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markdown/marines/FMFRP 12-102 W Erratum The 9th Australian Division Versus the Africa Corps_2.md

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+more determined than their enemy. They lost one gun, ten men killed in action, and four wounded in action.
+
+0700.
+
+The German tanks again turned to the east but again ran into antitank fire from the 2-3d and the 25-pounders of the RHA. The antitank guns enfiladed them, and the RHA fired from the front. The tanks passed and the smoke and dust cleared to reveal four immobilized tanks in front of the 2-3d. Three antitank guns were also destroyed. The 1st Royal Tanks now engaged the German tanks at one mile and began to close with them. Smoke and dust were everywhere. Farther back, near the perimeter, B Company of the 2-17th was counterattacking against
+100 Germans holed up near the ruins called Goschen's house, north of R32. D Company of the 2-15th established a blocking position just to the north to assist in containing the Germans. Attacking with grenades and bayonets, the Australians killed eighteen Germans and captured eighteen. Overhead, Tobruk's RAF Hurricanes were fighting a battle with German and Italian fighters, while antiaircraft guns fired at the weaving and turning aircraft. The Hurricanes brought down four enemy planes and lost one of their own.
+
+Under fire from all sides, the German tanks finally withdrew, turning to the south and heading for the gap. Tank after tank was being knocked out as they ran the gauntlet. The British cruisers and two infantry tanks which had joined them gave chase.
+
+On the perimeter, the German infantry, who had failed to widen the gap and secure the flanks of the penetration, were scattered ever'where. Enemy pockets near the gap were being suppressed by the Australians, but groups who had penetrated deeper to the rear of the perimeter posts continued to cause trouble. There was great confusion as the German tanks and infantry pushed together out through the gap. Captain Balfe, the D Company commander, described the scene:
+The crossing was badly churned up and the tanks raised clouds of dust as they went. In addition, there was the smoke of two tanks blazing just outside the wire. Into this cloud of dust and smoke we fired anti-tank weapons, Brens, rifles, and mortars, and the gunners sent hundreds of shells. We shot up a lot of infantry as they tried to get past, and many, who took refuge in the anti-tank ditch, were later captured. It was all I could do to stop the troops following them outside the wire. The Germans were a rabble, but the crews of three tanks did keep their heads. They stopped at the anti-tank ditch and hitched on behind them the big guns, whose crews had been killed. They dragged these about one thousand yards, but by then we had directed our artillery on to them. They unhitched the guns and went for their lives.35
+0730.
+
+The Germans were in full retreat. Forty German divebombers appeared above the harbor to bomb the town in an attack meant to be coordinated with the lead German tank battalion. Four Stukas were shot down by British antiaircraft gunners and two by Hurricane fighters. Seventy-five Germans were captured at Goschen's house.
+
+## Troops In A Dust Storm, Tobruk
+
+0830. Except for sporadic fighting, the battle was over. By noon, the last of the enemy was rounded up. Rommel gave the order to attack again at 1800, but the order was canceled when sufficient forces could not be mustered. Two days later, on 16
+April, Rommel, thinking the 8th Machine Gun Battalion was still within the perimeter, personally directed a new attack from the west against the Ras el Medauuar sector with six medium and twelve light tanks of the Ariete Division, plus the 62d Infantry Regiment of the Trento Division. When counterattacked by the 2-48th Australian Infantry, 26 German officers and 777
+men surrendered.
+
+Continuing the attack the next day with ten tanks, the Italians reached their forward posta, but when the infantry failed to follow, they withdrew losing five tanks.36 During the next ten days, the Australians gave the Germans and Italians little rest, conducting aggressive patrolling and bringing in approximately 1,700 prisoners. The Germans didn't attack again until their second abortive attempt on 30 April.
+
+Critical Events The clearly recognizable turning point of the battle was when the 5th Panzer regimental commander, Colonel Olbrich, ordered his forces to withdraw.37 A mile and one-half inside the Australian perimeter, having reached a slight rise across their front, the panzers suddenly faced a line of British 25-pounders, antitank guns, and tanks on their flanks. The British fire was devastating, and seventeen panzers were destroyed. As soon as the lead panzer battalion turned to avoid the British fire, it ran into the trailing panzer battalion. With this reverse in direction came confusion and an immediate shift of momentum to the defenders.
+
+This key event was further magnified by the actions of the German 8th Machine Gun Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Ponath, the battalion commander, had tried unsuccessfully to prevent Colonel Olbrich from withdrawing.38 Without tank support, the
+8th Machine Gun Battalion's men were lying on the ground, with no cover, under heavy fire, and their ammunition was running short. Colonel Ponath decided to pull the battalion back, and as they made the first rush to withdraw, he was killed, a bullet through his heart. The next senior officer ordered the men to cease fire, and many then surrendered.39 With this event, the Australian infantry was able to restore the perimeter, except for minor pockets of German resistance. Other key events were B Company of the 2-l7th's counterattack to eliminate the German resistance around Goschen's house, thereby relieving the pressure on D Company and Post R33, which was covering the gap; there was also the failure of the German engineers to lead the attacking columns directly to the perimeter opening, causing a delay in the attack time and a loss of the effects of preparatory fires; the numerous probes and the abortive attack on 11 April against the 2-l7th's sector also alerted the Australians to the imminence of an attack. Forewarned, General Morshead con-.
+
+centrated his artillery, antitank guns, tanks, and infantry reserves to meet the German assault. All of these major occurrences favored the Australians and certainly helped effect a decisive victory.
+
+## Iii. Conclusions Analysis Of German And Australian Capabilities
+
+To analyze why the Australians won such a clear tactical victory, it is illuminating to match both opponents against a set of capabilities.
+
+Force Structure Although the Australians employed 32,000 combat troops in the Tobruk defenses, with about 24,000 being combat troops, there were still insufficient infantry battalions to properly secure the 28-mile perimeter in depth. Each battalion was thinly spread over a five-mile front, with two companies up and one back.
+
+The Germans, on the other hand, had sufficient men to operate and maintain vehicles and equipment but lacked enough infantry units to share the load of the 8th Machine Gun Battalion. Hindered by losses it suffered before the final 14 April attack, the
+8th Machine Gun Battalion did not have enough infantry to secure the flanks of the penetration as well as to support the panzers in the attack.
+
+Organization and Tactics The 9th Australian Division's success at Tobruk was predicated on the expert application of all available assets in a combined arms effort. This included aerial, mobile, and foot reconnaissance to determine the enemy's location and movements;
+aggressive, deep, and continuous combat patrolling to keep the enemy off-balance as well as to deny him ground reconnaissance of friendly positions; air interdiction to prevent him from concentrating his forces outside artillery range; air-to-air interdiction and antiaircraft artillery support to protect the port facilities and naval ships; close air support, artillery, and combat patrolling to keep the enemy from concentrating his forces within range of the main defensive area; a strong system of defense in depth with mutually supporting positions reinforced by mines and obstacles to deny the enemy access to the perimeter; and aggressive, courageous infantrymen supported in depth by welltrained artillerymen, antitank gunners, and an armored counterattack force. These assets combined to defeat the enemy's blitzkrieg tactics. The Germans, on the other hand, were unable to muster sufficient forces at the point of penetration, as they had piecemealed their forces in order to surround the Australian garrison. The units that remained for the attack had 112 light and medium tanks; some small sapper units; 8 field guns (virtually out of ammunition); a few light and heavy antiaircraft guns; and 1 infantry battalionthe tired and depleted 8th Machine Gun Battalion.
+
+Weapons and Equipment The British and Bush artillery completely outgunned the Germans' few fleldpieces and Mark IV tanks mounting the 75-mm gun. The British had forty-eight 25-pounders, twelve 18-pounders, and twelve 4.5-inch howitzers.
+
+The Germans, however, had the edge in available air power with their ability to mass thirty to forty dive-bombers with fighter escorts against the fourteen British Hurricanes and handful of Blenheim bombers.
+
+The German Mark III and IV tanks and 50-mm antitank guns also outranged the British 2-pound tank and antitank gun, but they suffered greatly from the 25-pound guns.
+
+Intelligence The Germans used aerial reconnaissance, ground reconnaissance, and probing attacks in an attempt to determine the strength and location of the Tobruk defenses. But they had no accurate maps and only received two from the Italians just before the attack on 12 April. The Germans were not sure where the antitank ditch was located, and they fully believed the British forces in the garrison were preparing to evacuate by sea and thus would be completely demoralized and unwilling to fight.
+
+The Australians, on the other hand, conducted extensive aerial and ground reconnaissance in maintaining contact with the enemy. Their continuous deep patrolling not only supplied information but denied the Germans close observation of the garrison positions. Lack of cover and concealment forward of the defenses and artillery fire and antiaircraft fire also helped curtail the German reconnaissance efforts. Because of the Germans' lack of information, they conducted numerous probes that revealed to the Australians the intended location of the German attack.
+
+Command and Control Rommel was noted for leading from well forward in his armored command car. Before the Easter Battle, he had moved rapidly about the battlefield west of Tobruk by air and ground, urging his units on into their final positions around the perimeter. Though he had radio communication, his rapid movement caused him to outdistance the range of his radio, and as a result, he was out of touch with his corps headquarters as well as his subordinate units. Certain subordinate commanders thought this method of command and control also meant Rommel often did not know the true ground situation. General Toppe, in Desert Warfare: German Experiences in World War II, felt that higher level commanders should not change locations too frequently but rather remain with their command post at a fixed point, even if the situation was unclear.40 But Rommel thought differently. His philosophy was to see things for himself, to get a better grasp of the battlefield in order to make the right decisions.41 At dawn on 14 April, Rommel, having personally gone after the Ariete Division to get them to move up to reinforce the attack, went to within 100 yards of the gap in the antitank ditch, lost his communications, and was out of contact until
+0900, when he returned to his headquarters.42 Like their commander, Rommel's subordinate leaders also moved well forward.
+
+General Streich was to move with the 5th Panzer Regiment but got lost en route to their attack position. Colonel Olbrich, commander of the panzer regiment, led the tank attack, and Lieutenant Colonel Ponath, the 8th Machine Gun Battalion commander, led his battalion personally in the reconnaissance probes, in the breaching operation, and the main attack. The serious d.rawback, however, was that the German chain of command could not communicate with each other without physically moving to the rear, to the corps headquarters. Rommel also used a trusted representative, Lieutenant Schmidt, who moved along with General Streich to observe the action as it unfolded.
+
+General Morshead also had problems, though communicating from a fixed position was not as difficult as trying to maintain contact in a fluid battlefield situation. For the Australians, radio communication was not yet available for the infantry. A wire telephone network, following the normal lines of command, was laid from the fortress headquarters to the perimeter. Battalion headquarters had strung lines to the companies and from the companies to some of the posts, usually those where the platoon leaders were located. The exposed wire, however, was vulnerable to artillery fire. The most dependable means of communication were the separate artillery cable and wireless network. General Morshead and his commanders throughout the chain also habitually went forward to assess and supervise the preparations for the defense. It is important to note that during the battle, commanders and forward observers moved about whenever necessary to influence the battle as well as to personally lead their men.
+
+Training While neither opponent had received desert training, the British artillerymen were exceptionally well trained and disciplined in general, as shown by their stand against the German tanks. Though German subordinate units were equally well trained, they certainly had difficulty with night movement and navigation. As for Australian individual training, it was well advanced, the men having experienced some subunit training, but battalions and regiments had pot been exercised as units.
+
+In particular, German soldiers were well instructed in the use of mortars, dummy positions, and camouflage discipline. The Australians, on their part, were noted for their use of snipers, the bayonet, ground camouflage, target detection, and the use of surprise.
+
+Senior Leadership The two principal commanders were Rommel and Morshead.
+
+Rommel, on his part, was constantly at odds with his higher command, his Italian allies, and his immediate subordinate commander. His conflict with his higher headquarters resulted because he wanted support for an all-out offensive, while his superiors wanted him to conduct strategic defensive operations. (At the time, North Africa had a secondary role in the German grand strategy, behind the invasion of the USSR.) Rommel was also disconcerted by the Italians and their commander, General Gariboldi, for he felt that they were not equal to carrying out their share of the war, and their failures frequently had a critical effect on German operations. General Streich, the 5th Light Division commander, also posed problems for Rommel, for Streich continually criticized orders and had previously clashed with Rommel in Europe, where Rommel's division had taken credit for successes achieved by Streichs regiment.
+
+Streich was also reluctant to continue the assault on Tobruk and on Easter Sunday had an altercation with Rommel over the feasibility of continuing the attack. But though abrupt and impatient with his senior officers, Rommel was kind and understanding with the younger soldiers; he often shared their hardships, and he had earned their respect.
+
+General Morshead, on his part, had executed a well-controlled withdrawal ahead of Rommel, fighting a series of effective rearguard actions. He was respected for his judgment and experience and known for his high standards and extreme attention to detail. While he was a hard taskmaster, his thoroughness gave his men a feeling of security. Morshead, tough and competent, was supported by a capable group of devoted officers, who possessed all the technical and tactical skills needed to execute successful operations.
+
+Cohesion and Morale Both the Germans and the Australians were exhausted by
+14 April. The Australians, however, were close-knit, aggressive, devil-may-care types with a strong will to fight, yet with a contempt for heroics. Ironically, until the probing attack against the 2-l7th's positions on 11 April, the Germans had believed Australian morale was low. Consequently, they were both surprised and shaken by the Australians' stiff defense, including the weight of their artillery and their use of the bayonet. Though still well disciplined and confident, this experience caused the Germans to lose some of their arrogance.
+
+Battlefield Experience Many of the German units had fought as part of the 3d Panzer Division during the campaigns in western Europe and had been driving the British forces in front of them for three weeks. Up to the time of the battle, the Australians had been untried, but now they had fought an exhausting, yet successful, delaying action at Tobruk.
+
+Logistical Support Throughout the siege, the Australians, thanks to their navy, had sufficient food, water, and ammunition. Their rations were good and well balanced. In the forward posts, the meals were similar to C rations, except at night, when hot meals were brought forward. Their most critical shortages were tanks and antitank guns. These two items had a higher priority elsewhere at the time.
+
+The Germans, on the other hand, had serious problems. They were in desperate need of a port close to the front. Benghazi and Tripoli were 300 and 1,000 miles away, respectively. They needed 50,000 tons of supplies a month or 350 tons a day to support one division. Additionally, the Italians required 20,000
+tons per month. The Africa Corps was living from hand to mouth. Though capable of handling 50,000 tons monthly, Benghazi was reduced to 15,000 tons a month due to RAF bomber interdiction and a shortage of coastal shipping. The capacity at Tripoli was 45,000 tons per month,43 but once the offensive began, Rommel did not have the trucks to move materiel to the front. As a result, supplies piled up on the Tripoli dock8, while shortages were felt at the front. Though one of the major reasons Rommel wanted Tobruk was its port facility, in retrospect, it is doubtful its capture would have helped much. Theoretically capable of unloading 1,500 tons a day, in practice it rarely exceeded
+60O.
+
+Terrain and Weather Terrain and weather had an adverse effect on both German and fortress personnel alike. However, by virtue of being on the defense, in prepared positions, and tied to a support base, the elements and topography favored the Australians. The Germans operating in the open south of the 2-l7th's positions found it impossible to dig in because of the desert's underlying limestone layer. Consequently, to avoid detection, they had to lie motionless in the scorching sun with black flies swarming over their bodies. Night brought them bitter cold, and often the day blackened with raging sandstorms and hurricane-force winds.
+
+Good Fortune Everything seemed to go well for the Australians, while nothing seemed to go right for the Germans. The two-day sandstorm before the attack impeded the Germans' preparations but gave the Australians more time to enhance their positions. Getting lost en route to their objective cost the Germans their fire support, and as bad luck would have it, a defective spotlight on one of their lead vehicles blinked on and off revealing their position. Had the Germans received the more accurate Italian maps earlier, they might have picked a more suitable point to breach the Australian perimeter.
+
+Final Assessment The prime causes for the German failure at Tobruk were piecemealing of forces, a poor assessment of the garrison's defensive strength, and overconfidence. These factors affected the ability of the assault forces to retain the initiative and to hold, reinforce, and expand their penetration.
+
+In reviewing the Tobruk operations from the point of view of the principles of war, the German attack appeared doomed from the start. In their overconfidence and in their underestimation of the Australians' defensive strength, the Germans failed to adhere to the basic principles of war. Rommel's objective was not attainable. He did not possess the tanks, infantry, nor artillery necessary to encircle Tobruk and to penetrate to the city while at the same time maintaining his capability to continue an offensive to the Egyptian frontier. His objective had been clearly defined, and he was most decisive about its execution, but when it came time to go on the offensive at Tobruk, he could not retain the initiative or exploit it. Moreover, Rommel was unable to mass his forces to concentrate their combat power t the point of penetration. In a maneuver to encircle the fortress, he had piecemealed his forces in economy of force efforts, attacking, defending, delaying, and conducting deceptive operations, but failing to allocate enough forces to support the main attack with infantry and a mobile reserve.
+
+Rommel also had serious problems with unity of command, because the 5th Light Division commander strongly objected to his plan. At a critical point, Rommel had taken control from him and then given it back. The Germans also lost the element of surprise, because they could not avoid Australian observation and detection, which interfered with German movements. And finally, the German plan lacked simplicity, because it called for a night attack against a fortified position without sufficient intelligence or reconnaissance.
+
+Morshead, on the other hand, limited his objective to holding Tobruk at all costs. He was successful because he took the initiative away from the Germans, going on the offensive with a defense based on a program of deep patrolling, air and artillery interdiction, and aerial reconnaissance. Though spread thin in an economy of force effort to cover the 28-mile perimeter, he was able to mass his combat power at the critical time by establishing his defense in depth. This defense included a mobile reserve placed in position to maneuver on short notice to relieve pressure on the defense or, if possible, to take the initiative and exploit a successful defense.
+
+As for unity of command, even though General Lavaraok had overall command of the area, General Morshead was responsible for the defense of the garrison. Nonetheless, there was total cooperation between the two, and they shared a common objective.
+
+The Germans never acquired an advantage over the Australians because they were unable to penetrate their security.
+
+Again, by aggressive patrolling, air and artillery interdiction, use of snipers, and excellent camouflage, the Australians denied the Germans the opportunity to gain information and kept them continuously off-balance.
+
+Furthermore, the Australians achieved surprise at several critical times during the five days of action. For instance, the Germans were thrown completely off guard by the Australians'
+aggressive use of snipers, bayonets, artillery, and rapid counterattack. The Germans were also surprised when their tanks were ambushed by the 25-pounders and when the Australian infantry allowed German tanks to pass through the initial defenses before engaging the dismounted troops that followed. The simplicity of the Australian plan influenced its almost flawless execution.
+
+In its implementation, fires were well coordinated, positions were mutually supporting, and counterattack forces were properly rehearsed.
+
+The battle for Tobruk is a set piece for light infantry supported by artillery, armor, and antitank weapons in the defense against a heavier armored force. At Tobruk, Rommel had been denied a critical objective, and his blitzkrieg tactics had failed.
+
+Psychologically, it was a shocking blow to German morale, cohesion, and momentum. For the British and their allies, it provided a long-needed boost in morale.
+
+A captured panzer officer called Tobruk "a witches cauldron."45 German prisoners were to refer to it later as "the hell of Tobruk," admitting that nothing like it had ever happened to them before.46 Allied forces had made a lasting impression on the German and Italian forces in North Africa.
+
+Lessons Learned Many lessons were learned from the experiences at Tobruk, both by the Germans and the Allies, concerning tactics, weapons, equipment, logistics, and training. The following are some of these lessons, some arrived at from the German perspective, others from the Australian and British view of things.
+
+o Well-balanced, closely coordinated teams of armored forces
+infantry, field artillery, engineers, antiaircraft, and air forces
+were the organizations that achieved the best results in desert fighting. However, infantry units, if well balanced, were able to defend themselves against tank attacks from various directions when supported by artillery.
+
+o Infantry battalions, with a proportionate allotment of supporting weapons on the present scale of provision, were not strong enough to provide themselves with all-around defense against an attack in force by tanks. Moreover, there was not enough room inside a battalion sector for a portion of the artillery to be placed to carry out a normal artillery role, which is essential to the defensive plan. Battalion-defended positions must therefore be placed in groups sufficiently close to each other to ensure that the ground between them can be effectively covered by antitank, small-arms, and mortar fire. In addition, each group must be arranged so that the artillery is protected from direct attack from any direction.
+
+o Brigade defensive areas must be established so that from whatever direction attacks may come, each area can be supported by the artillery fire of adjacent areas. If brigades have to be placed in isolated positions, the general plan of defense must provide for their withdrawal in the event an enemy obtains freedom of action in the area in which they are positioned.
+
+Otherwise, the enemy will be able to concentrate its attack againat such brigades and destroy them in detail.
+
+o Artillery and antitank guns must form the nucleus of all defended positions and sectors. Therefore, organization and establishment of defenses is primarily an artillery and antitank problem and must be treated as such. No defended area can hope to stop a tank attack if the antitank defense is not in depth.
+
+The 25-pounder troops should not constitute the depth but only add to it. As far as resources permit, there must be depth in the disposition of antitank guns in front of the 25-pounder troop positions.
+
+- When the enemy is attacking, he must be brought to a halt by the fire of antitank guns, while the artillery concentrates upon the unarmored portion of his force. A plan must then be made to attack him in the flank or rear, using the largest number of tanks possible, supported by all available weapons.
+
+Artillery will be used either to provide concentrations of fire against the enemy's supporting weapons or to blind them by using smoke. All available machine guns and small arms must be used to neutralize enemy antitank guns, to force enemy tanks to remain buttoned up, and to prevent any movement of dismounted troops with the tanks.
+
+- Not only must antitank guns hold their fire until tanks are well within their effective range, but they must wait until tanks are within range of other guns of the defensive sector. If guns open fire individually, they reduce the effect of surprise and run the risk of having the whole of the attacker's fire concentrated on each, in turn. It is, however, dangerous for a gun to remain silent when it has obviously been located by the enemy tanks or supporting weapons.48 The Bren gun (or similar weapon) with each antitank gun must be used to force the enemy tanks to button up.
+
+- Antitank guns must always be dug in, even if a position is only to be occupied temporarily.
+
+- Usually 2-pounder antitank batteries were directed not to use direct lay against tanks until tanks were within 800 yards of their positions. For 25-pounders, direct fire was held until the enemy vehicles were within 1,000 yards. Opening fire at
+600 yards was found to be too short a distance because the enemy machine guns were then within effective range. At 800 yards, the antitank gun was nearly as accurate as at 600 yards, whereas the machine gun had lost considerable accuracy and was unlikely to penetrate gun shields.49
+- All artillery covering an area of a division or brigade must be under the command of one artillery officer so that the maximum concentration of fire can be brought to bear in support of any one area.
+
+- A 25-pounder battery position should be organized for allaround defense with small-arms weapons used against the possibility of attack by infantry at night, in smoke, or in duststorms.
+
+o The artillery must know the infantry, machine-gun, mortar, and antitank fire plan.
+
+o Every defended position or sector must be prepared to defend against attack from any direction. All-around defense is essential.
+
+- To deny enemy aircraft from penetrating through the harbor unobserved, antiaircraft gun defenses and observation posts at Tobruk were established on the escarpment overlooking the harbor.
+
+o When enemy dive-bombers attacked antiaircraft gun positions, the safest course of action was to engage them, rather than take cover.
+
+o Gun towers were also used by the artillery to gain height for observing fire. These observation post (OP) ladders were used both as dummies to draw fire and for observation. They were mounted on trucks or could be removed quickly and set up. The British observation towers were generally about twenty-five feet high. The Germans had a two-piece telescoping tube mounted on the side of their armored OP, which could be cranked up into observing position. To employ these gun towers effectively, numbers of themat least one to each four gunsshould be used. These, like tanks and the slight rises in the ground, aid in overcoming the flatness of the desert.5
+o All infantry sections and platoons and all antitank-gun, machine-gun, and mortar subunits must know the areas they are to cover, the ranges at which they are to open fire, and the types of targets they are to engage. They must also know where, for how long, and in what circumstances artillery defensive fire will be brought down and how it is proposed to make use of smoke. Distances to tactical features must be paced off, not guessed. Range marks must be put up. The maximum ranges at which fire is to be opened by each different type of weapon must also be paced off and marked on the ground with rocks, tins, or some other means.5'
+o Troops must be made to dig in at once upon taking up a position, however tired they may be. This applies to machinegun, mortar, antitank gun, and field artillery units, as well as to infantry platoons.
+
+o Positions must be kept concealed. Trucks must not be allowed to drive around stopping to deliver rations except during mirage hours or in darkness. The enemy will spend hours watching for such clues as to the location of positions.
+
+o The existence of mineflelds must never be allowed to induce a false sense of security. Commanders must take frequent action to make certain this does not happen. The deeper the minefield, the greater the need for forward patrolling. Mineflelds can be used to economize in antitank weapons employed, but not in infantry.
+
+o The principle of concentration at the decisive point of attack applies to the allotment of mines and laying of mineflelds as much as to other aspects of war. Small dispersed minefields are useless.
+
+o There must be enough access lanes to enable troops to move in and out of minefields without undue difficulty. One foot exit on each company front and one vehicle exit on each battalion front was the minimum.52
+o Dummy mineflelds can be used to deceive the enemy. Also, dummy lanes are deceptive and excellent for ambushes.
+
+o When the Germans used tanks to cover the breaching of mineflelds by their engineers, the British used well-directed smallarms fire and machine guns to engage them from the flanks as well as snipers to drive them off.
+
+o In the desert, every gun was dug into a pit, if time permitted, and covered with a net; every tent was set in a pit and camouflaged; and even each tank had a canvas top placed over it to make it look like a truck. All vehicles were painted with nonglare, sand-colored paint, and all glass was smeared with oil or a glycerine solution, and then dirt was thrown on these surfaces. Only a narrow unsmeared slit on the windshield was left to obtain vision. Wheel tracks were everywhere but could not be disguised or obliterated.
+
+A liberal application of dull yellow paintthe color of the sandwas found to be the best method of rendering both artillery pieces and trucks less visible in the desert. The outlines of pieces were broken by the use of scrub and sand mats. The barrel and cradle were sometimes painted a dull sandy color, except for a one-foot diagonal stripe of light brown or green to break up the pattern of the gun. Motor vehicles carried camouflage nets, which were stretched taut from a central position on the roof of the vehicle at an angle of not more than 45 degrees and then pegged to the ground and covered with threaded screen and bleached canvas or with pieces of sandbags, 50 to 70 percent of which were painted a dull yellowish white. The vehicles themselves were painted cream white, broken by irregular patches of light brown or green. The object was to neutralize dark shadows by an equivalent amount of dull white. The Germans and British adopted this sand color as camouflage. During operations, German tanks were painted black, evidently to aid their antitank gunners in quick daytime identifications while also serving as night camouflage.53
+o As a security measure and to prevent unauthorized persons gaining information regarding the identification of units and movement of troops, the practice of marking vehicles with unit designations was discontinued by the British. A code system employing colors and combinations of colors with numbers (to indicate various tactical organizations) was adopted.54
+- All defended localities and areas must be covered by mobile outposts to give warning of approach, to deny close observation of the position to the enemy, and to harass and delay his advance.
+
+o All motorcycles, including half-track motorcycles, proved unsatisfactory for the Germans and were replaced eventually by Volkswagens.
+
+o Movement of units or replacements to the desert in the summer resulted in more metabolic disorders than during the rest of the year.
+
+o A period of acclimatization is not absolutely essential before engagement of troops, as efficiency is not greatly affected upon arrival.
+
+o After one year in the hot desert climate, troops should be rotated to a different theater, as their efficiency and health declines rapidly. Units carried more supplies than was contemplated by peacetime training; seven days' supply was advocated by many units, and the Germans were said to carry fourteen. Each unit sent into the desert needed to be as self-sustaining as possible.55
+- The British relied on supply dumps to a greater extent than the Germans, who used supply trains. The artillery played an important role in the defense of both dumps and columns.
+
+o German maintenance and recovery units went into battle with their tanks. The British did not have this capability and suffered accordingly.
+
+- The Germans gave much attention to the effect of the tropical sun on their munitions and weapons. All ammunition other than small-arms ammunition was especially packed for the tropics. All munition cases were so marked. Normal charges for tropical use were calculated at an average temperature of
+770 Fahrenheit.56
+Flashless powder was highly desirable, especially for medium and heavy artillery, which were the favorite targets of djve-bombers, strafing fire, and enemy batteries. Weapons were difficult to detect at a distance when this type of propellant was used. The use of separate-loading ammunition placed any weapon at a disadvantage during action against armored vehicles.57
+o Extensive use on both sides was made of captured machine guns, antiaircraft weapons, artillery, tanks, and motor vehicles.
+
+o In regard to tank and antitank technology, the Germans felt that all tank and antitank systems should have the longest possible range since the enemy could be seen at great distances, and it was critical to engage him before he engaged you. Because there was little cover and only a few reverse slope positions in the desert, they said it was desirable to have only vehicles and weapon systems with a low silouette. They determined it was especially important to have tanks that were fast, maneuverable, and equipped with long-range guns.58
+o Shortage of tank crews was a greater problem than the shortage of tanks.
+
+o German units that were transferred to Africa during the course of the campaign there received no specialized training owing to the fact that the orders for their transfer came so unexpectedly that there was no time for this purpose. However, in a suggestion submitted to the army High Command by the army in Africa, the following training subjects were considered important:
+
+- Exercises of all types in marching and combat in open,
+sandy terrain.
+- Cover and camouflage in open terrain.
+- Aiming and firing of all weapons in open terrain and
+at extremely long ranges.
+- Recognition and designation of targets without instruments. Aiming and firing exercises were to be carried
+out by daylight, at night, in the glaring sun, during
+twilight, facing the sun, with the back to the sun, with the sun shining from one side, by moonlight, and with
+artificial lighting.
+- Exercises
+during extreme heat.
+- Exercises of long duration with no billeting accommodations.
+- The construction of shelters in sandy terrain.
+- Practice in night driving and in driving over sandy
+terrain.
+- Marching at night in level terrain.
+- Orientation by compass or by the stars.
+- Driving by compass.
+- Recovery of tanks and other vehicles in sandy terrain.
+- Laying and removing mines in sandy terrain.
+- Exercises in mobile warfare.59
+
+## Appendix A Tobruk Fortress Order Of Battle, 14 April 1941
+
+HQ 9th Aust Div & Tobruk Fortress
+9th Aust Div Intelligence Sec
+HQ 3d Armored Bde (60 x tanks working; another 26 tanks in
+repair)
+3d Hussars/5 the Royal Tanks (Det 4 x light tanks and 18
+cruisers)
+1st Royal Tank Regt (Det 15 x light tanks and 19 x cruisers)
+1st Kings Dragoon Guards (30 x armored cars)
+4th Royal Tank Regt (Troop of 4 x infantry tanks)
+18th Cavalry Regt (Indian)
+
+HQ Royal Horse Artillery
+1st RHA Regt
+(16 x 25-pounders)
+3d RHA (minus one btry)
+(16 x 2-pounder antitank
+guns)
+104th RHA Regt
+(16 x 25-pounders)
+107th RHA Regt
+(16 x 25-pounders)
+51st Field Regt
+(12 x 18-pounders and 12 x
+4.5 inch how)
+2-3d Aust Antitank Regt
+(Unk no., type, Bofors
+(minus one btry)
+37-mm; Breda 47/32-mm;
+2-pounders)
+HQ Royal Australian Engineers
+2-3d Aust Field Company
+2-7th Aust Field Company
+2-13th Aust Field Company
+2-4th Aust Field Company
+2-4th Aust Field Park Company
+2-1st Aust Pioneer Battalion
+Signals 9th Aust Div
+HQ 18th Aust Inf Bde
+Sig Sec
+16th Aust Antitank Company
+2-9th Aust Inf Bn
+2-10th Aust Inf Bn 2-12th Aust Inf Bn
+HQ 20th Aust Inf Bde
+Sig Sec
+20th Aust Antitank Company
+2-13th Aust ml Bn
+2-15th Au8t Inf Bn
+2-17th Aust Inf Bn
+HQ 24th Aust Inf Bde (-)
+(2-25th Inf Bn still in Australia)
+Sig Sec
+24th Aust Antitank Co
+2-28th Aust Inf Bn
+2-43d Aust Inf Bn
+HQ 26th Aust Inf Bde
+Sig Sec
+26th Aust Antitank Co
+2-23d Aust Inf Bn
+2-24th Aust Inf Bn 2-48th Aust Inf Bn
+
+1 Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (Machine Gun Bn)
+
+HQ Aust Army Service Corps (AASC)
+9th Aust Div Supply Column 9th Aust Div Ammunition Co 9th Aust Div Petroleum Co
+Composite Co AASC
+7th Aust Div Supply Column
+2-3d Aust Field Ambulance Co
+2-8th Aust Field Ambulance Co
+2-11th Aust Field Ambulance Co
+2-5th Aust Field Ambulance Co
+2-4th Field Hygiene Co
+
+9th Aust Div Provost Co 9th Aust Div Protection Platoon
+9th Aust Div Empl Platoon
+9th Aust Div Postal Unit
+9th Aust Salvage Unit
+
+## Fortress Troops
+
+Royal Artillery
+HQ 4th Antiaircraft (AA) Bde
+13th Light AA Regt
+14th Light AA Regt
+51st Heavy AA Regt
+3d Aust Light AA Regt
+
+## Notts Yeomanry (Coast Defense)
+
+Royal Engineers (under chief royal engineer, 9th Aust Div)
+295th Field Co Royal Engineers 551st Tps Co Royal Engineers
+4th Field Sqd Royal Engineers
+143d Field Park Troops
+Signals (under Cdr Signals, 9th Aust Div)
+K Base Section
+27th Line Maintenance Section
+Royal Army Service Corps (RASC)
+309th Reserve Motor Co 345th Reserve Motor Co
+550th Co
+RASC 4th Lt AA Bde RASC Sec 13th Lt AA Regt
+No. 1 Water Tank Co
+
+## Medical 16Th Mac
+
+Ordnance (Royal Army Ordnance Corps [RAOCJ)
+2d Armored Div Workshops RAOC
+Y Army Tank Receiving Section, RAOC
+2d Spt Gp Ord Field Park Sec, RAOC
+
+A Sec Ord Field Park AAOC
+2-1st AFW AAOC
+Det 2-2d AFW AAOC
+
+## Tobruk Subarea
+
+HQ Tobruk Subarea
+1st Libyan Refugee Bn
+2d Libyan Refugee Bn
+4th Libyan Refugee Bn HQ 45th Group
+1205th Indian Pioneer Co
+1206th Indian Pioneer Co
+1207th Indian Pioneer Co Libyan Work Bn Army Post Office H Adv Stationary Depot Transit Camp Misc Detachments:
+Greek Civilians POW Cage
+
+## Appendix B* The North African Campaigns
+
+Source George Forty, Afrika Korps at War (New York: Charles Scribnef a Sons,
+1978), 9.
+
+## Appendix C* German Offensive Tactics
+
+A German tank battalion in tactical formation moves in short rushes, taking advantage of the terrain. Frequently the whole regiment advanced in mass formation with lines of tanks at regular intervals of about 50 yards, advancing in waves. The relatively close formation is more readily controlled than a widely dispersed one. Field artillery and antitank weapons are kept up close, although their location is not apparent until they go into action, usually on the flanks of the tank column. The Germans have in the past been able to bring effective artillery and antitank fire to bear on the British before the British could effectively fire upon them. In addition, RAF planes, because of the pilots' inability to distinguish between their own and German tanks, have not attacked German tank formations in the forward areas.
+
+d.
+
+Offensive Tactics In the desert frontal attacks have not often been used, an effort being made more often to attack from one or both flanks.
+
+German tanks usually open fire at 1,500 to 2,000 yards, which is beyond the effective range of the hostile weapons that they have thus far encountered. When contact is made, the speed of advance is slowed down unless the movement is a quick thrust to force the withdrawal of weaker hostile forces. The 75-mm and
+50-mm guns are used to keep hostile tanks out of range.
+
+(1)
+Usual German objectives.The object of the Germans is to knock out quickly as many of the antitank guns and foremost field guns as may be visible. When the German tank commander has decided to attack a position, his first objective has often been the British 25-pounders. By reconnaissance in tanks he first locates the British battery positions and makes his plans. This plan in principle always appears to be the same.
+
+He decides which battery to attack and he arranges to attack it from enfilade. His attack is made with 105-mm guns, the 88-
+mm dual-purpose guns, and both Mark III and IV tanks. The
+105-mm guns fire from covered positions; their observation posts are in tanks. The 88-mm dual-purpose guns are towed. These guns use direct fire from their trailers after attaining defiladed positions at ranges varying from 2,000 to 2,500 yards. The Mark IV tanks assume positions in defilade and fire over open sights at ranges varying from 2,000 to 2,500 yards. The high velocity
+75-mm gun in the Mark IV tank and the 88-mm dual-purpose gun have far higher muzzle velocities than any artillery that the British have had in the desert.
+
+(2)
+German Mark III tanks.The Mark III tank is used as the main striking force in attack. It has the dominant role in tank-versus-tank combat. Its heavy armor and powerful 50-mm gun give it a decided advantage over all types of tanks which it has thus far encountered in the desert. The 75-mm gun in the Mark IV tank is not an antitank gun but a close-support weapon. Its maximum range is 7,000 yards. Frequently these tanks use direct laying from a defiladed position in which, owing to the location of the gun in the turret, they offer a very small target. At other times the fire is massed, with indirect laying, and is adjusted by forward or flank observers in tanks.
+
+Tanks rarely fire while moving, although in at least one instance they were used to fire a rolling barrage at from 3,000 to 4,000 yards while advancing slowly. This forced the oppOsing tanks to close up doors and turrets.
+
+The first wave of Mark III tanks overrun the gun positions.
+
+The second wave of Mark III tanks is closely followed by the motorized infantry, which detrucks only when forced to and cleans up the position with small-arms fire, assisted by tanks which accompany it. After the artillery has neutralized the tanks, the support infantry is attacked. Such attacks have nearly always neutralized the artillery, either by destroying it when the attack was driven home, or by forcing it to withdraw before the tank attack was launched. A successful defense against such attacks has been made only when a tank force was available to launch a counterattack from concealed positions against the flank of the German tank attack.
+
+(3)
+The German Mark IV tanks used as artillery.In the attack the Germans maneuver to some position where their Mark IV tanks can take up a position in defilade. The Germans meanwhile make a reconnaissance, probing the enemy from all directions to test his strength, and to induce the defenders to disclose their positions by opening fire. During this period, observation posts keep close watch, and any guns which disclose their positions are marked down for destruction when the main attack begins. Then, from their defliaded positions, the Mark IV's attack by fire all antitank guns or light artillery which are visible and within range. Light artillery, antitank guns, and machine guns with the same mission are pushed forward among and to the flanks of the tanks. Observers and occasionally infantry are pushed further forward.
+
+Each German tank battalion has one company of 10 Mark IV tanks, which are employed in 2 principal roles: as highly mobile artillery, and as a component of a fast-moving column.
+
+Often field artillery cannot be immediately available in armored engagements; the Mark IV tank with its 75-mm gun together with the artillery of the armored division provides German armored formations with the necessary heavy firepower for a breakthrough.
+
+The maximum range of the 75-mm gun is reported to be
+9,000 yards. This relatively long range dictates to troops equipped with light antitank guns the time and place of a battle.
+
+In addition, the speed of the Mark IV tank is sufficient to enable it to take part in a rapid advance with the Mark III
+tanks. The Germans have used these tanks as sniper guns, as artillery against forward British columns, and as heavy concealed weapons in the ambushes into which German armored cars have tried to draw the British cars. In a defensive situation the Mark IV is able to engage British troops from outside the range of the antitank guns, avoiding at the same time, by their mobility, the British artillery fire.
+
+(4)
+Field artillery support.The 105-mm mobile batteries and the 75-mm guns of the Mark IV tank furnish the principal artillery support for the German Mark ill tank, which is the main attacking tank. Sometimes the 88-mm dual-purpose gun is used in conjunction with the Mark III tank.
+
+Some reports indicate that the direction of this supporting fire is carried out by a system of air bursts, since air bursts have been immediately followed by HE concentrations. The fire of 75-mm and 105-mm guns using HE shells has not been reported to be extremely effective. Casualties caused to personnel and tanks by these weapons have been reported to be the result of a new flarea 75-mm shell which envelopes the tank in flames regardless of what portion of the tank is hit. One whole tank regiment was reported destroyed by this type of projectile.
+
+Although the casualties caused from these weapons may be slight, all reports agree that they have a high nuisance value to tanks because of the blinding effect of the smoke and dust.
+
+The 88-mm is effective; tanks hit squarely by this gun are destroyed..
+
+e.
+
+German Methods of Forcing Gaps through Mine fields A heavy artillery concentration is placed on the point to be forced and upon the defending troops in the vicinity. After the defenders' resistance is lowered by the concentration, a comparatively small number of foot troops advance to the gap under cover of smoke or of dust raised by the concentration; they locate the mines by prodding the ground with bayonets or with mine detectors; the mines are then removed. Casualties are replaced from a reserve unit that is held immediately in the rear. This method was used in forcing a gap through the mine field that was part of the defenses of Tobruk; the preliminary concentration lasted for two hours. After a gap is forced and marked, infantry followed by tanks or tanks followed by infantry attack through the gap. Infantry preceded the tanks in the battle of Tobruk.
+
+## Appendix D* British Antitank Operations
+
+a.
+
+Organization Since the number of guns in use in Cyrenaica has been inadequate, all available are used or emplaced before the close of each operation. The antitank weapons, which are considered artillery by the British, are under the command of the division artillery commander in the British forces, and he is responsible for so placing his artillery and antitank guns that they will be mutually supporting. For any action the artillery commander issues the necessary orders alloting the antitank weapons to both artillery and infantry units.
+
+Antitank artillery regiments of 2-pounders consist of 3 battalions of 2 batteries of 8 guns each, totaling 48 guns. They are organized exactly in the same manner as the artillery units except for the number of personnel assigned. A few 6-pounder and 18-pounder batteries are being used. The 6-pounder guns are mounted portee, and the 18-pounders are truck-drawn. These units are also organized in the same fashion as the artillery batteries. The trucks used for the 2-pounders and 6-pounders portee are in general of the 1 1/2-ton type.
+
+The minimum amount of antitank guns required with units necessarily depends on the type of country; the more open the country, the larger the number of guns needed. In the desert where there are no natural tank obstacles an attack may come from any direction. Headquarters and rear echelons must be protected. The large frontages covered and the wide dispersion necessary to minimize the efforts of air attack make this problem of protecting rear elements a difficult one.
+
+In the western desert there have been in use no antitank warning systems, but the British make use of armored car patrols to prevent any surprises, and, as a rule, when one weapon fires, all prepare for action. OP's [observation posts] to the front and flank warn by visual signals of the approach of the enemy armor.
+
+b.
+
+Positions In some cases one battery of twelve 2-pounder antitank guns is detailed to protect each infantry regiment. Each attached supporting battery of artillery is often given one troop of four antitank 2-pounder guns. Organic artillery has the support of one antitank troop per artillery battery. These 2-pounder antitank units are not usually grouped or held in reserve at any point but are actually placed in positions from 100 to 300 yards from the unit protected.
+
+British artillery regiments are armed with 25-pounders which, although not so designed, have formed the basis of the antitank defense. This has been necessary, because the 2-
+pounder antitank gun has not proved effective. The 25-pounders are sited to give protection in depth, and, where the terrain permits, to give all-around protection to the position.
+
+Antitank guns are placed to cover the 25-pounders in front, in intervals, and on the flanks. A proportion of them may be kept on wheels to counter a threat from an unexpected direction.
+
+The fewer the total number of antitank guns, the larger will be the proportion kept in mobile reserve. But positions which guns may have to occupy will in most cases be reconnoitered and prepared beforehand.
+
+Despite the fact that the British have usually operated with one and sometimes two 48-gun antitank regiments to the division, they have still found the number to be too small, and consequently have had their choice of positions affected by the necessity of choosing terrain which could allow them the maximum use of their inadequate number of antitank guns.
+
+Unless otherwise dictated by the terrain, it is considered better to place the few antitank guns in comparatively small localities for all-around defense rather than to attempt a complete defense in depth over a wide area. The batteries of 25-pounders are used to provide depth to the defense. Antitank weapons are often placed from 100 to 300 yards on the flank of a battalion in action. For all-around defense of an organization, they are placed from 500 to 1,000 yards in front or on the flank of a battalion with instructions to move close to the battalion position when tanks approach within 1,000 yards of their positions.
+
+.
+
+.
+
+
+.
+
+. Harassing and bombardment tasks are carried out by the 25-pounder guns that are situated in covered positions.
+
+The efforts to avoid observation are directed toward concealmerit and protection. Scrub ground, or other rough ground, is chosen wherever possible, and digging is done with great care.
+
+Movement of all personnel is rigidly controlled.
+
+Guns are placed so as to give effect to the principle of concentration of fire. This is necessary, as the German tanks usually attack in a mass, which cannot be engaged effectively by single guns.
+
+## Notes
+
+1.
+Ernst Bolbrinker. "5th Panzer Regiment (1314 Apr 1941)." Foreign Military Studies No. MS D-088 (Historical Section, U.S. Army Europe, 1947),
+translation from the German by Colonel Gunter Siebert, U.S. Army War
+College Class, 1984, 2.
+2.
+AIF (Middle East), the Military History and Information Section, Active
+Service: With Australia in the Middle East, (Canberra: The Buok of
+Management of the Australian War Memorial, 1941), 35.
+3.
+Ian Stanley Ord Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. 2, The
+Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally (1941) (London: Her Majesty's
+Stationery Office, 1956), 38.
+4.
+Barton Maughan, Tobruk and El Alamein: Australia in the War of 1939
+1945 (Adelaide: The Griffin Press, 1966), 225.
+5.
+Peter Firkins, The Australians in Nine Wars: Waikato to Longtan (New
+York: McGraw-Hill, 1972), 232.
+6.
+Maughan, Tobruk, 267.
+7.
+Ibid., 210.
+8.
+John Strawson, The Battle for North Africa (New York: Charles Scribner's
+Sons, 1969), 57.
+9.
+Maughan, Tobruk, 125.
+10.
+Generalmajor Alfred Toppe, et al, "Desert Warfare: German Experiences
+in World War II." Extracted from Foreign Military Studies No. MS P.129
+(Mimeographed. Historical Division, U.S. Army Europe, 1952), 66.
+11.
+Ibid., 66.
+12.
+Maughan, Tobruk, 131.
+13.
+John Robertson, Australia at War, 19391945 (Victoria: Brown Prior Anderson Pty Ltd., 1981), 16.
+14.
+Maughan, Tobruk, 159.
+15.
+ibid., 159.
+16.
+Ibid., 169.
+17.
+Anthony Heckstall-Smith, Tobruk: The Story of a Siege (New York: W. W.
+Norton, 1960), 121.
+18.
+Maughan, Tobruk, 410.
+19.
+Ibid., 120.
+20.
+John Cumpston, The Rats Remain: Tobruk Siege 1941 (Melbourne: Grayflower Productions, 1966), 208.
+21.
+Ibid., 76.
+22.
+George Forty, Afrika Korps at War (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
+1978), 48.
+23.
+Playfair, Mediterranean, 35.
+24.
+Ibid., 13.
+25.
+Ibid., 13, 342.
+26.
+G. B. Jarrett, West of Alamein (Northridge, CA: Sentry Books, 1971), 64.
+27.
+Playfair, Mediterranean, 341.
+28.
+Ibid., 299.
+29.
+Maughan, Tobruk, 19.
+30.
+Chester [R.W.W.J Wilmot, Tobruk, 1941: Capture, Siege, Relief (Sydney:
+Angus and Robertson, 1944), quoted in Maughan, Tobruk, 133.
+31.
+Ibid.
+32.
+Boibrinker, "5th Panzer Regiment," 2.
+33.
+Maughan, Tobruk, 145.
+34.
+Boibrinker, "5th Panzer Regiment."
+35.
+Chester [R.W.WJ Wilmot, Tobruk, 1941, quoted in Maughan, Tobruk, 133.
+36.
+Playfair, Mediterranean, 38.
+37.
+Wolf Heckmann, Rommel's War in Africa (New York: Doubleday, 1981), 82.
+38.
+Ibid.
+39.
+Ibid., 83.
+40. Toppe, et al, "Desert Warfare," 83.
+41.
+Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953),
+122.
+42.
+Ibid., 125.
+43.
+Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton
+(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 184.
+44.
+Ibid., 187.
+45.
+Heckstall-Smith, Tobruk, 63.
+46.
+Ibid.
+47.
+U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Department of Tactics,
+RB 100-6, Battalion and Brigade Operations: Main Lessons of Recent Operations in the Western Desert (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1976), 237.
+48.
+Ibid., 235.
+49.
+U.S. War Department, Military Intelligence Service, Artillery in the Desert
+(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 25 November 1942),
+78.
+50.
+Ibid., 42.
+51.
+CGSC, DTAC, Main Lessons, 238.
+52.
+Ibid., 241.
+53.
+U.S. War Department, Artillery in the Desert, 45.
+54.
+Ibid., 47.
+55.
+Ibid., 1.
+56.
+Ibid., 37.
+57.
+Ibid.
+58.
+Toppe, 66.
+59.
+Ibid., 10.
+
+## Bibliography
+
+AIF (Middle East). Military History and Information Section. Active Service:
+With Australia in the Middle East. Canberra: The Book of Management
+of the Australian War Memorial, 1941.
+Australian War Memorial, Canberra. Pictorial Hi8 tory of Australia at War,
+193945. Vols. IV. Canberra: [S.N.}, 1959.
+Boibrinker, Ernst. "5th Panzer Regiment 1314 Apr 1941." Foreign Military
+Studies No. MS D-088. Historical Section, U.S. Army Europe, 1947. Trans
+lation from the German by Col. Gunter Siebert, U.S. Army War College
+Class, 1984.
+Cumpston, John S. The Rats Remain: Tobruk Siege 1941. Melbourne: Grayflower Productions, 1966.
+Firkins, Peter. The Australians in Nine Wars: Waikato to Longtan. New York:
+McGraw-Hill, 1972.
+Forty, George. Afrika Korps at War. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1978.
+Heckmann, Wolf. Rommel's War in Africa. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981.
+Heckstall.Smith, Anthony. Tobruk: The Story of a Siege. New York: W. W.
+Norton, 1960.
+Homer, D. M. High Command: Australia and Allied Strategy, 19391945.
+North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd., 1982.
+Jarrett, G. B. West of Alamein, Northridge, CA: Sentry Books, 1971.
+Maughan, Barton. Tobruk and El Alamein: Australia in the War of 19391945.
+Adelaide: Griffin Press, 1966.
+Playfair, Ian Stanley Ord. The Mediterranean and Middle East. Vol. 2. The
+Germans Come to the Help of Their Ally (1941). London: Her Majesty's
+Stationery Office, 1956.
+Robertson, John. Australia at War, 19391945. Victoria: Brown Prior Anderson
+Pty Ltd., 1981.
+Rommel, Erwin. The Rommel Papers. New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1953.
+Stmawson, John. The Battle for North Africa. New York: Charles Scribner's
+Sons, 1969.
+Toppe, Alfred, Generalmajor, et al. "Desert Warfare: German Experiences in
+World War II." Extracted from Foreign Military Studies No. MS P-129.
+Mimeographed. Historical Division, U.S. Army Europe, 1952.
+U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Department of Tactics. RB
+100-6. Battalion and Brigade Operations. Main Lessons of Recent Operations in the Western Desert. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1976.
+U.S. War Department. Military Intelligence Service. Artillery in the Desert.
+Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 25 November 1942.
+German Methods of War in the Libyan Desert. Washington, DC: U.S.
+Government Printing Office, 9 July 1942.
+U.S. Military Academy, West Point. Department of Military Art and Engineering. The War in North Africa. Pt. 1. (Operations in Egypt and Libya). 2
+vols. West Point, NY: U.S. Military Academy Press, 19451950.
+Van Creveld, Martin L. Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton.
+Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
+Weeks, John. Men Against Tanks: A History of Anti-Tank Warfare. New York:
+Mason/Charter, 1975.
+Young, Peter, ed. The World Almanac Book of World War If. Englewood Cliffs,
+NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1981.
+Young, Desmond. Romme!, the Desert Fox. New York: Harper and Brothers,
+1950.
+Colonel Ward A. Miller is currently chief of the Force Readiness Division, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C. He received a B.S. degree from Indiana Uni-ersity, an M.Ed. from Loyola University of Chicago, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, the U.S. Army War College, and the Harvard Program for Senior Officials in National Security. Miller's previous assignments included serving as an author-instructor, Department of Tactics, USACGSC, the commander of the 2d Battalion (Airborne), 508th Infantry, and the G3, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
+
+## Combat Studies Institute
+
+Missions The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June 1979 as a department-level activity within the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. CS! has the following missions:
+
+1.
+Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to the doctrinal concerns of
+the Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for the Active
+Army and Reserve Components.
+2.
+Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist
+other USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their
+instruction.
+3.
+Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's executive agent
+for the development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program
+of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system.

markdown/marines/MCTP 3-32A.md

@@ -0,0 +1,736 @@
+# Marine Air-Ground Task Force Combat Camera
+
+U.S. Marine Corps DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
+
+# (Formerly Mcwp 3-33.7)
+
+DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
+Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20350-3000
+
+# 4 April 2018 Change 1 To Mctp 3-32A Marine Air-Ground Task Force Combat Camera
+
+1. This publication has been edited to ensure gender neutrality of all applicable and appropriate terms, except those terms governed by higher authority.   No other content has been affected. 2. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication. Reviewed and approved this date.
+
+## By Direction Of The Commandant Of The Marine Corps
+
+Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration Publication Control Numbers: Publication: 147 000018 00 Change: 147 000018 01
+
+# Erratum To Mcwp 3-33.7 Marine Air-Ground Task Force Combat Camera
+
+##
+
+1. Change all instances of MCWP 3-33.7, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Combat Camera, to MCTP 3-32A, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Combat Camera.
+
+ 2. Change PCN 143 000105 00 to PCN 147 000018 00. 3. File this transmittal sheet in the front of this publication.
+
+DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
+Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20380-1775
+
+## Foreword
+
+Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-33.7, Marine Air-Ground Task Force Combat Camera, informs the Marine airground task force (MAGTF) commander and staff planners on combat camera (COMCAM) capabilities. Combat camera is an information resource that provides a timely, accurate, "you-arethere" imagery perspective on military operations. It is essential to internal and external communications. The need for COMCAM capabilities will increase as the Marine Corps reaches Marine families, interacts with domestic and international media, and provides tactical imagery to enhance force protection and situational awareness. To expedite their decisionmaking processes and operational requirements, commanders must have a successful COMCAM program. Lessons learned during Operation Enduring Freedom prove that COMCAM units are not fully used due to a lack of understanding of the COMCAM mission and capabilities. Therefore, commanders must realize that COMCAM units make a valuable contribution to the MAGTF and the Marine Corps when COMCAM is understood and the COMCAM officer is supported. Combat camera also provides a visual record for high-level briefs and internal and external communications or historical records. This publication supersedes MCWP 3-33.7, Combat Camera and Visual Information in Expeditionary Operations, 1 October 2002. Reviewed and approved this date.
+
+## By Direction Of The Commandant Of The Marine Corps
+
+GEORGE J. FLYNN
+Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration Publication Control Number: 143 000105 00 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
+
+## Marine Air-Ground Task Force Combat Camera Table Of Contents Chapter 1.  Fundamentals
+
+Overview. . . . . . . . .1-1
+Mission . . . . . . . .1-1 Policy Documents . . . . . . . .1-2
+Function  . . . . . . . .1-3 Combat Camera Products . . . . . . . .1-4 Principles. . . . . . . . .1-6 Information Operations and Combat Camera . . . . . . . .1-8
+Archiving  . . . . . . . .1-9
+
+## Chapter 2.  Organizations And Responsibilities
+
+Combat Camera Personnel . . . . . . . .2-1
+4612, Combat Camera Production
+ Specialist, E1 to E6. . . . . . . . .2-1
+4616, Reproduction Equipment
+Repairer Specialist, E4 to E6 . . . . . . . .2-2
+4641, Combat Photographer, E1 to E6. . . . . . . . .2-2 4671, Combat Videographer, E1 to E6  . . . . . . . .2-2 4691, Combat Camera Chief, E7 to E9 . . . . . . . .2-2 4602, Combat Camera Officer,
+Warrant Officer 1 to Major . . . . . . . .2-2
+Marine Corps Forces Staff  . . . . . . . .2-3 MAGTF Staff  . . . . . . . .2-3
+Ground Combat Element  . . . . . . . .2-4 Aviation Combat Element  . . . . . . . .2-5 Logistics Combat Element . . . . . . . .2-5
+Supporting Establishment . . . . . . . .2-5 Headquarters Element Staff. . . . . . . . .2-6
+MAGTF Commander's Responsibilities. . . . . . . . .2-7
+Marine Corps Information Operations Center. . . . . . . . .2-8 Secretary of the Navy Responsibilities . . . . . . . .2-9 Defense Imagery Management Operations Center . . . . . . . .2-9
+
+## Chapter 3.  Planning
+
+Levels of War  . . . . . . . .3-1 Combat Camera Officer's Role. . . . . . . . .3-2
+Early Deployment . . . . . . . .3-4 Operation Plans and Operation Orders . . . . . . . .3-5
+Combat Camera Products and Usage  . . . . . . . .3-6 Who Uses Combat Camera Products?. . . . . . . . .3-6
+
+## Chapter 4.  Operations
+
+Mission Requirements. . . . . . . . .4-1
+Information Operations. . . . . . . . .4-2 Strategic Communications . . . . . . . .4-3 Civil-Military Operations . . . . . . . .4-4 Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
+and Disaster Relief . . . . . . . .4-4
+Counterdrug Operations . . . . . . . .4-6
+Peacekeeping Operations . . . . . . . .4-7 Psychological Operations. . . . . . . . .4-7 Intelligence and Counterintelligence . . . . . . . .4-8 Public Affairs . . . . . . . .4-8 Training  . . . . . . . .4-9
+Joint Combat Camera Requirements. . . . . . . . .4-10
+
+## Chapter 5.  Systems And Equipment
+
+Individual Acquisition Systems  . . . . . . . .5-1 Tactical Imagery Production System  . . . . . . . .5-1
+Communications Requirements . . . . . . . .5-2
+
+## Appendices
+
+| A                         | Sample Appendix 9 (COMCAM) to    |
+|---------------------------|----------------------------------|
+| Annex C  (Operations) A-1 |                                  |
+| B                         | Sample Concept of Employment B-1 |
+| C                         | Training C-1                     |
+
+## Glossary References Chapter 1 Fundamentals Overview
+
+Combat camera (COMCAM) is the acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations and during exercises. Official visual documentation is used for operational and combat support as well as public information purposes. It is an essential visual record of Marine Corps commands throughout significant and often historical events. Therefore, complete access to areas of operations and timely exploitation of collected imagery are keys to COMCAM success.
+
+## Mission
+
+The mission of COMCAM is to provide the President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), Military Departments, combatant commanders, and on-scene commander with a directed image capability in support of operational and planning requirements during world crisis, contingencies, exercises, and wartime operations per Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3104.1A, *Marine Corps Combat Camera Program.*
+
+A fundamental tool of commanders and decisionmakers, COMCAM
+
+
+Provides commanders with combat trained documentation teams that are primary suppliers of operational imagery.
+
+Supports combat, information, humanitarian, special force; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); engineering; legal; and public affairs (PA) missions.
+
+Provides valuable imagery at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.
+
+Speeds decisionmaking and facilitates the execution of missions at lower levels through vertical and horizontal information flow.
+
+## Policy Documents
+
+Policy governing the Joint COMCAM Program is found in Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5040.04, Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM) Program, which
+
+
+Assigns Joint Combat Camera Program responsibilities.
+
+Updates COMCAM in support of joint, combined, and Servicespecific military operations of joint interest.
+
+Establishes the Joint Combat Camera Planning Group.
+Policy governing visual information is found in DODI 5040.02, Visual Information (VI), which
+
+
+Assigns responsibilities for managing the Department of Defense (DOD) visual information resources.
+
+Establishes the Joint Visual Information Services Distribution Activity and the Defense Visual Information Center and continues establishment of the DOD Visual Information Steering Committee.
+
+## Function
+
+Marine Corps COMCAM teams are organized, trained, and equipped to provide rapid deployment of COMCAM assets in support of exercises, operations, and contingencies that support the operating forces and are available for tasking by
+
+
+The Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, and federal agencies as directed.
+
+Unified and subunified combatant commanders.
+
+Joint and combined task force commanders and their staffs.
+
+Marine Corps component commanders and their staffs.
+Challenges faced by commanders on today's battlefield make COMCAM operations more critical and more difficult to execute. Commanders will exploit imagery at various times and from various sources such as ISR, PA, coalition forces, or civilian media.
+
+Therefore, Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) COMCAM Marines must be prepared to incorporate COMCAM assets into missions across the full range of military operations, and they must be flexible and able to task-organize COMCAM for any size MAGTF and operation. Combat camera Marines support a commander's situational awareness, information operations (IO), PA, and civil affairs objectives to include ISR, battlefield damage assessment, military deception, legal, and history functions. Combat camera supports the commander's imagery requirements and produces timely products supporting the commander's intent and mission objectives.
+
+## Combat Camera Products
+
+Combat camera provides the MAGTF commander with imagery (video and still), graphics, and printing/reproduction capabilities to facilitate his/her decisionmaking process and, ultimately, mission accomplishment. Types of COMCAM products are
+
+
+Still photographic imagery (digital and conventional) (see fig. 1-1).
+
+Motion imagery (video) (see fig. 1-2 on page 1-6).
+
+Combat lithography, such as flyers, leaflets, orders, or documents (see fig. 1-3 on page 1-7).
+
+Combat art (see fig. 1-4 on page 1-9).
+
+Multimedia digital graphics.
+Note:  The above types of COMCAM products are hereafter collectively referred to as COMCAM products.
+
+## Principles
+
+Marine Corps COMCAM personnel, the MAGTF commander, and small unit leaders must know the principles that guide the planning and execution of COMCAM operations. These principles include the following:
+
+
+Imagery's worth is increased by the number of viewers. Imagery
+becomes useful when it is viewed, shared, used, and understood. Acquisition and production must be synchronized with dissemination options and quickly retrievable archives.
+
+Several
+missions
+can
+be
+supported
+simultaneously.
+Understanding strategic, operational, tactical, immediate, and future COMCAM requirements will empower the COMCAM officer to support concurrent missions, often with the same imagery.
+
+The COMCAM applications are boundless. The application of combat camera requires creative thought to enhance the value of COMCAM units and imagery for mission accomplishment.
+
+Combat camera personnel must practice and provide security at the source. This principle means not sharing
+information inappropriate for release.
+
+## Information Operations And Combat Camera
+
+The imagery captured by COMCAM units can be used to influence information operations and multiple types of other missions, from major combat operations to small wars. The MAGTF COMCAM organizations
+
+
+Maximize support throughout the MAGTF.
+
+Must be considered throughout all phases of planning and execution.
+
+Ensure and maintain operations security.
+
+Obtain and maintain the commander's trust. This involves anticipating requirements and providing COMCAM products in a usable, understandable, relevant, and timely manner. It also involves restricting access to imagery in accordance with the commander's intent.
+
+Support DOD and joint COMCAM operations and organizations, including augmenting a joint/combined COMCAM management team.
+
+Provide camera skills sustainment training for ISR Marines.
+
+Provide technical advice and guidance on equipment to PA and ISR personnel.
+
+## Archiving
+
+The Marine Corps Combat Camera Management Support Center at the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC), Quantico, VA, archives COMCAM products forwarded by COMCAM personnel. Imagery, which may have a broader significance to the history of the United States, is submitted to the Defense Imagery Management Operations Center (DIMOC) at the Pentagon. From there, it is available to the general public.
+
+## Chapter 2 Organizations And Responsibilities Combat Camera Personnel
+
+Occupational field (OccFld) 4600 is comprised of Marines located in COMCAM billets at the
+
+
+Marine Corps forces.
+
+Marine expeditionary forces (MEFs).
+
+Marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs).
+
+Marine expeditionary units (MEUs).
+
+Ground combat elements (GCEs).
+
+Aviation combat elements (ACEs).
+
+Logistics combat elements (LCEs).
+
+Supporting establishment's base and station COMCAM units and training commands.
+The following military occupational specialties (MOSs) comprise OccFld 4600.
+
+## 4612, Combat Camera Production Specialist, E1 To E6
+
+Combat camera production specialists operate and maintain printing and reproduction equipment. They prepare original layout and design, print multiple formats and sizes, and produce large quantity reproductions.
+
+## Mcwp 3-33.7 4616, Reproduction Equipment Repairer Specialist, E4 To E6
+
+Reproduction equipment repairer specialists maintain all tables of equipment (T/E), reproduction-related equipment, and perform administrative and planning functions to include equipment maintenance records.
+
+## 4641, Combat Photographer, E1 To E6
+
+Combat photographers possess the skill and expertise to document operations in any environment using the latest in still imagery acquisition and production equipment. They are capable and equipped to produce field expedient, still imagery products.
+
+## 4671, Combat Videographer, E1 To E6
+
+Combat videographers possess the skill and expertise to document operations in any environment using the latest in video imagery acquisition and production equipment. They are capable and equipped to produce field expedient, edited video products.
+
+## 4691, Combat Camera Chief, E7 To E9
+
+Combat camera chiefs assist the COMCAM officer in supervising, coordinating, administering, and managing COMCAM units and assets. They provide advice and technical expertise to the COMCAM officer and/or MAGTF commander on COMCAM capabilities and deployment and employment of assets.
+
+## 4602, Combat Camera Officer, Warrant Officer 1 To Major
+
+Combat camera officers supervise, coordinate, administer, and manage COMCAM units and assets. They provide advice and
+
+## Magtf Combat Camera
+
+technical expertise to the MAGTF commander on COMCAM capabilities and deployment and employment of COMCAM assets. Officers are an integral part of the planning process, working closely with other staff sections within MAGTF commands to ensure the proper employment of COMCAM and to ensure COMCAM actions and missions support the commander's intent. The COMCAM officer writes appendix 9 (COMCAM) to Annex C (Operations) to the Operation Order (OPORD). See appendix A for additional information.
+
+## Marine Corps Forces Staff
+
+The COMCAM officer develops policy, guidance, and standards for the COMCAM effort throughout the area of operations. The COMCAM officer is the focal point for planning, monitoring, and coordinating COMCAM efforts that support air, ground, and combat service support operations. The COMCAM officer assists the principal staffs and provides guidance to the commander, and specific combatant commander, for all joint exercises, operations, and deployments, requiring COMCAM support. The COMCAM officer is responsible for estimating, recommending, and determining requirements and preparing COMCAM annexes and detailed plans for publication. See appendix B for a sample concept of employment.
+
+## Magtf Staff
+
+The MAGTF COMCAM officer serves as a battlestaff officer who advises the MAGTF commander on issues, capabilities, and
+
+requirements pertaining to COMCAM operations. According to the MCO 3120.10, Marine Corps Information Operations Program (MCIOP), issues, capabilities, and requirements pertaining to COMCAM operations are normally assigned to the assistant chief of staff, operations staff officer (G-3) or the IO cell; the COMCAM officer manages all the MAGTF commander's COMCAM assets to include table of organization and equipment and augmentation tasks from higher command. They task-organize COMCAM personnel for any operational commitments and develop MEF/MEB operational annexes and OPORDs pertaining to COMCAM. Combat camera personnel are assigned to the MEU command element (CE). Additional assets within the GCE, ACE, and LCE may be tasked to support MEU COMCAM personnel based on operational requirements. Regardless of size, COMCAM units maintain the capability to acquire, edit, disseminate, archive, manage, and transmit imagery. All COMCAM units are equipped to acquire imagery in darkness and inclement weather.
+
+## Ground Combat Element
+
+The Marine division's COMCAM unit is the division commander's organic COMCAM capability. Combat camera provides rapid, deployable assets for the execution of operational imagery documentation. The unit supplies task-organized GCEs with COMCAM support to meet the commander's critical information requirements during offensive and defensive operations. This includes direct support to regimental landing teams and battalion landing teams in support of the MAGTF.
+
+## Aviation Combat Element
+
+The ACE must be capable of operating from sea-based and shorebased airfields. Operating in a variety of forward-based environments requires a full range of COMCAM capabilities that are organic to the ACE. When an ACE operates from the sea or a forward base, COMCAM is essential to operations. Examples of COMCAM support are site surveys prior to occupation by wing units or targeting folders used to plan strike missions, air assault, or helicopter/parachute landing zones.
+
+## Logistics Combat Element
+
+The COMCAM tasks required to support air and ground forces far exceed the organic COMCAM capabilities of the Marine divisions and Marine aircraft wings. All facets of LCE support (such as foreign humanitarian assistance operations and disaster relief) must be documented for historical relevance. Imagery produced by these units has long lasting significance that is vital to lessons learned, training, and future deployments.
+
+## Supporting Establishment
+
+Combat camera units exist at major Marine Corps bases and stations and at Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC). Each unit is task-organized based on assets available and supports the command's unique mission. Supporting establishment personnel are a vital part of operational sustainment when the requirement for support exceeds the ability of the operational forces' organic assets. Supporting establishment personnel are globally sourced when component commanders identify the need.
+
+Marine Corps base or Marine Corps air station COMCAM units provide support to the supporting establishment and have a dual mission of
+
+
+Providing the means for the Marine Corps to develop, train, and maintain a modern force that is prepared to win the Nation's battles.
+
+Supporting the quality of life for Marines and their families.
+The supporting establishment COMCAM units do not maintain a T/E; therefore, the commander is responsible for equipping and maintaining the centers based on this mission. Commanders must equip Marines with the same systems used in the operating forces. Combat camera offices in HQMC agencies support standardization of COMCAM equipment across the Marine Corps. Combat camera units should follow guidance set forth in
+
+
+Marine Corps Reference Publication 3-0A, Unit Training Management Guide.
+
+Navy/Marine Corps Departmental Publication (NAVMC) 3500.26, Combat Camera Training and Readiness Manual.
+This publication is used to set up a unit training plan (UTP) to ready supporting establishment COMCAM personnel.
+See appendix C for additional information on training.
+
+## Headquarters Element Staff
+
+Combat camera personnel in HQMC agencies develop COMCAM warfighting concepts and determine associated
+
+## Magtf Combat Camera
+
+required capabilities in the areas of doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to enable the Marine Corps to field combat ready COMCAM forces. They also participate in and support other major processes of the Expeditionary Force Development System.  Marine Corps Combat Camera Management Support Center is located at Quantico, VA. It is the central point for all imagery archived for Marine Corps COMCAM units.
+
+## Magtf Commander's Responsibilities
+
+The MAGTF commander should ensure that COMCAM assets are tailored to support missions across the full range of military operations. They should also consider imagery requirements that support the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and all HQMC departments. Combat camera assets are in all MAGTF elements (see fig. 2-1 on page 2-8). Special requirements may arise where additional personnel are required. The MAGTF commander should request COMCAM personnel augmentation to their unit via higher headquarters CE. The local COMCAM officer will be the action officer for all COMCAM personnel and asset requirements by the commander. The local COMCAM officer will provide personnel and equipment recommendations to the CE staff for approval. A thorough mission analysis and situational assessment of anticipated COMCAM requirements will assist the higher unit MAGTF commander in deciding how to deploy COMCAM assets. The MAGTF commander should exercise COMCAM capabilities during training exercises, paying particular attention to coordinating with the operational staff, deploying and using all COMCAM functions, and identifying and addressing operations security.
+
+## Marine Corps Information Operations Center
+
+The Marine Corps Information Operations Center (MCIOC) will provide MAGTF commanders and the Marine Corps a responsive and effective full range IO planning and psychological operations (PSYOP) delivery capability by means of deployable support teams and a comprehensive general support IO reachback capability in order to support the integration of IO into Marine Corps operations. This includes, but is not limited to IO subject matter experts in COMCAM.
+
+The MCIOC shall
+
+
+Provide IO specific training to COMCAM personnel assigned to the MCIOC.
+
+Provide the MAGTF with guidance on the proper employment and use of COMCAM capabilities in support of IO.
+See Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-40.4, Marine Air-
+Ground Task Force Information Operations, for additional information on IO.
+
+## Secretary Of The Navy Responsibilities
+
+The Secretary of the Navy shall ensure the availability of
+
+
+COMCAM personnel with shipboard experience.
+
+Aircrew and diver-qualified COMCAM personnel with appropriate equipment to support operational requirements.
+
+MAGTF COMCAM personnel to support operational requirements.
+
+## Defense Imagery Management Operations Center
+
+The DIMOC provides the CJCS with current imagery transmitted from the Military Services involved in the ongoing operation or training exercise. The DIMOC is the central imagery reception point for all joint field documentation. It also distributes joint
+
+imagery to the Secretary of Defense and other local DOD users. In a joint operation, imagery must be transmitted to the DIMOC according to established DOD timelines. The DIMOC serves as the Pentagon's imagery resource center and provides all imagery received from field locations. Every image sent to the DIMOC has the potential to reach thousands of DOD and executive branch members. There is no standing joint COMCAM management team; joint COMCAM management teams are task-organized for each joint contingency. Commanders involved in joint and multinational operations shall plan for, sustain, and employ COMCAM forces. Commanders shall expeditiously process and forward COMCAM imagery with captions to the DIMOC.
+
+## Chapter 3 Planning
+
+A good COMCAM plan of employment significantly enhances the commander's decision-making process. Therefore, the COMCAM officer must
+
+
+Understand the overall operation plan (OPLAN).
+
+Understand the commander's intent.
+
+Envision COMCAM's role and how to exploit COMCAM assets in support of the   commander's intent.
+
+Understand the value, composition, and life cycle of imagery.
+
+Be involved in the planning process at all times and at all levels from the earliest possible moment.
+
+## Levels Of War
+
+Combat camera is critical to the ability of the MAGTF to accomplish its mission at all levels of war. This is especially true because the global information environment spans the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. The operational aim for COMCAM is to acquire and disseminate COMCAM products to the MAGTF commander, his/her planners and staff, and higher headquarters. As with combat operations, speed and concentration of effort are paramount to operational planners; therefore, COMCAM products that support mission planning and identify critical information (such as convoy routes, danger zones, or ingress and egress routes) must be received in a timely and expeditious manner. Commanders have a responsibility to include COMCAM as they conduct operations. Imagery supports
+
+command and control and enhances IO initiatives and strategic communication requirements. It can also be key in maintaining public support. Combat camera footage is often the only imagery of key events. This can significantly enhance media exposure. The impact that emerging technologies and the evolving global media environment will have on all aspects of future military operations is difficult to fully anticipate or grasp. One thing is certain: information will become exponentially more abundant and potentially overwhelming. The MAGTF's COMCAM can be a force multiplier by supporting key objectives, providing accurate, easy-to-use imagery and printed or digital products, and providing these products to commanders based on a clear understanding of priorities and requirements. Commanders must realize that the information they control at the tactical level is the most time sensitive and must be used while valuable. This requires an aggressive acquisition and dissemination plan. Imagery not seen is imagery wasted; the first imagery seen is generally the most believed by global audiences. Commander's need to understand that battles are fought on the physical battlefield as well as on the Global Information Grid. Accurate, believable imagery will support mission IO objectives and strategic themes and messages.
+
+## Combat Camera Officer's Role
+
+Commanding officers with COMCAM assets will designate a COMCAM officer or director with releasing authority for all COMCAM products per MCO 3104.1A. The COMCAM officers cannot release imagery outside of the tasking command without the commander's written authorization. The COMCAM officer cannot release imagery to the public directly. This generally falls under the PA officer's duties. The commander designates the command's releasing authority. Communicationinternal and externalmust be constantly monitored and adjusted. The COMCAM officer must consider multiple customers, competing timelines, long-term usefulness, and specific customer requirements. For instance, while supporting an ISR mission, the COMCAM officer should consider targets for the brigade or higher intelligence staff officer (G-2) or battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (S-2). During an Operation Restore Hope, a single visual reconnaissance flight produced imagery for target folders, direct action missions, force protection, and convoy planners. It was used later to brief followon forces. The COMCAM officer should also understand that commanders and their staffs rely on them to use COMCAM as a
+
+
+Critical information provider.
+
+Force multiplier.
+
+Aid to force protection efforts.
+
+Situational awareness tool.
+
+Training critique tool.
+The COMCAM officer must do more than simply produce photographs. The COMCAM officer must provide meaningful images that are objective, thorough, accurate, timely, relevant, ready for use, and easy for customers to understand. This may require
+
+
+An overlay with key information.
+
+A quickly edited video clip of a route reconnaissance.
+
+A Web-based imagery archive for use by planners, briefers, or analysts.
+The COMCAM officer must understand the importance of tactical intelligence, which is the level of intelligence Marines need, generate, and use most often. The COMCAM officer should find ways to support the formulation of the commander's estimate of the situation, such as
+
+
+Provide as accurate an image of the hostile situation as possible.
+
+Aid in situation development.
+
+Develop IO products.
+
+Provide support to force protection.
+
+Support targeting and combat assessment; e.g., battle damage assessment.
+
+## Early Deployment
+
+Personnel in support of COMCAM must deploy early to support various potential customers. Imagery of areas and facilities during initial site surveys can help advanced echelon forces plan logistical requirements. Imagery of approach lanes and landing zones can familiarize pilots and aircrews with terrain features and obstacles they may encounter. Imagery can help commanders visually describe the tactical situation to higher headquarters. Analysts need to see imagery of certain target areas, which over time, provide long-term insight to evolving situations. Historians usually want to see before and after imagery and detailed aspects of the Marines' environment (living conditions, fighting holes, weapons carriage, terrain, chow, or mail).
+
+## Operation Plans And Operation Orders
+
+Combat camera must be included in OPLANs and OPORDs based on projected tasking and focus of effort. The COMCAM Marines must train with their assigned units and be included in the units' OPLANs and OPORDs. Guidance for conducting COMCAM operations comes from several sources.  The standard contingency documentation plan (SCDP) establishes procedures, at the national level, for documenting military operations. This documentation normally supports COMCAM requirements. Tasking is referred to as programmed requirements. Deploying COMCAM teams will use the SCDP as a guide until the theater COMCAM representative provides further guidance, which is based on the theater commander's needs and the combat situation. The SCDP addresses documentation of combat and combat support operations. From this information, deploying COMCAM teams must be able to adapt COMCAM operations to almost any similar situation. At the theater level, the combatant commander issues plans and orders to establish a joint COMCAM management team or other COMCAM guidance. Combat camera plans and orders are prepared by the COMCAM officer and appear as Appendix 9 (COMCAM) to Annex C (Operations) to the OPORD (see app. A for additional information). A COMCAM plan is required when preparing for exercises, operations, or routinely planned events. Combat camera planning will be carried out concurrently with operational planning. With minor modifications, Appendix 9 can also be used by the command to form the COMCAM plan for garrison use.
+
+## Combat Camera Products Usage
+
+The value of COMCAM products is based on a combination of timeliness and content. Timely COMCAM products act as force multipliers. During Operation Iraqi Freedom, Marine Corps COMCAM teams documented actions in the cities of the of Al Anbar province. These images were made available daily through an online searchable database and, within hours, utilized by IO officers, planners, and commanders to plan for current operations and the development of IO/PSYOP products. Additionally, the aggregate of imagery was used to show progress in the streets of Al Anbar from 2005 to 2008, also known as the "Awakening." The imagery collected provided valid information for commanders, staffs, and planners to prepare their units for the upcoming conflict and foster a greater understanding of the areas of operation their units would be operating in. Additionally, imagery was provided to worldwide news agencies as the "first imagery," many times providing visual proof to stories and at times dispelling our adversary's misinformation. Historically, significant imagery is archived as a permanent record of what occurred at a specific time and place. Compelling, historical imagery has repeatedly been used to champion the Marine Corps' existence or need for resources. Failure to use COMCAM in training and operations will result in a lack of historical imagery.
+
+## Who Uses Combat Camera Products?
+
+Combat camera products directly or indirectly support the warfighter whether planning the next operation, being used for a brief at HQMC or higher, and a myriad of functions in between.
+
+## Magtf Combat Camera
+
+Combat camera imagery from World War II, Vietnam, and Iraq, which was originally gathered to support a commander's imagery requirements, is repeatedly used to produce training manuals, lessons learned, historical programs, and Commandant of the Marine Corps-produced motivational videos or recruiting posters. Understanding the varied multitude of personnel who use COMCAM products and the uses of these products help planners determine equipment requirements and the best mix of COMCAM assets, required to document any event. The DODI 5040.04 requires the Services to provide imagery of current operations to the DOD; these images are eventually routed to the National Archives in Washington, DC. Combat camera imagery is routinely used to support a multitude of individuals or organizations simultaneously; e.g., the on-scene commander, the CJCS, joint COMCAM efforts, planners, analysts, civil affairs personnel, engineers, military police, and PA efforts. As society becomes more visually oriented in communications, the demand for timely imagery will increase and a wider variety of personnel will need to access the same COMCAM products for support. Therefore, commanders must make COMCAM products available and useful to as many users and planners as possible. With the quantity of information available at any one time, the value of quality information has grown tremendously. Combat camera provides commanders with a directed imagery acquisition and production capability that is comparable to any civilian imagery professional.
+
+## Chapter 4 Operations
+
+A principal aim of command and control is to enhance the commander's ability to make sound and timely decisions. Quality information adds value to the decisionmaking process and is critical to the success or failure of an operation. Therefore, the commander must determine his/her information requirements and ensure that information is managed effectively. Combat camera assists the MAGTF commander in the decisionmaking process by making a major contribution to the understanding of the battlespace and the threat. Combat camera should also be an integral element of the decisionmaking process through which the commander implements decisions. The COMCAM Marines also need to know the mission, tactical situation, tasks to be accomplished, support available, and the communications required to accomplish the mission.
+
+## Mission Requirements
+
+Combat camera products support various mission requirements simultaneously. Combat camera officers train with commanders and staffs and develop relationships during planning and exercises. These established working relationships produce streamlined communication, anticipation of a commander's requirements, and fine-tuned COMCAM support. Throughout the MAGTF, COMCAM is organized to support the COMCAM requirements of the warfighter.  Tasking for COMCAM support can come from the combatant commander, on-scene commander, local commander, or personnel within the chain of command.
+
+Combat camera is an integral feature of the MAGTF and its operations and should not be considered an independent entity. Combat camera missions are in direct support of the commander's critical information requirements and provide products that assist in gaining the advantage against the enemy. Through the specialized assets that COMCAM brings to the commander, it supports the many different missions of the MAGTF to include
+
+
+IO.
+
+Strategic communication.
+
+Civil-military operations (CMO).
+
+Foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.
+
+Counterdrug operations.
+
+Peacekeeping operations.
+
+PSYOP.
+
+Intelligence and counterintelligence.
+
+PA.
+
+Training.
+
+## Information Operations
+
+Decisionmakers use IO to affect adversary information and information systems while defending their own information and information systems (see fig. 4-1). The force that best controls, shapes, and safeguards information and information systems will enjoy a decided military advantage.  Information operations interact with the global information environment and exploit or deny the adversary's information and decision capabilities. Units conduct IO across the full range of military operations.  Information operations continue beyond the end of hostilities and into the pacification and nation-building phase.
+
+## Strategic Communication
+
+Strategic communication is defined as focused [US] Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of [US] Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power (Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms). Combat camera supports strategic communications by providing imagery incorporated into strategic communication themes and messages, images depicting all US Government efforts, and still and video evidence of military engagements of counter adversaries that cause civilian casualties. Combat camera imagery and printed materials may also be used to support CMO and PSYOP efforts to inform the populous of US Government efforts to minimize civilian casualties, employ appropriate rules of engagement to minimize civilian casualties, and to help support awareness of the effects that cause civilian casualties.
+
+## Civil-Military Operations
+
+Civil-military operations activities encompass the relationship between military forces, civil authorities, and people in a friendly or foreign country or area (see fig. 4-2). They support national policy and implement US national objectives by coordinating with, influencing, developing, or controlling indigenous infrastructures in operational areas. Civil-military operations secure local acceptance of and support for US forces. Civil-military operations are important for gaining information dominance because of its ability to interface with key organizations and individuals in the global information environment; e.g., CMO's traditional relationship with nongovernmental organizations and international organizations. Combat camera can influence ideas, concepts, and issues via printed fliers, photographs, video productions, or Web-based graphics.
+
+## Foreign Humanitarian Assistance And Disaster Relief
+
+Combat camera is an invaluable asset during foreign humanitarian assistance missions, not only as a tool to document US efforts to aid countries hit by natural and manmade disasters, but also as an aid to IO efforts (see fig. 4-3 on page 4-6). Combat camera Marines assigned to a MEU can provide time-sensitive imagery to on-scene commanders and higher commands during noncombatant evacuation operations.
+
+Combat camera can be attached to the civil engineer battalion to document conditions before and after civil engineer battalion operations, capturing the improvements in living conditions and foreign humanitarian assistance provided during operations. Imagery collected by COMCAM assets can also be used to determine levels of destruction in the event of natural disasters.
+
+## Counterdrug Operations
+
+Many factors are unique to counterdrug operations, such as a high degree of interagency and international coordination. Most significantly, the legal and law enforcement aspects are extremely sensitive. Commanders use COMCAM imagery to familiarize their Marines with terrain features, show facilities for use in planning command posts, document seizures and evidence, and protect US forces from legal reprisal.
+
+## Peacekeeping Operations
+
+Because of the nature of peacekeeping operations, COMCAM is often the only means to provide imagery to higher headquarters and the press (see fig. 4-4). Imagery collected can provide proof of military involvement if and when false accusations are presented.  Imagery collected can also demonstrate the successes involved during peacekeeping operations. These images can enhance the commander's decisionmaking process and maintain public support for the mission.
+
+## Psychological Operations
+
+One of the five pillars of IO is PSYOP. Combat camera is an invaluable resource to support efforts to shape the battlefield and execute a PSYOP campaign plan. Psychological operations are planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions; motives; objective reasoning; and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. A
+
+major element of PSYOP is propaganda, which is any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group to benefit the sponsor either directly or indirectly.
+
+## Intelligence And Counterintelligence
+
+Combat camera supports the commander's intelligence and counterintelligence requirements by providing COMCAM products to support the following actions:
+
+
+Identify and evaluate existing conditions and capabilities.
+
+Aid in identifying friendly critical vulnerabilities.
+
+Assist in developing and evaluating friendly courses of action.
+
+Enhance tempo through effective information flow, taking advantage of all available communication means to disseminate imagery.
+
+## Public Affairs
+
+Public affairs informs and educates the target audience whether it is within the Marine Corps or part of the general public (see fig. 4-5). Public affairs influence is a by-productthe result or effects of people being informedrather than the design or intent of the communication.  Combat camera can support PA missions with graphics, photography, video products, and digital and printed media. Public affairs credibility is based on truthfulness.  Combat camera is not a function of PA, but a separate discipline and entity that can support PA requirements.
+
+## Training
+
+Training is a professional and moral imperative (see fig. 4-6 on page 4-10). It is the Marine leader's responsibility to ensure that his/her Marines are properly trained and prepared for combat.  Combat camera provides products that facilitate the leader's evaluation of the effectiveness of the training package and whether or not the training objectives have been met. Safety is a major concern during the training process. Combat camera products can assist in identifying unsafe conditions or procedures. Combat camera can also provide materials to be used for training evolutions in the form of video and still imagery assets and/or printed materials.
+
+## Joint Combat Camera Requirements
+
+Combat camera forces are tasked, deployed, and employed as an integral part of joint/combined and multinational operations to ensure documentation of the entire scope of US military activities and DOD components during wartime operations, worldwide crises, contingencies, joint exercises, and other events of significant national interest.
+
+## Magtf Combat Camera
+
+Combat camera is an operational mission assigned to the J-3 [operations directorate of a joint staff]. The joint force information operations chief (J-39) is responsible for COMCAM activities. The J-39 generates COMCAM mission assignment tasking and receives mission assignments from higher authority and within the joint task force. The J-39 will establish priorities and coordinate support for COMCAM missions with requesting commanders within the joint force. It is important that the joint COMCAM team's officer in charge work to keep the J-39 informed of all COMCAM activities. The COMCAM operation in support of the joint force's plan expands beyond the role of the IO plan. When Marine Corps commands are the lead for joint or combined task forces, the Marine Corps commander will assign a COMCAM officer to be the joint combat camera management team officer in charge.
+
+## Chapter 5 Systems And Equipment
+
+Marine Corps operational COMCAM capabilities provide the MAGTF commander direct support in the form of photography, videography, graphic products, and lithography. Teams use organic Marine Corps communications systems to disseminate COMCAM both horizontally and vertically throughout the MAGTF. The MAGTF COMCAM systems produce products that interoperate with joint imagery requirements.
+
+## Individual Acquisition Systems
+
+The MAGTF's COMCAM personnel deploy with equipment and systems capable of all-weather, day and night digital imagery acquisition.  These systems are MOS-specific and include still and video digital cameras, limited printing and video duplications, night vision, and communications equipment provided by the communications section.
+
+## Tactical Imagery Production System
+
+The tactical imagery production system (TIPS) is a selfcontained, deployable production unit designed for use by COMCAM teams. It provides high volume visual information, production, reproduction, and transmission in direct support of the MAGTF commander. The TIPS is deployed and employed at major subordinate commands or higher levels within the MAGTF. During Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom, TIPS was used as a direct support asset to the MAGTF commander and major subordinate commands.
+
+## Communications Requirements
+
+Communications capabilities must be seamless. Imagery collected on the battlefield may be accessible to operational planners, with a justifiable requirement for ongoing imagery collection and IO, regardless of location. Combat camera communications requirements must be integrated into organic Marine Corps communications systems and interface with all current and future imagery production systems. Communications connectivity requirements center on interoperability with the MAGTF's organic tactical data network.  It is imperative that the COMCAM officer work closely with the MAGTF communications staff to ensure connectivity requirements are met with as little impact as possible on the network. The COMCAM mission to disseminate imagery is vital, but should never degrade the tactical data network.  The TIPS and other COMCAM systems are organic to the MAGTF, but should be managed to ensure the commander's critical information requirements are supported, not hindered.
+
+# Appendix A Sample Appendix 9 (Comcam) To Annex C (Operations)
+
+CLASSIFICATION
+Copy no. __ of __ copies OFFICIAL DESIGNATION
+OF COMMAND
+PLACE OF ISSUE Date-time group Message reference number
+
+## Appendix 9 (Combat Camera) To Annex C (Operations) To Operation Order (Number) (U) (U) References:
+
+(a)  Regulations (b)  Required maps and charts (c)  Other relevant documents
+(U) TIME ZONE:
+1.  (U)  Situation. This paragraph includes a brief general description of the situation; i.e., information and COMCAM support that paragraph 1 of the OPLAN does not cover and the intended purpose of this appendix.
+
+Page number CLASSIFICATION
+
+## Classification
+
+a. (U) Friendly Forces. Outline the higher headquarters'
+plan, the COMCAM annex, and adjacent unit COMCAM plans. Provide information on friendly coalition forces that may affect the COMCAM mission. Note COMCAM resources supporting the unit.
+b. (U) Attachments and Detachments. Identify all augmenting COMCAM units supporting this command and all attached/assigned subordinate units. Include effective dates, if applicable.
+c. (U) Enemy Forces. List information on the threat force,
+its relationship to COMCAM mission, and any information not included in the OPLAN/OPORD that may affect the COMCAM mission.
+d. (U) Assumptions. List any additional assumptions or
+information not included in the general situation that will affect the COMCAM mission. Include a communications appraisal of tactical imagery transmission requirements.
+2.  (U)  Mission. There must be a clear, concise statement of the COMCAM mission. This statement should reflect the broad COMCAM mission during the particular operation or event, not the overall military mission. Communications goals should be clearly stated in appropriate detail. For a plan that supports combat operations, a determination should be made for direct support, general support, and priority of support.
+
+Page number
+
+## Classification Classification
+
+3.  (U) Execution. This paragraph provides a summary of the overall intended course of action.
+
+a. (U) Concept of Operation. Briefly summarize the COMCAM OPLAN, include COMCAM imagery and printing priorities.
+
+b. (U) Tasks. Identify and assign supporting tasks to each COMCAM element of subordinate and supporting units. Route tasks through the G-3 or S-3 as appropriate.
+
+c. (U) Coordinating Instructions.  Provisions for combat documentation shall be included in the plan. Include support provisions for COMCAM teams, priorities, and other instructions.  Give details on coordination, task organization, and groupings.  List instructions that apply to two or more subordinate elements or units.  Include all details in direct support of commanders, operators, analysts, and other customers; details on embarkation schedules, any restrictions because of weight or equipment, imagery transmission and dissemination plans; or any other details.
+
+4.  (U) Service Support. Service support includes statements of administrative and logistical arrangements.
+
+a. (U) Administration. Provide a statement of the administrative arrangements applicable to this operation. If they are long or not ready for inclusion in the OPLAN, Page number
+
+## Classification Classification
+
+arrangements may be issued separately and referenced there.  Release authority will be named in annex F (Public Affairs). Refer to it accordingly.  Special consideration should be given to the chain of custody of imagery with evidential value; e.g., imagery of war crimes, atrocities against civilians.
+
+b. (U) Logistics. Provide a statement of the logistical
+arrangements applicable to this operation. Specific coordination should be included, if possible, but arrangements may be issued separately and referenced there if they are too long.
+5.  (U) Command and Signal. List signal, visual imaging, and satellite communications policies; headquarters/joint COMCAM team and military media center locations or movements; and code words, code names, and liaison elements.
+
+## Acknowledge Receipt
+
+Page number CLASSIFICATION
+
+## Appendix B Sample Concept Of Employment
+
+Marine air-ground task force commanders are free to distribute COMCAM assets as they see fit.  However, to provide them with as much flexibility as possible, the following concept of employment has been developed.
+
+## Magtf And Major Subordinate Command Comcam Tasks
+
+
+Manage and coordinate imagery taskings with GCE, ACE, and Marine logistics group (formerly force service support group) COMCAM assets throughout the MEF/MEB area of operations.
+
+Dispatch, as needed, MEF/MEB COMCAM teams to events of interest for the tactical, operational, and strategic decisionmaking processes for the CE and to support the IO campaign plan.
+
+Use available communications assets to transmit imagery vertically from the major subordinate commands to higher headquarters and horizontally from adjacent and coalition commands.
+
+Provide reliable archival capability of imagery for use in briefings and command chronological records for situation assessments and after action information.
+
+Provide rapid reproduction of various media formats for information dissemination.
+
+## Proposed Tables
+
+The MEF/MEB CE, GCE, ACE, Marine logistics group, radar control terminal, and MEU will provide imagery of interest to CEs and higher commands to support the tactical, operational, and strategic decisionmaking processes. For all of these units, table or organization (T/O) personnel have organic still and video acquisition gear and ruggedized laptops with transmission capability. The TIPS contains imagery acquisition, transmission, and print/production capabilities; is mobile and self-powered; and can displace rapidly.
+
+Note:  The MEU does not have a resident TIPS capability.
+
+No current T/E for a MEF COMCAM team exists. The current T/O only supports a captain 4602 MOS. Personnel assets required to support the MEF CE will have to come from organic COMCAM assets in the MEF or globally sourced through the respective Marine Corps forces.
+
+## Expeditionary Brigade Command Element
+
+Personnel:
+1 to 8 (task-organized) 1 COMCAM officer (CWO/Capt) 1 COMCAM chief (GySgt/MSgt) 2 combat photographers (Cpl/LCpl) 2 combat videographers (Cpl/LCpl) 2 combat production specialists (Cpl/LCpl) 1 combat (Cpl/LCpl) Equipment: 2 digital still imagery kits 2 video imagery kits 2 acquisition/transmission kits 1 TIPS Initial consumable stock of 180 days 2HMMWVs
+Capt
+ captain
+Cpl               corporal CWO
+ chief warrant officer
+GySgt           gunnery sergeant HMMWV     high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle LCpl              lance corporal
+MSgt             master sergeant
+Ground Combat Element
+Personnel:
+1 to 13 (organic assets) 1 COMCAM officer 1 COMCAM operations chief (MSgt/GySgt) 3 combat photographers (Sgt/Cpl) 3 combat videographers (Sgt/Cpl) 4 combat production specialists (Cpl/LCpl) Equipment: Requisite T/E equipment per listed T/O 1 TIPS Consumable stock for 60 days Initial consumable stock of 180 days 2 HMMWVs
+
+Legend: Cpl               corporal GySgt           gunnery sergeant HMMWV     high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle LCpl              lance corporal MSgt             master sergeant Sgt sergeant
+
+## Aviation Combat Element Personnel: 1 To 7 (Organic Assets)
+
+1 COMCAM officer (CWO) 1 COMCAM operations chief (GySgt/SSgt) 2 combat photographers (Cpl/LCpl) 2 combat videographers (Cpl/LCpl) 2 combat production specialists (Cpl/LCpl) Equipment: Initial consumable stock of 180 days 2 HMMWVs Requisite T/E equipment per listed T/O Consumable stock for 60 days
+Cpl               corporal CWO
+ chief warrant officer
+GySgt           gunnery sergeant HMMWV     high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle LCpl              lance corporal SSgt               staff sergeant
+
+## Marine Logistics Group
+
+Personnel:
+1 to 5 (organic assets) 1 COMCAM operations chief (GySgt/SSgt) 2 combat photographers (Cpl/LCpl) 1 combat videographer (Cpl/LCpl) 1 combat production specialist (Cpl/LCpl) Equipment: Requisite T/E equipment per listed T/O Consumable stock for 60 days Initial consumable stock of 180 days 2 HMMWVs
+Cpl               corporal GySgt           gunnery sergeant HMMWV     high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle LCpl              lance corporal SSgt               staff sergeant
+
+## Regimental Combat Teams
+
+Personnel:
+1 to 6 (task-organized) 1 COMCAM operations chief (GySgt/SSgt) 2 combat photographers (Sgt/Cpl) 2 combat videographer (Sgt/Cpl) 1 combat production specialist (Cpl/LCpl) Equipment: Requisite T/E equipment per listed T/O Consumable stock for 60 days Initial consumable stock of 180 days
+Cpl               corporal GySgt           gunnery sergeant LCpl              lance corporal
+SSgt              staff sergeant
+Sgt
+ sergeant
+
+## Marine Expeditionary Unit
+
+Personnel:
+1 to 3 (organic assets) 1 COMCAM operations chief (GySgt/SSgt) 1 combat photographer (Cpl/LCpl) 1 combat videographer (Cpl/LCpl) no T/O Equipment: Requisite T/E equipment per listed T/O Consumable stock for 60 days Initial consumable stock of 180 days 2 HMMWVs
+Legend: Cpl               corporal GySgt           gunnery sergeant HMMWV     high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle LCpl              lance corporal
+SSgt              staff sergeant
+
+## Appendix C Training
+
+Combat camera personnel apply the training principles of
+
+
+The building block approach.
+
+Focus on expected combat missions.
+
+Focus on unit core capabilities and individual core skills.
+
+Organization of tasks into executable events.
+
+Sustainment of training.
+These principles are key to successful training during peacetime and in combat. As an integral part of the MAGTF commander's decisionmaking process, COMCAM personnel must train to enhance individual skills learned at formal schools and to become combat-ready as units and teams. The NAVMC 3500.26 provides a centralized repository of training requirements for OccFld 4600, allowing for the development of continuous and progressive training accomplished by individual, team, and collective training.
+
+## Individual And Initial Team Training
+
+Currently all OccFld 4600 formal school instruction is conducted at Defense Information School. Marine COMCAM personnel receive core training in individual skills for MOS qualification. Initial team training is accomplished on the TIPS, preparing Marines for operational COMCAM units.
+
+## Mcwp 3-33.7 Team Training
+
+Upon the arrival of COMCAM Marines at their assigned unit, they are assimilated into the existing UTP. The COMCAM officer and senior staff noncommissioned officer in charge follow NAVMC 3500.26, enhancing the individual and initial team training learned at Defense Information School. Individual and initial team training is further expanded based on the UTP and current mission requirements defined by the MAGTF commander.
+
+## Collective Training
+
+Collective training is accomplished through the UTP. Because collective readiness and individual readiness are closely related, NAVMC 3500.26 contains individual and collective training events. Collective training encompasses those events that require two or more personnel for successful completion. The COMCAM officer develops the mission essential task list based on lists of higher headquarters.
+
+## Glossary Section I: Acronyms And Abbreviations
+
+ACE. . . . . . . . .aviation combat element
+CE . . . . . . . .command element
+CJCS . . . . . . . .Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+CMO . . . . . . . . civil-military operations
+COMCAM . . . . . . . . combat camera
+DIMOC . . . . . .Defense Imagery Management Operations Center
+DOD . . . . . . . .Department of Defense DODI. . . . . . . . .Department of Defense instruction
+G-2  . . . . . . . . brigade or higher intelligence staff officer
+G-3  . . . . . . . . brigade or higher operations staff officer
+GCE. . . . . . . . . ground combat element
+HQMC. . . . . . . . .Headquarters, Marine Corps IO  . . . . . . . . information operations
+ISR  . . . . . . . . intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
+J-39 . . . . . . . . information operations chief of a joint staff
+LCE . . . . . . . . logistics combat element
+MAGTF. . . . . . . . . Marine air-ground task force MCCDC  . . . . . . Marine Corps Combat Development Command
+MCIOC . . . . . . . . Marine Corps Information Operations Center
+MCO . . . . . . . .Marine Corps order
+MCWP. . . . . . . . .Marine Corps warfighting publication
+MEB  . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary brigade
+MEF. . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary force
+MEU  . . . . . . . . Marine expeditionary unit MOS  . . . . . . . .military occupational specialty
+NAVMC. . . . . . . . .Navy/Marine Corps departmental publication
+OccFld . . . . . . . .occupational field
+OPLAN . . . . . . . .operation plan
+OPORD . . . . . . . . operation order
+PA  . . . . . . . .public affairs
+PSYOP. . . . . . . . . psychological operations S-2 . . . . . . . .battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer (Army; Marine Corps battalion or regiment) S-3 . . . . . . . .battalion or brigade operations staff officer (Army; Marine Corps battalion or regiment) SCDP. . . . . . . . .standard contingency documentation plan T/E. . . . . . . . . table of equipment
+TIPS. . . . . . . . . tactical imagery production system
+T/O. . . . . . . . .table of organization US . . . . . . . . United States UTP . . . . . . . . unit training plan
+
+## Section Ii. Definitions
+
+area of operationsAn operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (JP 1-02) battle damage assessmentThe estimate of damage resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. (JP 1-02)  The timely and accurate estimate of the damage resulting from the application of military force. Battle damage assessment estimates physical damage to a particular target, functional damage to that target, and the capability of the entire target system to continue its operations. (MCRP 5-12C) battlespaceAll aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum which encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (MCRP 5-12C) civil-military operationsThe activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions.
+
+They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02) combat cameraThe acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations and during exercises. Also called **COMCAM**. (MCRP 5-12C) combined operationAn operation conducted by forces of two or more Allied nations acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. (JP 1-02) command and controlThe exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 1-02) The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. (MCRP 5-12C) commander's intentA concise expression of the purpose of the operation and the desired end state. It may also include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. (JP 1-02)
+component1. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional components. (JP 1-02, part 1 of a 2 part definition) coordinationThe action necessary to ensure adequately integrated relationships between separate organizations located in the same area. Coordination may include such matters as fire support, emergency defense measures, area intelligence, and other situations in which coordination is considered necessary. (MCRP 5-12C) counterintelligenceInformation gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. (JP 1-02) The active and passive measures intended to deny the enemy valuable information about the friendly situation, to detect and neutralize hostile intelligence collection, and to deceive the enemy as to friendly capabilities and intentions. (MCRP 5-12C) disseminationConveyance of intelligence to users in a suitable form. (MCRP 5-12C) force protectionPreventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. (JP 1-02)
+foreign humanitarian assistanceDepartment of Defense activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development or Department of State conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation. (JP 1-02) general support1. That support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof. (JP 1-02, part 1 of a 2-part definition) helicopter landing zoneA specified ground area for landing assault helicopters to embark or disembark troops and/or cargo. A landing zone may contain one or more landing sites. (JP 1-02) intelligence1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity. (JP 1-02) Knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding environment needed to support decisionmaking. This knowledge is the result of the collection, processing, exploitation, evaluation, integration, analysis, and interpretation of available information about the battlespace and threat. (MCRP 5-12C) intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissanceAn activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. Also called ISR. (JP 1-02).
+
+joint forceA general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02). joint operationsA general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (JP 1-02) joint task forceA joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called **JTF**. (JP 1-02) multinational operationsA collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02) psychological operationsPlanned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called **PSYOP**. (JP 1-02) public affairsThose public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)
+situational awarenessKnowledge and understanding of the current situation that promotes timely, relevant, and accurate assessment of friendly, enemy, and other operations within the battlespace in order to facilitate decisionmaking. An informational perspective and skill that foster an ability to determine quickly the context and relevance of events that are unfolding. Also called SA. (MCRP 5-12C)
+strategic communicationFocused United States Government efforts to understand andengage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of United States Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (JP 5-0) tactical intelligenceIntelligence required for planning and conduct of tactical operations. (JP 1-02) Intelligence concerned primary with the location, capabilities, and possible intentions of enemy units on the battlefield and the tactical aspects of terrain and weather within the battlespace. (MCRP 5-12C) target1. An entity or object considered for possible engagement or other action. 2. In intelligence usage, a country, area, installation, agency, or person against which intelligence operations are directed. 3. An area designated and numbered for future firing. (JP 1-02, parts 1 through 3 of a 4-part definition) visual informationVarious visual media with or without sound. Generally, visual information includes still and motion photography,  audio video recording, graphic arts, visual aids, models, display, and visual presentation. Also called VI. (JP 1-02)
+
+## References
+
+| Department of Defense Instructions (DODIs)         |                                                  |
+|----------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------|
+| 5040.02                                            | Visual Information (VI)                          |
+| 5040.04                                            | Joint Combat Camera (COMCAM) Program             |
+| Joint Publication (JP)                             |                                                  |
+| 1-02                                               | Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and |
+| Associated Terms                                   |                                                  |
+| Navy/Marine Corps Departmental Publication (NAVMC) |                                                  |
+| 3500.26                                            | Combat Camera Training and Readiness Manual      |
+| Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)                         |                                                  |
+| 3104.1A                                            | Marine Corps Combat Camera Program               |
+| 3120.10                                            | Marine Corps Information Operations              |
+| Program (MCIOP)                                    |                                                  |
+| Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP)        |                                                  |
+| 3-40.4                                             | Marine Air-Ground Task Force                     |
+| Information Operations                             |                                                  |
+
+## Marine Corps Reference Publication (Mcrp) 3-0A Unit Training Management Guide
+
+
+
+Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status.