THEIR FELLOW COUNTRYMEN;
+7. RELIABLE RESEARCH CAPACITY TO MEET CRITERIA UNDER THIS SECTION; 8. ADEQUATE TRANSMITTER AND RELAY CAPACITY TO SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES
+DESCRIBED IN THIS SECTION; AND
+9. TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR INDEPENDENT INDIGENOUS MEDIA
+THROUGH GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PRIVATE UNITED STATES ENTITIES.
+The independence the BBG gained from the 1994 legislation has caused considerable confusion and consternation among the interagency members responsible for influence and strategic information. While its goals and objectives are outlined in the IBA of 1994, the present organization has deviated from its statutory mission through the personal interpretations by a small body of its membership. These actions have caused the organization to be compelled to appear before Congress and explain its program of activities and how they are developed, its internal quality control mechanisms and approval mechanisms utilized prior to dissemination of product and most importantly, its justification for continued existence.
+
+Most of the problems associated with the IBA have been removed, but the underlying reason for confusion still exists. There is not a lead agency with tasking authority that develops the U.S strategy for promoting and magnifying the government's goals and objectives of fostering democratic principles worldwide and providing international target audiences with truthful and factual information on U.S. activities. Additionally, there is not an interagency organization that conducts appropriate target audience analysis while countering hostile disinformation, misinformation and hostile propaganda.
+
+Fundamental to all these requirements is the question of how the BBG is related to and integrated with national security strategies and foreign policy. While credibility of information, journalistic integrity and accurate reporting are important for international acceptance, primacy of effort should be directed towards target audiences, types of languages to broadcast in, length of broadcast, dissemination techniques, area of coverage and measurements of effectiveness used to determine format and process.
+
+Simultaneously, the major problem which must be solved lies in the area of U.S. policy and law: who decides how and when the broadcasting assets are utilized during times of crisis, and how to define the appropriate relationships between the BBG, and the Departments of State and Defense, and other U.S. national security agencies. 18 The BBG has played a crucial role in disseminating the U.S. message to denied countries and target audiences where freedom of information is restricted.  This organization faces numerous difficult choices if it's going to remain a key entity within the USG influence arena for the 21st century.  The statutory authority under which it presently operates degrades the U.S. international broadcasting potential and limits it effectiveness for future influence activities. These shortfalls lie within the parameters of a interagency vetted information program where long-term, sustained and synchronized operations are required to influence international target audiences using traditional mediums and advanced technologies including internet based radio and direct broadcast satellites.
+
+## Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (Scpcc)
+
+The Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee, in accordance with NSPD-
+1, was established on 10 September 2002 with the specific mission coordinating all U.S.
+
+informational policies and programs through an NSC directed interagency medium.  This group is designed to foster positive international and domestic public opinion on current USG strategic objectives and influence foreign audiences in ways favorable to USG goals and objectives.19
+The Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee is co-chaired by the Department of State's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs and a the Special Assistant to the President for Democracy, Human Rights and International Operations. Its membership will consist of the chair of the Combating Terrorism Information Strategy PCC, the Deputy Assistant to the President and Counselor to the National Security Advisor for Communications, and the Director, White House of Global Communications. Relevant agencies will be represented at the Assistant Secretary level with the capability to expand or contract as required20.  The PCC possesses IA tasking authority for information as well as analytical capabilities required to develop future influence plans through the IPI Secretariat which is now integrated into State's Office of Strategic Communication (OSC).  Its primary mission will be to coordinate domestic and foreign releases and act as the single point of contact for USG information programs. Subsequently, this PCC is responsible for: coordinating interagency support for international broadcasting, foreign information programs, and public diplomacy: and promoting the development of strategic communications capabilities throughout government. 21
+Concurrently with the SCPCC structure, the OSC is tasked to develop and disseminate of a National Information Strategy (NIS) and are responsible for analyzing and responding to hostile propaganda and dis/misinformation directed against the USG.
+
+The PCC will utilize the IPI Secretariat as its principal coordinating mechanism to facilitate the interagency process.  Even though the PCC was activated on 10 September 2002, it has only held three meetings.  Additionally, its members and potential interagency participants have not been fully utilized.  As with any PCC, the President or his agent of Influence will have to tell the interagency that informational programs and its secondary effects are critical to the successful conduct of influence activities throughout the world.  Hopefully, in the near-term, key communicators will understand the implications and act accordingly.
+
+## Department Of State And Public Diplomacy
+
+"But if the watchman sees the sword coming and fails to blow the warning trumpet...I will hold the watchman responsible..."
+Ezekiel 33:6
+The Department of State, one of America's oldest and most important instruments of statecraft is an antiquated agency whose level of performance and effectiveness has been questioned by numerous administrations and members of Congress.  While this organization has been led by some of our greatest leaders and diplomats, the rank and file consider themselves part of an elite organization within the U.S. government and are generally xenophobic when dealing outside of their bureaus.  The Department is broken down into multiple areas of specialization, but in actuality is organized into two main areas of responsibility; regional and functional bureaus.  These two separate entities also include a series of internal struggles between functional areas called cones (e.g., political, economic, counselor affairs, public diplomacy) or Foreign Service (FS) specialties.  The State Department is the government agency responsible for the conduct of diplomatic activities worldwide, but this paper will only concentrate on its public diplomacy responsibility.
+
+The Reagan administration in 1983 produced the National Security Decision Directive
+(NSDD) -77,   which defined public diplomacy as those actions of the U.S. government designed to generate support among foreign audiences for our national security objectives.  While State remains the lead for public diplomacy efforts worldwide, other government agencies to include the Departments of Defense, Commerce, Transportation, Justice, Education and USAID conduct global activities with a significant public diplomacy impact, but the activities are usually uncoordinated and unsynchronized with DoS for maximum effect.
+
+The United States Information Agency (USIA) had successfully told "America's Story," for almost 50 years, deftly adapting each new successive technological advance in broadcasting, satellite communication, transportation, and finally, computers and the internet.  More than two generations of people around the world learned about the United States through USIA libraries, broadcasts, exhibits and publications and cultural exchanges. "During the Cold War, USIA's diplomacy of information and ideas penetrated the Iron Curtain and projected America's message of freedom to audiences in both developing and industrial societies."22  USIA, created in 1953, was the brainchild of the Eisenhower administration. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, a stubborn and traditional diplomat who wanted to divorce "information" programs from the department's diplomatic efforts.   The world has experienced revolutionary changes since 1953, and the requirement to update diplomatic techniques has only increased due to the advent of technological achievements and globalization.  Nonetheless, in October 1999, USIA was integrated into the Department of State as part of the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, but its absence is being critically felt throughout the world.
+
+Secretary of State Madeleine Albright declared at the integration ceremony, "the full integration of public diplomacy into American foreign policy will make it more agile and open and more convincing to the rest of the world.23" Her statements were simultaneously being countered by John Reinhardt, a senior USIA official who stated: "There is no one in this room who doesn't approach this merger with trepidation. We fear that public diplomacy will be swallowed and destroyed by the State Department, which practices formal diplomacy.24" His fears have proven true, and to the detriment of public diplomacy, US foreign policy and international relations.
+
+First, one must understand that the elimination of USIA was a political concession by the Clinton Administration to Senator Jesse Helms who wanted to downsize government and thought the consolidation of USIA into DoS was a positive step.  USIA was independent from the State Department, and concentrated on long-term information, educational and cultural programs at the strategic level. Its members, while assigned to U.S. embassies, were somewhat independent from the "Country Team" since they possessed their own budgets, and conducted both strategic and regional information program. Most importantly, the final approval for their programs was the director of USIA and not the U.S. Ambassador or Secretary of State. USIA also controlled all USG strategic dissemination assets and produced government publications that told the "American Story."  After the Cold War, USIA became an easy target for elimination because it lacked a domestic constituency since its focus was solely on foreign target audiences.
+
+Prior to the consolidation, USIA controlled and developed radio and television programs charged with telling America's story to foreign audiences. When Congress merged the U.S.
+
+Information Agency with the Department of State, it also established the Broadcasting Board of Governors as an independent entity, which only furthered confused the direction and execution of public diplomacy strategy, programs and activities. The State Department integrated the majority of former USIA into the Office of International Information Programs (IIP) and dispersed the remainder of PD personnel into regional and functional bureaus where they became supporting members. While the integration may have been conceptually valid, the application and rational behind its focus is totally unjustified and the capability that USIA had to conduct long-term public diplomacy activities has been greatly reduced and not replicated.
+
+## International Information Programs (Iip)
+
+The Office of International Information Programs (IIP) is on of three entities reporting to the Department of State's Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The others are the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and the Bureau of Public Affairs, both administered by Assistant Secretaries.  IIP is the supposed successor to the United States Information Agency, but is a replacement with limited public diplomacy resources, personnel and influence within the Department of State.
+
+IIP is presently in its eighth year of existence within the Department of State. It continues in its attempt to become an innovative, aggressive organization which produces vital public diplomacy programs and products for the USG.  Nonetheless, during the reorganization, its responsibilities and activities were splintered between the State Department and other government agencies and it has lost the holistic approach it needs for executing public diplomacy.
+
+In addition to disbanding USIA, numerous key areas of strategic influence have been left neglected or partially split between agencies.  The Foreign Press Center has been transferred to State's Bureau of Public Affairs, which also assumed responsibility for the former WORLDNET interactive television productions, now labeled American Embassy TV.25  In addition to losing this key asset and influence node, responsibility for their state-of-the-art printing plant in Manila has been transferred to State's Office of Administration thereby greatly reducing overall efficiency of strategic dissemination assets.
+
+IIP operates with an annual budget of 40 million and a staff of 279, which is considerably smaller than the over 600-person staff of its predecessor a decade ago.26  Any student of bureaucracy fully understands that your capacity is lessened when your organization loses control of dedicated functional assets designed to support its primary mission, and that bureaucratic requirements significantly increase when required to task assets outside of an organization.  Nonetheless, the spirit of USIA continues to exist within IIP and the organization has successfully enhanced the internet capability within the U.S. government, providing the most comprehensive record of American foreign policy or of the U.S. Government's public record in the last decade.
+
+IIP's current programs, products and services include: strategic planning where both short and long-term public diplomacy strategies are designed to support State Department diplomatic initiatives; support the International Public Information Secretariat chartered by PDD-68 and revalidated by NSPD 1; and develop and execute a series of multi-language web sites (usinfo.state.gov) where information is provided on a wide variety of major policy issues - such as the War on Terrorism, the treatment of detainees, environmental regulations and initiatives in five languages, which are updated daily. It also conducts speaker programs where functional experts from the United State travel abroad and meet with foreign officials, media, academic, religious or other elites to address specific areas identified by the country team. Through enhanced technology, it provides Information Resource Centers (IRC) to over 170 countries worldwide. The IRCs are the successor to the USIA open shelf American libraries aboard. They are located at the American Center and use computer and digital technology to disseminate information to key audiences, train mission staff and mine electronic data bases.
+
+Since the State-USIA consolidation, IIP's public diplomacy initiatives have had mixed results.  While State respects the technological capabilities provided to them from IIP and understands the requirements for immediacy of dissemination, the greatest shortfall is the lack of an appreciation for IIP capabilities.  These neglected capabilities include: long-term information policy development, multi-media product production and non-computer dissemination, and non-diplomatic, face-to-face meetings at the American centers.
+
+## Department Of Defense
+
+The real target in war is the mind of the enemy commander, not the bodies of his troops.
+
+Captain Sir Basil Liddel Hart, Thoughts on War, 1944
+During the past ten years, the Department of Defense has attempted to define information operations (IO), organize forces, and develop acceptable and executable intra- and inter-service doctrine that incorporates and makes operational the functions constituting IO - Psychological Operations (PSYOPs), Computer-Network Attack/Defense (CNA/CND), Electronic Warfare
+(EW), Operational Security (OPSEC), Physical Destruction and Deception Operations,27  as well as connections to Public Affairs and Civil Affairs.
+
+## Information Operations (Io)
+
+IO has different meanings for different government agencies, but most importantly it even differs between services within DOD.  Presently each service has its own manual pertaining to IO which includes control and integration, and currently the joint doctrine writers are rewording its definition to one of consensus, which is causing additional confusion. The joint IO goal is to have information superiority: the capability to collect process and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same. The current IO organizational structure has caused significant planning, developing, coordination and dissemination problems within DoD due to the approval process for execution.  Multiple OSD organizations (e.g., USD-P, ASD-SOLIC, ASD-C3I, ASD-PA) possess specific and/or limited approval authority for portions of IO (CNA/CND, PSYOPs, Deception). Additionally, they have limited influence on the operational and tactical portions (Physical Destruction, Electronic Warfare and OPSEC) because the approval authority is granted to the Combatant Commanders' during time of crisis.  There is also ongoing confusion regarding the various DOD organizations such as Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), Naval Information Warfare Activity (NIWA), Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC), U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) areas of responsibilities and authorities to conduct IO.  Additionally, IO is DoD-centric, and its applications limited in the interagency due to required security clearances, fears concerning sovereignty and privacy issues, and required presidential approval for Computer Network Attack (CNA). These interagency fears are primarily due to a concern about open-ended legal interpretations concerning CNA and the potential for crossing over departmental charters and responsibilities while potentially threatening a country's sovereignty.
+
+The Department of Defense has had limited operational and tactical successes using IO in support of the GWOT in Afghanistan. What successes there were came from the Combined/Joint PSYOP Task Force (CJPOTF), a USSOCOM traditional functional command in support of the Combatant Commander, and not the Joint Information Operations Task Force (JIOTF). The JIOTF is an ad hoc organization, possessing no organic forces or functional staff in the Pentagon, and not under the control of either the Joint Staff or OSD (U/S-Policy)
+
+## Public Affairs (Pa)
+
+The Department of Defense maintains very robust and relatively sophisticated influence mechanisms to inform and influence foreign audiences at the operational and tactical levels during peacetime and in war.  This organization is headed by Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD/PA) with public affairs offices and detachments located throughout the Department of Defense organization. Public affairs organizations usually disseminate information using short-term, action directed strategies for specific missions or periods. They do not incorporate regional analysis of foreign target audiences. Their primary means of communicating with foreign audiences are through this public affairs apparatus and in coordination with Department of Defense's overt military Psychological Operations (PSYOP) programs which expands Department of Defense's ability to reach foreign audiences. DoD PA activities are normally coordinated within the interagency process and should support DoS Public Diplomacy initiatives.
+
+The Department of Defense public affairs activities in support of national strategic goals include traditional public affairs, that is, news releases, public announcements, briefings for foreign and domestic journalists, visits, tours, open houses, guest speaker programs, community relations programs, web site production, and regional command information programs. Additionally, it participates in interagency public affairs forums and the National Security Council's Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee.
+
+The primary purpose of public affairs within Department of Defense is to provide timely, free flowing and accurate information to commanders and staff, military and civilian members, Department of Defense family members and multiple U.S. internal audiences to include Congress and the civilian news media.  These efforts are performed under the provisions of the Secretary of Defense's "Principles of Information."28 Additionally, Public Affairs Officers provide advice on matters pertaining to international media relations that affect DoD activities as well as missions with allied and friendly nations.
+
+## Psychological Operations (Psyop), Not Propaganda
+
+What is PSYOP and how can it help?  This question is best answered by first explaining what PSYOP is not.  PSYOP is often confused with propaganda, which is practiced by many of our adversaries, and in some cases, by selected U.S. agencies and politicians. Propaganda has connotations of deception and distortion.29 Propaganda has no rules and can be a mixture of the truth, incorrectly attributed truth (sometimes referred to as gray propaganda), or pure fiction, purposely misattributed (black propaganda or covert propaganda).30
+U.S. DoD PSYOP, on the other hand, are actions taken to influence the emotions, attitudes and ultimately the behavior of a target audience.31 The intent is to influence target audiences in ways that support USG national policy objectives at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.32  Additionally, DoD PSYOP programs are always based on truth in order to maintain local and regional credibility equal to or greater than that of public affairs activities and local journalists.  In many instances, PSYOP products and activities (newspapers, radio broadcasts, leaflets, hand bills and face-to-face communication) become the primary source of trusted information within an area of conflict or disaster. Another definition is provided in the United States Special Operations Forces Posture Statement which describes PSYOP as "planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign government organizations, groups and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives."33
+Some PSYOP principles, applied in all categories of PSYOP (strategic, operational, tactical and consolidation), include a credible message (based on truth), a message chosen and shaped to create a positive impression on the target audience, and a message integrated into the overall military, diplomatic or political program which it supports.34 All PSYOP products, programs and activities are intelligence-based, that is, an adversary's nation and culture are studied in detail to determine its vulnerabilities, susceptibilities, key communicators, media and methods of communication used to influence elites and various social and ethnic groups.
+
+## Defense Science Board Task Force On Managed Information Dissemination
+
+The Defense Science Board is an advisory committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense.  This board has been operating for over fifty years and consists of independent subject matter experts (SMEs) from government, industry and academia. Its purpose is to address independently a specific subject, analyze its perceived weaknesses and strengths from various viewpoints and methodologies and then provide unbiased recommendations to eliminate those deficiencies.
+
+The 2001 Defense Science Board Task Force on Managed Information Dissemination is a follow-on effort from the May 2000 DSB study on the "Creation and Dissemination of All Forms of Military Information in Support of Psychological Operations (PSYOP) in Time of Military Conflict."35 The Defense Science Board Task Force members were tasked with determining the requirements and feasibility for a coordinated U.S. information capability. 36  Specifically, the Task Force was asked to examine and compare existing USG strategic information activities and capabilities of the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State (DOS).  It is interesting to note, that this study was jointly sponsored by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (OASD/SO/LIC) and the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (DOS/R).37
+The Task Force investigated a wide range of informational issues within the roles and missions of DoD, State, and other government agencies (OGA) such as the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) nonmilitary information dissemination capability (Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Marti) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).  During the course of its assessment, it expanded its investigative and analytical work and incorporated informational issues to include policy development, legal and resource limitations, and new and emerging technologies designed to further a coordinated USG
+information dissemination capability.38 The Task Force assessment expanded well beyond its original direction and eventually included multimedia corporations (CNN, AOL-Time Warner) as well as international and nongovernmental organizations and queried individuals skilled in leading edge media technology as well as strategic communications techniques and analytical capabilities.
+
+Throughout its investigations, the Defense Science Board's observations and empirical data continuously reflected that the U.S. Government requires a coordinated means to speak with a coherent voice abroad.
+
+## Recommendations
+
+The USG and primarily the foreign affairs community should take a hard look at its informational capability during this period of governmental reorganization and transition.  The Executive Branch and Congress should jointly reevaluate the current capacity for our government to project America's message domestically and abroad, and if required, reestablish a USIA like organization to address these shortfalls.
+
+For the USG to conduct informational programs successfully, it needs to expand its horizons using the SCPPC as the catalyst. Adequate interagency resources to include personnel, facilities and a robust budget are required immediately to support U.S. policy initiatives and objectives.  The SCPCC, in collaboration with PCC working groups needs to develop programs at the strategic level that address four target audiences separately: the U.S. domestic audience, coalition or multilateral countries, the international media, and specific target audiences in which the campaigns are being directed against (e.g., Iraq, North Korea, international terrorist and/or criminal organizations).  The developmental process alone will require the integration of multiple agencies to support the analytical and technical baselines required.  Concurrently, a significant increase in dissemination capability needs to be addressed to ensure the integration of state of the art technology with human factor variables.  Our capacity to influence must cover the spectrum from high-tech to no-tech and be executed using both traditional and asymmetric means.
+
+Additionally, the SCPCC needs to establish a U.S. sponsored forum that allows for active participation of coalition partners/allies, United Nations and Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) actors. This multilateral organization should be sub-divided into two parts: one which develops and coordinates internationally vetted strategies and programs which support USG/coalition initiatives; and a second sub-organization which actually deploys within a region and operationalizes this strategy through a multi-faceted information campaign..  These parallel organizations will greatly increase the overall effectiveness of U.S. informational programs by providing on-the-ground truth, increased or enhanced international acceptability through participation and increased legitimacy of action.
+
+With any organizational increase in capability or mission change, adequate funding and manpower will be required.  The current restructuring of government in support of Homeland Defense is the perfect venue to incorporate these changes.  The ability to influence target audiences and project U.S. information is relatively cheap in comparison to using the other instruments of national power.  The personnel and capability is ready; only political emphasis will is required.
+
+## Conclusions
+
+After the events of 9-11, a significant event occurred within the government which greatly affected the USG's ability to develop and send a coherent message abroad: every senior official and political appointee became an "expert" in information and influence operations. Unfortunately, the interagency process looked like a soccer team composed of eight year olds, and when the whistle blew they all ran towards the ball; this ball was that of strategic information.
+
+Control of the information environment at the strategic level has always been a critical capacity for our government.  Not since the Creel Committee (1917-1919) has any government organization controlled both the foreign and domestic media, been funded adequately and had the approval authority to further U.S. national goals and objectives. Since that time, numerous government entities have been established to develop coordinate, synchronize and execute a proactive multi-dimensional information capability, however, the results have been meager. The Presidential authorization of the SCPPC seems to be a move in the right direction, but the interagency needs to cooperate to make it a viable entity.
+
+Knowledge, now more than ever, is power.   The U.S. needs to capitalize on its technological and economic advantages and begin selling American democracy again.  It worked for over fifty years, and is greatly needed now.
+
+"Good understanding wins favor - Every prudent man acts out of knowledge, but the fool exposes his folly."
+Proverbs 13:15-16
+WORD COUNT = 9,520
+
+## Endnotes
+
+1 Timothy L. Thomas, "The Mind Has No Firewall," 22 July 98, Psychotronic War: IW and Bioeffects of DEW, Infowar.com, "Infowar.com/wmd/wmd_062298a_j.html-ssi," accessed 27
+July 2001.
+
+2 Department of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of America,
+(pre-decisional Draft, Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 02),2.
+
+3 William V. Parker, Director, Office of Strategic Communication (DoS), telephonic interview by author, 15 January 2003.
+
+4 President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (The White House; Washington D.C., September 2002),ii.
+
+5 Marion K. Pinsdorf, Woodrow Wilson's public relations: "Wag the Hun," Public Relations Review, Greenwich; (Fall 1999),1.
+
+6 Ibid,2. 7Thomas Timmes, OASD-SOLIC Memorandum, Assessment of International Public InformationHistorical Perspective, The Pentagon, August 2001.
+
+8 President Harry Truman, National Security Council NSC 59/1, (Washington, D.C.,March
+1950).
+
+9 Thomas Timmes, OASD-SOLIC Memorandum, Assessment of International Public InformationHistorical Perspective, The Pentagon, August 2001.
+
+10 Jeffery Jones, Director, Counter-Terrorism PCC (NSC), telephonic interviewby author, 12
+July 2002.
+
+11 President Harry S. Truman, The National Security Act of 1947, (Washington, D.C.:
+Government Printing Office, 1947), 2.
+
+12 George T. Raach and Ilana Kass, "National Power and the Interagency Process"
+Washington D.C.: Joint Forces Quarterly, (Summer, 1995),10.
+
+13  President George W. Bush, National Security Presidential Directive 1 (NSPD 1), (The White House; Washington D.C., April 2001),3.
+
+14 President William J. Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 68 - International Public Information, (The White House: Washington D.C., April 1999),2.
+
+15 Samuel B. Griffith, ed., Sun Tzu: The Art of War (London: Oxford University Press, 1971),
+84.
+
+16 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination, (Washington D.C., October 2001), 26.
+
+17 Ibid, 26. 18 Ibid, 1. 19 President George W. Bush, Establishment of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating Committee (SCPCC), (The White House; Washington D.C., September 10, 2002),1.
+
+20 William V. Parker, Director, Office of Strategic Communication (DoS), telephonic interview by author, 15 January 2003.
+
+21 Ibid. 22  Dell F Pendergrast, Institutional Shift Who Will Tell America's Story?, Chicago Tribune, Chicago Ill.; September 30 1999.
+
+23 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, The Importance of Public Diplomacy to American Foreign Policy, (U.S. Department of State Dispatch; Washington, D.C., Oct 1999).
+
+24 Sarah Booth Conroy, The Last Word on USIA, The Washington Post; Washington;
+October 1999.
+
+25 Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination, (Washington D.C., October 2001) 34.
+
+26 Ibid, 36. 27U.S.Department of Defense, Joint Publication for Information Operations (JP 3-13), Oct
+1998.
+
+28Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination, (Washington D.C., October 2001) 17.
+
+29 Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language, College Edition, 1964, under the term "propaganda."
+30Psychological Operation Officer's Course (POOC) instruction, untitled lecture presented in the U.S. Army Officer Psychological Operations Course at the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, N.C., July 1992.
+
+31 U.S. Department of the Army, U.S. Army Psychological Operations, 3-05.30 (FM 33-1), June 2000. Cited hereafter as 3.05.30.
+
+32  Ibid, ,. 3-05.30, 1-1. 33Allen H. Holmes & General Wayne A. Downing, United States Special Operations Posture Statement, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Special Operations Command, 1994).
+
+34 Curtis Glen, An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP), Federal Research Division, Soviet Union-Eastern European Section (4A). (Washington D.C.:USIA, 1994).
+
+35Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination, (Washington D.C., Oct 2001),68.
+
+36 Ibid,65.
+
+37 Ibid,1.
+
+38 Ibid, 65.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+Albright, Madeleine., The Importance of Public Diplomacy to American Foreign Policy. U.S.
+Department of State Dispatch; Washington: Oct 1999.
+Aaron, Christopher., A New Language of Terror. Jane's Intelligence Review, October 2001.
+Alter, Johnathan. The Media's 'Balancing' Act. Newsweek; October 2001.
+Bardos, Arthur A., Public Diplomacy: A Old Art, A new Profession. The Virginia Quarterly
+Review, Charlottesville; Summer 2001. Bedlington, Stanley. Not Who You Think. The Washington Post; October 2001.
+Bush, George W., National Security Decision Directive 1. Washington, D.C.: The White House,
+April 2001.
+Bush, George W., The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington,
+D.C.: The White House, September 2002.
+Bush, George W., Establishment of the Strategic Communication Policy Coordinating
+Committee (SCPCC). The White House; Washington D.C., September 10, 2002.
+Clinton, William J., Presidential Decision Directive 68 - International Public Information.
+Washington, D.C.: The White House, April 1999.
+Clinton, William J., A National Security Strategy for a Global Age. Washington, D.C.: The White
+House, December 2000.
+Conroy, Sarah Booth, The Last Word on USIA. The Washington Post; Washington; October
+1999.
+Department of the Army, U.S. Army Psychological Operations 3-05.30 (FM 33-1). June 2000. Department of Defense,  Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, D.C.: The
+Pentagon, September 2001.
+Department of State, Fact Sheet - International Affairs-FY 2004 Budget. Washington, D.C.,
+February 2003.
+Dobbs, Michael. Words and Images: Weapons of Other War. The Washington Post; October
+2001.
+Efron, Sonni, THE WORLD; America's Got and Image Problem, Panel Warns; Policy: A Study
+of how the world sees the nation has led to the creation of an office to counter anti-U.S. sentiments. Some wonder whether anything will help. The Los Angeles Times; Los Angeles, Ca; July 2002.
+Glen, Curtis (1990). An Overview of Psychological Operations (PSYOP). Federal Research
+Division, Soviet Union-Eastern European Section (4A). Washington D.C.:USIA.
+Griffith, Samuel B. ed., Sun Tzu: The Art of War.  (London: Oxford University Press, 1971), 84. Hoffman, David. Beyond Public Diplomacy. Foreign Affairs; New York; March/April 2002. Holmes, Allen H.  &  Downing, Wayne A. General. (1994), United States Special Operations
+Posture Statement.
+Hughes, John. Why America's story needs to be sent overseas. Christian Science Monitor;
+Boston, Mass.; April 2002.
+Hughes, John. Bring back USIA, and let America tell its story. Christian Science Monitor;
+Boston, Mass.; December 2001.
+Kaiser, Robert G. US Message Lost Overseas; Officials See Immediate Need for 'Public
+Diplomacy'. The Washington Post: Washington, D.C.: October 2001.
+Laffin, John. The Arab Mind: A Need For Understanding. London: Cassell and Company limited,
+1975.
+Leonard, Mark. Diplomacy By Other Means. Foreign Policy; Washington, D.C.:
+September/October 2002.
+Mroz, Jacqueline. Selling the War Effort. Sales and Marketing Management; New York;
+February 2002.
+Office of the Secretary of Defense, The National Military Strategy of the United States of
+America. Pre-decisional draft, Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, September 2002.
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Report on
+the Defense Science Board on Managed Information Dissemination. Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, October 2001.
+Payne, Kenneth B., The Fallacies of Cold War Deterrence and a New Direction. University of
+Kentucky Press, Lexington, Kentucky, 2001.
+Parker, William V., State Department, Director, Office of Strategic Communication. Telephonic
+Interview by author. September/December 2002, January/February 2003.
+Pendergrast, Dell F., Institutional Shift Who Will Tell America's Story?. Chicago Tribune;
+Chicago Ill.; September 30 1999.
+Pinsdorf, Marion K., Woodrow Wilson's Public Relations: "Wag the Hun." Public Relations
+Review; Greenwich; Fall 1999.
+Reagan, Ronald., National Security Decision Directive 130 - US International Information
+Policy. Washington, D.C.: The White House, March 1984.
+Raach, George T.  and Kass, Ilana., *National Power and the Interagency* Process .Washington
+D.C.: Joint Forces Quarterly, (Summer, 1995).
+The Joint Staff, Joint Publication for Information Operations (JP 3-13). Washington, D.C.: The
+Pentagon, October 1998.
+The Joint Staff, Joint Vision 2020. Washington, D.C.: The Pentagon, June 2000. Thomas, Timothy L., The Mind Has No Firewall. 22 July 98, Psychotronic War: IW and
+Bioeffects of DEW, Infowar.com, "Infowar.com/wmd/wmd_062298a_j.html-ssi," accessed 27 July 2001.
+Timmes, Thomas. Department of Defense, OASD-SOLIC, POC for Psychological Operations,
+Information Operations and interagency procedures. Telephonic interview by author.
+September 2002.
+Truman, Harry S., The National Security Act of 1947. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing
+Office, 1947.

markdown/misc/zawahiri.md

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+## Zawahiri Tries To Clear Name, Explain Strategy
+
+For the past two months, Al-Qaida's number two, Ayman Al- Zawahiri, has engaged in an ideological counter offensive against his detractors.  First, in early March 2008, he published a 188-page Arabic book online titled The Exoneration: A
+Treatise Exonerating the Community of the Pen and the Sword from the Debilitating Accusation of Fatigue and Weakness.1  In it, he responds to the November 2007 criticisms of his former mentor, Sayid Imam Abdel-Aziz Al-Sharif (Abdel-Aziz), who lambasted him for misapplying the doctrine of jihad and for bringing harm to the Muslim world.  Then in late March, Zawahiri released part one of his response to questions he solicited online from other militants.2  Around the same time, he also released a statement on the plight of the Palestinians.3  Many of the themes and arguments in the book, the Q&A, and the statement overlap, suggesting a campaign to repair the ideological and public relations damage done to Al-Qaida over the past year.4  The broad thrust of the campaign is to defend the religious legitimacy and political efficacy of attacks that affect civilians.  It is also to explain why Al-Qaida's strategic focus has been on Iraq, Afghanistan, and Algeria instead of the Palestinian Territories and Egypt or responding to European insults to the Prophet Mohammed.  The number of his statements which have been released and their detailed nature suggest that Al-Qaida's senior leadership is concerned that it is losing its relevance among its base. Zawahiri gives four indications as to Al-Qaida's current strategic orientation.  First, he wants Al-Qaida in Iraq to shift its violence away from Shi'a civilians and towards Shi'a militias.  Second, Zawahiri calls for militants to increase attacks against Jewish targets abroad in the near term and against Israeli targets in Israel and the Palestinian Territories in the long term.  Third, he calls for the death of those associated with the cartoons of the Prophet in Europe.  Fourth, Zawahiri wants militants in Egypt to ready themselves to seize the opportunity when Hosni Mubarak dies.  By focusing on Israel, ending sectarian violence against civilians in Iraq, punishing Europeans who have insulted Mohammed, and overthrowing the unpopular Mubarak, Al-Qaida may be trying to increase its diminished popularity by highlighting issues that resonate with popular Muslim resentment.
+
+## Zawahiri's Strategic Thinking
+
+One reason for the negative popular response is Al-
+Qaida's tactics, which have been criticized for harming Muslim civilians and for failing to further the organzation's stated goals of driving the U.S. from the Middle East and creating Islamic states.5  The most pointed criticism has come from Zawahiri's former mentor and previous head of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) organization, Abdel-Aziz.  In November 2007, Imam serially published a short book in which he criticized Al-Qaida and other Sunni militant organizations for attacking civilians because they were too weak to attack the government directly.  He argued that the weakness of these groups should prompt them to abandon violent jihad and adopt nonviolent means of coping with un-Islamic regimes.  Imam's criticisms came at the end of a year of similar criticism from prominent hard-line clerics who had previously supported Al-Qaida.6
+In the Exoneration, Zawahiri retorts that Imam and other hard-liners eviscerate jihad by arguing that noncombatants should not be harmed or that militants should have parity with their enemies.7  "If Muslims wait until they have full parity with their enemies,"
+Zawahiri asks rhetorically, "then how will they ever be able to defeat an oppressive ruler or powerful foreign nation who has invaded their lands?"8  "If a Muslim's family is threatened by an oppressive regime or foreign power, why would he adopt nonviolence to protect them?"9  "If a Muslim never attacks the enemy for fear of killing fellow believers or innocent people, how can he put pressure on a much more powerful enemy?"10  In short, the overwhelming power of local "apostate" regimes and their foreign supporters means that violence is not voided; rather, it is the only way to defeat the enemy.  Thus, whereas Imam maintains that asymmetry in power means militants should lay down arms, Zawahiri believes that asymmetry means that Muslims have no choice but to use violence.
+
+
+Zawahiri's strategic thinking and understanding of asymmetrical warfare and revolutionary violence is heavily indebted to vanguardism, a Leninist theory of revolution which posits that a small, revolutionary elite uses violence to rouse the people to fight against the government.  The inevitable government crackdown will further fuel popular discontent and increase support for the vanguard.  "[This method] was our means of raising the awareness of the *Ummah* (Islamic nation) and awakening it," Zawahiri says.11  He adds that by attacking Americans and Jews, their allies in the Middle East will be forced to defend them, which will further demonstrate their subservience to foreign powers.12
+Although revolutionary vanguardism does not necessarily imply terrorism, or violence against civilians for political ends, this has been Zawahiri's primary method in countries where guerilla campaigns are impossible.  Thus, in his Q&A, Zawahiri explains that Algerian militants use guerilla tactics because they have great freedom to maneuver. Conversly, in Egypt militants can only prepare for terror attacks because their activities are so circumscribed.13
+The potential problem with Zawahiri's application of the theory of vanguardism in countries that are inhospitable to guerilla campaigns is that terrorism, in the sense of violence against civilians for political ends, usually diminishes the support of both the government (because of its harsh reprisals) as well the terrorist organization.  This was the result of the terrorist campaign initiated by Zawahiri in the 1990s in Egypt during his tenure as head of the EIJ.  Zawahiri acknowledges that his organization was completely discredited because of these attacks, but he does not reconsider his application of vanguardism.  Rather, he posits that the true reason his organization did not gain popularity is because the U.S. supported Mubarak's regime and prevented its collapse. This was the reason, he concludes, that the revolutionary vanguard had to focus on the U.S. before trying to topple local regimes.14  In Zawahiri's analysis, applying the principles of revolutionary vanguardism and fighting the U.S. resulted in an increase of Muslim support for Al-Qaida after the inevitable U.S. reprisals:
+By attacking America and Israel and then goading them into two jihadi wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Jihadi Movement gained the love, support, and affection of the vast majority of the Muslim community.  It became a symbol of popular resistance against the Zionist-Crusader campaign against the Muslim community.15
+the Pen and the Sword from the Debilitating Accusation of Fatigue and Weakness)." Ekhlaas January 2008, Ibid. 172.
+
+more involved once the U.S. has left Iraq.48
+Moreover, he takes special care to call for attacking Jewish interests abroad, perhaps indicating a renewed focus on Jewish and Israeli targets outside Israel.49
+One other issue is mentioned repeatedly by Zawahiri: the cartoons of Mohammed printed in Denmark.  In the Exoneration, he argues that those who insult the Prophet should be put to death.50  Zawahiri even hypothetically talks about the assassination of offensive cartoonists in Europe.51  This dovetails with bin Laden's latest statement calling for attacks on the cartoonists and may indicate Al-Qaida's active involvement in an attack on the cartoonists.52  The recent arrest of a Moroccon Dane and two Tunisians plotting to kill one of the cartoonists indicates that something is afoot.53  At the very least, it plays to popular Muslim resentment of the cartoons. It is unclear from Zawahiri's statements if his treatment of the political situation in Egypt, the plight of the Palestinians, and the offending cartoonists in Europe are just public relations ploys, current operational concerns, or long-term interests.  He is coy about active operations to deal with these issues while being upfront about operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.  But presumably, Zawahiri's coyness does not equal disintrest; he can afford to be candid about operations in open theaters of conflict because doing so does not have significant operational security consequences, in contrast to operations elsewhere.  If Zawahiri's statements are operationally significant, Al-Qaida may be targeting Jewish interests abroad, individuals and agencies associated with the cartoon controversy, and planning operations in Egypt around the time of Hosni Mubarak's death.  At the very least, his public relations counteroffensive demonstrates that Al- Qaida is feeling the heat of the criticisms coming from former supporters.  The intricacy of Zawahiri's responses, their number, and their rapid release are all indicative of an organization that is trying to burnish its reputation.