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+## Dod Directive 3000.09 Autonomy In Weapon Systems
+
+ Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Effective:
+January 25, 2023 Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Directive 3000.09, "Autonomy in Weapon Systems," November 21, 2012 Approved by:
+Kathleen H. Hicks, Deputy Secretary of Defense Purpose: This directive:
+- Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for developing and using autonomous and semiautonomous functions in weapon systems, including armed platforms that are remotely operated or operated by onboard personnel.
+- Establishes guidelines designed to minimize the probability and consequences of failures in
+autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that could lead to unintended engagements.
+- Establishes the Autonomous Weapon Systems Working Group.
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 7
+2.1.  USD(P). ........ 7 2.2.  USD(A&S). ........ 7 2.3.  USD(R&E). ........ 7 2.4.  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness........ 8 2.5.  DOT&E. ........ 9 2.6.  General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC DOD). ........ 9
+2.7.  Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. ........ 9 2.8.  CDAO. ........ 10
+2.9.  Secretaries of the Military Departments; Commander, USSOCOM; and Directors of the
+Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities. ........ 10
+2.10.  CJCS. ........ 12 2.11.  VCJCS........ 12 2.12.  Combatant Commanders. ........ 12
+SECTION 3:  VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION AND TESTING AND EVALUATION OF AUTONOMOUS
+AND SEMI-AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS ........ 14
+SECTION 4:  GUIDELINES FOR REVIEW OF CERTAIN AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS ........ 15 SECTION 5:  AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEM WORKING GROUP ........ 19
+5.1.  General. ........ 19 5.2.  Membership. ........ 19
+GLOSSARY ........ 21
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 21 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 21
+REFERENCES ........ 24 FIGURES
+Figure 1.  Flow Chart to Help Determine If Senior Review and Approval is Required ........ 18
+
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+a.  This directive applies to:
+(1)  OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD.
+
+(2)  The design, development, acquisition, testing, fielding, and employment of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, including guided munitions that are capable of automated target selection.
+
+(3)  The application of lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or non-kinetic, force by autonomous or semi-autonomous weapon systems.
+
+b.  This directive does not apply to:
+
+(1)  Autonomous or semi-autonomous cyberspace capabilities.
+(2)  Unarmed platforms, whether remotely operated or operated by onboard personnel, and whether autonomous or semi-autonomous.
+
+(3)  Unguided munitions. (4)  Munitions manually guided by the operator (e.g., laser- or wire-guided munitions).
+(5)  Mines.
+(6)  Unexploded explosive ordnance. (7)  Autonomous or semi-autonomous systems that are not weapon systems.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a.  Autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems will be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.
+
+(1)  Systems will go through rigorous hardware and software verification and validation
+(V&V) and realistic system developmental and operational test and evaluation (T&E) in accordance with Section 3.  Training, doctrine, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)
+applicable to the system in question will be established.  These measures will provide sufficient confidence that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems:
+(a)  Function as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries taking realistic and practicable countermeasures.
+
+(b)  Complete engagements within a timeframe and geographic area, as well as other relevant environmental and operational constraints, consistent with commander and operator intentions.  If unable to do so, the systems will terminate the engagement or obtain additional operator input before continuing the engagement.
+
+(c)  Are sufficiently robust to minimize the probability and consequences of failures.
+
+(2)  Consistent with the potential consequences of an unintended engagement or unauthorized parties interfering with the operation of the system, physical hardware and software will be designed with appropriate:
+(a)  System safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, and cybersecurity in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8500.01 and Military Standard 882E.
+
+(b)  Human-machine interfaces and controls. (c)  Technologies and data sources that are transparent to, auditable by, and explainable by relevant personnel.
+
+(3)  For operators to make informed and appropriate decisions regarding the engagement of targets, the human-machine interface for autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems will:
+(a)  Be readily understandable to trained operators, such as by clearly indicating what actions operators need to perform and which actions the system will perform.
+
+(b)  Provide transparent feedback on system status.
+
+(c)  Provide clear procedures for trained operators to activate and deactivate system functions.
+
+b.  Persons who authorize the use of, direct the use of, or operate autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems will do so with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable rules of engagement (ROE). The use of AI capabilities in autonomous or semi-autonomous weapons systems will be consistent with the DoD AI Ethical Principles, as provided in Paragraph 1.2.f.
+
+c.  With the exception of systems intended to be used in a manner that falls within the policies in Paragraphs 1.2.d.(1) through 1.2.d.(4), autonomous weapon systems, including weapon systems with both autonomous and semi-autonomous modes of operation, must be approved by the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)), and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS) before formal development.  They must be approved again by the USD(P), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), and the VCJCS before fielding.  These requirements for approval are supplementary to the requirements in other applicable policies and issuances.  Autonomous weapon systems requiring these senior approvals in accordance with Section 4 of this directive before formal development and again before fielding include:
+(1)  Autonomous weapon systems that have not previously been reviewed and approved in accordance with this directive, including autonomous weapon systems that are modifications of an existing non-autonomous weapon system.
+
+(2)  Modified versions of previously approved autonomous weapon systems whose system algorithms, intended mission sets, intended operational environments, intended target sets, or expected adversarial countermeasures substantially differ from those applicable to the previously approved weapon systems so as to fall outside the scope of what was previously approved in the senior review.  Such modified systems require a new senior review and approval before formal development and again before fielding.
+
+d.  The senior review described in Paragraph 1.2.c is not required for weapon systems intended to be used in the manner described in Paragraphs 1.2.d.(1) through 1.2.d.(4).  These will be considered for approval in accordance with applicable policies and issuances, such as applicable issuances related to the Defense Acquisition System.  Weapon systems that do not require the senior review provided in Paragraph 1.2.c are:
+(1)  Semi-autonomous weapon systems used to apply lethal or non-lethal, kinetic or nonkinetic, force without any modes of operation in which they are intended to function as an autonomous weapon system.
+
+(2)  Operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems used to select and engage materiel targets for local defense to intercept attempted time-critical or saturation attacks for:
+(a)  Static defense of installations with personnel, including networked defense where the autonomous weapon system is not co-located with the installation.
+
+(b)  Onboard and/or networked defense of platforms with onboard personnel.
+
+(3)  Operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems used to select and engage materiel targets for defending operationally deployed remotely piloted or autonomous vehicles and/or vessels.
+
+(4)  Autonomous weapon systems used to apply non-lethal, non-kinetic force against materiel targets in accordance with DoDD 3000.03E.
+
+e.  International sales or transfers of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems will be approved in accordance with existing technology security and foreign disclosure requirements and processes in accordance with DoDD 5111.21.
+
+f.  The design, development, deployment, and use of AI capabilities in autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems will be consistent with the DoD AI Ethical Principles and the DoD Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway.  The DoD AI Ethical Principles, as adopted in the February 21, 2020 Secretary of Defense Memorandum, are:
+
+(1)  Responsible.
+DoD personnel will exercise appropriate levels of judgment and care, while remaining responsible for the development, deployment, and use of AI capabilities.
+
+(2)  Equitable.
+The DoD will take deliberate steps to minimize unintended bias in AI capabilities. (3)  Traceable. The DoD's AI capabilities will be developed and deployed such that relevant personnel possess an appropriate understanding of the technology, development processes, and operational methods applicable to AI capabilities, including with transparent and auditable methodologies, data sources, and design procedures and documentation.
+
+(4)  Reliable.
+The DoD's AI capabilities will have explicit, well-defined uses, and the safety, security, and effectiveness of such capabilities will be subject to testing and assurance within those defined uses across their entire life cycles.
+
+(5)  Governable.
+The DoD will design and engineer AI capabilities to fulfill their intended functions while possessing the ability to detect and avoid unintended consequences, and the ability to disengage or deactivate deployed systems that demonstrate unintended behavior.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  USD(P).
+
+The USD(P):
+a.  Provides policy oversight for developing and employing autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems.
+
+b.  Receives requests for approval of systems submitted in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.c, and in coordination with the USD(A&S) or USD(R&E) and the VCJCS, reviews and considers for approval such systems.
+
+c.  Issues guidance to help implement this directive, and reviews, as necessary, the appropriateness of such guidance given the continual advancement of new technologies and changing warfighter needs.
+
+d.  Approves the DoD position on international sales or transfers of autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems in accordance with existing technology security and foreign disclosure requirements and processes.
+
+e.  Supervises and assigns a chair for the Autonomous Weapon Systems Working Group, provides necessary logistical and administrative support for the working group, approves the charter for the working group, and provides guidance and terms of reference as needed. 2.2.  USD(A&S).
+
+The USD(A&S):
+a.  In coordination with the USD(P) and the VCJCS, reviews and considers for approval weapon systems submitted before fielding in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.c.
+
+b.  Ensures that DoD guidance relating to the Defense Acquisition System includes a requirement to document the determination that an autonomous or semi-autonomous weapon system is intended to be used in a manner that falls within the policies in Paragraphs 1.2.d.(1) through 1.2.d.(4), and therefore does not require senior approval in accordance with this directive.  This documentation should occur before formal development and again before fielding, regardless of the acquisition pathway that is applicable to that weapon system. 2.3.  USD(R&E). The USD(R&E):
+a.  Oversees establishment of standards and evaluation metrics for developmental testing, safety certification, and reliability assessment of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, with particular attention to the risk of unintended engagements or operational interference by unauthorized parties.
+
+b.  Oversees establishment of science and technology and research and development priorities for autonomy in weapon systems, including the development of new methods of V&V and T&E and the establishment of minimum thresholds of risk and reliability for the performance of autonomy in weapon systems.
+
+c.  Oversees formulation of concrete, testable requirements for all non-AI elements of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems.
+
+d.  Collaborates with the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer (CDAO) to formulate concrete, testable requirements for implementing the DoD AI Ethical Principles and the DoD Responsible AI Strategy and Implementation Pathway.
+
+e.  Oversees and evaluates the developmental testing of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems to assess the risk of failures.
+
+f.  Develops and maintains workforce certification processes, talent management, and curricula to support T&E and V&V of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems by DoD personnel.
+
+g.  In coordination with the USD(P) and the VCJCS, reviews and considers for approval weapon systems submitted before entering formal development in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.c.
+
+h.  Coordinates with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) and the appropriate Secretary of a Military Department or Commander, United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to provide for monitoring to identify and address when changes to the system design or operational environment require additional T&E to provide sufficient confidence that the system will continue to avoid unintended engagements and resist interference by unauthorized parties.
+
+## 2.4.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Personnel And Readiness.
+
+In accordance with DoDD 1322.18, the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness oversees and establishes policy for:
+a.  Individual military training programs for the Total Force relating to autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems.
+
+b.  Individual and functional training programs for military personnel and the collective training programs of military units and staffs relating to autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems.
+
+
+2.5.  DOT&E.
+
+The DOT&E:
+a.  Oversees development of realistic operational T&E standards for autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems, including requirements for data collection and standards for T&E of any changes to the system following initial operational T&E (IOT&E), in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.a.(1) and Section 3.
+
+b.  Evaluates whether autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems under DOT&E
+oversight have met standards for rigorous V&V and T&E in realistic operational conditions, including potential adversary action, to provide sufficient confidence that the probability and consequences of failures have been minimized.
+
+c.  Establishes standards for data collection post-fielding and monitoring and assessment by programs.
+
+d.  Coordinates with the USD(R&E) and the appropriate Secretary of a Military Department or Commander, USSOCOM to provide for monitoring to identify and address when changes to the system design or operational environment require additional T&E to provide sufficient confidence that the system will continue to avoid unintended engagements and resist interference by unauthorized parties.
+
+e.  Reviews and approves operational and live fire test plans for autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems for Major Defense Acquisition Programs and programs designated for DOT&E oversight.
+
+## 2.6.  General Counsel Of The Department Of Defense (Gc Dod).
+
+In accordance with DoDD 5000.01, DoDD 2311.01, DoDD 5145.01, and, where applicable, DoDD 3000.03E, the GC DoD provides for guidance on, and coordination of, significant legal issues in autonomy in weapon systems.  The GC DoD also coordinates on the review of the legality of weapon systems submitted in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.c.
+
+## 2.7.  Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense For Public Affairs.
+
+The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs coordinates on the development of guidance on public affairs matters concerning autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems and the use of such guidance and approves final guidance release.
+
+2.8.  CDAO. The CDAO:
+a.  Monitors and evaluates AI capabilities in and cybersecurity for autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems, in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.a.(2)(a) of this directive and DoDI 8500.01, and advises the Secretary of Defense on such matters.
+
+b.  Collaborates with the USD(R&E) to formulate concrete, testable requirements for implementing the DoD AI Ethical Principles and the DoD Responsible AI Strategy and Implementation Pathway.
+
+c.  Establishes policy and issues guidance on definitions of requirements and testability for AI-enabled systems to implement and demonstrate adherence to the DoD AI Ethical Principles and the DoD Responsible AI Strategy and Implementation Pathway.
+
+d.  Issues guidance on T&E practices for AI capabilities in autonomous or semi-autonomous weapon systems.
+
+e.  Coordinates with the USD(R&E) and DOT&E on developing and using common tools and infrastructure for T&E and V&V of AI capabilities in autonomous or semi-autonomous weapon systems.
+
+## 2.9.  Secretaries Of The Military Departments; Commander, Ussocom; And Directors Of The Defense Agencies And Dod Field Activities.
+
+The Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Commander, USSOCOM; and, under the authority, direction, and control of their respective OSD Component head, the Directors of Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities:
+a.  Design and develop autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force.  This will include developing and implementing:
+(1)  Employment concepts, doctrine, experimentation strategies, TTPs, training, and logistics support.
+
+(2)  V&V, anti-tamper mechanisms, physical hardware, and software system safety in accordance with Military Standard 882E.
+
+(3)  Cyber survivability, operational resilience, and cybersecurity in accordance with DoDI 8500.01.
+
+(4)  Appropriate developmental and operational T&E, regardless of acquisition pathway, the joint/non-joint nature of those system's missions, or the lack of a survivability Key Performance Parameter for those systems.
+
+b.  For the systems in Paragraph 2.9.a:
+(1)  Design autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems to minimize the probability and consequences of failures.
+
+(2)  Perform rigorous and realistic developmental and operational T&E and V&V, including T&E of any changes to the system following IOT&E, in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.a.(1) and Section 3.
+
+(3)  In coordination with the USD(R&E) and DOT&E, provide for monitoring to identify and address when changes to the system design or operational environment require additional T&E to provide sufficient confidence that the system will continue to avoid unintended engagements and resist interference by unauthorized parties.
+
+(4)  For systems incorporating AI capabilities, design the system to utilize robust AI, in accordance with the DoD Responsible AI Strategy and Implementation Pathway, so that the system is resilient in real-world settings and against adversarial attacks and spoofing.
+
+(5)  Design system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, cyber survivability, operational resilience, and cybersecurity capabilities in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.a.(2) of this directive, DoDI 5000.83, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual, and DoDI 8500.01.
+
+(6)  Design human-machine interfaces to be readily understandable to trained operators, with clear procedures to activate and deactivate system functions, and to provide transparent feedback on system status in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.a.(3).
+
+(7)  Certify that operators have been trained in system capabilities, doctrine, and TTPs to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force and employ systems with appropriate care in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and ROE that are applicable or reasonably expected to be applicable.
+
+(8)  Establish and periodically review training, TTPs, and doctrine to ensure operators and commanders understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of a system's autonomy under realistic operational conditions, including as a result of possible adversary actions.
+
+c.  Ensure that legal reviews of the intended acquisition, procurement, or modification of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems are conducted in accordance with DoDD 5000.01, DoDD 2311.01, and, where applicable, DoDD 3000.03E.  Legal reviews must address consistency with all applicable domestic and international law and, in particular, the law of war.
+
+d.  Consider for support only those autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems that are technically feasible, consistent with applicable law, and consistent with the standards in this directive.
+
+e.  In accordance with Paragraphs 1.2.c and 1.2.d, submit any autonomous weapon system for which approval is required to the USD(P), USD(A&S) or USD(R&E), and the VCJCS before a decision to enter formal development, and again before fielding of any such system.
+
+## 2.10.  Cjcs.
+
+The CJCS:
+a.  Develops and implements joint employment concepts, doctrine, experimentation strategies, TTPs, training, and logistics support for autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems.
+
+b.  Assesses military requirements for autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems, including applicable Key Performance Parameters and key system attributes.
+
+c.  Develops and publishes joint doctrine, policy, and other guidance as appropriate to incorporate emerging capabilities of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems into joint and combined operations, in accordance with this directive.
+
+## 2.11.  Vcjcs.
+
+In coordination with the USD(P) and USD(A&S) or USD(R&E), the VCJCS reviews and considers for approval autonomous weapon systems submitted in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.c.
+
+## 2.12.  Combatant Commanders.
+
+The Combatant Commanders:
+a.  Use autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems in accordance with this directive and in a manner consistent with their design, testing, certification, operator training, doctrine, TTPs, and approval as autonomous or semi-autonomous weapon systems.
+
+b.  Employ autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and applicable ROE, in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.b, and employ AI capabilities in autonomous and semiautonomous weapon systems consistent with the DoD AI Ethical Principles and the DoD Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway, in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.f.
+
+c.  Ensure that autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems are not employed or modified to operate in a manner that falls outside the policies in Paragraphs 1.2.d.(1) through 1.2.d.(4) without specific approval in accordance with Paragraph 1.2.c.
+
+
+d.  Integrate autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems into operational mission planning as appropriate.
+
+e.  Through the CJCS, identify warfighter priorities and operational needs that may be met by autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems.
+
+## Section 3:  Verification And Validation And Testing And Evaluation Of Autonomous And Semi-Autonomous Weapon Systems
+
+Regardless of the acquisition pathway or OSD T&E oversight status for a given weapon system, to ensure autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems function as anticipated in realistic operational environments against adaptive adversaries and are sufficiently robust to minimize failures:
+a.  Systems will go through rigorous hardware and software V&V and realistic system developmental and operational T&E, including analysis of unanticipated emergent behavior.
+
+(1)  Hardware and software V&V will include iterative cyber T&E in accordance with DoDI 5000.89, to verify that the weapon system is resilient and survivable in contested cyberspace.
+
+(2)  Systems incorporating AI capabilities will go through rigorous developmental and operational T&E to verify and validate that the AI is robust according to design requirements.
+
+b.  T&E of systems incorporating AI capabilities will include testing to confirm that their autonomy algorithms can be rapidly reprogrammed on new input data.
+
+c.  After IOT&E, as directed by the DOT&E, system data will be collected and any further changes to the system will undergo appropriate V&V and T&E to ensure that critical safety features have not been degraded.
+
+(1)  System software will be tested using best-available DoD means and methods to validate that critical safety features have not been degraded.  Automated testing tools, such as modeling and simulation, will be used whenever feasible.  The testing will identify any new operating states and other relevant changes in the autonomous or semi-autonomous weapon system.
+
+(2)  As directed by the DOT&E:
+(a)  Each new or revised operating state will undergo appropriate and tailored additional T&E to characterize the system behavior in that new operating state.
+
+(b)  Changes to the state transition matrix may require whole system follow-on operational T&E.
+
+d.  In coordination with the USD(R&E) and DOT&E, the owning Component will provide for monitoring to identify and address when changes to the system design or operational environment require additional T&E to provide sufficient confidence that the system will continue to avoid unintended engagements and resist interference by unauthorized parties.
+
+## Section 4:  Guidelines For Review Of Certain Autonomous Weapon Systems
+
+4.1.  Autonomous weapon systems intended to be used in a manner that falls outside the policies in Paragraphs 1.2.d.(1) through 1.2.d.(4) must be approved by the USD(P), USD(R&E), and VCJCS before formal development and by the USD(P), USD(A&S), and VCJCS before fielding. If the weapon system in question is to be developed and then fielded by DoD, it will need to undergo both reviews and receive approvals.  A review is not needed if the weapon system is covered by a previous approval for formal development or fielding.  Requests for senior review and approval should be submitted to USD(P), attention to the Director of the Emerging Capabilities Policy Office.
+
+a.  An autonomous weapon system that is a variant of an existing weapon system previously approved through this review will not be covered by previous approval if changes to the system algorithms, intended mission set, intended operational environments, intended target sets, or expected adversarial countermeasures substantially differ from those applicable to the previously approved weapon system so as to fall outside the scope of what was previously approved in the senior review.  Such systems will require a new senior review before their formal development and again before fielding.
+
+b.  An autonomous weapon system that is a modification of an existing weapon system not previously approved through this review requires the senior review described in Paragraph 1.2.c unless it is intended to be used in a manner that falls within the policies in Paragraphs 1.2.d.(1) through 1.2.d.(4).
+
+c.  Before a decision to enter formal development, the USD(P), USD(R&E), and VCJCS will verify that:
+(1)  The system design incorporates the necessary capabilities to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force in the envisioned planning and employment processes for the weapon.
+
+(2)  The system is designed to complete engagements within a timeframe and geographic area, as well as other applicable environmental and operational parameters, consistent with commander and operator intentions.  If unable to do so, the system will terminate engagements or obtain additional operator input before continuing the engagement.
+
+(3)  The combination of the system's design and concept of employment (e.g., its target selection and engagement logic and other relevant processes or measures) accounts for risks to non-targets, consistent with commander and operator intent.
+
+(4)  The system design, including system safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, and cybersecurity in accordance with DoDI 8500.01, addresses and minimizes the probability and consequences of failures.
+
+(5)  Plans are in place for V&V and T&E to establish system reliability, effectiveness, and suitability under realistic conditions, including possible adversary actions, to a sufficient standard consistent with the potential consequences of an unintended engagement or unauthorized parties interfering with the operation of the system.
+
+(6)  For systems incorporating AI capabilities, plans are in place to ensure consistency with the DoD AI Ethical Principles and the DoD Responsible AI Strategy and Implementation Pathway.
+
+(7)  A preliminary legal review of the weapon system has been completed in coordination with the GC DoD and in accordance with DoDD 5000.01, DoDD 2311.01 and, where applicable, DoDD 3000.03E.
+
+d.  Before fielding, the USD(P), USD(A&S), and VCJCS will verify that:
+(1)  System capabilities, human-machine interfaces, doctrine, TTPs, and training have been demonstrated to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force and to employ systems with appropriate care and in accordance with the law of war, applicable treaties, weapon system safety rules, and ROE that are applicable or reasonably expected to be applicable.
+
+(2)  System safety, anti-tamper mechanisms, cyber survivability, operational resilience, and cybersecurity capabilities have been implemented in accordance with DoDI 5000.83, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual, and DoDI 8500.01 to minimize the probability and consequences of failures.  A monitoring regime is in place to identify and address changes in operational environment, data inputs, and use that could contribute to such failures.
+
+(3)  V&V and T&E:
+(a)  Assess system performance, capability, reliability, effectiveness, and suitability under realistic conditions, including possible adversary actions, consistent with the potential consequences of unintended engagement or unauthorized parties interfering with the operation of the system.
+
+(b)  Have demonstrated that the system can be reprogrammed with sufficient rapidity to enable timely correction of any unintended system behaviors that may be observed or discovered during future system operations.
+
+(4)  Adequate training, TTPs, and doctrine are available, periodically reviewed, and used by system operators and commanders to understand the functioning, capabilities, and limitations of the system's autonomy in realistic operational conditions.
+
+(5)  System design and human-machine interfaces are readily understandable to trained operators, provide transparent feedback on system status, and provide clear procedures for trained operators to activate and deactivate system functions.
+
+(6)  For systems incorporating AI capabilities, the deployment and use of the AI
+capabilities in the weapon system will be consistent with the DoD AI Ethical Principles and the DoD Responsible AI Strategy and Implementation Pathway.
+
+(7)  A legal review of the weapon system has been completed, in coordination with the GC DoD, and in accordance with DoDD 5000.01, DoDD 2311.01, and, where applicable, DoDD 3000.03E. 4.2.  In cases of urgent military need, the USD(P), USD(A&S), USD(R&E), or VCJCS may request a Deputy Secretary of Defense waiver of the requirements in this section and Paragraph 1.2.c. 4.3.  Figure 1 illustrates the senior review process and can help determine whether a weapon system needs to undergo senior review.
+
+## An Autonomous Or Semi-Autonomous Weapon System (Including A Modification Of An Existing System) Is Proposed For Formal Development Or Fielding
+
+Y
+Does the system fall within a previous senior review and approval because it is not
+substantially different from what was previously approved or is the weapon system
+only intended to be used as a semi-autonomous weapon system?
+N
+Y
+Is the weapon an operator-supervised anti-materiel system to defend platforms or
+installations with onboard personnel against time-critical or saturation attacks?
+N
+Y
+Is the weapon an operator-supervised anti-materiel system to defend remotely
+piloted or autonomous vehicles or vessels?
+N
+Y
+Does the weapon only apply non-lethal, non-kinetic force against materiel targets?
+N
+Review the weapon system in accordance with Section 4 of DoDD 3000.09.
+
+Before formal development, the reviewers are the USD(P), USD(R&E), and VCJCS, supported by the Autonomous Weapon Systems Working Group
+
+Before fielding, the reviewers are the USD(P), USD(A&S), and VCJCS, supported by the Autonomous Weapon Systems Working Group
+Did the review process result in approval to develop or field the system?
+Y
+N
+Do not develop or field the system.
+Proceed with formal development or
+fielding in accordance with applicable
+DoD acquisition policies and procedures.
+
+## Section 5:  Autonomous Weapon System Working Group 5.1.  General.
+
+The Autonomous Weapon System Working Group will:
+a.  Support the USD(P), the USD(R&E), and the VCJCS in considering the full range of relevant DoD interests during the review of autonomous weapon systems before formal development.
+
+b.  Support the USD(P), the USD(A&S), and the VCJCS in considering the full range of relevant DoD interests during the review of autonomous weapon systems before fielding.
+
+c.  When requested by appropriate representatives of the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Commander, USSOCOM; or, when applicable, a Director of a Defense Agency or a DoD Field Activity:
+(1)  Advise whether a given weapon system requires senior-level approval in accordance with this directive.
+
+(2)  Help identify and advise on addressing potential issues presented by a given weapon system during a potential senior-level review in accordance with this directive.
+
+## 5.2.  Membership.
+
+In addition to representatives of the USD(P), the Autonomous Weapon System Working Group will consist of representatives of each of the following officials listed below.  All members of the working group will be full time Federal Government employees, permanent part-time Federal Government employees, or Service members on active duty.  The parent organizations for the representatives will be responsible for any expenses, to include travel related expenses, associated with participation in the working group:
+
+a.  USD(A&S). b.  USD(R&E). c.  GC DoD. d.  CDAO. e.  DOT&E. f.  CJCS representatives from:
+(1)  Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy (Joint Staff J5).
+(2)  Director, Command, Control, Communications and Computers/Cyber, Chief Information Officer (Joint Staff J6).
+
+(3)  Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessment (Joint Staff J8). (4)  Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+AI
+artificial intelligence
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+CDAO
+Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+DOT&E
+Director of Operational Test and Evaluation
+GC DoD
+General Counsel of the Department of Defense
+IOT&E
+initial operational test and evaluation
+ROE
+rules of engagement
+T&E
+test and evaluation
+TTPs
+tactics, techniques, and procedures
+USD(A&S)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+USD(R&E)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+USSOCOM
+United States Special Operations Command
+VCJCS
+Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+V&V
+verification and validation
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this directive.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+autonomous weapon system
+A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by an operator.  This includes, but is not limited to, operator-supervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further operator input after activation.
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+failure
+An actual or perceived degradation or loss of intended functionality or inability of the system to perform as intended or designed. Failure can result from a number of causes, including, but not limited to, human error, faulty human-machine interaction, malfunctions, communications degradation, software coding errors, enemy cyber-attacks or infiltration into the industrial supply chain, jamming, spoofing, decoys, other enemy countermeasures or actions, or unanticipated situations on the battlefield.  For the purposes of this issuance, minimizing the probability and consequences of failure means reducing the probability and consequences of unintended engagements to acceptable levels while meeting mission objectives and does not mean achieving the lowest possible level of risk by never engaging targets.
+fielding
+Making a weapon system available for, or placing it into, operational use (rather than testing, exercises, or experiments), regardless of the acquisition approach employed for the weapon system, including major defense acquisition programs, middle tier acquisitions, or prototyping efforts such as joint concept technology
+demonstrations.
+
+formal development
+Begins at "Milestone B," as described in Paragraph 3.10 of DoDI 5000.85, in the case of major defense acquisition programs. For cases other than major defense acquisition programs, begins after the preliminary design review that correlates with the end of the technology maturation and risk reduction phase.
+materiel
+Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
+
+operator-supervised autonomous weapon system
+An autonomous weapon system that is designed to provide operators with the ability to intervene and terminate engagements, including in the event of a weapon system failure, before unacceptable levels of damage occur.
+operating state
+A variable or vector reflecting the status of the system.
+operator
+A person who operates a platform or weapon system.
+remotely operated platform
+An air, land, surface, subsurface, or space platform that is actively controlled by an operator who is not physically on the platform.
+robust AI
+Defined in the DoD Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and Implementation Pathway.
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+semi-autonomous weapon system
+A weapon system that, once activated, is intended to only engage individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected
+by an operator.  This includes: Weapon systems that employ autonomy for engagement-related functions including, but not limited to, acquiring, tracking, and identifying potential targets; cuing potential targets to operators; prioritizing selected targets; timing of when to fire; or providing terminal guidance to home in on selected targets, provided that operator control is retained over the decision to select individual targets and specific target groups for engagement. "Fire and forget" or lock-on-after-launch homing munitions that rely on TTPs to maximize the probability that the only targets within the seeker's acquisition basket when the seeker activates are those individual targets or specific target groups that have been selected by an operator.
+specific target group
+A discrete group of potential targets, such as a particular flight of enemy aircraft, a particular formation of enemy tanks, or a particular flotilla of enemy vessels.  A general class of targets or a specific type of target, such as a particular model of tank or aircraft, does not constitute a specific target group.
+state transition matrix
+A matrix that characterizes the ability of a system to transition from one operating state to another.
+target selection
+The identification of an individual target or a specific group of targets for engagement.
+
+unintended engagement
+The use of force against persons or objects that commanders or operators did not intend to be the targets of U.S. military operations, including unacceptable levels of collateral damage beyond those consistent with the law of war, ROE, and commander's intent.
+weapon system
+Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
+weapon system safety rules
+Guidance for personnel, issued by competent authority, focused on addressing weapon safety issues and concerns that present significant mishap risk and is applied with a view towards ensuring
+freedom from conditions that can cause occupational illness, unintended death or injury, unintended damage to or loss of
+equipment or property, or unintended damage to the environment.
+
+## References
+
+DoD Directive 1322.18, "Military Training," October 3, 2019 DoD Directive 2311.01, "DoD Law of War Program," July 2, 2020 DoD Directive 3000.03E, "DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) and NLW
+Policy," April 25, 2013, as amended
+
+DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," September 9, 2020, as amended DoD Directive 5111.21, "Arms Transfer and Technology Release Senior Steering Group and
+Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure Office," October 14, 2014, as amended
+DoD Directive 5145.01, "General Counsel of the Department of Defense," December 2, 2013, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 5000.83, "Technology and Program Protection to Maintain Technological
+Advantage," July 20, 2020, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5000.85, "Major Capability Acquisition," August 6, 2020, as amended DoD Instruction 5000.89, "Test and Evaluation," November 19, 2020 DoD Instruction 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," March 14, 2014, as amended DoD Responsible AI Working Council, "DoD Responsible Artificial Intelligence Strategy and
+Implementation Pathway," June 21, 2022
+Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual, "Manual for the Operation of
+the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," August 31, 2018
+Military Standard 882E, "Department of Defense Standard Practice System Safety," May 11,
+2012
+Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition.
+Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Artificial Intelligence Ethical Principles for the
+Department of Defense," February 21, 2020

markdown/dod/d3025_13.md

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+## Department Of Defense Directive
+
+NUMBER 3025.13 NUMBER 3025.13
+October 8, 2010 October 8, 2010
+
+##
+
+USD(P)
+USD(P)
+
+## Subject: Employment Of Dod Capabilities In Support Of The U.S. Secret Service (Usss), Department Of Homeland Security (Dhs) Subject: Employment Of Dod Capabilities In Support Of The U.S. Secret Service (Usss), Department Of Homeland Security (Dhs)
+
+ References:
+See Enclosure 1
+References:
+See Enclosure 1 1.  PURPOSE
+1.  PURPOSE.  This Directive reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 3025.13 (Reference (a)) to establish DoD policy and assign responsibilities for employment of DoD capabilities in support of the USSS, a component of DHS.
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Directive:
+a.  Applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the
+"DoD Components").
+
+b.  Does NOT apply to routine intelligence assistance provided by DoD intelligence and counterintelligence components in support of the USSS. 3.  DEFINITIONS.  See Glossary.
+
+4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  The Department of Defense will provide services, equipment, and facilities in support of the USSS when performing its protective duties under section 3056 of title 18, United States Code (U.S.C.), and Public Law 94-524, as amended (References (b) and (c), respectively), when
+requested by the Director of the USSS and approved by the Secretary of Defense.  Such support is an express exception to section 1385 of Reference (b) (also known and hereafter referred to as "The Posse Comitatus Act") and is authorized by Reference (c).
+
+
+b.  When the USSS requests support not related to its protection duties, such as additional support during National Special Security Events (NSSEs), DoD capabilities will be provided to the USSS subject to approval by the Secretary of Defense (taking into account national security objectives, military readiness, and other DoD mission requirements), subject to the Posse Comitatus Act and DoDD 5525.5 (Reference (d)).
+
+c.  Support shall be provided consistent with but not limited to applicable laws, international agreements, and Presidential Directives.  In accordance with Reference (c) and section 1535 of title 31, U.S.C. (Reference (e)), support to the USSS shall be provided on a reimbursable basis, except for telecommunications support provided in accordance with section 8100 of Public Law
+104-208 (Reference (f)) or when the Department of Defense provides temporary assistance directly related to the protection of the President or of the Vice President (or other officer immediately next in order of succession to the Office of the President in accordance with Reference (c)).
+
+d.  At a minimum, USSS requests for support shall be evaluated based on their legality, lethality, risk, cost, propriety, and impact on military readiness.
+
+e.  A clear DoD chain of command (or supervision) shall be maintained for all DoD
+personnel assigned to missions in support of the USSS, while allowing such support to be provided under the overall supervision of the supported civil authority.
+
+f.  USSS-sensitive support requirements shall be processed and coordinated in accordance with DoDD S-5210.36 (Reference (g)).
+
+5.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 6.  INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.  The reporting requirements in paragraph 11.d. of Enclosure 2 have been assigned DD-POL(AR)1466 in accordance with DoD 8910.1-M
+(Reference (h)). 7.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED.  This Directive is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+
+
+8.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Directive is effective upon its publication to the DoD Issuances Website. Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+
+2.  Responsibilities 3.  DoD Request and Assistance Process for Augmentation for USSS Presidential Protection
+
+Glossary
+
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Directive 3025.13, "Employment of Department of Defense Resources in Support of the United States Secret Service," September 13, 1985 (hereby cancelled)
+
+(b) Sections 13851 and 3056 of title 18, United States Code
+(c)
+Public Law 94-524, "Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976,"  October 17, 1976, as
+amended
+(d) DoD Directive 5525.5, "DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,"
+January 15, 1986
+(e) Section 1535 of title 31, United States Code
+(f)
+Section 8100 of Public Law 104-208, "Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997"
+(g) DoD Directive S-5210.36, "Provision of DoD Sensitive Support to DoD Components and
+Other Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government," November 6, 2008
+(h) DoD 8910.1-M, "Department of Defense Procedures for Management of Information
+Requirements," June 30, 1998
+(i)
+Joint Federal Travel Regulations, Volume 1, "Uniformed Service Members," current
+edition
+(j)
+Joint Federal Regulations, Volume 2, "Department of Defense Civilian Personnel," current
+edition
+(k)
+DoD 7000.14-R, "Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations (FMRs),"
+Volumes 1-15, current edition
+(l)
+DoD Directive 5200.31E, DoD Military Working Dog (MWD) Program, March 29, 2006
+(m) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B, "Standing Rules of
+Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for U.S. Forces," June 13, 2005
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DoD EXECSEC).
+The DoD ExecSec (unless otherwise specified in Enclosure 3 of this Directive), shall:
+a.  Act as the initial point of contact for the Department of Defense in all matters pertaining to requests addressed to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the DoD ExecSec for DoD support to the USSS, unless otherwise directed.
+
+b.  Receive, assign to the appropriate DoD Component, and monitor the status of such requests for support to the USSS.
+
+c.  Approve, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, DoD support to the USSS that is required by Reference (c).
+
+d.  Forward such requests for DoD support to the USSS to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)) or other appropriate DoD official.
+
+e.  Designate, consistent with the recommendations of the Secretary of the Military Department concerned and in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, officials authorized to approve specific requests for DoD support from the USSS.
+
+2.  ASD(HD&ASA).  The ASD(HD&ASA), under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), shall:
+a.  Serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) for all matters pertaining to DoD support of the USSS.
+
+b.  Develop DoD policy pertaining to DoD support of the USSS.
+
+
+c.  Implement and maintain an interagency agreement with the DHS that:
+
+
+(1)  Establishes guidelines and procedures for the submission of requests for DoD support to the USSS.
+
+
+(2)  Establishes the process for reimbursement, where required, for such support.
+
+d.  Coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+(USD(P&R)) on any interagency agreement with DHS that creates a demand for DoD personnel.
+
+
+
+e.  As requested by the DoD ExecSec, evaluate, coordinate, and prepare responses and recommendations to requests from the USSS for personnel, support, or services.  Coordinate such matters with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Chief, National Guard Bureau (CNGB) if National Guard personnel may be used to respond to such requests; the Secretaries of the Military Departments; affected Combatant Commanders, Directors of Defense Agencies, and Directors of DoD Field Activities; and the appropriate OSD Principal Staff Assistants.
+
+f.  Supervise and monitor the execution of DoD support of the USSS to ensure the proper employment of DoD capabilities, consistent with other mission requirements and this Directive.
+
+g.  Coordinate, consolidate, and prepare submissions of DoD claims for reimbursement from the USSS for service and support provided under References (c) and (e).  Such matters shall be coordinated with the appropriate Secretaries of the Military Departments, Directors of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CNGB, and the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (USD(C))/Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Department of Defense.
+
+h.  Develop implementing guidance as required to further describe procedural components for supporting the USSS as appropriate, including but not limited to explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) credentials and credentialing procedures in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
+(ASD(SO/LIC&IC)).
+
+i.  In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the USD(C)/CFO, and the appropriate Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities, prepare the semi-annual report of expenditures required by Reference (e).
+
+3.  ASD(SO/LIC&IC).  The ASD(SO/LIC&IC), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), shall establish policies and procedures for EOD and specifically ensure proper employment of EOD in support of the USSS.
+
+4.  USD(P&R).  The USD(P&R), in addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, shall develop guidelines and procedures for the provision of personnel support to DHS for inclusion in any interagency agreement developed pursuant to this Directive. 5.  USD(C)/CFO.  The USD(C)/CFO, in addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Establish policies and procedures to ensure timely reimbursement to the Department of Defense for its support of the USSS, in accordance with References (e) and (f) for missions such as, but not limited to, NSSEs.
+
+b.  Establish appropriate intra-agency reporting codes to account for DoD expenditures.
+
+6.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE (USD(I)).  The USD(I), in addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, shall establish policies and procedures governing support to the USSS in the areas of sensitive support (in accordance with Reference (g)), intelligence, counterintelligence, cover, security, and employment of military working dogs (MWDs) and explosive detector dogs (EDDs).
+
+7.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS (ASD(PA)).  The ASD(PA), in addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, shall respond to inquiries from the news media and the public regarding DoD support to the USSS, but refer specific inquiries to the supported agencies, as appropriate.
+
+8.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NETWORKS AND INFORMATION
+INTEGRATION/DoD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (ASD(NII)/DoD CIO).  The ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, in addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, shall oversee all telecommunications and information sharing support to the USSS.
+
+9.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA).  The Director, DISA, under the authority, direction, and control of the ASD(NII)/DoD CIO and in addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, shall provide specific support as directed, based on Enclosure 3 of this Directive.
+
+10.  HEADS OF THE DoD AND OSD COMPONENTS.  The Heads of the DoD and OSD
+Components shall:
+a.  Designate and maintain an office of primary responsibility (OPR) for Presidential protection and provide OPR designation and contact information to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff within 60 days of the publication of this Directive; and within 30 days of any change in the OPR.
+
+b.  Notify the ASD(HD&ASA) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when providing support using separate authorities not addressed in this Directive.
+
+c.  Use methods of calculating and capturing the costs of support to the USSS that adhere to appropriate fiscal law and DoD policy pursuant to the Joint Federal Travel Regulations, Volume 1, Joint Travel Regulations, Volume 2, and DoD 7000.14-R (References (i), (j), and (k)). 11.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND DIRECTORS OF THE
+DEFENSE AGENCIES AND DoD FIELD ACTIVITIES.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Directors of the Defense Agencies and DoD Field Activities, in addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, shall:
+
+a.  Identify and report all costs incurred in providing protective duty support to the USSS
+consistent with paragraph 10.c. of this enclosure.  Identify non-reimbursable costs for support provided in accordance with Reference (c) and reimbursable costs for support provided in accordance with Reference (e).
+
+b.  Consolidate cost reports for support to the USSS at the Military Department, Defense Agency, or DoD Field Activity Headquarters-level and forward to the ASD(HD&ASA), with copies to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(C)/CFO, within 90 days of the completion of the assigned support mission.  Provide reports of routine support, as outlined in Enclosure 3, to the ASD(HD&ASA), with copies to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the USD(C)/CFO, by September 30th of each year.
+
+12.  SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE.  The Secretary of the Air Force, in addition to the responsibilities in sections 10 and 11 of this enclosure and as the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for the DoD MWD Program in accordance with DoDD 5200.31E (Reference (l)), shall coordinate with USD(I) on development of policies and procedures for proper employment of EDD teams in support of the USSS.
+
+13.  CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Advise the Secretary of Defense on the effects that USSS requests for support have on national security and military readiness, consult with Military Service Chiefs and Combatant Commanders, as appropriate, and coordinate with the ASD(HD&ASA) as such requests are staffed.
+
+b.  Identify and coordinate available capabilities for support of the USSS.
+
+c.  Release execution or deployment orders related to support of the USSS when approved by the Secretary of Defense.
+
+14.  CNGB.  The CNGB, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense through the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force, shall:
+a.  Serve as the channel of communication on all matters pertaining to National Guard support to the USSS between:  (1)  the Secretary of Defense and the Heads of the DoD Components (including the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force); and (2) the States.  Direct liaison between the entities in (1) and (2) should occur only in an emergency when time does not permit compliance with this Directive.  In each such instance, the CNGB should be informed of the communication.
+
+b.  Annually assess the readiness of the National Guard of the States to conduct support to the USSS and report on this assessment to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force, the USD(P&R), the ASD(HD&ASA), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and appropriate Combatant Commanders.
+
+
+c.  Participate in the Joint Staff capability-based planning and assessments, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, and the DoD planning, programming, budgeting, and execution assessment for all actions pertaining to National Guard capabilities required for support to the USSS.
+
+d.  Facilitate and deconflict the planning and use of National Guard forces among the States to ensure that adequate and balanced forces are available and responsive for National Guard support to USSS missions, consistent with national security objectives and priorities.
+
+
+
+15.  COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS.  The Commanders of the Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in addition to the responsibilities in section 10 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Execute DoD missions in support of the USSS, as directed.
+
+b.  Establish the military command relationships and reporting chain of command for assigned DoD missions in support of the USSS.  Ensure that military command and control over assigned forces is maintained, and that appropriate coordinating instructions are provided for coordination between civilian authorities and assigned DoD forces.  Request mission-specific rules for the use of force in accordance with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3121.01B (Reference (m)).
+
+c.  Submit after-action reports to the ASD(HD&ASA) on assigned non-routine DoD missions in support of the USSS in performing its protective duties.
+
+## Enclosure 3 Dod Request And Assistance Process For Augmentation For Usss Presidential Protection Usss Presidential Protection
+
+| SUPPORT REQUESTED                                                           |
+|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| WHMO                                                                        |
+| (i)  Requests for airlift or airlift support will be generated by the White |
+| House Military Office (WHMO) and passed to the Commander, United            |
+| States Transportation Command for action.                                   |
+| WHMO/DoD ExecSec                                                            |
+| (ii)  Requests for DoD air assets other than airlift, such as fighter air   |
+| patrols or helicopters, will be submitted through the WHMO and the          |
+| White House Chief of Staff's Office to the DoD ExecSec.                     |
+| DoD ExecSec                                                                 |
+| (iii)  Requests for airborne early warning (radar and notification) for     |
+| Presidential/Vice-Presidential travel sites within the United States will   |
+| be made by the USSS directly to the DoD ExecSec.                            |
+| WHMO/DoD ExecSec                                                            |
+| (iv)  Requests for specific DoD-provided personnel or equipment (such       |
+| as special forces, a high mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle, or         |
+| forklift) will be submitted through the WHMO and the White House            |
+| Chief of Staff's Office to the DoD ExecSec.                                 |
+| WHMO/DoD ExecSec                                                            |
+| (v)  Requests for medical and rescue support (such as emergency             |
+| medical technician personnel and ambulances) will be generated by           |
+| either the USSS or White House Medical Unit, and will be routed             |
+| through the WHMO and the White House Chief of Staff's Office to the         |
+| DoD ExecSec.                                                                |
+| USNORTHCOM/Joint Explosive                                                  |
+| Ordnance Disposal Very Important                                            |
+| Persons Protection Support Activity                                         |
+|                                                                             |
+|                                                                             |
+| (vi)  Routine requests (25 or fewer teams) for EOD directly in support of   |
+| President/Vice President protective missions and other authorized           |
+| protectees will be coordinated through the Commander, United States         |
+| Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) or his or her designated                      |
+| representative.                                                             |
+| DoD ExecSec                                                                 |
+| Non-routine requests (more than 25 teams) for EOD or requests for non-      |
+| EOD search capabilities in support of EOD requests will be coordinated      |
+| through the DoD ExecSec.                                                    |
+| SecAF as DoD EA for MWD Program                                             |
+| (vii)  Routine requests (25 or fewer teams) for EDD directly in support     |
+| of President/Vice President protective missions and other authorized        |
+| protectees will be coordinated through the Secretary of the Air Force       |
+| (SecAF) or his or her designated representative.                            |
+|                                                                             |
+|                                                                             |
+|                                                                             |
+| DoD ExecSec/USD(I)/SecAF                                                    |
+| Non-routine requests (more than 25 teams) for EDD will be coordinated       |
+| through the DoD ExecSec.                                                    |
+|                                                                            |
+|----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| SUPPORT REQUESTED                                                          |
+| DoD OFFICE OF PRIMARY                                                      |
+| RESPONSIBILITY FOR                                                         |
+| COORDINATION                                                               |
+| (viii)  In accordance with Reference (c), WHMO, ASD(NII)/DoD CIO,          |
+| and DISA shall provide telecommunications assistance on a temporary        |
+| basis without reimbursement when assisting the USSS in its duties          |
+| directly related to the protection of the President or the Vice President  |
+| (or other officer immediately next in order of succession to the Office of |
+| the President).                                                            |
+| (ix)  In accordance with Reference (f), fixed and mobile                   |
+| telecommunications support shall be provided by the White House            |
+| Communications Agency to the USSS, without reimbursement, in               |
+| connection with the USSS duties directly related to the protection of the  |
+| President or the Vice President (or other officer immediately in order of  |
+| succession to the Office of the President) at the White House Security     |
+| Complex in the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area and Camp David,         |
+| Maryland.  For these purposes, "White House Security Complex"              |
+| includes the White House, the White House grounds, the Dwight David        |
+| Eisenhower Executive Office Building, the New Executive Office             |
+| Building, Blair House, the Treasury Building, and the Vice President's     |
+| Residence at the Naval Observatory.                                        |
+WHMO, ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, and DISA WHMO, ASD(NII)/DoD CIO, and DISA
+
+## Glossary Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+ASD(HD&ASA)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
+Security Affairs
+ASD(NII)/DoD CIO Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information
+Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer
+ASD(PA)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs
+ASD(SO/LIC&IC)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity
+Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
+
+
+CNGB
+Chief, National Guard Bureau
+
+
+DHS
+Department of Homeland Security
+DISA
+Director, Defense Information Systems Agency
+DoD ExecSec
+DoD Executive Secretary
+DoDD
+Department of Defense Directive
+
+
+EA
+Executive Agent
+EDD
+explosive detection dogs
+EOD
+explosive ordnance disposal
+
+
+MWD
+military working dog
+
+
+NSSE
+National Special Security Event
+
+
+OPR
+office of primary responsibility
+
+
+SecAF
+Secretary of the Air Force
+
+
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USD(C)/CFO
+Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
+USD(I)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+USD(P&R)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+
+USNORTHCOM
+United States Northern Command
+USSS
+United States Secret Service
+
+
+WHMO
+White House Military Office

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+## Department Of Defense Directive
+
+
+NUMBER 3025.18
+December 29, 2010
+Incorporating Change 2, Effective March 19, 2018
+
+
+## Usd(P)
+
+ SUBJECT: Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)
+
+References: See Enclosure 1 1.  PURPOSE.  This Directive:
+a.  Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for DSCA, also referred to as civil support.
+
+b.  Incorporates and cancels DoD Directive (DoDD) 3025.1 and DoDD 3025.15
+(References (a) and (b)).
+
+
+
+c.  Supplements *Provides guidance for implementing* the regulations (in DoDD 5525.5 DoD
+Instruction (DoDI) 3025.21 (Reference (c))) required by section 375 275 of title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), (Reference (d)) regarding military support for of civilian law enforcement.
+
+d.  Provides guidance for the execution and oversight of DSCA when requested by civil authorities or by qualifying entities and approved by the appropriate DoD official, or as directed by the President, within the United States, including the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, and any territory or possession of the United States or any political subdivision thereof.
+
+e.  Authorizes immediate response authority for providing DSCA, when requested.
+
+f.  Authorizes emergency authority for the use of military force, under dire situations circumstances, as described in paragraph 4.i. *4.k.* above the signature of this Directive.
+
+g.  Incorporates the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (e)), which is hereby cancelled. 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Directive:
+
+a.  Applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the
+"DoD Components").
+
+
+
+b.  Applies to the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard (hereafter referred to collectively as the "National Guard") personnel when under Federal command and control.  Also applies to National Guard personnel when the Secretary of Defense determines that it is appropriate to employ National Guard personnel in title 32, U.S.C. *(Reference (f))*, status to fulfill a request for DSCA, the Secretary of Defense requests the concurrence of the Governors of the affected States, and those Governors concur in the employment of National Guard personnel in such a status.
+
+
+
+c.  Applies to all DSCA (except the specific forms of DSCA listed in paragraph 2.d. of this section), including but not limited to:
+
+
+(1)  Mutual or automatic aid, also known as reciprocal fire protection agreements (see chapter 15A of title 42, U.S.C. (Reference (fg))).
+
+
+(2)  DoD fire and emergency services programs (see DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6055.06
+(Reference (gh))).
+
+
+(3)  Support of special events in accordance with applicable laws and DoD policy (see DoDD 2000.15 *DoDI 3025.20* (Reference (hi))).
+
+
+(4)  United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) activities as the DoD Coordinating and Primary Agency for Emergency Support Function #3, Public Works and Engineering, of the National Response Framework (Reference (ij)).
+
+
+(5)  Defense support to civilian law enforcement agencies (see DoDD 3025.12
+(Reference (j)) and Reference (c)).
+
+d.  Does NOT apply to the following:
+
+(1)  Support in response to foreign disasters provided in accordance with DoDD 5100.46
+(Reference (k)). (2)  Joint investigations conducted by the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, and the military criminal investigative organizations with civil law enforcement agencies on matters within their respective jurisdictions using their own forces and equipment. (3)  Detail of DoD personnel to duty outside the Department of Defense in accordance with DoDI 1000.17 (Reference (l)).
+
+
+(4)  Counternarcotics operations conducted under the authority of section  1004 of Public Law 101-510 (1991) (Reference (m)) *section 284 of Reference (d)*. (5)  Support provided by the USACE when accomplishing missions and responsibilities under the authority of section 701n of title 33, U.S.C. (Reference (nm)) and Executive Order
+12656 (Reference (on)). (6)  Assistance provided by DoD intelligence and counterintelligence components in accordance with DoDD 5240.01 (Reference (po)), Executive Orders 12333 and 13388 (References (qp) and (rq)), DoD 5240.1-R (Reference (sr)), DoD Manual 5240.01 (Reference (s)), and other applicable laws and regulations. (7)  Military community relations programs and activities administered by the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (see DoDD 5410.18 and DoDI 5410.19
+(References (t) and (u))). (8)  Sensitive support in accordance with DoDD S-5210.36 (Reference (v)). (9)  Activities performed by the Civil Air Patrol in support of civil authorities or qualifying entities when approved by the Air Force as auxiliary missions in accordance with section 9442 of Reference (d) and DoD 3025.1-M Volume 1 of *DoD Manual 3025.01* (Reference (w)) except as restricted by paragraph 4.j. *4.l.* above the signature of this Directive. (10)  Innovative readiness training (formerly called "civil-military cooperative action programs") (see DoDD 1100.20 (Reference (x))).
+
+3.  DEFINITIONS.  See Glossary. 4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+
+a.  This Directive shall be implemented consistent with national security objectives and military readiness. b.  Unless expressly stated otherwise, the provisions of this Directive should not be construed to rescind any existing authorities of the Heads of DoD Components, commanders, and/or responsible DoD civilians to provide DSCA in accordance with existing laws, DoD issuances, and Secretary of Defense-approved orders. c.  DSCA is initiated by a request for DoD assistance from civil authorities or qualifying entities or is authorized by the President or Secretary of Defense.
+
+
+d.  All requests for DSCA shall be written, and shall include a commitment to reimburse the Department of Defense in accordance with sections 5121, et. seq., of Reference (fg) (also known as "The Stafford Act"), section 1535 of title 31, U.S.C. (also known as "The Economy Act"
+(Reference (y))), or other authorities except requests for support for immediate response, and mutual or automatic aid, in accordance with paragraphs 4.g. *4.i.* and 4.m 4.o. of this section. Unless approval authority is otherwise delegated by the Secretary of Defense, all DSCA requests shall be submitted to the office of the Executive Secretary of the Department of Defense.  For assistance provided according to paragraph 4.g. *4.i* of this section, civil authorities shall be informed that oral requests for assistance in an emergency must be followed by a written request that includes an offer to reimburse the Department of Defense at the earliest available opportunity.  States also must reimburse the United States Treasury in accordance with section
+9701 of Reference (y).  Support may be provided on a non-reimbursable basis only if required by law or if both authorized by law and approved by the appropriate DoD official. e.  All requests from civil authorities and qualifying entities for assistance shall be evaluated for:
+
+
+(1)  Legality (compliance with laws). (2)  Lethality (potential use of lethal force by or against DoD Forces). (3)  Risk (safety of DoD Forces). (4)  Cost (including the source of funding and the effect on the DoD budget). (5)  Appropriateness (whether providing the requested support is in the interest of the
+Department).
+
+(6)  Readiness (impact on the Department of Defense's ability to perform its other primary missions).
+
+
+f.  In accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 8 (Reference (z)), the Secretary of Defense, with the heads of other federal departments and agencies with a role in prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery, are responsible for national preparedness efforts, including department-specific operational plans, as needed, consistent with their statutory roles and responsibilities.
+
+
+fg.  DSCA plans shall be compatible with Reference (i) *References (j) and (z)*; the National Incident Management System (Reference (zaa)); all contingency plans for operations in the locations listed in paragraph 1.d. above the signature of this Directive; and any other national plans (approved by the President or Secretary of Defense) or DoD issuances governing DSCA operations.  DSCA planning will consider command and control options that will emphasize unity of effort, and authorize direct liaison if authorized by the Secretary of Defense.
+
+
+h.  DoD must be prepared to help civilian authorities save and protect lives during a complex catastrophe (see Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (ab))).
+
+
+g*i.*  Federal military commanders, Heads of DoD Components, and/or responsible DoD
+civilian officials (hereafter referred to collectively as "DoD officials") have IMMEDIATE
+RESPONSE AUTHORITY as described in this Directive.  In response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions and if time does not permit approval from higher authority, DoD officials may provide an immediate response by temporarily employing the resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage within the United States.  Immediate response authority does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.
+
+(1)  DoD officials must exercise judgment based on available information and resources in determining the maximum allowable distance from the installation or facility the immediate response may take place.  DoD officials should consider challenges such as sustainment, transportation, communications, mission impact, and increased risk (see Reference (e)).
+
+
+(2)  Before responding to a civilian authority's request for assistance, DoD officials should, unless otherwise directed by a higher authority, prioritize resources to DoD requirements first and then to address civilian authority requests.
+
+
+            (3)  The civil authority's request for immediate response should be directed to the
+installation commander or other appropriate DoD official responsible for the installation, with
+further dissemination as needed.
+
+
+(1)(4)  The DoD official directing a response under immediate response authority shall
+
+immediately notify the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center (NJOIC), through the
+DoD organization's higher headquarters and chain of command, of the details of the response.
+The NJOIC will inform the appropriate DoD Components, including the geographic Combatant
+Command and the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
+Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)).
+
+
+(2)(5)  An immediate response shall end when the necessity giving rise to the response is
+
+no longer present (e.g., when there are sufficient resources available from State, local, and other
+Federal agencies to respond adequately and that agency or department has initiated response
+activities) or when the initiating DoD official or a higher authority directs an end to the response.
+The DoD official directing a response under immediate response authority shall reassess whether
+there remains a necessity for the Department of Defense to respond under this authority as soon
+as practicable but, if immediate response activities have not yet ended, not later than 72 hours
+after the request for assistance was received.
+
+
+(3)(6)  Support provided under immediate response authority should be provided on a
+
+cost-reimbursable basis, where appropriate or legally required, but will not be delayed or denied
+based on the inability or unwillingness of the requester to make a commitment to reimburse the
+Department of Defense.
+
+
+hj.  The authority of State officials is recognized to direct a State immediate response using
+
+National Guard personnel under State command and control (including personnel in a title 32, U.S.C. (Reference (ef)) (hereafter referred to as "Title 32") status) in accordance with State law, but National Guard personnel will not be placed in or extended in Title 32 status to conduct State immediate response activities.
+
+
+i*k.*  Federal military commanders are provided EMERGENCY AUTHORITY under this Directive.  Federal military forces shall not be used to quell civil disturbances unless specifically authorized by the President in accordance with applicable law (e.g., chapter 15 13 of Reference (d)) or permitted under emergency authority, as described below. (see DoDD 3025.12 (Reference (j)) and DoDD 5525.5 (Reference (c))).  In these circumstances, those Federal military commanders have the authority, in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization by the President is impossible and duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation, to engage temporarily in activities that are necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances because:
+
+(1)  Such activities are necessary to prevent significant loss of life or wanton destruction of property and are necessary to restore governmental function and public order; or,
+
+(2)  When duly constituted Federal, State, or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for Federal property or Federal governmental functions.  Federal action, including the use of Federal military forces, is authorized when necessary to protect the Federal property or functions.
+
+jl.  Except for immediate response and emergency authority as described in paragraphs 4.g.
+
+and 4.i. *and 4.k.* of this section, only the Secretary of Defense may approve requests from civil authorities or qualifying entities for Federal military support for:
+(1)  Defense assistance in responding to civil disturbances (requires Presidential authorization) in accordance with Reference (jc). (2)  Defense response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) events (see DoDI 2000.18 (Reference (aa)) incidents, except as authorized in *paragraph 4.s. of this section*.
+
+
+(3)  Defense assistance to civilian law enforcement organizations, except as authorized in paragraph 4.s. of this section and Reference (c). (4)  Assistance in responding with assets with potential for lethality.  This support includes loans of arms; vessels or aircraft; or ammunition.  It also includes assistance under section 382 282 of Reference (d) and section 831 of title 18, U.S.C. (Reference (abac)); all support to counterterrorism operations; and all support to civilian law enforcement authorities in situations where a confrontation between civilian law enforcement and civilian individuals or groups is reasonably anticipated.
+
+
+k*m.*  Federal military forces employed for DSCA activities shall remain under Federal military command and control at all times. ln.  Special event support to a qualifying entity shall be treated as DSCA. mo.  All requests for DSCA mutual and automatic aid via the DoD Fire and Emergency Services programs shall be in accordance with Reference (gh).
+
+
+np.  DSCA is a total force mission (see DoDD 1200.17 (Reference (acad))). oq.  No DoD unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) will not be used for DSCA operations, including support to Federal, State, local, and tribal government organizations, unless expressly approved by the Secretary of Defense.  (See References (po), (qp), (rq), and (sr), *and (s)*)
+(1)  The only exception to the requirement for approval by the Secretary of Defense for the use of DoD UAS for DSCA operations is for search and rescue missions involving distress and potential loss of life that are coordinated by the Air Force Rescue Coordination Center, Alaska Rescue Coordination Center, or Joint Rescue Coordination Center-Pacific and approved by the applicable Combatant Commander in accordance with the Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 15-002 (Reference (ae)).
+
+(2)  Use of armed UAS for DSCA operations is not authorized.
+
+pr.  Direct liaison between DoD Components and the States should occur only when time does not permit compliance with paragraph 13.a. in Enclosure 2 of this Directive.  In each such instance, the Chief, National Guard Bureau, will be informed of the direct liaison.
+
+s.  The ASD(HD&GS) may approve requests for the following types of DoD support of civilian law enforcement agencies in accordance with the Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (af)):
+
+(1)  Non-lethal support that is unrelated to law enforcement functions such as arrest, search, seizure, or crowd or traffic control.
+
+
+           (2)  Support provided by non-military personnel under section 2564 of Reference (d),
+including support contracted by DoD to support civilian law enforcement agencies during
+certain sporting events.
+
+
+            (3)  CBRNE detection and response capabilities for pre-planned events, with the
+concurrence of the force providers, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other DoD
+officials as appropriate. t.  DoD personnel and National Guard personnel in Title 32 status will not conduct
+operations at polling places and must strictly refrain from activities similar to those prohibited
+by sections 592-594 of Reference (ac).
+
+
+u.  Use of intelligence assets for DSCA purposes must be in accordance with Reference (o).
+
+
+5.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2.
+
+
+6.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED *Cleared for public release*.  This Directive is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web-site at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives *Directives Division Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD*. 7.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Directive:
+a.  Is is effective December 29, 2010.
+
+b.  Must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication in accordance with DoD Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (am)).  If not it will expire effective December 29, 2020 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website.
+
+
+ Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+
+Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Directive 3025.1, "Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)," January 15, 1993
+(hereby cancelled)
+(b) DoD Directive 3025.15, "Military Assistance to Civil Authorities," February 18, 1997
+(hereby cancelled)
+(c) DoD Directive 5525.5, "DoD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials,"
+January 15, 1986
+(c) DoD Instruction 3025.21, "Defense Support of Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies,"
+February 27, 2013
+(d) Sections 375 275, *277,*382 *282, 284*, 2564, 9442, and Chapter Chapters 13, 15*, and 18* of
+title 10, United States Code
+(e)
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Utilization of Immediate Response Authority for Defense Support of Civil Authorities in Complex Catastrophes," December 9, 2013 (hereby cancelled)
+(ef) Title 32, United States Code
+(fg) Sections 300hh-11 and 5121. et. seq.1, and Chapter 15A of title 42, United States Code
+(gh) DoD Instruction 6055.06, "DoD Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES) Program,"
+December 21, 2006
+(h) DoD Directive 2000.15, "Support to Special Events," November 21, 1994
+(i)
+DoD Instruction 3025.20, "Defense Support of Special Events," April 6, 2012
+(ij) Department of Homeland Security, "National Response Framework," January 20082016 (j)
+DoD Directive 3025.12, "Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS),"
+February 4, 1994
+(k) DoD Directive 5100.46, "Foreign Disaster Relief," December 4, 1975 July 6, 2012 (l)
+DoD Instruction 1000.17, "Detail of DoD Personnel to Duty Outside the Department of
+Defense," April 16, 2008 October 30, 2013
+(m) Section 1004, Public Law 101-510, "1991 National Defense Authorization Act," as
+amended
+(nm) Section 701n of title 33, United States Code (on) Executive Order 12656, "Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities," as
+amended
+(po) DoD Directive 5240.01, "DoD Intelligence Activities," August 27, 2007, as amended (qp) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," December 4, 1981, as
+amended
+(rq) Executive Order 13388, "Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to
+Protect Americans," October 25, 2005
+(sr) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components
+That Affect United States Persons," December 1982
+(s)
+DoD Manual 5240.01, "Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence
+Activities," August 8, 2016
+(t)
+DoD Directive 5410.18, "Public Affairs Community Relations Policy," November 20,
+2001, as amended
+(u) DoD Instruction 5410.19, "Public Affairs Community Relations Policy Implementation,"
+November 13, 2001
+(v) DoD Directive S-5210.36, "Provision of DoD Sensitive Support to DoD Components and
+Other Departments and Agencies of the U.S. Government," November 6, 20082
+(w) DoD Manual 3025.1-M, "Manual for Civil Emergencies," June 1994 (w) DoD Manual 3025.01, Volume 1, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities: Overview,"
+August 11, 2016
+(x) DoD Directive 1100.20, "Support and Services for Eligible Organizations and Activities
+Outside the Department of Defense," April 12, 2004
+(y) Sections 15353 and 9701 of title 31, United States Code
+(z)
+Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8, "National Preparedness," March 30, 2011
+(zaa) Department of Homeland Security, "National Incident Management System,"
+March 1, 2004December 2008
+(ab) Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Actions to Improve Defense Support in Complex
+Catastrophes," July 20, 2012
+(aa) DoD Instruction 2000.18, "Department of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological,
+Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines," December 4, 2002
+(abac) Section Sections *592-594 and* 831 of title 18, United States Code (acad) DoD Directive 1200.17, "Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force,"
+October 29, 2008
+(ae) Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 15-002, "Guidance for the Domestic
+Use of Unmanned Aircraft Systems," February 17, 2015
+(af) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Delegation of Approval Authority," June 28,
+2016
+(adag) DoD Directive 5111.13, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and
+Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA))," January 16, 2009
+(ae) DoD Directive 8320.02, "Data Sharing in a Net-Centric Department of Defense,"
+December 2, 2004
+(ah) DoD Instruction 8320.02, "Sharing Data, Information Technology (IT) Services in the
+Department of Defense," August 5, 2013
+(afai) DoD Directive 1322.18, "Military Training," January 13, 2009 (agaj) DoD Directive *Instruction* 6010.22, "National Disaster Medical System (NDMS),"
+January 21, 2003April 14, 2016
+(ahak) Unified Command Plan, current edition4 (aial) Global Force Management Implementation Guidance, current edition5
+(ajam) DoD Instruction 1215.06, "Uniform Reserve, Training, and Retirement Categories,"
+February 7, 2007 March 11, 2014, as amended
+(akan) DoD Directive 5105.77, "National Guard Bureau (NGB)," May 21, 2008 October 30,
+2015
+(al) Joint Publication 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition
+(ao) Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "DoD Dictionary of Military and
+Associated Terms," current edition
+(am) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," October 28, 2007
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)).  The USD(P) shall:
+a.  Coordinate DSCA policy with other Federal departments and agencies, State agencies, and the DoD Components, as appropriate. b.  Establish DoD policy governing DSCA.
+
+2.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND
+AMERICAS' SECURITY (ASD(HD&ASA)).  *ASD(HD&GS).*   The ASD(HD&ASA) ASD(HD&GS), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), shall:
+a.  Serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) for DSCA.
+
+
+b.  Serve as the Defense Domestic Crisis Manager.
+
+c.  Serve as an approval authority, subject to the following conditions, for waiver of the requirement to reimburse DoD, pursuant to section 277 of Reference (d), up to $500,000, for costs associated with providing support to civilian law enforcement agencies under chapter 15 of Reference (d), or section 502(f) of Reference (f).
+(1)  The reimbursement requirement may only be waived if the support is provided in the normal course of military training or operations or if the support results in a benefit to DoD or personnel of the National Guard providing the support that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained from military operations or training, as determined by the unit commander or other appropriate authority.
+
+(2)  The following should concur prior to the waiver of reimbursement:
+(a)  Relevant Secretaries of the Military Departments. (b)  Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer of the
+Department of Defense (USD(C)/CFO). (c)  General Counsel of the Department of Defense. (d)  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (e)  Affected Combatant Commanders. (f)  Other DoD officials as appropriate.
+ (3)  The ASD(HD&GS) must notify the Secretary of Defense of the use of this delegated authority at the earliest opportunity.
+
+
+cd.  As delegated by the Secretary of Defense in accordance with DoDD 5111.13 (Reference
+(adah)), serve as approval authority for requests for assistance from civil authorities or qualifying entities sent to the Secretary of Defense, except for those items retained in paragraphs 4.j.4.l., and 4.o.*4.q.* above the signature of this Directive, or delegated to other officials.  This authority may not be delegated further than the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs *ASD(HD&GS)*.  When carrying out this authority, the ASD(HD&ASA) *ASD(HD&GS)* shall:
+
+(1)  Coordinate requests with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Commanders of the Combatant Commands with DSCA responsibilities in the matter, and Military Department Secretaries and other DoD officials as appropriate.
+
+
+(2)  Immediately notify the Secretary of Defense of the use of this authority.
+
+de.  Develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of DoD policy for DSCA plans and activities, including:
+
+
+(1)  Requests for assistance during domestic crises, emergencies, or civil disturbances. (2)  Domestic consequence management *CBRNE response*. (3)  Coordination or consultation, as appropriate, with the Department of Homeland
+Security and other Federal agencies on the development and validation of DSCA requirements.
+ (4)  DoD support for national special security events. (5)  DoD support for national and international sporting events, in accordance with section 2564 of Reference (d).
+
+
+(6)  Direct the fullest appropriate dissemination of information relating to all aspects of DSCA, using all approved media and in accordance with DoDD *DoDI* 8320.02 (Reference (aeah)).
+
+ef.  Exercise staff cognizance over Reference (c). 3.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW- INTENSITY CONFLICT AND INTERDEPENDENT CAPABILITIES (ASD(SO/LIC&IC)). The ASD(SO/LIC&IC), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), shall support planning by the Defense Domestic Crisis Manager during DSCA operations, as required.
+
+4.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER) (USD(C))/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER (CFO), DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE *USD(C)/CFO*.  The USD(C)/CFO shall:
+a.  Establish policies and procedures to ensure timely reimbursement to the Department of Defense for reimbursable DSCA activities.
+
+b.  Assist in management of statutory resources for DSCA in support of appropriate international and domestic sporting events. 5.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R)).  The USD(P&R) shall identify, monitor, and oversee the development of integrated DSCA training capabilities and the integration of these training capabilities into exercises and training to build, sustain, and assess DSCA readiness in accordance with DoDD
+1322.18 (Reference (afai)). 6.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS (ASD(HA)).  The ASD(HA), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for all DoD health policy, shall:
+a.  Provide guidance and support for all domestic crisis situations or emergencies that require health or medical-related DSCA to ASD(HD&ASA) *the ASD(HD&GS).* b.  Exercise authority in accordance with section 300hh-11 of Reference (fg), and the policy according to DoDD *DoDI* 6010.22 (Reference (agaj)), for participation in the National Disaster Medical System. 7.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR *MANPOWER AND* RESERVE AFFAIRS (ASD(M&RA)).  The ASD(M&RA), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), shall provide recommendations, guidance, and support on the use of the Reserve Components to perform DSCA missions to ASD(HD&ASA) *the ASD(HD&GS)*. 8.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS *SUSTAINMENT* (USD(AT&L A&S)).  The USD(AT&L A&S) shall establish policies and procedures, in coordination with ASD(HD&ASA) *the ASD(HD&GS)*, to implement DSCA requirements for DoD Fire and Emergency Services programs and mutual or automatic aid that may be part of that program. 9.  HEADS OF THE DoD COMPONENTS.  The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
+a.  Direct that any DSCA-related DoD issuances, concept plans, interagency agreements, and memorandums of understanding or agreement with external agencies are in full compliance with this Directive.
+
+
+b.  Direct Component compliance with financial management guidance related to support provided for DSCA operations, including guidance related to tracking costs and seeking reimbursement.
+
+c.  When approved by the Secretary of Defense, plan, program, and budget for DSCA
+capabilities in accordance with law, policy, and assigned missions.
+
+10.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments, in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall:
+
+a.  Establish the necessary policies and procedures to ensure the appropriate personnel are trained to execute DSCA plans as directed by the Secretary of Defense. b.  Direct that requests for reimbursement of actual DSCA expenditures (performance of work or services, payments to contractors, or delivery from inventory) begin within 30 calendar days after the month in which performance occurred.  Final billing invoices shall be submitted to supported departments and agencies within 90 calendar days of the termination of the supported event.
+
+
+c.  In coordination with the relevant geographic Combatant Commander, direct relevant DoD officials under that Secretary's supervision, direction, and control to take appropriate actions to share information on DSCA capabilities with civil authorities at all levels.  DoD officials should share information prior to need, when appropriate, to facilitate requests for assistance, including under immediate response authority, when a need arises.  This capability information should not list specific units or assets. 11.  CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Advise the Secretary of Defense on the effects of requests for DSCA on national security and military readiness. b.  Identify available resources for support in response to DSCA requests, and release related orders when approved by the Secretary of Defense.
+
+c.  Incorporate DSCA into joint training and exercise programs in consultation with the USD(P&R), the Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB), and appropriate officials from the Department of Homeland Security and other appropriate Federal departments and agencies. d.  Advocate for needed DSCA capabilities.
+
+
+12.  COMMANDERS OF COMBATANT COMMANDS WITH DSCA RESPONSIBILITIES. The Commanders of Combatant Commands with DSCA responsibilities, in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure and in accordance with the Unified Command Plan (Reference (ahak)), shall:
+
+a.  In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, plan and execute DSCA
+operations in their areas of responsibility in accordance with this Directive, Reference (ahak), and the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance (Reference (aial)). b.  In coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, incorporate DSCA into joint training and exercise programs in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security, other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, and the NGB.
+
+
+c.  Advocate for needed DSCA capabilities and requirements through the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, subject to paragraph 9.c. of this enclosure, and the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process. d.  Work closely with subordinate commands to ensure that they are appropriately reimbursed for DSCA in accordance with paragraph 10.b. of this enclosure.
+
+
+e.  Exercise Training Readiness Oversight (TRO) over assigned Reserve Component forces when not on active duty or when on active duty for training in accordance with DoDI 1215.06 (Reference (ajam)).
+
+
+f.  In coordination with the relevant Secretaries of the Military Departments, direct relevant DoD officials under Combatant Commander supervision, direction, and control to take appropriate actions to share information on DSCA capabilities with civil authorities at all levels. DoD officials should share information prior to need, when appropriate, to facilitate requests for assistance, including under immediate response authority, when a need arises.  This capability information should not list specific units or assets. 13.  CHIEF, NGB.  The Chief, NGB, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, normally through the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of the Air Force consistent with paragraphs 5a, 5b, and 5c of DoDD 5105.77 (Reference (an)),and in addition to the responsibilities in Reference (ao), shall:
+a.  Serve as the channel of communications for all matters pertaining to the National Guard between DoD Components and the States in accordance with DoDD 5105.77 (Reference (ak)).
+
+ba.  Annually assess the readiness of the National Guard of the States to conduct DSCA
+activities and report on this assessment to the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force; the USD(P&R), ASD(HD&ASA) *ASD(HD&GS)*, and ASD(RA) *ASD(M&RA)*; and, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense and appropriate Combatant Commanders.
+
+
+cb.  Report National Guard support of civil authorities or qualifying entities when using Federal resources, equipment, and/or funding to the NJOIC. d.  Serve as an advisor to the Combatant Commanders on National Guard matters pertaining to the combatant command missions, and support planning and coordination for DSCA activities as requested by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the Combatant Commanders. ec.  Ensure that National Guard appropriations are appropriately reimbursed for DSCA
+activities. f.  Advocate for needed DSCA capabilities. gd.  Develop and promulgate, in accordance with Reference (akan) and in coordination with the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force and the ASD(HD&ASA) *ASD(HD&GS)*, guidance regarding this Directive as it relates to National Guard matters.
+
+
+
+## Glossary
+
+
+
+## Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+
+ASD(HA) ASD(HD&ASA) ASD(HD&GS)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security
+ASD(M&RA)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for *Manpower and* Reserve Affairs
+ASD(SO/LIC&IC)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low- Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities
+
+
+CBRNE
+chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives
+
+
+DoDD
+DoD Directive
+DoDI
+DoD Instruction
+DSCA
+Defense Support of Civil Authorities
+
+
+NGB
+National Guard Bureau
+NJOIC
+National Joint Operations and Intelligence Center
+
+
+TRO
+Training Readiness Oversight
+
+
+UAS
+unmanned aircraft systems
+USACE
+United States *U.S.* Army Corps of Engineers
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USD(AT&LA&S)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics *Sustainment*
+USD(C)/CFO
+Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,
+Department of Defense
+USD(I)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+USD(P&R)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+
+
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Directive. civil authorities.  Defined in Joint Publication 1-02 the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Reference (alao)). civil disturbances.  Defined in Reference (alao).
+
+complex catastrophe.  Defined in Reference (ao). direct liaison.  An authority for Federal military forces to consult with, coordinate with, and respond to State authorities (including National Guard units and personnel operating in Title 32
+status or in State Active Duty status) or Federal civilian authorities in the tactical-level execution of assigned tasks, pursuant to an order by the Secretary of Defense or the President to provide support to those authorities. DoD Domestic Crisis Manager.  The lead DoD official responsible for DoD's domestic crisis management response, ensuring the information needs and other requirements of the Secretary of Defense are met, and developing, coordinating, and overseeing the implementation of DoD policy for crisis management to ensure DoD capability to develop and execute options to prevent, mitigate, or respond to a potential or actual domestic crisis.  The ASD(HD&ASA)
+ASD(HD&GS) serves as the Defense Domestic Crisis Manager. DSCA.  Support provided by U.S. Federal military forces, DoD civilians, DoD contract personnel, DoD Component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Governors of the affected States, elects and requests to use those forces in title 32, U.S.C., status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events.  Also known as civil support. emergency authority.  A Federal military commander's authority, in extraordinary emergency circumstances where prior authorization by the President is impossible and duly constituted local authorities are unable to control the situation, to engage temporarily in activities that are necessary to quell large-scale, unexpected civil disturbances because 1) such activities are necessary to prevent significant loss of life or wanton destruction of property and are necessary to restore governmental function and public order or (2) duly constituted Federal, State, or local authorities are unable or decline to provide adequate protection for Federal property or Federal governmental functions.
+
+Federal military forces.  Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force personnel (including Reserve Component personnel) on Federal active duty and National Guard personnel when under Federal command and control. immediate response authority.  A Federal military commander's, DoD Component Head's, and/or responsible DoD civilian official's authority temporarily to employ resources under their control, subject to any supplemental direction provided by higher headquarters, and provide those resources to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage in response to a request for assistance from a civil authority, under imminently serious conditions when time does not permit approval from a higher authority within the United States.  Immediate response authority does not permit actions that would subject civilians to the use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive, proscriptive, or compulsory.  (State immediate response is addressed in paragraph 4.h.*4.j.* above the signature of this Directive.)
+qualifying entity.  A non-Governmental organization to which the Department of Defense may provide assistance for special events by virtue of statute, regulation, policy, or other approval by the Secretary of Defense or his or her authorized designee.
+
+responsible DoD civilian.  For purposes of DSCA, the Head of a DoD Component or other DoD civilian official who has authority over DoD assets that may be used for a DSCA response. special event.  An international or domestic event, contest, activity, or meeting, which by its very nature, or by specific statutory or regulatory authority, may warrant security, safety, and/or other logistical support or assistance from the Department of Defense. total force.  Defined in Reference (acad).
+
+UAS.  Defined in Reference (ao).

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+## Directive
+
+
+October 22, 2014
+Incorporating Change 2, April 28, 2022
+
+DoD CIO SUBJECT: DoD Command and Control Enabling Capabilities References: See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  This directive:
+a.  Reissues, retitles, and renumbers DoD Directive (DoDD) 5100.30 (Reference (a)) to establish DoD command and control (C2) enabling capability policy and assign responsibilities under the authority of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (b)), DoD Instruction (DoDI) O-3710.02 (Reference (c)), and DoDD 5144.02 (Reference (d)) for funding, managing, developing, acquiring, operating, maintaining, evaluating, and improving DoD C2 information technology (IT) and National Security Systems enabling capabilities.
+
+b.  Updates and reestablishes the functional and organizational relationships among all DoD
+elements involved in providing DoD C2 enabling capabilities and directs necessary operational links to non-DoD organizations.
+
+c.  Assigns the responsibilities for DoD C2 enabling capability oversight and management;
+assigns responsibilities to the appropriate DoD Component to review, prioritize, and direct DoD programs; identifies and directs establishment of appropriate structures and processes to execute Secretary of Defense-directed compliance oversight responsibilities. 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD
+Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the "DoD Components"). 3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  DoD C2 enabling capabilities extend across all warfighting decision-making levels, and support:
+
+
+(1)  Requirements of the President, the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, the Combatant Commanders (CCDRs), other senior leaders, and warfighters.
+
+
+(2)  The successful execution of the Unified Command Plan (Reference (e)).
+
+b.  DoD C2 information integration and decision support services will:
+
+(1)  Ensure enhanced information sharing, collaboration, and situational awareness while maintaining cyber security and information assurance standards in accordance with DoDI 8500.01 (Reference (f)), DoDI 8320.02 (Reference (g)), DoDI 8330.01 (Reference (h)), and DoDI 8530.01 (Reference (i)).
+
+
+(2)  Be managed using integrated strategic planning, integrated architectures, standards, measures of performance, risk assessment and management, transition plans, and portfolio management in accordance with DoDD 8115.01 (Reference (j)).
+
+
+(3)  Support a seamless DoD C2 enabling capability that predictably degrades across the threat spectrum.
+
+
+(4)  Ensure the integration of DoD C2 enabling capabilities throughout the DoD
+information enterprise, and among federal department and agency systems directly supporting senior leaders.
+
+
+(5)  Support the integration of DoD C2 enabling capabilities with mission partners.
+
+
+(6)  Ensure DoD C2 enabling capabilities will be developed in such a manner as to maximize re-use across DoD Components, minimize redundant development efforts, and minimize cost to the DoD.
+
+c.  A DoD senior executive-level body under the authority and direction of the DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) Executive Board will provide governance and strategic oversight to develop recommendations on DoD C2 plans, policies and procedures, and initiate a review of issues, programs, initiatives, and systems in accordance with Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (k)).
+
+d.  DoD C2 oversight and management processes will ensure that integrated, flexible, interoperable, and adaptable DoD C2 enabling capabilities are developed.  All C2 management and governance structures developed within DoD must support, and be consistent with, the oversight and management structure established by DoD CIO in conjunction with this directive.
+
+4.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 5.  RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release**.  This directive is available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. 6.  SUMMARY OF CHANGE 2.  The changes to this issuance:
+a.  Update the responsibilities formerly delegated to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics in accordance with DoDDs 5135.02 and 5137.02 (References (x) and (y)). b.  Update organizational titles and references for currency. 7.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This directive is effective October 22, 2014.
+
+Robert O. Work
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense
+
+
+Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Directive 5100.30, "Department of Defense (DoD) Command and Control (C2),"
+January 5, 2006 (hereby cancelled)
+(b) Title 10, United States Code
+(c) DoD Instruction O-3710.02, "Secretary of Defense Communications (SDC),"
+October 20, 2014
+(d) DoD Directive 5144.02, "DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO)," November 21,
+2014, as amended
+(e) Unified Command Plan 2011, April 6, 2011, as amended1
+(f)
+DoD Instruction 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," March 14, 2014, as amended
+(g)
+DoD Instruction 8320.02, "Sharing Data, Information, and Information Technology (IT) Services in the Department of Defense," August 5, 2013, as amended
+(h) DoD Instruction 8330.01, "Interoperability of Information Technology (IT), Including
+National Security Systems (NSS)," May 21, 2014, as amended
+(i)   DoD Instruction 8530.01, "Cyber Security Activities Support to DoD Information Network
+Operations," March 7, 2016, as amended
+(j)
+DoD Directive 8115.01, "Information Technology Portfolio Management," October 10,
+2005
+(k) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Department of Defense Chief Information
+Officer Executive Board Charter," February 12, 2012
+(l)
+Section 3534 of Title 44, United States Code
+(m) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 5123.01I, "Charter of the Joint
+Requirements Oversight Council and Implementation of the Joint Capabilities Integration
+and Development System,"  October 30, 2021
+(n) DoD Directive S-3710.01, "(U) National Leadership Command Capability," May 27, 2015 (o)
+DoD Instruction 5000.88, "Engineering of Defense Systems," November 18, 2020
+(p)
+DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003 September 9,
+2020
+(q) DoD Directive 5141.02, "Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E),"
+February 2, 2009
+(r)
+DoD Directive 3020.26, "DoD Continuity Policy," February 14, 2018
+(s)
+DoD Directive 5111.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))," June 23, 2020
+(t)
+DoD Directive 5000.71, "Rapid Fulfillment of Combatant Commander Urgent Operational
+Needs," August 24, 2012, as amended
+(u) DoD Directive S-5210.81, "(U) United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control,
+Safety, and Security," April 24, 2017
+(v) Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "DoD Dictionary of Military and
+Associated Terms," current edition
+(w) DoD Directive 8000.01, "Management of the Department of Defense Information
+Enterprise (DoD IE)," March 17, 2016, as amended
+(x) DoD Directive 5135.02, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+(USD(A&S))," July 15, 2020
+(y) DoD Directive 5137.02, "Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+(USD(R&E))," July 15, 2020
+(z) DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Adaptive Acquisition Framework,"
+January 23, 2020
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  DoD CIO.  The DoD CIO:
+a.  Serves as the Principal Staff Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for all matters pertaining to the DoD information enterprise that supports DoD C2 enabling capabilities.
+
+b.  Provides policy development, strategic planning, resource management, fiscal and program evaluation, and oversight for DoD C2 enabling capabilities.
+
+c.  Develops and implements an oversight and management structure for DoD C2 enabling capabilities.
+
+d.  Oversees DoD C2 enabling capabilities, including:
+
+(1)  DoD Component policies and implementing instructions specific to DoD C2;
+coordinates on all DoD C2 planning, programming, and budgeting recommendations made to the Secretary of Defense, consistent with section 3534 of Title 44, U.S.C. (Reference (l)).
+
+
+(2)  The integration of DoD C2 services, systems, applications, standards, and architectures in collaboration with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)); the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)); the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD(I&S)); the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)); the CJCS; CCDRs; and Secretaries of the Military Departments.
+
+
+(3)  DoD C2 plans, programs, and budgets that support development of materiel and nonmateriel solutions for joint military capability requirements that have been validated in accordance with CJCS Instruction 5123.01I (Reference (m)) and Presidentially directed DoD C2 enabling capabilities.
+
+
+(4)  The development and maintenance of DoD C2 reliability, survivability, security, and accessibility standards produced by the DoD Components.
+
+
+
+(5)  Fixed, mobile, and airborne resources that support Presidential requirements to ensure they are integrated with DoD C2 enabling capabilities, in accordance with DoDD S-3710.01 (Reference (n))
+e.  Ensures information sharing regarding DoD C2 enabling capabilities with mission partners.
+
+f.  Develops overarching architectures and documentation that describe the specifications, data format, reliability requirements, and metrics necessary to promote DoD C2 enabling capability strategies.
+
+g.  Chairs a senior executive-level body under the authority and direction of the DoD CIO
+Executive Board to provide governance and strategic oversight to address DoD C2 enabling capability issues.
+
+h.  Periodically updates and maintains the DoD C2 Strategic Plan and DoD C2
+Implementation Plan in coordination with the USD(A&S); the USD(P), the USD(I&S); the USD(R&E); the CJCS; CCDRs; and Secretaries of the Military Departments.
+
+2.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AGENCY (DISA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the DoD CIO and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 12 of this enclosure, the Director, DISA:
+a.  Leads systems engineering support, as identified in DoDIs 5000.88 and 5000.02
+(References (o) and (z)), with input from the DoD Components, to sustain and modernize the DoD information enterprise that supports DoD C2 enabling capabilities.
+
+b.  Reviews and assesses DoD C2 capabilities to ensure system integration, interoperability, and standardization among the DoD Components, consistent with OSD and Joint Staff policy (e.g., Reference (h)), and with U.S. Government (USG) agencies.
+
+c.  Supports DoD C2 matters through plans, programs, and budgets to ensure the Department of Defense information network (DoDIN) and DoDIN Enterprise Services are capable of supporting DoD C2 requirements. 3.  USD(A&S).  The USD(A&S):
+a.  Ensures acquisition of DoD C2 enabling capabilities conform with the policies and practices of the DoD Acquisition System pursuant to DoDD 5000.01 (Reference (p)). b.  Ensures acquisition activities related to DoD C2 programs that effectively support the Combatant Commands and Military Services in coordination with the DoD CIO and the CJCS.
+
+c.  Supports the periodic update of the DoD C2 Strategic Plan and DoD C2 Implementation Plan.
+
+d.  In coordination with the DoD CIO and the USD(R&E), ensures DoD C2 system acquisition enables the integration of DoD C2 services, capabilities, standards, and architectures.
+
+e.  Performs duties as the Principal Staff Assistant and capability portfolio manager for the nuclear command control and communications enterprise, with responsibility for nuclear command control and communications acquisition, procurement, modernization, sustainment, interoperability, and resources in accordance with Reference (x).
+
+4.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(A&S), through the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs, and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph
+12 of this enclosure, the Director, DTRA:
+a.  Provides recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, DoD CIO, USD(A&S), and the CJCS for assessing vulnerabilities and enhancing the survivability and operability of DoD C2 resources and systems throughout the threat spectrum, with particular focus on the effects of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons.
+
+b.  Maintains and provides modeling, simulation, and testing capability to predict and assess the consequences of attacks using CBRNE weapons in warfighting and asymmetrical terrorist threat scenarios.
+
+c.  Provides an assessment program on critical DoD C2 enabling capabilities, under the direction of USD(A&S) and DoD CIO, that continuously addresses the spectrum of natural hazards and hostile threats and provides the results of the assessment to identify vulnerabilities of critical missions and recommends solutions to mitigate them.
+
+5.  USD(R&E).  The USD(R&E):
+
+
+a.  In coordination with the DoD CIO and the USD(A&S), ensures DoD C2 enabling capability related research and development provides for the integration of DoD C2 services, capabilities, standards, and architectures.
+
+b.  Develops and evolves long-term command, control, and communication network architectures; initiates, manages, and coordinates technology maturation; and ensures suitability of the innovation base to support DoD C2 enabling capabilities.
+
+c.  Coordinates with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, DoD CIO, CJCS, and USD(A&S) to develop viable transition paths for research, development, and engineering initiatives that support DoD C2 enabling capabilities.
+
+d.  In coordination with the DoD CIO and the DoD Components, oversees developmental test and evaluation, systems engineering, and technology readiness assessments of designated DoD C2 systems and ensures that reviews are timely and effectively implemented.
+
+6.  DIRECTOR, MISSILE DEFENSE AGENCY (MDA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(R&E) and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 12 of this enclosure, the Director, MDA, ensures missile defense C2 systems, processes, and procedures are integrated into DoD C2. 7.  DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION (DOT&E).  The DOT&E:
+a.  Oversees and approves operational testing related to DoD C2 systems acquisition.
+
+b.  Oversees and manages efforts to improve interoperability and information assurance in the DoD through the operational evaluation of the systems under oversight and of exercises conducted by the Combatant Commands and the Military Departments in accordance with DoDD 5141.02 (Reference (q)). 8.  USD(P).  The USD(P):
+a.  Ensures DoD C2 supports overarching continuity of operations (COOP) and continuity of government (COG) policy and requirements in accordance with DoDD 3020.26 (Reference (r)), and that DoD C2 policies and procedures will support and complement current and future department and agency COOP and COG processes across the DoD Component community and other federal departments and agencies.
+
+b.  Supports the periodic update of the DoD C2 Strategic Plan and DoD C2 Implementation Plan.
+
+c.  Coordinates with DoD CIO on incorporation of DoD C2 enabling capabilities into the planning phase of the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System in accordance with DoDD 5111.01 (Reference (s)).
+
+9.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (USD(C)/CFO).  The USD(C)/CFO reviews and evaluates DoD Component plans, programs, and budget submissions for adherence to established priorities, policies, procedures, standards, and resource guidance supporting DoD C2. 10.  USD(I&S).  The USD(I&S):
+a.  Ensures DoD intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) policies, architectures, and functional capabilities are integrated with DoD C2 services and capabilities.
+
+b.  Coordinates with the DoD CIO to ensure that current and future DoD ISR developments are consistent with net-enabled operations across the DoDIN and are interoperable to the level necessary to meet mission support requirements.
+
+c.  Assesses the performance and support of Defense intelligence activities relevant to DoD
+C2 and works with the DoD CIO to ensure intelligence assessments are integrated into DoD C2 decision-support tools and processes.
+
+d.  Supports the periodic update of the DoD C2 Strategic Plan and DoD C2 Implementation Plan. 11.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S) and in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 12 of this enclosure, the Director, DIA, develops and updates threat assessments used to determine DoD C2 survivability and reliability, deployments, deployment training scenarios, and system requirements.
+
+12.  DoD COMPONENT HEADS.  The DoD Component heads:
+a.  Support DoD C2 by ensuring acquired systems are compliant with data-centric strategies, policies, and guidance, and provide survivable, reliable support for senior USG officials and the U.S. military, as well as the suitability of solutions to meet operational requirements. b.  Support DoD C2 through plans, programs, and budgets and execute programs that will develop materiel solutions for Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System-approved DoD C2 enabling capabilities.
+
+c.  Help the Director, DISA, provide systems engineering support for DoD C2 enabling capabilities.
+
+d.  Conduct operational evaluations of DoD C2 systems, equipment, and facilities in support of the geographic and functional commands.
+
+e.  Support the periodic update of the DoD C2 Strategic Plan and DoD C2 Implementation Plan.
+
+f.  Coordinate policies and implementing instructions specific to DoD C2 with the DoD CIO
+with regard to capabilities planning, programming, and budgeting recommendations.
+
+g.  Ensure that for DoD C2 enabling capabilities associated with urgent operational needs, as described in Reference (m), all oversight, management structures, reviews, assessments, support, assistance, and other actions described in this directive are performed in a manner consistent with the policy established by the DoD, including policy established in DoDD 5000.71
+(Reference (t)).
+
+13.  CJCS.  In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 12 of this enclosure and in coordination with the other DoD Component heads, the CJCS:
+a.  Provides advice and assessments on DoD C2 enabling capability needs and establishes the operational requirements for C2 capabilities, systems, and services, as well as the suitability of solutions to meet operational expectations.
+
+b.  Defines the DoD C2 enabling capabilities required to support the full range of operations.
+
+c.  Operates the National Military Command System (NMCS) to meet the needs of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the global and regional warfighters.  Defines the Component C2 capabilities of the NMCS, establishes operational policies, and ensures their compliance in accordance with Reference (n), DoDD S-5210.81 (Reference (u)), and CJCS
+guidance.
+
+d.  Identifies specific DoD C2 systems, equipment, and facilities subject to survivability and reliability design standards.
+
+e.  Monitors the development and readiness of DoD C2 capabilities compliance with established survivability, reliability, security, and accessibility standards.
+
+f.  Confirms and supports capability-based requirements for DoD C2 through the capabilitiesbased assessment process.
+
+g.  Supports the periodic update of the DoD C2 Strategic Plan and DoD C2 Implementation Plan.
+
+h.  Participates in reviews and advises the OSD on all DoD C2 policy matters.
+
+i.  On behalf of the warfighter, integrates and assesses DoD C2 enabling capabilities, data strategies and standards, architectures, operational concepts, and mission partner operations.
+
+14.  CCDRs.  In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 12 of this enclosure, the CCDRs support the CJCS in establishing requirements for sharing DoD C2 information and data with mission partner networks.
+
+15.  COMMANDER, UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND (USSTRATCOM).  In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraphs 12 and 14 of this enclosure and in coordination with the CJCS, the Commander, USSTRATCOM, ensures that USSTRATCOM mission responsibilities are properly integrated into plans, architectures, and processes that constitute and sustain DoD C2 capabilities, consistent with Reference (e).
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+| C2         | command and control                                                    |
+|------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| CBRNE      | chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives |
+| CCDR       | Combatant Commander                                                    |
+| CJCS       | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff                                  |
+| COG        | continuity of government                                               |
+| COOP       | continuity of operations                                               |
+|            |                                                                        |
+| DIA        | Defense Intelligence Agency                                            |
+| DISA       | Defense Information Systems Agency                                     |
+| DoD CIO    | DoD Chief Information Officer                                          |
+| DoDD       | DoD directive                                                          |
+| DoDI       | DoD instruction                                                        |
+| DoDIN      | Department of Defense information network                              |
+| DOT&E      | Director, Operational Test and Evaluation                              |
+| DTRA       | Defense Threat Reduction Agency                                        |
+|            |                                                                        |
+| ISR        | intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance                         |
+| IT         | information technology                                                 |
+|            |                                                                        |
+| MDA        | Missile Defense Agency                                                 |
+|            |                                                                        |
+| NMCS       | National Military Command System                                       |
+|            |                                                                        |
+| U.S.C.     | United States Code                                                     |
+| USD(A&S)   | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment             |
+| USD(C)/CFO | Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer,      |
+| DoD        |                                                                        |
+| USD(I&S)   | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security               |
+| USD(P)     | Under Secretary of Defense for Policy                                  |
+| USD(R&E)   | Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering                |
+| USG        | U. S. Government                                                       |
+| USSTRATCOM | United States Strategic Command                                        |
+|            |                                                                        |
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for purposes of this directive. C2.  Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Reference (v)). DoD C2 enabling capabilities.  Comprised of information integration and decision-support services, systems, processes, and related infrastructure that enable the exercise of authority and direction over assigned and attached forces.  These capabilities enable commanders and decision makers to rapidly evaluate, select, and execute effective courses of action in accomplishing the mission. DoDIN.  Defined in Reference (v). mission partners.  Defined in DoDD 8000.01 (Reference (w)). urgent operational need.  Defined in Reference (t).

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+## Directive
+
+ SUBJECT: DoD Energy Policy
+
+References: See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  This directive:
+a.  Establishes policy and guidance and assigns responsibilities for energy planning, use, and management for the DoD.
+
+b.  Provides for the establishment of DoD energy boards and councils.
+
+c.  Incorporates, as appropriate, and cancels DoD Instruction (DoDI) 4170.10
+(Reference (a)).
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the "DoD Components"). 3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy to enhance military capability, improve energy security, and mitigate costs in its use and management of energy.  To these ends, DoD will:
+a.  Improve the energy performance of weapons systems, platforms, equipment, and products, and their modifications; installations, including both enduring and non-enduring locations; and military forces.
+
+b.  Diversify and expand energy supplies and sources, including renewable energy sources and alternative fuels.
+
+c.  Ensure that energy analyses are included in DoD requirements, acquisition, and planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) processes.
+
+
+
+d.  Assess and manage energy-related risks to operations, training, and testing, to include assets, supporting infrastructure, equipment, supplies, platforms, and personnel.
+
+e.  Develop and acquire technologies that meet DoD energy needs and manage risks; utilize appropriate resources and energy expertise in other governmental organizations and the private sector.
+
+f.  Educate and train personnel in valuing energy as a mission essential resource.
+
+
+
+4.  RESPONSIBILITIES. See Enclosure 2.
+
+5.  RELEASABILITY.  **Unlimited**.  This directive is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 6.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This directive:
+a.  Is effective April 16, 2014. b.  Must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication to be considered current in accordance with DoDI 5025.01 (Reference (b)). c.  Will expire effective April 16, 2024 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website if it hasn't been reissued or cancelled in accordance with Reference (b).
+
+Christine H. Fox
+
+Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense
+
+Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities Glossary
+
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a)
+DoD Instruction 4170.10, "Energy Management Policy," August 8, 1991 (hereby cancelled)
+(b)
+DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," September 26, 2012, as amended
+(c)
+Title 10, United States Code
+(d)
+DoD Directive 5134.15, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and
+Programs (ASD(OEPP))," May 17, 2011
+(e)
+DoD Directive 3000.10, "Contingency Basing Outside the United States," January 10,
+2013
+(f)
+Joint Capabilities Integration Development System Manual, "Manual for the Operation of
+the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," current edition1
+(g)
+DoD Directive 4140.25, "DoD Management Policy for Energy Commodities and Related Services," April 12, 2004
+(h)
+DoD Instruction 4120.24, "Defense Standardization Program (DSP)," July 13, 2011
+(i)
+DoD Instruction 4170.11, "Installation Energy Management," December 11, 2009
+(j)
+DoD Instruction 3020.41, "Operational Contract Support (OCS)," December 20, 2011
+(k)
+DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))," December 8, 1999
+(l)
+DoD Directive 3020.40, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities for Critical Infrastructure," January 14, 2010, as amended
+(m) DoD Directive 3025.18, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)," December 29,
+2010, as amended
+(n)
+DoD Instruction 7730.66, "Guidance for the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS)," July 8, 2011
+(o)
+DoD Directive 7045.14, "The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) Process," January 25, 2013
+(p)
+Interim DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," November 25, 2013
+(q)
+Defense Acquisition University, "Defense Acquisition Guidebook," current edition2
+(r)
+DoD Directive 4120.11, "Standardization of Mobile Electric Power (MEP) Generating Sources," April 13, 2004
+(s)
+DoD 8910.1-M, "Department of Defense Procedures for Management of Information
+Requirements," June 30, 1998
+(t)
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01H, "Joint Capabilities Integration
+and Development System," January 10, 2012
+(u)
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3401.02B, "Force Readiness Reporting,"
+May 31, 2011
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS (USD(AT&L)).  The USD(AT&L):
+a.  Establishes DoD energy policy. b.  Establishes DoD energy boards and councils as necessary to support DoD energy policies, plans, and programs.
+
+c.  Oversees DoD energy planning, use, and management, and the implementation of this directive.
+
+2.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR OPERATIONAL ENERGY PLANS AND PROGRAMS (ASD(OEPP)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), and with the ability to communicate views regarding operational energy plans and programs and the operational energy strategy directly to the Secretary or Deputy Secretary consistent with section 138c(c) of Title 10, United States Code (Reference (c)), the ASD(OEPP):
+
+
+a.  Is the principal operational energy policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense.
+
+b.  Provides oversight and implementing guidance related to operational energy strategy, goals, initiatives, and budgetary matters in accordance with Reference (c) and DoD Directive
+(DoDD) 5134.15 (Reference (d)).
+
+c.  Develops operational energy-related policy for contingency basing and facilitates energy improvements at contingency locations in accordance with DoDD 3000.10 (Reference (e)).
+
+
+
+d.  Develops policy and guidelines and provides oversight for development, certification, qualification, field demonstration, and ongoing purchases of alternative fuels for operational platforms in accordance with Reference (c).
+
+e.  Oversees operational energy research, development, testing, and evaluation programs;
+collaborates with DoD Components, the private sector, and other governmental organizations for identification and demonstration of operational energy technologies.
+
+f.  Supports the CJCS in the requirements process regarding operational energy, in accordance with the Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System Manual (Reference (f)).
+
+g.  Promotes operational energy-related issues, programs, and accounts as an advisor to the Defense Acquisition Board and other key acquisition bodies.
+
+h.  Advises the CJCS and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) regarding the role of energy in the DoD planning process across the full range of military operations.
+
+
+i.  In conjunction with other DoD risk management and readiness programs, oversees identification and mitigation of operational energy-related risks.
+
+3.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR LOGISTICS AND MATERIEL READINESS (ASD(L&MR)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), the ASD(L&MR):
+
+##
+
+
+a.  Provides guidance for management of energy commodities and related services in accordance with DoDD 4140.25 (Reference (g)).
+
+b.  Provides guidance for obtaining equipment, modifications, and products that improve energy performance and mission effectiveness, are cost effective and, as appropriate, are capable of using multiple energy sources.
+
+c.  Facilitates the inclusion of energy considerations and performance incentives in contracts and operational contract support.
+
+d.  Provides guidance for assessment and management of energy-related risks to logistics infrastructure and assets.
+
+e.  Ensures logistics participation in alternative fuel qualification, certification, and field demonstration activities.
+
+4.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION (ASD(A)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), the ASD(A):
+
+##
+
+
+a.  Oversees acquisition of weapons systems, platforms, equipment, modifications, and products that improve energy performance and mission effectiveness, are cost effective, and, as appropriate, are capable of using multiple energy sources.
+
+b.  Oversees energy-related policy and practices in defense acquisition workforce training and education.
+
+5.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING (ASD(R&E)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), the ASD(R&E):
+
+
+a.  In collaboration with the ASD(OEPP) and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment (DUSD(I&E)), oversees development of technologies that improve energy performance and diversify energy supply for the DoD.
+
+
+b.  Oversees standardization of energy-related equipment and technologies for the DoD in accordance with DoDI 4120.24 (Reference (h)).
+
+6.  DUSD(I&E).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), the DUSD(I&E):
+
+
+a.  Implements policies and provides guidance to the DoD Components for managing facility energy resources and investments and serves as the primary adviser for facility energy matters in accordance with DoDI 4170.11 (Reference (i)).
+
+b.  Ensures cost-effective investments are made in facility infrastructure to reduce energy demand, increase on-site distribution (including renewables), and enhance the power resiliency of installations.
+
+c.  In coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA)), manages energy-related risks to support mitigation of commercial electric grid challenges for DoD infrastructure and missions.
+
+d.  Oversees facility energy technology programs.  Identifies and supports the demonstration of energy technologies to address installations needs.
+
+e.  Collaborates with other governmental organizations and the private sector on facility energy matters.
+
+7.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE LOGISTICS AGENCY (DLA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L) through the ASD(L&MR), the Director, DLA:
+
+
+a.  Manages energy commodities and related services in accordance with Reference (g).
+
+b.  Procures equipment and products that, in support of mission requirements, improve energy performance, are cost effective, and, as appropriate, are capable of using multiple energy sources.
+
+c.  Conducts assessments and manages energy-related risks to DLA infrastructure and assets.
+
+d.  Provides energy expertise to support qualification and certification of alternative fuels and field demonstration activities.
+
+8.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PROCUREMENT AND ACQUISITION POLICY (DPAP).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), in accordance with DoDI 3020.41 (Reference (j)), the Director, DPAP, oversees the inclusion of energy considerations and performance incentives in policy, guidance, contracts, and operational contract support.
+
+
+9.  USD(P).  The USD(P):
+
+
+a.  Provides regional and functional policy guidance and oversight as necessary for implementation of this directive, in accordance with DoDD 5111.1 (Reference (k)).
+
+b.  In coordination with the USD(AT&L) and the Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (DCAPE), facilitates development of energy analysis and integration of insights from the analysis into defense planning and programming considerations.
+
+c.  Ensures assessments and management of energy-related mission risks for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities activities.
+
+10.  ASD(HD&ASA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), the ASD(HD&ASA):
+
+
+a.  Oversees assessment and implementation of energy-related risk management for the Defense Critical Infrastructure Program (DCIP), Defense continuity programs, mission assurance, and other ASD(HD&ASA) mission areas.
+
+b.  In coordination with the DUSD(I&E), promotes collaboration between components of the DoD and non-DoD government and private sector entities on restoration and resilience of commercial energy infrastructure upon which DoD relies to reduce mission risk.
+
+c.  Coordinates identification of key energy-related mission dependencies and capabilities with the DUSD(I&E) and the ASD(OEPP) through the DCIP in accordance with DoDD 3020.40 (Reference (l)).
+
+d.  Coordinates requests from civil authorities for energy-related support in accordance with DoDD 3025.18 (Reference (m)).
+
+11.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R)).  The USD(P&R):
+
+
+a.  Oversees energy-related readiness reporting in accordance with DoDI 7730.66
+(Reference (n)).
+
+b.  Ensures DoD personnel are educated and trained in valuing energy as a mission essential resource.
+
+
+
+12.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (USD(C)/CFO).  The USD(C)/CFO updates and maintains financial policy and guidance for energy-related activities as needed. 13.  DCAPE.  The DCAPE:
+
+
+a.  Provides programming guidance for implementation of this directive.
+
+
+b.  Supports the use of energy analyses in DoD requirements, acquisition, and PPBE
+processes in accordance with DoDD 7045.14 (Reference (o)).
+
+c.  Guides and assesses the Fully Burdened Cost of Energy in analyses of alternatives conducted for all developmental DoD systems with end items that create a demand for energy in the battlespace, in accordance with DoDI 5000.02 (Reference (p)), and the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (Reference (q)).
+
+
+14.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments:
+
+
+a.  Develop and implement doctrine, guidance, and strategies that are consistent with this directive and its implementing instructions.
+
+b.  Develop, acquire, and deploy weapons systems, platforms, equipment, modifications, and products; installations, including enduring and non-enduring locations; and operating units that:
+
+(1)  Improve energy performance and mission effectiveness.
+
+
+
+(2)  Are cost effective.
+
+(3)  As appropriate, are capable of using multiple energy sources.
+
+c.  Include energy considerations and performance incentives in contracts and operational contract support.
+
+
+
+d.  Use the DoD standard family of mobile electric power generating sources, in accordance with DoDD 4120.11 (Reference (r)).
+
+e.  Measure energy consumption, account for energy-related programs, and provide this information to OSD as directed by the USD(AT&L) in accordance with the procedures of DoD 8910.1-M (Reference (s)).
+
+f.  Integrate energy analyses into their department's requirements, acquisition, and PPBE
+processes.
+
+g.  Incorporate modeling and simulation tools as appropriate to analyze system energy demand and logistics supportability in the requirements, acquisition, and force planning processes.
+
+
+h.  Support joint planning that includes energy considerations and energy supportability analyses across the full range of military operations, from engagement and security cooperation to major operations and campaigns.
+
+
+
+i.  Implement assessments and management of energy-related risks to infrastructure and assets to improve mission assurance and energy security.  Conduct periodic evaluations of the vulnerability of basic mission requirements to energy disruptions, in accordance with Reference (i).
+
+j.  Develop and acquire technologies that meet DoD energy needs and manage risk.  Use appropriate resources and energy expertise from other governmental organizations and the private sector.
+
+
+k.  Educate and train personnel in valuing energy as a mission essential resource; develop a workforce with skills needed to manage energy and reduce risks; and promote non-materiel and behavior-based solutions.
+
+15.  CJCS.  The CJCS:
+
+
+a.  Develops doctrine and implements guidance that are consistent with this directive and its implementing instructions.
+
+b.  Oversees and conducts energy analyses in the requirements process and ensures incorporation of modeling and simulation tools as appropriate to analyze system energy demand and logistics supportability, in accordance with Reference (f) and CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01 (Reference (t)).
+
+c.  Ensures joint planning includes energy considerations and energy supportability analyses across the full range of military operations, from engagement and security cooperation to major operations and campaigns.
+
+d.  Monitors energy-related mission assessments and information for planning, readiness, and risk assessment purposes in accordance with CJCSI 3401.02B (Reference (u)).
+
+e.  Ensures that joint exercises and wargames incorporate and assess the Joint Force's energy demand and logistics supportability.
+
+f.  Ensures education and training include energy-related lessons learned from military operations and exercises.
+
+
+
+## 16.  Combatant Commanders (Ccdrs).  The Ccdrs:
+
+
+
+a.  Incorporate guidance and analyses in Combatant Command planning to address energy risks and opportunities across the full range of military operations, from engagement and security cooperation to major operations and campaigns.
+
+b.  Assess energy-related operational risks and identify associated capability gaps.
+
+c.  Ensure that joint training and exercises improve the Joint Force's tactics, techniques, and procedures for the delivery and use of energy.
+
+## Glossary
+
+
+
+## Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+ ASD(A)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition
+
+ASD(HD&ASA) Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
+Security Affairs
+ASD(L&MR)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness
+ASD(OEPP)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Operational Energy Plans and Programs
+ASD(R&E)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
+
+
+CCDR
+Combatant Commander
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+CJCSI
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
+
+
+DCAPE
+Director of Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation
+DCIP
+Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
+DLA
+Defense Logistics Agency
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+DPAP
+Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
+DUSD(I&E)
+Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Installations and Environment
+
+
+PPBE
+planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
+
+
+USD(AT&L)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+USD(C)/CFO
+Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+USD(P&R)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ These terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this directive. energy performance.  The degree to which the DoD achieves missions, functions, or goals for the amount of energy consumed. energy security.  Defined in section 2924(3) of Reference (c). facility energy.  The energy required to power fixed installations and non-tactical vehicles.  This includes energy consumed from the electric grid and on-site installation energy sources. operational energy.  Defined in section 2924(5) of Reference (d).

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+## Dod Directive 5105.76 Planning For Presidential Transitions And The Transition Of Political Appointees And Other Officials Originating Component: Office Of The Director Of Administration And Management
+
+ Effective:
+August 30, 2022
+Change 1 Effective:
+February 3, 2023 Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Directive 5105.76, "Transition of Administration Appointees and
+Other Officials," May 26, 2017
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Designation of a Senior Career Official (SCO) for Each Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)
+Principal Staff Assistant (PSA)," December 9, 2010 Approved by:
+Kathleen H. Hicks, Deputy Secretary of Defense
+Change 1 Approved by:
+Kathleen H. Hicks, Deputy Secretary of Defense
+
+ Purpose: Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) by Section 113 of Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) and the "Presidential Transition Act of 1963," as amended, published as a note under Section 102 of Title 3, U.S.C., this issuance:
+
+- Establishes policy for the transfer of authority from outgoing to incoming senior officials during the
+transition between Presidential administrations or in the course of other personnel actions including, but not limited to, reassignment, retirement, or resignation.
+- Establishes policy for the departure and arrival of political or certain non-career appointees,
+including those Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed (PAS) officials; non-career senior executive
+service (SES) members; Schedule C appointees; and other officials appointed as experts or consultants pursuant to Section 3109 of Title 5, U.S.C. and Section 129b of Title 10, U.S.C.
+- Assigns responsibilities for the administration, management, and direction of transition activities
+pursuant to Executive Order 13727.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3 1.3.  Summary of Change 1. ........ 4
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 5
+2.1.  DA&M. ........ 5 2.2.  Director, WHS. ........ 6 2.3.  Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA). ........ 7 2.4.  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. ........ 7 2.5.  General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC DoD). ........ 8 2.6.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs. ........ 8 2.7.  Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. ........ 9 2.8.  Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for White House Liaison. ........ 9 2.9.  OSD PSAs and DoD Component Heads. ........ 9 2.10.  Secretaries of the Military Departments. ........ 10
+SECTION 3:  SUCCESSION PLANS ........ 11 SECTION 4:  DOD TRANSITION STRUCTURE ........ 12
+4.1.  Purpose. ........ 12 4.2.  Transition SSG. ........ 12 4.3.  DoD Transition Director. ........ 12 4.4.  DoD TTF Director. ........ 14 4.5.  OSD PSA and DoD Component TACs. ........ 14
+GLOSSARY ........ 15
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 15 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 16
+REFERENCES ........ 18
+
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a.  The DoD, in coordination with the Executive Office of the President, other Executive Branch departments and agencies, and the transition teams of eligible candidates and the President-Elect and Vice PresidentElect, will:
+
+(1)  Coordinate and carry out responsibilities required to accomplish an efficient and
+thorough transition of its political leadership.
+(2)  Provide for the continuity of the national security activities of the United States.
+(3)  Mitigate unnecessary disruption from such transition in political leadership. (4)  Sustain effective and efficient operations within the DoD.
+b.  Pursuant to Section 113 of Title 10, U.S.C.; the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, as amended; and Executive Order 13727, the SecDef establishes the DoD transition structure, described in Section 4, for the planning, coordination, management, and execution of transition activities.  As such:
+(1)  A Transition Senior Steering Group (SSG), to be chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef), and the DoD Transition Task Force (TTF) are established.
+
+(2)  A senior career official (SCO) for Presidential transition is designated and will serve as the DoD's Transition Director.
+
+(3)  OSD Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs) and DoD Component heads must designate transition assistance coordinators (TACs).
+
+c.  The DoD will submit updated succession plans to the Federal Transition Coordinator no later than September 15th in a year during which a Presidential election is held, as well as identify and prepare interim agency leadership to ensure the continuity of mission operations and the goals listed in Paragraph 1.2.a. during transition (see Section 3 for additional information.).
+
+d.  Instructions from the Assistant to the President for Presidential Personnel direct the DoD
+in the coordination of all activities relating to Presidential appointments.
+
+## 1.3.  Summary Of Change 1.
+
+This change:
+a.  Clarifies the Director of Administration and Management (DA&M) responsibility in Paragraph 2.1.a. regarding designating the DoD Transition Director.
+
+b.  Corrects terminology in Paragraph 4.2.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  DA&M. In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.9., the DA&M:
+a.  Serves as the DoD Transition Director if a career executive.  If the DA&M is a political appointee, an SCO will be designated to serve as the DoD Transition Director.
+
+b.  Ensures the DoD Transition Director (or performs these duties if serving as the DoD
+Transition Director):
+(1)  Manages and coordinates transition activities for PAS officials and other non-career senior officials and employees entering or departing from the DoD due to a Presidential transition and in conjunction with the DoD transition structure.
+
+(2)  Publishes implementation procedures and guidelines for transition activities. (3)  Represents the DoD on the Federal-level Agency Transition Directors Council and any other interagency transition meetings as the DoD representative for Presidential inaugural matters.
+
+(4)  Oversees assigned personnel, administrative, and logistical functions, in accordance with DoD Directive (DoDD) 5105.53, to provide for the orderly departure and arrival of officials assigned to serve within the DoD.
+
+(5)  Coordinates with the DoD TTF Director and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for White House Liaison for personnel and administrative matters pertaining to departing and incoming personnel.
+
+(6)  Upon request, coordinates engagement on transition activities, before the election, with authorized representatives of eligible candidates in support of effective transition planning in accordance with the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, as amended, and Executive Order 13727.
+
+(7)  Coordinates with the DoD TTF Director and the President-Elect's DoD focal point to facilitate support for the incoming administration's nominees for the SecDef and DepSecDef.
+
+(8)  Integrates security disciplines, as appropriate, to protect associated DoD information, personnel, facilities, and equipment.
+
+c.  During Presidential transitions or any other transition of PAS officials and other political appointees:
+(1)  In coordination with the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for White House Liaison, provides guidance to OSD PSAs and the Secretaries of the Military Departments regarding the arrival and departure of political appointees and other officials.
+
+(2)  Maintains a central repository of Military Department Secretariat and OSD
+Component succession plan information, including a current list of SCOs, and ensures reporting on vacancies pursuant to Sections 33453349d of Title 5, U.S.C., also known as and referred to in this issuance as the "Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998," as amended (FVRA), is done in a timely fashion.  Pursuant to Public Law 113-187; Sections 1220-1236 of Title 36, Code of Federal Regulations; DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5015.02; and Administrative Instruction 15, the office assigned responsibility by DA&M for development of this repository must coordinate with Washington Headquarters Services (WHS) to identify and submit a record schedule for this repository.
+
+(3)  As appropriate, recommends to the DepSecDef assignment of responsibility for the preparation of confirmation books.  Provides leadership orientation training to non-career SES members or selected other individuals appointed to positions within the DoD.
+
+(4)  Oversees mentoring activities for PAS officials within the DoD. (5)  Designates the OSD Historical Office to coordinate exit interviews with departing PAS officials (including those acting as or performing the duties of) to inform the Secretaries of Defense Historical Series specifically and the historical record generally.  Records recommended improvements to operations and processes that may enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of the DoD.
+
+(6)  Designates the OSD Historical Office as the entity responsible for arranging additional oral history interviews with current and former PAS officials to inform the Secretaries of Defense Historical Series and other official publications.
+
+(7)  Integrates security disciplines, as appropriate, to protect associated DoD information, personnel, facilities, and equipment.
+
+## 2.2.  Director, Whs.
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the DA&M, the Director, WHS:
+a.  Provides operational support for the transition of PAS and other senior political appointees for all OSD PSAs and DoD Components, except for the Military Departments and any DoD Components serviced by a Military Department.
+
+b.  May provide operational support for the transition of PAS and other senior political appointees entering or departing from the Military Departments, as required.  Such services may be provided on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis as agreed upon by WHS and the Military Department concerned.
+
+c.  Establishes comprehensive operational guidelines and coordinates major activities, within WHS and other appropriate DoD organizations, for administration and support of all transition activities, in accordance with Paragraph 2.1.
+
+d.  Submits required FVRA reports to the Government Accountability Office in a timely manner.
+
+e.  Provides other functional support to transitions, as directed by the DA&M.
+
+## 2.3.  Director, Pentagon Force Protection Agency (Pfpa).
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the DA&M, the Director, PFPA:
+a.  Oversees all physical security requirements for the transition of political appointees entering or departing the OSD and those political appointees of the Military Departments, Defense Agencies, and DoD Field Activities.
+
+b.  Conducts personal security training for newly appointed or assigned officials, as appropriate.
+
+c.  Coordinates for and conducts personal security vulnerability assessments for newly confirmed or appointed officials, as appropriate, as outlined in DoDI O-2000.22.
+
+d.  Ensures newly appointed or assigned officials are covered by the DoD Counter Insider Threat Program pursuant to DoDD 5205.16, and takes actions necessary to provide for force protection consistent with law and regulations.
+
+e.  Establishes comprehensive operational support and appropriate guidelines for the administration of security support of all transition activities within the scope of agency responsibilities.  Such operational support and guidelines may include, but are not limited to, physical security access permissions and badging, implementation of operations security and countermeasures, appropriate training, driver support, alarms, and sensors.
+
+## 2.4.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Personnel And Readiness.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.9., the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:
+a.  Provides oversight of and ensures the DoD meets all Office of Personnel Management
+(OPM) deadlines related to:
+(1)  Certification of PAS officials' positions in the DoD in accordance with Section 8403
+of Public Law 108-458, also known as the "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004."
+(2)  Submission of information on DoD civil service leadership and support position to be included in the United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (Plum Book).
+
+b.  Provides OPM transition guidance to OSD PSAs and DoD Component heads.
+
+## 2.5.  General Counsel Of The Department Of Defense (Gc Dod).
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.9., the GC DoD:
+
+a.  Provides advice, counsel, and assistance on all transition activities.
+b.  Provides information, advice, and counsel concerning applicable standards of conduct laws, regulations, and policies in accordance with Sections 201-209 of Title 18, U.S.C.; Section 101 of Title 5, U.S.C. Appendix, et seq., also known and referred to in this issuance as the "Ethics in Government Act;" and implementing regulations.
+
+c.  Coordinates with the Office of Government Ethics to obtain Office of Government Ethics pre-clearance of prospective PAS nominee financial disclosure reports and ethics agreements.
+
+d.  Provides Departmental guidance regarding permissible activities for prospective PAS
+nominees within the DoD before confirmation and appointment.
+
+e.  Provides counsel on transition-related matters as required, including:
+
+(1)  Legal requirements relating to filling, both permanently and temporarily, PAS.
+(2)  Applicable standards of conduct laws, regulations, and policies governing the actions of and other matters pertaining to prospective nominees, incoming and outgoing political appointees, or such other officials as may be required.
+
+(3)  Use of U.S. Government personnel and equipment, including government transportation.
+
+## 2.6.  Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Legislative Affairs.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.9., the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs:
+a.  Monitors activities of the Executive Office of the President with respect to the nomination of DoD PAS officials, including the intent to nominate and the submission of the nomination for Senate confirmation.
+
+b.  As appropriate, coordinates the submission of information to and the appearance of DoD
+PAS nominees before the respective committees considering their nominations.
+
+c.  As appropriate, coordinates and oversees official calls or visits by administration officials to members of Congress or with the staffs of such members or oversight committees, including such official calls and visits made before their appointment.
+
+d.  Provides support to DoD transition activities and engages in liaison activities with members of Congress and their respective staffs and committees.
+
+## 2.7.  Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense For Public Affairs.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.9., the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs:
+a.  Reviews and approves all news media requests for engagement with the DoD TTF, in coordination with the DoD Transition Director.
+
+b.  Reviews and approves all responses to news media queries regarding DoD transition activities, in coordination with the DoD Transition Director.
+
+c.  As appropriate, in coordination with the DoD Transition Director, prepares official statements and announcements for release to the news media regarding DoD transition activities, succession plans, and political appointees arriving in or departing the DoD, and updates and issues public affairs guidance to bases and stations.
+
+d.  Receives and manages all news media queries and requests for engagement regarding DoD transition activities and political appointees arriving or departing.
+
+## 2.8.  Special Assistant To The Secretary Of Defense For White House Liaison.
+
+The Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for White House Liaison:
+a.  Serves as the focal point for the arrival to, and departure of, political appointees in the DoD.
+
+b.  Coordinates with the DA&M, the DoD Transition Director (if the DA&M is not serving as the DoD Transition Director), and the DoD TTF Director as appropriate on personnel and administrative matters pertaining to departing appointees.
+
+c.  Coordinates with the DA&M, OSD PSAs, and Secretaries of the Military Departments, or their designated TACs, to provide guidance regarding the procedures for support to arriving and departing appointees of their respective Components.
+
+d.  Coordinates with the GC DoD Standards of Conduct Office to facilitate timely completion of financial disclosure reports and initial ethics training by arriving non-PAS appointees, pursuant to the Ethics in Government Act and implementing regulations.
+
+e.  Helps develop and support leadership orientation training for non-career SES members or selected other individuals appointed to positions within the DoD.
+
+f.  Helps identify and assign mentors for PAS officials within the DoD.
+
+## 2.9.  Osd Psas And Dod Component Heads.
+
+The OSD PSAs and DoD Component heads:
+a.  Identify an official within their respective Components to serve as the TAC, either as required during a Presidential election cycle or for the departure of senior officials within their Component.
+
+b.  Provide timely submission of materials to support agency review team (ART) transition requests for information, briefings, and nomination confirmation books on request.
+
+c.  Establish, as appropriate, succession plans for critical non-career positions to provide for continuity of operations, in accordance with DoDD 3020.04 and the FVRA with separate succession plans for PAS officials.
+
+(1)  Standing succession plans should include the identification of at least one, either by position or by name, SCO in the order of succession.  The SCO will be recognized as the official responsible for the continuity of institutional knowledge.
+
+(2)  As officials out-process or on-board, update succession plans as appropriate.
+
+d.  Ensure adequate preparation of career employees to serve in critical non-career leadership positions in an acting or other capacity if these positions become vacant.  The SCO, as it relates to this designation, maintains awareness concerning the nature and breadth of the Component's activities.
+
+## 2.10.  Secretaries Of The Military Departments.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.9., the Secretaries of the Military Departments:
+
+a.  Ensure proper DoD transition of outgoing political appointees.
+b.  Coordinate with the DA&M and the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for White House Liaison to arrange onboarding and orientation for arriving political appointees.
+
+c.  Provide Military Departmentspecific orientation and support to arriving political appointees.
+
+d.  Identify DoD transition support requests to the DA&M.
+e.  Conduct personal security vulnerability assessments for newly confirmed or appointed officials, as appropriate, as outlined in DoDI O-2000.22.
+
+## Section 3:  Succession Plans
+
+3.1.  Individuals awaiting possible Senate confirmation, appointment by the President, and taking the oath of office as PAS officials within the DoD may, at the discretion of the SecDef, be appointed as experts or consultants to the SecDef pursuant to Section 3109 of Title 5, U.S.C.;
+Section 129b of Title 10, U.S.C.; and Part 304 of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, and will be provided the information and, where necessary, such limited training or professional development support to allow them to effectively advise the SecDef. 3.2.  Individuals appointed as experts or consultants will not presume to act in any capacity as a PAS.  This includes, but is not limited to, making any personnel decisions.  These experts or consultants will be appointed and located outside the respective organizations to which they are nominated.  They may provide expertise or consult within the DoD on current policy topics, receive briefings, and become familiar with relevant issues but will neither offer nor provide views or guidance on matters pertaining to the PAS offices to which they have been nominated. 3.3.  PAS and other non-career officials departing from the DoD may, at the SecDef's discretion, be appointed as experts or consultants pursuant to Section 3109 of Title 5, U.S.C.; Section 129b of Title 10, U.S.C.; and Part 304 of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations, following their departure to provide for proper debriefings, disposition of official records, and other transitional activities in the interest of the U.S. Government and the public.
+
+3.4.  If an incumbent's intention to leave, whether through reassignment, retirement, or resignation, has been documented, the DoD may establish a different position in which to employ a designated successor for a brief period pending the incumbent's departure.  For example, when a director plans to leave, a temporary special assistant position may be established for a short period to facilitate orientation of the incoming director to the office's operations.  DoD authority under this paragraph will not affect or extend to positions within the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense. 3.5.  Qualified career civilian employees from OSD PSAs and DoD Components will serve in an acting status when applicable, and in accordance with the FVRA for all PAS positions, or, alternatively, be delegated the authorities of the position concerned and serve in a "performing the duties of" status, in critical positions vacated by non-career officials during a Presidential transition.
+
+## Section 4:  Dod Transition Structure 4.1.  Purpose.
+
+The DoD transition structure is established before a Presidential election by the SecDef pursuant to Section 113 of Title 10, U.S.C.; the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, as amended; and Executive Order 13727.  Its purpose is to plan for, manage, support, and execute DoD transition matters and ensure optimum efficiency, effectiveness, and communication throughout the transition.
+
+## 4.2.  Transition Ssg.
+
+Upon establishment of the DoD transition structure by the SecDef, the DepSecDef will convene and chair the SSG.  The SSG is composed of the Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD PSAs, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for White House Liaison, DoD Transition Director, and the DoD TTF Director.  The DoD TTF Director will serve as the SSG's Executive Secretary.  The SSG will meet on a periodic basis during an election and transition cycle and provides guidance, oversight, and direction to the DoD Transition Director and DoD TTF Director.
+
+## 4.3.  Dod Transition Director.
+
+The DoD Transition Director oversees and implements DoD activities related to the Presidential transition.  In the event of a vacancy of the DA&M or if the incumbent DA&M is not a career official, the DoD Transition Director is designated not later than 6 months before the date of the Presidential election.  The DoD Transition Director:
+a.  Coordinates all support of the DoD under the control of the outgoing Presidential administration to the transition of the incoming Presidential administration.
+
+b.  Ensures Department compliance with Executive Office of the President guidance and any requirements outlined in the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the White House and Eligible Candidate Transition Team, which governs the conduct of a transition in accordance with statute.
+
+c.  Following the Administrator of the U.S. General Services Administration's ascertainment of an apparent successful Presidential candidate, the Federal Transition Director will notify the DoD Transition Director of the names for the DoD ART Team.  Following the election (i.e., the first Tuesday of November), DoD organizations and transition personnel are not authorized to provide support until the ascertainment of a successful candidate in accordance with the Presidential Transition Act of 1963, as amended, and DoD policies.
+
+d.  Coordinates with representatives of eligible candidates before the election and after the ascertainment of the apparent election results with the President-Elect's DoD focal point to provide guidance for the development and production of Initial Transition Books (ITBs), as well as other briefing materials and information provided to the incoming President-Elect Transition Team's DoD ART.
+
+e.  Coordinates with other Federal Agency Transition Directors to support non-DoD ART
+requested engagements with DoD organizations (e.g., intelligence community ART engagements with defense intelligence agencies).
+
+f.  Implements direction and guidance provided by the DepSecDef through the Transition SSG.  On a periodic basis, reports status and progress being made to the Transition SSG.
+
+g.  Provides instructions and manages and executes assigned tasks pursuant to SecDef and DepSecDef direction.
+
+h.  Organizes the DoD TTF from OSD PSA and DoD Component TACs and other staff members from the OSD PSAs and DoD Components as needed.  Designates the DoD TTF Director.
+
+i.  Supports the transition of outgoing political appointees.  Organizes town halls and other briefings to provide outgoing political appointees with important information about Federal benefits, security classification and review, and post-government employment ethics rules.
+
+j.  Upon approval of nominations submitted by the OSD PSAs and DoD Component heads, not later than September 15 in each Presidential transition year:
+(1)  Designates a career official for each PAS position who would be eligible to act in or perform the duties of such position in the event of a vacancy.
+
+(2)  Certifies the DoD has completed the broader succession plans for all critical non-career positions.
+
+(3)  Ensures career employees designated to temporarily assume the responsibilities of critical non-career vacancies are adequately prepared.
+
+k.  Oversees and ensures preparation of ITBs and other briefing materials and information related to a Presidential transition not later than November 1 of a year during which a Presidential election is held.
+
+(1)  Ensures materials are disclosed or protected in accordance with statute, policy, and the MOU between the White House and Eligible Candidate Transition Team.  Ensures proper marking and safeguarding of any non-public information provided to the President-Elect Transition Team and ART members in the conduct of their duties.
+
+(2)  Ensures ITBs do not contain any pre-decisional information.
+
+l.  Ensures DoD briefers and interviewees receive adequate preparation ahead of meeting with ART members (e.g., are provided a topic agenda or advance questions, understand what types of information may and may not be shared).  ART interviews or briefings should be scheduled and conducted with adequate time for preparation and review and approval of readahead materials by the DoD.
+
+m.  Coordinates for any non-career holdovers.
+(1)  Recommends to the designated representative of the incoming administration the holdover of any non-career officials who are either close to retirement-eligibility, or have medical reasons, or to ensure the continuity of certain projects, programs, and activities.
+
+(2)  Upon request of an incoming administration for the President-Elect, notifies and confirms the willingness of certain non-career individuals to serve in certain key positions after the inauguration.
+
+## 4.4.  Dod Ttf Director.
+
+The DoD TTF Director:
+a.  Provides staff support to the DoD Transition Director and the outgoing DoD leadership, as well as the incoming leadership, to the extent permitted by law, by executing the broad range of day-to-day functions and activities necessary to efficiently conduct the transition.
+
+b.  Leads the DoD TTF and orchestrates the activities of its elements or supporting organizations.
+
+c.  Oversees transition matters of OSD and DoD Components internal to the DoD. d.  With the DoD Transition Director, oversees the identification, coordination, and support to transition matters that require interagency coordination or are external to the DoD.
+
+e.  Captures best practices and lessons learned throughout the DoD transition process and publishes an after-action report.
+
+## 4.5.  Osd Psa And Dod Component Tacs.
+
+Each TAC:
+a.  Serves as the lead representative facilitating and supporting transition matters directly involving their respective OSD PSAs or DoD Components.
+
+b.  Serves as a supplemental member of the DoD TTF supporting Department-wide TTF and transition requirements.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+ART
+agency review team
+DA&M
+Director of Administration and Management
+DepSecDef
+Deputy Secretary of Defense
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+FVRA
+Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998, as amended
+GC DoD
+General Counsel of the Department of Defense
+ITB
+Initial Transition Book
+MOU
+memorandum of understanding
+OPM
+Office of Personnel Management
+PAS
+Presidentially-appointed, Senate-confirmed
+PFPA
+Pentagon Force Protection Agency
+PSA
+Principal Staff Assistant
+SCO
+senior career official
+SecDef
+Secretary of Defense
+SES
+senior executive service
+SSG
+senior steering group
+TAC
+transition assistance coordinator
+TTF
+transition task force
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+WHS
+Washington Headquarters Services
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+
+ART
+The President-Elect Transition Team designated team to build knowledge about specific the DoD and identify critical policy and program issues, deadlines, and challenges on behalf of the President-Elect.
+
+confirmation book
+A collection of material used to prepare a nominee for confirmation hearing(s), usually for a PAS position.
+Executive Branch
+Defined in Part 1, Chapter 1 of Title 5, U.S.C. as an "Executive
+departments and
+department" and an "Executive agency."
+agencies Federal Transition
+Co-chair of the Agency Transition Directors Council.  Serves as
+Coordinator
+interagency lead to coordinate Executive Branch activities in
+support of a presidential transition.  The General Services Administration, through the Federal Transition Coordinator, ensures the Federal Government has an integrated strategy for addressing inter-agency challenges and responsibilities around Presidential transitions and turnover of non-career appointees.
+ITB
+A notebook prepared by each Secretary of a Military Department and OSD PSA (including each PAS official in their organization),
+as well as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief
+of the National Guard Bureau.  ITBs contain DoD and organizational background information to assist the incoming President-Elect Transition Team with planning.  At a minimum, ITBs contain the mission and functions, organization charts,
+transition issue papers, existing statutory functions and authorities,
+workforce and personnel end-strength, and budgetary information. Each ITB sets the stage for follow-on, more-detailed meetings and briefings with an ART.
+non-career SES
+A member of the SES whose appointment is approved by the White House and the OPM and who serves at the pleasure of the appointing officer.  Non-career SES appointments do not require
+competition and offer no tenure.
+operational support
+Includes support services as may be provided by WHS in accordance with DoDD 5110.04 and by the PFPA in accordance with DoDD 5105.68, or as may be provided by other DoD Components in accordance with DoDI 4000.19.  These transition
+TERM
+DEFINITION services may include office facilities, building access, badging, communications, transportation, human resources services, security, supplies, and administrative support.
+
+OSD
+Defined in Section 131 of Title 10, U.S.C.
+PAS officials
+Civilian officials appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.
+political appointees
+Officials who hold positions to which they are appointed: By the President with the advice and consent of the Senate; By the President without the advice and consent of the Senate; As non-career members of the SES (including political appointees in the defense intelligence SES); or As Schedule C employees (or equivalent political appointees).
+Schedule C appointees
+Political appointees primarily serving as confidential assistants,
+policy experts, special counsels, and schedulers at grade General
+Schedule-15 or below, serving under an appointment pursuant to Schedule C of Part 213 of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations.
+transition
+The full spectrum of activities to support the arrival and in-briefing of officials assigned to the DoD, the departure of those officials at the conclusion of their terms of service, as well as President-Elect Transition Team and ART activities when there is
+a change of administration.  Transition activities include, but are not limited to, the following resources: Human resources. General administration of pay and allowances. Security clearance issuance and access. Allocation of information technology. Allocation of office space. Security review.
+
+   Disposition of official records.
+
+## References
+
+Administrative Instruction 15, "OSD Records and Information Management Program,"
+May 3, 2013, as amended Code of Federal Regulations, Title 5 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 36, Sections 1220-1236 DoD Directive 3020.04, "Order of Succession Pursuant to Executive Order 13533 and the Federal Vacancies Reform Act of 1998," August 25, 2010
+
+DoD Directive 5105.53, "Director of Administration and Management (DA&M),"
+February 26, 2008
+DoD Directive 5105.68, "Pentagon Force Protection Agency (PFPA)," December 5, 2013, as
+amended
+DoD Directive 5110.04, "Washington Headquarters Services (WHS)," March 27, 2013 DoD Directive 5205.16, "The DoD Insider Threat Program," September 30, 2014, as amended DoD Instruction O-2000.22, "Designation and Physical Protection of DoD High-Risk
+Personnel," June 19, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," December 16, 2020 DoD Instruction 5015.02, "DoD Records Management Program," February 24, 2015, as
+amended
+Executive Order 13727, "Facilitation of a Presidential Transition," May 6, 2016 House Oversight and Government Reform Committee and Senate Committee on Homeland
+Security and Governmental Affairs, "United States Government Policy and Supporting Positions (Plum Book)," current edition
+Public Law 108-458, "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,"
+December 17, 2004, as amended
+Public Law 113-187, "Presidential and Federal Records Act Amendments of 2014,"
+November 26, 2014 (also known as the "Federal Records Act")
+United States Code, Title 3, Section 102, "Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries" (also
+known as the "Presidential Transition Act of 1963," as amended)
+United States Code, Title 5 United States Code, Title 10 United States Code, Title 18 White House-Eligible Candidate Transition Team, "Memorandum of Understanding Regarding
+Transition Procedures, Identification of Transition Contacts, and Access to Non-public
+Government and Transition Information," current edition.1

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+## Dod Directive 5105.86 Director, Strategic Capabilities Office (Sco)
+
+
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense
+
+Effective:
+November 14, 2016
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+
+Incorporates and Cancels: Office of the Secretary of Defense, OSD071695-15, "Charter for the
+Strategic Capabilities Office," June 3, 2015 (Declassified in accordance with Executive Order 13526 on: September 28, 2016 by the Deputy Secretary of Defense)
+
+Approved by:
+Ashton B. Carter, Secretary of Defense
+
+Purpose: Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by Sections 113 and 131(b)(9) of Title 10, United States Code, this issuance establishes the responsibilities and functions, relationships, and authorities of the Director, SCO, as an OSD Principal Staff Assistant (PSA), consistent with this directive.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS ........ 4 SECTION 3:  RELATIONSHIPS ........ 7
+3.1.  Director, SCO. ........ 7 3.2.  OSD PSAs and Heads of DoD Components........ 7 3.3.  General Counsel of the Department of Defense. ........ 8 3.4.  Director, DoD SAPCO........ 8
+3.5.  Combatant Commanders. ........ 8
+3.6.  Director, Washington Headquarters Services. ........ 8
+SECTION 4:  AUTHORITIES ........ 9 GLOSSARY ........ 11
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 11 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 11
+REFERENCES ........ 12
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information
+
+1.1.  APPLICABILITY.  This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+1.2.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  During peacetime and conflict, the Department must explore and adopt cost-effective, strategic alternatives to shape and counter emerging threats by combining capability innovation with concepts of operation and information management.
+
+b.  Given the constrained resource environment, and an increasingly complex operational setting, the Department must generate new and unconventional uses of existing systems and near-term emerging technologies, either by application to new missions, integration with other systems, incorporation of recent technology, or adoption of non-traditional operational concepts that can create strategic effects that deter, or when necessary, defeat adversaries.
+c.  Due to the need to establish a new era of power projection, and acknowledging the rapid rate of change in systems and technology, the Department must ensure those individuals responsible for forging the conceptual and technological paths to achieve break-through approaches that produce tactical, operational, and strategic warfighter advantage possess uniquely-suited competencies and technical expertise.
+
+d.  Nothing in this issuance should be construed as detracting from the duties and responsibilities of the OSD PSAs and the DoD Component heads.  For this purpose, the Director, SCO, will coordinate with those OSD PSAs whose responsibilities and authorities are affected by proposed actions of the SCO.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities And Functions
+
+The Director, SCO:
+a.  Is the PSA and an advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for augmenting other efforts within the Department with respect to strategic capabilities development.  Specifically, the Director advises on the identification, analysis, and introduction of disruptive applications and new and unconventional uses of existing systems and near-term technologies, for both U.S. Government (USG) and commercial capabilities, to create operational strategic effects, including:
+
+(1)  Deterrence. (2)  Power projection. (3)  Cost imposition. (4)  Surprise.
+(5)  Overmatch.
+b.  Develops strategic capability alternatives; vets and recommends to the Deputy Secretary of Defense innovative ideas and concepts for funding or operational execution; conducts demonstrations, experiments, and prototypes through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the heads of other DoD Components to reduce upfront risk on potentially game-changing concepts that can be fielded in the near-term (0-5 years) fiscal development period; collaborates with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CJCS, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and the heads of other DoD Components with program offices on alternative strategic capability development and on processes to expedite transition timelines; develops program information management strategies to create deterrence and maintain U.S. strategic advantage; leverages existing DoD relationships with the national security community to coordinate and synchronize efforts; and interfaces, after approval and pursuant to guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense, with the international community to identify opportunities for cooperative efforts.  Specifically, the Director, SCO:
+(1)  Performs rigorous analysis (including modeling, prototyping, and red teaming) to generate ideas and preliminary operational concepts to shape capabilities to counter emerging threats.
+(2)  Makes recommendations to the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding new applications of, and modifications to, existing and near-term capabilities, that would provide operational advantage to the Department.  Before being presented to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, these recommendations will be reviewed by either the 3-Star Programmers or by the Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel, in accordance with the December 5, 2014, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, and conveyed as investment recommendations to the Deputy's Management Action Group.
+
+(3)  Works through the Secretaries of the Military Departments and heads of other DoD
+Components to execute and acquire approved innovative concepts.  The Director, SCO, will initiate, structure, and provide semi-annual reviews of program content and progress at the Deputy's Management Action Group, through the 3 Star Programmers.
+
+
+(4)  Develops program information management strategies, objectives, and technologies, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the CJCS; the USD(AT&L);
+the USD(P); the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)); the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense; the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation;
+and other OSD PSAs and heads of DoD Components, as appropriate.
+(5)  Oversees and directs operational and technological assessments of SCO-identified projects, programs, and other initiatives through a field evaluation to determine potential operational utility and technical feasibility, in consultation with the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, if and as appropriate.
+
+(6)  Establishes agreements and partnership arrangements, as approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense:
+(a)  With the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Combatant Commanders, and heads of other DoD Components; and other USG agencies, in coordination with the USD(P) and the USD(I), jointly identifies, analyzes, and speeds the transition of promising near-term capabilities to partnering offices.
+(b)  With the Defense Intelligence Enterprise and the Intelligence Community jointly identifies, analyzes, and speeds the transition of promising near-term capabilities, in coordination with the USD(I).  On all matters related to National and Defense Intelligence, coordinates with the USD(I), as the Director of Defense Intelligence.
+
+(c)  With international allies and partners, consistent with DoD Directive (DoDD)
+5530.3, fosters cooperation and jointly identifies and analyzes near-term capabilities, in coordination with USD(AT&L) and USD(P), and consistent with DoD policy on international transfers, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 2040.02.
+
+(d)  With academia and industry to identify and analyze near-term capabilities, as authorized and appropriate.
+(7)  Implements Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense guidance and funding decisions on SCO-identified capabilities.  Ensures approved funding profiles are provided for inclusion in annual planning, programming, budgeting, and execution activities, in accordance with DoDD 7045.14.
+(8)  Coordinates with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense to ensure the SCO operates within applicable laws and regulations.
+
+(9)  On all matters related to Congressional engagements, coordinates with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs (ASD(LA)); the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense (USD(C)/CFO); and the Director, DoD Special Access Program Central Office (DoD SAPCO), when answering Special Access Program (SAP) inquiries.
+
+(10)  Performs other duties as assigned by the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary of Defense.
+
+## Section 3:  Relationships
+
+3.1.  DIRECTOR, SCO.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and in the performance of assigned responsibilities and functions, the Director, SCO:
+a.  Reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. b.  Coordinates and exchanges information with other OSD PSAs, other DoD Component heads, and USG officials having collateral or related responsibilities and functions relative to the matters assigned in this issuance.
+
+c.  Uses existing systems, facilities, and services of the DoD and other federal departments and agencies, when possible, to avoid duplication and to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.
+
+d.  Provides regular project updates and briefs to the congressional defense committees, as well as other congressional stakeholders, in coordination with the ASD(LA) and the USD(C)/CFO, and, additionally, for congressional engagements involving SAP information, in coordination with the Director, DoD SAPCO, and in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the CJCS, the USD(AT&L), the USD(P), the USD(I), the Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, and the Combatant Commanders, as appropriate.
+e.  Coordinates with the CJCS to ensure SCO initiatives are aligned with Joint warfighting mission needs.
+
+f.  Coordinates with the USD(AT&L) on acquisition strategies for all approved innovative concepts.
+
+g.  Coordinates with the USD(P) on all engagements with foreign governments and other foreign entities.
+
+h.  Coordinates with the USD(I) regarding security and program information management strategies to speed transition to the appropriate operational execution authority and ensure consistency with other Departmental and Intelligence Community efforts.
+
+i.  Refers all requests to disclose classified military information to foreign governments and international organizations to the Executive Director, National Disclosure Policy Committee, Defense Technology Security Administration, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.
+3.2.  OSD PSAS AND HEADS OF DOD COMPONENTS.  The OSD PSAs and heads of DoD
+Components will coordinate with the Director, SCO, on all matters under their purview related to the responsibilities, functions, and authorities assigned in this issuance.
+3.3.  GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.  In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 3.2., and pursuant to DoDDs 5145.01 and 5145.04, the General Counsel of the Department of Defense selects legal counsel for the SCO.
+3.4.  DIRECTOR, DOD SAPCO.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director, DoD SAPCO, will support the SCO, as follows and in accordance with DoDD 5205.07:
+
+a.  Serves as the cognizant authority for SAP activities executed by the SCO.
+b.  Serves as the approval authority for access to DoD SAPs, unless specifically delegated to
+the Director, SCO.
+c.  Reviews proposals and developmental activities at all classification levels to ensure horizontal protection and appropriate application of enhanced security safeguards.
+
+3.5.  COMBATANT COMMANDERS.  In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 3.2., the Combatant Commanders will inform the Director, SCO, of command priorities on an annual basis through the CJCS using existing processes and via the annual Comprehensive Joint Assessment Survey.  The Director, SCO, may also engage directly with Combatant Commanders to clarify needs and priorities and will keep the CJCS advised on results of those consultations.
+
+3.6.  DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICES.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense, the Director, Washington Headquarters Services, and in addition to the responsibilities in paragraph 3.2., and subject to the limitations of paragraph 4.g, provides administrative and logistical support for the SCO, including human resources management, security clearance services, facilities management, manpower management, budget and financial management, and other support and services, as appropriate or directed and in accordance with DoDD 5110.04.
+
+
+## Section 4:  Authorities
+
+Pursuant to the authorities vested in the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and subject to their authority, direction, and control, and in accordance with DoD policies and issuances, the Director, SCO, is hereby delegated authority to exercise, within his or her assigned responsibilities and functions, pursuant to this Directive, all authorities of the Secretary of Defense derived from statute, Executive order, or interagency agreement, except where specifically limited by statute or Executive order and is delegated authority to:
+a.  Communicate directly with the OSD PSAs and other DoD Component heads, as necessary, in carrying out assigned responsibilities and functions, including transmissions of requests for advice and assistance.  Communications to the Military Departments will normally be transmitted through the Secretaries of the Military Departments, their designees, or as otherwise provided in law or as directed by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense in other DoD issuances.  Due to the special mission of the Office, and in accordance with Paragraph 4.b.(3)(d) of DoDD 5100.01, the Director, SCO, may communicate directly with the CJCS on Combatant Commander requirements, consistent with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System process, and will provide quarterly updates to the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as appropriate.
+b.  Communicate with other USG officials, representatives of the Legislative Branch, members of the public, and representatives of foreign governments or other entities, as appropriate, in carrying out assigned responsibilities and functions.  Communications with representatives of the Legislative Branch will be coordinated with the USD(C)/CFO, the ASD(LA), or the DoD SAPCO, as applicable, and be consistent with the DoD Legislative Program.  Communications with members of the news media will be coordinated with the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, who is the sole release authority of official DoD information to news media representatives, and will be consistent with DoDD 5122.05.  Communications with representatives of foreign governments will be coordinated with the USD(P), approved by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and will be consistent with DoDD 5530.3. c.  Obtain reports and information, as necessary, to perform assigned responsibilities and functions, in accordance with DoDI 8910.01.
+
+d.  Enter into support agreements with the other federal departments and agencies, as necessary, to perform assigned responsibilities and functions, in accordance with DoDI 4000.19.
+
+e.  Use existing systems, facilities, and services of the DoD, and other federal departments and agencies, when possible, to avoid duplication and to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.
+
+f.  Exercise all necessary acquisition authorities through a Military Department, a DoD
+contract administration services component, or a federal department and agency, as appropriate, to further the SCO mission.
+g.  Receive administrative, acquisition, and logistical support from Washington Headquarters Services, unless otherwise directed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense.  In those instances, service and support arrangements will be incorporated into appropriate memoranda of agreement.
+
+h.  Conduct analysis of strategic alternatives at any access level, from unclassified to special access required.
+i.  Exercise Top Secret original classification authority, in accordance with Executive Order
+13526 and Volume 1 of DoD Manual 5200.01.
+
+
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+| ASD(LA)               | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs            |
+|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| CJCS                  | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff                             |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| DoDD                  | DoD Directive                                                     |
+| DoDI                  | DoD Instruction                                                   |
+| DoD SAPCO             | DoD Special Access Program Central Office                         |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| PSA                   | Principal Staff Assistant                                         |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| SAP                   | Special Access Program                                            |
+| SCO                   | Strategic Capabilities Office                                     |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| USD(AT&L)             | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and       |
+| Logistics             |                                                                   |
+| USD(C)/CFO            | Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, |
+| Department of Defense |                                                                   |
+| USD(I)                | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence                       |
+| USD(P)                | Under Secretary of Defense for Policy                             |
+| USG                   | U.S. Government                                                   |
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+disruptive **applications**:  Capabilities, strategies, or actions that significantly change adversaries' assumptions, operational concepts, research and development plans, cost of operations, or other factors strongly affecting pre-conflict competition or future conflict in order to maintain U.S., allied, or partner strategic advantage.
+
+program information management strategies:  Comprehensive integration of all aspects of the information environment that surround a given capability or operational activity to sustain a coherent narrative over the life of the system or activity, but does not include deception or influence operations.  This includes, but is not limited to, program protection plans, operation security, security classification guidance, communications plans, and security and counterintelligence strategies.  The objective of an information management narrative is to enhance the deterrent value of the system or activity while preserving operational overmatch.
+
+## References
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel,"
+December 5, 2014
+DoD Directive 5100.01, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,"
+December 21, 2010
+DoD Directive 5110.04, "Washington Headquarters Services (WHS)," March 27, 2013
+DoD Directive 5122.05, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)),"
+September 5, 2008
+DoD Directive 5145.01, "General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC DoD)," December
+2, 2013, as amended
+DoD Directive 5145.04, "Defense Legal Services Agency (DLSA)," April 16, 2012 DoD Directive 5205.07, "Special Access Program (SAP) Policy" July 1, 2010 DoD Directive 5230.11, "Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments
+and International Organizations," June 16, 1992
+DoD Directive 5530.3, "International Agreements," June 11, 1987, as amended DoD Directive 7045.14, "The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
+Process," January 25, 2013
+DoD Instruction 2040.02, "International Transfers of Technology, Articles, and Services,"
+March 27, 2014
+DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," April 25, 2013 DoD Instruction 8910.01, "Information Collection and Reporting," May 19, 2014 DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Security Program:  Overview,
+Classification, and Declassification," February 24, 2012
+Executive Order 13526, "Classified National Security Information," December 29, 2009
+National Disclosure Policy-1, "National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified
+Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations," October 2, 2000
+United States Code, Title 10

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+## Dod Directive 5111.13 Assistant Secretary Of Defense For Homeland Defense And Global Security (Asd(Hd&Gs))
+
+
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense
+
+Effective:
+March 23, 2018
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Directive 5111.13, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas' Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA))," January 16,
+2009
+
+Approved by:
+Patrick M. Shanahan, Deputy Secretary of Defense
+
+Purpose: Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by Sections 113 and 138 of Title
+10, United States Code (U.S.C.), and under the authority of DoD Directive (DoDD) 5111.1, this directive:
+
+- Establishes and updates the responsibilities and functions, relationships, and authorities of the
+ASD(HD&GS), including all relevant changes in the January 9, 2015, Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum.
+- Supersedes any conflicting portions of DoDD 5111.10 pertaining to domestic antiterrorism activities, consistent with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 2000.12 and Volume 1 of DoDI O-2000.16.
+
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1: GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+SECTION 2: RESPONSIBILITIES AND FUNCTIONS ........ 4
+a.  Interagency and International. ........ 4 b.  Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System. ........ 4 c.  Homeland Defense. ........ 4 d.  Unmanned Aircraft Systems. ........ 5 e.  DSCA. ........ 5 f.  DoD Support of the U. S. Secret Service. ........ 7 g.  National Preparedness. ........ 7
+h.  Climate Change. ........ 7
+i.  Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative. ........ 7 j.  DoD Support to Domestic Crisis Management. ........ 8 k.  Defense Continuity. ........ 8 l.  MA. ........ 8 m.  DoD Support to Domestic Counterterrorism. ........ 9 n.  DoD Global Antiterrorism Programs. ........ 9 o.  CWMD. ........ 10 p.  Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program. ........ 11 q.  Oceans Policy........ 11 r.  Cyberspace........ 11 s.  Space. ........ 12 t.  Additional Duties. ........ 13
+SECTION 3:  ASD(HD&GS) RELATIONSHIPS ........ 14 SECTION 4: AUTHORITIES ........ 15 GLOSSARY ........ 17
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 17 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 17
+REFERENCES ........ 19
+
+## Section 1: General Issuance Information
+
+APPLICABILITY.  This directive applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+## Section 2: Responsibilities And Functions
+
+The ASD(HD&GS) is the principal civilian policy advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) for assigned areas of responsibility, as follows:
+a.  Interagency and International.  Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) in interagency policy deliberations and international discussions and negotiations relating to assigned areas of responsibility.
+b.  Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution System.  Participate in planning, programming, budgeting, and execution activities that relate to assigned areas of responsibility.
+Advise the Secretary of Defense, through the USD(P), and the Under Secretary of Defense
+(Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense (USD(C)/CFO), on DoD program and budget priorities for homeland defense activities, Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), space activities, cyber activities, defense continuity and mission assurance (MA), and countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) matters.
+
+c.  Homeland Defense.  Provide overall supervision of homeland defense activities of the Department of Defense, pursuant to Section 138 of Title 10, U.S.C.
+(1)  Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of DoD policy for:
+(a)  Homeland defense activities, including homeland defense plans and the commitment of forces or other DoD resources (e.g., non-lethal weapons and capabilities in support of homeland defense).
+
+(b)  Air defense, air sovereignty, and support to broader U.S. aviation security, pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-16/ National Security Presidential Directive-47 and the National Strategy for Aviation Security.  Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) in interagency aviation security, air sovereignty, and air defense matters and lead DoD coordination of aviation security, air sovereignty, and air defense plans, activities, and support.
+
+(c)  Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13/National Security Presidential Directive-41, and all maritime defense matters.  Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) in interagency MDA and maritime defense, and lead DoD coordination of MDA and maritime defense plans, activities, and support.
+
+(d)  The participation of National Guard units or members in homeland defense activities, pursuant to Section 902 of Title 32, U.S.C., when the Secretary of Defense determines such participation is necessary; and prepare reports to Congress, in accordance with Section 908
+of Title 32, U.S.C., and DoDD 3160.01.
+
+(2)  Coordinate the integration of homeland defense policies and programs into DoD
+theater security cooperation and bilateral and multilateral defense policies and programs, when appropriate.
+
+(3)  Maintain and update, as required, the DoD Strategy for Homeland Defense and DSCA.
+(4)  Coordinate on matters regarding the readiness posture of forces to conduct homeland defense activities.
+
+(5)  Oversee policy for the deployment and employment of non-lethal weapons for homeland defense and DSCA missions, consistent with DoDD 3000.03E.
+
+d.  Unmanned Aircraft Systems.  Develop, coordinate, and provide policy oversight for the domestic use of DoD unmanned aircraft systems, in accordance with Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 15-002.
+
+e.  DSCA.
+(1)  Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of DoD policy for DSCA plans and activities, including:
+(a)  Requests for assistance during domestic crises, emergencies, or civil disturbances.
+
+(b)  Domestic consequence management. (c)  Coordination on the development and validation of DSCA requirements and the provision of DoD capabilities.
+
+(d)  Coordination on the development and approval of all DoD pre-scripted mission assignments.
+
+(e)  DoD support to national and international sporting events, including support authorized by Section 2564 of Title 10, U.S.C.
+
+(f)  Matters related to public health and medical DSCA.
+
+(2)  Coordinate DoD assistance to federal, State, and local officials when responding to threats involving nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical weapons, or high-yield explosives or related materials or technologies, including assistance in identifying, neutralizing, dismantling, and disposing of nuclear, radiological, biological, chemical weapons, and high-yield explosives and related materials and technologies, pursuant to Section 2313 of Title 50, U.S.C.
+
+(3)  Coordinate on DSCA plans, doctrine, and exercises, and the commitment of forces, or the employment of other DoD resources for DSCA.
+
+(4)  Develop, coordinate, recommend, and supervise the implementation of policy for defense support of civilian law enforcement agencies, including law enforcement support activities.
+
+(a)  Develop procedures and issue appropriate direction, as necessary, for defense support of law enforcement agencies.
+
+(b)  Serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) for planning and executing Civil Disturbance Response Operations with the Department of Justice.
+
+(c)  Coordinate on policies to further DoD cooperation with civilian law enforcement agencies.
+
+(d)  Provide guidance for the use of Reserve Component personnel in support of civilian law enforcement agencies.
+
+(e)  Develop policy regulating plans, procedures, and requirements of the DoD
+Components with authority over defense resources that may be employed to provide law enforcement support.
+
+(f)  Inform the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)), of all requests for assistance by civilian law enforcement agencies that may be met using Reserve Component personnel and resources.
+
+(5)  Serve as the DoD manager for national special security events (NSSEs) and coordinate DoD support for all events designated as NSSEs and for other special security events. Evaluate requests for assistance for NSSE support, and prepare recommendations for approval.
+
+(6)  Advise and assist the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), in the development of DoD
+policy for military emergency preparedness liaison officers employment.
+
+(7)  Coordinate on matters or policy related to the readiness posture of forces to conduct DSCA activities, including critical infrastructure protection and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives response forces.
+
+(8)  Coordinate and align homeland defense policies, plans, and programs with nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs under the oversight of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)).
+
+(9)  Lead and coordinate all public health and medical DSCA policies and programs.
+
+(10)  Serve as the lead DoD official for public health and medical DSCA.  Receive and evaluate public health and medical requests for assistance and prepare recommendations for approval.
+
+(11)  Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P), in collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), on White House and interagency councils and committees related to public health and medical disaster event preparedness and response, including the Senior Leader Council on Patient Movement and interagency forums related to the National Response Framework Emergency Support Function #8:  "Public Health and Medical Services."  Represent the USD(P) on the National Disaster Medical System Senior Policy Group.
+
+(12)  Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P), when appropriate, to governmental, non-governmental, and private sector governance organizations and advocacy groups focused on the DSCA mission.
+
+(13)  Provide guidance on the use of DoD personnel or capabilities in support of DSCA
+policies.
+
+f.  DoD Support of the U. S. Secret Service.  Coordinate all matters pertaining to DoD
+support of the U.S. Secret Service, in accordance with DoDD 3025.13 and DoDIs 3025.19 and
+3025.20.
+
+g.  National Preparedness.  Lead support of national preparedness and implementation of Presidential policies on national preparedness, consistent with Presidential Policy Directive
+(PPD)-8.
+
+(1)  Lead DoD participation in the interagency development of integrated national planning frameworks, concerning prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery.
+
+(2)  Provide oversight of DoD participation in interagency development of interagency operational plans to support each of the national planning frameworks.
+
+(3)  Develop guidance and provide oversight of DoD efforts to build and sustain DoD
+preparedness for its roles in national prevention, protection, mitigation, and response.
+
+(4)  Coordinate and monitor DoD participation in interagency efforts to build and sustain national preparedness.
+
+(5)  Lead DoD support of Department of Homeland Security development of the annual national preparedness report to the President.
+
+h.  Climate Change.  Develop, coordinate, and integrate DoD climate change policy for homeland defense activities including:
+
+(1)  National preparedness.
+(2)  Defense mobilization in emergency situations.
+(3)  DSCA. (4)  Preserving freedom of navigation.
+(5)  Other ASD(HD&GS) mission areas, in accordance with DoDD 4715.21 and DoDI S-
+2005.01.
+
+i.  Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative.  Develop policy and coordinate DoD efforts, consistent with DoDD 5535.3 and DoDI 5535.10, to identify, evaluate, deploy, and transfer to federal, State, and local first responders technology items, equipment, and intellectual property to enhance public safety and improve homeland security.
+
+j.  DoD Support to Domestic Crisis Management.
+(1)  Pursuant to DoDD 3020.44, serve as the Domestic Crisis Manager.
+
+(2)  In coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, CJCS, and OSD
+Principal Staff Assistants, as appropriate, develop, coordinate, and oversee the implementation of DoD-wide policy for domestic crisis management, including:
+(a)  Programs, processes, and supporting infrastructure to implement crisis management within the Department of Defense, including information technology and information sharing.
+
+(b)  Support for the President and the Secretary of Defense in a national security emergency and the coordination of such matters with the Executive Office of the President, the DoD Component heads, other Federal departments and agencies, and State and local agencies and municipalities, as appropriate.
+
+k.  Defense Continuity.  Lead all defense continuity policy to ensure that the DoD can execute its essential functions, even in the face of asymmetric military and non-military threats and severe natural hazards posing a threat to defense personnel, installations, and infrastructure, in accordance with DoDD 3020.26.
+
+(1)  Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of Defense continuity policy, including activities supporting continuity of operations, continuity of government, and enduring constitutional government.
+
+(2)  Develop, coordinate, and oversee a comprehensive continuity program to ensure the development and exercise of continuity plans and preparedness activities that support the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the DoD Component heads.
+
+(3)  Determine capabilities and requirements for DoD continuity policy and strategy.
+Advocate for the resources required to develop and execute the continuity program in coordination with the OSD and applicable DoD Components.
+
+(4)  Support the USD(P) as the DoD single point of contact for other federal departments and agencies and the National Security Council staff on continuity matters.
+
+(a)  Develop, manage, and coordinate requirements for continuity communications capabilities supporting DoD and national missions, consistent with PPD-40.
+
+(b)  Establish policy for National Leadership Command Capability systems and capabilities that are critical to the performance of DoD essential functions.
+
+l.  MA.  Coordinate all MA policy to ensure that the DoD can execute its core missions, consistent with DoDD 3020.40.
+
+(1)  Develop policy and oversee implementation of the MA strategy goals across the DoD.
+
+(a)  Establish and lead a comprehensive and integrated risk management governance and oversight steering group to:
+1.  Identify, prioritize, and map critical missions, systems, assets, and underlying critical infrastructure dependencies.
+
+2.  Assess vulnerabilities. 3.  Prioritize risk management actions to improve warfighting effectiveness and
+address evolving threats to missions as they develop.
+
+(b)  Develop policy to promote MA goals, include MA objectives in the DoD's guiding documents, and execute education and outreach on the MA process across DoD.
+
+(c)  Establish collaborative partnerships with other federal departments and agencies and the National Security Council staff and, as appropriate, internationally and with the private sector to address risks to critical missions and assets, consistent with the National Infrastructure Protection Plan.
+
+(2)  Ensure a MA approach to develop and execute the DoD's cyber strategy.
+
+(3)  Integrate a broad range of threat- and component-specific programs and develop effective partnerships with other federal departments and agencies and, as appropriate, with the private sector to build the resilient infrastructure essential to defense operations.
+
+(4)  Serve as co-chair of the MA Executive Steering Group.
+
+m.  DoD Support to Domestic Counterterrorism.  Lead all DoD domestic counterterrorism policy.
+
+(1)  Align defense policies with national policies for the prevention and disruption of terrorist attacks in the Homeland in support of key U.S. Government partners, including the National Security Council staff, Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and Department of Homeland Security.
+
+(2)  Align homeland defense policies, plans, and programs concerning the prevention and disruption of the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by terrorists in the homeland, and align domestic policy with overall DoD counterterrorism policy, plans, and programs.
+
+(3)  Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of DoD policy concerning requests for interagency assistance in response to domestic terrorism crises.  Advise the Secretary of Defense and other DoD officials on the use of DoD resources and capabilities in domestic counterterrorism roles.
+
+n.  DoD Global Antiterrorism Programs.  Establish antiterrorism policy, standards, and guidance on protective measures to reduce the vulnerability to terrorist acts on DoD personnel, dependent family members, installations and other facilities, and critical resources.  Integrate DoD antiterrorism policy into national security and DoD policy and strategy.
+
+## O.  Cwmd.
+
+(1)  Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of DoD strategy and policies for CWMD, in accordance with DoDD 2060.02.
+
+(2)  Coordinate with the OSD and other DoD Components on technology security matters related to multilateral arms control, export control, and nonproliferation, in accordance with DoDD 5105.72.
+
+(3)  Develop, coordinate, and monitor implementation of DoD policies for multilateral arms control and nonproliferation of nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological, and advanced conventional weapons and missiles.
+
+(4)  Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) in interagency and international partner CWMD policy engagements.
+
+(5)  Develop and coordinate DoD policy regarding WMD-related international sanctions regimes.
+(6)  Develop and oversee DoD policy regarding international WMD-related agreements and regimes promulgated by the United Nations.
+
+(7)  Provide priority intelligence requirements for collection and analysis to the Intelligence Community.  Integrate WMD proliferation-related information and threat assessments into the policy formulation process.
+
+(8)  Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on non-proliferation and multilateral arms control matters, including, but not limited to, those involving the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
+(a)  Develop and coordinate DoD policies and positions on arms control implementation and compliance issues for international negotiations, in accordance with DoDD 2060.1.
+(b)  Coordinate with the Defense Technology Security Administration on the development and implementation of DoD policy positions on matters concerning technology security including, but not limited to, the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, in accordance with DoDD 5105.72.
+
+(9)  Establish, coordinate, and oversee DoD policy to prevent WMD proliferation or use of WMD against the United States and its allies and partners.  Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) to integrate DoD CWMD policy and activities with similar efforts by national and international partners.
+
+(10)  Serve as the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P)
+for matters concerning policy for DoD support to an international chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear incident, in accordance with DoDI 2000.21.
+
+(11)  Establish DoD policy and oversee coordination of DoD efforts contributing to the Global Health Security Agenda, including activities that enhance the capabilities of international partners to prevent, detect, and respond to infectious disease outbreaks of security concern, whether naturally occurring or caused by accidental or purposeful release.
+
+(12)  Develop policy to assist partner nations build a sustainable national-level WMD
+preparedness and incident-response capacity to effectively respond to, mitigate, and recover from the effects of an incident involving WMD.
+(a)  Oversee related multilateral engagements, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Australia Group, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.
+(b)  Develop policy options to mitigate threats from emerging technologies with WMD implications.
+p.  Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program.  Develop policy guidance for the programs and activities of the DoD CTR Program authorized in relevant sections of Chapter 48, Title 50, U.S.C.  Collaborate with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(A&S), for effective oversight of the CTR Program, in accordance with DoDDs 2060.02, 5105.62, and 5134.08.
+
+q.  Oceans Policy.
+
+(1)  Develop and oversee DoD policy for oceans policy affairs.  This includes all matters involving the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; due regard responsibilities for use of international airspace; and maritime interactions not affecting defense of the Homeland, particularly those involving enforcement of measures under international law such as United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
+
+(2)  Direct the DoD Freedom of Navigation Program, in accordance with DoDI S-
+2005.01.
+
+(3)  Serve as the primary point of contact for the DoD Representative for Oceans Policy Affairs for all matters related to duties as the DoD Representative for Oceans Policy Affairs.
+
+r.  Cyberspace.
+
+(1)  Serve as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense on military cyber forces and activities, in accordance with the July 17, 2014, Secretary of Defense Memorandum and the June 9, 2014, Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum.
+
+(2)  Develop, coordinate, and monitor implementation of overarching DoD cyberspace policy and strategy.
+
+(3)  Provide policy oversight of Military Service and Combatant Command cyberspace programs, activities, authorities, and associated cyberspace operations forces and elements.
+
+(4)  Monitor the implementation of DoD strategy and plans related to cyberspace operations, forces, capabilities, and activities.
+
+(5)  Develop DoD policy guidance on international cyberspace-related engagements, and lead its implementation.
+
+(6)  Develop, coordinate, and monitor DoD policy guidance on innovation and capabilities development for cyberspace operations.
+
+(7)  Oversee programs and activities associated with integration of cyberspace operations and capabilities into operations and contingency plans.
+
+(8)  Formulate DoD cyber policy guidance on private sector outreach, engagement, and agreements.
+
+(9)  Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of national-level cyber policies, consistent with PPD-21 and other directives related to cyberspace, as appropriate.
+
+(10)  Represent the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P) on interagency cybersecurity policy matters and lead DoD coordination of whole-of-government cyber policies, plans, activities, and support.  Advocate to other federal departments and agencies and the National Security Council staff on matters related to DoD cyber operations and other DoD proposals, as required.
+
+(11)  Monitor programs and activities associated with implementation of cyberspace effects workforce development, recruitment, and retention, in coordination with cyber workforce governance structures, in accordance with DoDD 8140.01.
+
+(12)  In accordance with the August 18, 2017, Secretary of Defense Memorandum, as Principal Cyber Advisor, provide direction and control for the administration and support of U.S.
+
+Cyber Command, including matters related to readiness and organization of assigned forces, equipment and resources peculiar to cyber operations, and civilian personnel, consistent with Section 932 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, and Section 167b of Title 10, U.S.C.
+
+s.  Space.
+
+(1)  Develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of overarching DoD policy related to space.
+
+(2)  Develop, coordinate, and implement policies derived from, or developed consistent with, PPD-4, the National Security Space Strategy, and DoDD 3100.10.
+
+(3)  Analyze, develop, coordinate, and oversee implementation of U.S. Government and DoD policy and guidance for DoD activities in space.
+
+(4)  Formulate DoD policy and guidance on:
+
+(a)  Space forces, systems, and their employment.
+(b)  International agreements and legal regimes, including arms control and transparency and confidence-building measures affecting space activities.
+
+(c)  Integration of space capabilities into operations and contingency plans.
+(d)  Space cooperation with foreign defense departments, ministries, and governments.
+
+(5)  Review, evaluate, and coordinate assigned space and space-related DoD Special Access Program activities (including Special Access Program employment in combat operations), programs, plans, and systems requirements.  Provide approved recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the USD(P).
+
+(6)  Oversee the implementation of DoD strategy and plans related to space forces, systems, and activities.
+
+(7)  Review and evaluate space and space-related programs, plans, and systems requirements.
+
+(8)  Oversee the management of the cadre of space professionals within DoD, in accordance with DoDD 3100.16.
+
+t.  Additional Duties.  Perform duties as assigned by the Secretary of Defense or the USD(P).
+
+
+
+## Section 3:  Asd(Hd&Gs) Relationships
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), and in the performance of assigned functions and responsibilities, the ASD(HD&GS) will:
+
+a.  Report directly to the USD(P).
+b.  Coordinate and exchange information with OSD officials, the DoD Component heads, and federal officials with collateral or related responsibilities and functions.
+
+c.  Collaborate, coordinate, and exchange information with other OSD Principal Staff Assistants, the CJCS, the DoD Component heads, and federal officials who have related responsibilities and functions.  Close coordination will be accomplished to ensure that programs and plans for the use of forces and other high demand resources do not conflict.
+
+d.  Serve as the DoD focal point for policy matters pertaining to homeland defense activities, DSCA, space policy, cyber policy, and CWMD matters, including, but not limited to:
+
+(1)  Defense domestic consequence management.
+(2)  MA activities.
+(3)  Domestic crisis management.
+(4)  Alignment of homeland defense activities with counterterrorism and counternarcotics policy and programs and homeland defense activities.
+
+e.  Serve as the principal DoD representative on assigned areas of responsibility with interagency partners, the Congress, State governments, local municipalities, and organizations in the private sector.
+
+f.  Use existing DoD facilities, systems, and services and other federal departments and agencies, when possible, to avoid duplication and to achieve maximum efficiency and economy.
+
+g.  Coordinate with the Assistant Secretary for Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(A&S), for the implementation of the functions described in the January 15, 2016, Memorandum of Agreement.
+
+h.  Coordinate, as appropriate, with the Principal DoD Space Advisor or successor official, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, for space policy matters.
+
+
+## Section 4: Authorities
+
+The ASD(HD&GS) is delegated authority to:
+a.  Request that DoD Component heads, through appropriate channels, plan for the commitment of DoD resources in response to requests for support from civil authorities.
+b.  Except as retained by the Secretary of Defense, approve requests for assistance from civil authorities.
+(1)  Approval of such requests will be coordinated consistent with Paragraph 3.c.
+(2)  In the absence of the ASD(HD&GS), the Principal Deputy ASD(HD&GS) may exercise the authority of the ASD(HD&GS) to approve such requests.  This authority may not be further delegated.
+
+c.  Approve requests for the following types of DoD support of civilian law enforcement agencies, in accordance with the June 28, 2016, Deputy Secretary of Defense memorandum:
+(1)  Non-lethal support that is unrelated to law enforcement functions, such as arrest, search, or crowd and traffic control.
+
+(2)  Support provided by non-military personnel under Section 2564 of Title 10, U.S.C., including support contracted by DoD to support civilian law enforcement agencies during certain sporting events.
+
+(3)  Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives detection and response capabilities for pre-planned events with the concurrence of the force providers, CJCS, and other DoD officials, as appropriate.
+
+d.  Serve as an approval authority, subject to the following conditions, for waiver of the requirement to reimburse DoD, pursuant to Section 277 of Title 10, U.S.C., up to $500,000 for costs associated with providing support to civilian law enforcement agencies under Chapter 15 of Title 10, U.S.C., or Section 502(f) of Title 32, U.S.C.
+
+(1)  Support is provided in the normal course of military training or operations, or the support results in a benefit to the element of the DoD or personnel of the National Guard providing the support that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be obtained from military operations or training, as determined by the unit commander or other appropriate authority.
+
+(2)  The relevant Military Department Secretaries, as well as the CJCS, the USD(C)/CFO, the affected Combatant Commanders, the General Counsel of the Department of the Defense, and other DoD officials as appropriate, have concurred in the waiver of reimbursement.
+
+(3)  Notification must be provided to the Secretary of Defense of the use of this delegated authority at the earliest opportunity.
+
+e.  Issue DoDIs, DoD manuals, and one-time directive-type memorandums, consistent with DoDI 5025.0l, implementing policy approved by the Secretary of Defense or the USD(P) in assigned areas of responsibility.  Instructions to the Military Departments will be issued through the Secretaries of the Military Departments.  Instructions to the Combatant Commands normally will be communicated through the CJCS.
+
+f.  Communicate directly with the DoD Component heads, as necessary, to perform assigned responsibilities and functions, including requests for advice and assistance.  Communications to the Military Departments are transmitted through the Secretaries of the Military Departments, as otherwise provided in law, or as the Secretary of Defense directs in other DoD issuances. Communications to the Combatant Commanders must be in accordance with DoDD 5100.01.
+
+g.  Communicate with other federal, State, and local government officials and representatives of foreign governments, international organizations, the private sector, academia, and the general public, to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions.  Communications with representatives of the Legislative Branch will be coordinated with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs, except for communications with the Defense Appropriations Committees, which must be coordinated with the USD(C)/CFO.
+
+h.  Obtain reports and information consistent with DoDI 8910.01, as necessary, to carry out assigned responsibilities and functions.
+
+i.  Negotiate and conclude international agreements in areas of assigned responsibility, in accordance with DoDD 5530.3 and in coordination with the General Counsel of the Department of Defense.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+| ASD(HD&GS)            | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and           |
+|-----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| Global Security       |                                                                   |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| CJCS                  | Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff                             |
+| CTR                   | cooperative threat reduction                                      |
+| CWMD                  | countering weapons of mass destruction                            |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| DoDD                  | DoD directive                                                     |
+| DoDI                  | DoD instruction                                                   |
+| DSCA                  | Defense Support of Civil Authorities                              |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| MA                    | mission assurance                                                 |
+| MDA                   | Maritime Domain Awareness                                         |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| NSSE                  | national special security event                                   |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| PPD                   | presidential policy directive                                     |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| U.S.C.                | United States Code                                                |
+| USD(A&S)              | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment        |
+| USD(C)/CFO            | Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, |
+| Department of Defense |                                                                   |
+| USD(P)                | Under Secretary of Defense for Policy                             |
+| USD(P&R)              | Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness            |
+|                       |                                                                   |
+| WMD                   | weapons of mass destruction                                       |
+
+G.2.  DEFINITIONS.  Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this issuance. antiterrorism.  Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
+
+combating terrorism.  Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. counterterrorism.  Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. DSCA.  Defined in DoDD 3025.18. domestic.  Relating to the 50 States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the former trust Territories of the Pacific Islands, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Republic of the Marshall Islands, or any political subdivision thereof.
+
+Domestic Crisis Manager.  The DoD official responsible for the process of identifying, acquiring, planning, and executing the use of DoD resources needed to prevent or resolve a potential or actual domestic crisis.
+
+homeland defense activities.  Defined in Section 901 of Title 32, U.S.C.
+
+installation preparedness.  Actions taken at a DoD installation to prevent, detect, protect, and respond to terrorist attacks, including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives attacks; disasters; and other emergencies.  In addition to facilities and equipment, installation preparedness includes the protection of military personnel, civilian employees, dependent family members, and contractors.  At the OSD and DoD Component-level, installation preparedness encompasses those policy, planning, and programming activities undertaken to ensure that DoD processes and resources are in place to support preparedness actions by commanders on installations.
+
+MA.  Defined in DoDD 3020.40. national security emergency.  Any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or threatens the national security of the United States.
+
+WMD.  Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
+
+.
+
+## References
+
+Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
+Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction ("Biological Weapons Convention"), April 10, 1972
+Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical
+Weapons and on Their Destruction ("Chemical Weapons Convention"), January 13, 1993
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Guidance Regarding Cyberspace Roles,
+Responsibilities, Functions, and Governance within the Department of Defense," June 9, 2014
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Reorganization of the Office of the Under
+Secretary of Defense for Policy," January 9, 2015
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Delegation of Approval Authority," June 28, 2016
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Policy Memorandum 15-002, "Guidance for the Domestic Use of
+Unmanned Aircraft Systems," February 17, 2015
+DoD Directive 2060.1, "Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements,"
+January 9, 2001
+DoD Directive 2060.02, "DoD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy,"
+January 27, 2017
+DoD Directive 3000.03E, "DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) and NLW
+Policy," April 25, 2013, as amended
+DoD Directive 3020.26, "Department of Defense Continuity Programs," February 14, 2018
+DoD Directive 3020.40, "Mission Assurance (MA)," November 29, 2016
+DoD Directive 3020.44, "Defense Crisis Management," June 4, 2007, as amended DoD Directive 3025.13, "Employment of DoD Capabilities in Support of the U.S. Secret Service
+(USSS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS)," October 8, 2010, as amended
+DoD Directive 3025.18, "Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)," December 29, 2010, as
+amended
+DoD Directive 3100.10, "Space Policy," October 18, 2012, as amended
+DoD Directive 3100.16, "DoD Management of Space Professional Development," January 26,
+2009, as amended
+DoD Directive 3160.01, "Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard,"
+August 25, 2008, as amended
+DoD Directive 4715.21, "Climate Change Adaptation and Resilience," January 14, 2016 DoD Directive 5100.01, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components,"
+December 21, 2010
+DoD Directive 5100.96, "DoD Space Enterprise Governance and Principal DoD Space Advisor
+(PDSA), June 9, 2017
+DoD Directive 5105.62, "Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)," April 24, 2013, as
+amended
+DoD Directive 5105.72, "Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA)," April 26, 2016
+DoD Directive 5111.1, "Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P))," December 8, 1999
+DoD Directive 5111.10, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
+Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)," March 22, 1995, as amended
+DoD Directive 5134.08, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Biological and
+Chemical Defense Programs (ASD(NCB))," January 14, 2009, as amended
+DoD Directive 5530.3, "International Agreements," June 11, 1987, as amended DoD Directive 5535.3, "DoD Domestic Technology Transfer (T2) Program," May 21, 1999 DoD Directive 8140.01, "Cyberspace Workforce Management," August 11, 2015, as amended
+DoD Instruction 2000.12, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program," March 1, 2012, as amended DoD Instruction O-2000.16, Volume I, "DoD Antiterrorism (AT) Program Implementation: DoD
+AT Standards," November 17, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 2000.21, "DoD Support to International Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
+Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Incidents," April 5, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 3025.19, "Procedures for Sharing Information with and Providing Support to
+the U.S. Secret Service (USSS), Department of Homeland Security (DHS)," November 29, 2011, as amended
+DoD Instruction 3025.20, "Defense Support of Special Events," April 6, 2012, as amended DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Issuances Program," August 1, 2016, as amended DoD Instruction 5535.10, "Coordination of DoD Efforts to Identify, Evaluate, and Transfer DoD
+Technology Items, Equipment, and Services to Federal, State, and Local First Responders," November 24, 2009, as amended
+DoD Instruction 8910.01, "Information Collection and Reporting," May 19, 2014 DoD Instruction S-2005.01, "Freedom of Navigation (FON) Program," October 20, 2014
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive-13/National Security Presidential Directive-41,
+"Maritime Security Policy," December 21, 2004
+
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive-16/National Security Presidential Directive-47,
+"Aviation Security Policy," June 22, 2006
+"Memorandum of Agreement Between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
+Defense and Global Security (ASD(HD&GS)) and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Material Readiness (ASD(L&MR)) for the Defense Continuity Organizational Transition," January 15, 2016
+National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014, Section 932
+"National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 20131
+National Security Space Strategy, January 2011 Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms," current edition Presidential Policy Directive-4, "National Space Policy," June 29, 2010
+Presidential Policy Directive-8, "National Preparedness," March 30, 2011
+Presidential Policy Directive-21, "Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience," February 12,
+2013
+Presidential Policy Directive-40, "National Continuity Policy," July 15, 2016
+Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Designation of the DoD Principal Cyber Advisor," July 17,
+2014
+Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Elevation of U.S. Cyber Command Implementation Guidance," August 18, 2017
+Strategy for Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Support, February 20132
+Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty), July 1,
+1968
+
+United States Code, Title 10 United States Code, Title 32
+United States Code, Title 50

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+## Dod Directive 5160.05E Roles And Responsibilities Associated With The Chemical And Biological Defense Program (Cbdp)
+
+
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+
+
+Effective:
+September 8, 2017
+Change 2 Effective:
+July 18, 2019
+
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  This directive is available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+
+Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Directive 5160.05E, "Roles and Responsibilities Associated with the
+Chemical and Biological Defense (CBD) Program (CBDP)," October 9, 2008
+
+
+Approved by:
+Patrick M. Shanahan, Deputy Secretary of Defense
+Change 2 (Administrative) Approved by:
+Sajeel Ahmed, Acting Director of Administration and Organizational Policy, Office of the Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense
+
+## Purpose: This Issuance:
+
+- Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities associated with the CBDP research, development, and acquisition (RDA) of chemical, biological, and radiological (CBR) defense (CBRD) capabilities
+(medical and physical defense) required to support countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD) missions as set forth in the DoD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and DoD Directive (DoDD) 2060.02.
+
+- Designates and defines the role of the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for the CBDP pursuant to Section 1522 of Title 50, United States Code (U.S.C.) and in accordance with DoDD 5101.1.
+
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+ SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3 1.3.  Summary of Change 2. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 4
+2.1.  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S))........ 4 2.2.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
+(ASD(NCB)). ........ 4
+2.3.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment. ........ 5 2.4.  Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense Programs
+(DASD(CBD)). ........ 5
+2.5.  Director, DTRA. ........ 6 2.6.  USD(R&E). ........ 6 2.7.  Director, DARPA. ........ 7 2.8.  Deputy Director for Developmental Test, Evaluation, and Prototyping. ........ 7 2.9.  Director, Test Resource Management Center. ........ 7 2.10.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security. ........ 7 2.11.  ASD(HA). ........ 7 2.12.  USD(I)........ 8 2.13.  Secretaries of the Military Departments. ........ 8 2.14.  Secretary of the Army. ........ 9 2.15.  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. ........ 10 2.16.  Chief, National Guard Bureau. ........ 10
+GLOSSARY ........ 11
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 11 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 12
+REFERENCES ........ 13
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information
+
+1.1.  APPLICABILITY.  This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+1.2.  POLICY.  The DoD will:
+a.  Carry out a coordinated CBDP that:
+(1)  Is a special interest program under the oversight of the Defense Acquisition Executive.
+
+(2)  Maintains close and continuous coordination between CBR physical defense programs and CBR medical defense programs.  Coordinations will develop and acquire a family of integrated and interoperable CBRD capabilities that enable CWMD missions and enable military forces to operate successfully in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
+environments.
+(3)  Places the DoD CBDP funding requests for each fiscal year as a separate account with a single program element for each category of research, development, test, and evaluation
+(RDT&E); procurement; and military construction in accordance with Section 1522 of Title 50, U.S.C.
+
+b.  Be in full compliance with the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction; the United States is a State Party to both treaties.  Issues related to questions of compliance will be addressed in accordance with DoDD 2060.01.
+
+c.  Comply fully with the requirements of Parts 712-717 and 742.2 of Title 15, Code of Federal Regulations; Parts 120-130 of Title 22, Code of Federal Regulations; and DoD Instruction (DoDI) 2040.02.
+
+1.3.  SUMMARY OF CHANGE 2.  This change is administrative and updates references and organizational symbols for accuracy and to reflect the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), pursuant to the July 13, 2018 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum.
+
+
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION AND SUSTAINMENT
+(USD(A&S)).  The USD(A&S):
+a.  Oversees:
+(1)  DoD RDA programs to ensure they support the DoD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and CWMD policy in accordance with DoDD 2060.02.
+
+(2)  The activities of the DoD EA for the CBDP as required by DoDD 5101.1.
+
+b.  Directs resourcing, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense(Comptroller)/
+Chief Financial Officer, for the CBDP to execute the RDA requirements for the development and fielding of priority DoD CBRD capabilities.
+
+c.  Coordinates intelligence-related RDA and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense (CBRND) programs and activities with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) in accordance with DoDD 5143.01.
+
+2.2.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
+BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS (ASD(NCB)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(A&S), the ASD(NCB):
+a.  Serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the USD(A&S) on chemical and biological defense, including all matters related to the RDA of CBRND materiel in accordance with Section 138 of Title 10, U.S.C. and DoDD
+5134.08.
+
+b.  Oversees and integrates RDA of CBRND capabilities supporting the objectives to:  reduce incentives to pursue, possess, and employ weapons of mass destruction (WMD); increase barriers to WMD acquisition, proliferation, and use; manage WMD risks, including WMD terrorism risks; and deny the effects of current and emerging WMD threats through layered, integrated defenses across a spectrum of active and passive measures in accordance with the DoD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; Section 1522 of Title 50, U.S.C.; and DoDDs 5000.01 and 5134.08.
+
+c.  Coordinates with the DoD EA for the CBDP, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), and the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) to direct CBRND RDA in accordance with DoDD 2060.02 and the DoD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
+
+d.  Provides strategic guidance with priorities, goals, and objectives for CBRND RDA
+investments as part of the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.
+
+2.3.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR SUSTAINMENT.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(A&S), the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Sustainment coordinates with the ASD(NCB) on DoD RDT&E real property infrastructure critical to RDA of CBRD capabilities.
+
+2.4.  DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR CHEMICAL AND
+BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS (DASD(CBD)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(A&S) through the ASD(NCB), exercises overall coordination, oversight, and integration of the CBDP pursuant to Section 1522 of Title 50, U.S.C., and in accordance with the April 22, 2003 USD(AT&L) Memorandum, the DASD(CBD):
+a.  Executes oversight of CBDP funds, RDA activities, PPBE processes, and interagency and international coordination.
+b.  Establishes a governance framework to support oversight and resolve cross-cutting CBDP
+issues.
+
+c.  Develops risk-informed policies and guidance in support of CBDP RDA activities that:
+(1)  Align CBDP activities and investments with national and DoD guidance in support of CWMD missions.
+
+(2)  Promote balanced doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy solutions for CBRD capability requirements.
+
+d.  Coordinates with:
+(1)  Interagency and international partners on CBRD RDA matters of national interest.
+
+(2)  USD(P) on positions with CBRD RDA matters of national interest in advance of international engagements.
+
+(3)  Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)) on PPBE
+issues associated with RDT&E Budget Activities 1-4 as defined in DoD 7000.14-R.
+
+e.  Executes overall coordination, integration, and oversight of DoD infrastructure required to perform CBDP-related RDT&E and operational mission support by:
+(1)  Coordinating with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA));
+the DoD EA for the CBDP; the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA); and the Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), to plan, program, and budget for DoD CBDP infrastructure and core scientific capabilities, including laboratories and associated safety, security, and control measures.
+(2)  Establishing procedures to maintain continuous insight with respect to inventory of RDT&E infrastructure supporting CBDP.
+(3)  Advising ASD(NCB) throughout the PPBE processes regarding infrastructure resource requirements to meet mission objectives.
+
+f.  Oversees and integrates RDA activities for joint radiological defense programs.
+Coordinates with the ASD(HA) for joint radiological medical defense RDA activities.
+g.  Develops and coordinates the annual report to Congress on Chemical and Biological Warfare Defense pursuant to Section 1523 of Title 50, U.S.C.
+h.  Coordinates with the DoD EA for the CBDP for the independent analysis and program integration support required to execute the responsibilities in this section.
+
+2.5.  DIRECTOR, DTRA.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(A&S)
+through the ASD(NCB); in accordance with DoDDs 5105.62 and 5134.08; and consistent with the April 22, 2003 USD(AT&L) memorandum; the Director, DTRA:
+a.  Exercises funds management responsibility for the CBDP and designates an accountable official to perform the funds management functions for the CBDP under the oversight of the ASD(NCB) and in compliance with applicable financial policy, standards, and principles.
+
+b.  Establishes and maintains the Joint Science and Technology Office for CBD to direct and manage the CBDP science and technology (S&T) programs using RDT&E Budget Activities 1-3 as defined in DoD 7000.14-R.
+
+c.  Consistent with appropriate guidance, coordinates and integrates S&T plans and budgets with DoD laboratories, industry, academia, international partners, and other government agencies and laboratories to support acquisition programs for the DoD Components, other organizations, and DTRA's core mission in areas related to CBRND, which includes:
+(1)  Coordinating with the Secretaries of the Military Departments to plan, program, and budget to preserve core S&T competencies necessary to conduct core CBDP RDT&E activities in the DoD laboratories and other organizations.
+(2)  Providing support to DoD Component analytical processes to evaluate current and future CBRN threats, and resultant risks and capability needs.
+d.  Manages the CBDP Joint Technology Demonstration process in coordination with the Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense (JRO-CBRND), Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense, and the Secretaries of the Military Departments.
+
+2.6.  USD(R&E).  In accordance with DoDD 5134.3 and the July 13, 2018 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, the USD(R&E) coordinates with the ASD(NCB) on:
+a.  Development of policy as it relates to laboratories critical to RDA of CBRD capabilities, including infrastructure.
+
+b.  The review and assessment of S&T related to CBRD capabilities.
+2.7.  DIRECTOR, DARPA.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(R&E) and in accordance with Section 1522 of Title 50, U.S.C., the Director, DARPA, may conduct a program of basic and applied research and advanced technology development on chemical and biological warfare defense technologies and systems.  If such a program is conducted, the Director, DARPA, must:
+a.  Coordinate with Director, DTRA, DASD(CBD), and the Military Departments in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of the chemical and biological warfare defense activities.
+
+b.  Establish a separate program element in the DARPA budget for these efforts.
+
+2.8.  DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR DEVELOPMENTAL TEST, EVALUATION, AND
+PROTOTYPING.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(R&E) as the principal advisor for developmental test and evaluation, and, in accordance with DoDI 5134.17, the Deputy Director for Developmental Test, Evaluation, and Prototyping develops policy and guidance for the conduct, including planning, execution, and reporting, of developmental test and evaluation related to the DoD CBDP.
+
+2.9.  DIRECTOR, TEST RESOURCE MANAGEMENT CENTER.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(R&E), and in accordance with DoDD 5105.71, the Director, Test Resource Management Center, coordinates with the ASD(NCB) concerning the infrastructure and personnel required to accomplish the test and evaluation (T&E) mission as it relates to the RDA of CBRD capabilities.
+2.10.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND
+GLOBAL SECURITY.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P), and in accordance with DoDDs 5111.13, 5111.18, and 2060.02, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security:
+a.  Develops, coordinates, and oversees the implementation and integration of DoD CWMD
+policy as set forth in the DoD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction and DoD policy for preparedness and response to domestic CBRN incidents.
+
+b.  Coordinates with the ASD(NCB) on CWMD planning and programming priorities for the RDA and use of CBRN defense capabilities.
+
+## 2.11.  Asd(Ha).  Under The Authority, Direction, And Control Of The Usd(P&R), The Asd(Ha):
+
+a.  Serves as the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and USD(P&R) for clinical health care and health surveillance aspects of CBRN medical defense programs, and deployment matters as they pertain to force health protection and readiness for DoD support to CWMD in accordance with DoDD 2060.02.
+
+b.  Coordinates with the ASD(NCB) on:
+(1)  CBRN medical materiel RDA activities and the development of policy for the prophylaxis, diagnosis, and treatment of DoD personnel as it relates to CBRN medical defense in accordance with DoDD 5136.01.
+
+(2)  Medical laboratory infrastructure, personnel, and facilities. (3)  Medical readiness of DoD forces to respond to CBRN threats.
+c.  Prepares and submits the DoD Unified Medical Program Budget, including the operational sustainment of biological defense vaccines and other CBRN medical materiel, in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Director, Defense Health Agency.
+
+2.12.  USD(I).  The USD(I):
+a.  Through the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, and pursuant to DoDD 5143.01 and DoDI 5000.02, provides all required intelligence support for the validation and prioritization of CBRN threats to DoD personnel, systems, equipment, and facilities.
+
+b.  Provides advice and assistance to the USD(A&S), other DoD officials, or entities in the U.S. Government concerning CBRND acquisition programs that significantly affect defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security programs or organizations pursuant to DoDD
+5143.01.
+
+c.  Identifies opportunities to exploit advances in technology to enhance CBRND-related intelligence, counterintelligence, and security capabilities of the Department.
+
+d.  Oversees RDT&E of national intelligence program-funded CWMD programs subject to DoD acquisition regulations and Sections 139 and 2399 of Title 10, U.S.C., in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence, the USD(A&S), the USD(R&E), and other OSD Principal Staff Assistants, as appropriate.
+2.13.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments:
+a.  Organize, train, equip, and otherwise prepare their respective forces to counter WMD.
+
+b.  Develop and validate operational concepts and Military Department annexes to joint and Military Service-sponsored CBRD capability requirement documents, consistent with the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS).
+c.  Coordinate the JCIDS approval of Military Service-sponsored CBRD capability requirement documents through the JRO-CBRND.
+
+d.  Budget for the operations and sustainment of CBRD equipment and materiel.
+e.  Plan and program for the safety and security requirements at DoD laboratories working with chemical and biological agents in accordance with DoDIs 5210.65 and 5210.88.
+
+f.  Provide personnel and facilities as required to support the CBRND joint materiel developer.
+
+2.14.  SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.  In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.13 and pursuant to Section 1522 of Title 50, U.S.C.; consistent with the February 26, 1994 Secretary of Defense and April 22, 2003 USD(AT&L) memoranda; and in accordance with DoDD 5101.1, the Secretary of the Army in his or her capacity as the DoD EA for the CBDP:
+a.  Serves as the DoD EA to coordinate and integrate RDT&E and acquisition requirements of the Military Departments for chemical and biological warfare defense programs.
+
+b.  Reviews all funding requirements for the CBDP throughout the PPBE cycle. c.  Through the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, maintains the Joint Program Executive Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense to be the Joint Service Materiel Developer, Milestone Decision Authority, Type Classification Authority, and total life cycle acquisition manager for designated Acquisition Category II and III programs.
+
+d.  Through the Deputy Under Secretary of the Army, maintains the T&E Executive for the CBDP to oversee adequacy of T&E programs and infrastructure supporting the CBDP test requirements.
+e.  Maintains the Joint Combat Developer for Experimentation to synchronize and integrate joint capabilities experimentation and demonstrations for CBRD to support the JCIDS and RDA processes, in coordination with the other Military Departments; the Joint Staff; and the Director, DTRA.
+
+f.  Maintains the Joint CBRND Program Analysis and Integration Office to:
+
+(1)  Provide independent analysis, review, and integration functions for the CBDP. (2)  Determine the overall health of the CBDP against objectives and evaluate
+alternatives to shape program policy and guidance.
+(3)  Inform oversight of the CBDP pursuant to responsibilities of the ASD(NCB), the DASD(CBD), and the DoD EA, or designee, in accordance with Paragraphs 2.2., 2.3., and this section.
+
+(4)  Integrate PPBE functions across CBDP organizations and defense-wide program elements.
+
+(5)  Perform CBDP RDA planning that details mid- and far-term CBDP goals, objectives, and transition of materiel within each phase of the acquisition process consistent with the DoD Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
+(6)  Maintain the CBDP Future Years Defense Program and support development of the CBDP Program Objective Memorandum and Program and Budget Review submissions.
+(7)  Lead development of CBDP budget submissions.
+
+2.15.  CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
+a.  Pursuant to Sections 163 and 181 of Title 10, U.S.C., advises the Secretary of Defense by identifying, assessing, and prioritizing joint CBRND operational capability requirements to meet the national military strategy.
+
+b.  In consultation with the DoD Components, validates and prioritizes CBRN threats to DoD
+personnel, equipment, and weapon systems.
+
+c.  Through the Joint Staff/J-8 Director for Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment, maintains the Director of the JRO-CBRND to identify, coordinate, and approve joint CBRND
+operational requirements and joint operational concepts and architectures.
+d.  Supports and facilitates the development of multi-Service and joint CBRND doctrine, training, leader development and education, and exercises.
+
+e.  Maintains visibility of CBRND-related demonstration activities of the Military Services, Combatant Commands, and relevant Defense Agencies.
+
+f.  Leads development of the CBDP Program Objective Memorandum recommendation in accordance with the April 22, 2003 USD(AT&L) memorandum.
+
+g.  Develops and maintains the Joint CBRND Modernization Plan.
+
+## 2.16.  Chief, National Guard Bureau.  The Chief, National Guard Bureau:
+
+a.  Participates in DoD processes supporting CBRD RDA, including PPBE, JCIDS, and DoD
+support for strategic analysis, to ensure that unique National Guard CBRD operational concepts, capability requirements, and functions are looked at in context of the respective processes and clearly articulated in the outputs of each process.
+b.  Coordinates with the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force to program and budget for the operation and sustainment of CBDP equipment provided to the National Guard.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+| ASD(HA)                                                     | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs                    |
+|-------------------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ASD(NCB)                                                    | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological |
+| Defense Programs                                            |                                                                      |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| CBDP                                                        | Chemical and Biological Defense Program                              |
+| CBR                                                         | chemical, biological, and radiological                               |
+| CBRD                                                        | chemical, biological, and radiological defense                       |
+| CBRN                                                        | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear                      |
+| CBRND                                                       | chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear defense              |
+| CWMD                                                        | countering weapons of mass destruction                               |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| DARPA                                                       | Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency                            |
+| DASD(CBD)                                                   | Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological    |
+| Defense Programs                                            |                                                                      |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| DoDD                                                        | DoD directive                                                        |
+| DoDI                                                        | DoD instruction                                                      |
+| DTRA                                                        | Defense Threat Reduction Agency                                      |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| EA                                                          | Executive Agent                                                      |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| JCIDS                                                       | Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System                |
+| JRO-CBRND                                                   | Joint Requirements Office for CBRN Defense                           |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| PPBE                                                        | Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution                      |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| RDA                                                         | research, development, and acquisition                               |
+| RDT&E                                                       | research, development, test, and evaluation                          |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| S&T                                                         | science and technology                                               |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| T&E                                                         | test and evaluation                                                  |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| U.S.C.                                                      | United States Code                                                   |
+| USD(AT&L)                                                   |                                                                      |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and |                                                                      |
+| Logistics                                                   |                                                                      |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| USD(A&S)                                                    | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment           |
+| USD(I)                                                      | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence                          |
+| USD(P)                                                      | Under Secretary of Defense for Policy                                |
+| USD(P&R)                                                    | Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness               |
+| USD(R&E)                                                    | Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineerin               |
+|                                                             |                                                                      |
+| WMD                                                         | weapons of mass destruction                                          |
+
+G.2.  DEFINITIONS.  Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+CBRD.  Measures taken to minimize or negate the vulnerabilities to, and effects of, a chemical, biological, or radiological hazard or incident.
+CBRN defense.  Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
+
+CBRN environment.  Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
+
+Special Interest Program.  An acquisition program that falls below Major Defense Acquisition Program dollar thresholds and is determined by the Defense Acquisition Executive as requiring additional oversight based on one or more of the following factors:  technological complexity;
+congressional interest; a large commitment of resources; or the program is critical to the achievement of a capability or set of capabilities, part of a system of systems, or a joint program.
+
+## References
+
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 15
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 22 "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
+Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction," April 10, 1972,
+1015 U.N.T.S. 1631
+"Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and use of
+Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," January 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 3172
+"Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction," June 20143
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Establishment of the Office of the Under Secretary
+of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
+for Acquisition and Sustainment," July 13, 2018
+DoD Directive 2060.02, "DoD Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Policy,"
+January 27, 2017
+DoD Directive 2060.01, "Implementation of, and Compliance with, Arms Control Agreements,"
+January 9, 2001, as amended
+DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003, as amended DoD Directive 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent," September 3, 2002, as amended DoD Directive 5105.62, "Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)," April 24, 2013, as
+amended
+DoD Directive 5105.71, "Department of Defense Test Resource Management Center (TRMC),"
+March 8, 2004
+DoD Directive 5111.13, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas'
+Security Affairs (ASD(HD&ASA))," March 23, 2018
+DoD Directive 5111.18, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global
+Strategic Affairs Security (ASD(HD&GS))," March 14, 2018
+DoD Directive 5134.08, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological
+Programs (ASD(NCB))," January 14, 2009, as amended
+DoD Directive 5134.3, "Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E),"
+November 3, 2003
+DoD Directive 5136.01, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)),"
+September 30, 2013, as amended
+
+DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary for Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)),"
+October 24, 2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 2040.02, "International Transfers of Technology, Articles, and Services,"
+March 27, 2014, as amended
+
+DoD Instruction 5000.02, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," January 7, 2015, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 5210.65, "Security Standards for Safeguarding Chemical Agents,"
+January 19, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5210.88, "Security Standards for Safeguarding Biological Select Agents and
+Toxins (BSAT)," January 19, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5134.17, "Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Developmental Test and
+Evaluation (DASD(DT&E))," October 25, 2011, as amended
+DoD 7000.14-R, Volumes 1-16, "Department of Defense Financial Management Regulations
+(FMRs)," dates vary by volume
+Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition
+Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Designation Pursuant to Title XVII:  Chemical and
+Biological Warfare Defense, Section 1701, of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Public Law 103-160)," February 26, 1994
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum,
+"Implementation Plan for the Management of the Chemical Biological Defense Program,"
+April 22, 2003, as amended4
+United States Code, Title 10
+United States Code, Title 50

markdown/dod/d5205_15e.md

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+# Department Of Defense Directive Number 5205.15E
+
+April 26, 2011
+Incorporating Change 1, August 14, 2017
+
+USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: DoD Forensic Enterprise (DFE)
+
+References: See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  Pursuant to the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by section 113 of title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (a)), this Directive:
+a.  Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities within the DoD to develop and maintain an enduring, holistic, global forensic capability to support the full range of military operations (ROMO).  The DFE consists of those DoD resources, assets, and processes that provide forensic science analysis linking persons, places, things, and events.  These linkages are made in both traditional law-enforcement and medical purviews, as well as in the expeditionary environment. The DFE supports numerous customers, including military criminal investigators, medical examiners, joint force commanders (JFCs), and criminal-intelligence and intelligence analysts.
+Not included in the DFE are those distinct, non-traditional missions requiring unique forensic disciplines that support technical nuclear, technical chemical, and biological disciplines, and specialized intelligence.
+
+b.  Establishes, under the provisions of DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5105.18 (Reference (b)), the Forensic Executive Committee (EXCOM) to coordinate the activities of the DFE (see Enclosure 2).
+
+c.  Assigns the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+(USD(AT&L)) the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) responsibilities pursuant to DoD Directive
+(DoDD) 5101.1 (Reference (c)) for the DFE.
+
+
+
+d.  Designates the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for Forensics, in accordance with Reference (c) and DoDD 5154.24 (Reference (d)), for those forensic disciplines relating to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) *(excepting those related to forensic medicine)*, serology, firearms and tool marks, latent prints, questioned documents, drug *forensic* chemistry, and trace materials, as well as forensics relating to forensic medicine disciplines such as forensic pathology, forensic anthropology, forensic toxicology, and DNA analysis to identify human remains.
+
+
+
+e.  Designates the Secretary of the Air Force as the DoD EA for Digital and Multimedia
+(D/MM) Forensics in accordance with Reference (c) and DoDD 5505.13E (Reference (ed)), for those forensics disciplines relating to computer and electronic device forensics, audio forensics, image analysis, and video analysis.
+
+f.  Assigns to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), primary responsibility for intelligence activities and programs related to forensics pursuant to DoDD 5105.21
+(Reference (fe)).
+
+g.  Cancels the USD(AT&L) Memorandum (Reference (gf)). 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Directive:
+
+
+a.  Applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG, DoD), the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD
+Components").
+
+b.  Does not apply to:
+
+(1)  Technical nuclear or technical chemical and biological forensics, including forensic disciplines that support these efforts, which are distinct, non-traditional missions requiring unique capabilities that are governed by title 50, U.S.C. (Reference (hg)), and DoDDs 5160.05E and S-2060.04 (References (ih) and (ji)).
+
+
+(2)  Specialized intelligence collected through reconnaissance programs by the DoD
+offices described at subsection 3.5(h)(7) of Executive Order 12333 (Reference (kj)), which involve the quantitative measurement and interpretation of signatures performed outside the scope of the Capstone Concept of Operations for DoD Forensics (Reference (lk)). 3.  DEFINITIONS.  See Glossary. 4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  The Forensic EXCOM shall oversee the implementation of this Directive and facilitate the coordination of forensic activities throughout DoD.
+
+b.  Enhancement of forensics capabilities within DoD shall minimize redundancies by leveraging existing capabilities and programs to the fullest extent feasible.
+
+c.  The DoD forensic functions -- recognize, preserve, collect, analyze, store, and share --
+shall be conducted in a manner that maximizes consistency and interoperability across the DoD and at the national and international levels.
+
+d.  Forensic capabilities shall be fully integrated into military operations across the ROMO as appropriate.
+
+
+e.  Nothing in this Directive shall supersede the roles and responsibilities of the Heads of the DoD Components to exercise their authorities pursuant to References (a) and (h) and title 5, U.S.C. Appendix, also known as "The Inspector General Act of 1978" (Reference (m)).
+
+
+
+f.  Individual rights and privacy shall be protected in accordance with applicable laws and policies.  Reference (k), DoDD 5148.13 (Reference (l)), Procedures 1-4 and 7 in DoD Manual 5240.01 (Reference (n)) and *Procedure 13 in* DoD 5240.1-R (Reference (n)) apply to the activities of DoD Intelligence Components.  Incidents that constitute questionable intelligence activities *and significant or highly sensitive matters* shall be reported pursuant to procedure 15 in Reference (n).
+
+g.  DoD forensic functions, material, and data collected for forensic analysis and the results of that forensic analysis shall be protected at the appropriate classification level pursuant to established security classification guides and DoDI 5200.01 (Reference (o)) to facilitate information sharing.
+
+
+h.  Forensic material and data collected pursuant to DoD's law enforcement mission shall be protected and handled in accordance with applicable criminal evidentiary standards.
+
+ih.  DoD shall, through the Forensic EXCOM, promulgate appropriate enterprise standards for expeditionary forensic laboratories and personnel performing forensic analyses. 5.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 3. 6.  RELEASABILITY.  This Directive is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.  Cleared for public release.  This directive is available on the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. 7.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Directive is effective upon its publication to the DoD Issuances Website *April 26, 2011*.
+
+
+Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Forensic EXCOM
+
+3.  Responsibilities
+
+Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+
+(a) Title 10, United States Code (b) DoD Instruction 5105.18, "DoD Intergovernmental and Intragovernmental Committee
+Management Program," July 10, 2009*, as amended*
+(c) DoD Directive 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent," September 3, 2002, as amended
+(d) DoD Directive 5154.24, "Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP)," October 3, 2001 (ed) DoD Directive 5505.13E, "DoD Executive Agent (EA) for the DoD Cyber Crime Center
+(DC3)," March 1, 2010
+(fe) DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," March 18, 2008 (gf) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Memorandum,
+"Defense Forensics Executive Steering Group," January 14, 2008 (hereby cancelled)
+(hg) Title 50, United States Code
+(ih) DoD Directive 5160.05E, "Roles and Responsibilities Associated with the Chemical and
+Biological Defense (CBD) Program (CBDP)," October 9, 2008
+(ji) DoD Directive S-2060.04, "DoD Support to the National Technical Nuclear Forensics
+(NTNF) Program (U)," April 1, 2009
+(kj) Executive Order 12333, "United States Intelligence Activities," December 4, 1981, as
+amended
+(lk) Director of Defense Research and Engineering, "Capstone Concept of Operations for DoD
+Forensics," August 5, 20081
+(m) Title 5, United States Code, Appendix, also known as "The Inspector General Act of 1978"
+(l)
+DoD Directive 5148.13, "Intelligence Oversight," April 26, 2017
+(m) DoD Manual 5240.01, "Procedures Governing the Conduct of DoD Intelligence
+Activities," August 8, 2016
+(n) DoD 5240.1-R, "Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that
+Affect United States Persons," December 1982, as amended
+(o) DoD Instruction 5200.01, "DoD Information Security Program and Protection of Sensitive
+Compartmented Information," October 9, 2008 April 21, 2016
+(p) Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation DoD Architecture Framework
+(DoDAF) Working Group, "DoDAF Version 2.0," May 28, 2009
+(p) DoD Chief Information Officer, "DoD Architecture Framework Version 2.02," August
+2010
+(q) DoD Directive 5530.3, "International Agreements," June 11, 1987, as amended (r)
+DoD Directive 2310.07E, "Personnel Accounting -- Losses Due to Hostile Acts," November 10, 2003
+(r)
+DoD Directive 2310.07, "Past Conflict Personnel Accounting Policy," April 12, 2017
+(s)
+DoD Instruction 1400.25, Volume 250, "DoD Civilian Personnel Management System:
+Volume 250, Civilian Strategic Human Capital Planning (SHCP)," November 18, 2008
+June 7, 2016
+(t)
+DoD Directive 2000.19E, "Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)," February 14, 2006
+(ut) DoD Directive 5106.01, "Inspector General of the Department of Defense," April 13, 2006
+April 20, 2012, as amended
+(vu) DoD Instruction 5525.07, "Implementation of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)
+Between the Departments of Justice (DoJ) and Defense Relating to the Investigation and
+Prosecution of Certain Crimes," June 18, 2007
+(wv) Annex II to National Security Presidential Decision Directive 46/Homeland Security
+Presidential Directive 15, "U.S. Policy and Strategy in the War on Terror" January 4, 20072
+(xw) National Security Presidential Directive 54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23,
+"Cyber Security and Monitoring," January 8, 20082
+
+## Enclosure 2 Forensic Excom
+
+ 1.  PURPOSE.  The Forensic EXCOM shall oversee the implementation of this Directive and facilitate the coordination of forensic activities throughout DoD. 2.  OBJECTIVES.  The objectives of the Forensic EXCOM are to:
+a.  Ensure that DoD maintains an enduring, holistic, global forensic capability that includes an expeditionary capacity, necessary reach back, appropriate forensic expertise, and the infrastructure needed to support the range of military operations.
+
+b.  Address the evolving needs of DoD forensics to support the ROMO and encourage collaboration, coordination, and interoperability of forensic activities to modernize, streamline, and integrate forensic activities across DoD.
+
+c.  Reduce the cost of forensic-related military and business operations and enhance the use of current resources that maximize value and manage risk.
+
+d.  Identify responsible stakeholders for developing, sourcing, and executing forensic-related requirements. 3.  MEMBERSHIP.  The Forensic EXCOM shall be chaired by the USD(AT&L) or a designated representative.  Its membership shall consist of one senior general or flag officer or civilian equivalent from each of the DoD Components that provide or require forensic capabilities and support, as well as those making strategic management decisions related to forensic activities. 4.  FUNCTIONS.  The Forensic EXCOM shall advise and assist the USD(AT&L) in making key strategic management decisions relating to forensic activities and serve as a forum to:
+a.  Coordinate and integrate strategic-level forensic activities within DoD.
+
+
+b.  Develop strategic-level forensics policy and set programmatic priorities.
+
+c.  Develop clear, objective-associated performance measures and monitor progress toward fulfilling the objectives set forth in this Directive.
+
+d.  Monitor DFE initiatives and programs to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.
+
+e.  Recommend changes or additions to the assignment of authorities and responsibilities within the DFE. 5.  RELATIONSHIPS
+
+a.  The Chair shall preside over meetings and shall seek the consensus of committee members.  If resolution or consensus cannot be achieved, the Chair shall serve as the final decision maker except with respect to matters for which primary responsibility is assigned to another PSA.
+
+b.  The Chair may invite full or part-time Federal officers or employees from non-DoD
+organizations to serve as temporary or full time members as the need arises.  Invitees that are private citizens or representatives from the private sector or non-profit organizations may not exercise member-like privileges (participating in deliberations and voting specifically) and are limited to providing his or her individual opinion on technical or expert information to aid in the deliberation of the membership.
+
+c.  The members shall work closely with the Chair to manage the priorities, plans, programs, and schedules for work to be jointly accomplished by the DoD Components.
+
+## Enclosure 3 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  USD(AT&L).  The USD(AT&L) shall:
+a.  Execute the PSA authorities and responsibilities for the DFE pursuant to Reference (c).
+
+b.  In coordination with the members of the Forensic EXCOM, establish the programs and policies of the DFE.
+
+c.  Appoint a Director for Defense Forensics to coordinate and synchronize forensic requirements, doctrine, policy, organization, training, material, logistics, architecture, standards, and funding.  The Director for Defense Forensics will be the representative for DoD on forensicrelated matters with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies and international entities as appropriate.
+
+d.  Oversee the activities of the DoD EAs for Forensics and D/MM Forensics in their functional areas of responsibility.
+
+e.  Review the adequacy of forensic-related acquisition programs and associated budget submissions to ensure they meet DFE program requirements and objectives.
+
+f.  Serve as the Chair of the Forensic EXCOM (or designate an alternate), provide administrative support as needed for its effective operation and establish working groups to address issues and make recommendations as needed.
+
+g.  Serve as the senior point of contact with other USG agencies and international entities on forensic capabilities unless otherwise assigned.
+
+h.  Coordinate with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) on forensic programs, activities, and agreements that may affect intelligence-related authorities and missions.
+
+i.  Coordinate and synchronize forensic research, development, test, and evaluation
+(RDT&E) efforts among DoD Components and USG agencies that contribute to the DFE.
+
+j.  Coordinate and publish a DFE strategic plan, supported by a communications outreach plan.
+
+k.  Coordinate with the DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO) on programs, policies, and activities pertaining to D/MM forensics.
+
+l.  Unless otherwise assigned, establish and maintain forensic information-sharing agreements with non-DoD organizations.
+
+m.  Oversee the development and integration of the DFE architecture in accordance with the DoD Architecture Framework Version 2.02 (Reference (p)). 2.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)).  The USD(P) shall:
+a.  Review and endorse interagency cooperation agreements for DoD forensic activities as appropriate and exercise the responsibilities prescribed in DoDD 5530.3 (Reference (q)) regarding international cooperative agreements.
+
+b.  Serve as the principal advisor to the USD(AT&L) for personnel accounting and personnel recovery programs, activities, and agreements that may affect the DFE.
+
+
+
+c.  Establish policy, monitor and evaluate program performance, and provide guidance with respect to all DoD DFE activities related to efforts to account for personnel unaccounted for due to hostile actions *from past conflicts and other designated conflicts* pursuant to DoDD 2310.07E 2310.07 (Reference (r)). 3.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS (USD(P&R)).  The USD(P&R) shall:
+a.  Serve as the principal advisor to the USD(AT&L) on forensic medicine disciplines.
+
+b.  Participate in forensic committees when issues related to human capital management are addressed.
+
+c.  Coordinate with the appropriate Functional Community Manager, pursuant to Volume 250
+of DoDI 1400.25 (Reference (s)), on civilian human capital management planning issues, including those dealing with the civilian expeditionary workforce.
+
+
+
+d.  Establish policy, monitor and evaluate program performance and provide guidance with respect to all DoD DFE activities related to forensic medicine disciplines. 4.  USD(I).  The USD(I) shall:
+a.  Serve as the principal advisor to the USD(AT&L) on intelligence activities affecting the DFE.
+
+b.  Direct policy development and implementation for the application of forensics to defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and established security requirements, as needed.
+
+
+c.  Establish and oversee all Defense Intelligence Component plans, programs, and budgets that support the intelligence requirements of the DFE; disseminate implementing guidance for intelligence programs and activities to support forensics.
+
+
+d.  In conjunction with the DoD CIO, ensure that forensic-derived intelligence information is accessible through an intelligence-sharing environment to tactical and operational users as well as the USG-wide intelligence, counterintelligence, foreign intelligence, and security communities as appropriate under existing policy and statutes.
+
+e.  Coordinate with the USD(AT&L) on intelligence programs, activities, and agreements that may affect the DFE.
+
+5.  DIRECTOR, DIA.  The Director, DIA, under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), and in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Serve as the intelligence lead for forensic activities and programs.
+
+b.  Coordinate with the DoD EAs for Forensics and D/MM Forensics on intelligence activities and programs that may affect forensic-related authorities and missions.
+
+c.  Establish and coordinate intelligence-related forensic mission area applications among the Defense Intelligence Component and DoD EAs for Forensics and D/MM Forensics.
+
+d.  Propose implementing guidance for the USD(I) directing the application of forensic resources to support intelligence, collection, processing, analysis, and production in partnership with other Defense Intelligence Components.
+
+e.  Develop joint intelligence doctrine for intelligence-related forensics functions.
+
+f.  Coordinate with the other members of the Forensic EXCOM to establish, incorporate, and maintain intelligence-sharing agreements related to forensics with foreign partners, as appropriate.
+
+g.  Provide intelligence-related training and professional certification activities that support the DFE.
+
+h.  Program and budget for expeditionary forensic laboratory capability to support intelligence requirements not otherwise provided by the DoD EAs for Forensics and D/MM Forensics.
+
+i.  Develop, maintain, and publish the forensics security classification guide for the DoD.
+Nothing in the forensic security classification guide will supersede existing classification guides pertaining to forensic products produced by the DoD community.
+
+
+
+j.  Establish the standards, processes, and procedures required for the application of forensics to weapons technical intelligence (WTI) collection, processing, analysis, and exploitation processes.  Coordinate with the Director, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) when these standards, processes, and procedures pertain to the exploitation of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and their components in accordance with DoDD 2000.19E (Reference (t)).
+
+kj.  Develop, maintain, and publish a list of existing and potential security threats to DoD
+forensic technologies and systems. 6.  DoD CIO.  The DoD CIO shall:
+
+a.  Provide policy oversight and guidance for information systems and networks necessary to support the DFE.
+
+
+
+b.  Coordinate with the USD(AT&L) on programs, policies, and activities pertaining to the DoD Cyber Crime Center, as they relate to the DFE, pursuant to Reference (e).
+
+7.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEM AGENCY (DISA).  The Director, DISA, under the authority, direction, and control of the DoD CIO and in addition to the responsibilities in section 8 of this enclosure, shall provide engineering and technical support to the EAs as they establish and maintain their required forensics information management systems. 8.  IG, DoD.  The IG, DoD, in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Serve as the principal advisor to the Chair of the Forensic EXCOM on matters related to DoD criminal investigation programs.
+
+
+
+b.  Establish policy, monitor and evaluate program performance, and provide guidance with respect to all DoD DFE activities related to criminal investigation programs pursuant to DoDD 5106.01 (Reference (ut)) and DoDI 5525.07 (Reference (vu)). 9.  HEADS OF THE DoD COMPONENTS.  The Heads of DoD Components shall:
+a.  Consult and coordinate with the USD(AT&L) on the establishment of programs and development of policies affecting the DFE.
+
+b.  Designate representatives to participate in the Forensic EXCOM pursuant to section 4 of Enclosure 2.
+
+
+c.  Coordinate and integrate strategies, concepts, capabilities, and requirements regarding forensic matters within the framework of the Forensic EXCOM to meet forensic requirements and to prevent unnecessary duplication of forensic activities.
+
+
+d.  Formulate and execute forensic program elements for forensic activities in respective budgets.
+
+e.  Field forensics capabilities to meet warfighter needs in accordance with the established strategic-level policy and programmatic priorities.
+
+f.  Negotiate and resolve forensics issues on behalf of their Components.
+
+g.  Ensure DFE activities are incorporated into Military Service exercises.
+
+
+
+h.  Comply with standards, processes, and procedures established by the DoD EAs for Forensics and D/MM Forensics as appropriate.
+
+i.  Ensure that Component-level forensic training programs are developed, implemented, and validated in coordination with the DoD EAs for Forensics or D/MM Forensics, as appropriate. 10.  SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.  The Secretary of the Army, in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall serve as the DoD EA for Forensics for all forensic disciplines specified by paragraph 1.d. above the signature of this Directive, and in that capacity shall, for the forensic disciplines under his or her purview:
+a.  Execute DoD EA responsibilities in accordance with applicable law, Reference (c), and this Directive.
+
+b.  Coordinate with the Heads of the DoD Components to:
+
+(1)  Execute the responsibilities and activities assigned in this Directive.
+
+
+(2)  Program for and budget sufficient resources to support common forensic requirements for the forensic disciplines for which the Secretary of the Army is the DoD EA.
+
+
+(3)  Ensure that traditional and battlefield (including expeditionary and reach-back)
+forensic capabilities are planned, programmed, budgeted, and provided to support the JFCs.
+
+
+(4)  Establish appropriate standards, processes, and procedures for the forensic disciplines for which the Secretary of the Army is the DoD EA.
+
+
+(5)  Establish and maintain training, professional certification, and RDT&E programs for the forensics disciplines for which the Secretary of the Army is the DoD EA.
+
+
+
+(6)  Develop and maintain the DFE architecture pursuant to Reference (p) for the forensic disciplines for which the Secretary of the Army is the DoD EA.
+
+c.  Coordinate with the Director, DIA, on forensic activities and programs that may affect intelligence-related authorities and missions.
+
+d.  Designate a DoD Center of Excellence to promote collaboration and the application of best practices for those forensics disciplines for which the Secretary of the Army is the DoD EA
+and ensure they:
+
+(1)  Develop appropriate standards, processes, and procedures.
+
+
+(2)  Develop and maintain examiner training and professional certification, and laboratory accreditation.
+
+
+(3)  Provide integration of joint operational RDT&E of new forensics capabilities to the DoD Components in support of the JFC.
+
+e.  Develop and maintain continuity of operations and disaster recovery plans for forensicrelated missions and capabilities for which the Secretary of the Army is the DoD EA.
+
+f.  Establish and maintain DoD authoritative data repositories and/or develop guidelines to interface with existing authoritative data repositories for those forensic disciplines for which the Secretary of the Army is the DoD EA.  Ensure data within these repositories is accessible to strategic, operational, and tactical users across security domains.
+
+
+
+g.  Provide forensic support to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in support of DoD
+responsibilities pursuant to Annex II to National Security Presidential Decision Directive 46/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 15 (Reference (wv)).
+
+h.  Establish and maintain forensic information-sharing agreements within the DoD for those forensic disciplines for which the Secretary of the Army is the DoD EA.
+
+i.  Establish and maintain a defense forensics information-sharing capability to support the forensic disciplines within the DFE for which the Secretary of the Army is the DoD EA.  This capability will be hosted on the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) and compliant with Federal and DoD CIO policies and guidance.
+
+11.  SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE.  The Secretary of the Air Force, in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall serve as the DoD EA for D/MM Forensics and in that capacity shall:
+a.  Execute DoD EA responsibilities in accordance with applicable law, Reference (c), and this Directive.
+
+
+b.  Coordinate with the Heads of the DoD Components to:
+
+(1)  Execute the responsibilities and activities assigned in this Directive.
+
+
+
+(2)  Program for and budget sufficient resources to support common forensic requirements for those disciplines for which the Secretary of the Air Force is the DoD EA.
+
+
+(3)  Establish appropriate standards, processes, and procedures for the forensic disciplines for which the Secretary of the Air Force is the DoD EA.
+
+
+(4)  Establish and maintain training, professional certification, and RDT&E programs for the forensic disciplines for which the Secretary of the Air Force is the DoD EA.
+
+
+
+(5)  Develop and maintain the DFE architecture pursuant to Reference (p) for the forensic disciplines for which the Secretary of the Air Force is the DoD EA.
+
+c.  Coordinate with the Director, DIA, on forensic activities and programs that may affect intelligence-related authorities and missions.
+
+d.  Designate a Center of Excellence to promote collaboration and the application of best practices for those forensics disciplines for which the Secretary of the Air Force is the EA and ensure they:
+
+
+(1)  Develop appropriate standards, processes, and procedures.
+
+
+(2)  Develop and maintain examiner training and professional certification, and laboratory accreditation.
+
+
+(3)  Provide integration of joint operational RDT&E of new forensics capabilities to the DoD Components in support of the JFC.
+
+e.  Develop and maintain continuity of operations and disaster recovery plans for forensicrelated missions and capabilities for which the Secretary of the Air Force is the DoD EA.
+
+f.  Establish and maintain DoD authoritative data repositories and/or develop guidelines to interface with existing authoritative data repositories for those forensic disciplines for which the Secretary of the Air Force is the DoD EA.  Ensure data within these repositories is accessible to strategic, operational, and tactical users across security domains.
+
+
+
+g.  Provide forensic support to the DOJ in support of DoD responsibilities pursuant to Reference (wv).
+
+h.  Establish and maintain forensics information-sharing agreements within DoD for those forensic disciplines for which the Secretary of the Air Force is the DoD EA.
+
+
+
+i.  Establish and maintain a defense forensics information-sharing capability to support D/MM forensics within the DFE.  This capability shall be hosted on the DISN and compliant with Federal and DoD CIO policies and guidance.
+
+
+j.  Support DoD responsibilities pursuant to National Security Presidential Directive 54/
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive 23 (Reference (xw)). 12.  CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF.  The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Review and assess the adequacy of forensic acquisition programs and budgets to support joint objectives and operational plans and ensure the integration of forensics into strategic and operational plans and training as applicable.
+
+b.  Coordinate Combatant Commanders' requirements and arrangements associated with such requirements to the DoD EAs for Forensics or D/MM Forensics, as appropriate, in order to support and facilitate national military objectives across the ROMO.
+
+c.  Develop operational joint doctrine related to forensic capabilities.
+
+
+d.  Validate joint requirements for forensics capabilities for the joint force.
+e.  Coordinate theater-specific requirements for forensic capabilities.
+
+f.  Represent the forensics program interest of the Combatant Commanders.
+
+g.  Coordinate with the Forensics EXCOM and the DoD EAs for Forensics or D/MM
+Forensics as appropriate to ensure the forensics capability supports National Military Strategy and Combatant Commander requirements.
+
+13.  COMMANDERS OF THE COMBATANT COMMANDS.  The Commanders of the Combatant Commands, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Identify, validate, and prioritize theater-specific requirements related to the DFE and submit them to the Joint Staff for coordination.
+
+b.  Integrate appropriate aspects of the DFE into plans, policies, and joint force headquarters training and exercises.
+
+c.  Provide DFE lessons learned to the Joint Staff.
+
+14.  DIRECTOR, JIEDDO.  The Director, JIEDDO, in addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  In coordination with the DoD EAs for Forensics and D/MM Forensics, accept into the Joint IED Capability Approval and Acquisition Management Process for resourcing consideration Counter IED related forensics requirements that are:
+
+(1)  Urgent, emerging, or surge capabilities beyond the Services' abilities to respond to Combatant Command requirements.
+
+
+(2)  Strategic requirements consistent with the policy and programmatic priorities established by the Forensic EXCOM.
+
+
+b.  Coordinate with the Director, DIA, for the application of forensics to WTI when these standards, processes, and procedures pertain to the exploitation of IEDs and their components, in accordance with Reference (t).
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+
+DFE
+DoD Forensics Enterprise
+DIA
+Defense Intelligence Agency
+DISA
+Defense Information System Agency
+DISN
+Defense Information Systems Network
+D/MM
+digital and multimedia
+DNA
+deoxyribonucleic acid
+DoD CIO
+DoD Chief Information Officer
+DODD
+DoD Directive
+DODI
+DoD Instruction
+DODM
+DoD Manual
+DOJ
+Department of Justice
+
+
+EA
+Executive Agent
+EXCOM
+Executive Committee
+
+
+IED
+improvised explosive device
+IG DoD
+Inspector General of the Department of Defense
+
+
+JFC
+joint force commander
+JIEDDO
+Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
+
+
+PSA
+Principal Staff Assistant
+
+
+RDT&E
+research, development, test, and evaluation
+ROMO
+range of military operations
+
+
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USD(AT&L)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+USD(I)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+| USD(P)    | Under Secretary of Defense for Policy                  |
+|-----------|--------------------------------------------------------|
+|           |                                                        |
+| USD(P&R)  | Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness |
+| USG       | United States Government                               |
+|           |                                                        |
+| WTI       | weapons technical intelligence                         |
+|           |                                                        |
+|           |                                                        |
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Directive.
+
+authoritative data repository.  The primary DoD-approved repository of information. business operations.  The policies, processes, information, and systems related to the end-to-end financial, logistical, facility management, human capital, acquisition, administrative, and other such functions of the DoD that support the warfighter. DFE.  The DoD resources, assets, and processes required to provide forensic capabilities in support of DoD operations. D/MM forensics.  The application of computer science and investigative procedures involving the examination of D/MM material.  D/MM forensics is derived from a combination of definitions as it applies across the spectrum of computer forensics, audio forensics, image analysis, and video analysis.
+
+computer and electronic device forensics.  A sub-discipline of D/MM forensics that involves the scientific examination, analysis, and/or evaluation of digital and electronic materials.
+
+audio forensics.  A sub-discipline of D/MM forensics that involves the scientific examination, analysis, comparison, and/or evaluation of audio.
+
+image analysis.  A sub-discipline of D/MM forensics that involves the application of image science and domain expertise to examine and interpret the content of an image and/or the image itself.
+
+video analysis.  A sub-discipline of D/MM forensics that involves the scientific examination, comparison, and/or evaluation of video. forensic science (often shortened to forensics).  The application of multidisciplinary scientific processes to establish facts. multimedia.  The use of different formats for presenting information to convey information and content that utilizes a combination of different content forms.  The term can be used as a noun (a medium with multiple content forms) or as an adjective describing a medium as having multiple content forms.  The term is used in contrast to media that only utilize traditional forms of printed or hand-produced material.  Multimedia includes a combination of text, audio, still images, animation, video, and interactivity content forms, often packaged on compact disk-read only memory with links to the Internet.
+
+
+questioned documents.  Documents that undergo a forensic document examination to include the analysis and comparison of questioned handwriting, hand printing, typewriting, commercial printing, photocopies, papers, inks, and other documentary items with known material in order to establish the authenticity of the contested material as well as the detection of alterations. ROMO.  The spectrum of operations in which the future joint force is expected to engage. U.S.-based forensics laboratories.  Those DoD laboratories based in the United States that perform forensic analysis to support the Department's full range of military operations.  These labs include:
+U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Laboratory Defense Forensic Science Center
+
+
+Defense Computer Forensics Laboratory
+
+Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory Medical Examiner System
+
+Joint *Defense* POW/MIA Accounting Command *Agency* Central Identification Laboratory
+laboratories WTI.  A category of intelligence derived from the forensic and technical collection and exploitation of IEDs, associated components, improvised weapons, and other weapon systems.

markdown/dod/d8521_01e.md

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+## Department Of Defense Directive
+
+#
+
+
+NUMBER 8521.01E
+January 13, 2016
+Incorporating Change 1, August 15, 2017
+
+USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: DoD Biometrics
+
+References: See Enclosure 1 1.  PURPOSE.  This directive:
+a.  Reissues DoD Directive (DoDD) 8521.01E (Reference (a)) to establish policy and assign responsibilities for DoD biometrics.
+
+b.  Designates the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+(USD(AT&L)) as the Biometrics Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) responsible for oversight of DoD biometric activities and policy.
+
+c.  Designates the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for Biometrics in accordance with Public Law 106-246 (Reference (b)) and DoDD 5101.1 (Reference (c)). 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This directive:
+a.  Applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this directive as the "DoD
+Components"). b.  Does not apply to physical evidence or other biometric material collected either pursuant to a criminal investigation or as directed by DoD Instruction 5505.14 (Reference (d)).
+
+3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  The DoD Biometrics Enterprise provide a critical end-to-end capability through a defined operations or intelligence cycle to support tactical and operational decision-making across the full range of military operations for DoD warfighting, intelligence, law enforcement, security, force protection, homeland defense, counterterrorism, business, and information environment mission areas (referred to in this directive as "DoD mission areas").
+
+b.  DoD biometric programs be designed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of identity activities and to eliminate unwarranted duplication of technology development and information management efforts.
+
+c.  Biometric collections are encouraged during all military operations and military intelligence activities where legal and appropriate.
+
+d.  The maintenance, collection, use, and dissemination of biometric data, which includes the transmission, storage, caching, tagging, analysis, production, and use of biometric data adhere to applicable laws, policies, standards, and protocols, including but not limited to DoDD 5400.11
+(Reference (e)), to support data sharing and interoperability.
+
+e.  The DoD biometric and intelligence enterprises are to be integrated and interoperable through the use of identity intelligence capabilities, including biometric enabled intelligence
+(BEI), to the fullest extent possible to enable DoD and mission partners' operations.
+
+f.  Biometric, biographic, behavioral, and contextual data collected and maintained by DoD
+Components, as well as resulting BEI products, are to be considered DoD data, protected from unauthorized release, and shared in accordance with applicable data sharing and disclosure policy under appropriate authorities, arrangements, and agreements.  Foreign-collected identity information that is shared with the DoD is to be withheld from public disclosure to avoid the adverse effects such a release would have on the DoD's ability to obtain the same or similar information in the future.
+
+g.  The DoD maintain authoritative biometric data repositories to conduct match, store, and share functions for the DoD mission areas of:
+
+(1)  Individuals whose biometric data were collected as a part of national security-related operations, including bulk collections from interagency or foreign partner repositories; or (2)  Individuals affiliated with or seeking to be affiliated with the DoD whose biometric data were obtained for a legitimate, authorized, and DoD purpose in accordance with applicable law, regulation, and policy.
+
+h.  Biometric, biographic, behavioral, and contextual data collected and maintained by DoD
+Components and BEI are to be unclassified or classified at the lowest appropriate level consistent with standard criteria for security classification and in accordance with applicable security classification guidance to support interagency and international data accessibility.
+
+i.  The DoD develop and maintain continuity of operations and disaster recovery plans for vital biometric capabilities.
+
+
+j.  The DoD make available to other U.S. Government agencies all biometric and associated biographic and contextual data collected during the course of military operations to support national security screening and vetting activities to the fullest extent permitted by law.
+
+
+k.  The DoD comply with National Security Presidential Directive-59/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-24 (Reference (f)) and the Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security Action Plan (Reference (g)).
+
+4.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 5.  INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.  The DoD Biometrics Enterprise Results, referred to in paragraph 11g of Enclosure 2, does not require licensing with a report control symbol in accordance with paragraph 1b(16) of Volume 1 of DoD Manual 8910.01
+(Reference (h)).
+
+6.  RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release**.  This directive is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. the Directives Division Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. 7.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This directive is effective January 13, 2016.
+
+Robert O. Work
+
+Deputy Secretary of Defense
+
+
+Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Directive 8521.01E, "Department of Defense Biometrics," February 21, 2008 (hereby
+cancelled)
+(b) Section 112 of the Emergency Supplemental Act, 2000, Division B of Public Law 106-246,
+July 13, 2000
+(c) DoD Directive 5101.1, "DoD Executive Agent," September 3, 2002, as amended
+(d) DoD Instruction 5505.14, "Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Collection Requirements for
+Criminal Investigations, *Law Enforcement, Corrections, and Commanders,*" December 22,
+2015, as amended
+(e) DoD Directive 5400.11, "DoD Privacy Program," October 29, 2014
+(f)
+National Security Presidential Directive59/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-24,
+"Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security," June 5, 2008
+(g) Office of the Attorney General of the United States, "Biometrics for Identification and
+Screening to Enhance National Security: Action Plan," November 20081
+(h) DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections:  Procedures for DoD
+Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014
+(i)
+DoD Directive 5530.3, "International Agreements," June 11, 1987, as amended
+(j)
+Title 10, United States Code
+(k) DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," March 18, 2008 (l)
+DoD Instruction O-3300.04, "Defense Biometric Enabled Intelligence (BEI) and Forensic
+Enabled Intelligence (FEI)," May 25, 2012
+(m) Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6, "Integration and Use of Screening Information
+to Protect against Terrorism," September 16, 2003
+(n) Homeland Security Presidential Directive-11, "Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening
+Procedures," August 27, 2004
+(om) DoD Directive *Instruction* 1000.25, "DoD Personnel Identity Protection (PIP) Program,"
+July 19, 2004 March 2, 2016
+(p) DoD Instruction 1000.13, "Identification (ID) Cards for Members of the Uniformed
+Services, Their Dependents, and Other Eligible Individuals," January 23, 2014
+(q) DoD Manual 1000.13, Volume 1, "DoD Identification (ID) Cards:  ID Card Life-Cycle,"
+January 23, 2014
+(rn) DoD Directive 5200.27, "Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and
+Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense," January 7, 1980
+(so) United States Army, "DoD Capstone Concept of Operations for Employing Biometrics in
+Military Operations," June 10, 2012
+(tp) Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Intelligence," current edition
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  USD(AT&L).  In his or her capacity as the Biometrics PSA, the USD(AT&L):
+a.  Oversees and, as required, directs the activities of the DoD Biometrics Enterprise and the DoD EA for Biometrics, in accordance with Reference (c).
+
+b.  Facilitates the development and implementation of policy for DoD biometrics in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), and the DoD EA for Biometrics.
+
+
+
+c.  Serves as the primary DoD point of contact for other U.S. Government agencies and international entities on all biometric-related activities unless specified in this directive, DoD policy, or applicable law.
+
+d.  Appoints an official to chair the DoD Biometrics Executive Committee (EXCOM). 2.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION.  The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition manages the alignment and compliance of biometric-related acquisitions with DoD Biometrics Enterprise objectives and policies. 3.  USD(P).  The USD(P):
+a.  Develops and oversees the implementation of policy for DoD biometrics in coordination with the USD(AT&L), the USD(I), and the DoD EA for Biometrics.
+
+
+b.  Approves biometric sharing arrangements and agreements for areas under the authority of the USD(P), and as appropriate, coordinates these arrangements and agreements with other U.S. Government agencies and international entities in accordance with DoDD 5530.3 (Reference (i)).
+
+c.  Determines whether foreign-collected identity information is eligible for exemption in accordance with section 130c of Title 10, United States Code (Reference (j)) in coordination with the USD(I).
+
+4.  USD(I).  The USD(I):
+a.  Oversees DoD Component BEI policy, activities, and programs that support identity activities for the DoD mission areas and the DoD Biometrics Enterprise.
+
+
+
+b.  Establishes standard criteria for security classification of certain biometric data and other biometric-related information.
+
+c.  Coordinates with the Biometrics PSA on intelligence, to include BEI programs, activities, and agreements that may affect biometric-related authorities and missions.
+
+d.  Oversees the integration of biometrics and BEI into the DoD intelligence, counterintelligence, and defense security enterprises in coordination with the Director of National Intelligence.
+
+e.  Serves as the primary point of contact for other U.S. Government agencies and international entities on all BEI-related activities.
+
+
+
+5.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (DIA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I), the Director, DIA:
+a.  Serves as the DoD intelligence lead for biometric activities and programs in accordance with DoDD 5105.21 (Reference (k)) and DoD Instruction O-3300.04 (Reference (l)).
+
+b.  Facilitates delivery of BEI capabilities within the intelligence process to support a defined operations or intelligence cycle in coordination with the DoD intelligence components and the DoD EA for Biometrics.
+
+c.  Coordinates and synchronizes development and implementation of DoD biometric collection strategies for the DoD mission areas.
+
+d.  Develops, maintains, manages, and shares a DoD biometric enabled watchlist.
+
+
+
+e.  Helps the DoD Components implement Reference (f), Reference (g), HSPD-6 (Reference
+(m)), and HSPD-11 (Reference (n)). 6.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS.  The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness:
+a.  Merges biometrics into the policies and procedures under his or her purview.
+
+b.  Oversees and maintains the DoD authoritative biometric data repository for match, store, and share functions for individuals affiliated or seeking to be affiliated with the DoD.  This repository contains authoritative identity information for the issuance of identity credentials in accordance with DoDD *DoDI* 1000.25 (Reference (om)), DoD Instruction 1000.13 (Reference
+(p)), and Volume 1 of DoD Manual 1000.13 (Reference (q)).
+
+7.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER)/CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.  The Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense maintains the visibility of biometric-related funding. 8.  DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.  In his or her capacity as the DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Officer, the Deputy Chief Management Officer of the Department of Defense:
+a.  Ensures that the maintenance, use, collection, and dissemination of biometric information are conducted in accordance with Reference (e) and that DoD biometric policies and procedures also comply with DoDD 5200.27 (Reference (rn)).
+
+
+b.  Directs all privacy and civil liberties issues related to the maintenance, use, collection, and dissemination of biometric data be coordinated with the Directorate for Oversight and Compliance, Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Division in the Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer.
+
+9.  DOD COMPONENT HEADS, EXCEPT FOR THE CJCS.  The DoD Component heads, except for the CJCS:
+a.  Designate a general or flag officer or Senior Executive Service-equivalent individual to serve as a member on the DoD Biometrics EXCOM.
+
+b.  Notify and coordinate all biometric and BEI activities and acquisitions with the Biometrics PSA, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, the USD(I), the DoD EA for Biometrics, and the Director, DIA.
+
+c.  Plan, program, budget for, and field DoD Component-required and, where appropriate, joint and common biometric and BEI capabilities and institutional training requirements to support identity activities in accordance with Reference (j) and Major Force Program-11
+authorities.
+
+d.  Adhere to DoD-approved standards, protocols, and enterprise architectures.
+
+
+
+e.  Implement References (f), (g), (l), (m), and (n). 10.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, the Secretaries of the Military Departments ensure policy and guidance exist to maintain oversight of their Department's biometric and BEI capabilities.
+
+11.  SECRETARY OF THE ARMY.  In addition to the responsibilities in sections 9 and 10 of this enclosure, and in his or her capacity as the DoD EA for Biometrics, the Secretary of the Army:
+
+a.  Appoints a general or flag officer or Senior Executive Service official to serve as the focal point of the DoD Biometrics Enterprise to plan, program, and budget sufficient resources to execute the responsibilities of the DoD EA for Biometrics in accordance with Reference (c) and this directive.
+
+b.  Leads and executes common storage, matching, analysis, and sharing activities of the DoD Biometrics Enterprise for biometric data collected as a part of military operations.
+
+c.  Requires DoD Components' biometric products, systems, and services to adhere to applicable standards, protocols, and the DoD biometric authoritative enterprise reference architecture to support interoperability.
+
+d.  Leads requirements, architecture, and standards development for joint, common, and interagency biometric capabilities.
+
+e.  Acquires common biometric capabilities to support the operational requirements of the joint force commander.
+
+
+
+f.  Oversees and maintains the DoD's authoritative biometric data repository for match, store, and share functions for the DoD mission areas of individuals whose biometric data were collected as a part of operations and, subject to Reference (rn) and/or the approval by the Deputy Chief Management Office, individuals not affiliated with or seeking to be affiliated with the DoD.
+
+g.  Measures the health and performance of the DoD Biometrics Enterprise and generates results for the Biometrics PSA and the DoD Biometrics EXCOM.
+
+h.  Exchanges biometric data with appropriate DoD, interagency, State, tribal, local, and international partners in accordance with applicable law, regulation, policy, and data sharing arrangements and agreements.
+
+i.  Leads implementation of DoD military detainee national security threat activities, in coordination with the Director, DIA, and pursuant to Reference (g).
+
+j.  Acts as the DoD point of contact for execution of biometric-related activities or as directed and assigned by the Biometrics PSA.
+
+k.  Directs the execution of concluded biometric-related agreements with other U.S.
+
+Government agencies and international entities, and notifies the Biometrics PSA, the USD(P), and the USD(I) of the need for their initiation, modification, suspension, or cancellation.
+
+
+l.  Appoints an official to serve as a co-chair of the DoD Biometrics EXCOM. 12.  CJCS.  The CJCS coordinates and monitors fulfillment of validated joint requirements for biometrics and BEI, and appoints an official to serve as a co-chair of the DoD Biometrics EXCOM. 13.  COMBATANT COMMANDERS.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 9 of this enclosure, the Combatant Commanders identify biometric and BEI capability and policy gaps that inhibit achievement of operational objectives; develop and issue guidance on the use of biometrics and BEI within their areas of responsibility; and engage mission partners to employ biometric capabilities and share biometric data in support of identity activities in coordination with the USD(P), the USD(I), the Director, DIA, the CJCS, and the DoD EA for Biometrics.
+
+
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+BEI
+biometric enabled intelligence
+
+
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+
+
+DIA
+Defense Intelligence Agency
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+
+
+EA
+Executive Agent
+EXCOM
+Executive Committee
+
+
+HSPD
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive
+
+
+PSA
+Principal Staff Assistant
+
+
+USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+USD(I)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this directive.
+
+
+BEI.  Defined in Reference (l). biometric enabled watchlist.  Defined in Reference (l). biometric data.  Computer data created during a biometric process.  It encompasses raw sensor observations, biometric samples, models, templates, and/or similarity scores.  Biometric data is used to describe the information collected during an enrollment, verification, or identification process but the term does not apply to end user information such as user name, demographic information, or authorizations. biometrics.  The process of recognizing an individual based on measurable anatomical, physiological, or behavioral characteristics.
+
+collect.  Defined in Capstone Concept of Operations for Employing Biometrics in Military Operations (Reference (so)).
+
+contextual data.  Defined in Reference (so). DoD Biometrics Enterprise.  An entity comprised of DoD joint, Service, and agency operations, intelligence, law enforcement, and security organizations working together to integrate biometrics into the identity transactions needed to support military operations, activities, and departmental business functions. identity activities.  A collection of functions and actions that appropriately recognize and characterize an entity from another entity to support decision making.  Activities include the collection of identity attributes and captured materials, their processing and exploitation, allsource analytic efforts, and production and dissemination of identity intelligence products to inform policy and strategy development, operational planning and assessment, and appropriate action at the point of encounter. identity intelligence.  Defined in Joint Publication 2-0 (Reference (tp)). match.  Defined in Reference (so). military detainee national security threat.  Defined in Reference (g). share.  Defined in Reference (so). store.  Defined in Reference (so).

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction Number 1000.01 Number 1000.01
+
+April 16, 2012 April 16, 2012
+
+##
+
+USD(P&R) USD(P&R) SUBJECT: Identification (ID) Cards Required by the Geneva Conventions SUBJECT: Identification (ID) Cards Required by the Geneva Conventions References: See Enclosure 1 References: See Enclosure 1 1.  PURPOSE
+1.  PURPOSE.  In accordance with the authority in DoD Directives 5124.02 and 1000.25
+(References (a) and (b)), this Instruction:
+a.  Reissues DoD Instruction (DoDI) 1000.1 (Reference (c)) to establish policy, assign responsibilities, and provide procedures for DoD ID cards issued to meet certain requirements of the Geneva Conventions.
+
+b.  Lists certain requirements for DoD ID cards stipulated by the Geneva Conventions
+(References (d) through (f)).
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Instruction applies to:
+a.  OSD, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
+
+b.  The Commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS), under agreement with the Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), under agreement with the Department of Commerce.
+
+3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+
+a.  DoD ID cards shall serve as the Geneva Conventions card for eligible personnel and shall be issued in accordance with Directive-Type Memorandum 08-003 (Reference (g)).
+
+
+b.  The DoD ID number shall replace the Social Security Number (SSN) and serve as the Geneva Conventions serial number on ID cards issued to eligible personnel that no longer display an SSN.
+
+
+c.  DoD ID cards shall be issued for purposes associated with this Instruction and Reference
+(g) and shall not be issued solely to facilitate travel overseas, base and installation access, and other DoD business processes.
+
+4.  RESPONSIBILITIES
+a.  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)).  The USD(P&R)
+shall oversee implementation of the procedures within this Instruction.
+
+
+
+b.  Heads of the DoD Components; Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; Director, USPHS; and Director, NOAA.  The Heads of the DoD Components; Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; Director, USPHS; and Director, NOAA, shall implement the procedures prescribed in this Instruction and ensure that their supplemental guidance and procedures are in accordance with this Instruction and Reference (g).
+
+5.  PROCEDURES.  See Enclosure 2.
+
+6.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED.  This Instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+
+7.  EFFECTIVE DATE
+
+a.  This Instruction is effective upon its publication to the DoD Issuances Website. b.  If this Instruction is not otherwise reissued or cancelled in accordance with DoD
+Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (h)), it will expire effective April 16, 2022 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website. Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Procedures Glossary
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+ ENCLOSURE 1:  REFERENCES ........4 ENCLOSURE 2:  PROCEDURES ........5
+CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF PERSONS PROTECTED BY THE GENEVA
+CONVENTIONS ........5
+
+ID CARD REQUIREMENTS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS ........5
+
+ISSUANCE AND USE OF DOD ID CARDS ........6
+
+MILITARY-CIVILIAN GRADE RELATIONSHIPS ........9
+
+
+APPENDIX
+MILITARY-CIVILIAN GRADE RELATIONSHIPS FOR GENEVA
+CONVENTIONS IDENTIFICATION PURPOSES ........10
+
+
+GLOSSARY ........15
+
+ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ........15 TABLES
+1.  Uniformed Services Geneva Convention Categories and Grades for Prisoner of War
+Identification ........12
+
+2.  Civilian Geneva Convention Categories and Equivalent Grades for Prisoner of War
+Identification ........14
+
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Directive 5124.02, "Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+(USD(P&R))," June 23, 2008
+
+(b) DoD Directive 1000.25, "DoD Personnel Identity Protection (PIP) Program," July 19, 2004 (c) DoD Instruction 1000.1, "Identity Cards Required by the Geneva Conventions,"
+January 30, 1974 (hereby cancelled)
+(d) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
+Armed Forces in the Field of August 12, 19491
+(e) Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
+Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 19491
+(f)
+Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 19491
+(g) Directive-Type Memorandum 08-003, "Next Generation Common Access Card (CAC)
+Implementation Guidance," December 1, 2008
+(h) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," October 28, 2007 (i)
+DoD Directive 1404.10, "DoD Civilian Expeditionary Workforce," January 23, 2009
+(j)
+DoD Instruction 3020.41, "Operational Contract Support (OCS)," December 20, 2011
+(k) DoD Instruction 1330.13, "Armed Forces Entertainment Program," March 23, 2004
+
+## Enclosure 2 Procedures
+
+ 1.  CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF PERSONS PROTECTED BY THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
+a.  Prisoners of war (POWs), including members of the uniformed Service and civilian personnel authorized to accompany the armed forces who have fallen into the power of the enemy, are protected by the Geneva Conventions in accordance with Article 4 of Reference (f).
+
+b.  Medical personnel exclusively engaged in the search for, or the collection, transport, or treatment of the wounded or sick, or in the prevention of disease, staff exclusively engaged in the administration of medical units and establishments, and chaplains attached to the armed forces are protected by the Geneva Conventions in accordance with Article 24 of Reference (d) and with Article 33 of Reference (f).
+
+c.  Medical auxiliary personnel specially trained for employment, should the need arise, as hospital orderlies, nurses, or auxiliary stretcher-bearers in the search for or the collection, transport, or treatment of the wounded and sick, are protected by the Geneva Conventions in accordance with Article 25 of Reference (d).
+
+d.  Religious, medical, and hospital personnel of hospital ships and their crews are protected by the Geneva Conventions in accordance with Article 36 of Reference (e).
+
+e.  Religious, medical, and hospital personnel assigned to the medical or spiritual care of Service members and other persons who are at sea and who are wounded, sick, or shipwrecked (including forced landings at sea by or from aircraft) are protected by the Geneva Conventions in accordance with Article 37 of Reference (e).
+
+f.  The staff of the National Red Cross Societies and that of other voluntary aid societies, duly recognized and authorized by their governments, who may be employed on the same duties as the personnel named in Article 24 of Reference (d), are protected by the Geneva Conventions in accordance with Article 26 of Reference (d).
+
+2.  ID CARD REQUIREMENTS OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS.  In order that the personnel referred to in section 1 of this enclosure may benefit from the status accorded them pursuant to References (d) through (f), including, but not limited to, being eligible for repatriation, each party to a conflict must furnish certain persons under its jurisdiction with an ID card.
+
+a.  Article 17 of Reference (f) provides the requirements for ID cards for persons who are liable to become prisoners of war.  These requirements state:
+(1)  The ID card shall show the owner's surname, first names, rank, armed force, regimental, personal, or serial number or equivalent information, and date of birth.
+
+(2)  The ID card may bear the signature, fingerprints, or both of the owner, and may also bear any other information the party to the conflict may wish to add concerning persons belonging to its armed forces. (3)  As far as possible, the ID card shall measure 6.5 x 10 cm. and shall be issued in duplicate. (4)  The ID card shall be shown by the POW upon demand, but shall in no case be taken from the POW.
+
+
+b.  Article 40 of Reference (d) and Article 42 of Reference (e) provide identical requirements for ID cards for medical, religious, and auxiliary medical personnel, including:
+(1) The ID card shall bear the distinctive red emblem (e.g., red cross, red crescent). (2)  The ID card shall be water-resistant, of such size that it can be carried in the pocket, and worded in the national language. (3)  The ID card shall mention, at minimum, the surname and first names, the date of birth, the rank, and the service number of the bearer, and shall state in what capacity the bearer is entitled to the protection of the present convention. (4)  The ID card shall bear the owner's photograph and either a signature, fingerprints, or both. (5)  ID cards shall be embossed with the stamp of the military authority and shall be uniform throughout the armed forces. (6)  ID cards will be made out, if possible, at least in duplicate, one copy being kept by the home country.  In no circumstances may personnel be deprived of their ID cards and, in case of loss, they shall be entitled to receive duplicates of the ID cards.
+
+3.  ISSUANCE AND USE OF DoD ID CARDS.  DoD ID cards shall be issued to uniformed Service members and eligible civilian personnel in order to meet the ID requirements of the Geneva Conventions listed in section 2 of this enclosure.
+
+a.  Requirements for Geneva Conventions ID Cards for Military Personnel
+
+(1)  A DoD ID card shall be issued to all uniformed Service members on active duty.
+This card shall meet all the requirements of and will therefore serve as ID for the purposes of Article 17 of Reference (f).
+
+
+
+(2)  A DoD ID card shall be issued to Reserve Components members.  This card shall meet all the requirements of and will therefore serve as ID for the purposes of Article 17 of Reference (f), for Reservists on active duty for periods of less than 30 days.
+
+
+
+(3)  The duplicate ID card requirements of Article 17 of Reference (f), to facilitate identification of POWs with the Prisoner of War Information Bureau as delineated in Article 122
+of Reference (f), are more adequately met by the information routinely maintained in the Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System (DEERS).  Accordingly, duplicate ID cards will not be required.
+
+
+(4)  In the event of his or her capture as a POW, the Service member's ID card shall be shown to the capturing authorities, but in accordance with Article 17 of Reference (f), it shall in no case be taken from the POW.
+
+
+
+(5)  The requirements of Article 17 of Reference (f) for the ID card to contain unique identifying information (e.g., photograph and fingerprints or signature) shall be implemented in accordance with References (b) and (g).  The unique characteristics shall be maintained in DEERS and shall include, but are not limited to, digital photographs and fingerprints.
+
+b.  Requirements for Geneva Conventions ID Cards for Civilians Authorized to Accompany the Armed Forces
+
+(1)  A DoD ID card shall be issued to all civilian DoD employees officially designated as emergency essential as defined in DoDD 1404.10 (Reference (i)) and to DoD Component contractors authorized to accompany the U.S. armed forces pursuant to DoDI 3020.41
+(Reference (j)).  This ID card may be issued to such individuals departing the continental United States (CONUS) to serve elsewhere.
+
+
+(2)  A DoD ID card shall be issued to other categories of civilian personnel who have been authorized to accompany the U.S. armed forces and who are at risk of capture and detention by the enemy as POWs.  This ID card may be issued to such individuals departing CONUS to serve elsewhere.
+
+
+(3)  For civilian personnel authorized to accompany U.S. armed forces, the requirement for a duplicate ID card in Article 17 of Reference (f) to facilitate identification of POWs with the Prisoner of War Information Bureau as delineated in Article 122 of Reference (f), is more adequately met by the information routinely maintained in DEERS.  Accordingly, duplicate ID cards will not be prepared.
+
+
+(4)  In the event of his or her capture as a POW, the civilian's ID card shall be shown to the capturing authorities, but in accordance with Article 17 of Reference (f), it shall in no case be taken from the POW.
+
+
+(5)  The requirements of Article 17 of Reference (f) for the ID card to contain unique identifying information shall be implemented in accordance with References (b) and (g).  The unique characteristics shall be maintained in DEERS and shall include, but are not limited to, digital photographs and fingerprints.
+
+c.  Requirements for Geneva Conventions ID Cards for Medical and Religious Personnel and Auxiliary Medical Personnel
+
+(1)  A DoD ID card shall be issued to medical, religious, and auxiliary medical personnel described in section 1 of this enclosure by their DoD Component.
+
+
+
+(a)  In the case of military medical and religious personnel, the DoD ID card issued in accordance with paragraph 3.a. of this enclosure shall be used to meet the requirements of Article 40 of Reference (d) and Article 42 of Reference (e).  A duplicate card need not be issued, since documentation of their status is readily available in DEERS.
+
+
+
+(b)  In the case of civilian medical and religious personnel, this card shall be issued if the individual is not already eligible for a DoD ID card in accordance with paragraph 3.b. of this enclosure.  If eligible:
+1.  The DoD ID card issued in accordance with paragraph 3.b. of this enclosure shall be used to meet the requirements of Article 40 of Reference (d) and Article 42 of Reference (e).
+
+2.  A duplicate card need not be issued since documentation of their status is readily available in DEERS and will be provided to the voluntary aid society to which the individual belongs.
+
+
+
+(c)  In the case of military auxiliary medical personnel, a duplicate card need not be issued since the additional role, and subsequent withdrawal after the assignment is terminated, is managed in DEERS.
+
+
+
+(d)  The requirements of Article 17 of Reference (e) for the ID card to contain unique identifying information shall be implemented in accordance with References (b) and (g).  The unique characteristics shall be maintained in DEERS and shall include, but are not limited to, digital photographs and fingerprints.
+
+
+(2)  The DoD ID card shall distinguish the affiliation and role of the card holder.
+
+
+
+(a)  DoD ID cards for military medical and religious personnel shall distinguish the parent Service of the card holder and medical or religious role (e.g., "U.S. Navy Medical," "U.S.
+
+Air Force Chaplain").
+
+
+
+(b)  DoD ID cards for military auxiliary medical personnel shall distinguish the parent Service of the card holder and "Medical Auxiliary" as the role.  This applies to personnel specially trained for employment, should the need arise, as trained hospital orderlies, trained ambulance drivers, etc.
+
+
+
+(c)  DoD ID cards for civilian medical and religious personnel shall include the name of the voluntary aid society recognized and authorized by the United States and the role of the card holder (e.g., "American Red Cross Medical").
+
+
+
+(3)  The ID card shall contain the distinctive red emblem in accordance with Article 40 of Reference (d) and Article 42 of Reference (e). 4.  MILITARY-CIVILIAN GRADE RELATIONSHIPS.  Military-civilian equivalent grade relationships have been developed to conform with the rank categories prescribed in Article 60 of Reference (f), for monthly advances of pay to POWs, and to facilitate treatment of POWs with due regard to rank in accordance with Article 43 of Reference (f).  These relationships are based largely upon congressional action in establishing grade and compensation for military and civilian employees.
+
+a.  The rank equivalencies set forth in the Appendix to this enclosure will be used throughout the DoD for POW identification purposes.  The assignment of excessively high rank equivalence shall be avoided.
+
+(1)  With the exception of contractors, the equivalent rank for all categories of civilian personnel shall be printed on the ID card when it can be established via an authoritative data source, such as a letter or data feed from the sponsoring organization. (2)  When an equivalent rank cannot be established by an authoritative data source, the rank of "Other" shall be printed on the card and a Geneva Convention Category of III or IV shall be assigned as shown in column 8 of Table 2 of the Appendix. (3)  For contractors, the rank of "Other" shall always be printed on the card, and a Geneva Convention Category of III or IV shall be assigned as shown in column 8 of Table 2 of the Appendix.
+
+
+b.  The rank equivalencies do not convey to civilian personnel rank or authority over military personnel.  It is not the intent of this Instruction to require the use of those grade relationships for any other purpose; however, the table was coordinated with similar tables for precedence, housing entitlement, and other purposes to seek consistency to the extent possible.
+
+## Appendix To Enclosure 2 Military-Civilian Grade Relationships For Geneva Conventions Identification Purposes
+
+ Table 1 provides the list of Geneva Conventions categories for uniformed Service personnel. Civilians authorized by a DoD Component to accompany the U.S. armed forces will be placed in categories listed in Table 2 in accordance with the guidelines in paragraphs a. through i. of this appendix.  The assignment of excessively high Geneva Convention category and rank equivalence shall be avoided.
+
+a.  Federal Employees.  Experts, consultants, and other special categories of personnel directly employed by the Federal Government will be assigned by the sponsoring DoD
+Component to an appropriate Geneva Convention Category, normally in the range of categories I through IV, based on a salary or grade comparison with civilian employees listed in columns 4,
+5, and 6 of Table 2.
+
+b.  Foreign Service Personnel.  Personnel in the Foreign Service will be assigned by the sponsoring DoD Component to the appropriate category based on direct salary comparisons with the General Schedule (GS) classification listed in column 3 of Table 2.
+
+c.  Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Employees.  NAF employees will be assigned by the DoD
+Component concerned to the category based upon their GS equivalent, NAF, Army and Air Force Exchange Service salary, wage, or hourly classification.  Those not so classified will be assigned to an appropriate equivalent, normally in the range of categories I through IV, based on a grade comparison with civilian employees listed in columns 3 through 6 of Table 2.
+
+d.  Contractors and Other Non-Federal Employees.  Advisors, observers, contractor representatives and employees, representatives of religious organizations, and similar categories of non-Federal personnel will be assigned by the DoD Component concerned to an appropriate category, normally in the range of categories III through IV, based upon the individual's standing in his or her profession or line of work and the difficulty and responsibility of the duties to be performed (e.g., supervisory or non-supervisory).
+
+e.  Service Organization Employees.  Employees of service organizations, such as the United Service Organizations (USO) and Salvation Army, will be assigned by the DoD Component concerned to an appropriate category, normally in the range of categories III and IV, as shown in column 9 of Table 2, based on a salary or grade comparison with civilian employees listed in columns 3 through 6 of the Table 2.
+
+f.  Professional Entertainers.  Professional entertainers will be assigned to the appropriate category by the Department of the Army, acting for the DoD in accordance with DoDI 1330.13 (Reference (k)).  Rank equivalency normally will be determined from column 8 of Table 2 with the recommendation of the USO, based upon the professional standing of the individual in the entertainment field.
+
+
+g.  American Red Cross (ARC) Personnel.  ARC personnel serving with the U.S. armed forces, including those in the medical and religious personnel category, will be assigned to the category corresponding to the comparable GS grade authorized for travel or housing purposes, as shown in column 7 of Table 2, by the major overseas military commander within whose jurisdiction they are permanently assigned.  The Department of the Army will act for the DoD in sponsoring staff members designated by American Red Cross Headquarters.
+
+
+h.  News Media Representatives.  Accredited news media representatives will be assigned Geneva Conventions Category IV without determination of specific rank equivalency.
+
+
+i.  Local Hires.  Persons locally hired in foreign areas may be assigned to categories determined by the military commanders concerned.  Categories in the range of I through IV are normally considered appropriate.
+
+
+
+##
+
+| Category                |   Grade  | Army    | Navy, USCG, NOAA    | Air Force    | Marine Corps    | PHS    |
+|-------------------------|----------|---------|---------------------|--------------|-----------------|--------|
+| 1                       |       2  | 3A      | 3B                  | 3C           | 3D              | 3D     |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| O-10                    |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| General                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Admiral                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| General                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| General                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Assistant Secretary     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| V                       |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| O-9                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Lieutenant General      |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Vice Admiral            |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Lieutenant General      |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Lieutenant General      |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Surgeon General         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| O-8                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Major General           |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Rear Admiral (upper     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| half)                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Major General           |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Major General           |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Deputy Surgeon General  |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| / Asst. Surgeon General |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| O-7                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Brigadier General       |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Rear Admiral (lower     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| half)                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Brigadier General       |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Brigadier General       |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| O-6                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Colonel                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Captain                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Colonel                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Colonel                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Medical Director        |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| IV                      |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| O-5                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Lieutenant Colonel      |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Commander               |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Lieutenant Colonel      |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Lieutenant Colonel      |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Senior Surgeon          |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| O-4                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Major                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Lieutenant Commander    |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Major                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Major                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Surgeon                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| O-3                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Captain                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Lieutenant              |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Captain                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Captain                 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Senior Asst. Surgeon    |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| O-2                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| First Lieutenant        |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Lieutenant Junior Grade |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| First Lieutenant        |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| First Lieutenant        |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Asst. Surgeon           |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| III                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| O-1                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Second Lieutenant       |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Ensign                  |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Second Lieutenant       |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Second Lieutenant       |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Jr. Asst. Surgeon       |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| W-5                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 5 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 5 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 5 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| W-4                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 4 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 4 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 4 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| W-3                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 3 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 3 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 3 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| W-2                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 2 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 2 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Chief Warrant Officer 2 |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| W-1                     |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Warrant Officer         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Warrant Officer         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| Warrant Officer         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+| - - -                   |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+|                         |          |         |                     |              |                 |        |
+
+
+Category
+Grade
+Army
+Navy, USCG, NOAA
+Air Force
+Marine Corps
+PHS
+1
+2
+3A
+3B
+3C
+3D
+3D
+
+E-9
+Sergeant Major of the Army, Command Sergeant of the Army, Sergeant Major
+Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy, Master Chief Petty Officer
+Chief Master Sergeant of the Air Force, Command Chief Master Sergeant, Chief Master Sergeant
+Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps, Sergeant Major, Master Gunnery Sergeant
+- - -
+
+
+II
+
+
+E-8
+First Sergeant, Master Sergeant
+Senior Chief Petty Officer
+Senior Master Sergeant
+First Sergeant, Master Sergeant
+- - -
+
+
+E-7
+Platoon Sergeant, Sergeant First Class
+Chief Petty Officer
+Master Sergeant
+Gunnery Sergeant
+- - -
+
+
+E-6
+Staff Sergeant
+Petty Officer First Class
+Technical Sergeant
+Staff Sergeant
+- - -
+
+
+E-5
+Sergeant
+Petty Officer Second Class
+Staff Sergeant
+Sergeant
+- - -
+
+E-4
+Corporal, Specialist
+Petty Officer Third Class
+Senior Airman
+Corporal
+- - -
+
+
+I
+
+
+- - -
+
+E-3
+Private First Class
+Seaman
+Airman First Class
+Lance Corporal
+
+
+- - -
+
+E-2
+Private
+Seaman Apprentice
+Airman
+Private First Class
+
+
+- - -
+E-1
+Private (no insignia)
+Seaman Recruit
+Airman Basic
+Private (no insignia)
+
+
+Civilian Grade Groups
+
+
+Contractors
+and Other Non-Federal Civilians
+Geneva Convention
+Grade
+Equiv.
+
+
+SES/GS
+or
+equivalent
+Federal Wage
+Teaching
+Positions
+NAF Pay
+Category
+ARC
+USO
+System
+Band
+1
+2
+3
+4
+5
+6
+7
+8
+9
+V
+O-10,O-9
+-  -  -
+-  -  -
+-  -  -
+-  -  -
+-  -  -
+
+
+General Officer,
+-  -  -
+
+O-8
+
+
+ARC President; Board of Governors Members; Senior VP; Senior Directors / Directors
+POW of Equivalent Rank
+-  -  -
+SES*
+-  -  -
+-  -  - NF-6
+O-7
+
+
+Executive
+-  -  -
+-  -  -
+Directors
+IV
+
+GS-15
+Ship Pilots,
+
+
+Senior Associates and Associates
+USO Staff Executives and Entertainers:
+
+Field Grade Officer, POW of Equivalent Rank
+O-6
+WS-14 thru WS-19
+
+
+Supervisory
+WL-15, and
+TP Plan Positions
+NF-5
+O-5
+GS-14,
+Team Leaders and Station Managers
+Production Support
+Appropriate Equivalent Rate
+GS-13
+
+Equivalents
+
+O-4
+GS-12
+NF-4
+Asst Station Managers
+III
+O-3
+GS-11,
+WS-8 thru WS-13
+
+
+Nonsupervisory
+Company Grade
+
+GS-10
+WL-6 thru WL-14
+
+Officer, POW of Equivalent Rank
+WG-12 thru WG- 15,
+
+O-2
+GS-9,
+
+
+-  -  -
+GS-8
+
+W-4,W-3
+
+and Production Support Equivalents
+-  -  -
+O-1
+GS-7
+NF-3
+
+W-2,W-1
+
+II
+E-9, E-8, E-7
+GS-6
+
+
+Non-Commissioned Officer, POW of Equivalent Rank
+WS-1 thru WS-7
+-  -  -
+
+
+-  -  -
+E-6, E-5,
+
+WL-1 thru WL-5
+
+-  -  -
+-  -  -
+
+WG-9 thru WG-11
+NF-3
+GS-5
+-  -  -
+
+I
+E-4
+GS-4
+WG-1 thru WG-8
+-  -  -
+NF-2
+-  -  -
+
+
+Enlisted, POW of Equivalent Rank
+-  -  -
+E-3, E-2, E-1
+GS-3 thru
+
+
+NF-1
+
+-  -  -
+GS-1
+-  -  -
+-  -  -
+
+*Reference includes Defense Intelligence Senior Level, Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service, and Senior Leaders.
+
+
+## Glossary Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+
+ARC
+American Red Cross
+
+
+DEERS
+Defense Enrollment Eligibility Reporting System
+DoDI
+DoD Instruction
+
+
+GS
+General Schedule
+
+
+ID
+identification
+
+
+NAF
+nonappropriated fund
+NOAA
+National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
+
+
+POW
+prisoner of war
+
+
+SSN
+social security number
+
+
+USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+USO
+United Service Organizations
+USPHS
+U.S. Public Health Service

markdown/dod/i1000_29.md

@@ -0,0 +1,277 @@
+# Department Of Defense
+
+## Instruction
+
+# Number 1000.29
+
+May 17, 2012
+Incorporating Change 1, November 26, 2014
+
+DA&M DCMO SUBJECT:
+DoD Civil Liberties Program
+
+References: See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  This Instruction, in accordance with the authorities in sections 2000ee and 2000ee-1 of title 42, United States Code (U.S.C.) (Reference (a)), Public Law 108-458
+(Reference (b)), DoD Directive 5105.53 (Reference (c)), Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandums (References (d) and (de)), and the guidance in DoD Civil Liberties Officer Memorandum (Reference (ef)) and DoD Civil Liberties Officer Memorandum (Reference (fg)):
+a.  Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities for the implementation of the DoD Civil Liberties Program and for those portions of Reference (a) that relate to privacy.  The DoD's Privacy Act Program will continue to be governed by DoD Directive 5400.11(Reference (gh)), DoD 5400.11-R (Reference (hi)), and Director of Administration and Management Memorandum (Reference (ij)).
+
+b.  Delegates authorities for the effective administration of the DoD Civil Liberties Program.
+
+c.  Authorizes the Defense Civil Liberties Board.
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components"). 3.  DEFINITIONS.  See Glossary. 4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy to:
+
+a.  Protect the privacy and civil liberties of DoD employees, members of the Military Services, and the public to the greatest extent possible, consistent with its operational requirements.
+
+
+b.  Consider appropriately privacy and civil liberties in the review, development, and implementation of new or existing laws, regulations, policies, and initiatives.
+
+c.  Not maintain information, as defined in Reference (hi), on how an individual exercises rights protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, including the freedoms of speech, assembly, press, and religion, except when:
+
+(1)  Specifically authorized by statute;
+
+
+(2)  Expressly authorized by the individual, group of individuals, or association on whom the record is maintained; or
+
+(3)  The record is pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement, intelligence collection, or counterintelligence activity.
+
+d.  Have adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and redress complaints from individuals who allege that the DoD has violated their privacy or civil liberties.
+
+e.  Prohibit reprisals or the threat of reprisals against individuals who make complaints or disclose information that indicates a possible violation of privacy protections or civil liberties in the administration of the programs and operations of the Federal Government to the:
+
+(1)  Privacy or civil liberties officers as described in subsection (a) or (b) of section
+2000ee-1 of Reference (a);
+
+(2)  Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board as defined in section 2000ee of Reference (a); or
+
+(3)  Component chief civil liberties officers or primary civil liberties points of contact
+(POCs).  No reprisals or threat of reprisals shall be taken by any Federal employee in a position to take such actions, unless the complaint was made or the information was disclosed with the knowledge that it was false or with willful disregard for its truth or falsity.
+
+5.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 6.  INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.  a.  The Quarterly R report on the Activities of the DoD Civil Liberties Program referred to in paragraph 1.h. of Enclosure 2 of this Instruction is submitted to Congress *and to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board* in accordance with sections 2000ee and 2000ee-1, of Reference (a) and is coordinated with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Legislative Affairs in accordance with the procedures in DoDI 5545.02 (Reference (j)). b.  The reports directed by DPCLO DoD Civil Liberties Program Reporting Requirements referred to in paragraph*s 1.h, 3.g., and* 7.i. of Enclosure 2 of this Instruction have been assigned Report Control Symbol (RCS) DD- DA&M*DCMO*(QSA)2472, in accordance with *the procedures in Volume 1 of* DoD *Manual*
+8910.01-M (Reference (k)).
+
+7.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED *Cleared for public release*.  This Instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. 8.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  a.  This Iinstruction is effective May 17, 2012.
+
+
+b.  This Instruction must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication in accordance with DoD Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (l)).c.  If not, this Instruction will expire effective May 17, 2022, and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website (Reference (l)).
+
+Michael L. Rhodes
+
+Director of Administration and Management Change 1 approved by
+
+
+David Tillotson III
+
+Assistant Deputy Chief Management Officer Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1
+
+
+
+## References
+
+ (a)
+Sections 2000ee and 2000ee-1, of title 42, United States Code, *as amended*
+(b)
+Public Law 108-458, "The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004," as
+amended
+(c)
+DoD Directive 5105.53, "Director of Administration and Management (DA&M),"
+February 26, 2008
+(d)
+Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Reorganization of the Office of the Deputy
+Chief Management Officer," July 11, 2014
+(de) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Designation of the DoD Civil Liberties
+Officer (CLO)," July 2, 2009
+(ef) DoD Civil Liberties Officer Memorandum, "Organizational Placement and Structure of
+DoD Civil Liberties Officer (CLO) Functions," December 14, 2009
+(fg) DoD Civil Liberties Officer Memorandum, "Protection of Civil Liberties in the Department
+of Defense," November 1, 2010
+(gh) DoD Directive 5400.11, "DoD Privacy Program," May 8, 2007*, as amended* (hi) DoD 5400.11-R, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 14, 2007 (ij) Director of Administration and Management Memorandum, "Appointment of a Senior
+Official for Privacy and Issuance of Revised Program Compliance Reporting
+Requirements," February 7, 2008
+(j)
+DoD Instruction 5545.02, "DoD Policy for Congressional Authorization and
+Appropriations Reporting Requirements," December 19, 2008
+(k) DoD *Manual* 8910.01-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information
+Requirements," June 30, 1998 Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections Manual: Procedures for DoD
+Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014
+(l)
+DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," October 28, 2007
+(ml) DoD Directive 5148.11, "Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
+(ATSD (IO))," September 20, 2010 *April 24, 2013*
+(nm) Appendix 3 of title 5, United States Code (also known as "The Inspector General Act of
+1978," as amended)
+(on) Chapter 47, title 10, United States Code (also known as "The Uniform Code of Military
+Justice")
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  DIRECTOR OF ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT (DA&M) DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (DCMO).  The DA&M DCMO, in addition to the responsibilities in section 7 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Advise the Secretary of Defense and senior DoD leadership on the DoD Civil Liberties Program.
+
+b.  Serve as the DoD Civil Liberties Officer in accordance with Reference (a).
+
+
+c.  Assist the Secretary of Defense and senior leadership in appropriately considering privacy and civil liberties concerns when they propose, develop, or implement laws, regulations, policies, procedures, DoD issuances, or guidelines.
+
+d.  Ensure that DoD actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and related laws and their implementation are periodically investigated and reviewed to provide for the adequate consideration of privacy and civil liberties.
+
+e.  Ensure that the DoD has adequate procedures in place to receive, investigate, respond to, and redress complaints from individuals who allege that the DoD violated their privacy or civil liberties.
+
+f.  When providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power, consider whether the DoD has established that:
+
+(1)  The need for the power is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties.
+
+
+(2)  There is adequate supervision of the use of that power by the DoD to ensure the protection of privacy and civil liberties.
+
+
+(3)  There are adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine the use of the power.
+
+g.  Coordinate privacy and civil liberties activities with the Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG, DoD) to avoid duplication of effort.
+
+
+h.  Submit quarterly *semiannual* reports on the activities of the DoD Civil Liberties Program to appropriate committees of Congress, and to the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board once constituted, *and to the Secretary of Defense* in accordance with Reference (a).
+
+
+i.  Ensure the reports referenced in paragraph 1.h. of this enclosure are made available to the public to the greatest extent possible, consistent with the protection of classified information and applicable law, and otherwise inform the public of the activities of the DoD Civil Liberties Program.
+
+
+j.  Establish the Defense Civil Liberties Board.
+
+k.  Publish Defense Civil Liberties Board advisory opinions and other guidance to ensure timely and uniform implementation of the DoD Civil Liberties Program.
+
+2.  DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON HEADQUARTERS SERVICE (WHS).  The Director, WHS, under the authority, direction, and control of the DA&M DCMO through the Director of Administration, shall support the Heads of the OSD Components, in the operation of the DoD
+Civil Liberties Program. 3.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OFFICE (DPCLO).  The Director, DPCLO, under the authority, direction, and control of the DA&M *DCMO,* shall:
+a.  Serve as the DoD Deputy Civil Liberties Officer and perform all duties and responsibilities as directed by the DoD Civil Liberties Officer.
+
+b.  Assist the DoD Civil Liberties Officer in performing the duties in Section 1 of this Enclosure.
+
+c.  Coordinate privacy and civil liberties activities, at the direction of the DoD Civil Liberties Officer, with the IG, DoD, to avoid duplication of effort.
+
+d.  Manage and supervise the DPCLO.
+
+e.  On behalf of the DoD Civil Liberties Officer, chair, supervise, and oversee the activities of the Defense Civil Liberties Board.
+
+f.  Publish Defense Civil Liberties Board advisory opinions and other guidance to ensure timely and uniform implementation of the DoD Civil Liberties Program.
+
+g.  Periodically, but not less than Request reports *semiannually* request data from DoD
+Components for *the reports referred to in paragraph 1.h. of this enclosure.* reporting purposes, pursuant to Reference (a).
+
+h.  Ensure DoD employees and Service members of the military are adequately trained, as appropriate, regarding the protection of privacy and civil liberties.
+
+i.  Coordinate with DoD Components, as appropriate, to establish and maintain procedures for the investigation of complaints from individuals who allege that the DoD Component violated their privacy or civil liberties.
+
+j.  Coordinate with the Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)) *DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official* for complaints that allege violations of privacy or civil liberties in the conduct of DoD intelligence activities in accordance with DoD Directive 5148.11 (Reference (ml)). 4.  GENERAL COUNSEL OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (GC, DoD).  The GC, DoD, in addition to the responsibilities in section 7 of this enclosure, shall:
+a.  Provide advice and assistance on all legal matters arising out of, or incident to, the DoD
+Civil Liberties Program.
+
+
+b.  Inform and advise the DoD Civil Liberties Officer or the Deputy DoD Civil Liberties Officer on privacy and civil liberties related litigation, judicial decisions, legislation, and other legal issuances or developments that affect the administration of the DoD Civil Liberties Program or are of significant interest to the public, media, Congress, or DoD senior officials.
+
+c.  Review, in consultation with the DoD Civil Liberties Officer or the Deputy DoD Civil Liberties Officer, allegations of privacy or civil liberties violations and provide support to the investigation of those allegations as appropriate. 5.  IG, DoD.  The IG, DoD, shall inform the DoD Civil Liberties Officer or the Deputy Civil Liberties Officer of its privacy and civil liberties activities in order to avoid duplication of effort, in accordance with Reference (a).  The IG, DoD, is an independent organizational component of the DoD, and nothing in this Instruction should be construed as infringing upon the independence of the IG, DoD, or preventing the IG, DoD, from fulfilling its duties pursuant to Appendix 3 of title 5, U.S.C. (also known as "The Inspector General Act of 1978," as amended) (Reference (nm)).  Effective coordination and cooperation shall not interfere with existing investigatory processes conducted by the IG, DoD, including investigations into privacy or civil liberties complaints. 6.  ATSD(IO)*DOD SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT OFFICIAL*.  The ATSD(IO), in addition to the responsibilities in section 7 of this enclosureUnder the authority, direction, and control of the DCMO, the DoD Senior Intelligence Oversight Official shall coordinate with the DoD Civil Liberties Officer or the Deputy DoD Civil Liberties Officer on complaints that allege violations of privacy or civil liberties in the conduct of DoD intelligence activities, consistent with Reference (ml). 7.  HEADS OF THE OSD AND DoD COMPONENTS.  The Heads of the OSD and DoD Components shall:
+
+a.  Designate a senior Service member or civilian employee to serve as the Component chief civil liberties officer.
+
+b.  Designate a Service member or civilian employee to serve as the Component primary civil liberties POC.
+
+c.  Consider privacy and civil liberties when proposing, developing, or implementing laws, regulations, policies, procedures, or guidelines related to the Component's mission.
+
+d.  Periodically investigate and review Component actions, policies, procedures, guidelines, and related laws and their implementation to ensure that the Component is considering appropriately privacy and civil liberties.
+
+
+e.  Ensure the Component has adequate procedures to receive, investigate, respond to, and redress complaints from individuals who allege that the Component violated their privacy or civil liberties.
+
+f.  In providing advice on proposals to retain or enhance a particular governmental power, consider whether the Component has established that:
+
+(1)  The need for the power is balanced with the need to protect privacy and civil liberties.
+
+
+(2)  There is adequate supervision of the use by the Component of the power to ensure protection of privacy and civil liberties.
+
+
+(3)  There are adequate guidelines and oversight to properly confine the use of the power.
+
+g.  Coordinate privacy and civil liberties activities with the Component Inspector General to avoid duplication of effort.
+
+h.  Ensure that any violation of the prohibitions regarding reprisals under paragraph 4.e above the signature of this Instruction by civilian employees under their respective jurisdictions is reviewed for appropriate disciplinary action under regulations governing civilian employees.
+
+
+
+i.  Submit *the semiannual* reports *referenced in paragraphs 1.h. and 3.g. of this enclosure*as directed by to the *Director,* DPCLO, using DD Form 2984, "Component Civil Liberties Report (42 U.S.C. 2000ee-1)." in accordance with Reference (a).
+
+
+(1)  The reports include:
+
+
+
+(a)  Information on the number and types of reviews undertaken.
+
+
+(b)  The type of advice provided and the response given to such advice.
+
+
+(c)  The number and nature of the complaints received by the OSD or DoD
+Component for alleged violations.
+
+
+
+(d)  A summary of the disposition of such complaints, the reviews and inquiries conducted, and the impact of the activities of the OSD and DoD Component's Civil Liberties Program.
+
+
+(2)  Reports are not required to include complaints arising out of non-judicial punishments, military courts-martial, and administrative separation processes.
+
+
+
+j.  Ensure Component employees and Service members are trained, as appropriate, regarding the protection of privacy and civil liberties.
+
+
+8.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS.  The Secretaries of the Military Departments, in addition to the responsibilities in section 7 of this enclosure, shall issue general regulations making punishable pursuant to chapter 47 of title 10, U.S.C. (also known as "The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)" (Reference (on)), any violation of the prohibitions of paragraph 4.e. above the signature of this Instruction by persons subject to the UCMJ.
+
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+ ATSD(IO)
+Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight
+
+
+DA&M
+Director of Administration and Management
+DCMO
+Deputy Chief Management Officer
+DPCLO
+Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office
+
+
+GC, DoD
+General Counsel, Department of Defense
+
+
+IG, DoD
+Inspector General of the Department of Defense
+
+
+POC
+point of contact
+
+
+UCMJ
+Uniform Code of Military Justice
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+
+
+WHS
+Washington Headquarters Service
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Instruction. chief civil liberties officer.  Senior Service member or civilian employee with authority to act on behalf of the Component Head and to direct the Component's compliance with Reference (a) and the DoD Civil Liberties Program. civil liberties.  Fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution of the United States. complaint.  An assertion alleging a violation of privacy and/or civil liberties. primary civil liberties POC.  Service member or civilian employee who is responsible for fulfilling the responsibilities of the DoD Civil Liberties Program within the Component, as directed by the chief civil liberties officer. privacy.  The right to privacy recognized under the Constitution of the United States. violation of civil liberties.  Undue government interference with the exercise of fundamental rights and freedoms protected by the Constitution of the United States.

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+## Department Of Defense
+
+#
+
+## Instruction
+
+# Number 3200.19 May 17, 2012 Incorporating Change 1, September 13, 2017
+
+
+USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW) Human Effects Characterization
+
+References: See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.01 (Reference (a)), this Instruction:
+a.  Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides procedures for a human effects characterization process in support of the development of NLW, non-lethal technologies, and NLW systems.
+
+b.  Establishes the Human Effects Review Board (HERB) in accordance with DoD
+Instruction (DoDI) 5105.18 (Reference (b)) as an independent DoD board to ensure appropriate scientific processes are used to characterize the human effects of all DoD NLW programs. c.  Establishes the Human Effects Readiness Level (HERL) as a measure of the availability, sufficiency, and maturity of data and information of the human effects of NLW. d.  Establishes health care capability (HCC) indexes as a basis to determine the risk of significant injury (RSI) from NLW. e.  Focuses on the human effects on NLW targets.  Effects of weapons on operators are covered in other DoD procedures as required. 2.  APPLICABILITY.  This Instruction applies to:
+a.  OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD
+Components").
+
+
+b.  Requirements development for NLW. c.  Research, development, test, evaluation, and acquisition of all NLW within the Defense Acquisition System in accordance with DoDD 5000.01 (Reference (c)). d.  NLW human effects characterization data, reports, and related products that will inform NLW training and demonstration policies and employment decisions. e.  NLW research independent of the budget activities funding the research, the mission of the DoD organization conducting or supporting the research, the security classification of the research, the location of the research in the United States or a foreign country, or whether the research is conducted or supported under a program that is not considered research for other purposes.
+
+
+3.  DEFINITIONS.  See Glossary. 4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  NLW are intended to have relatively reversible effects (see Glossary) and minimize risk of fatalities, permanent injuries, or permanent damage to materiel; however, they shall not be required to have a zero probability of producing these effects in accordance with DoD Directive 3000.03E (Reference (d)).
+
+
+b.  Characterization of the human effects of NLW shall be conducted during the materiel development process to assess the likelihood of achieving the desired effect(s) and identify RSI for counter-personnel systems, as well as the RSI for collateral damage to humans from countermateriel systems.
+
+
+c.  The RSI for any given weapon shall be identified by the combat developer to assist in materiel development and enable force commanders to understand the potential risks associated with the use of specific NLW.
+
+d.  NLW programs that involve animal subjects shall comply with DoD Instruction 3216.01
+(Reference (e)) and implementing DoD Component issuances.
+
+
+e.  NLW programs that involve human subjects shall comply with DoD Instruction 3216.02
+(Reference (f)) and implementing DoD Component issuances. f.  Secrecy oaths or other non-disclosure agreements will not be used to inhibit veterans from discussing health concerns with their doctors or seeking compensation from the Department of Veterans Affairs for potential service-related disabilities.
+
+5.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 6.  PROCEDURES.  See Enclosures 3 and 4. 7.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED.  This Instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+
+Cleared for public release.  This issuance is available on the Directives Division Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/. 8.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This instruction is effective May 17, 2012.
+
+
+
+a.  This Instruction is effective May 17, 2012.
+
+b.  This Instruction must be reissued, cancelled, or certified current within 5 years of its publication in accordance with DoD Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (g)).  If not, this Instruction will expire effective May 17, 2022 and be removed from the DoD Issuances Website.
+
+Frank Kendall
+
+Acting Under Secretary of Defense for
+
+Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Enclosures
+
+1.  References
+
+
+2.  Responsibilities
+
+3.  Procedures
+
+4.  HERB
+Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+(a) DoD Directive 5134.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
+Logistics (USD(AT&L))," December 9, 2005*, as amended*
+(b) DoD Instruction 5105.18, "DoD Intergovernmental and Intragovernmental Committee
+Management Program," July 10, 2009
+(c) DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003
+(d) DoD Directive 3000.3, "Policy for Non-Lethal Weapons," July 9, 1996
+(d) DoD Directive 3000.03E, "DoD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal Weapons (NLW), and
+NLW Policy," April 25, 2013
+(e) DoD Instruction 3216.01, "Use of Animals in DoD Programs," September 13, 2010
+(f)
+DoD Instruction 3216.02, "Protection of Human Subjects and Adherence to Ethical
+Standards in DoD-Supported Research," October 20, 2011 *November 8, 2011*
+(g) DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Directives Program," October 28, 2007 (hg) Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate "Joint Capabilities Document (JCD) for Joint Non-
+Lethal Effects (JNLE), Version 1," January 22, 20081
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUSITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS (USD(AT&L)).  The USD(AT&L), as the OSD Principal Staff Assistant for the DoD NLW Program, shall:
+a.  Oversee NLW human effects characterization in coordination with the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for NLW, consistent with Reference (d).
+
+b.  When appropriate, approve alternate exposure policies needed for NLW development where exposure requirements exceed existing policy limits (e.g., non-routine exposure of DoD
+personnel to NLWs above existing occupational safety and health standards for the purposes of demonstrations or training). 2.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING (ASD(R&E)).  The ASD(R&E), under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(AT&L), shall provide scientific and technical oversight and coordination on NLW human effects research and development with the DoD EA for NLW. 3.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY (USD(P)).  The USD(P) shall oversee DoD policy for the employment of NLW in consultation with the USD(AT&L) and the DoD EA
+for NLW, in accordance with Reference (d).  Decisions on NLW employment policy will be informed by NLW human effects characterization data, reports, and related products. 4.  COMMANDANT OF THE U. S. MARINE CORPS.  The Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, as the DoD EA for NLW in accordance with Reference (d), shall:
+
+a.  Establish procedures pertaining to the characterization of NLW human effects.
+
+b.  Designate a DoD NLW Health Effects Officer.
+
+
+(1)  The DoD NLW Health Effects Officer shall hold credentials within the biomedical sciences.  He or she will report to the director of the jointly manned activity conducting the dayto-day activities of the Joint NLW Program.
+
+
+(2)  The DoD NLW Health Effects Officer shall manage the day-to-day activities associated with NLW human effects, including the establishment, maintenance, and coordination of NLW human effects characterization processes and guidance on DoD NLW human effects research and development and risk assessment.  This individual will serve as the primary point of contact on NLW human effects and as the chair of the HERB.
+
+
+c.  Identify a core of NLW human effects subject matter experts (SMEs), to include the DoD
+NLW Health Effects Officer, to assist DoD Component combat and materiel developers and program managers in the NLW capabilities development process, in assessment of human effects, and in conducting non-lethal-effects characterizations and risk assessments.
+
+d.  In coordination with the HERB, prescribe processes and procedures for the conduct of HERB reviews for all NLW programs.
+
+
+e.  Convene and conduct the HERB according to the procedures in Enclosure 4 of this Instruction.
+
+f.  Establish and maintain a repository for information related to NLW human effects, human effects characterizations, and risk assessments in order to provide a central resource for NLW
+human effects data and information for use by the DoD NLW community. g.  Coordinate NLW human effects matters with appropriate departments and agencies external to DoD as approved by the USD(AT&L) or USD(P).
+
+
+
+5.  DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL TEST AND EVALUATION (DOT&E).  The Director, DOT&E shall:
+a.  Advise the Secretary of Defense, the USD(AT&L), the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the DoD EA for NLW with respect to operational test and evaluation of NLW as it relates to NLW human effects characterization. b.  Prescribe policies and procedures for the conduct of operational test and evaluation that involve human effects characterization, including:
+(1)  Counter-personnel systems.
+
+
+
+(2)  Counter-materiel systems that involve the RSI to humans from collateral damage
+(e.g., directed energy systems that may involve secondary non-lethal collateral damage effects to humans). c.  Provide guidance to and consult with the Secretary of Defense, the USD(AT&L) and the Secretaries of the Military Departments with respect to operational test and evaluation of systems that require human effects characterization. d.  Approve the adequacy of operational test plans that involve human effects characterization.
+
+6.  SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS AND COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND (USSOCOM).  The Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commander, USSOCOM, shall:
+a.  Ensure the policies and procedures in this Instruction are applied to all NLW programs. b.  Ensure that a human effects characterization is completed in the development of NLW
+during the acquisition process in order to assess the likelihood of achieving the desired effect and to identify RSI associated with NLW in counter-personnel and counter-materiel applications.
+
+
+c.  Ensure that NLW program managers incorporate assessment of human effects and the risks posed by NLW into project plans and test requirements.
+
+
+d.  Ensure human effects assessment data is provided to the servicing legal office to support the legal review of non-lethal weapons required during the acquisition process.  Legal reviews ensure weapons being acquired by DoD remain consistent with applicable law, including U.S.
+
+treaty obligations, customary international law, and the law of war.  Early identification of legal issues of concern reduces costs and facilitates the development of viable systems.
+
+e.  Plan for and provide adequate resources to aid in NLW requirements generation, and in assessment and characterization of human effects and risk.
+
+
+f.  Appoint one member from their respective Surgeon General offices and one member from their respective safety centers (or equivalents), as applicable, to serve on the HERB. g  Ensure that NLW program managers adhere to the HERB procedures in Enclosure 4 of this Instruction.
+
+
+h.  Ensure that RSI of NLW is addressed in appropriate capabilities documents (e.g., capability development and production documents).
+
+
+i.  Develop formal processes for the use of NLW on DoD personnel (e.g., assessments, training, or demonstrations) when such use is not considered research involving a human subject by a DoD Component pursuant to Reference (f).
+
+
+## Enclosure 3 Procedures 1.  Capabilities Development
+
+a.  Combat and materiel developers shall consult human effects and developmental and operational test and evaluation SMEs early in the NLW capabilities development process.
+
+(1)  Human effects SMEs shall advise combat developers in articulating NLW human effects requirements to support the development of suitable human effects-related performance attributes (e.g., duration of effect, reversibility, RSI).
+
+
+
+(2)  Developmental and operational test and evaluation SMEs shall advise combat developers on testing protocols and procedures to ensure NLW performance metrics are quantitatively or qualitatively verifiable.
+
+
+b.  Combat developers, in consultation with human effects and developmental and operational test and evaluation SMEs, shall ensure NLW effectiveness and human effects-related performance attributes are addressed in appropriate capability documents (e.g., capability development and capability production documents).
+
+
+
+(1)  The effectiveness of NLW is critical to successful employment and shall be designated as a key system attribute (KSA) or key performance parameter (KPP) in capabilities documents.
+
+
+(2)  Combat developers, working with warfighter input, shall determine the human effects-related performance attributes of NLW, to include acceptable RSI.  These attributes may be addressed in capabilities documents as attributes, KSAs, and KPPs.  RSI shall be addressed as a KSA or KPP.
+
+
+
+c.  RSI shall provide the force commander a measure of the likelihood that employed NLW
+may directly cause injury requiring HCC Index 1 or 2.  HCCs are depicted in the Figure, which illustrates the relationship between RSI and the HCC indexes.  HCC 0 reflects limited first responder requirements such as self-aid or buddy-aid.  HCC 1 reflects first responder care that could include resuscitation and stabilization.  HCC 2 reflects forward hospitalization capabilities such as advanced emergency or surgical services.  Common DoD terminology for HCC indexes is provided in the Joint Capabilities Document for Joint Non-Lethal Effects (Reference (hg)).
+
+
+## 2.  Human-Effects Characterizaton
+
+a.  NLW program managers, in consultation with SMEs and the HERB, shall identify the knowledge gaps in the human effects data that need to be addressed to satisfy warfighter requirements.  Assessment of human effects and the risks posed by NLW shall be conducted before milestone (MS) B (engineering and manufacturing development phase) approval or, for a system or program initiated at or beyond MS B, as soon as practicable. b.  Human effects SMEs shall determine the HERL, as described in the Table, for candidate NLW.  The HERL is a measure of the availability, sufficiency, and maturity of human effects knowledge regarding a specific NLW.  NLW shall not be required to achieve a particular HERL;
+rather the purpose of the HERL shall be to describe the scope of scientific research applicable to specific NLW.
+
+
+
+LEVEL
+DESCRIPTION
+9
+Human or surrogate participation in operational testing.  Data validated from live fire
+experimentation and fielding.
+8
+Human or surrogate tests in field environment with mature prototype systems under realistic conditions.
+7
+Human studies or surrogates in lab or field environments with prototype systems under specific, highly controlled, exposure conditions.
+6
+Non-human primate or large-animal models confirm safety.  Provide basis of limited human studies in laboratory to examine effectiveness.
+5
+Studies in large-animal models to more fully characterize effects, demonstrate technology effectiveness and safety.
+4
+Bioeffect mechanism accepted by the scientific community; small animal studies
+conducted to develop dose-response relationships.
+3
+Bioeffect mechanism clearly identified; studies to determine dose-response relationships planned or begun in small animal models.
+2
+In-vitro and cellular models used to study postulated bioeffect mechanisms; important
+dose-response parameters are postulated.
+1
+Bioeffect mechanism postulated through paper studies, theoretical analysis.
+
+
+## Enclosure 4 Herb
+
+1.  PURPOSE
+a.  The HERB is established to independently review human effects analyses that apply to NLW.  The implementation of the HERB review ensures that the human effects of NLWs are evaluated consistently.
+
+b.  The HERB advises program managers and milestone decision authorities (MDAs) of the quality and completeness of human effects information, identifies potential human effects risks, and provides recommendations for further research and considerations to mitigate these risks. 2.  MEMBERSHIP
+a.  The HERB is comprised of the DoD Health Effects Officer, members representing the Surgeon Generals of each Service (including the Medical Officer of the U.S. Marine Corps) and USSOCOM, as applicable, and a safety representative from each Service and USSOCOM.
+
+b.  The DoD NLW Health Effects Officer serves as the chair of the HERB.
+
+3.  PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES
+a.  A HERB review involving a specific NLW is scheduled based on recommendations of the DoD NLW Health Effects Officer and by request of the MDA or NLW program manager to the DoD Health Effects Officer.  The HERB review shall be conducted prior to acquisition decision points, to include the materiel development decision point.
+
+b.  HERB members shall be provided relevant reference material from the NLW program manager and human effects SMEs in advance of the review.  Each HERB review meeting includes presentations from the NLW program manager, human effects SMEs, and other invited speakers on the NLW under review; however, none of the invited participants shall be allowed to participate in the Board's deliberations.
+
+c.  The HERB shall produce a memorandum that provides an assessment and recommendations on the NLW evaluated to the NLW program manager and MDA.  The HERB
+memorandum additionally can be used by the NLW program to support legal, treaty, and policy reviews.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Acronyms And Abbreviations
+
+ DoDD
+DoD Directive
+DoDI
+DoD Instruction
+DOT&E
+Director, Operational Test and Evaluation
+
+
+EA
+Executive Agent
+
+
+HCC
+health care capability
+HERB
+Human Effects Review Board
+HERL
+Human Effects Readiness Level
+
+
+KSA
+key system attribute
+KPP
+key performance parameter
+
+
+MDA
+milestone decision authority
+MS
+milestone
+
+
+NLW
+non-lethal weapons
+
+
+RSI
+risk of significant injury
+
+
+SME
+subject matter expert
+
+
+USD(AT&L) Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD(P)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
+USSOCOM
+U.S. Special Operations Command
+
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+ Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this Instruction. combat developer.  Command or agency that formulates doctrine, concepts, organization, material requirements and objectives.  May be used generically to represent the user community role in the material acquisition process. counter-materiel.  Directed effects against materiel (vehicles, vessels, aircraft, buildings, facilities, structures, weapon systems, ammunition, weapons of mass destruction, etc.).  Nonlethal counter-materiel effects must remain non-lethal to personnel. counter-personnel.  Effects directed against individual(s). effect.  The physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, set of actions, or another effect; the result, outcome, or consequence of an action; a change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. effectiveness.  The extent to which specific NLW achieve the intended effect.
+
+HCC Index 0.  Limited first-responder capability including self-aid, buddy-aid, and combat lifesaver skills. HCC Index 1.  First responder-capability including resuscitation, stabilization, and emergency care. HCC Index 2.  Forward resuscitative and theater hospitalization capabilities including advanced emergency, surgical, and ancillary services. HERL.  A measure of the availability, sufficiency, and maturity of human effects knowledge regarding a specific NLW. human effect.  The physical impact on, or behavioral response of, a human resulting from a stimulus or set of stimuli. human effects characterization.  A formal process for fully describing the compendium of physiological- and behavioral-effects knowledge associated with a given NLW.  It establishes the baseline human effects understanding of NLW, identifies risks and data gaps in human effects knowledge, and facilitates presentation and communication of its human effects. incapacitate.  To disable, inhibit, or degrade one or more functions or capabilities of a target to render it ineffective. joint NLW program.  Joint efforts related to research, development, test, and evaluation under DoD EA for NLW oversight. materiel developer.  A command or agency responsible for research and development, production, and fielding of a new materiel system. NLW.  Defined in Reference (d). non-lethal technology.  Technology being considered or utilized as an NLW.
+
+permanent injury.  Physical damage to a person that permanently impairs physiological function and restricts the employment or other activities of that person for the rest of his or her life. reversibility.  The ability to return the target to its pre-engagement functionality.  It is usually measured by the time and level of effort required for recovery of the target. RSI.  The potential of NLW to directly cause injury requiring HCC Index 1 or higher HCC index treatment, permanent injury, or death.  RSI is the parameter used to describe reversibility of NLW as it relates to human effects. target.  An area, complex, installation, force, equipment, capability, function, or behavior identified for possible action to support a commander's objectives, guidance, and intent.

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+## Department Of Defense Instruction
+
+#
+
+NUMBER 3305.15
+August 13, 2015
+Incorporating Change 2, Effective August 25, 2020
+
+USD(I&S) SUBJECT: DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Training and Certification
+
+References: See Enclosure 1 1.  PURPOSE.  In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01 (Reference (a)), this instruction:
+a.  Reissues DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3305.15 (Reference (b)) to establish policy and assign responsibilities for the conduct of DoD HUMINT training and certification of DoD personnel in accordance with DoDI 3115.11 and DoDD 1322.18 (References (c) and (d)).
+
+b.  Assigns the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), as the functional manager for DoD HUMINT training and certification, as a subset of the larger responsibility granted in DoDD S-5200.37 and DoDI O-5100.93 (References (e) and (f)) as the Defense Human Intelligence Manager (DHM).
+
+c.  Authorizes the establishment of DoD HUMINT training and certification governance bodies comprised of representatives of the DoD Components.  These bodies report through the Director, DIA, to the DoD Intelligence Training and Education Board in accordance with Reference (c) and to the Defense Counter Intelligence & HUMINT Board of Directors in accordance with Reference (f).
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY.  This instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this instruction as the
+"DoD Components"). 3.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a.  The DoD will develop and maintain HUMINT training and certification programs.
+
+
+
+b.  Prior to conducting HUMINT activities, DoD personnel will be trained in accordance with core common tradecraft standards, established in consultation with the DHM, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate (J2), and the National HUMINT Manager.
+
+c.  HUMINT training and certification support DoD missions, are operationally and technically sound, are in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, and focus on the development of the knowledge, skills, and abilities (KSAs) required to perform DoD HUMINT activities.
+
+d.  DoD HUMINT training and certification programs are resourced in DoD Component planning, programming, budgeting, and execution (PPBE) actions in accordance with DoDD 7045.14 (Reference (g)).
+
+
+
+e.  All HUMINT training and certification for DoD intelligence personnel will be implemented in accordance with Reference (d).
+
+4.  RESPONSIBILITIES.  See Enclosure 2. 5.  INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS.  The Annual Report of Intelligence and Security Training, Education, and Certification, referred to in paragraphs 2j and 4k of Enclosure 2 of this instruction, has been assigned report control symbol DD-INT(A,SA)2252 and is prescribed in DoD Manual  3115.11 (Reference (h)).
+
+6.  RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release**.  This instruction is available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+7.  SUMMARY OF CHANGE 2.  This administrative change updates the title of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence to the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security in accordance with Public Law 116-92 (Reference (i)).
+
+8.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This instruction is effective August 13, 2015.
+
+
+Marcel Lettre Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Enclosures
+1.  References
+
+2.  Responsibilities Glossary
+
+## Enclosure 1 References
+
+ (a) DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
+(USD(I&S))," October 24, 2014, as amended
+(b) DoD Instruction 3305.15, "DoD Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Training," February 25,
+2008, as amended (hereby cancelled)
+(c) DoD Instruction 3115.11, "DoD Intelligence Human Capital Management Operations,"
+January 22, 2009, as amended
+(d) DoD Directive 1322.18, "Military Training," January 13, 2009, as amended (e) DoD Directive S-5200.37, "Management and Execution of Defense Human Intelligence
+(HUMINT) (U)," February 9, 2009, as amended
+(f)
+DoD Instruction O-5100.93, "Defense Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence
+(HUMINT) Center (DCHC)," August 13, 2010
+(g) DoD Directive 7045.14, "The Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE)
+Process," January 25, 2013, as amended
+(h) DoD Manual 3115.11, "DoD Intelligence and Security Training Standards," March 24,
+2015, as amended
+(i)
+Public Law 116-92, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020," December 20,
+2019
+(j)
+DoD Instruction C-5105.32, "Defense Attache Service (DAS) (U)," March 18, 2009,
+as amended
+(k) DoD Manual 3305.02, "DoD Collection Management (CM) Accreditation and
+Certification," November 21, 2012, as amended
+(l)
+DoD Directive 1400.35, "Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System (DCIPS),"
+September 24, 2007, as amended
+
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+ 1.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY (USD(I&S)).  In accordance with References (a) and (c), the USD(I&S):
+a.  Establishes policy and provides direction and oversight for DoD HUMINT training and certification for the DoD Components and assigns training and certification responsibilities as necessary.
+
+b.  Reviews DoD HUMINT standards, training, and certification programs and provides recommendations to the DoD Components.
+
+c.  Develops and distributes HUMINT training and certification guidance in accordance with the strategic planning guidance, defense intelligence guidance, and other appropriate OSD policy guidance to identify HUMINT training and certification requirements during the program and budget build and during development of supplemental resource requests.
+
+d.  Reviews HUMINT resource requests from the DoD Component heads and the Director, DIA, and provides additional guidance as required.
+
+e.  Receives and evaluates HUMINT training and certification recommendations from the Director, DIA, on policies, standards, responsibilities, or related HUMINT matters for use in appropriate policy, oversight, and guidance.
+
+f.  Coordinates policies on HUMINT training and certification of DoD military and civilian personnel with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)).
+
+2.  DIRECTOR, DIA.  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I&S) and in addition to the responsibilities in section 4 of this enclosure, the Director, DIA:
+a.  Establishes and maintains DoD HUMINT training standards and DoD HUMINT
+certifications in coordination with the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Joint Staff, as appropriate.
+
+b.  Manages attache nominations, selection, and training process in accordance with DoDI
+C-5105.32 (Reference (j)).
+
+c.  Establishes joint training activities to plan and manage the implementation of DoD
+HUMINT training in coordination with the CJCS, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the USD(I&S).
+
+d.  Conducts HUMINT training and certification for the Defense Intelligence workforce.
+Shares training, content, and training facilities with other DoD Components to the maximum extent possible, as appropriate, to achieve efficiencies and support implementation of training standards.
+
+e.  Submits DoD HUMINT training and certification resource requirements to the USD(I&S)
+for inclusion in the various defense planning documents for the PPBE process.
+
+f.  Recommends DoD HUMINT training resource allocations to the USD(I&S) in consultation with the DoD Components.
+
+g.  Designates a lead for all matters related to DoD HUMINT training and certification.
+
+h.  Establishes and oversees the activities of DoD HUMINT training and certification governance bodies, that:
+
+
+(1)  Support the Director, DIA, in the development and validation of DoD HUMINT
+training policies, standards, and requirements and ensures that training informs and facilitates HUMINT certification.
+
+
+(2)  Provide recommendations for improving, sharing, or consolidating HUMINT training to the Director, DIA, for reporting to the USD(I&S) and the appropriate DoD Components.
+
+i.  Incorporates HUMINT KSAs into DoD and Intelligence Community intelligence functional competencies, training, and certification standards for HUMINT.
+
+j.  Develops and conducts assessments and evaluations of DoD HUMINT training and certification programs in accordance with the procedures in DoD Manual 3305.02 (Reference
+(k)) to determine the effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance with established policy and standards.
+
+k.  Reports annually to the USD(I&S) on the status of DoD HUMINT training and certification for inclusion in the USD(I&S) Annual Report of Intelligence and Security Training, Education and Certification.
+
+3.  USD(P&R).  In accordance with Reference (e), the USD(P&R) coordinates with the USD(I&S) on military training policies as they apply to DoD HUMINT training and certification. 4.  DoD COMPONENT HEADS AND COMMANDANT OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD.  The DoD Component heads and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard:
+a.  Implement policies, procedures, programs, and requirements as specified in this instruction and, as appropriate, incorporate USD(I&S) and Director, DIA, HUMINT training and certification guidance into their training and certification programs.
+
+
+b.  Coordinate with the CJCS, the Director, DIA, the Chair of the DoD HUMINT training and certification governance bodies, and the USD(I&S) in establishing any HUMINT joint training activities to assist in the development of a DHM-approved HUMINT training program.
+
+
+c.  Maintain and periodically forward to the Director, DIA, a list of all HUMINT training and certification programs under their responsibility.
+
+d.  Assist the Director, DIA, develop and maintain HUMINT training standards and HUMINT certifications.
+
+e.  Identify and exploit opportunities to conduct HUMINT training and certification and share training, content, and training facilities with other DoD Components to achieve efficiencies and support implementation of training standards.
+
+
+
+f.  Plan, program, and budget for HUMINT training and certification using USD(I&S) and DIA guidance and recommendations, as appropriate.
+
+g.  Submit Component-specific HUMINT training requirements and limitations on training and certifications, as required, based on unique missions areas to DIA.
+
+h.  Identify an office of primary responsibility for HUMINT training and certification.
+
+i.  Provide a representative to the DoD HUMINT training and certification governance bodies established by DIA.  This requirement does not apply to the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense.
+
+j.  Review and analyze DoD Component-unique education and training curriculums, and share the HUMINT training and certification best practices and lessons learned results, as appropriate, with the DoD HUMINT training and certification governance bodies.
+
+k.  Report annually to the Director, DIA, on the status of HUMINT training and certification for inclusion in the USD(I&S) Annual Report of Intelligence and Security Training, Education, and Certification in accordance with Reference (h).
+
+5.  CJCS.  In addition to the responsibilities in section 4 of this enclosure, the CJCS:
+a.  Coordinates with the Director, DIA, and the USD(I&S) in establishing any jointly manned activity to plan and manage the implementation of DoD HUMINT training.
+
+b.  Coordinates with the Defense Intelligence Component heads in establishing and manning HUMINT joint training activities to help develop a DHM-approved HUMINT training program.
+
+c.  Leverages HUMINT training opportunities, in consultation with the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the Director, DIA, and the chairs of the DoD training governance body, to achieve economies of scale and establish joint training activities, when appropriate, to capitalize on best practices to effectively train HUMINT personnel.
+
+GLOSSARY
+
+PART I.  ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
+
+CJCS
+Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
+
+
+DHM
+Defense Human Intelligence Manager
+DIA
+Defense Intelligence Agency
+DoDD
+DoD Directive
+DoDI
+DoD Instruction
+
+
+HUMINT
+human intelligence
+
+
+KSA
+knowledge, skills, and abilities
+
+
+PPBE
+planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
+
+
+USD(I&S)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security
+USD(P&R) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+PART II.  DEFINITIONS These terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this instruction. certification.  Defined in Reference (c). Defense Intelligence Components.  Defined in DoD Directive 1400.35 (Reference (l)). functional manager.  The designated DoD advisor for an area defined as an enterprise-wide intelligence and security activity or set of intelligence and security activities.  These activities are
+characterized by specific skill sets, data sources, tasking, collection, processing, exploitation, analysis, and dissemination processes requiring specialized training, equipment, or unique applications of training or skills. HUMINT training.  Instruction and applied exercises for acquiring and retaining skills and knowledge required in the acquisition of foreign intelligence derived from the collection discipline that uses human beings as both sources and collectors.

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+## Instruction
+
+USD(AT&L) SUBJECT: Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA):  Responsibilities of the SMCA, the Military Services, and United States Special Operations Command
+(USSOCOM) References:  See Enclosure 1
+1.  PURPOSE.  This Instruction:
+a.  Reissues DoD Instruction 5160.68 (Reference (a)) under the authority of DoD Directive
+5134.01 (Reference (b)).
+
+b.  Implements DoD Directive 5160.65 (Reference (c)) by specifying the functional responsibilities and mission functions to be performed by the Secretary of the Army or designee as SMCA and by the Military Service and USSOCOM customers on conventional ammunition management actions.
+
+c.  The SMCA, Military Service, and USSOCOM customers shall jointly develop and distribute joint conventional ammunition policies and procedures (JCAPPS) through the Joint Ordnance Commanders Group.  JCAPPS shall align with the paragraph structure in Enclosure 2 of this Instruction.
+
+2.  APPLICABILITY
+a.  This Instruction applies to OSD, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").  The term "Military Services," as used herein, refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
+
+
+b.  The requirements of this Instruction shall be incorporated into agreements in which other organizations acquire munitions through the Department of Defense.
+
+3.  DEFINITIONS.  Terms used in this Instruction are defined in the Glossary.
+
+4.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that this Instruction and enclosures implement policy established in Reference (c).
+
+5.  RESPONSIBILITIES
+
+
+a.  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)).
+The USD(AT&L) shall oversee performance of the responsibilities specified in this Instruction.
+
+b.  Heads of DoD Components.  The Heads of DoD Components shall ensure that the assigned Military Service mission functions are accomplished.
+
+c.  Secretary of the Army.  The Secretary of the Army shall ensure that the assigned SMCA
+mission functions are accomplished.
+
+d.  SMCA, the Military Services, and USSOCOM.  SMCA, the Military Services, and USSOCOM shall perform the mission functions listed in Enclosure 2 for the specific conventional ammunition management functions listed therein.  Implementing guidance is contained in associated JCAPPs.
+
+e.  Commandant, United States Coast Guard.  The Commandant, United States Coast Guard, agrees to abide by the procedures identified in this Instruction to the extent that the Department of Defense provides munitions to the United States Coast Guard.
+
+
+6.  PROCEDURES.  SMCA, the Military Services, and USSOCOM shall perform the mission functions as delineated in Enclosure 2. 7.  INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS.
+
+a.  The Hazardous Component Safety Data Statement, DD Form 2357, has been assigned RCS DD-AT&L(AR)1687 in accordance with DoD 8910.1-M (Reference (d)).
+
+b.  The transition plan and database are exempt from licensing in accordance with paragraphs C4.4.2 and C4.4.4 of Reference (d).
+
+8.  RELEASABILITY.  UNLIMITED.  This Instruction is approved for public release and is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
+
+9.  EFFECTIVE DATE.  This Instruction is effective immediately.
+
+Enclosures
+
+1.  References
+
+2.  Procedures
+
+Glossary
+
+ENCLOSURE 1
+
+REFERENCES (a) DoD Instruction 5160.68, "Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA):
+Responsibilities of the SMCA and the Military Services," December 22, 2003 (hereby canceled)
+(b) DoD Directive 5134.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
+Logistics (USD(AT&L))," December 9, 2005
+(c) DoD Directive 5160.65, "Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA),"
+August 1, 2008
+(d) DoD 8910.1-M, "DoD Procedures for Management of Information Requirements,"
+
+June 30, 1998
+(e) DoD 7000.14-R, "Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMRs),
+Volume 2B, Chapter 4," July 2008
+(f)
+DoD 7000.14-R, "Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMRs),
+Volume 2B, Chapter 6," July 2008
+(g) DoD 7000.14-R, "Department of Defense Financial Management Regulation (FMRs),
+Volume 11B, Chapter 58," December 1994
+(h) Section 806, Public Law 105-261, "Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act
+for Fiscal Year 1999," October 17, 1998
+(i)
+DoD Directive 5000.01, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003
+(j)
+DoD Instruction 5000.2, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003
+(k) DoD 4140.1-R, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation," May 23, 2003 (l)
+Sections 5 (Supply), 11 (Safety), and 14 (Personnel and Unit Training) of the Joint
+Conventional Ammunition Policies and Procedures, January 9, 20061
+(m) DoD 5100.76-M, "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, and
+Explosives," August 12, 2000
+(n) DoD 4145.19-R, "Storage and Warehousing Facilities and Services," June 15, 1978 (o) Part 266, Subpart M of Title 40, Code of Federal Regulations, "Military Munitions,"
+current edition
+(p) DTR 4500.9-R, "Defense Transportation Regulation," Part II, "Cargo Movement,"
+September 2007
+(q) DoD 5105.38-M, "Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)," October 3, 2003
+ENCLOSURE 2
+
+PROCEDURES The SMCA, Military Services, and USSOCOM shall perform the following mission functions: 1.  RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT, TEST, AND EVALUATION (RDT&E) AND
+TRANSITION
+a.  RDT&E
+
+
+(1)  SMCA
+
+
+(a)  Coordinate with the Military Services or USSOCOM throughout the RDT&E
+phase on SMCA-assigned conventional ammunition to:
+
+
+1.  Obtain information on the progress of conventional ammunition development programs.
+
+
+
+2.  Provide SMCA conventional ammunition logistics and production base requirements and plans for inclusion in the Military Services or USSOCOM's short- and longrange systems planning.
+
+
+
+3.  Provide to the Military Services or USSOCOM SMCA-related acquisition and/or conventional ammunition production base issues for presentation to the Milestone Decision Authority.
+
+
+
+(b)  Provide fabrication of developmental conventional ammunition in support of the RDT&E phase upon request of the Military Services or USSOCOM, with agreed schedules and resources provided by the Military Services or USSOCOM.
+
+
+(2)  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+
+(a)  Coordinate with the SMCA throughout the RDT&E phase on SMCA-assigned conventional ammunition to:
+
+
+1.  Provide the SMCA information on the progress of conventional ammunition development programs.
+
+
+
+2.  Include SMCA conventional ammunition logistics and production base requirements and plans in short- and long-range systems planning.
+
+
+
+3.  Present SMCA-related issues to the Milestone Decision Authority, as those issues relate to acquisition of assigned conventional ammunition items and/or the conventional ammunition production base.
+
+
+
+4.  Ensure commonality is considered during the design of conventional ammunition.
+
+
+
+(b)  When appropriate, provide resources to the SMCA for fabrication of developmental conventional ammunition in support of RDT&E.
+
+
+
+(c)  Incorporate demilitarization and disposal design requirements into the systems engineering of munitions early in the RDT&E phase to ensure munitions designs are tailored to minimize cost and environmental and safety impacts during demilitarization.  Munitions designs shall enable cost-effective recycling and reuse of materials and components and the use of closed-disposal demilitarization methods.  Final disposition of new munitions by open burning or open detonation shall not be considered an option.
+
+
+
+(d)  Retain responsibility for the RDT&E of conventional ammunition developed by the individual Military Service or USSOCOM, including fabrication, testing, and evaluation of any developmental conventional ammunition fabricated by the SMCA.
+
+b.  Transition
+
+(1)  SMCA
+
+
+(a)  Participate with the Military Services and USSOCOM in the transition of SMCA-
+assigned conventional ammunition.
+
+
+
+(b)  Prepare an annual transition plan that identifies the transitioning of SMCA-
+assigned items to the SMCA.
+
+
+(2)  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+
+(a)  Annually identify to the SMCA plans for transitioning all SMCA-assigned items not yet transitioned.
+
+
+
+(b)  Prepare transition plans in coordination with the SMCA.
+
+
+
+(c)  Transition SMCA-assigned items to the SMCA to accommodate the SMCA
+procurement and logistics support functions.
+
+
+
+(d)  Transition for procurement should occur in sufficient time to allow the SMCA to award the first full-rate production contract.  As an exception, and with notification to the Executive Director for Conventional Ammunition, the Military Services or USSOCOM may retain the procurement function in those cases where the full value and efficiencies of the SMCA may not be immediately realized.
+
+
+
+(e)  Upon agreement between the SMCA and the Military Services, or USSOCOM, Military Service/USSOCOM-retained items may be transitioned to the SMCA.
+
+
+
+(f)  The Military Services or USSOCOM retain program management responsibility.
+
+2.  PRODUCTION BASE
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Lead in the development and publication of an overarching conventional ammunition industrial base strategic plan that supports the Military Services and USSOCOM's conventional ammunition requirements as reflected in the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP).
+
+
+(2)  Plan for an optimum production base through the overarching conventional ammunition industrial base strategic plan, and prioritize available production base support resources to effectively meet the Military Services and USSOCOM's conventional ammunition requirements.  Annually identify and prioritize production base deficiencies and formulate corrective actions to mitigate those deficiencies.
+
+
+
+(a)  Identify and incorporate new and more efficient production technologies.
+
+
+
+(b)  Conduct industrial preparedness planning and provide production base information and results to the Military Services and USSOCOM.
+
+
+
+(c)  Coordinate with the Military Services and USSOCOM on the status of the production base as significant changes are planned or occur.
+
+
+(3)  Communicate with the Military Services and USSOCOM on establishment and retention of the ammunition production base.  To the maximum extent possible and except as otherwise provided by law, all costs associated with the production base will be reflected in product or unit prices. When there is valid justification for investing, retaining, and maintaining Government property, ensure that resource requirements are developed and submitted in accordance with established financial management regulations and Army guidance for inclusion in the Program Objective Memorandum for applicable target program years.  Execute the direct appropriations for Production Base Support program (Provision of Industrial Facilities (PIF), Layaway of Industrial Facilities (LIF), and Maintenance of Inactive Facilities (MIF)) for munitions production base support projects.  DoD 7000.14-R, Volume 2B, Chapter 4 (Reference (e)), provides specific guidance for PIF, MIF, and LIF.  DoD 7000.14-R , Volume 2B, Chapter 6 (Reference (f)) provides guidance for facility production projects requiring Military Construction
+(MILCON) and DoD 7000.14-R, Volume 11B, Chapter 58 (Reference (g)) provides guidance for projects requiring Capital Investment Program (CIP) funding.  Each facility production project shall be validated on a case-by-case basis, including but not limited to policy, funding constraints, and environmental impacts.
+
+
+
+(a)  Facility production projects at government-owned, contractor-operated facilities
+(GOCOs) or contractor-owned, contractor-operated facilities (COCOs) will be funded by the hardware end-item budget line unit cost and/or the PIF program.
+
+
+
+(b)  Facility production projects at government-owned, government-operated facilities
+(GOGOs) will be funded by the hardware end-item budget line unit cost, MILCON, and/or CIP funds.
+
+
+
+(c)  Converting facilities from production to long-term storage at GOGOs, GOCOs, and COCOs is funded by the LIF program.  The MIF program funds those costs associated with maintaining approved LIF projects.
+
+
+(4)  Serve as the technical advisor to the Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board on matters related to assigned conventional ammunition.
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Retain responsibility for determination of FYDP conventional ammunition requirements and ensure such requirements are conveyed to the SMCA.  The requirements should include non-SMCA-assigned items using the same production capabilities as SMCA
+items.
+
+
+(2)  Provide support in development of the overarching conventional ammunition industrial base strategic plan.
+
+
+(3)  Should use existing SMCA capabilities for the benefit of economies of scale and/or retention of capabilities when they meet the Military Services' or USSOCOM's requirements.
+
+
+(4)  Communicate with the SMCA when there may be a requirement to modify or establish new or additional production capability or capacity in the government-owned production base.
+
+
+
+(5)  Plan, program, budget, and fund facility production projects within the hardware budget line unit cost in support of SMCA-assigned ammunition items when PIF, CIP, or MILCON cannot be used.
+
+
+(6)  Provide, to the maximum extent possible, industrial preparedness planning information to the SMCA relative to items unique to a Military Service or USSOCOM that utilize common facilities or producers used by the SMCA.  This will enhance the development of an overarching industrial base strategic plan.
+
+3.  ACQUISITION
+a.  SMCA
+
+
+(1)  Comply with section 806 of Public Law 105-261 (Reference (h)).
+
+
+(2)  Comply with the policies and procedures as described in DoD Directive 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2 (References (i) and (j)).
+
+
+(3)  Prepare, with assistance from the Military Services and USSOCOM, advanced acquisition plans for SMCA-acquired conventional ammunition.  When dealing with recent (or pending) transitioned items, the advanced acquisition plan shall be based upon the Military Service/USSOCOM-approved acquisition plan.
+
+
+(4)  Acquire conventional ammunition, upon receipt of funded programs, to meet Military Service and USSOCOM requirements.
+
+
+
+(5)  Provide contract services and other technical support during the acquisition of SMCA-assigned conventional ammunition.
+
+
+(6)  Provide advice to the Military Services and USSOCOM during preparation of the FYDP.
+
+
+(7)  Conduct periodic reviews and provide access to financial and logistics information monitoring the status of Military Service or USSOCOM orders and evaluating overall trends and activity.
+
+
+(8)  Comment on the Military Services or USSOCOM's conventional ammunition acquisition plans and prepare, with the assistance of the Military Services or USSOCOM, an Integrated Conventional Ammunition Procurement Plan (ICAPP) for use by the Military Services, USSOCOM, and the OSD staff.  The ICAPP should be available to coincide with the budget submission requirements of the DoD planning, programming, budgeting, and execution
+(PPB&E) process.
+
+
+(9)  Notify the Military Services and USSOCOM of management actions that may impact the execution of funds and timely completion of orders.
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Comply with Reference (h).
+
+
+(2)  Comply with the policies and procedures as described in References (i) and (j).
+
+
+(3)  Obtain SMCA advice in the preparation of the Military Services' or USSOCOM's FYDP to optimize procurement and production order sizes, work-loading, and delivery schedules for achieving efficiencies and economies.
+
+
+(4)  SMCA-assigned items that have transitioned to the SMCA for procurement should be acquired by the SMCA.  As an exception, and with notification to the EDCA, the Military Services or USSOCOM may execute the procurement function in those cases where the full value and efficiencies of the SMCA may not be immediately realized.
+
+
+(5)  Provide the following for SMCA-acquired conventional ammunition:
+
+
+(a)  Technical definition (e.g., technical data packages, performance specification) to the SMCA to support Military Service or USSOCOM conventional ammunition requirements.
+
+
+
+(b)  Approved conventional ammunition procurement funds (appropriated or under Continuing Resolution Authority) by forwarding appropriate funding authorization documents to the SMCA to support annual acquisitions within 80 days of signature of appropriation law.
+
+
+
+(c)  Concurrent with development of supplemental or bridge program, provide notification to the SMCA to support the Funded Reimbursement Authority request.
+
+
+
+(d)  Delivery information.
+
+
+
+(e)  Any Military Service/USSOCOM-unique requirements (e.g., special quality requirements, packaging).
+
+
+(6)  Consider the overarching conventional ammunition industrial base strategic plan in the Military Services or USSOCOM's acquisition strategies and plans.
+
+
+(7)  Identify to the SMCA and other Military Services, as delineated in DoD 4140.1-R
+(Reference (k)) and Section 5 of the Joint Conventional Ammunition Policies and Procedures (Reference (l)), any excess items in the Military Service inventory for applying assets to other Military Services or USSOCOM's requirements to preclude unnecessary procurements.
+
+
+(8)  Provide planning, programming, and budgetary data and information to the SMCA
+for forecasting and planning support activities and development of the ICAPP.
+
+
+(9)  Participate in periodic SMCA reviews of financial and logistics information.
+
+4.  SUPPLY
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Provide the specific inventory management functions defined in this paragraph for assigned conventional ammunition stored at SMCA-managed facilities under Reference (k).
+
+
+
+(a)  Responsibility for custodial accountability for assigned conventional ammunition.
+
+The SMCA is relieved of custodial accountability on receipt by the Military Service/USSOCOM-accountable officer at the first retail point or consumer level.
+
+
+
+(b)  Report, as required by the Military Services or USSOCOM, the status of assigned Military Service/USSOCOM-owned assets.
+
+
+
+(c)  Perform physical inventories per DoD 5100.76-M (Reference (m)).
+
+
+(2)  Operate SMCA-managed installations and facilities to support the Military Services and USSOCOM's conventional ammunition wholesale stockpile in accordance with DoD 4145.19-R (Reference (n)).
+
+
+(3)  Maintain a wholesale distribution system for meeting projected needs of the Military Services and USSOCOM.
+
+
+(4)  Issue wholesale stocks based on the Military Services or USSOCOM requirements.
+
+
+(5)  Manage and invest in integrated logistics functions that support conventional ammunition responsibilities.
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Provide time-phased force deployment data to the SMCA.
+
+
+(2)  Provide forecasts for receipt, storage, and issue requirements in sufficient time for inclusion in the Army budget.
+
+5.  MAINTENANCE
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Manage the maintenance of wholesale conventional ammunition in support of the SMCA mission.
+
+
+(2)  Fund, on a non-reimbursable basis, and perform maintenance on SMCA-assigned conventional ammunition deteriorating from a serviceable condition to an unserviceable condition due to improper storage and handling conditions while in SMCA-managed facilities.
+
+
+(3)  Develop, acquire, and maintain conventional ammunition peculiar equipment required for the surveillance, maintenance, and demilitarization of conventional ammunition at SMCA-managed facilities on a non-reimbursable basis.
+
+
+(4)  Perform maintenance based on scope of work and funding provided by the Military Services or USSOCOM.  This type of maintenance normally includes renovation, conversion, modification, modernization, reclamation, refurbishment, and remanufacture of serviceable or unserviceable assets.  Maintenance normally requires replacing of components other than packaging material.
+
+
+
+(5)  Manage installations and facilities performing maintenance in support of the SMCA
+mission.
+
+
+(6)  Conduct periodic reviews and provide access to financial and logistics information monitoring the status of Military Service or USSOCOM maintenance orders and evaluating the overall conventional ammunition maintenance trends and activity.
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Prioritize condition code "E" assets requiring maintenance.
+
+
+(2)  Provide funding and scope of work for reimbursable maintenance programs performed by the SMCA.
+
+
+6.  DEMILITARIZATION AND DISPOSAL
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Demilitarize and dispose of all conventional ammunition, including non-SMCA-
+managed items, for which capability, technology, and facilities exist to complete demilitarization and disposal.  The SMCA shall accept these items into the demilitarization stockpile with appropriate technical data.  Plan, program, and budget for a demilitarization and disposal program for all munitions in the SMCA Resource Recovery and Disposition Account (RRDA).
+
+
+(2)  Plan, program, budget, and fund a joint-Service research and development program for developing the capacity where capability, technology, and facilities do not exist.
+
+
+(3)  Acquire equipment and facilities required for demilitarizing and disposing of conventional ammunition at SMCA-managed facilities on a non-reimbursable basis.
+
+
+(4)  Develop an annual comprehensive demilitarization and disposal plan.
+
+
+(5)  Serve as the authorized military official (AMO) (the DoD-designated disposition authority (DDA)) for managing waste military munitions (WMM) according to part 266, subpart M of title 40, Code of Federal Regulations (Reference (o)).  Coordinate WMM determinations and actions with Military Service/USSOCOM-level AMOs (DDAs).
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Provide demilitarization and disposal plans with technology requirements for Military Service/USSOCOM-developed items designed after November 1, 1977.
+
+
+(2)  Provide an annual 5-year forecast of conventional ammunition generations into the SMCA's RRDA to support the development of the SMCA demilitarization and disposal plan.
+
+
+
+(3)  Fund the movement of assets from retail sites to sites specified by the SMCA for demilitarization and disposition.  Coordinate these shipments with the receiving sites.
+
+
+(4)  Provide technical data for supporting demilitarization and disposal operations and a joint-Service research and development program.
+
+
+(5)  Coordinate with the SMCA AMO (DDA) prior to transferring assets to the SMCA
+RRDA.
+
+
+(6)  Provide Military Service/USSOCOM-level AMOs (DDAs) for managing WMM
+according to Reference (o).  Coordinate WMM actions with the DoD AMO (DDA).
+
+7.  QUALITY ASSURANCE
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Manage and execute the quality assurance programs established by the Military Services or USSOCOM in SMCA procurements and Military Service/USSOCOM-funded maintenance programs.  Work towards common quality assurance requirements.  When necessary, incorporate Military Service/USSOCOM-unique quality assurance requirements into contracts.
+
+
+(2)  Manage a quality assurance program during storage, maintenance, demilitarization, and disposal of wholesale conventional ammunition.  The quality assurance program shall be uniform for all Military Services and USSOCOM.  When variances occur, the SMCA shall work with the Military Services or USSOCOM for determining, implementing, and disseminating the best quality assurance practices.
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Establish and maintain life-cycle quality assurance programs for conventional ammunition developed by the Military Services or USSOCOM.
+
+
+(2)  Work toward common quality assurance requirements.  When necessary, identify Military Service/USSOCOM-unique quality assurance requirements to the SMCA.
+
+
+(3)  Collaborate with the SMCA to determine the best quality assurance practices for SMCA procuring, maintaining, or storing conventional ammunition.
+
+8.  TECHNICAL DATA AND CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL
+a.  SMCA
+
+
+(1)  Establish and maintain configuration controls for SMCA-assigned conventional ammunition that complement the Military Services or USSOCOM's life-cycle configuration management program and provide for participation by the Military Services or USSOCOM.
+
+
+(2)  Maintain the conventional ammunition data card repository for SMCA-assigned conventional ammunition.
+
+
+(3)  Monitor configuration controls for common components or materials and provide for coordination with the Military Services or USSOCOM.
+
+
+(4)  Request a procurement data package from the Military Services or USSOCOM when the item will be acquired by the SMCA.
+
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Retain overall configuration management and control for conventional ammunition developed by the Military Services or USSOCOM.
+
+
+(2)  Establish and maintain a life-cycle configuration management program that provides for participation by the SMCA, when required.
+
+
+(3)  Provide the SMCA technical definitions (e.g., technical data packages, performance specifications) and characterization data to support conventional ammunition developed by the Military Services or USSOCOM.  Technical definition shall support SMCA requirements for procurement, production, storage, maintenance, demilitarization, or disposal in time to allow the SMCA to plan and execute the SMCA program.
+
+
+(4)  Make technical information available to other Military Services and USSOCOM, as requested.
+
+9.  TRANSPORTATION AND HANDLING
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Coordinate with the Joint Munitions Transportation Coordinating Activity (JMTCA)
+for performing duties, as delineated in DTR 4500.9-R (Reference (p)), so that the JMTCA can provide decision makers with advance planning visibility.
+
+
+(2)  Provide transportation and handling management and control for wholesale conventional ammunition to:
+
+
+(a)  Develop and implement safe, secure, and efficient transportation and handling processes at SMCA-managed facilities.
+
+
+
+(b)  Coordinate with other transportation managers to develop and execute integrated movement plans for meeting peacetime and contingency movement requirements.
+
+
+(3)  Coordinate movement to the point of receipt by continental United States retail customers, or to the overseas port of embarkation, in conjunction with other transportation managers.
+
+
+(4)  Plan for and maintain a transportation and handling capability to meet projected contingency requirements.
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Provide planning and movement information and instructions to the SMCA as required for the transportation of the Military Services or USSOCOM's assets.
+
+
+(2)  Fund transportation of conventional ammunition movements submitted to the SMCA.
+
+10.  SAFETY
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Maintain a uniform process for handling hazardous materials under Section 11 of Reference (l).  Included in the process is the use of DD Form 2356 (Hazardous Material Contract Cover Sheet), DD Form 2357 (Hazardous Component Safety Data Sheets (HCSDS)), and DD Form 2271 (Decontamination Tag).
+
+
+(2)  Serve as a technical advisor to the DoD Explosives Safety Board on assigned conventional ammunition and associated processes.
+
+
+(3)  Ensure development, refinement, and adherence of safety standards in the conduct of the SMCA mission.
+
+
+(4)  Maintain the Explosives Accident database.
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Provide hazardous component safety data to the SMCA for conventional ammunition developed by the Military Services or USSOCOM and being procured through the SMCA.
+
+
+(2)  Participate in the development and refinement of safety standards necessary for facilitating safe conventional ammunition and explosives operations.
+
+
+(3)  Provide results of explosive accident investigations to the SMCA.
+
+11.  SECURITY
+a.  SMCA
+
+
+(1)  Provide physical security for conventional ammunition in the wholesale supply system under guidance provided in Reference (m).
+
+
+(2)  Provide physical security and protection of facilities under guidance provided in Reference (m).
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM.  Military Services and USSOCOM provide the SMCA
+the security requirements for conventional ammunition developed by the Military Services.
+
+
+12.  FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND PPB&E
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Plan, program, budget, and execute resources (manpower and funds) required for all assigned responsibilities and functions identified in this Instruction.
+
+
+(2)  Ensure that resources identified in subparagraph 12.a. of this enclosure for the SMCA
+mission are separately and visibly described in the Department of the Army's FYDP and budget exhibits for the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budget System.
+
+
+(3)  Manage, operate, and maintain a financial management system for assigned functions and responsibilities identified in this Instruction.
+
+
+(4)  Provide the Military Services and USSOCOM web access to view status of open procurement orders.
+
+
+
+(5)  Provide the Military Services and USSOCOM timely information of expected costs to complete orders.
+
+
+(6)  Provide the Military Services and USSOCOM with the 30-, 60-, and 90-day funding requirements by August 31 of the current fiscal year when operation under a Continuing Resolution Authority is anticipated for the subsequent fiscal year.
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Plan, program, and budget for conventional ammunition procurement, retained conventional ammunition functions, and support to the SMCA, as provided for in this Instruction.
+
+
+(2)  Provide updates to the SMCA for funding changes to allow the other Military Services and USSOCOM to program and budget accordingly.
+13.  IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS AND ASSESSMENT
+
+
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Staff proposed changes to this Instruction with the Military Services and USSOCOM
+and forward recommended changes to USD(AT&L) for approval.
+
+
+(2)  Communicate, coordinate, and collaborate with the Military Services and USSOCOM for matters affecting accomplishment of the SMCA mission.
+
+
+(3)  Develop and maintain, in coordination with the Military Services and USSOCOM, a process for measuring effectiveness and implementing process improvements of the mission functions in this Instruction.
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM
+
+(1)  Coordinate and support the SMCA in its effort to successfully accomplish the SMCA
+mission.
+
+
+(2)  Participate in the process described in subparagraph 13.a.(3) of this enclosure.
+
+14.  PERSONNEL AND UNIT TRAINING
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Operate a defense ammunition school for providing education and training for ammunition careerists and military personnel.  This includes, but is not limited to, ammunition managers, specialists, and operating personnel required for performing conventional ammunition logistics and explosive safety missions, and for supporting related civilian ammunition career programs.
+
+
+(2)  Training of civilian and military personnel shall be conducted under guidance provided in Section 14 of Reference (l) and the Military Services' education and training policies.
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM.  Provide projected training requirements to the SMCA
+for planning of course content and scheduling to accommodate the training needs of the Military Services for ammunition logistics and explosive safety. 15.  SECURITY ASSISTANCE
+a.  SMCA
+
+(1)  Coordinate with the Military Services and USSOCOM's security assistance management element for supporting security assistance mission duties, as delineated in DoD 5105.38-M (Reference (q)), and provide program support to the security assistance mission requirements.
+
+
+(2)  Coordinate with the requesting Military Service or USSOCOM security assistance management element in preparation of the price and availability for the letter of offer and acceptance to the foreign military customer.
+
+
+
+b.  Military Services and USSOCOM.  Comply with the provisions of Reference (o) when performing the mission functions delineated in this Instruction.  This includes, but is not limited to, providing information for developing the price and availability for the letter of offer and acceptance to the foreign military customer.
+
+GLOSSARY
+
+TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
+
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purposes of this Instruction.
+
+
+SMCA-assigned conventional ammunition.  Conventional ammunition listed in Reference (c)
+that is assigned for management by the SMCA. SMCA-procured conventional ammunition.  Conventional ammunition, either SMCA-assigned or Military Service/USSOCOM-retained, that the SMCA procures.
+
+SMCA production base.  The total privately owned and Government-owned industrial production capacity available to manufacture items required by the Military Services.  The production base together with the maintenance base comprises the industrial base.
+
+
+wholesale supply of conventional ammunition.  The highest level of organized DoD supply maintained for resupplying the retail levels of supply including assets in transit between wholesale and retail.

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+## Department
+
+# Of Defense Instruction
+
+NUMBER 5200.46
+September 9, 2014
+Incorporating Change 1, Effective May 4, 2018
+
+## Subject: Dod Investigative And Adjudicative Guidance For Issuing The Common Access Card (Cac)
+
+References: See Enclosure 1
+1. PURPOSE.  In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5143.01 (Reference (a)), this instruction establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for investigating and adjudicating eligibility to hold a CAC consistent with References (b) through
+(n).  The CAC is the DoD personal identity verification (PIV) credential.  This instruction incorporates and cancels Enclosure 4, DoD Instruction 5200.02 (Reference (o)).
+
+2. APPLICABILITY.  This instruction applies to:
+a. OSD, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the "DoD Components").
+
+b. The commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service (USPHS), under agreement with the Department of Health and Human Services, and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), under agreement with the Department of Commerce. 3. POLICY.  It is DoD policy that:
+a. Individuals appropriately sponsored for a CAC consistent with DoD Manual 1000.13, Volume 1 (Reference (b)) must be investigated and adjudicated in accordance with this instruction.  Individuals not CAC eligible may be processed for local or regional base passes in accordance with Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) policy guidance for DoD
+physical access control DoD 5200.08-R *DoDI 5200.08* (Reference (p)) and local installation security policies and procedures.
+b. A favorably adjudicated National Agency Check with Inquiries (NACI) or equivalent in accordance with revised Federal Investigative Standards is the minimum investigation required for a final credentialing determination for a CAC.
+c. Individuals requiring a CAC must meet the credentialing standards in accordance with the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) memorandums (References (c) and (d)) and this instruction.
+
+d. A CAC may be issued on an interim basis based on a favorable National Agency Check or a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) National Criminal History Check (fingerprint check)
+adjudicated by appropriate approved automated procedures or by a trained security or human resource (HR) specialist, and successful submission to the investigative service provider (ISP) of a NACI or a personnel security investigation (PSI) equal to or greater in scope than a NACI. Additionally, the CAC applicant must present two identity source documents, at least one of which is a valid federal or State government-issued picture identification (Reference (c)).
+
+e. The subsequent credentialing determination will be made upon receipt of the completed investigation from the ISP.
+
+f. Discretionary judgments used to render an adjudicative determination for issuing the CAC
+are inherently governmental functions and must only be performed by trained U.S. Government personnel who have successfully completed required training and possess a minimum level of investigation (NACI or equivalent in accordance with revised Federal Investigative Standards).
+Established administrative processes in DoD 5200.2-R *DoDI 5200.02* (Reference (q)) and DoDD
+5220.6 (Reference (r)) must be applied.
+
+g. Adjudications rendered for eligibility for access to classified information, eligibility to hold a sensitive position, suitability, or fitness for federal employment based on a NACI or higher level investigation may result in a concurrent CAC decision for that position.
+
+h. Favorable credentialing adjudications from another federal department or agency will be reciprocally accepted in accordance with conditions stated in the procedural guidance in this instruction.  Reciprocity must be based on final favorable adjudication only.
+
+i. CAC applicants or holders may appeal CAC denial or revocation in accordance with the conditions stated in the procedural guidance in this instruction.  Appeals must be processed as indicated in the procedural guidance in this instruction.
+j. Non-U.S. nationals at foreign locations are not eligible to receive a CAC on an interim basis.  Special considerations for conducting background investigations of non-U.S. nationals are addressed in Reference (c).  An interim CAC may be issued to non-U.S. nationals in the U.S. or U.S. territories if they have resided in the U.S. or U.S. territory for at least 3 years, and they satisfy the requirements of paragraph 3.e. of this instruction and paragraph 4.b.(1) of Enclosure 3
+of this instruction.
+
+k. Individuals who have been denied a CAC or have had a CAC revoked due to an unfavorable credentialing determination are eligible to reapply for a credential 1 year after the date of final adjudicative denial or revocation.
+l. Individuals with a statutory or regulatory bar are not eligible for reconsideration while under debarment.
+
+m. Reports of investigations conducted as required for compliance with Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 (Reference (g)) be sent to the DoD Consolidated Adjudications Facility.
+n. When eligibility is denied or revoked, CACs will be recovered whenever practicable, and will immediately be rendered inoperable.  In addition, agencies' physical and logical access systems will be immediately updated to eliminate the use of a CAC for access.
+
+## 4. Responsibilities.  See Enclosure 2. 5. Procedures.  See Enclosures 3 And 4.
+
+6. RELEASABILITY.  **Cleared for public release**.  This instruction is available on the Internet from the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives. This instruction is available on the Directives Division Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+7. EFFECTIVE DATE.  This instruction: is effective September 9, 2014.
+
+a. Is effective September 9, 2014.
+
+b. Will expire effective September 9, 2024 if it hasn't been reissued or cancelled before this date in accordance with DoD Instruction 5025.01 (Reference (s)).
+
+## Enclosures
+
+1. References 2. Responsibilities 3. CAC Investigative Procedures
+4. CAC Adjudicative Procedures
+
+## Glossary Enclosure 1 References
+
+(a)
+DoD Directive 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I))," November 23, 2005 October 24, 2014 as amended
+(b)
+DoD Manual 1000.13, Volume 1, "DoD Identification (ID) Cards:  ID Card Life-Cycle," January 23, 2014
+(c)
+U.S. Office of Personnel Management Memorandum, "Final Credentialing Standards for
+Issuing Personal Identity Verification Cards Under HSPD-12," July 31, 2008
+(d)
+U.S. Office of Personnel Management Memorandum, "Introduction of Credentialing,
+Suitability, and Security Clearance Decision-Making Guide," January 14, 2008
+(e)
+Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-05-24, "Implementation of Homeland
+Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12 - Policy for a Common Identification Standard
+for Federal Employees and Contractors," August 5, 2005
+(f)
+U.S. Office of Personnel Management Federal Investigations Notice Number 06-04, "HSPD 12 - Advanced Fingerprint Results," June 8, 2006
+(g)
+Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12, "Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors," August 27, 2004
+(h)
+Sections 552, 552a1, and 7313 of Title 5, United States Code
+(i)
+Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 201-2, "Personal Identity
+Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors," August 2013
+(j)
+Executive Order 13467, "Reforming Processes Related to Suitability for Government
+Employment, Fitness for Contractor Employees, and Eligibility for Access to Classified National Security Information," June 30, 2008
+(k)
+Executive Order 13488, "Granting Reciprocity on Excepted Service and Federal Contractor
+Employee Fitness and Reinvestigating Individuals in Positions of Public Trust," January 16, 2009
+(l)
+Section 278g-3 of Title 15, United States Code
+(m)
+Section 11331 of Title 40, United States Code
+(n)
+U.S. Office of Personnel Management Federal Investigations Notice Number 10-05, "Reminder to Agencies of the Standards for Issuing Identity Credentials Under HSPD-12" May 17, 2010
+(o)
+DoD Instruction 5200.02, "DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP)," March 21, 2014, as
+amended
+(p)
+DoD 5200.08-R, "Physical Security Program," April 9, 2007, as amended
+(q)
+DoD 5200.2-R, "Personnel Security Program," January 1987, as amended
+(p)
+DoD Instruction 5200.08, "Security of DoD Installations and Resources and the DoD Physical Security Review Board (PSRB)," December 10, 2005, as amended
+(q)
+DoD Instruction 5200.02, "DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP)," March 21, 2014, as
+amended
+(r)
+DoD Directive 5220.6, "Defense Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Review
+Program," January 2, 1992, as amended
+(s)
+DoD Instruction 5025.01, "DoD Issuances Program," June 6, 2014
+(t)
+Federal Acquisition Regulation, current edition
+(u)
+Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, current edition
+(v)
+DoD Directive 5145.01, "General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC DoD)," May
+2, 2001 December 2, 2013, as amended
+(w) Title 8, United States Code, also known as "The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
+as amended," June 27, 1952
+(x)
+Parts 731, 732, and 736 of Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations
+(y)
+Executive Order 12968, "Access to Classified Information," August 7, 1995
+(z)
+DoD Instruction 1000.01, "Identification (ID) Cards Required by the Geneva
+Conventions," April 16, 2012, as amended
+(aa) DoD Directive 5240.06, "Counterintelligence Awareness and Reporting (CIAR)," May 17,
+2011, as amended
+(ab) Sections 801-830 of Title 21, United States Code (also known as "The Controlled
+Substances Act of 1970, as amended")
+(ac) Section 2331 of Title 19, United States Code
+
+## Enclosure 2 Responsibilities
+
+1. USD(I).  The USD(I) must:
+a. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+(USD(P&R)) and the General Counsel of the Department of Defense (GC, DoD *GC DoD*), establish adjudication procedures to support CAC credentialing decisions in accordance with References (b) through (n) for issuing a CAC to Service members and DoD civilian personnel.
+b. In coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) and the GC, DoD *GC DoD*, establish adjudication procedures to support a CAC credentialing decision for contractors in accordance with the terms of applicable contracts and References (b) through (n), the Federal Acquisition Regulation (Reference (t)), and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (Reference (u)).
+
+c. Issue, interpret, and clarify CAC investigative and adjudicative guidance in coordination with the Suitability Executive Agent as necessary. 2. USD(P&R).  The USD(P&R) must, in coordination with the GC, DoD *GC DoD*, implement CAC PSI and adjudication procedures established herein as necessary to support issuance of a CAC to Service members and DoD civilian personnel in accordance with References (b) through (n).
+
+3. USD(AT&L).  The USD(AT&L) must, in coordination with the GC, DoD *GC DoD*, implement CAC PSI and adjudication procedures established by the USD(I) for contractors in accordance with the terms of applicable contracts and References (b) through (n), (t), and (u).
+
+## 4. Gc, Dod *Gc Dod*.  The Gc, Dod *Gc Dod* Must:
+
+a. Provide advice and guidance as to the legal sufficiency of procedures and standards involved in adjudicating CAC investigations.
+
+b. Perform functions relating to the DoD Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-
+12 Program in accordance with Reference (r) and DoDD 5145.01 (Reference (v)) including maintenance and oversight of the Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) and its involvement in contractor CAC revocations as specified in subparagraph 6.a.(2) of Enclosure 4
+of this instruction.
+
+c. Coordinate on USD(P&R) implementation of CAC PSI and adjudication procedures, in accordance with References (b) through (n), for Service members and DoD civilian personnel, and USD(AT&L) implementation of USD(I) procedures for CAC PSI and adjudication in accordance with the terms of applicable contracts and References (b) through (n), (t), and (u).
+
+## 5. Dod Component Heads.  The Dod Component Heads Must:
+
+a. Comply with and implement this instruction.
+b. Provide resources for PSIs, adjudication, appeals, and recording of final adjudicative results in a centralized database.
+
+c. Require individuals sponsored for a CAC to meet eligibility requirements stated in Reference (b).
+
+d. Provide appeals boards for those individuals appealing CAC denial or revocation as specified in subparagraph 6.a.(1) of Enclosure 4 of this instruction.
+
+e. Enforce requirements for reporting of derogatory information, unfavorable administrative actions, and adverse actions to personnel security, HR, and counterintelligence official(s), as appropriate.
+
+f. Require all PSIs submitted for non-DoD personnel to be supported by and comply with DoD PIV procedures in contracts that implement requirements of paragraphs 4.1303 and 52.204- 9 of Reference (t).
+g. Require all investigations and adjudications required for non-DoD personnel to be in response to a current, active contract or agreement and that the number of personnel submitted for investigation and adjudication does not exceed the specific requirements of that contract or agreement while ensuring compliance with HSPD-12.
+
+## Enclosure 3 Cac Investigative Procedures 1. Investigative Requirements
+
+a. A personnel security investigation (NACI or greater) completed by an authorized ISP is required to support a CAC credentialing determination based on the established credentialing standards promulgated by OPM (Reference (c)).
+
+b. Individuals identified as having a favorably adjudicated investigation on record, equivalent to or greater than the NACI, do not require an additional investigation for CAC
+issuance.
+
+c. There is no requirement to reinvestigate CAC holders unless they are subject to reinvestigation for national security or suitability reasons as specified in applicable DoD issuances. 2. SUBMISSION OF INVESTIGATIONS.  Investigative packages must be submitted promptly by HR or security personnel to the authorized ISP.  Fingerprints for CAC applicants must be taken by HR or security personnel.  DoD Components using the OPM as the ISP may request advanced fingerprint check results in accordance with (Reference (f)).
+
+## 3. Reciprocity
+
+a. The sponsoring Component must not re-adjudicate CAC determinations for individuals transferring from another federal department or agency, provided:
+(1) The individual's former department or agency verifies possession of a valid PIV.
+
+(2) The individual has undergone the required NACI or other equivalent (or greater)
+suitability or national security investigation and received favorable adjudication from the former department or agency.
+
+(3) There is no break in service 2 years or more and the individual has no actionable information since the date of the last completed investigation.
+
+b. Interim CAC determinations are not eligible to be transferred or reciprocally accepted.
+
+Reciprocity must be based on final favorable adjudication only.
+4. FOREIGN (NON-U.S.) NATIONALS.  DoD Components must apply the credentialing process and standards in this instruction to non-U.S. nationals who work as employees or contractor employees for the DoD.  However, special considerations apply to non-U.S. nationals.
+
+## A. At Foreign Locations
+
+(1) DoD Components must initiate and ensure completion of a background investigation before applying the credentialing standards to a non-U.S. national at a foreign location.  The background investigation must be favorably adjudicated before a CAC can be issued to a non- U.S. national at a foreign location.  The type of background investigation may vary based on standing reciprocity treaties concerning identity assurance and information exchanges that exist between the U.S. and its allies or agency agreements with the host country.
+
+(2) The investigation of a non-U.S. national at a foreign location must be consistent with a NACI, to the extent possible, and include a fingerprint check against the FBI criminal history database, an FBI investigations files (name check) search, and a name check against the terrorist screening database.
+
+b. At U.S.-Based Locations and in U.S. Territories (Other than American Samoa and Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands)
+(1) Individuals who are non-U.S. nationals in the United States or U.S. territory for
+3 years or more must have a NACI or equivalent investigation initiated after employment authorization is appropriately verified.
+(2) Non-U.S. nationals who have been in the United States or U.S. territory for less than
+3 years do not meet the investigative requirements for CAC issuance.  DoD Components may delay the background investigation of a Non-U.S. national who has been in the U.S. or U.S.
+
+territory for less than 3 years until the individual has been in the United States or U.S. territory for at least 3 years.  In the event of such a delay, an alternative facility access identity credential may be issued at the discretion of the relevant DoD Component official, as appropriate based on a risk determination, and in accordance with References (c) and (p).
+
+
+(3) The U.S. territories of American Samoa and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands are not included in the "United States" as defined by the Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended (Reference (w)).
+
+
+5. INVESTIGATIONS ACCEPTABLE FOR CAC ADJUDICATION.  A list of investigations acceptable for CAC adjudication is located in the Table.  These investigations are equivalent to or greater than a NACI.  This list will be updated by the USD(I) as revisions to the Federal investigative standards are implemented.
+
+| Investigation                                                                | Description                                                               |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ANACI                                                                        | Access National Agency Check and Inquires                                 |
+| BGI-0112                                                                     | Upgrade Background Investigation (1-12 months from LBI)                   |
+| BGI-1336                                                                     | Upgrade Background Investigation (13-36 months from LBI)                  |
+| BGI-3760                                                                     | Upgrade Background Investigation (37-60 months from LBI)                  |
+| BI                                                                           | Background Investigation                                                  |
+| BIPN                                                                         | Background Investigation plus Current National Agency Check               |
+| BIPR                                                                         | Periodic Reinvestigation of Background Investigation                      |
+| BITN                                                                         | Background Investigation (10 year scope)                                  |
+| CNCI                                                                         | Child Care National Agency Check plus Written Inquires and Credit         |
+| IBI                                                                          | Interview Oriented Background Investigation                               |
+| LBI                                                                          | Limited Background Investigation                                          |
+| LBIP                                                                         | Limited Background Investigation plus Current National Agency Check       |
+| LBIX                                                                         | Limited Background Investigation - Expanded                               |
+| MBI                                                                          | Moderate Risk Background Investigation                                    |
+| MBIP                                                                         | Moderate Risk Background Investigation plus Current National Agency Check |
+| MBIX                                                                         | Moderate Risk Background Investigation - Expanded                         |
+| NACB                                                                         |                                                                           |
+| National Agency Check/National Agency Check plus Written Inquires and        |                                                                           |
+| Credit Check plus Background Investigation Requested                         |                                                                           |
+| NACI                                                                         | National Agency Check and Inquires                                        |
+| NACLC                                                                        | National Agency Check with Law and Credit                                 |
+| NACS                                                                         |                                                                           |
+| National Agency Check/National Agency Check plus Written Inquires and        |                                                                           |
+| Credit Check plus Single Scope B.I. Requested                                |                                                                           |
+| NACW                                                                         | National Agency Check plus Written Inquires and Credit                    |
+| NACZ                                                                         |                                                                           |
+| National Agency Check plus Written Inquires and Credit plus Special          |                                                                           |
+| Investigative Inquiry                                                        |                                                                           |
+| NLC                                                                          | National Agency Check, Local Agency Check and Credit                      |
+| NNAC                                                                         |                                                                           |
+| National Agency Check plus Written Inquires and Credit Plus Current National |                                                                           |
+| Agency Check                                                                 |                                                                           |
+| NSI                                                                          | NSI - NACI/Suitability Determination                                      |
+| PRI                                                                          | Periodic Reinvestigation                                                  |
+| PRS                                                                          | Periodic Reinvestigation Secret                                           |
+| PRSC                                                                         | Periodic Reinvestigation Secret or Confidential                           |
+| PPR                                                                          | Phased Periodic Reinvestigation                                           |
+| SPR                                                                          | Secret Periodic Reinvestigation                                           |
+| SSBI                                                                         | Single Scope Background Investigation                                     |
+| SSBI-PR                                                                      | Periodic Reinvestigation for SSBI                                         |
+
+## Enclosure 4 Cac Adjudicative Procedures 1. Guidance For Applying Credentialing Standards During Adjudication
+
+a. As established in Reference (g), credentialing adjudication considers whether or not an individual is eligible for long-term access to federally controlled facilities and/or information systems.  The ultimate determination to authorize, deny, or revoke the CAC based on a credentialing determination of the PSI must be made after consideration of applicable credentialing standards in Reference (c).
+b. Each case is unique.  Adjudicators must examine conditions that raise an adjudicative concern, the overriding factor for all of these conditions is unacceptable risk.  Factors to be applied consistently to all information available to the adjudicator are:
+(1) The nature and seriousness of the conduct.  The more serious the conduct, the greater the potential for an adverse CAC determination.
+
+(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct.  Sufficient information concerning the circumstances of the conduct must be obtained to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the conduct poses a risk to people, property or information systems.
+(3) The recency and frequency of the conduct.  More recent or more frequent conduct is of greater concern.
+
+(4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct.  Offenses committed as a minor are usually treated as less serious than the same offenses committed as an adult, unless the offense is very recent, part of a pattern, or particularly heinous.
+
+(5) Contributing external conditions.  Economic and cultural conditions may be relevant to the determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe there is an unacceptable risk if the conditions are currently removed or countered (generally considered in cases with relatively minor issues).
+
+(6) The absence or presence of efforts toward rehabilitation, if relevant, to address conduct adverse to CAC determinations.
+
+(a) Clear, affirmative evidence of rehabilitation is required for a favorable adjudication (e.g., seeking assistance and following professional guidance, where appropriate; demonstrating positive changes in behavior and employment).
+
+(b) Rehabilitation may be a consideration for most conduct, not just alcohol and drug abuse.  While formal counseling or treatment may be a consideration, other factors (such as the individual's employment record) may also be indications of rehabilitation.
+
+c. CAC adjudicators must successfully complete formal training through a DoD CAC
+adjudicator course from the Defense Security Service Center for Development of Security Excellence or a course approved by the Suitability Executive Agent. 2. CREDENTIALING STANDARDS.  HSPD-12 credentialing standards contained in Reference (c) must be used to render a final determination whether to issue or revoke a CAC
+based on results of a qualifying PSI.
+
+a. Basic Standards.  CAC credentialing standards and the adjudicative guidelines described in Appendix 1 of this enclosure are designed to guide the adjudicator who must determine, based on results of a qualifying PSI, whether CAC issuance is consistent with the basic standards, would create an unacceptable risk for the U.S. Government, or would provide an avenue for terrorism.
+b. Supplemental Standards.  The supplemental standards are intended to ensure that the issuance of a CAC to an individual does not create unacceptable risk.  The supplemental credentialing standards must be applied, in addition to the basic credentialing standards.  In this context, an unacceptable risk refers to an unacceptable risk to the life, safety, or health of employees, contractors, vendors, or visitors; to the Government's physical assets or information systems; to personal property; to records, including classified, privileged, proprietary, financial, or medical records; or to the privacy of data subjects.  The supplemental credentialing standards, in addition to the basic credentialing standards, must be used for CAC adjudication of individuals who are not also subject to the following types of adjudication:
+
+(1) Eligibility to hold a sensitive position or for access to classified information,
+(2) Suitability for federal employment in the competitive service, or
+(3) Qualification for federal employment in the excepted service.
+
+## 3. Application Of The Standards
+
+a. CAC credentialing standards will be applied to all DoD civilian employees, Service members, and contractors who are CAC eligible, have been sponsored by a DoD entity, and require: (1) physical access to DoD facilities or non-DoD facilities on behalf of DoD; (2) logical access to information systems (whether on site or remotely); or (3) remote access to DoD
+networks that use only the CAC logon for user authentication.
+
+b. If an individual is found unsuitable for competitive civil service consistent with 5 CFR
+part 731 (Reference (x)), ineligible for access to classified information pursuant to Executive Order 12968 (Reference (y)), or disqualified from appointment in the excepted service or from working on a contract, the unfavorable decision may be sufficient basis for non-issuance or revocation of a CAC, but does not necessarily mandate this result.
+
+4. ADJUDICATION.  The CAC adjudicators will consider the information provided by the CAC PSI in rendering a CAC credentialing determination.  The determination will be unfavorable if there is a reasonable basis to conclude that a disqualifying factor in accordance with the basic CAC credentialing standards is substantiated, or when there is a reasonable basis to conclude that derogatory information or conduct relating to the supplemental CAC credentialing standards presents an unacceptable risk for the U.S. Government.
+
+a. If a DoD Component or DOHA proposes to deny or revoke a CAC under conditions other than those cited in paragraph 3.b. of this enclosure, the DoD Component or DOHA, as appropriate in accordance with section 6.a. of this enclosure, must issue the individual a written statement (also known as a letter of denial (LOD) or revocation (LOR)) identifying the disqualifying condition(s).  The statement must contain a summary of the concerns and supporting adverse information, instructions for responding, and copies of the relevant CAC credentialing standards and adjudicative guidelines from Appendix 1 or 2 of this enclosure.  The written LOD or LOR must be as comprehensive and detailed as permitted by the requirements of national security and to protect sources that were granted confidentiality, and as allowed pursuant to provisions of sections 552 and 552a of Title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.)
+(Reference (h)).  (Section 552a is also known and hereinafter referred to as "The Privacy Act of 1974, as amended.")
+b. The individual may elect to respond in writing to the DoD Component or DOHA, as appropriate, within 30 calendar days from the date of the LOD or LOR.  Failure to respond to the LOD or LOR will result in automatic CAC denial or revocation.
+
+c. When, subsequent to issuance of an interim or final CAC, the U.S. Government receives credible information that raises questions as to whether a current CAC holder continues to meet the applicable credentialing standards, the DoD Component may reconsider the credentialing determination using the procedures in this instruction.
+
+## 5. Denial Or Revocation
+
+a. DoD Components must deny or revoke a CAC if the individual fails to respond to the LOD or LOR within the specified time-frame or the response to the written statement has not provided a basis to reverse the decision.
+
+b. Denial or revocation of a CAC must comply with applicable governing laws and regulations:
+(1) The U.S. Coast Guard will afford individuals appeal rights as established in applicable Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Coast Guard
+(2) CAC provides Service members with Geneva Convention protection in accordance with DoD Instruction 1000.01 (Reference (z)), and authorized benefits (e.g. medical) and must not be revoked or denied pursuant to the provisions of this instruction.  CAC for Military Service members will be surrendered only upon separation, discharge, or retirement.
+(3) In certain instances, a CAC provides other benefits or specific privileges to civilian employees (e.g. medical, post exchange and commissary) when assigned overseas long-term;  or protected status to  civilian employees and contractors who are accompanying U.S. forces during overseas deployments in accordance with Reference (z).  CAC for DoD civilians or contractors in this circumstance will not be revoked pursuant to the provisions of this instruction, but may be surrendered as part of other adverse employment or contracting actions or procedures.
+
+c. When eligibility is denied or revoked, the CAC will be recovered whenever practicable and will immediately be rendered inoperable.  In addition, agency's physical and local access systems will immediately be updated to eliminate the use of the CAC for access.
+
+## 6. Appeals
+
+a. Individuals who have been denied a CAC or have had a CAC revoked due to an unfavorable credentialing determination must be entitled to appeal the determination in accordance with the following procedures:
+(1) Except as stated in paragraph b, new civilian and contractor applicants who have been denied a CAC may elect to appeal to a three member board composed of not more than one security representative and one human resources representative.
+(2) Contractor employees who have had their CAC revoked may appeal the unfavorable determination to the DOHA in accordance with the established administrative process set out in Reference (r).
+b. This appeal process does not apply when a CAC is denied or revoked as a result of either an unfavorable suitability determination consistent with part 731 of Reference (x) or a decision to deny or revoke eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility for a sensitive national security position, since the person is already entitled to seek review in accordance with applicable suitability or national security procedures.  Likewise, there is no right to appeal when the decision to deny the CAC is based on the results of a separate determination to disqualify the person from an appointment in the excepted service or to bar the person from working for or on behalf of a federal department or agency.
+c. The DoD Component will notify the individual in writing of the final determination and provide a statement that this determination is not subject to further appeal.
+
+7. RECORDING FINAL DETERMINATION.  Immediately following final adjudication, the sponsoring activity must record the final eligibility determination (e.g., active, revoked, denied) in the OPM Central Verification System as directed by Reference (c).  DoD Component records will document the adjudicative rationale.  Adjudicative records will be made available to authorized recipients as required for appeal purposes.
+
+Appendixes
+1. Basic Adjudicative Standards 2. Supplemental Adjudicative Standards
+
+## Appendix 1 To Enclosure 4 Basic Adjudicative Standards
+
+1. A CAC will not be issued to a person if the individual is known to be or reasonably suspected of being a terrorist.
+
+a. Individuals entrusted with access to federal property and information systems must not put the U.S. Government at risk or provide an avenue for terrorism.
+
+b. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include evidence that the individual has knowingly and willfully been involved with reportable domestic or international terrorist contacts or foreign intelligence entities, counterintelligence activities, indicators, or other behaviors described in DoDD 5240.06 (Reference (aa)).
+
+2. A CAC will not be issued to a person if the employer is unable to verify the individual's claimed identity.
+
+a. To be considered eligible for a CAC, the individual's identity must be clearly authenticated.  The CAC must not be issued when identity cannot be authenticated.
+
+b. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include:
+(1) The individual claimed it was not possible to provide two identity source documents from the list of acceptable documents in Form I-9, Office of Management and Budget No. 1115-
+0136, "Employment Eligibility Verification,"(available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-
+9.pdf) or provided only one identity source document from the list of acceptable documents.
+
+(2) The individual did not appear in person as required by Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 201-2 (Reference (i)).
+
+(3) The individual refused to cooperate with the documentation and investigative requirements to validate his or her identity.
+
+(4) The investigation failed to confirm the individual's claimed identity.
+
+c. No conditions can mitigate inability to verify the applicant's identity.
+
+3. A CAC will not be issued to a person if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual has submitted fraudulent information concerning his or her identity.
+
+a. Substitution occurred in the identity proofing process; the individual who appeared on one occasion was not the same person that appeared on another occasion.
+
+b. The fingerprints associated with the identity do not belong to the person attempting to obtain a CAC.
+
+c. No conditions can mitigate submission of fraudulent information in an attempt to obtain a current credential.
+
+4. A CAC will not be issued to a person if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual will attempt to gain unauthorized access to classified documents, information protected by the Privacy Act, as amended (Reference (h)), information that is proprietary in nature, or other sensitive or protected information.
+
+a. Individuals must comply with information-handling regulations and rules.  Individuals must properly handle classified and protected information such as sensitive or proprietary information.
+b. Individuals should not attempt to gain unauthorized access to classified documents or other sensitive or protected information.  Unauthorized access to U.S. Government information or improper use of U.S. Government information once access is granted may pose a significant risk to national security, may compromise individual privacy, and may make public information that is proprietary in nature, thus compromising the operations and missions of federal agencies.
+c. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include any attempt to gain unauthorized access to classified, sensitive, proprietary or other protected information.
+d. Circumstances relevant to the determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe there is an unacceptable risk include:
+(1) Since the time of the last act or activities, the person has demonstrated a favorable change in behavior.
+(2) The behavior happened so long ago, was minor, or happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's ability and willingness to properly handle protected information. 5. A CAC will not be issued to a person if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual will use an identity credential outside the workplace unlawfully or inappropriately.
+
+a. Conditions that may be disqualifying include:
+(1) Documented history of fraudulent requests for credentials or other official documentation.
+
+(2) Previous incidents in which the individual used credentials or other official documentation to circumvent rules or regulations.
+
+(3) A history of incidents that put physical assets or personal property at risk.
+
+b. Circumstances relevant to the determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe there is an unacceptable risk include that the behavior happened so long ago, was minor, or happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's ability and willingness to use credentials lawfully and appropriately.
+
+6. A CAC will not be issued to a person if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual will use federally-controlled information systems unlawfully, make unauthorized modifications to such systems, corrupt or destroy such systems, or engage in inappropriate uses of such systems.
+
+a. Individuals must comply with rules, procedures, guidelines, or regulations pertaining to information technology systems and properly protect sensitive systems, networks, and information.  The individual should not attempt to use federally-controlled information systems unlawfully, make unauthorized modifications, corrupt or destroy, or engage in inappropriate uses of such systems.  A CAC must not be issued to a person if there is a reasonable basis to believe the individual will do so or has done so in the past.
+
+b. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include:
+(1) Illegal, unauthorized, or inappropriate use of an information technology system or component.
+
+(2) Unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation of information, software, firmware, or hardware to corrupt or destroy information technology systems or data.
+
+c. Circumstances relevant to the determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe there is an unacceptable risk include that the behavior happened so long ago, was minor, or happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's ability and willingness to conform to rules and regulations for use of information technology systems.
+
+## Appendix 2 To Enclosure 4 Supplemental Adjudicative Standards
+
+1. A CAC will not be issued to a person if there is a reasonable basis to believe, based on the individual's misconduct or negligence in employment, that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.
+
+a. An individual's employment misconduct or negligence may put people, property, or information systems at risk.
+
+b. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include:
+(1) A previous history of intentional wrongdoing on the job, disruptive, violent, or other acts that may pose an unacceptable risk to people, property, or information systems.
+(2) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations in the workplace which put people, property or information at risk.
+
+(3) A documented history of misusing workplace information systems to view, download, or distribute pornography.
+
+(4) Violation of written or recorded commitments to protect information made to an employer, such as breach(es) of confidentiality or the release of proprietary or other information.
+
+(5) Failure to comply with rules or regulations for the safeguarding of classified, sensitive, or other protected information.
+
+c. Circumstances relevant to the determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe there is an unacceptable risk include:
+(1) The behavior happened so long ago, was minor, or happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current trustworthiness or good judgment relating to the safety of people and proper safeguarding of property and information systems.
+
+(2) The individual was not adequately warned that the conduct was unacceptable and could not reasonably be expected to know that the conduct was wrong.
+
+(3) The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the behavior. (4) The individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial training and has since demonstrated a positive attitude toward the discharge of information-handling or security responsibilities.
+
+2. A CAC will not be issued to a person if there is a reasonable basis to believe, based on the individual's criminal or dishonest conduct, that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.
+
+a. An individual's conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about his or her reliability or trustworthiness and may put people, property, or information systems at risk.  An individual's past criminal or dishonest conduct may put people, property, or information systems at risk.
+b. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include:
+(1) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses which put the safety of people at risk or threaten the protection of property or information.  A person's convictions for burglary may indicate that granting a CAC poses an unacceptable risk to the U.S. Government's physical assets and to employees' personal property on a U.S. Government facility.
+
+(2) Charges or admission of criminal conduct relating to the safety of people and proper protection of property or information systems, regardless of whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted, or convicted.
+
+(3) Dishonest acts (e.g., theft, accepting bribes, falsifying claims, perjury, forgery, or attempting to obtain identity documentation without proper authorization).
+
+(4) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, or other intentional financial breaches of trust.
+
+(5) Actions involving violence or sexual behavior of a criminal nature that poses an unacceptable risk if access is granted to federally-controlled facilities and federally-controlled information systems.  For example, convictions for sexual assault may indicate that granting a CAC poses an unacceptable risk to the life and safety of persons on U.S. Government facilities.
+
+(6) Financial irresponsibility may raise questions about the individual's honesty and put people, property or information systems at risk, although financial debt should not in and of itself be cause for denial.
+(7) Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant facts or deliberately providing false or misleading information to an employer, investigator, security official, competent medical authority, or other official U.S. Government representative, particularly when doing so results in personal benefit or which results in a risk to the safety of people and proper safeguarding of property and information systems.
+
+c. Circumstances relevant to the determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe there is an unacceptable risk include:
+(1) The behavior happened so long ago, was minor in nature, or happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur.
+
+(2) Charges were dismissed or evidence was provided that the person did not commit the offense and details and reasons support his or her innocence.
+
+(3) Improper or inadequate advice from authorized personnel or legal counsel significantly contributed to the individual's omission of information.  When confronted, the individual provided an accurate explanation and made prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation.
+
+(4) Evidence has been supplied of successful rehabilitation, including but not limited to remorse or restitution, job training or higher education, good employment record, constructive community involvement, or passage of time without recurrence. 3. A CAC will not be issued to a person if there is a reasonable basis to believe, based on the individual's material, intentional false statement, deception, or fraud in connection with federal or contract employment, that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.
+
+a. The individual's conduct involving questionable judgment, lack of candor, or unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations can raise questions about an individual's honesty, reliability, trustworthiness, and put people, property, or information systems at risk.
+b. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include material, intentional falsification, deception or fraud related to answers or information provided during the employment process for the current or a prior federal or contract employment (e.g., on the employment application or other employment, appointment or investigative documents, or during interviews.)
+c. Circumstances relevant to the determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe there is an unacceptable risk include:
+(1) The misstated or omitted information was so long ago, was minor, or happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur.
+
+(2) The misstatement or omission was unintentional or inadvertent and was followed by a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation. 4. A CAC will not be issued to a person if there is a reasonable basis to believe, based on the nature or duration of the individual's alcohol abuse without evidence of substantial rehabilitation, that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.
+
+a. An individual's abuse of alcohol may put people, property, or information systems at risk.
+
+Alcohol abuse can lead to the exercise of questionable judgment or failure to control impulses, and may put people, property, or information systems at risk, regardless of whether he or she is diagnosed as an abuser of alcohol or alcohol dependent.  A person's long-term abuse of alcohol without evidence of substantial rehabilitation may indicate that granting a CAC poses an unacceptable safety risk in a U.S. Government facility.
+
+b. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include:
+(1) A pattern of alcohol-related arrests. (2) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job.
+
+(3) Current continuing abuse of alcohol. (4) Failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol education, evaluation, treatment, or abstinence.
+
+c. Circumstances relevant to the determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe there is an unacceptable risk include:
+(1) The individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues of alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if alcohol dependent) or responsible use (if an abuser of alcohol).
+
+(2) The individual is participating in counseling or treatment programs, has no history of previous treatment or relapse, and is making satisfactory progress.
+
+(3) The individual has successfully completed inpatient or outpatient counseling or rehabilitation along with any required aftercare.  He or she has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment recommendations, such as participation in an alcohol treatment program.  The individual has received a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol treatment program.
+
+5. A CAC will not be issued to a person if there is a reasonable basis to believe, based on the nature or duration of the individual's illegal use of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances without evidence of substantial rehabilitation, that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.
+
+a. An individual's abuse of drugs may put people, property, or information systems at risk.
+
+Illegal use of narcotics, drugs, or other controlled substances, to include abuse of prescription or over-the-counter drugs, can raise questions about his or her trustworthiness, or ability or willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.  For example, a person's long-term illegal use of narcotics without evidence of substantial rehabilitation may indicate that granting a CAC poses an unacceptable safety risk in a U.S. Government facility.
+
+b. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include:
+(1) Current or recent illegal drug use, serious narcotic, or other controlled substance offense.
+
+(2) A pattern of drug-related arrests or problems in employment.
+
+(3) Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution of illegal drugs, or possession of drug paraphernalia.
+
+(4) Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or drug dependence.
+
+(5) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug treatment program.
+
+(6) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a duly qualified medical professional.
+
+(7) Any illegal drug use after formally agreeing to comply with rules or regulations prohibiting drug use.
+
+(8) Any illegal use or abuse of prescription or over-the-counter drugs.
+
+c. Circumstances relevant to the determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe there is an unacceptable risk include:
+(1) The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur (e.g., clear, lengthy break since last use; strong evidence the use will not occur again).
+
+(2) A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, such as:
+
+(a) Abstaining from drug use. (b) Disassociating from drug-using associates and contacts. (c) Changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used.
+(3) Abuse of prescription drugs followed a severe or prolonged illness during which these drugs were prescribed and abuse has since ended.
+
+(4) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including but not limited to rehabilitation and aftercare requirements without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional. 6. A CAC will not be issued to a person if a statutory or regulatory bar prevents the individual's contract employment; or would prevent federal employment under circumstances that furnish a reasonable basis to believe that issuance of a CAC poses an unacceptable risk.
+
+a. The purpose of this standard is to verify whether there is a bar on contract employment, or whether the contract employee is subject to a federal employment debarment for reasons also pose an unacceptable risk in the contracting context.  For example, a person's 5-year bar on federal employment based on a felony conviction related to inciting a riot or civil disorder, as specified in section 7313 of Reference (h), may indicate that granting a CAC poses an unacceptable risk to persons, property, and assets in U.S. Government facilities.
+
+b. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include:
+(1) A debarment was imposed by OPM, DoD, or other federal agencies when the conduct poses an unacceptable risk to people, property, or information systems.
+
+(2) The suitability debarment was based on the presence of serious suitability issues when the conduct poses an unacceptable risk to people, property, or information systems.
+
+c. Circumstances relevant to the determination include:
+(1) Applicant proves the reason(s) for the debarment no longer exists. (2) The debarment is job or position-specific and is not applicable to the job currently under consideration.
+
+7. A CAC will not be issued to a person if the individual has knowingly and willfully engaged in acts or activities designed to overthrow the U.S. government by force.
+
+a. Individuals entrusted with access to U.S. Government property and information systems must not put the U.S. Government at risk.
+
+b. Therefore, conditions that may be disqualifying include:
+(1) Illegal involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason or sedition against the United States of America.
+
+(2) Association or agreement with persons who attempt to or commit any of the acts in subparagraph 7.b.(1) of this section with the specific intent to further those unlawful aims.
+
+(3) Association or agreement with persons or organizations that advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other illegal or unconstitutional means in an effort to overthrow or influence the U.S. Government.
+
+c. Circumstances relevant to the determination of whether there is a reasonable basis to believe there is an unacceptable risk include:
+(1) The behavior happened so long ago, was minor, or happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's current trustworthiness.
+(2) The person was not aware of the person's or organization's dedication to illegal, treasonous, or seditious activities or did not have the specific intent to further the illegal, treasonous, or seditious ends of the person or organization.
+(3) The individual did not have the specific intent to incite others to advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other illegal or unconstitutional means to engage in illegal, treasonous, or seditious activities.
+
+(4) The individual's involvement in the activities was for an official purpose.
+
+## Glossary Part I.  Abbreviations And Acronyms
+
+CAC
+common access card
+DoDD
+DoD Directive
+DOHA
+Defense Office of Hearings and Appeals
+FBI
+Federal Bureau of Investigation
+GC, DoD *GC DoD*
+General Counsel of the Department of Defense
+HR
+human resource
+ISP
+investigative service provider
+NACI
+National Agency Check with Inquiries
+NISP
+National Industrial Security Program
+OPM
+U.S. Office of Personnel Management
+PIV
+personal identity verification
+PSI
+personnel security investigation
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+USCIS
+U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
+USD(AT&L)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
+USD(I)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
+USD(P&R)
+Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+
+## Part Ii.  Definitions
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this instruction. actionable information.  Information that potentially justifies an unfavorable credentialing determination. CAC.  The DoD Federal PIV card. contractor.  Defined in Executive Order 13467 (Reference (j)). contractor employee fitness.  Defined in Reference (j).
+
+debarment.  A prohibition from taking a competitive service examination or from being hired (or retained in) a covered position for a specific time period. drugs.  Mood and behavior-altering substances, including drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and listed in sections 801-830 of title 21, U.S.C. (also known as "The Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended"(Reference (ab)) (e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, hallucinogens), and inhalants and other similar substances. drug abuse.  The illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction. employee.  Defined in Reference (y).
+
+fitness.  Defined in Executive Order 13488 (Reference (k)).
+
+fitness determination.  Defined in Reference (k). logical and physical access.  Defined in Reference (j). material.  Defined in part 731 of Reference (x). reasonable basis.  A reasonable basis to believe occurs when a disinterested observer, with knowledge of the same facts and circumstances, would reasonably reach the same conclusion. Suitability Executive Agent.  Defined in Reference (j) terrorism.  Defined in section 2331 of Title 19, U.S.C. (Reference (ac)). unacceptable risk.  A threat to the life, safety, or health of employees, contractors, vendors, or visitors; to the U.S. Government physical assets or information systems; to personal property; to records, including classified, privileged, proprietary, financial, and medical records; or to the privacy rights established by The Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, or other law that is deemed unacceptable when making risk management determinations. U.S. national.  Defined in Reference (c).

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+## Dod Instruction 5210.42 Dod Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Assurance
+
+
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment
+
+
+Effective:
+April 27, 2016
+Change 3 Effective:
+October 11, 2019
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+
+
+Reissues and renames:
+DoD Instruction 5210.42, "Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability
+Program (PRP)," July 16, 2012
+
+Approved by:
+Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics
+Change 3 (Administrative)
+Approved by:
+Karen Saunders, Chief of Staff
+
+
+Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5134.01 and the July 13,
+2018 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, this issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides direction for the management of individuals assigned to perform specified duties associated with U.S. nuclear weapons, nuclear command and control (NC2) systems, positive control material (PCM) and equipment, and special nuclear material (SNM) and subject to a nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance program as directed in DoDD
+S-5210.81, DoDD 3150.02, and DoD Instruction (DoDI) O-5210.63.
+
+
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3 1.3.  Summary of Change 3. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 4
+2.1.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
+(ASD(NCB)). ........ 4
+2.2.  Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). ........ 4 2.3.  Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)). ........ 4
+2.4.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs (ASD(HA)). ........ 4
+2.5.  Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (ASD(M&RA)). ..... 5 2.6.  DoD Component Heads Involved With Nuclear Command and Control System (NCCS)
+or SNM........ 5
+SECTION 3:  STANDARDS ........ 6
+3.1.  Key Tenets. ........ 6 3.2.  Essential Elements. ........ 6 3.3.  Mandatory Disqualification or Decertification. ........ 7
+GLOSSARY ........ 9
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 9 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 9
+REFERENCES ........ 11
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information
+
+1.1.  APPLICABILITY.  This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a.  In accordance with Presidential Policy Directive 35 and DoDD 3150.02, nuclear weapon systems require special consideration because of their political and military importance, their destructive power, and the potential consequences of an accident or unauthorized act.  Assured nuclear weapons safety, security, and control remain of paramount importance.  NC2 safety and security also remain of paramount importance as stated in DoDD S-5210.81.
+
+b.  Only those persons who demonstrate reliability will be certified to perform specified duties associated with U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, and SNM.
+
+c.  Only DoD military and civilian personnel will fill a U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, or SNM duty position unless the DoD Component head decides that contractor personnel are required for performance of these duties and that the contract services are essential in accordance with DoDI 1100.22.
+
+1.3.  SUMMARY OF CHANGE 3.  This change is administrative and updates references and organizational symbols to reflect the reorganization of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, pursuant to the July 13, 2018 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum.
+
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND
+BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS (ASD(NCB)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), the ASD(NCB):
+a.  Develops nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance policy, standards, and procedures; and provides management oversight of personnel reliability assurance.
+
+b.  Reviews DoD Component nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance implementation guidance for consistency and compliance with this issuance.
+
+c.  Conducts programmatic reviews, manages audits, and directs research and analysis related to nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance.
+
+d.  Ensures the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement provides for application of the requirements of this issuance to contracts for performance of duties associated with nuclear weapons.
+
+e.  In accordance with DoDD 5205.16, advises DoD Components on the requirements of insider threat policies as related to nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance.
+
+2.2.  DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY (DTRA).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(A&S) and through the ASD(NCB), the Director, DTRA, conducts defense nuclear surety inspection oversight and nuclear personnel reliability assurance staff assessments for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
+
+2.3.  UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS
+(USD(P&R)).  The USD(P&R) advises and consults on:
+a.  Policies, standards, and procedures for all military, civilian, and contractor personnel actions related to nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance.
+
+b.  Federal civilian personnel management matters related to nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance.
+
+c.  Nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance education and training materials.
+
+2.4.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR HEALTH AFFAIRS (ASD(HA)).
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), the ASD(HA) advises and consults on:
+a.  Medical policies, standards, and procedures for evaluation of candidates and individuals subject to nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance.
+
+b.  Periodic and special reviews conducted by the Military Departments on the effectiveness of nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance medical policies, standards, and procedures.
+
+c.  Education and training materials for medical support to nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance.
+
+2.5.  ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR MANPOWER AND RESERVE
+AFFAIRS (ASD(M&RA)).  Under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(P&R), the ASD(M&RA):
+a.  Implements policies, conducts analyses, provides advice, and makes recommendations to the USD(P&R) and the Secretary of Defense on nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance matters concerning the Reserve Components.
+
+b.  Reviews and evaluates DoD programs that have application(s) for Reserve Component individuals subject to personnel reliability assurance.
+
+2.6.  DOD COMPONENT HEADS INVOLVED WITH NUCLEAR COMMAND AND
+CONTROL SYSTEM (NCCS) OR SNM.  The DoD Component heads involved with NCCS or SNM:
+a.  Recommend nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance policy, standards, and procedure changes to the ASD(NCB).
+
+b.  Develop policies, standards, and procedures for ensuring due process for individuals identified for disqualification or decertification, and for requalifying individuals who have been disqualified or decertified.
+
+c.  Provide nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance training to individuals who are certified in, or who administer, nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance.
+
+d.  Define contractor procedures for incorporation into contracts when the statement of work under the contract involves activities that are subject to nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance.
+
+e.  Conduct periodic and special reviews of the effectiveness of nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance policies, standards, and procedures.
+
+## Section 3:  Standards 3.1.  Key Tenets.
+
+a.  Only certified personnel will be assigned to U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM
+and equipment, or SNM duty positions.  They will be formally designated in accordance with DoD Manual (DoDM) 5210.42 and will be restricted to the minimum number required to accomplish the mission.
+
+b.  Certification is based on informed decisions concerning an individual's reliability to perform U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, or SNM duties as determined through comprehensive screening and continuing evaluation.
+
+c.  Disqualification or decertification of nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance eligibility is neither a punitive measure nor the basis for disciplinary action.  The failure of an individual to be qualified or certified for assignment to U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, or SNM duty does not necessarily reflect unfavorably on the individual's suitability for assignment to other, non-nuclear related duties.
+
+d.  Nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance is a critical link in nuclear surety.
+Screening, personnel security investigations, and continuing evaluation are designed to mitigate risks and protect the nuclear deterrent from insider threats.  As such, supporting agencies and supervisors must aid commanders and certifying officials in their initial and continuing evaluation duties by providing all relevant information on those trusted with U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, or SNM duty.
+
+3.2.  ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS.  Commanders are responsible for ensuring that all military, civilian, and contractor personnel assigned to nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance positions meet the qualifying criteria.  Individuals must:
+
+a.  Be a U.S. citizen.
+b.  Have a security clearance, in accordance with DoDM 5200.02.  All individuals assigned to nuclear personnel reliability assurance positions will be subject to a position appropriate periodic reinvestigation every 5 years.
+
+c.  Be fully qualified in the U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, or SNM duty position.
+
+d.  Have reliability verified by the certifying official in accordance with DoDM 5210.42 prior to assignment.
+
+e.  Be continuously evaluated.
+
+(1)  Certifying officials must observe the behavior and performance of individuals subject to nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance on a frequent and consistent basis.  The primary consideration for certifying officials should be that the sum of all observations, including personal and peer observation and reporting, is sufficiently detailed to allow for thorough evaluation of the individual.
+
+(2)  For periods in which an individual subject to nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance was not subject to continuing evaluation, the certifying official must ensure that the individual's reliability during these times continues to meet reliability assurance standards.
+
+f.  Have a medical evaluation in accordance with DoDM 5210.42.  As part of the nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance certification process, medical personnel will evaluate health history and records to determine the candidate's medical qualifications for U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, or SNM duty.  When an individual's performance may be impaired by medical care or the use of prescribed medication or short-term stress, the certifying official will be notified to decide if the individual needs to be removed from these duties.
+
+g.  Have a personnel file review in accordance with DoDM 5210.42.  The certifying official will take into account any personnel files, other official records, and information locally available on the behavior, conduct, and reliability of the individual.
+
+h.  Have a personal interview.  The certifying official will personally interview the selected individual.  This interview will not be conducted as part of a routine orientation briefing.
+
+i.  Meet the following qualifying criteria:
+(1)  Be dependable, mentally alert, and technically proficient commensurate with their respective U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, or SNM duty requirements.
+
+(2)  Be flexible in adjusting to changes in the working environment, including ability to work in adverse or emergency situations.
+
+(3)  Have good social adjustment, emotional stability, personal integrity, sound judgment, and allegiance to the United States.
+
+(4)  Have a positive attitude toward U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, and SNM duty.
+
+3.3.  MANDATORY DISQUALIFICATION OR DECERTIFICATION.  Any of the following conditions will result in disqualification or decertification of the individual assigned to or being considered for U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment or SNM duty positions:
+a.  An individual diagnosed with alcohol use disorder who subsequently fails to complete or fails to participate in the prescribed rehabilitation program or treatment regimen.
+
+b.  An individual found to be involved in the unauthorized trafficking, cultivation, processing, manufacturing, or sale of any controlled or illegal drug, including cannabis-based products.
+
+c.  An individual found to have ever used a drug that could cause flashbacks. d.  An individual diagnosed with severe substance use disorder. e.  Revocation of the individual's security clearance. f.  Loss of confidence by the certifying official in the reliability of the individual.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+| ASD(HA)          | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs                    |
+|------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| ASD(NCB)         | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological |
+| Defense Programs |                                                                      |
+| ASD(M&RA)        | Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Reserve Affairs      |
+|                  |                                                                      |
+| DoDD             | DoD directive                                                        |
+| DoDI             | DoD instruction                                                      |
+| DoDM             | DoD manual                                                           |
+| DTRA             | Defense Threat Reduction Agency                                      |
+|                  |                                                                      |
+| NC2              | nuclear command and control                                          |
+| NCCS             | Nuclear Command and Control System                                   |
+|                  |                                                                      |
+| PCM              | positive control material                                            |
+|                  |                                                                      |
+| SNM              | special nuclear material                                             |
+|                  |                                                                      |
+| USD(A&S)         | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment           |
+| USD(P&R)         | Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness               |
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+alcohol use disorder.  A problematic pattern of alcohol use leading to clinically significant impairment or distress, as defined by symptoms in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
+
+certifying official.  DoD military or civilian official responsible for U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2
+systems, PCM and equipment, and SNM operations having sufficient personal contact with all subordinate individuals subject to personnel reliability assurance to permit continual evaluation of their performance and assessment of their continued reliability.  For DoD contractor personnel, the certifying official will be the DoD military or civilian official identified for that purpose in the contract.
+continuing evaluation.  The process by which a nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance certified individual is observed for compliance with reliability standards.  This is an ongoing process that considers duty performance, on- and off-duty behavior, and reliability on a continuing and frequent basis.
+
+decertified.  An action based on the receipt of adverse information leading to removal from nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance of an individual who has been screened, determined reliable, and certified capable of preforming U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, or SNM duty.
+disqualification.  Before certification, an action taken based on the receipt of information to deny nuclear weapons personnel reliability assurance eligibility of an individual considered for, or in training leading to the assignment to, U.S. nuclear weapons, NC2 systems, PCM and equipment, or SNM duty.
+
+NCCS.  Defined in DoDD S-5210.81. reliability.  A combination of the traits of integrity, trustworthiness, emotional stability, professional competence, and unquestioned loyalty and allegiance to the United States.
+
+SNM.  As defined under Section 2011 of Title 42, United States Code, also known as the
+"Atomic Energy Act of 1954," as amended.  SNM is plutonium and uranium, enriched with the isotope uranium-233 or in the isotope uranium-235.  SNM does not include source material such as natural uranium or thorium.
+
+substance use disorder.  A problematic pattern of substance use leading to clinically significant impairment or distress, as defined by symptoms in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
+
+## References
+
+American Psychiatric Association, "Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,"
+current edition
+
+Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, current edition Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Establishment of the Office of the Under Secretary
+of Defense for Research and Engineering and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment," July 13, 2018
+DoD Directive 3150.02, "DoD Nuclear Weapons Surety Program," April 24, 2013, as amended DoD Directive 5134.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and
+Logistics," December 9, 2005, as amended
+DoD Directive 5205.16, "The DoD Insider Threat Program," September 30, 2014, as amended
+DoD Directive S-5210.81, "United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control, Safety, and
+Security," April 24, 2017
+DoD Instruction 1100.22, "Policies and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix," April 12,
+2010, as amended
+DoD Instruction O-5210.63, "DoD Procedures for Security of Nuclear Reactors and Special
+Nuclear Materials (SNM)," November 21, 2006, as amended
+DoD Manual 5200.02, "Procedures for the DoD Personnel Security Program (PSP),"
+April 3, 2017
+DoD Manual 5210. 42, "Nuclear Weapons Personnel Reliability Program (PRP) Regulation,"
+January 13, 2015, as amended
+Presidential Policy Directive 35, "United States Nuclear Weapons Command and Control,
+Safety, and Security," December 8, 2015
+United States Code, Title 42

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+## Dod Instruction 5505.15 Dod Contractor Disclosure Program Originating Component: Office Of Inspector General Of The Department Of Defense
+
+ Effective:
+June 3, 2021
+Change 1 Effective:
+
+October 31, 2022 Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+
+ Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Instruction 5505.15, "DoD Contractor Disclosure Program,"
+June 16, 2010
+
+ Approved by:
+Sean W. O'Donnell, Acting Inspector General of the Department of
+Defense
+Change 1 Approved by:
+Sean W. O'Donnell, Acting Inspector General of the Department of
+Defense
+
+ Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5106.01, the Inspector General
+(IG) Act of 1978, as amended, in the Appendix of Title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.), and DoD
+Instruction (DoDI) 7050.01, this issuance establishes policies and assigns responsibilities for receiving, reporting and investigating contractor disclosures for violations of:
+
+- Federal criminal law involving fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, or gratuity violations found in
+Title 18, U.S.C.
+- A violation of Sections 3729 through 3733 of Title 31, U.S.C., also known and referred to in this issuance as the "False Claims Act," in connection with the award, performance, or closeout of any contract or subcontract.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3 1.3.  Summary of Change 1. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 4
+2.1.  IG DoD. ........ 4 2.2.  Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment. ........ 5 2.3.  Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). ........ 5 2.4.  DoD Component Heads, Excluding the Director, DCAA. ........ 5
+2.5.  DoD Component Heads, Excluding the DoD Intelligence Component Heads and
+Director, DCAA. ........ 5
+2.6.  DoD Intelligence Component IGs. ........ 6 2.7.  Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard. 6
+GLOSSARY ........ 7
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 7 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 7
+REFERENCES ........ 8
+
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+This issuance applies to OSD, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG DoD), the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+a.  All contractor disclosures made pursuant to Paragraphs 1.2.a.(1) through 1.2.a.(3) will be reported to the IG DoD, in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Subpart 203.1003(b) of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS), as applicable:
+(1)  The provisions in the Subpart 3.10. of the FAR, for the establishment of contractor codes of business ethics and conduct.
+
+(2)  Subpart 9.4. of the FAR, governing the debarment and suspension of contractors. (3)  Clause 52.203-13 of the FAR, the Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct.
+
+b.  A referral for investigation of a contractor disclosure to a DoD Component or Defense Criminal Investigative Organization (DCIO) Hotline Coordinator by the IG DoD will be considered a referral as provided for in DoDD 5106.01 and DoDI 7050.01.
+
+## 1.3.  Summary Of Change 1.
+
+This administrative change updates a legal citation and definition.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities 2.1.  Ig Dod.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraphs 2.4. and 2.5., the IG DoD:
+a.  Manages the DoD Contractor Disclosure Program and develops policies and procedures to receive contractor disclosures from DoD employees, contractors, and subcontractors.
+
+b.  Receives all contractor disclosures in accordance with Clause 52.203-13(b)(3)(i) of the FAR and Subpart 203.1003(b) of the DFARS, as applicable, as the "agency office of the Inspector General."
+c.  Promptly notifies the Criminal Division and Civil Division of the Department of Justice and affected DoD Components, as appropriate, upon receipt of a contractor disclosure matter, and periodically discusses with these organizations the status of outstanding disclosures.
+
+d.  Notifies the respective DoD Intelligence Component's IG upon receipt of non-frivolous allegations of contractor disclosure matters relating to fraud, bribery, conflict of interest, gratuity violations, or violations of the False Claims Act involving its agency; coordinates investigative activities with that IG to avoid duplication; and periodically discusses the status of such matters.
+
+e.  Refers contractor disclosures determined to be of a criminal nature to the appropriate DCIO for investigation.
+
+f.  Conducts annual reviews of DCIO investigative activities to ensure timely investigations of contractor disclosure matters referred to those organizations.
+
+g.  Refers non-criminal contractor disclosures to the affected DoD Component, after coordination with the Department of Justice Criminal Division and Civil Division.
+
+h.  Coordinates remedies proposed by DoD Component suspension and debarment authorities with DCIOs to ensure the proposed remedies do not impact ongoing investigations, in accordance with DoDI 7050.05.
+
+i.  Safeguards and treats information obtained pursuant to the contractor's disclosure as confidential, as appropriate, including where the information has been marked "confidential,"
+"proprietary," or similarly by the company.
+
+(1)  To the extent required or permitted by law and regulation, such information will not be released by the U.S. Government to the public pursuant to a request made in accordance with Section 552 of Title 5, U.S.C., also known as the "Freedom of Information Act," without prior notification to the contractor and in accordance with DoD Manual 5400.07.
+
+(2)  The U.S. Government may transfer documents provided by the contractor to any department or agency within the Executive Branch if the information relates to matters within the organization's jurisdiction.
+
+## 2.2.  Under Secretary Of Defense For Acquisition And Sustainment.
+
+The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment establishes guidelines to ensure that contractor disclosures are promptly forwarded to the IG DoD.
+
+## 2.3.  Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency (Dcaa).
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of the Defense (Comptroller) /Chief Financial Officer, Department of Defense, the Director, DCAA:
+a.  Establishes procedures to ensure any contractor disclosure received directly from a contractor is immediately forwarded to the IG DoD.
+
+b.  Provides audit support to contracting officers, the IG DoD, and the DCIOs in accordance with the DCAA Contract Audit Manual 7640.1.
+
+## 2.4.  Dod Component Heads, Excluding The Director, Dcaa.
+
+The DoD Component heads, excluding the Director, DCAA, establish procedures to:
+a.  Require that acquisition officials and contracting officers immediately forward to the IG
+DoD, in accordance with Subpart 3.10, Section 3.1003(b) of the FAR and Subpart 203.1003(b) of the DFARS, as applicable, and inform the relevant DoD Intelligence Component IG for situational awareness, when applicable, any possible contractor violation of:
+(1)  Federal criminal law involving fraud, conflict of interest, bribery, or gratuity violations found in Title 18, U.S.C.; or
+(2)  The False Claims Act.
+
+b.  Reference Clause 252.203-7003 of the DFARS in all solicitations and contracts in accordance with Clause 52.203-13(b)(3)(i) of the FAR or Subpart 203.1003(b) of the DFARS.
+
+c.  Assess contractor disclosures to determine whether administrative remedies are necessary.
+DoD Component heads will decide to take action following coordination with affected DoD Components, components' IGs, and the servicing DCIO.
+
+## 2.5.  Dod Component Heads, Excluding The Dod Intelligence Component Heads And Director, Dcaa.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.4., the DoD Component heads, excluding the DoD Intelligence Component heads and Director, DCAA, establish procedures to provide the IG DoD a copy of the hotline completion report of all actions taken as a result of an investigation or inquiry subsequent to an action referral from the DoD Hotline.
+
+## 2.6.  Dod Intelligence Component Igs.
+
+The DoD Intelligence Component IGs will establish procedures to:
+a.  Notify the IG DoD of any non-frivolous allegations reported by a contractor concerning fraud, bribery, conflict of interest, or gratuity violations and violations of the False Claims Act, unless the IG DoD and a DoD Intelligence Component's IG agree on categories of disclosures that do not require notification.
+
+b.  Notify the DoD Hotline if the DoD Intelligence Component IG believes an investigation or inquiry is not warranted or practicable in response to an action referral, or a response is not warranted or practicable to an action referral, and coordinate with the DoD Hotline to determine the appropriate course of action.
+
+c.  Provide the IG DoD a copy of the hotline completion report or other reporting format as agreed on by the IG DoD and the DoD Intelligence Component IG, and the results of actions taken by the DoD Intelligence Component IG in response to an action referral from the DoD Hotline, including administrative remedies taken by the DoD Intelligence Component head.
+Coordinate with the DoD Hotline to determine the appropriate course of action for any case the DoD Hotline review determines requires further action.
+
+## 2.7.  Secretaries Of The Military Departments And The Commandant Of The U.S. Coast Guard.
+
+In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraphs 2.4. and 2.5., the Secretaries of the Military Departments and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard:
+
+a.  Ensure that their respective DCIOs:
+(1)  Thoroughly and in a timely fashion, adhere to established procedures to evaluate allegations of fraud, criminal matters, or violations found in Title 18, U.S.C., or the False Claims Act, arising from contractor disclosures that involve programs, persons, and organizations affiliated or conducting business with the DoD.
+
+(2)  Investigate allegations in accordance with DoDD 5106.01 and DoDI 5505.02 when indicated.
+
+b.  Establish procedures within their Military Service to resolve, through administrative remedies, contractor disclosures when DCIOs determine the matter does not fall within their investigative jurisdiction.
+
+c.  Establish procedures to ensure DCIOs provide the IG DoD a copy of the hotline completion report of all actions taken as a result of an investigation or inquiry.
+
+d.  Establish procedures within their Military Service to ensure DCIOs report information of potential insider threats involving contractors to their appropriate DoD Component counter insider threat program office in accordance with DoDD 5205.16.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+DCAA
+Defense Contract Audit Agency
+DCIO
+Defense Criminal Investigative Organization
+DFARS
+Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
+DoDD
+DoD directive
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+FAR
+Federal Acquisition Regulation
+IG
+inspector general
+IG DoD
+Inspector General of the Department of Defense
+U.S.C.
+United States Code
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+action referral
+A referral for action as defined in DoDI 7050.01.
+contractor disclosure
+A written disclosure by a DoD contractor or subcontractor to the IG DoD of the existence of credible evidence that the contractor or subcontractor has committed a violation of Title 18, U.S.C., or the
+False Claims Act, in connection with the award, performance, or closeout of a contract or any subcontract thereunder.
+
+DCIOs
+The United States Army Criminal Investigation Command, Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Defense Criminal Investigative Service.
+DoD Intelligence Components
+The DoD Intelligence Components are the National Security Agency; National Reconnaissance Office; Defense Intelligence Agency; and National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.
+
+
+## References
+
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 48, Part 52, Subpart 203-13 Defense Contract Audit Agency Contract Audit Manual 7640.1, current edition Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, current edition DoD Directive 5106.01, "Inspector General of the Department of Defense (IG DoD),"
+April 20, 2012, as amended
+
+DoD Directive 5205.16, "The DoD Insider Threat Program," September 30, 2014, as amended DoD Instruction 5505.02, "Criminal Investigations of Fraud Offenses," August 29, 2013,
+as amended
+DoD Instruction 7050.01, "DoD Hotline Program," October 17, 2017 DoD Instruction 7050.05, "Coordination of Remedies for Fraud and Corruption Related to Procurement Activities," May 12, 2014, as amended DoD Manual 5400.07, "DoD Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Program," January 25, 2017 Federal Acquisition Regulation, current edition United States Code, Title 5 United States Code, Title 18 United States Code, Title 31

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+## Dod Instruction 6055.08 Occupational Ionizing Radiation Protection Program
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+April 9, 2021
+Effective: Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the Directives Division Website at https://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Instruction 6055.08, "Occupational Ionizing Radiation Protection
+Program," December 15, 2009, as amended
+Approved by:
+Virginia S. Penrod, Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive 5124.02 and the April 10, 2019 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, and the guidance in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6055.01, this issuance:
+
+
+Implements the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ionizing radiation standards
+pursuant to Section 1910.1096 of Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), and in accordance with Executive Order 12196; Chapter 15 of Title 29, United States Code, also known as the "Occupational
+Safety and Health Act of 1970, as amended;" and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Radiation Protection Guidance to Federal Agencies for Occupational Exposure.
+
+Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and updates requirements for the Occupational Ionizing
+Radiation Protection Program for the DoD in DoD workplaces, including military operations and deployments.
+
+Establishes the DoD Ionizing Radiation Working Group (DoD IRWG) to provide technical guidance
+and recommend policy on ionizing radiation safety and occupational health matters within the DoD in accordance with DoDI 6055.01.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3 1.3.  Information Collections. ........ 4
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 5
+2.1.  ASD(R). ........ 5 2.2.  DoD Component Heads. ........ 5
+SECTION 3:  OCCUPATIONAL IONIZING RADIATION PROTECTION PROGRAM REQUIREMENTS ........ 6
+3.1.  General. ........ 6 3.2.  Dosimetry. ........ 6
+3.3.  Health Risk Management (HRM). ........ 6 3.4.  Ionizing Radiation Doses to the Unborn Child. ........ 7
+a.  ALARA. ........ 7 b.  Notifications. ........ 7 c.  Declaration Statement. ........ 7 d.  Occupational Exposure Limits. ........ 7
+3.5.  Inspections, Risk Management, and Records. ........ 8
+a. Inspections........ 8
+b.  Risk Management. ........ 8 c.  Records. ........ 8
+3.6.  Control of Radioactive Material and Devices Capable of Generating Ionizing Radiation.
+........ 9
+3.7.  Increased Controls. ........ 10 3.8.  ALARA Program. ........ 10 3.9.  Facilities and Installations........ 10 3.10.  Cosmic Radiation. ........ 11
+SECTION 4:  DOD IRWG FUNCTIONS ........ 12 GLOSSARY ........ 13
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 13 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 13
+REFERENCES ........ 15 Figure 1.  Equation for Calculating the WLM/yr ........ 10
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information 1.1.  Applicability.
+
+This issuance:
+a. Applies to:
+(1) OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+(2) All DoD civilian and military personnel who are occupationally exposed to ionizing radiation.
+
+b. Does not apply to:
+(1) Personnel who, as patients, undergo diagnostic or therapeutic radiological procedures in medical or dental treatment facilities.
+
+(2) Personnel exposed to ionizing radiation as a result of nuclear war or detonation of improvised nuclear devices or radiological dispersal devices.
+
+(3) Personnel exposed to ionizing radiation as a result of combat, peacekeeping, or peacemaking operations for which an alternate ionizing radiation protection standard is implemented in accordance with Joint Publication 3-11.
+
+(4) Personnel exposed to natural background radiation except as described in Paragraph 3.10.
+
+(5) Personnel engaged in activities associated with nuclear reactor programs, including the Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program, nuclear weapon systems, and fuel and other material controlled in accordance with Section 5844 of Title 42, United States Code.
+
+(6) DoD contractors, unless required by contract specification.
+
+## 1.2.  Policy.
+
+It is DoD policy to maintain personnel exposures to occupational ionizing radiation associated with DoD operations to a level as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) with consideration given to efficiency, cost, and mission requirements.  Whenever practical, the use of engineering controls will prevail over the use of administrative controls and personal protective equipment.
+
+## 1.3.  Information Collections.
+
+The status update to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness (ASD(R)), referred to in Paragraph 3.8. of this issuance, is exempt from review and approval in accordance with Paragraph 1.b. of Volume 1 of DoD Manual 8910.01.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities 2.1.  Asd(R).
+
+Under the authority, direction, and control of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, the ASD(R):
+a. Develops policy and provides guidance and coordination on occupational ionizing radiation protection matters within the DoD.
+
+b. Serves as the principal DoD point of contact for Federal and State agencies that regulate occupational exposure to ionizing radiation.
+
+c. Establishes the DoD IRWG, consisting of full-time or permanent part-time DoD
+employees from the DoD Components, and approves the DoD IRWG Charter.
+
+d. Appoints an OSD representative to the DoD IRWG.
+
+## 2.2.  Dod Component Heads.
+
+The DoD Component heads that conduct operations in which potential exposure to occupational doses of ionizing radiation exist:
+a. Establish and maintain occupational ionizing radiation protection programs that implement the requirements in Section 3 and ensure that unnecessary exposure is avoided.
+
+b. Support existing Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) master material licenses and NRC programs to implement this issuance and foster the use of these programs to provide compatibility, continuity, and compliance in joint situations.
+
+c. Appoint representatives to the DoD IRWG to perform the functions described in Section 4.  These representatives must:
+(1) Possess radiation protection-related expertise, such as the General Schedule
+(GS)-1306, GS-1311, GS-0840 job series;
+(2) Possess an advanced degree (e.g., Master of Science, doctorate) in health physics or related field; or
+(3) Maintain a current professional certification from the American Board of Health Physics or similar professional certification.
+
+## Section 3:  Occupational Ionizing Radiation Protection Program Requirements 3.1.  General.
+
+The DoD Components that conduct operations in which potential exposures to occupational doses of ionizing radiation exist will implement the requirements in this section and conform to the requirements in Radiation Protection Guidance to Federal Agencies for Occupational Exposure.
+
+## 3.2.  Dosimetry.
+
+The DoD Components will process individual dosimetry devices by laboratories accredited by the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program.  Individuals who, in the course of their duties, may be occupationally exposed to any source of ionizing radiation will be provided dosimetry monitoring devices and bioassays, according to the applicable exposure pathways, when:
+a. It is determined that there is a significant chance of receiving more than one-tenth of the limit on annual exposure specified in Part 20.1201 of Title 10, CFR, as specified in Part 20.1502 of Title 10, CFR.
+
+b. The DoD Component head determines that it benefits their Component to document doses below those specified in Paragraph 3.2.a.
+
+c. The DoD Component head has reason to believe exposure to ionizing radiation or radioactive material is probable in a wartime or emergency environment, and monitoring will be beneficial in preventive measures, medical treatment, or future inquiries.  Commanders have the authority to issue radiation dosimeters when operationally necessary.
+
+d. It is required by NRC license.
+e. Dose limits for machine-generated radiation will be identical to the NRC dose limits for byproduct-generated radiation.
+
+## 3.3.  Health Risk Management (Hrm).
+
+a. Conduct HRM in accordance with DoDI 6055.05 and DoD Component policies. b. Use HRM, documentation, and training to support monitoring efforts.
+c. Use a DoD Componentapproved information management system for HRM data.
+d. Maintain records of radiological results from HRM activities as well as site characterization and decommissioning activities according to the DoD Component's records disposition schedule.
+
+e. Establish procedures to make data easily retrievable and available for review, on request.
+
+## 3.4.  Ionizing Radiation Doses To The Unborn Child.
+
+a. ALARA.
+Establish policies and procedures to keep ionizing radiation doses to an embryo or fetus ALARA.
+
+b. Notifications.
+Civilian employees and military members, in order to control occupational exposure to ionizing radiation as discussed in Paragraph 3.4.d., have the option of notifying their supervisor, radiological controls manager, or medical representative of their pregnancy in order to invoke exposure controls for the embryo or fetus.
+
+c. Declaration Statement.
+The DoD Components will document in a declaration statement the notification of pregnancy and the intent to invoke exposure controls.  The declaration statement is retained in the individual's occupational health treatment record or ionizing radiation exposure record.
+
+d. Occupational Exposure Limits.
+Limit occupational exposures to an embryo or fetus in accordance with Section 20.1208 of Title 10, CFR, and Paragraphs 3.4.d.(1) and 3.4.d.(2).
+
+(1) Once a declaration of pregnancy is made, immediately take action to limit the occupational exposure to an embryo and fetus of a declared pregnant individual to less than 500 millirems (mrem) (5 millisieverts (mSv)) total effective dose equivalent during the entire gestation period.  Exposure should not exceed 50 mrem (0.5 mSv) per month.  If the occupational dose to an embryo or fetus is determined to have exceeded 500 mrem (5mSv) before the individual declares pregnancy, limit the individual's occupational exposure to 50 mrem (0.5 mSv) for the remainder of the pregnancy.
+
+(2) For the duration of the pregnancy, offer a declared pregnant individual reassignment from specific tasks if it is determined by a qualified radiation protection expert or professional that there is significant potential for a total effective dose to an embryo or fetus in excess of
+500 mrem (5 mSv) for the gestation period.  Reassignment will entail no loss of job security or economic penalty to the worker.
+
+## 3.5.  Inspections, Risk Management, And Records.
+
+a. Inspections.
+Conduct inspections capable of measuring compliance, identifying deficiencies, informing commanders, eliciting corrective actions, and validating outcomes.  These inspections will:
+(1) Occur at a frequency and time advantageous to the DoD Components to ascertain deficiencies during routine operations.
+
+(2) Be identified by the DoD Component heads, as appropriate, for garrison, underway, and wartime operations.
+
+b. Risk Management.
+Manage risk to keep exposures to ionizing radiation and radioactive material ALARA in context with military operational demands.  Hazard identification is the primary focus of risk management and every military and civilian member will be encouraged to mitigate hazards.
+
+## C. Records.
+
+(1) For each monitored person, maintain cumulative ionizing radiation dose records in a central data repository consistent with the requirements of Section 20.2106 of Title 10, CFR, for doses received by all employees for whom monitoring was required pursuant to Section 20.1502 of Title 10, CFR.
+
+(2) Make external and internal dosimetry data a part of the record even when the results are less than the minimum sensitivity of the dosimeter or analysis method for a specific period of time or event.  In addition, identify dosimetry data that is not based on actual measurements (i.e., calculations, estimates).
+
+(3) Make dosimetry records available to monitored individuals on request and annually to those individuals whose occupational dose exceeds 100 mrem (1 mSv), based on established DoD Component policy.
+
+(4) Instruct individuals on how to obtain their cumulative dosimetry records on release from employment in accordance with the privacy requirements in DoDI 5400.11, DoD 5400.11-R, and DoD Manual 6025.18.
+
+(5) Retain HRM and dosimetry data and inspection results at the installation level and archive according to established DoD Component policy.
+
+(6) Archive environmental data pertinent to occupational exposure to ionizing radiation or radioactive material indefinitely on closure of installations or facilities.
+
+(7) Establish procedures to make data easily retrievable and available for review by the DoD Component heads, on request.
+
+## 3.6.  Control Of Radioactive Material And Devices Capable Of Generating Ionizing Radiation.
+
+a. Establish measures to secure, inventory, and safely use radioactive material within an area of responsibility.
+
+b. Establish procedures to prevent and reconcile the loss of radioactive material within an area of responsibility.  Except for HRM and control of individual exposures to contamination, this does not apply to depleted uranium munitions unless specifically required by the applicable license or master material license permit.
+
+c. At the installation, licensee, or permittee level, as applicable, develop a complete inventory of radioactive material (above exempt quantities) and devices capable of emitting ionizing radiation.  See Part 30 of Title 10, CFR, for exempt quantities.
+
+d. Develop the capability to generate reports for specific or consolidated information when required by OSD or Federal regulatory agencies.
+
+e. To the fullest extent practical, implement the safety and occupational health portions of Nuclear Regulatory Commission technical report (NUREG)-1575, Revision 1; NUREG-1575, Supplement 1; and NUREG-1576 when decontaminating or decommissioning installations, facilities, and equipment.
+
+f. Consult with the DoD Component ionizing radiation safety offices to ensure that appropriate ionizing radiation safety programs are in place before the purchase of any industrial equipment designed to emit ionizing radiation.
+
+g. Establish measures to control contractor use of radioactive material and ionizing radiation-producing devices within DoD facilities and installations in accordance with Subpart 52.223-7 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation, when applicable.
+
+h. Establish measures so that the use and control of generally licensed devices are in accordance with Part 31 of Title 10, CFR.
+
+i. Apply the DoD goal to maintain the average annual concentration of radon gas in occupied workplaces at or below 0.8 working level month per year (WLM/yr) with an occupational exposure limit of 4 WLM/yr.  Apply the average annual radon gas concentration of 4 picocuries per liter (pCi/L) as a screening value to meet the goal of 0.8 WLM/yr.
+
+(1) Apply the ALARA principle to exposures greater than this goal, but less than the occupational exposure limit, with consideration given to efficiency, cost, and mission requirements.
+
+(2) Use measurements made in pCi/L to assess WLM/yr exposures if appropriate. (3) Use this calculation for determining exposures as measured in WLM/yr.  To assess the exposures as measured in WLM/yr from the average annual concentration measured as pCi/L, use the appropriate exposure duration and an equilibrium factor (EF).  Generally, the assumed (EF) is 0.4 unless measurements are made that indicate the use of an alternative.  Use the equation for calculating the WLM/yr shown in Figure 1.
+
+[Radon${}^{222}$ concentration, pCi/L) x (EF, unitless) x (time, hours/year)].
+
+## 3.7.  Increased Controls.
+
+a. Implement NRC requirements for protection of quantities of radioactive material exceeding Category 1 or Category 2 thresholds in accordance with Part 37 of Title 10, CFR.
+
+b. Coordinate efforts to comply with the requirements of Part 37 of Title 10, CFR, among DoD Component security, law enforcement, and force protection officials.
+
+c. For documents pertinent to control of materials in accordance with Part 37 of Title 10, CFR, and quantities of material meeting controlled unclassified information safeguarding levels:
+(1) Mark as "Withhold from public disclosure in accordance with Part 2.390 of Title 10, CFR."
+(2) Make accessible to individuals with a need to know and determined trustworthy according to NRC criteria.
+
+(3) Keep secure at all times.
+
+d. Transport material subject to the controls in Part 37 of Title 10, CFR, according to the NRC and Department of Transportation requirements.
+
+## 3.8.  Alara Program.
+
+a. Establish a means to demonstrate by metrics that exposures of individuals to occupational ionizing radiation are kept ALARA.
+
+b. Provide a status update to the ASD(R) as part of the safety and occupational health program management review requirements of DoDI 6055.01.
+
+## 3.9.  Facilities And Installations.
+
+a. Develop a list of locations where radioactive materials are or have been used, stored, or disposed.  A historical radiological assessment that documents past and current uses of radioactive materials at installations is the best method to accomplish this requirement.
+
+b. Update the historical radiological assessment as often as specified by the DoD Component heads for active facilities and installations.  Chapter 3 of NUREG 1575 provides guidance on conducting a historical site assessment, which is equivalent to a historical radiological assessment.
+
+c. Manage decontamination and decommissioning activities at DoD Component facilities and installations, including base realignment and closure, using appropriate ionizing radiation safety and occupational health protection protocols.
+
+d. Use signs, postings, and orders issued by commanders in accordance with Federal and State guidelines to designate ionizing radiation areas.
+
+## 3.10.  Cosmic Radiation.
+
+a. Provide aircrews training on in-flight radiation exposure associated with cosmic radiation using the Federal Aviation Administration training materials as found in the Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 120-61B, where practical.
+
+b. Provide space crews training on space flight radiation exposure and limit radiation doses in accordance with National Aeronautics and Space Administration Technical Standard, NASA- STD-3001.
+
+## Section 4:  Dod Irwg Functions
+
+The DoD IRWG will:
+
+a. Be composed of representatives from the ASD(R) and the DoD Components. b. Provide technical advice concerning ionizing radiation safety and occupational health to
+the ASD(R).
+c. Establish guidelines to govern the operation of the working group and procedures for selecting and rotating the chair.
+
+d. Meet routinely as specified by the working group charter to share information, discuss items of mutual interest, and recommend policies to the ASD(R).
+
+e. Submit an annual report with working group accomplishments and a work plan for future actions to the ASD(R).
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+ACRONYM
+MEANING
+ALARA
+as low as reasonably achievable
+ASD(R)
+Assistant Secretary of Defense for Readiness
+CFR
+Code of Federal Regulations
+DoD IRWG
+DoD Ionizing Radiation Working Group
+DoDI
+DoD instruction
+EF
+equilibrium factor
+GS
+General Schedule
+HRM
+health risk management
+mrem
+millirems
+mSv
+millisieverts
+NRC
+Nuclear Regulatory Commission
+NUREG
+Nuclear Regulatory Commission technical report
+pCi/L
+picocuries per liter
+WLM/yr
+working level month per year
+
+## G.2.  Definitions.
+
+These terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+embryo or fetus
+The developing human organism from conception until time of birth.
+ionizing radiation
+Electromagnetic waves (photons) or subatomic particles capable of producing ions, directly or indirectly, when passing through matter.
+TERM
+DEFINITION
+occupational dose
+Dose received by an individual in the course of employment in which the individual's assigned duties involve exposure to radiation or to
+radioactive material from licensed and unlicensed sources of
+radiation, whether in the possession of the licensee or other person. Does not include doses received from background ionizing radiation, from any medical administration the individual has received, from
+voluntary participation in medical research programs, or as a member of the general public.
+WLM
+A measurement that quantifies the exposure to radon progeny in air. It is defined as one work level (combination of progeny in a liter of
+air that results in the emission of 1.3 x 105 Mega electron-volts of
+short-lived alpha energy) of exposure for 170 hours (or the equivalent of 100 pCi/L for 170 hours in the artificial condition where all radon
+progeny are in equilibrium with the concentration of radon).
+
+## References
+
+Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Title 29, Section 1910.1096 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, "Safety and Occupational Health Policy Oversight
+Functions," April 10, 2019
+DoD 5400.11-R, "Department of Defense Privacy Program," May 14, 2007 DoD Directive 5124.02, "Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
+(USD(P&R))," June 23, 2008
+DoD Instruction 5400.11, "DoD Privacy and Civil Liberties Programs," January 29, 2019, as
+amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.01, "DoD Safety and Occupational Health (SOH) Program," October 14,
+2014, as amended
+DoD Instruction 6055.05, "Occupational and Environmental Health (OEH)," November 11,
+2008, as amended
+DoD Manual 6025.18, "Implementation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
+Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule Compliance in DoD Health Care Programs," March 13, 2019
+DoD Manual 8910.01, Volume 1, "DoD Information Collections Manual: Procedures for DoD
+Internal Information Collections," June 30, 2014, as amended
+Environmental Protection Agency, "Radiation Protection Guidance to Federal Agencies for
+Occupational Exposure," January 27, 19871
+Executive Order 12196, "Occupational Safety and Health Programs for Federal Employees,"
+February 26, 1980, as amended
+Federal Acquisition Regulation, Subpart 52.223-7, "Notice of Radioactive Materials," January
+1997
+Federal Aviation Administration Advisory Circular 120-61B, "In-Flight Radiation Exposure,"
+November 21, 20142
+Joint Publication 3-11, "Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
+Environments," October 29, 20183
+National Aeronautics and Space Administration Technical Standard, NASA-STD-3001,
+Volume 1, Revision A with Change 1, "NASA Space Flight Human System Standard
+Volume 1, Revision A: Crew Health," July 30, 20144
+Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulation-1576/Environmental Protection Agency 402-B-04-
+001-A/National Technical Information Service PB2004-105421, "Multi-Agency
+Radiological Laboratory Analytical Protocols Manual," July 20045
+Nuclear Regulatory Commission Technical Report-1575, Revision 1/Environmental Protection
+Agency 402-R-97-016/Department of Energy/EH-0624, "Multi-Agency Radiation Survey
+and Site Investigation Manual (MARSSIM)," August 20006
+Nuclear Regulatory Commission Technical Report-1575, Supplement 1/Environmental
+Protection Agency 402-R-09-001/Department of Energy/HS-0004, "Multi-Agency Radiation
+Survey and Assessment of Materials and Equipment Manual (MARSAME)," January 20097
+United States Code, Title 29, Chapter 15 (also known as the "Occupational Safety and Health
+Act of 1970, as amended")
+United States Code, Title 42, Section 5844

markdown/dod/i8582_01.md

@@ -0,0 +1,257 @@
+## Dod Instruction 8582.01 Security Of Non-Dod Information Systems Processing Unclassified Nonpublic Dod Information
+
+Originating Component:
+Office of the Chief Information Officer of the Department of Defense
+
+Effective:
+December 9, 2019
+
+Releasability:
+Cleared for public release.  Available on the DoD Issuances Website at http://www.esd.whs.mil/DD/.
+Reissues and Cancels:
+DoD Instruction 8582.01, "Security of Unclassified DoD Information on Non-DoD Information Systems," June 6, 2012
+Approved by:
+Dana Deasy, DoD Chief Information Officer
+Purpose: In accordance with the authority in DoD Directive (DoDD) 5144.02, this issuance establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides direction for managing the security of non-DoD information systems that process, store, or transmit unclassified nonpublic DoD information, including controlled unclassified information (CUI).
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+SECTION 1:  GENERAL ISSUANCE INFORMATION ........ 3
+1.1.  Applicability. ........ 3 1.2.  Policy. ........ 3
+SECTION 2:  RESPONSIBILITIES ........ 4
+2.1.  DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO). ........ 4 2.2.  USD(A&S). ........ 4 2.3.  USD(R&E). ........ 5 2.4.  USD(I)........ 5 2.5.  OSD and DoD Component Heads. ........ 5
+SECTION 3:  PROCEDURES ........ 6
+3.1.  General. ........ 6
+3.2.  Information System Safeguards. ........ 6 3.3.  Cyber Incident Reporting and Response. ........ 7
+a.  Cyber Incident Reporting Requirement. ........ 8 b.  Medium Assurance Certificate Requirement. ........ 8 c.  Malicious Software Requirement. ........ 8 d.  Media Preservation and Protection Requirement. ........ 8 e.  Access for Forensic Analysis Requirement. ........ 8 f.  Cyber Incident Damage Assessment Requirement. ........ 8 g. DoD Safeguarding and Use of Non-DoD Entity Attributional or Proprietary
+Information. ........ 8
+3.4.  Validation and Compliance........ 9
+GLOSSARY ........ 10
+G.1.  Acronyms. ........ 10 G.2.  Definitions. ........ 10
+REFERENCES ........ 13 TABLES Table 1.  Basic Safeguarding Requirements ........ 7
+
+## Section 1:  General Issuance Information
+
+1.1.  APPLICABILITY.  This issuance:
+a. Applies to:
+(1) OSD, the Military Departments (including the Coast Guard at all times, including when it is a Service in the Department of Homeland Security by agreement with that Department), the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the DoD (referred to collectively in this issuance as the "DoD Components").
+
+(2) All unclassified non-DoD information systems to the extent provided by applicable contracts, grants, or other legal agreements with the DoD that process, store, or transmit unclassified nonpublic DoD information.  This includes unclassified non-DoD information systems operated by mission partners.
+
+b. Does not apply to:
+(1) DoD information systems operated by a contractor or other entity on behalf of the DoD as described in DoD Instruction (DoDI) 8510.01.  Such information systems are treated the same as those operated by a DoD organization.
+
+(2) Non-DoD information systems providing information technology services to the DoD.  Such information systems follow the guidance prescribed in DoDIs 8500.01 and 8510.01.
+
+(3) Unclassified DoD information that has been cleared for public release in accordance with DoDD 5230.09.
+
+1.2.  POLICY.  It is DoD policy that non-DoD information systems provide adequate security for all unclassified nonpublic DoD information.  Appropriate requirements must be incorporated into all contracts, grants, and other legal agreements with non-DoD entities, including memorandums of agreement established in accordance with DoDI 4000.19.
+
+## Section 2:  Responsibilities
+
+2.1.  DOD CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER (CIO).  In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.5., the DoD CIO:
+a. Assigns the DoD Senior Information Security Officer to oversee implementation of this issuance in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (USD(A&S)), and the Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (USD(R&E)), as appropriate.
+
+b. Oversees integration of this guidance into Defense Industrial Base (DIB) cybersecurity activities in accordance with DoDI 5205.13.
+
+c. In coordination with the USD(A&S) and the USD(R&E), identifies, develops, and implements the DoD acquisition contracting process, policy, and procedures for improved protection of unclassified DIB information systems where unclassified non-public DoD information is processed, stored, or transmitted on unclassified DIB information systems, to include:
+
+(1) Subsection 52.204-21 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). (2) Subsection 252.204-7012 of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
+(DFARS).
+
+d. In coordination with the USD(R&E) and the USD(A&S), engages the DIB to identify and validate best practices to improve protection of nonpublic unclassified DoD information developed, used, and shared by non-DoD entities in support of defense acquisition programs.
+
+e. Requires non-DoD unclassified information systems containing CUI meet the security requirements of Part 2002 of Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations and DoD CUI policy in coordination with the USD(I).
+
+## 2.2.  Usd(A&S).  In Addition To The Responsibilities In Paragraph 2.5., The Usd(A&S):
+
+a. In coordination with the USD(I), the USD(R&E), the DoD CIO, and the DoD
+Components, as appropriate, identifies, develops, and implements the acquisition regulations, policies, and procedures for improved protection of contractor information systems processing, storing, or transmitting unclassified DoD information that has not been publicly released.
+
+b. In coordination with the USD(I), the USD(R&E), and the DoD CIO, engages the DIB to identify and validate best practices to improve protection of nonpublic unclassified DoD information developed, used, and shared by non-DoD entities in support of defense acquisition programs.
+
+2.3.  USD(R&E).  In addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.5., the USD(R&E):
+a. In coordination with the DoD CIO and the USD(A&S), engages the DIB to identify and validate best practices to improve protection of nonpublic unclassified DoD information developed, used, and shared by non-DoD entities in support of defense acquisition programs.
+
+b. Develops cyber incident damage assessment policy and oversees the process to conduct assessments of DoD programs, as required, on unauthorized access and compromise of DIB information systems containing unclassified DoD information.
+
+2.4.  USD(I).  As the DoD Senior Agency Official for Security, the USD(I), in addition to the responsibilities in Paragraph 2.5., in coordination with the DoD CIO, the USD(A&S), and the USD(R&E), as appropriate:
+
+a. Oversees implementation of this issuance in areas of USD(I) responsibility.
+b. Ensures information security requirements for CUI contained on non-DoD information systems are in accordance with DoD CUI policy.
+
+## 2.5.  Osd And Dod Component Heads.  The Osd And Dod Component Heads:
+
+a. Require contracts, grants, or other legal agreements to protect:
+(1) Unclassified nonpublic DoD information provided to, or developed by, non-DoD
+entities in support of DoD activities according to the basic information system safeguards in Table 1 (see Section 3).
+
+(2) DoD CUI provided to, or developed by, non-DoD entities in support of DoD
+activities according to the DoD CUI information system safeguards described in Paragraph 3.2.b.
+
+b. In addition to the safeguards specified in Section 3, require contracts, grants, and other legal agreements, by the insertion of applicable language, to implement any unique protection measures or reporting requirements regarding compromise, loss, or unauthorized disclosure of DoD CUI required by law, regulation, or government-wide policy (e.g., those relating to privacy, health information, law enforcement, or export control).
+
+c. In accordance with the authority in DoDD 5505.13E, ensure the DoD Cyber Crime Center
+(DC3) is identified as the single focal point for receiving cyber incident reports from non-DoD entities regarding unclassified information systems of non-DoD entities that process, store, or transmit DoD CUI as described in Paragraph 3.3.  Cyber incidents include activities taken through the use of information systems that result in a compromise or an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information system or the information residing therein.
+
+## Section 3:  Procedures
+
+3.1.  GENERAL.  Unclassified nonpublic DoD information may be disseminated by the contractor, grantee, or awardee to further the contract, grant, or agreement objectives, provided the information is disseminated within the scope of assigned duties, is not otherwise restricted by the contract, grant or agreement, and with a clear expectation that confidentiality will be preserved.  Examples are:
+
+a. Nonpublic information provided to a contractor (e.g., with a request for proposal). b. Information developed during the course of a contract, grant, or other legal agreement
+(e.g., draft documents, reports, or briefings and deliverables).
+
+c. Privileged information contained in transactions (e.g., privileged contract information, program schedules, or contract-related event tracking).
+
+3.2.  INFORMATION SYSTEM SAFEGUARDS.  Adequate security will vary depending on the nature and sensitivity of the information on any given non-DoD information system.
+
+a. All non-DoD information systems that process, store, or transmit unclassified nonpublic DoD information must be safeguarded in accordance with the basic safeguarding requirements in Table 1.  These requirements must be included in contracts, grants, and other legal agreements (in contracts, these are implemented in accordance with FAR 52.204-21.
+
+b. Non-DoD information systems processing, storing, or transmitting DoD CUI must be protected in accordance with National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication (NIST SP) 800-171.  If the non-DoD entity intends to use an external cloud service provider to process, store, or transmit any DoD CUI in performance of contracts, grants, or other legal agreements; the non-DoD entity must require and ensure that the cloud service provider meets security requirements equivalent to those established by the Government for the Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program Moderate baseline (https://www.fedramp.gov/resources/documents/).
+
+(1) This is typically implemented contractually in accordance with DFARS 252.204-
+7012.
+
+(2) DoD Components should restrict their security requirements to NIST SP 800-171 for information systems processing, storing, or transmitting DoD CUI unless the authorizing law, regulation, or Government-wide policy for the CUI category of the information involved prescribes specific safeguarding requirements for protecting the information's confidentiality, or there is a specific documented need to increase security above the Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199 moderate impact level.
+
+c. Non-DoD entities meeting the Basic Safeguarding Requirements in Table 1, meet the comparable security requirements of the NIST SP 800-171 as indicated.
+
+BASIC SAFEGUARDING REQUIREMENT
+NIST SP 800-171
+REQUIREMENT
+3.1.1
+Limit information system access to authorized users, processes acting on behalf of authorized users, or devices (including other information systems) Limit information system access to the types of transactions and functions that authorized users are permitted to execute
+3.1.2
+Verify and control/limit connections to, and use of, external
+information systems
+3.1.20
+Control information posted or processed on publicly accessible information systems
+3.1.22
+Identify information system users, processes acting on behalf of
+users, or devices
+3.5.1
+3.5.2
+Authenticate (or verify) the identities of those users, processes, or devices, as a prerequisite to allowing access to organizational information systems Sanitize or destroy information system media containing nonpublic DoD information before disposal or release for reuse
+3.8.3
+3.10.1
+Limit physical access to organizational information systems, equipment, and the respective operating environments to authorized individuals Escort visitors and monitor visitor activity; maintain audit logs of physical access; and control and manage physical access devices
+3.10.3, 3.10.4, and 3.10.5
+3.13.1
+Monitor, control, and protect organizational communications (i.e., information transmitted or received by organizational information systems) at the external boundaries and key internal boundaries of the information systems Implement subnetworks for publicly accessible system components that are physically or logically separated from internal networks
+3.13.5
+Identify, report, and correct information and information system flaws in a timely manner
+3.14.1
+Provide protection from malicious code at appropriate locations within organizational information systems
+3.14.2
+Update malicious code protection mechanisms when new releases are available
+3.14.4 3.14.5
+Perform periodic scans of the information system and real-time
+scans of files from external sources as files are downloaded, opened, or executed
+
+3.3.  CYBER INCIDENT REPORTING AND RESPONSE.  In accordance with DoD's DIB
+Cyber Security Activities Federal Rule, Part 236 of Title 32, Code of Federal Regulations, DoD Components must, through relevant contracts or other agreements, require non-DoD entities to report and respond to cyber incidents affecting their information systems that process, store, or transmit DoD CUI as specified in the following subparagraphs.  This is typically implemented contractually in accordance with DFARS 252.204-7012.
+
+## A. Cyber Incident Reporting Requirement.
+
+(1) When a non-DoD entity discovers a cyber incident, the non-DoD entity must conduct a review for evidence of compromise of DoD CUI.  The review should include analyzing the non-DoD entity's information system(s) that were part of the cyber incident, including, but not limited to, identifying compromised computers, servers, specific data, user accounts, and other information systems on the non-DoD entity's network(s) that may have been accessed as a result of the cyber incident, in order to identify compromised DoD CUI and report cyber incidents to DoD.
+
+(2) The non-DoD entity will rapidly report (within 72-hours of discovery) all cyber incidents affecting DoD CUI on unclassified information systems through the web portal at https://dibnet.dod.mil.  Upon receipt, DC3 will provide a copy of the report to the appropriate contracting officer or designated government representative.
+
+b. Medium Assurance Certificate Requirement.  The non-DoD entity must have or acquire a DoD-approved medium assurance certificate to report cyber incidents.  Information on obtaining a DoD-approved medium assurance public key infrastructure certificate can be found on the External Certification Authority Program Website at https://iase.disa.mil/pki/eca/Pages/index.aspx c. Malicious Software Requirement.  When the non-DoD entity discovers and isolates malicious software (also referred to as malicious code) in connection with a reported cyber incident, the non-DoD entity must submit the malicious software to the DC3 in accordance with instructions provided by DC3 or the contracting officer.
+
+d. Media Preservation and Protection Requirement.  When a non-DoD entity discovers a cyber incident has occurred, the non-DoD entity must preserve and protect images of all known affected information systems and all relevant monitoring and packet capture data for at least 90 days from the submission of the cyber incident report to allow DoD to request the media or decline interest through DoD processes established by the USD(R&E).
+
+e. Access for Forensic Analysis Requirement.  Upon request from a DoD Component, the non-DoD entity must provide DoD access to additional information or equipment that is necessary to conduct a forensic analysis.
+
+f. Cyber Incident Damage Assessment Requirement.  If the DoD Component elects to conduct a damage assessment, the DoD Component will, following processes established by the USD(R&E), request that the non-DoD entity provide all of the damage assessment information gathered in accordance with Paragraph 3.3.d.
+
+g. DoD Safeguarding and Use of Non-DoD Entity Attributional or Proprietary Information.  DoD Components will protect against unauthorized use or release of information obtained from the non-DoD entity (or derived from information obtained from the non-DoD
+entity) that contains non-DoD entity attributional or proprietary information, including such information submitted in accordance with Paragraph 3.3.a.
+
+## 3.4.  Validation And Compliance.
+
+a. When warranted based on the criticality of the information provided to, or developed by, the non-DoD entity, DoD Components will include a requirement in the solicitation for the non- DoD entity to describe implementation of the requirements of NIST SP 800-171, and as appropriate, include a requirement for the non-DoD entity to demonstrate compliance before or upon award of the contract, grant, or execution of another legal agreement.  The DoD Component may include a requirement in the solicitation for the non-DoD entity to notify the DoD Component when there is a deficiency that affects DoD information, or to periodically review how they are resolving deficiencies and meeting requirements, or both.  Additionally, for contracts that include the clause at DFARS 252.204-7012, the DoD Component's contracting officer may request the contractor for an assessment of the contractor's compliance with the requirements of that clause upon receipt of a cyber incident report.
+
+b. DoD Components should not intrude into the operations, maintenance, or governance of the non-DoD entity's internal information system by specifying the content and format of plans of action that address deficiencies, or specifying the parameters of security controls.
+
+## Glossary G.1.  Acronyms.
+
+| CIO         | chief information officer                                  |
+|-------------|------------------------------------------------------------|
+| CNSSI       | Committee on National Security Systems instruction         |
+| CUI         | controlled unclassified information                        |
+| DC3         | DoD Cyber Crime Center                                     |
+| DFARS       | Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement          |
+| DIB         | Defense Industrial Base                                    |
+| DoDD        | DoD directive                                              |
+| DoDI        | DoD instruction                                            |
+| FAR         | Federal Acquisition Regulation                             |
+| NIST SP     | National Institute of Standards and Technology Special     |
+| Publication |                                                            |
+| USD(A&S)    | Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment |
+| USD(I)      | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence                |
+| USD(R&E)    | Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering    |
+
+G.2.  DEFINITIONS.  Unless otherwise noted, these terms and their definitions are for the purpose of this issuance.
+
+adequate security.  Defined in Committee on National Security Systems Instruction
+(CNSSI) 4009.
+
+compromise.  Defined in CNSSI 4009. non-DoD entity attributional/proprietary information.  Information that identifies the contractor(s), whether directly or indirectly, by the grouping of information that can be traced back to the contractor(s) (e.g., program description, facility locations), personally identifiable information, as well as trade secrets, commercial or financial information, or other commercially sensitive information that is not customarily shared outside of the company.
+
+CUI.  Defined in Volume 4 of DoD Manual 5200.01. controlled technical information.  Technical information with military or space application that is subject to controls on the access, use, reproduction, modification, performance, display, release, disclosure, or dissemination.  Controlled technical information would meet the criteria, if disseminated, for distribution statements B through F using the criteria set forth in DoDI 5230.24.  The term does not include information that is lawfully publicly available without restrictions.
+
+cyber incident.  Actions taken through the use of computer networks that result in a compromise or an actual or potentially adverse effect on an information system and/or the information residing therein.
+
+DoD CUI.  CUI that is marked or otherwise identified and provided to a non-DoD entity by or on behalf of DoD in support of the performance of a contract, grant or other legal agreement; or collected, developed, received, transmitted, used, or stored by or on behalf of the non-DoD entity in support of the performance of the contract, grant or other legal agreement.
+
+DoD information.  Any information that is in DoD custody and control; relates to information in DoD custody and control; was acquired by DoD employees as part of their official duties or because of their official status within DoD, including information that is provided by the DoD to a non-DoD entity; or is developed by a non-DoD entity in support of an official DoD activity.
+
+DIB.  Defined in the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. federal contract information.  Defined in FAR 52.204-21.  An example of nonpublic DoD
+information when it relates to a DoD contract.
+
+IT service.  Defined in DoDI 8500.01. malicious code.  Defined in CNSSI 4009. malicious software.  Computer software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process that will have adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system.  This definition includes a virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that infects a host, as well as spyware and some forms of adware.
+
+media.  Defined in CNSSI 4009.
+
+mission partner.  Defined in DoDD 8000.01. non-DoD entity.  Any person who is not a civilian employee or military member of the DoD, or any entity or organization that is not a DoD Component.  This includes any non-DoD federal agency and its personnel, and any contractor, grantee, awardee, partner, or party to any form of legal agreement with the DoD or another federal agency.
+
+non-DoD information system.  Any information system that is not owned, controlled, or operated by the DoD and that is not used or operated by a contractor or other non-DoD entity exclusively on behalf of the DoD.  Includes information systems owned and operated by other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government; State and local governments; allies, coalition members, host nations and other nations; multinational organizations; non-governmental organizations; and the private sector.
+
+nonpublic DoD information.  Any DoD information that has not been cleared for public release in accordance with DoDD 5230.09.  Nonpublic DoD information includes federal contract information that relates to a DoD contract.
+
+on-behalf of.  A situation that occurs when a non-executive branch entity uses or operates an information system or maintains or collects information for the purpose of processing, storing, or transmitting federal information; and those activities are not incidental to providing a service or product to the government.
+
+public DoD information.  DoD information that has been cleared for public release in accordance with DoDD 5230.09.
+
+publicly available computer.  Any computer available to the general public, usually after certain conditions are met (e.g., payment of a fee, a paying guest in a hotel).
+
+## References Code Of Federal Regulations, Title 32 Committee On National Security Systems Instruction No. 4009, "Committee On National
+
+Security Systems (CNSS) Glossary," April 6, 2015
+Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 252.204-7012, "Safeguarding Covered
+Defense Information and Cyber Incident Reporting," current edition
+DoD Directive 5144.02, "DoD Chief Information Officer (DoD CIO)," November 21, 2014, as
+amended
+DoD Directive 5230.09, "Clearance of DoD Information for Public Release," August 22, 2015
+DoD Directive 5505.13E, "DoD Executive Agent (EA) for the DoD Cyber Crime Center
+(DC3)," March 1, 2010, as amended
+DoD Directive 8000.01, "Management of the Department of Defense Information Enterprise
+(DoD IE)," March 17, 2016, as amended
+DoD Instruction 4000.19, "Support Agreements," April 25, 2013, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5205.13, "Defense Industrial Base (DIB) Cyber Security (CS) Activities,"
+January 29, 2010, as amended
+DoD Instruction 5230.24, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents," August 23, 2012,
+as amended
+DoD Instruction 8500.01, "Cybersecurity," March 14, 2014 DoD Instruction 8510.01, "Risk Management Framework (RMF) for DoD Information
+Technology (IT)," March 13, 2014, as amended
+DoD Manual 5200.01, Volume 4, "DoD Information Security Program:  Controlled Unclassified
+Information (CUI)," February 24, 2012
+Federal Acquisition Regulation 52.204-21, "Basic Safeguarding of Covered Contractor
+Information Systems," current edition
+Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199, "Standards for Security
+Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems," February 2004
+National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-171, "Protecting
+Controlled Unclassified Information in Nonfederal Systems and Organizations," December 2016, as amended
+Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated
+Terms," current edition

markdown/marines/FMFRP 0-58 Problems in Desert Warfare.md

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+# Problems In Desert Warfare
+
+PCN 11o 000580 00
+
+## Foreword 1. Purpose
+
+FNFRP 0-58, Problems in Desert Warfare, provides an overview of the problems encountered in desert warfare and some of their solutions.
+
+## 2 - Background
+
+a.
+
+Desert operations have much in common with operations in the other parts of the world.
+
+The unique aspects of desert operations stein primarily from deserts' heat and lack of moisture.
+
+While these two factors have significant consequences, most of the doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures used in operations in other parts of the world apply to desert operations.
+
+The challenge of desert operations is to adapt to a new environment.
+
+b.
+
+FMFRP 058 was originally published by the Air Command and Staff College in 1982 as a student report.
+
+Major Allan R.
+
+Becker wrote the report.
+
+FMFRP 0-58 was published in August 1990
+as Operational Handbook 058.
+
+## 3. Superbession
+
+Operational Handbook 058, Problems in Desert Warfare; however, the texts of FMFRP 0-58 and OH 0-58 are identical and OH 0-58 will continue to be used until the stock is exhausted.
+
+## 4. Recommendations
+
+Users' comments are valuable to improving this manual.
+
+Submit comments to
+Commanding General Marine Corps Combat Development Command (WF12) Quantico, VA. 221345001
+
+## 5. Certification
+
+Reviewed and approved this date.
+
+BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS
+N. P. CAUL1'ELD
+Major General, U.S. Marine Corps Deputy Commander for Warfighting Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia D1ST
+14000058000
+820205
+PROBLEMS
+IN DESERT WARFARE
+REPORT NUMBER
+TITLE
+
+AUTHOR(S)
+Major Allan R. Becker, USAF
+FACULTY ADVISOR
+Major Richard C. Radawicz,
+AC SC/EDO WC
+SPONSOR
+Lt Col Gary B. Mclntire
+Defense Nuclear Agency / Forces Division
+
+Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of requirements for graduation.
+
+AIR COMMAND AND. STAFF COLLEGE
+AIR UNIVERSITY (ATC)
+MAXWELL AFB, AL 36112
+
+## Preface
+
+The author's purpose in studying desert warfare was to identify the basic, continuing problems the desert poses for military operations and make the results readily available to other military readers.
+
+The .study.was preparedfrom unclassified material to permit greater distribution and encourage its use at the unit level.
+
+In researching the study, the author found that most classified information on desert problems was classified due to the information source, not because of the actual problem itself, and that virtually all identified desert problems could be found in unclassified material.
+
+The problems discussed in the study should provide a basic level of knowledge for anyone who will be involved in desert operations and should present a point of departure for further study of particular3 specific problem areas.
+
+## Table Of Contents
+
+Preface
+Executive Summary
+CHAPTER ONE -
+INTRODUCTION
+Significance
+1
+Study Objective
+2
+CHAPTER TWO - BIOMSDICAL PROBLEMS IN THE DESERT
+Background
+3
+Water Requirements
+3
+Acclimatization
+5
+Disease
+6
+Food Problems
+7
+Treatment of Wounded
+8
+Clothing
+8
+Chemical Warfare
+9
+CHAPTER THREE - COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS
+PROBLEMS IN THE DESERT
+Background
+11
+Ducting Problems
+i_i
+Multipath Propagation
+12
+Attenuation
+12
+Static
+13
+Impact on Military Operations
+13
+CHAPTER FOUR -
+OPTICAL PROBLEMS IN THF DESERT
+Background
+15
+The rjndisturbed Desert
+15
+The Disturbed Desert
+16
+Visual References
+17
+CHAPTER FIVE - MOBILITY
+Background
+19
+Mobility Problems
+19
+CHAPTER SIX -
+AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND
+OPERATIONS
+IN THE DESERT
+Aircraft Maintenance
+21
+Aircraft Operations -
+23
+Helicopter Operations
+25
+Aircraft Ground Protection
+25
+- Summary
+26
+
+## Continued
+
+CHAPTER SEVEN -
+DESERT SURVIVAL FOR AIRCREWS
+Background
+27
+Ditching and Bailout
+Survival Environment
+28
+Ivlirages and Illusions
+29
+Water
+30
+Travel
+30
+Signaling
+31
+CHAPTER EIGHT - FINDINGS
+Conclusions
+33
+Recommendations
+34
+BIBLIOGRAPHY
+35
+
+## Executive Summary
+
+    Part of our College mission is distribution of the
+                                                           A
+    students' problem solving products to DoD
+    sponsors and other interested agencies to
+    enhance insight
+                        into
+                              contemporary,
+                                              defense
+.
+    related issues. While the College has accepted this
+    product as meeting academic requirements for
+    graduation, the views and opinions expressed or
+    implied are solely those of the author and should
+    not be construed as carrying official sanction.
+
+## "Insights Into Tomorrow" Report Number 82-0205 Author(S) Major Allan R. Becker, Usaf Title Problems In Desert Warfare
+
+I.
+
+Purpose:
+To identify the operational and logistical problems encountered by military forces operating in equatorial deserts and derive lessons learned that are applicable to today's forces.
+
+II.
+
+Problem:
+Though desert warfare occurs frequently, United States military forces have not conducted large scale combat operations in the desert since World War II.
+
+The experiences of World War. II and those of Arab-Israeli forces in 1967 and
+1973 need to be studied, updated, and distributed so the basic lessons learned in these conflicts can be used to prepare United States forces for future desert operations.
+
+III.
+
+Data:
+By the end of World War II the United States had developed a desert training program based on experience gained during the early years of the war.
+
+Much of the information taught in that program, such as basic desert survival, medical problems, and vehicle and, aircraft maintenance procedures, remains valid today and provides a good starting point for this study of desert warfare problems.
+
+A second source of information on desert warfare is the recent Arab-Israel.i wars which provide valuable information on the effectiveness of modern weapon systems.
+
+The final category of sources of information is the numerous government sponsored studies of the Arab-Israeli wars that focus on lessons learned in the conflicts.
+
+When these three major sources of information are studied together they provide a comprehensive overview of the. problems encountered in the desert.
+
+## Continued
+
+IV.
+
+Concluslons The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars proved beyond doubt that high-intensity, sophisticated air and ground combat can be conducted in the desert with existing United States and Soviet equipment.
+
+The study concludes that the problems of desert warfare are merely inconveniences that hamper operations and can be overcome.
+
+This is the same conclusion that the United States Army reached in World War II.
+
+United States forces can learn the basics of desert living and fighting if properly trained and exercised in the actual desert environment.
+
+V.
+
+Recommendations:
+The conclusions of this study indicate that virtually all problems encountered in desert warfare can be re-.
+
+solved by thorough training and the basing of units in the desert.
+
+Desert training should first be conducted in the classroom and then extensively exercised in an actual desert for long periods of time.
+
+In addition, United States forces should be based at locations where they operate daily under desert conditions, either in the southwest United States or overseas.
+
+It is only through actually living and training in the desert that United States forces can fully develop their desert warfighting potential.
+
+## Chaptar Ora Introduction Significance
+
+Desert warfare is unique because of the hostile environment in which it is fought.
+
+Military operations in the desert are characterized by fluid, highly mobile, shifting battles among widely dispersed units.
+
+Engagements of ground forces are frequent., rapid, and often occur during darkness so opposing forces can avoid detection and the extreme daytime temperatures o the desert. Deserts are generally sparsely populated, relatively empty and undeveloped.
+
+Desert terrain lacks vertical development, as well as natural cover, and the hostile desert climate can severely impair the effectiveness of both men and equipment.
+
+Deserts of political and military importance exist throughout the world.
+
+They range from the Death Valley (below sea level) to the Sahara and Atacania (elevations over 10,000 feet).
+
+Desert surfaces vary throughout the world and. include alluvial plains, bare rock, eroded rock-strewn areas, dry lake beds, salt flats, dry marshes, dry riverbeds, and shifting sand dunes.
+
+All deserts, however, are characterized by a lack of rainfall and many, the Sahara for example, experience the highest temperatures registered on earth.
+
+This study of desert warfare problems concentrates on the Sahara Desert sinceit is a typical equatorial desert and exten
+sive military operations have been conducted there in recent years.
+
+The Sahara is of' particular interest to the United States because of the continuing instability in the region and the possibility of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force deploying to the area.
+
+U.S. military experience in the Sahara goes back to World War II when air and ground operations were conducted across North Africa.
+
+Since then additional experience in desert warfare has been gained from the recent Arab-Israeli wars and US, training exercises.
+
+A thorough understanding of the problems encountered in desert warfare is important to military leaders since the United States has not conducted large scale military operations in a desert environment since World War II.
+
+U.S. forces are traine.d and equipped primarily for a central European war and their only recent combat experience occurred in the jungles of Southeast Asia.
+
+The terrain, climatology, and development of the desert is totally different from Europe or Southeast Asia and it causes the conduct of desert warfare to differ fundamentally.
+
+The differences result from ambient temperature extremes, lack of water, sand and dust, optical phenomena and illusions, terrain, and electromagnetic effects.
+
+These desert characteristics should be of prime interest to U.S. military commanders pre
+paring forces for desert combat since they influence day to day operations, battlefield tactics, and regional strategy.
+
+## Study Objective
+
+The purpose of this study is to identify operational and logistical problems, unique to the desert, that U.S. forces are likely to encounter when deployed to a desert region.
+
+The study deals primarily with experiences of U.S. forces fighting in North Africa during World War II and with observations of the recent Arab-Israeli wars.
+
+The study begins with the biomedical problems the desert poses, followed by the electromagnetic, optical, and mobility problems.
+
+The final chapters con
+cern aircraft maintenance and operation, desert survival, and conclude with the author's conclusions and recommendations.
+
+It is the author's hope that the historical experiences presented and discussed herein will provide other military readers addi
+tional insight into the nature of desert warfare and allow them to avoid the same problems and pitfalls experienced in the past.
+
+## Biomedical Problems In The Desert Background
+
+The severe desert environment causes unique biomedical problems for military personnel.
+
+The extreme heat and low humidity of the desert affect human water requirements, acclimati
+zation, physiological processes, and treatment of the sick and wounded.
+
+Other problems not directly associated with heat arid humidity that also cause medical problems are diseases, insects, and chemical agents.
+
+Meteorlogical conditions, such as glaring sunlight, windstorms, and drastic daily temperature changes also cause medical prolems.
+
+While the average temperature in the Sahara is about 52 F in the winter0and 90 F in the summer, the extremes vary between200F and 130 F, with temperature drops of 25-50F occurring at sunset.
+
+These temperature variations are greatest on the plains and tend to decrease at higher altitudes.
+
+(8:B1)
+To appreciate the seriousness of medical problems that may confront a deployed military force one need only look at the US, operation in Lebanon in 1958.
+
+In the first week of the operation, 1,100 of the 5,000 man force became ill with diarrhea.
+
+(8:B.-2)
+In World War II whenever U.S. troops first entered a desert region, both in the United States and overseas1 they encountered many heat casualties, By the end of the war,.however, the U.S. Army concluded that environmental heat was just anadditional handicap that could be tolerated and would not pre
+vent effective military operations, provided preventative ineasures were taken.
+
+(8:B-2)
+The following discussion will address the most significant medical problems experienced to date in desert regions.
+
+It is extremely important for commanders at all levels to be knowlegeabie of these medical problems and to conduct training and preventative measures to minimize their affects.
+
+## Water Requirements
+
+Inhabitants of temperate zones do not appreciate the importance of water to everyday life as do the inhabitants of equatorial deserts.
+
+For example, there is no one word in the English language that means "to die of thirst", yet in Arabic there are eight degrees of thirst expressed in the language.
+
+Arabs express Ghirst in terms of simple thirst,.burning thirst.
+
+vehement thirst, burning thirst with dizziness, and lastly excessive thirst
+ the thirst that kills.
+
+(8:B15)
+In desert combat all movement is driven by the availability of water.
+
+A military. column may run, out of fuel and face no immediate danger, however, when the same column exhausts its water supply, the entire force becomes vulnerable.
+
+Troops in combat must be assured a plentiful supply of water i they 'are to conduct effective operations.
+
+Locating water in the desert is a major problem, since.most subsurface desert water is highly mineralized and rapid, large scale. purification facilities are normally, not available.
+
+(8:B-15)
+The problem of locating water'
+in the desert is so serious that Soviet desert combat units are assigned special detachments for drilling wells.
+
+(11:Ch 14)
+Thermal regulation is the main physiological problem the human body encounters, in the desert when water is in short supply..
+
+The body's primary physiological cooling mechanisms are sweating, panting, and salivation.
+
+Another, less important mechanism, is the distribution of heat through the blood system where it is dissipated by radiation, conduction, and convection.
+
+These mechanisms are. reduced in effectiveness when ambient air temperature is higher than body temperature.
+
+When temperatures are high, however, evaporation increases and partially compensates for the inability of the other mechanisms to adequately function.
+
+(8:B-11)
+The thermodynamics of sweating are simple.
+
+Water evaporates at any temperature and the evaporation process uses.energy in the form of body heat.
+
+As sweat evaporates from the body surface the body is cooled.
+
+The body rotates sweating among the groups of sweat glands and the prevention of sweating on one part of the body normally increases sweating over another part of the body.
+
+The ability to sweat increases with acclimatization and sweating can. occur at rates from 0.5 to 3.0 quarts per hour.
+
+(8:B-13)
+The sweating process is essential for body cooling and it can consume large quantities of' water during strenuous activity in hot eather.
+
+For example, a man walking at 3 miles per hour in 100 F, heat requires about one quart of water per hour to continue the evaporative process and maintain body fluids.
+
+In general, desert troops need up to 12 quarts of drinking water each day (Soviet planners allocate 8.5 liters per man per day) when engaged in hard physical activity.
+
+(11Ch1Ll)
+The water should be consumed in small amounts so water loss through excessive urination is kept to a minimum.
+
+Tinder normal climatic conditions, thirst is an adequate indicator of' the body's need for.water.
+
+In the desert, however, thirst is not an adequate means of determining the body's true water needs and dependence on thirst can lead to involuntary dehydration.
+
+(8:B-16)
+The sheer bulk and weight of water required to support a military force constitutes a significant logistics prob
+lem.
+
+In addition, the water must be of sufficient quality to encourage drinking by the troops.
+
+(8:B-5)
+The loss of body salt is a common side effect of sweating.
+
+The salt deficiency develops a salt is lost from the body through sweating and it is not possible to build up the body's salt supply in advance.
+
+To try to do so is not a good physiological practice.
+
+Standard military rations provide sufficient salt for normal desert activity.
+
+The Israeli Army did not use salt tablets during the Sinai campaign in 1973arid they experienced no cases of heat exhaustion.
+
+It is necessary to give special attention to men who manifest anorexia to ensure they intake sufficient amounts of salt.
+
+(8:B-16)
+
+## Acclimatization
+
+Unfortunately, an individual arriving in the desert from a temperate zone is initally unable to perform hard physical work until he acclimates to the desert.
+
+The acclimatization process can take from two to four weeks and in some cases it may not be possible.
+
+Acclimatization remains with an individual for about two weeks after leaving the desert, however, it will continually decrease during the period and should be considered when rotating troops into and out of the theater or granting leave.
+
+(8:B-6)
+Acclimatization is necessary for the human body to gradually adapt to the desert's high ambient temperature and low humidity.
+
+The process also conditions the body to solar radiation, biting insects, blowing sand and dust, limited water, the sun's glare, optical illusions, and mirages that affect troops in the desert.
+
+In extreme instances the body mast adapt itself for exposure to temperatures as high as 150-160 F.
+
+The acclimatization process eventually conditions the individual to tolerate the temperature, humidity, and solar exposure of the desert environment.
+
+(8:B-6)
+Rapid, successful acclimati
+zation requires planned, disciplined periods of progressively longer physical activity in the desert climate.
+
+Exposure to heat alone will not promote acclimatization.
+
+The individual must engage in physical activity for acclimatization to occur.
+
+(8:B-23)
+The last, and perhaps most important aid to effecting acclimatization is to keep the troops in top physical condition. This allows them to better withstand the stresses of exposure to the desert environment and to engage in a more rigorous program of activity during the acclimatization period.
+
+## Disease
+
+In preparing for World War II, U.S. medical officers were greatly concerned about the appalling list of diseases common to African and Middle Eastern deserts.
+
+(8:B-26)
+These diseases include malaria, yellow fever, typhus, small pox, dysentery, sandfly fever, arid all forms of venereal disease.
+
+The diseases are transmitted by biting insects, prostitutes, arid unsanitary messing conditions.
+
+(8:B-6)
+The lack of water in the desert is the major cause of the poor sanitary conditions found among the native population.
+
+Most water supplies are heavily contaminated and must be purified prior to consumption.
+
+The use of human feces for fertilizing is common and local fruits arid vegetables must be thoroughly cooked before eating.
+
+The most frequently encountered diseases among troops in the desert are malaria, gastro-in-tes-tinal diseases, and venereal diseases.
+
+Malarial control of the troops prior to deployment into the desert is extremely important.
+
+Once in the desert, malaria must be kept under control, since recurrent malarial attacks are extremely dangerous where water is in short supply.
+
+Malarial control in the desert will be difficult unless a new insecticide is developed that will replace the no longer used, but highly effective, DDT.
+
+(8:B-27)
+Gastrointestinal diseases can be expected to cause the greatest manpower loss.
+
+For example, during the first week of U.S. operations in Lebanon, over 20 percent of the 5,000 man force contracted diarrhea.
+
+Gastro-intestinal diseases are usually transmitted through the food and water supply, which in turn are often contaminated by the lack of effective sewage disposal.
+
+Venereal diseases are the third major group of diseases common to the desert.
+
+In addition to the serious affects of the venereal diseases themselves, they make the patient more susceptable to heat injury.
+
+Venereal diseases can be expected to create a serious loss of manpower if effective indoctrination and control programs are riot instituted and strictly enforced.
+
+(8:B-26-27)
+Fever and dehydration also seriously compound the e.ffect of heat stress on the body.
+
+Hormonal and catabolic responses to disease increase the body's requirement for water and change the physiology of the cardiovascular system.
+
+The body's response to thermal stress creates cardiovascular side effects deterimental to the body's overall efficiency, particularly during illness.
+
+The superficial blood vessels in the body dilate causing an increase in the overall capacity of' the circulatory system.
+
+This forces the body to draw fluids from other parts of the body into, the circulatory system in order to prevent hydraulic inefficiency.
+
+The effect of this fluid transfer appears as orthostatic insufficiency and decreased cardiac efficiency.
+
+The transfer of plasma water also causes an increase in the red blood cell and protein concentrations in the body.
+
+The sum effect of these body responses is increased viscosity of the vascular fluids which in turn creates an added burden on the heart.
+
+This additional strain on the heart can be fatal if the effects of heat stress are Pot relieved by the body's normal evaporative dissipation of heat.
+
+(8:B-'14)
+U.S. troops stationed in desert areas during World War II found insects such as flies, sand flies, mosquitoes, ticks, lice, and fleas very irritating and annoying.
+
+(7:17-18)
+They reported swarms of flies that appeared from nowhere arid descended upon them causing constant irritation and scratching.
+
+The sand fly poses an even greater problem since it transmits sand fly fever.
+
+Concentrations of mosquitoes, potential malaria carriers, were also found along coastal areas with the insects making their appearance at dusk and then disappearing around
+8 o'clock in the evening.
+
+(726)
+To protect deployed troops from disease carrying insects the troops must be issue,d ample supplies of insect repellent.
+
+The repellent should be generously applied around the neck, wrist, and ankles so that clothing openings may remain open and permit circulation of cooling air.
+
+(8:B9)
+
+## Food Problems
+
+The nutritional requirements of troops in the desert do not differ from those in other parts o the world, with the exception of the increased water requirement.
+
+The messing system includes all aspects of food processing, preparation, service and storage.
+
+It faces unique sanitation and spoilage problems, due to the desert climate, that make it a potential source of gastro-intestinal diseases.
+
+(8:B-27)
+The everpresent shortage o water compounds the problem of' sanitation throughout the messing system, since large quantities of' water are needed to clean and sanitize utensils.
+
+At first it would appear that dehydrated rations are ideal for use in the desert, however, in reality they offer few advantages.
+
+The food processing procedure used to dehydrate and freeze dry foods leaves a residual bacteria population that is capable of rapidly multiplying when exposed to high temperatures.
+
+Rehydrated food that is allowed to stand, such as in large mess halls, can quickly spoil and become a source of dysentery.
+
+A
+further disadvantage is that dehydrated foods require water for reconstitution, and as a result increase the water transportation and distribution requirement.
+
+Lastly, troops do not accept rehydrated rations as readily as canned rations and the refusal to eat can become a critical problem since it sharply limits the body's salt intake.
+
+(8:B28)
+As a result, individual meal service rations are advantageous at operating locations where sanitation problems may be encountered.
+
+The individually packed rations also eliminate the need for water and fuel used to clean the mess kits and eating utensils.
+
+## Treatment Of Wounded
+
+The desert environment, combined with the mobile nature of desert warfare, creates problems in first aid treatment 2nd evacuation of wounded.
+
+Since desert operations are frequently conducted by small, mobile, dispersed units, norma]. battlefield first aid may not be available.
+
+In addition, the dispersal of the units increases the problem of evacuating casualties from the battle area.
+
+In World War II it was learned that the standard military ambulance was not suitable for use in the desert.
+
+It had poor traction, was too hot inside, and it had too high a silhouette.
+
+The Jeep was quickly modified to carry litters and it provided an effective substitute for the ambulance.
+
+(8:B-17)
+In modern operations, troops will be heavily dependent on helicopters for evacuation of wounded from dispersed fighting positions.
+
+As a result of the dispersal of units and problems providing forward medical care, it will be necessary for combat troops to be highly trained in first aid.
+
+In the desert, low humidity combined with unfiltered solar ultraviolet rays keeps the surface bacterial count lower than that of other areas, such as farms or urban centers.
+
+As a result, it is expected that a decrease in the frequency of secondary wound infection will occur in the desert, as compared to other regions.
+
+(8B-18)
+The heat arid low humidity, however, also have negative medical effects, such as accentuating shock and increasing the need for intravenous fluids.
+
+Troops exposed to the desert environment for any length of time can expect a variety of ailments that effect their performance and comfort.
+
+During a recent British operation in Kuwait, the troops found that the sand laden wind caused many cases of conjunctivitis (inflamed eyes), epistaxis (nose bleeds), cracked and bleeding lips, and a few cases of sore throat.
+
+The British also found that skin creams, and lotions were in great demand among the troops.
+
+(8:B18)
+
+## Clothing
+
+Clothing in desert regions serves different functions than it does in cold climates.
+
+In the desert, clothing provides protection from radiant and convective heat gain and also acts as a partial vapor barrier around the body.
+
+In deserts, loose clothing that permits extensive ventilation and, is vapor permeable is best.
+
+Impermeable garments and equipment, such as bullet
+proof vest and some chemical warfare outfits, create serious barriersto the body's normal evaporative cooling process.
+
+The effects are compounded when boots, helmets, masks, and gloves are worn.
+
+As a result, troops should not be expected to engage in prolonged heavy activity when clothed in impermeable garments.
+
+(8:28)
+In World. War II,. desert troops tightly closed all the openings arid ventilation ports of their uniforms in an effort to prevent insect bites.
+
+This hai -the effect of eliminating the circulation of cooling air and increasing the body's heat load.
+
+Today, troops should be issued adequate amounts of insect repellent so all exposed skin around clothing openings can be heavily treated with insect repellent.
+
+This permits the clothing openings to remain open and thereby increases the circulation of air and evaporation of sweat.
+
+The net result is that the troops are able to function more effectively in high temperatures.
+
+In
+-the British Kuwait operation, the troops found the need for a head covering which provided protea-tion from the sun, would not be blown away by thewind, and could accomodate earphones and goggles.
+
+They also preferred loose -trousers to -tight ones for desert operations and found that sweat rags they used needed to be highly absorbent and, most important, nonabrasive.
+
+(8:B18)
+
+## Chemical Warfare
+
+Chemical warfare in the desert should be considered an everpresent possibility and troops must be trained and equipped to function in a chemical environment.
+
+The high temperature, low humidity, and meteorological phenomena of the desert combine to influence the employment and effectiveness of chemical weapons.
+
+The desert's high temperature increases the volatility of mustard and V agents (nerve gas) arid the low humidity slows down the process of degradation hydrolysis.
+
+These effects cause an increase in the persistency of many agents when employed in the desert.
+
+The lack of vegetation on the desert's surface generally permits higher surface winds which will dissipate gas clouds.
+
+more quickly than in other areas.
+
+At nighttime the usual temperature inversion will tend -to trap chemical agents near the surface and make them more persistent between dusk and dawn.
+
+During daytime the reverse occurs and the use of chemical agents is prohibitive.
+
+Asa result, the time of day chemical agents are employed is critical, to their effectiveness and persistency.
+
+During the daytime, both ultraviolet and infrared radiation affect the way chemical agents penetrate the body.
+
+Ultraviolet radiation produces hyperemia (redness) of the skin which allows easier penetration of V agents, while infrared radiation brings more blood to the skin causing increased penetration of both mustard and V agents.
+
+Sweating increases the blistering effect of mustard gases, while in the case of V agents it retards penetration through the skin because the V agents are soluble in sweat,
+(8:B-3o-31)
+The need to wear chemical warfare equipment can be expected -to significantly degrade morale since troops wearing impermeable outfits must function in a high humidity micro-environment that creates extreme heat loads which in turn cause fatigue, exhaustion, and inefficient performance.
+
+## Com1Tunications-Electronics Problems In The Desert Background
+
+The desert produces several unusual phenomena that affect the performance of communications-electronics equipment.
+
+The most significant is ducting, a phenomenon that causes radio waves to bend either toward, or away, from the earth's surface.
+
+A second phenomenon is multipath propagation.
+
+It reduces electromagnetic signal strength and affects radar performance.
+
+A
+third phenomenon is signal attenuation caused by dust clouds and the fourth is the static discharges that occur around radio antennas.
+
+The effects produced by these phenomena are well understood and occur in specific frequency bands.
+
+These phenomena are important to both commanders and equipment operators.
+
+They must understand the performance limitations the desert imposes on their equipment and exercise preventative measures whenever possible to minimize the degradation these phenomena cause.
+
+A
+brief discussion of each phenomena follows.
+
+## Ducting Problems
+
+The temperature extremes which occur between day and night in the desert frequently create severe temperature inversions. These inversions cause the index of refraction to be non-linear in the vertical plane.
+
+This inhomogeneity in the lower atmosphere causes an upward deflection, or ducting, of electromagnetic signal during the day arid a downward ducting during the night.
+
+Ducting occurs almost daily in the desert, whereas in a temperate climate, such as Washington D.C., it occurs only L.6 percent of the time.
+
+The effects of ducting are significant in the UHF, SHF, and microwave frequency spectrums.
+
+(8:17)
+During the day, radio waves from ground stations are subrefracted upward and a vertical duct is created.
+
+Stations outside the direction and range of the duct receive either a faded, weaker signal, or no signal at all.
+
+This upward ducting is the primary cause of signal fading in the desert.
+
+Due to this fading, the radio horizon distance for an antenna in the Sahara is 1.8 to 5.5 percent less than for the same antenna operated in the United States.
+
+The variation in percent of reduction is due to the use of maximum and minimum monthly averages of the index of refraction in both the Sahara and the lJnjted States.
+
+Experience indicates that communication equipment operated in the Sahara Desert requires LI. to
+8 db more than in the United States for equal coverage.
+
+(8:A-15)
+Night ducting results in the opposite effect and can con
+siderably increase radio and radar range.
+
+At first the range increase appears desirable,. however, some tactical considerations tend to negate the advantages of the increased range.
+
+For example, increased radio range may transmit friendly c3mxnunications well beyond normal radio range and make them subject to exploitation by the enemy.
+
+The increased range may also cause friendly radio coverage to overlap creating frequency congestion. Further, it is also possible that civilian communications from well outside the battle area may be received and mistaken for enemy jamming or intrusion.
+
+Any civilian signals received will also compound the frequency congestion problem.
+
+The extended range of radar signals produces undesirable clutter on radar scopes and makes target acquisition arid trackingmore difficult.
+
+A final problem is that radar operators may attribute the increased range to good radar performance and then be deceived when atmospheric conditions change and the effect of ground ducting is reduced.
+
+The experience of the equipment operator, on that particular system at that particular location, is the critical factor in determining whether ducting or equipment malfunction is occurring.
+
+(8:A15)
+
+## Multipath Propagation
+
+The non-linear index of refraction, caused by desert temperature inversions, also creates multipath signal propagation problems.
+
+The multipath propagation problems are centered in the C and S frequency bands and cause the loss of a large percentage of targets on early warning and GCI radars..
+
+In a United States government test conducted over a western desert, 83
+tarets flew controlled profiles 25 miles from the radar at altitudes between 1,000 and LI.,000 feet above the desert.
+
+Test results showed that radar tracking loss occurred on 50 percent of the aircraft targets involved in the test.
+
+(8:17-18)
+
+## Attenuation
+
+A third major communications problem encountered in the desert is attenuation of electromagnetic signals due to absorption by dust clouds.
+
+Electromagnetic attenuation becomes appreciable (0.2db per kilometer) in the X band and higher frequencies and is more pronounced when larger dust particles arid denser dust clouds are present.
+
+In extremely dense dust clouds, attenuation also occurs in the lower frequency bands.
+
+(8:18)
+The most common source of dust clouds that affect military communications are moving vehicles arid helicopters.
+
+Generally, the effects of electromagnetic attenuation are minimal for the frequency bands and ranges used for communication within vehicle convoys.
+
+## Static
+
+A fourth phenomenon common to the desert is radio static caused by the electrification of dust clouds.
+
+The static results mainly from corona discharges from atennas and other metallic objects.
+
+The amount of static increases as dust cloud density and wind velocity increase.
+
+(8:A7)
+
+## Impact On Military Operations
+
+The phenomenon described in the previous paragraphs cause various degrees of degradation, including unpredictable performance, for many electronic systems.
+
+Understanding and anticipating these problems allows the military force to train for operations in a degraded electronic environment and also avoid tactical errors caused by misinterpretation of radar and radio performance.
+
+Of the four phenomenon described, ducting and multipath propagation are potentially the most serious problems. The remaining problems, attenuation and static discharges, have less impact on military operations since they are recognizable andcan be accommodated.
+
+The problems caused by signal ducting arid multipath propagation are insidious; there is no way to detect when, or to what extent, they are affecting equipment performance.
+
+Changing atmospheric conditions determine the severity of the ducting and, consequently, the maximum range of a radar, or radio, signal will vary considerably through the course of a 2.4 hour day.
+
+Although the ducting effect is unpredictable, an experienced radar operator, familiar with. the local radar scope picture, should be able to compensate for the increased clutter through frequent tuning and careful scope interpretation.
+
+The effects of multipathpropagation on radar performance are also insidious.
+
+This phenomenon appears in the C and S
+frequency bands and poses a serious limitation on the effectiveness of radars in those frequency spectrums.
+
+Radars in these bands should not be relied upon for early warning and GCI control in the desert.
+
+## Chapter Four Optical Problems In The Desert Background
+
+The desert is envisioned as an ideal optical environment.
+
+The openness of the terrain and lack of clouds often permit unlimited visibility.
+
+The excellent visibility of the desert, however, also creates disadvantages such as the inability to avoid detection by the enemy.
+
+The desert optical environment should be addressed in two basic conditions; the undisturbed desert and the disturbed desert.
+
+In the undisturbed desert, optical phenomena are natural effects caused by solar heating, whereas in the disturbed desert they are primarily meteorological or man-made.
+
+The major optical advantage of the desert is visibility and it is primarily due to the lack of trees, vegetation, and clouds.
+
+The major disadvantage is dust and in most desert battles the problem is usually too little visibility rather than too much.
+
+(8:E-5)
+
+## The Undisturbed Desert
+
+In the undisturbed desert, optical problems result from heating of the desert surface and convection in the atmosphere immediately above the surface.
+
+This solar flux and the low thermal conductivity o desert soil results in high surface temperatures which in turn cause a strong convective motion of the air over the surface.
+
+This air motion causes heat shimmering.
+
+and the appearance of a haze along thedesert surface.
+
+The haze severely restricts vision in the horizontal arid its effects vary with wind and the surface dust content.
+
+During World War II, visibilities as low as OO yards were common in the haze and aircraft could not be detected from the ground unless they passed nearly directly overhead.
+
+(7:29)
+Because of the haze, the Israelis found early morning the ideal time for photo recoririaissance missions.
+
+Interestingly, however, they flew most of their reconnaissance missionS at noon when the Arabs were relaxing and taking a mi4day rest..
+
+(8:E-6)
+Solar radiation heats the desert surface and causes shiminering.
+
+This shimmering reduces the resolution and stability of small images and makes it difficult to focus or precisely align optical instruments on them.
+
+Surface glare is another problem of the desert.
+
+It produces an effect similiar to "snow blindness" and nampers the effective use of optical instruments. The combined effect of glare, haze, and shimmering is to blur the edges and fine detail of images making detection, identifica-..
+
+tion, ranging, and tracking almost impossible.
+
+These effects also cause problems in such basic functions as aiming a rifle at a small target in the desert.
+
+(7:13)
+
+## The Disturbed Desert
+
+By far the most serious impediment to optical functions in the desert is dust.
+
+In battle the dust problem becomes very serious because of heavy vehicle movements, shell bursts, muzzle blasts, and smoke generated by the battle.
+
+The Israelis found dust and smoke to be the major cause of optical problems.
+
+Problems occurred when troop attempted to acquire targets, aim, fire, and follow tracers.
+
+(8:E8)
+Visibility in battle was so poor that Israeli tanic commanders fought with their heads out of the hatches to overcome the limited visibility.
+
+The fact that they continued to operate with open hatches after heavy casualties among tank commanders indicates the seriousness of the visibility problem in the battle area.
+
+(8:E-8)
+Dust also causes considerable physical damage to optical equipment by deterioriating lens coatings and filtering into all orifices and openings causing substantial damage to bearing surfaces.
+
+The Israelis state that the very fine, highly abrasive dust of the Negev and Sinai Deserts deteriorates optical equipment so rapidly that they must be recoated and polished every 18 months.
+
+(8:E-1O)
+The combined effects of dust and heat also accelerate the deterioration of rubber componets, such as eye pieces and lens covers.
+
+Combat troops must be trained to operate their weapons in a. heavy smoke and dust laden environment if they are to obtain maximum performance from their weapons in the dusty desert environment.
+
+Desert sandatorms and dust storms are another source of optical problems.
+
+Sandstorms, sometimes misidentified as dust storms, consist of large particles and extend only a few feet above the desert surface.
+
+The smaller particles of dust storms sometimes reach several thousand feet into the air.
+
+Dust storms can produce zero-visibility and last for several days at a time, severely limiting combat operatiors and reconnaissance.
+
+In World War II, Rommel frequently used dust storms to conceal his movements and preparations for attack.
+
+Blowing sand and dust also create a "sandblasting" effect that deteriorates optical equipment and damages lenses, Optical lenses should, therefore, be covered at all times when the equipment is not in use.
+
+(8:E-8)
+Thermal infrared imaging systems have been tested for use in the desert's haze and dust environment, but have not performed well due to attenuation and scattering by silicate compounds uniqueto desert dust particles.
+
+Tests conducted from aircraft have been significantly more successful than ground tests, due to the much smaller amount of dust that must be penetrated when viewed from directly above.
+
+The tests suggest that hazearid dust effects may not be as serious as previously thought.
+
+(8:
+E1112)
+
+## Visual References
+
+The final optical problem is the lack of visual references, such as hills, trees, vegetation, that can be used to help pinpoint a location.
+
+This poses a potential problem for artillery, forward air controllers, pilots, arid gunners since it will be difficult to visually reference, or acquire, a target that is momentarily sighted against the barren desert background.
+
+Ground troops would be wise to use this to their advantage and intentionally establih their positions away from visible features that could be used as fire control reference points by the enemy.
+
+## Mobility Background
+
+The vast expanse of maneuvering terrain causes desert warfare to be very fluid and makes mobility a prerequisite for effective combat operations arid logistical support.
+
+In the desert, as in any other war zone, the ability to concentrate superior firepower at the decisive time and place normally determines the victor.
+
+Because of the openness of the desert and wide dispersal of units, vehicular mobility determines the ability to mass and engage forces.
+
+Desert terrain varies from salt flats to impassable mountains and vehicles designed for one terrain or purpoe may be significantly less effective when used on different terrain.
+
+For example, wheeled vehicles operate well on paved roads and salt flats, but are severely restricted on soft sand or bedrock fields.
+
+Tracked vehicles, on the other hand, operate on virtually all surfaces, but cannot achieve high rates of speed on any.
+
+In general, tracked vehicles are best for desert combat operations and wheeled vehicles are best for rear area support functions where they can operate on the existing road network.
+
+(8:C-i,6)
+
+## Mobility Problems
+
+The major mobility problem in the desert is controlling the contarination of engines caused by airborne dust particles.
+
+Dust is gcnerated by the wheels and tracks of moving vehicles and is diEtributed by the air currents surrounding the moving vehicles and natural desert winds.
+
+In the desert's low humidity, dust particles lack cohesiveness and once disturbedthesrnaller particles remain airborne for extended periods.
+
+The airborne particles are ingested into engine air filters arid cause the filters to clog, restricting air flow in to the engine.
+
+When filters are not properly maintained poor engine operation (reduced power, excessive fuel consumption, overheating and premature engine failure) results.
+
+U.S. military specifications stipulate a service life of at least 20 hours for air filters, however, most U.S. vehicles do not meet this specification.
+
+For example, the Army's 2--ton truck (MLiLA2) will require air filter servicing every 2-5 hours when operated in zero-visibility conditions in the desert.
+
+(8:C-4)
+Another problem is higher engine operating temperatures caused by dust accumulations on radiator fins arid other cornponets.
+
+The dust acts as insulation which drastically reduces cooling efficiency and causes overheating or 'engine failure.
+
+Besides degrading the. efficiency of heat exchangers, the dust particles cause abrasion of fan blades and suspension componets, and reduce the visibility of vehicle drivers.
+
+(8:C17)
+Another series of vehicle probems are caused by the desert's high ambient temperatures (over 110 F).
+
+The cooling and lubricating systems of most U.S. vehicles are marginal, to inadequate, at the 125 F temperature stipulated in the military specifications.
+
+Performance of these systems is further reduced when dust and oil are allowed to build-up' on vehicle heat exchangers and other componets.
+
+The combination of high ambient temperatures, inadequate cooling systems, and rough terrain often necessitate that vehicles be operated in lower gears.
+
+As a result, maintaining engine operating temperature within limits, not actual engine power, is often the limiting factor in operating vehicles in the desert.
+
+High ambient temperatures also cause a loss of rated engine power that can be significant, when combined with high pr8ssure altitude.-
+A one percent loss of power occurs with each 10 F temperature rise (most engines are rated at induction-air temperature of 60 F) and an additional three percent is lost for each 1,000 fee.t above sea level.
+
+In the desert, at an altitude of 2,000 feet above sea level with the engine intake air (under the hood) temperature ranging from 200-250 F, a typical vehicle experiences a 20 percent loss of-rated power.
+
+(8:C-23)
+Standard military vehicle maintenance procedures are adequate for use in the desert, provided the maintenance depot is air conditioned, or as a xnininum it is supplied with filtered air.
+
+Field maintenance is more difficult, but it can be performed if certain precautions are observed.
+
+Vehicles should be allowed to cool for a minimum of four hours and it may be necessary for mechanics to wear heavy gloves when handling componets in order to-avoid burns.' When conducting field maintenance extreme care must be exercised, to avoid introducing dust or sand particles into critical comp'onets.
+
+## Chapter Six Aircraft Maintenance And Operations In The Desert Aircraft Maintenance
+
+Aircraft maintenance in the desert is an endless struggle against sand and its effects.
+
+In 194Li, U.S. aircraft mechanics enroute to North Africa were taught:
+Sand is the foremost foe of your equipment.
+
+Not only the sand on the terrain, but the dust found in suspension in the air..
+
+Whenever the hard crust of the desert has been broken, there is dirty work afoot.
+
+There is the deadly scratching, gouging action of quartz-hard grains and pebbles, and the terrific abrasive qualities of dust with the fine consistency of talcum powder....
+
+The life of an airplane and its parts is unbelievably short once you let sand and dust get the upper hand.
+
+(5:1)
+The problems sand and dust cause aircraft are similiar to those they cause vehicles.
+
+The particles cause abrasion, clogging of filters, contamination of fluids, and deterioration of seals. Each of these effects are potentially disastrous, not only for the obvious flight safety reasons, but also because they reduce the combat effectiveness of the force.
+
+When preparing a particular model and series of aircraft.
+
+for desert operations, applicable maintenance technical orders should Le consulted to determine any unique problems the aircraft may encounter.
+
+The technical data provides the approved hot weather and desert maintenance procedures.
+
+In addition, the following general maintenance rules should be observed when maintaining aircraft in the desert.
+
+1.
+Locate maintenance sites on hard stands whenever possi
+ble, or on terrain where fine sand grains of high quartz
+content are at a minimum.
+2.
+If possible, locate maintenance sites to the windward
+of abrasive, loose sand areas.
+Consider carefully the direction of prevailing winds and avoid locating maintenance sites in the path of blowing sand that results from disturbances
+of the deserts surface.
+
+3.
+
+When conditions permit, improvise some sort of shelter which will minimize sand interference with servicing.
+
+A
+canvas lean-to, a half-tent, afl improvised nose hanger, or a sand-break around the airplane, placed to windward are effective.
+
+4.
+
+Keep the maintenance site free of sand and dust.
+
+5.
+
+During violent sand si-id dust storms, postpone repairs arid service (if possible) until the storm abates.
+
+Do only such work as cannot be injured by dust or sand.
+
+6.
+
+These general rules cover conditions peculiar to desert maintenance.
+
+Rigidly follow the detailed aircraft technical manual for normal servicing.
+
+(52-3)
+The following general rules provide guidelines for the prevention of damage caused by sand and dust abrasion.
+
+1.
+
+The most injurious action of sand arid dust results from its adherence to oil-bearing surfaces.
+
+When mixed with oil, desert dust becomes an efficient grinding agent.
+
+Guard against it constantly, especially around close fitting parts or parts that work against friction.
+
+Clean, inspect, and lubricate regularly, frequently, continuously.
+
+This is a must.
+
+2.
+
+Surfaces tha-t must be lubricated should be cleaned of sand and dust, inspected, and relubricated (lightly) much more often than during non-desert operations.
+
+Many surfaces
+(normally lubricated in non-desert areas) can be best operated dry in the desert.
+
+They must, however, be cleaned of sand and dust and inspected as frequently as possible.
+
+3.
+
+Lubricate sparingly and only where absolutely necessary.
+
+Sacrifice lubrication rather than risk the grinding, abrasive action of sand and dust.
+
+4.
+
+On landing, immediately seal all openings on the aircraft with dust-proof covers arid after engine shut-down immediately install the intake and exhaust covers.
+
+Keep all covers on the aircraft while on the ground, After servicing, replace seals immediately.
+
+5.
+
+Do not lay tools on the, desert ground, Every article, large or small, is either lost, stolen, or damaged when placed on the ground in the desert.
+
+If you must lay parts or tools on the ground, place them on a clean ground cloth or put them in a suitable clean receptacle.
+
+6.
+i'1eta1 parts removed brom aircraft should be carefully
+cleaned, sealed :fl containers,
+and stored in lockers and
+bins away from sand and dust.
+(5:2-3)
+In addition to the aove rules, certain precautions should be observed when performing maintenance in high daytime tern
+peratures.
+
+While the heat is uncomfortable, it poses no problems that cannot be overcome if some basic "heat facts" are kept in mind.
+
+First, surface temperatures are determined by the heating effect of the sun minus whatever cooling effect may occur due to the wind.
+
+When there is no wind, or the velocity is low, aircraft skin temperature will run between 1.4 arid
+1.5 times higher than the free air temperature.
+
+During R8d Flag
+80-4 in Nevada,.ramp temperatures frequently exceeded 125 F.
+
+It was so hot that several men wearing steel toed boots blistered their feet and had to replace their boots with tennis shoes.
+
+(9:Ch 4)
+Whenever possible, aircraft should be parked under at least a partial cover to shade and cool the section of the aircraft under maintenance.
+
+In the shade the aircraft skin temperature will be somewhere between the free air temperature and
+1.4 times free air temperature.
+
+In the daytime, metal surfaces of the aircraft will often be too hot to touch and maintenance personnel should be issued gloves or mitts that will permit them to handle, metal tools or surfaces.
+
+Mats and pads should also be used to protect knees and elbows and it is also advisable to wrap tool handles with cord or tape to avoid burned hands.
+
+As a final precaution, whenever possible, maintenance on exposed aircraft should be scheduled. for early morning, late afternoon, evening, or night, when the desert heat is less intense.
+
+(5:4)
+
+## Aircraft 0Perati0S
+
+Experience of the US. and its allies indicates there are no significant problems that inhibit aircraft from operating in the desert.
+
+High performance aircraft will, however, need to operate from sites with hard surface runways and, suitable maintenance facilities in order to conduct sustained operations.
+
+Virtually all aircraft experience degraded performance when oper ated in the desert at high ambient temperature and high pressure altitude.
+
+For example, during Red Flag 80-4 the U.S. Air Force found the performance of the A-b severely degraded when the aircraft was operated in the desert.
+
+The high temperatures and pressure altitudes reduces "G" available, increased turn radii, caused excessive airspeed bleed-off, and decreased the aircraft's overall effective and survivability.
+
+(9:Ch 2)
+The effects are well understood and are addressed in detail in each aircraft performance manual.
+
+(8:D-5)
+There are, however, unuSual desert conditions involving sun, sand, wind, and visibility which call for pilot awareness and modification of techniques.
+
+During preflight pilots and crewchiefS must keep in mind that aircraft st4rfaces exposed to the sun will be very hot.
+
+Both should wear gloves.
+
+Because running engines generate dust clouds, ground operating time should be kept to an absolute minimum and as many preflight, checks as possible should be preformed prior to engine start.
+
+Once engines are running, pilots should minimize the use of power and avoid blowing dust and sand at other aircraft, personnel, or ground equipment.
+
+This holds true for all taxiing and in. extreme instances it may be desirable to tow aircraft to the end of the runway for engine start.
+
+After engine start, pilots must carefully monitor the temperature and pressure of the various lubricants, hydraulics and coolants on the aircraft.
+
+Avionics cooling will probably be inadequate during ground operations and it will be necessary to operate the avionics systems only after becoming airborne.
+
+The most logical approach to this problem is to briefly turn on the equipment for a ground check, then turn it off as soon as possible and not operate it again until airborne.
+
+Pnother ground problem occurs at the end of the runway where quick-check and arming delays create the potential for overheating and blowing dust and sand.
+
+The marshalling crew.chief and the pilot must be aware of the locat ion of each aircraft in order to avoid blowing sand or hot jet wash on other running aircraft.
+
+The effects of blowing sand on running aircraft are obvious.
+
+High temperature jet wash blowing on an aircraft will often activate aircraft temperature sensors, such as engine inlet duct temperature or radar cooling, and cause mission essential systems to fall off the line.
+
+The jet wash temperature problem will be significant during the heat of the day.
+
+Whenever possible, aircraft start, taxi, and takeoff should be staggered to avoid these problems.
+
+Once airborne, the desert presents unique problems, for the pilot.
+
+Visibility is extremely good, and as a result distances are very deceptive.
+
+Generally, an inexperienced pilot will underestimate range and should multiply his range estimate by a factor of three to compemsate for the good visibility.
+
+The intense, glaring sunlight of the desert is another problem and, tactically, it makes undetected enemy attacks a constant possibility.
+
+When on the offense, pilots should attack with the sun at, or near their back whenever possible.
+
+Attacking from the sun also eliminates most shadows that degrade optical weapon guidance and make visual target acquisition difficult for pilots.
+
+Though attack for the sun is generally a good rule, it should not. be followed to the point of making tactics predictable.
+
+(5:910)
+Dust storms also cause visibility problems over the desert.
+
+They rise as high as 8,000 feet above the surface and often reduce visibility to less than 100 yards.
+
+Dust storms are a factor in tactics, since maneuvering and suprise attacks often occur under their cover.
+
+They., also provide concealment for withdrawing forces and evasive maneuvers.
+
+Intelligent use of moving dust can be a factor in tactics and may make a suprise attack or tactical withdrawal successful.
+
+Other visibility problems are caused by heat distortion, Heat distortion, the result or heat waves at the surface, causes images to shimmer arid makes positive identification difficult.
+
+Heat distortion also affects depth perception during landing and causes pilots to flare too high.
+
+The depth perception problem can be minimized by using objects and references j the pilots periphereal vision to help judge height over the runway.
+
+(5:10)
+
+## Helicopter Operati Ons
+
+U.S. helicopters and V/STOL aircraft have only limited ex
+perience flying in the Middle East and North African deserts. The combination of high elevation and extremely high temperatures frequently requires heavy lift helicopters to use their absolute maximum performance to overcome the degradation of their lift capability.
+
+Operations with little, or no, excess power in the hot, elevated, arid areas, calls for steep, dangerous, landing approaches.
+
+Airborne sand and dust also create hazards during landing approaches and hovering.
+
+Sand and dust are picked up and circulated by the helicopter rotors and create local sandstorms that envelop the hovering helicopter.
+
+The pilot requires visual references to continue the hover, or land, and when they are lost in the dust cloud he must immediately transition to an instrument takeoff or risk loss of aircraft control.
+
+(5:32-33,37)
+Helicopters and V/STOL aircraft experience excessive corrosion of engines, propellers, rotors, and other componets when exposed to sand and dust particles during takeoff, hovering, and landing.
+
+Sustained operations increases maintenance and spare part requirements J'or these aircraft because of the corrosion caused by this "sandblasting effect's.
+
+Dust build-up on intakes and aerodynamic surfaces also affects engine and aerodynamic efficiency and must, therefore, be carefully monitored.
+
+(8:D-5)
+
+## Aircraft Ground Protection
+
+One of the most important lessons learned in the Arab-
+Israeli wars is the vulnerability of unsheltered, runway dependent aircraft.
+
+(6:L46_47)
+In
+1967, a full 98 percent of the Arab aircraft destroyed were destroyed on the ground, either parked on open ramps, in open bunkers, or taxiing toward the runway.
+
+(iO;1l9; 3199?
+
+Following the war, the Egyptians constructed twenty new airfields, each with multiple runways and hardened aircraft shelters.
+
+They erected bombproof hangers, dispersed their aircraft, and when the 1973 war occurred the Israeli Air Force was unable to destroy Egyptian aircraft on the ground.
+
+(2:21; 12Ch 5)
+The Egyptians also used decoy aircraft on their ramps in an effort to confuse the Israeli pilots; however, the Israelis attacked from such close range that they were usually able to discern which were decoys and not expend ordnance on them.
+
+(LI.:258)
+One Israeli officer credited their successin identifying decoys to both the poor quality of the decoys and good intelligence.
+
+He stated that on attacks near Ismailia some decoys were hit, but on the Sinai airfields, where intelligence was better, there were no mistakes.
+
+(1:85)
+The lessons learned by the Egyptians in 1967, and their total success in resolving the identified problems prior to the 1973 war, clearly highlights the importance and effectiveness o passive protection measures for aircraft on the ground.
+
+## Suivimary
+
+In summary, the problems caused by the desert environment vary from the normal only insofar as the natural characteristics of the desert emphasize the sun and suprise during flight.
+
+On the ground sand and dust are the major problems, however, they can be controlled through a well managed .maintenane program. Pilots and maintainers who understand the desert can minimize it's negative effects and at the same tine maximize the advantages the desert offers.
+
+## Desert Survival For Aircrews Background
+
+At the start of World War II U.S. airmen were poorly prepared for desert combat or survival. The Desert Training Center in the southwest United States proved of little value in training aircrews for the war in North Africa primarily because the program was based on limited survival experiences that occurred in United States deserts. The problem of survival in the North African desert during World War II was further compounded by the fact that no organized search and rescue force existed. Searches that did occur for downed airmen were planned and executed by their squadron mates when the battle situation permitted.
+
+Following the war, the consensus among rescued airmen was that the survival training and briefings they received were woefully inadequate. The men were simply not trained or briefed on what to do when forced down in the desert. (7:1,28,32) The remainder of this chapter will discuss several specific aspects of desert survival experienced by airmen during World War II in North Africa, and include ditching and bailout, the survival environment, mirages and illusions, water, and signaling.
+
+## Ditching And Bailout
+
+Desert surfaces vary greatly from eroded rock-strewn areas to dry lake beds. When faced with the decision to ditch or bailout, the pilot must carefully consider the terrain he is over.
+
+Although ditching is often possible because of the flat, barren desert terrain, ditching should be made prior to fuel starvation so that aircraft power is available when executing the forced landing. In World War II many pilots attempted to stretch their range prior to ditching and flew the aircraft until it ran out of fuel. After rescue, they all agreed that a poweron ditching was much safer than a deadstick landing in the desert. (7:5) With todayTs high performance jet aircraft, ejection would be preferable to ditching in virtually all situations.
+
+Sandstorms. and high desert winds also cause problems for airmen forced to bailout. They found that parachute descents were particularjy hazardous during sandstorms and they were often buffeted about and tossed in all directions by the winds.
+
+In one instance an airman was so badly peppered with flying sand and pellets -that he could hardly stand when he reached the ground.
+
+Another airman's face and hands were raw and bleeding when he landed due to the abrasive effect of flying sand.
+
+Parachute landings were usu.lly uneventful, although some serious sprains, bruises, and, abrasions occurred when airmen descended into rough terrain.
+
+The desert of southern Libya and the Sinai caused the greatest number of minor injuries due -to the numerous large rocks and boulders found in those areas.
+
+(7:4)
+Once on 'the ground, airmen found it extremely difficult to loca'te other crew members or the aircraft crash site.
+
+In one instance a British bomber crew bailed out of their aircraft as close together as possible, however, in -the four days that followed till they were rescued, none of them saw any of the other crew members.
+
+Another crew bailed out of their light bomber in a poorly planned manner and spread themselves over twelve miles of desert.
+
+Numerous other instances demonstrate the value of carefully planning for emergency bailout and in one instance a well planned bailout resulted in a crew of six men all landing within four hundred yards of each other.
+
+(7:4-5)
+
+## Survival Environivient
+
+The effects of sun and heat, combined with the lack of water, proved the most dangerous environmental factor that confronted downed airmen.
+
+The bright sun was hard on eyes, extremities, skin, and sunburned hands were reported as particularly painful.
+
+The daily temperature extremes of the -desert were terribly bothersome.
+
+The daytime heat caused exhaustion and severely limited physical activity, whereas the bitter cold night limited sleep and caused exposure problems.
+
+(7:12,20,34)
+Dust and blowing sand were frequently mentioned as problems and the medical reports on many rescued airmen indicated mild to serious sinusitis, probably due to irritation caused by the dust particles.
+
+The men also complained of continuous sore eyes caused by the sun's glare and abrasions of the eyelids and eyeballs caused by blowing sand and dust particles.
+
+These airborne particles also got into ears, nostrils, and mouths and sometimes caused severe irritation.
+
+One survivor reported the abrasions on his eyes, caused by dust particles, reached the poin.t where his eyes watered so badly he could not see, arid when the watering stopped his eyelids were like emery cloth.
+
+(7:12,20)
+Many survivors talked of the need for sunglasses or goggles to protect their eyes from the sand and sun.
+
+Sunglasses intended for survival must be carried in a safe location, either in the airman's personal equipment or the survival kit, so they will remain with the airman through the bailout and landing.
+
+Most desert survivors reported the presence off'ljes and other insects, even in remote areas.
+
+In one instance, flies were so bothersome in the middle of the day that rest or sleep was impossible.
+
+Another survivor reported he was not bothered by flies until be fell and scratched his arm; almost immediately flies appeared and he was unable to keep them away from the minor wound.
+
+Sand flies are even more troublesome due to their small size, painful bite, and the fact -that they an crawl throught the finest nets.
+
+Sand flies otten carry sandfly fever, however, their worst eect appears to be -the constant scratching that results from their bites.
+
+Insect repellent is the best way to keep sand flies away since they are small enough to penetrate most rnosquitoe nets.
+
+Mosquitoes should also be expected in the desert.
+
+The are reported to be particularly abundant near the coast and inland marshes.
+
+Desert survivors found little in the way of desert wildlife to bother -them.
+
+Instead, the irritation arid annoyance caused by flies, sand flies, ticks, mosquitoes, lice, and fleas proved to be the most significant problem and it was limited primarily to the daylight hours.
+
+(7:17,21,26)
+
+## Mirages And Illusions
+
+Mirages are common -to the desert and pose a potential prob
+lem for survivors.
+
+They are caused by the uneven density of the air near the surface and appear as a sheet of water on the desert.
+
+Mirages cause problems primarily in travel since they make it difficult to judge distance and obscure the intermediate terrain that is hidden by the mirage.
+
+Mirages can be expected to hamper vision, navigation, and in some instances to magnify or conceal objects.
+
+Under these conditions visual acquisition of aircraft or vehicles is difficult as is trying to signal them.
+
+Though reports of mirages are very common, in most cases they were easily recognized as mirages and caused only minor difficulties.
+
+(7:13)
+Another desert optical illusion is caused by atmospheric refraction and results in distant, objects appearing closer than they actually are.
+
+The conditions and effects are similiar to those that cause electromagnetic ducting and when the conditions occur distant objects appear closer and objects below the horizon are visible.
+
+Under slightlydifferent conditions atmospheric refraction causes light waves to reach the observer by two or more different paths, causing distorted or multiple images of the object.
+
+Illusions also occur at dawn and dusk.
+
+The most interesting of these is the false-dawn illusion that occurs when the sun's spectral light appears on the western horizon.
+
+The fact that the sun initially appearedin what was thought to be the west has caused many anxious moments for desert survivors.
+
+(7:13)
+
+## Water
+
+Few airmen can expect to land in the desert with an adequte water supply.
+
+In nearly all desert survival reports, airmen attempted to obtain water by searching for wells, cisterns, or oases.
+
+Some sought relief from thirst by sucking on small pebbles, chewing grass or leaves, arid sucking the juices from snails Without water the lips usually became the first part of the mouth to dry out, crack, and become painful.
+
+The use of a chap-stick, or some type of grease will help prevent drying of the lips.
+
+After about five days without water, survivors reported the skin began to peel from their tongues and mucous membranes, In World War II, many survivors found relief from thirst by locating water in the radiators and supplies of abaridoned and derelict vehicles that were abundant in the North African desert.
+
+Other, less imaginative survivors, overlooked this potential source of water.
+
+During World War II airmen were specifically warned that alcohol, in any form, shou1 be avoided in a survival situation, Alcohol should be considered a food, not a source of water, since alcohol requires water for digestion and excretion from the body.
+
+(7:15,17,34-35)
+
+## Travel
+
+Experience fro'm World War indicates an uninjured man is capable of traveling 12 to 18 miles a day on average terrain at the beginning of the survival experience.
+
+As heat and the lack of water take effect, the daily distance decreases.
+
+Generally, this becomes noticeable about the fifth day, and by the fourteenth day many men were able to travel only 1 to 2 miles a day.
+
+Theaverage time spent walking by World War II survivors was 5 days, however, 20 days or more were not uncommon and one group traveled for 29 days.
+
+The greatest distance traveled by a group of survivors was 350 miles and the average distance was
+50 miles.
+
+(7:8)
+It appears nighttime travel and daytime rest would be best in the desert, however, the survivor must consider that his chances of contacting passing vehicles or aircraft will be less at night than during the daytime.
+
+In World War II, men who traveled at night sought daytime shelter in caves, in the shade of trees or rock piles, arid many found that burying themselves ma shallow depression tended to reduce water loss, aid relaxation, and allow some sleep.
+
+Those who traveled during daylight hours found the physical effects of' the sun and heat severely handicapped their ability to travel.
+
+The most satisfactory time to travel is the early morning or late evening.
+
+(7:34-35)
+Standard issue flightsuits proved quite satisfactory for desert travel.
+
+Whenever possible gloves arid headgear should be retained for protection from the sun, however, substitutes can easily be made from parachute cloth if necessary.
+
+Govern.
+
+ment issue boots are also very satisfactory for.desertuse.
+
+Several survivors, however, experienced difficulty replacing their shoes due to the swelling of their feet that Occurred when the shoes were removed during rest stops.
+
+One group of six survivors was forced to continue their travel barefoot be
+cause they could not get their swollen feet back into their shoes.
+
+Other men who walked barefootc.d across alkaline swamps or salt flats reported they suffered alkali burns on their feet.
+
+(7:19,35)
+
+## S Ignaling
+
+Most signaling problems encountered in World War II have been resolved over the years.
+
+The creation of dedicated rescue forces and development of modern survival equipment will no doubt make desert rescues more rapid and successful.
+
+Optical problems in the desert, however, continue t affect signaling and rescue operations.
+
+The desert haze, coupled with the effects of inirages,complicate signaling.
+
+The haze often limits visibility to LOO yards,.. or less, and makes it impossible to see aircraft or survivors unless looking directly up or down through the haze.
+
+The haze also makes it very difficult to positively identify ground parties as friend or foe; consequently, survivors often hesitate to establish contact with ground parties or aircraft until they are relatively sure of identification or are desperate enough to surrender if necessary.
+
+(7:28-29)
+Though modern survival radios and signaling devices will usually lead to quick rescues in the future, airmen must be prepared to communicate with less sophisticated signaling and communications techniques in the event the modern equipment is is lost or fails.
+
+The experiences of World War II airmen discussed above provide a valuable source of information on basic desert survival.
+
+## Chapter Eight Findings Conclusions
+
+The 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars proved beyond doubt that high-intensity, sophisticated air and ground combat can be conducted in the desert with existing United States and Soviet equipment.
+
+Throughout the world native populations live in deserts and indigenious military forces operate daily in them.
+
+It logically follows that United States forces can learn the basics of desert living and fighting i1 properly trained and exercised in the desert environment.
+
+The documents researched for this study support this observation and lead to the following conclusions concerning desert warfare.
+
+1.
+
+Medical problems can be controlled through education, training, careful sanitation arid messing procedures, and ample supplies of insecticides arid insect repellents.
+
+Acclimatization problems can be minimized by maintaining troops in. top physical condition while in garrison and by a comprehensive acclimatization program when deployed.
+
+2.
+
+Electromagnetic problems are not significant and they can be overcome with training, except in the case of multipath propagation in the C and S radar frequency bands.
+
+Radars in these bands should not be relied upon for early warning or GCI control.
+
+3.
+
+Mobility in combat is best provided by trackedvehicles;
+however, wheeled vehicles perform well in rear support areas where they can operate on the existing road network.
+
+Extreme care must be taken to keep engine cooling systems and air filters free of sand and dust.
+
+Vehicle performance will often be limited by engine operating temperature, not by available.power, Careful operator maintenance is required to keep military vehicle in operation.
+
+Li.
+
+Optical illusions and mirages do not present major problems if they are understood by the troops.
+
+The shimmering of images caused by surface heat can significantly degrade visibilityand make optical tracking systems ineffective.
+
+Blowing sand and dust cause wear on optical len.ea an equipment and, consequently., optical equipment must be protected at all times.
+
+5.
+
+Aircraft maintenance can be effectively performed in the desert if precautions are taken against sand, dust, and the daytime high temperatures.
+
+6.
+
+Aircraft operations are degraded by the high daytime temperatures.
+
+The high temperatures result in longer takeoff rolls, reduced thrust, and smallerpayloads.
+
+Temperature affects virtually all aircraft.
+
+Blowing sand and dust also deteriorate aircraft componets and are a factor in helicopter and V/STOL operations.
+
+7.
+
+Modern survival equipment should permit rapid recovery of downed .aircrews in most cases.
+
+When evading, or without survival equipment, it is possible to survive in the desert for several weeks and travel substantial distances if properly trained in desert survival techniques.
+
+## Recom1Vndations
+
+The conclusions listed in the preceeding section indicate that virtually all problems encountered in desert warfare can be resolved by familiarizing the troops with the desert environment and then conducting extensive training exercises in the desert.
+
+To achieve this realistic training, the following recoin
+mendations are suggested.
+
+1.
+
+Training and Indoctrination.
+
+Desert problems occur because troops are unfamiliar with the environment.
+
+These problems, which include most medical, optical, electroniagnetic, and mobility problems identified in the study, can be resolved by thorough training and indoctrination.
+
+The training should first be conducted in the classroom and then extensively exercised in the, field in actual deserts for long periods of time.
+
+2.
+
+Operational Training.
+
+Both air and ground forces must train as they intend to fight in the desert.
+
+Current training exercises are of too short a duration to identify long range problems and provide the forces the desert experience they need to develop and refine maintenance and employment procedures.
+
+The United States should base combat and support units at locations where they operate daily under desert conditions, either in the southwest United States or overseas.
+
+It is only through actual operations in the desert that United States forces can fully achieve their desert warfighting potential.
+
+## Bibliography A. References Cited Books
+
+1.
+Churchill., Randolph S. and. Churchill, Winston S.
+The Six
+Day War.
+Boston:
+1-loughton Mifflin Company, 1967.
+
+## Articles And Periodicals
+
+2.
+Coleman, Herbert J..
+"Israeli Air Force Decisive in War,'
+Aviation Week and Space Technology,
+(3 December
+1973):
+pp. 21.
+3.
+Dinwiddie,
+James F.,
+Col, USAF Ret.
+International Symposium
+on The 1973 October War,
+(28-31 October 1975):
+pp. 199.
+4.
+Reagan, J.F.
+"Air Power Over Sinai,"
+Ordnance,
+Vol. 52,
+No. 285 (November-December 1967): pp.258.
+
+## Official Documents
+
+5.
+Arctic,
+Desert and Tropic Information Center.
+The Desert
+(Lecture II - Maintenance,
+Operations, and Camouflage).
+Eglin Field, Florida:
+Arctic, Desert and Tropic Information Center, undated (about 192.14).
+6.
+Gunnerson, Stanley ., Maj,
+USAF.
+A Study of Airpower
+Employment in The Six-Day War.
+Maxwell AFB, Alabama:
+Air University, May 1971.
+7.
+Howard, Richard A.
+Sun-Sand And Survival, An Analysis of
+Survival Experiences In Desert Areas.
+ADTIC Publication
+No. D-102.
+Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, January 1953.
+8.
+Institute. For Defense Analyses.
+Review of Selected Desert
+Warfare Problems.
+Arlington, Virginia: Institute For
+Defense Analyses, Systems Evaluation Division, April
+1972.
+SECRET.
+Classified by ARPA-TIO, Institute For
+Defense Analyses, downgraded at 12 year intervals, not
+automatically declassified.
+
+## Continued
+
+9.
+Mac D.ow.ell,. Paul.
+fl..,
+Maj.,. USAY.
+Final Reort RDF Red Flag
+8bLi 3 June 1980 - 3 July
+1980.
+Nellis AFB, Nevada:
+i4.44.Oth Tactical Fighter Training Group (Red Flag),
+12 September 1980.
+SECRET.
+Classified by Red. Flag
+Security Classification Guide, declassify on 1 June 1992.
+10.
+Stromberg., Ronald.D.,. Maj,. USAF.
+The Israeli Answer: A
+Classic Employment of Airpower.
+Maxwell AFB, Alabama:
+Air University, June 1968.
+11.
+U.S. Army Command. and General Staff College.
+Contingency
+Operations (Middle East Setting), in Selected Readings
+In Tactics No. 100-2, Vol. 3.
+Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
+August:.. 1976
+12.
+U.S. Army ommand arid General Staff College.
+The 1973
+Middle East War, in Selected Readings In Tactics No.
+100-?, Vol. 1.
+Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, March 1980.
+
+## B. Related Sources Books
+
+Herzog, Chiazn, Maj Gen.
+The War of Atonement.
+Boston:
+Little,
+Brown, and Company, 1975.
+Jackson, Robert.
+The Israeli Air Force Story.
+London:
+Northurnberland Press Ltd., 1970.
+Palit, D. K., Maj Gen.
+R.eturn To Sinai.
+New Delhi:
+Palit and
+Palit Publishers, 19714..
+Schiff, Zeev.
+October Earthquake, Yom Kippur 1973.
+Tel Aviv:
+University Publishing Projects Ltd., 1974.
+Stevenson, William.
+Zanek!
+A Chronicle of the Israeli Air
+Force.
+New York:
+The Viking Press, 1971.
+Weizman, Ezer.
+On Eagles' Wings.
+New York:
+MacMillian Publishing Company, Inc., 1977.
+
+## Continued Articles And Periodicals
+
+Handel, Michael
+I.
+"The. YomKippur War and the Inevitability
+of Surprise,1'
+International Studies Quarterly,
+(September 1977):
+pp. 474_475.
+Rodwell, Robert R.
+"Concrete fibber Conceived in France,"
+Flight International,
+Vol. 92, No. 3066 (14 December
+1967):
+p. 1013.
+"Warning: No Easy Victories,"
+Newsweek, (22 October 1973):
+pp.
+64 and 79.
+Young,
+Peter.
+"The ArabIsraeli War,"
+Royal United
+tion Journal,
+Vol. 112, No. 648 (November 1967):
+P. 331.
+
+## Official Documents
+
+Byrd, William B., Jr.,.Maj, USAF.
+USAF Heavy Lift Helicopters'
+Employment in a Hostile Middle East Desert Type Environment.
+Maxwell AFBI
+Alabama:
+Air University, May1974.
+Defense Intelligence Agency.
+A Summar
+of Lessons Learned In
+The Arab-Israeli War of October 1
+U
+
+DIA Directorate
+For Intelligence, August 197
+.
+SECRET NOFORN
+Classified
+by DIADi, exempt from general declassification schedule,
+declassification date indefinite.
+
+Department of Defense.
+Lessons of the October War: The Views
+of the Israeli Generals in January 1975.
+Washington D.C.:
+Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), 1975,
+SECRET/NOFORN.
+Classified by DASD (R&N),exempt. from
+general declassification, declassification date indefinite
+
+Digby,JaITleS. pern Weapons For Non-NATO Contingencies Report
+p-6521.
+Santa Monica,
+California:
+The Rand Corporation,
+December 1980.
+Olschfler, Clarence .E.. m Air Superiority Battle In The Middle
+1967_-_1973..
+Fort Leavenworth, Kansas:
+U.S. Army
+Command and General staff College, 1978.

markdown/marines/MCRP 7-20A.5.md

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+## Training Data Management U.S. Marine Corps
+
+Limited Dissemination Control: None PCN 144 000328 00
+
+## Foreword
+
+Marine Corps Reference Publication 7-20A.5, *Training Data Management*, provides guidance for all Marines concerning the management of information created during training planning, execution, and evaluation. It introduces Marines to data management roles and responsibilities within a unit training management program and how processes and technological systems contribute to and influence these functions. The purpose of training data management (TDM) is to provide information to commanders so they may assess unit training readiness. Training data management begins with the initial phase of planning and is continuous to facilitate the commander's assessments. It is critical that Marines understand how they contribute to their commander's understanding of the unit's readiness. This publication reflects concepts that are necessary to this understanding. Within the context of readiness, TDM more broadly supports talent management through the people, processes, and systems that record, report, and link individual training, education, and readiness data to Headquarters USMC Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA) data management systems. Thus, individual training management and data reporting is critical to support both readiness and talent management at the service level. This publication has been prepared for all Marines. Every Marine is engaged in their unit's training in some capacityas a training planner, unit leader, or Marine participating in training. Marine Corps Reference Publication 7-20A.5, in conjunction with Marine Corps Tactical Publication (MCTP) 7-20A, *Unit Training Guide*, cancels MCTP 8-10A, *Unit Training Management Guide*, dated 25 November 1996, erratum dated 2 May 2016, and change 1, date 4 April 2018; and MCTP 8-10B, How to Conduct Training, dated 10 August 2005, erratum dated 2 May 2016, and change 1, dated 4 April 2018. Reviewed and approved this date.
+
+Publication Control Number: 147 000328 00 Limited Dissemination Control: None
+
+## Chapter 1. Training Data Management Fundamentals Intent
+
+Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 7-20A.5, *Training Data Management* (TDM), defines information management-related concepts for unit training management (UTM). It provides a framework for understanding how people, technological systems, and processes contribute to effective management of unit training information throughout planning, execution, and evaluation. The primary purpose of TDM is to facilitate commander assessments by ensuring the availability of timely and accurate training information. The secondary goal is to ensure information usersleaders, trainers, and individual Marineshave access to timely, relevant information to implement the unit training plan. The concepts in this publication are introduced to familiarize Marines at all levels with roles and responsibilities, provide an overview of technology that enhances data management capacities, and describe general processes for TDM. These concepts enrich unit training as introduced in Marine Corps Tactical Publication 7-20A, Unit Training Guide, and span the planning processes described in the reference publications identified in Figure 1-1.
+
+## Mcrp 7-20A.5 Training Data Management Pillars
+
+Training data management is information management for standards-based unit training. Training data management creates a means of deliberately and proactively organizing information created during the UTM process. It is more than control of data; it flows across technical networks and covers the entire lifespan of information, centering on the commander's information requirements to make informed judgments and decisions about unit individual and collective training readiness. From publishing the commander's training guidance (CTG) to recording completion of each training event, data is managed such that it is accessible to those Marines requiring access throughout the training continuum. The purpose of training is to achieve unit readiness. The purpose of TDM is to provide the commander with timely and accurate unit training information to ensure the unit and each individual is progressing toward that end. Training data management enables commanders to understand what is happening in their unit, which in turn informs decisions and actions to adjust plans within the UTM program. Unit commanders use the data compiled throughout the TDM process to assess the training readiness of their unit. Training is designed to achieve training and readiness (T&R) standards and completion of that training creates metrics that can be used to assess readiness against the unit's mission-essential tasks (MET) and other readiness benchmarks. Data entered into the Marine Corps Training Information Management System (MCTIMS) or Marine Corps Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program (MSHARP) automatically transfers to other Marine Corps reporting and data management systems, such as the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and the Marine Corps Total Force System (MCTFS). Commanders use this data to determine compliance with Service training directives and unit mission readiness. Marine Corps Tactical Publication 3-30 B, *Information Management*, defines three information management pillars that apply to unit training.
+
+People People refers to the Marines collecting and consuming training data produced throughout the Systems Approach to Training and Education process. People use available information to build training plans; create training events; track training completion and evaluation; and determine training effectiveness, efficiency, and states of readiness. Additionally, training management and reporting of individual training event completion is critical to TDM. Readiness and readiness reporting both begin at the individual level.
+
+Technology Technology refers to the tools units use to collect and process data. Technological systems, such as MCTIMS and MSHARP, supports TDM by providing efficient means of collecting, disseminating, storing, and using training information. Technology also facilitates training information reporting as data is transferred from the primary reporting systems to other Marine Corps systems, such as DRRS and MCTFS.
+
+Process Training data management is the sum of processes used for the collaboration and sharing of unit training information. Process refers to the procedures and policies that, when implemented, facilitate efficient and effective information flows to meet a unit's readiness requirements. Training data management processes enhance the quality of organizational learning and decisionmaking in support of achieving unit operational readiness. Effective TDM ensures the commander has the most accurate information with which to make decisions about the unit's readiness state at any point in the unit training continuum. Shared understanding allows unit training planners and leaders the opportunity to identify training gaps and make or recommend decisions to change training early so action can be taken to achieve the training plan vision. Timely, quality information provides commanders situational awareness and adds value to the decision-making processboth of which impact mission accomplishment. Managing the flow of information and access to it are critical. Information management helps commanders focus people, technology, and processes effectively to meet challenges and leverage fleeting opportunities.
+
+## Chapter 2. Roles And Responsibilities
+
+The commander is responsible for the unit's training. However, successful UTM implementation requires a team. To create and execute a successful unit training plan involves a system of responsibilities delegated and assigned to Marines in leadership and UTM roles. When individuals effectively execute these roles, the resulting observable indicators depict an effective UTM program. It is incumbent upon commanders to identify capable individuals to perform these roles and ensure they are properly prepared to execute each role.
+
+## The Commander
+
+The commander is responsible for the unit's training and its requirements. To meet specific training needs, commanders develop overall unit training programs based on available resources, materials, guidance, and time. The CTG provides the commander's vision for unit training and establishes the desired end state for training in terms of unit readiness. The commander publishes training guidance to steer staff and subordinate unit planning, execution, and evaluation throughout the UTM process. The CTG identifies the unit mission, assigns priorities for training, and establishes the unit's standards-based training goals in accordance with a desired end state, measured against the unit's mission statement and mission-essential task list (METL). Unit commanders publish training guidance early to allow adequate planning time for planners and subordinate commanders. Once published, the CTG should not require revision unless a significant requirement is identified that alters the unit's training assessments, such as a change in mission. The CTG should address
+
+- Training philosophy. - Training priorities. - Commander's guidance.
+The purpose of TDM is to provide commanders with timely and accurate information to inform their assessment of unit readiness. Throughout the unit training continuum, the commander assesses the unit's operational readiness as compared to the unit's METL and based on all available training data.
+
+## Training Planners
+
+Unit training planners design a training plan to achieve the CTG. The core for unit training resides with the unit operations section and is supported by the staff and subordinate unit leaders. Training planners create a training plan that establishes the training continuum for the unit to progress from the current to the desired readiness state. Events are sequenced to ensure the unit builds proficiency and maintains currency in both individual and collective training events. It is essential that evaluations are planned throughout the training continuum to provide unit leaders data to indicate whether the unit is progressing as necessary to achieving required readiness states. Events identified in the training plan are associated with T&R standards or Service-level individual training requirements. Training events not associated with T&R standards or mandated training requirements should be scrutinized to ensure they contribute to the unit being ready to accomplish its designated mission; otherwise, these events risk expending valuable training time and may detract from the unit achieving its required readiness state. The training plan identifies the number, type, and duration of training events required to reach unit readiness benchmarks in accordance with the METL. This should never be viewed as "check in the box" training. The T&R standard must be achieved before training is recorded as complete. It is the sum of achieved T&R standards that produce the METL outcome. The training plan should also account for events that will cause unit readiness to fluctuate throughout the training continuum, such as Marines joining and departing the unit. These events can affect unit readiness as trained Marines leave the unit and untrained Marines join the unit. Accounting for these events enables the unit to project anticipated training needs while also helping to mitigate risk during training evolutions.
+
+## Training Leaders
+
+A training leader is identified on the training schedule as the individual responsible for planning, leading, and supervising the overall execution of a unit training event and assigned components of the unit training plan. The commander, or their designated representative, may identify this individual in writing by billet; position; or designation, qualification, and skill set. The training leader is formally included on the training plan as being responsible for leading and guiding Marines through a specific live, virtual, or constructive simulated training evolution. The training leader plans and executes designated training events or aspects of the unit training plan in accordance with the training plan and T&R manual, particularly by ensuring prerequisites have been completed within the required time interval. They are responsible for ensuring necessary support is identified and coordinated for training to be executed. Depending on the type of event, the training leader may be supported by a range safety officer, an on-scene medical representative or team, or a simulation technician or instructor to aid in safely facilitating and executing an event. During execution, the training leader ensures that training is being accomplished effectively and efficiently to achieve proficiency. Because training must be standards-based, training leaders must orient themselves on T&R standards that must be achieved for Marines to progress to higher-level individual and collective tasks. In developing training events, unit leaders document training by publishing letters of instruction, risk assessments, and other planning and execution materials as defined by policy and unit information requirements. Training completion is documented through evaluation. Effective TDM includes documenting evaluations with the associated training event, such as the use of a performance evaluation checklist, to ensure information for that event is easily accessible by other unit leaders and planners.
+
+## Training Data Managers
+
+Training data managers are critical to ensuring the TDM system progresses smoothly. While each UTM role contributes to the unit's efforts of managing training data, the Marines identified to record and maintain this data have the greatest influence on the accuracy and timeliness of the information flow. Training data managers ensure that individual and unit training completion are correctly documented as they occur. Their responsibilities may include publishing and maintaining unit training calendars, crediting Marines for successful completion of training, and ensuring evaluation data is recorded with training events. Training data managers are not responsible for the planning of unit training but are vital in ensuring that the process progresses efficiently. Failure to document and manage training in a timely manner results in inaccurate training statistics, can negatively influence individual readiness and promotion, and prevents the commander, other unit leaders, and planners from being able to accurately understand what is happening in the unit. This also results in negative consequences for decisions and follow-on actions.
+
+## Evaluator Cadre
+
+The evaluator or evaluation cadre, depending on the size and scope of the event, is responsible for observing and recording the performance of the Marines and/or unit being evaluated. Internal evaluations are performed by unit leaders within the unit conducting the training. External evaluations are conducted by evaluators assigned from outside the unit being evaluated, as described in MCRP 7-20A.4, *Evaluations and Assessments*. Teams of evaluators are formed to distribute evaluation responsibilities across several roles and ensure evaluation data is created, recorded, and disseminated efficiently. Evaluator training ensures everyone on the evaluation team understands and can perform their assigned roles. The purpose of evaluation is to provide feedback to the unit regarding performance of individual and collective training events. Evaluators provide feedback through debriefs, after-action reviews, and formally recording the results of the evaluation in the appropriate TDM systems. Evaluation feedback should be consistent across the method of reporting to eliminate confusion for the training audience. In other words, the evaluation recorded in the TDM system (e.g., MCTIMS or MSHARP) should be consistent with the feedback reported during debriefs and after-action reviews with the Marines and unit. Inconsistency reduces trust in the evaluation process and causes confusion about how the unit can improve its readiness. See MCRP 7-20A.4 for more information about training evaluations, debriefs, and after-action reviews.
+
+## Chapter 3. Training Data Management Systems
+
+Technology supports TDM by providing efficient means of collecting, disseminating, storing, and using training information. Outputs of the analyze, *design*, and *develop* phases of the Systems Approach to Training and Education process document the steps for creating training plans, events, and exercises. Information created during execution, including rosters, evaluation forms, and debriefs, documents the implementation and evaluation of training. This information is used to support procedural reporting requirements as well as commander assessments to determine whether the unit is achieving the desired state of operational readiness.
+
+## Information Management Systems
+
+An information management system is the aggregate of people, processes, and technology, all of which work and are employed together in processing information. The Marine Corps employs technological systems, or information management systems, to improve the efficiency of information processing. Information management systems for TDM, such as MCTIMS and MSHARP, provide means of identifying, tracking the status of, and recording completion of individual and unit training requirements. They allow decentralized management of training data (e.g., updating training schedules or recording completion rosters) while allowing for unit-wide situational awareness. Information management systems also automate information preparation for readiness reporting by communicating training data from one system to another, such as MCTIMS to DRRS. Technical automation provides data to unit commanders for the purpose of reporting unit readiness, as well as providing commanders, staffs, and leaders a snapshot of training readiness at any point based on current and projected training data that has been entered.
+
+Marine Corps Training Information Management System The Marine Corps Training Information Management System is the Marine Corps' primary program of record for TDM and is the Marine Corps' authoritative data source for individual and collective training relating to individual training requirements and ground T&R standards defined in the ground T&R program. All units use MCTIMS to manage and record the completion of Service-level individual training requirements and the Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation; the command element, ground combat element, and logistics combat element, as well as specific ground components within the aviation combat element, use MCTIMS to manage METL-based and T&R training. The system provides enterprise-wide training information technology services for individual Marines and Marine units and generates data that supports both individual and unit readiness reporting through MCTFS and DRRS, respectively. It allows units to document all stages of TDM, from planning through implementation and evaluation. All individual training requirements (e.g., annual training) are reported in MCTIMS. Using MCTIMS, units are able to document creation, execution, and evaluation of training plans through a variety of functions that are continually adapted to the needs of the Fleet Marine Force. The system centralizes planning processes and access to unit training information. Each role within the TDM process interacts with MCTIMS to ensure training guidance and products are widely accessible. As training is completed, MCTIMS aggregates completion data for individual training requirements and T&R events based on the data entered in the system. Individual training requirement completion is communicated to MCTFS to be recorded in individual Marine training records. Based on the number of T&R events evaluated as trained, MCTIMS also aggregates readiness percentages for each associated MET into a commander's assessment. The T&R event achievements are transmitted and reported in DRRS.
+
+Mission-Essential Task List. The unit METL is published in MCTIMS. Component METs are the objective for unit readiness. Training and readiness standards are associated to the unit's METs, facilitating tracking readiness progression as events are documented as "trained."
+Training Assessment. Based on training completion data entered into the system, MCTIMS
+aggregates the information into a training assessment. The commander and training planners use this assessment to determine whether the unit's training is progressing as necessary to meet readiness objectives and shape the training plan, as necessary. The training assessment from MCTIMS is automatically communicated to DRRS.
+
+Key Documents. Unit commanders and training planners upload key documents, such as CTG, unit policies, and training resources, which guide training development and execution throughout the training continuum. These documents are published in MCTIMS, and may be published via other media such as SharePoint or a read board, to be accessible by all Marines.
+
+Training Calendar. Training planners and training data managers populate the unit calendar with events and exercises. The calendar becomes the focal point for training plan execution and the sequencing of events to progress toward training readiness. Relevant unit events from the unit training plan, such as annual training occurrences, professional military education (PME) courses, or other readiness-related events, are recorded to create shared awareness.
+
+Events. Each event is documented in its entirety. Training events and exercises recorded on the calendar are associated with T&R events that contribute to unit readiness or individual training requirements. The training leader assigned for each event documents
+
+- Planning, by uploading necessary planning products, such as letters of instruction and risk
+assessments.
+- Completion, by identifying which Marines completed each associated standard or
+requirement and any resulting scores.
+The evaluator for applicable events uploads evaluations to document performance, as appropriate.
+
+Other Training. As the authoritative data source for individual training, MCTIMS facilitates the tracking of Marines' ancillary training, such as courses or certifications attained through other services or agencies that are not automatically credited in Marine Corps training systems. Training data managers submit other training, as appropriate, to ensure all training is documented on the Marines' service records. By using MCTIMS, units may easily orient their training on the unit METL from the assignment of tasks to the execution of T&R assessments. This information management system provides units a common means of planning and documenting training throughout the training continuum. For more detail and training on how to use MCTIMS, Marines and users of all ranks and roles can attend Training and Education Command-sponsored MCTIMS classes hosted aboard major Marine Corps installations. Additionally, Marine Corps Air Ground Task Force Training Command provides courses on UTM. The MCTIMS Service Desk provides support to Marine Corps units. System tutorials are also available to users looking for specific details.
+
+Marine Corps Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program The Marine Corps Sierra Hotel Aviation Readiness Program works in parallel to MCTIMS to identify and record completion of certain T&R events, designations, and certifications for Marines and units in the aviation combat element as defined in the aviation T&R program. Like MCTIMS, T&R standards are identified, managed, and tracked in MSHARP and aligned to designated aviation unit METs. Individual and collective T&R events, including evaluation of event performance, are recorded in this system. Training readiness data is reported to DRRS.
+
+Defense Readiness Reporting System Military units are required to submit objective, accurate, and timely readiness reports within DRRS. This system measures factors relating to readiness as the Secretary of Defense prescribes to fulfill statutory reporting requirements defined within Title 10 United States Code, Section 117. Readiness reports are the responsibility of the organization commander and reflect the commander's experience and best judgment regarding the organizations ability to undertake core and assigned mission(s). Readiness data in DRRS support crisis response planning, deliberate or peacetime planning, and Service-level responsibilities to organize, train, and equip combat-ready forces for combatant commands.
+
+Joint Risk Assessment Tool Marine Corps Order 5100.29C Vol 2 (Risk Management) discusses the Joint Risk Assessment Tool (JRAT) platform. The JRAT is a Web-based software application that assists the user with completing a deliberate joint risk assessment matrix. The software guides the user through each of the steps in an intuitive fashion with help screens and process information. The JRAT allows the chain-of-command to supervise and conduct quality control of the risk assessment process. The site provides up-to-date and relevant safety information and tutorials, and serves as the primary transition tool for the Marine Corps to the Joint Risk Assessment program. Upon completion of an assessment, reports can be printed and the assessment can be shared electronically. The USMC JRAT site is available via common access card at: https://jrat.safety.army.mil.
+
+## Learning Management Systems
+
+A learning management system (LMS) is a specific type of information management system that facilitates centralized administration, tracking, and reporting of individual training events and requirements. Learning management systems house course information and resources, facilitate synchronous and asynchronous learning, and allow for evaluation and feedback, as necessary. Common training administered through an LMS includes
+
+- Annual training. - PME course modules. - Ancillary training.
+The MarineNet eLearning Ecosystem brings together several systems and capabilities for the purpose of delivering training and education programs in a virtual environment. The MarineNet eLearning Ecosystem is primarily used by individual Marines to complete annual and ancillary training. It is also utilized for the completion of PME courses, either as the primary method for distance learning ("non-resident") courses or to augment resident courses. Within the MarineNet eLearning Ecosystem, Marines navigate and engage with course material, engage in collaborative exercises, and complete course evaluations. Completion of training and education requirements are reported in MCTIMS. The MarineNet eLearning Ecosystem contains requisite content for Marines to complete available training. Course content may be implemented independently (e.g., annual training) or as a module within a larger course (e.g., PME). To complete training in this LMS, an individual Marine engages with the course content and completes any required course evaluations. Upon completion, the LMS records and reports the outcome in a training information management system.
+
+## Chapter 4. Processing Training Data
+
+Training data provides a wealth of information to unit leaders. Throughout planning and execution, unit leaders can monitor UTM processes to ensure development of the training plan is aligned to the METL, relevant T&R standards, and CTG. At any point during the training continuum, unit leaders have a snapshot of current unit readiness and may project unit progress toward desired readiness objectives. Unit leaders and training planners have shared situational awareness concerning the training readiness and progress of the unit throughout training. Unit leaders and training planners evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of their training plans using this training data. A unit's or Marine's success in achieving progressively more difficult or collective training events indicates that the training plan is effective; poor performance in training evaluations or a lack of preparedness to progress to more difficult or collective training events indicates its ineffectiveness.
+
+## Planning For Training
+
+Training planners generate training data throughout planning and execution for the purpose of creating and maintaining the unit training plan. This information is continuously evaluated to ensure the training plan effectively and efficiently leads to achievement of unit training readiness in accordance with the unit's METs and individual training requirements. MCRP 7-20A.1, Training Plan Development, describes several outputs typical of a unit training plan as follows.
+
+Commander's Training Guidance The CTG provides the commander's guidance for the development and execution of the unit training plan. It highlights the unit's METs and required training, and outlines training priorities that inform the development of the unit's training plan. The CTG should not change during the training continuum unless the unit's commander, mission, or METs are changed.
+
+Training, Exercise, and Employment Plan The training, exercise, and employment plan (TEEP) is a broad overview of the unit training plan. It sequences major events that impact the development of a training schedule. The TEEP may change throughout the training continuum if the CTG changes or the unit identifies new major training events it will execute.
+
+Training Schedule The training schedule is a detailed timeline of unit skill building, including all events and exercises related to the unit's training plan. Training events and exercises are associated with T&R standards or individual training requirements. More granular detail provides the unit the opportunity to ensure the sequencing of their scheduled events align with the sequencing of T&R eventsspecifically those events that are deliberately chained, such as those requiring mastery of individual tasks before completion of more complex collective tasks. Additionally, the training schedule reflects significant unit events, such as expectations of significant personnel changes that may impact overall unit training readiness. The training schedule is more fluid than the CTG and TEEP, as events may be added, removed, or rescheduled at the discretion of the unit's leadership. The detailed training schedule also facilitates identifying units and personnel to execute and lead training. With this schedule, subordinate unit leaders are aware of requirements levied by higher headquarters and can create unit-level training schedules that prepare their Marines for participation in those higher headquarters collective events. The training leader responsible for specific events may also ensure they have completed necessary planning, such as letters of instruction and risk assessments, appropriate for the training to be conducted.
+
+## Training Completion
+
+In the case of individual training requirements, such as annual training requirements, an event may result in only a record of completion. The unit identifies training data managers to record training completion in MCTIMS. Distributing TDM roles between the headquarters and subordinate units allows for the efficient recording of training completion. In the case that completion reporting is automated from one system to another, the training data manager will simply verify that training is completed. Units must identify processes for recording their Marines' completion of annual and ancillary training. This not only ensures training requirements are completed, but also that Marines are credited for training not automatically reported in one of the Marine Corps training management systems. This is particularly important for training and certifications Marines achieve through civilian or other-service courses and which are career or military-occupational-specialty-enhancing.
+
+## Training Evaluation
+
+Training evaluation data is generated by the training cadre or individual evaluators for the purpose of providing performance feedback to the unit or individual Marines. Timely feedback, both informally in person and formally through after-action reviews and recording, is essential to providing the commander information about the unit's training readiness, enabling the individual or unit time to remediate training, and allowing training planners time to adjust the training schedule. Training evaluation also provides feedback to the unit about the effectiveness and efficiency of training. While immediate feedback may be the result of task performance, the unit may evaluate the source of the deficiency during training and whether the unit's resources may be better leveraged to improve training.
+
+## Readiness Assessment And Reporting
+
+Readiness assessments, as measured against the objective T&R standards and METs, give unit leaders insight into whether their training plans are leading to a desired state of mission readiness. Training readiness can be described in terms of proficiency and currency. The level of proficiency attained correlates to how well that task is executed. Proficiency is evaluated and measured against a predetermined standard as set forth by T&R manuals. Currency is measured against the sustainment interval for each skill as set forth by T&R manuals. The sustainment interval is the predetermined period within which skills must be refreshed or evaluated. Maintaining currency means that these skills are periodically demonstrated within specified time limits. Training information management systems provide a training readiness assessment based on the data that is entered as a result of training event and exercise execution. However, the commander must make a judgment of the unit's training readiness, such as in DRRS, to meet readiness reporting requirements. The commander incorporates information outside scaled evaluation reports to make these assessments. It is essential that the commander have all the information about unit training to report unit training readiness.
+
+## Conclusion
+
+Training data management supports the commander's readiness assessment. It brings together information management pillars of people, technology, and processes. As with any other unit function or mission, units must determine appropriate processes for employing the Marines and systems available to them to provide the commander with the information necessary to make decisions and take actions about unit training readiness. Effective TDM ensures that this information about individual Marines' and the unit's training is available to the commander for decision making.
+
+## References And Related Publications Joint Issuances
+
+DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
+
+## Other Instructions
+
+Navy/Marine Corps Departmental Publications (NAVMCs)
+1553.1_
+Marine Corps Instructional Systems Design/Systems Approach to Training and Education Handbook
+P3500.106_
+Ground Training and Readiness Program Manual
+3500.14_
+Aviation Training and Readiness Program Manual
+
+## Marine Corps Publications
+
+Marine Corps Supplement to the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
+
+Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDPs)
+1
+Warfighting
+5
+Planning
+7
+Learning
+Marine Corps Tactical Publications (MCTPs)
+3-30B
+Information Management
+7-20A
+Unit Training Guide
+Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)
+7-20A.1
+Training Plan Design
+7-20A.2
+Event and Exercise Design
+7-20A.3
+Marine Corps Simulations Training Guide
+7-20A.4
+Evaluations and Assessments
+Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)
+1553.10
+Marine Corps Training Information Management System Standing Operating Procedure
+1553.3_
+Unit Training Management Program
+3501.1_
+Marine Corps Combat Readiness Evaluation (MCCRE)
+5100.29_
+Marine Corps Safety Management System
+
+A non-cost copy of this document is available at:
+https://www.marines.mil/News/Publications/MCPEL/
+
+## Copyright Information
+
+This document is a work of the United States Government and the text is in the public domain in the United States. Subject to the following stipulation, it may be distributed and copied:
+
+
+Copyrights to graphics and rights to trademarks/Service marks included in this document are reserved by original copyright or trademark/Service mark holders or their assignees, and are used here under a license to the Government and/or other permission.
+
+The use or appearance of United States Marine Corps publications on a non-Federal
+Government website does not imply or constitute Marine Corps endorsement of the distribution service.

markdown/marines/MCWP 11-10.md

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+## Marine Corps Legal Support
+
+US Marine Corps DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
+
+PCN 143 000179 00
+Headquarters United States Marine Corps Washington, D.C. 20350-3000
+
+## Foreword
+
+Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 11-10, *Marine Corps Legal Support*, provides the doctrinal basis for how the legal community delivers support to the Marine Corps. This publication facilitates each commander's ability to integrate the two types of legal support, command legal advice and legal services support, into the planning and execution of Marine Corps operations across the spectrum of conflict, as well as the Service's responsibilities to organize, train, and equip. MCWP 11-10 provides flexible guidance based on accumulated best practices and applies those practices across the range of legal advice and services.
+
+Legal support is provided to the operating forces, supporting establishment, and Headquarters, United States Marine Corps by Marines with legal training who collectively comprise the Marine Corps legal community. Members of the legal community are integral to the Marine Corps by design. They provide an organic legal capability that is ready to respond when the Nation's force in readiness is called upon. MCWP 11-10 explains what the legal community does for the Marine Corps, identifies key personnel, offers an introduction to legal support functional areas, and addresses the judge advocate's role in the Marine Corps Planning Process. MCWP 11-10 is primarily concerned with providing commanders and their staffs a doctrinal reference for what the Marine Corps legal community brings to the fight. Therefore, it is important for every Marine in the legal community to understand the information contained herein. Reviewed and approved this date.
+
+## By Direction Of The Commandant Of The Marine Corps
+
+Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration Publication Control Number: 143 000179 00 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
+
+This Page Intentionally Left Blank
+
+Judge Advocate Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps ........ 4-3
+Staff Judge Advocate........ 4-3 Types of Courts-Martial Convening Authorities........ 4-4 Legal Services Support Sections and Legal Services Support Teams........ 4-5
+The Marine Corps Defense Services Organization........ 4-5 The Victims' Legal Counsel Organization ........ 4-5 Reserve Legal Support........ 4-6
+
+## Chapter 5. Role Of The Judge Advocate In The Marine Corps Planning Process
+
+Legal Advice During the Planning Process ........ 5-1 Measure of Performance and Measure of Effectiveness........ 5-2 Early Integration: Problem Framing........ 5-2
+Further Integration: Achieving Accuracy and Completeness........ 5-3
+
+## Glossary References And Related Publications To Our Readers Chapter 1 Fundamentals
+
+"Within the Marine Corps, having Marine judge advocates serve as unrestricted line officers, expected to maintain themselves as well-rounded MAGTF officers, makes for not only a better Marine officer, but also a more effective Marine judge advocate."
+
+## Conclusion Final Report Of The Independent Review Panel To Study The Judge Advocate Requirements Of The Department Of The Navy
+
+During the 60-plus years since the passage of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), the Marine Corps remains dedicated to two major concepts relative to legal support: the necessity for the Marine Corps legal community's unrestricted Marines to provide legal support to fellow Marines and for the Marines who provide that legal support to be organic to the units that they support, as opposed to a separate corps. These concepts are essential and originate from the Marine Corps expeditionary force character, a character that necessitates legal support inseparably intertwined with the force it helps maintain.
+
+Note: The term "unrestricted" is used here to denote that Marines in the legal community are not restricted to a particular type of duty to which they may be assigned or a separate competitive category. Marines in the legal community provide flexibility for use in a broad span of managerial and career broadening assignments, which are necessary to meet Marine Corps requirements.
+
+Marine Corps commanders have long recognized that good order, discipline, morale, and readiness are all command functions that share a connection with combat readiness and effectiveness.
+
+Changes at strategic, operational, and tactical levels have dramatically increased the amount and diversity of the legal support requirements of commanders. Military operations and day-to-day garrison activities are legally intensive, necessitating the assignment of legal Marines to the staffs of commanders to facilitate mission accomplishment. Legal support requirements are significant and continue to increase, particularly as the number and scope of laws and regulations expands. Consequently, identifying and fulfilling legal support requirements are essential to the Marine Corps in order to fulfill its role in helping to preserve the security and prosperity of the Nation.
+
+## Mission
+
+The mission of the Marine Corps legal community is to provide timely, efficient, and appropriate command legal advice and legal services to commanders, Marines, Sailors, and their families to promote readiness and contribute to Marine Corps mission accomplishment.
+
+## Marine Corps Legal Community
+
+Marine Corps judge advocates, legal administrative officers (warrant officers), enlisted legal services specialists, and civilian personnel comprise the Marine Corps legal community. While there are a number of civilian members, the vast majority of the Marine Corps legal community is comprised of Marines. Uniformed Marines are able to support the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) across the full range of military operations. They are ready and able to provide legal services in expeditionary environments.
+
+Note: An unrestricted commissioned officer in the Marine Corps can be designated by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy as a judge advocate, in accordance with United States Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, subtitle C, part II, chap. 539, sec. 5587a, *Regular Marine Corps: judge advocates*, and Secretary of the Navy Instruction (SECNAVINST) 1120.9A, Designation of Officers of the Regular Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve as Marine Corps Judge Advocates. The term staff judge advocate (SJA) refers to a judge advocate in a specific billet who serves as the primary legal advisor to a commander and provides command legal advice. See the Command Legal Advice and Staff Judge Advocate sections of this publication for more detailed information.
+
+Members of the Marine Corps legal community also serve tours in nonlegal billets, to include command, staff, and leadership positions, as well as students at resident military schools. Service in these billets produces legal Marines who provide better advice and support to commanders and their staffs.
+
+## Principles
+
+The Marine Corps legal community operates with the following three fundamental principles that guide its actions in support of the Marine Corps:
+
+- *Marines first*. Judge advocates, legal administrative officers, and legal services specialists are,
+first and foremost, Marines who adhere to the Service's core values, maintain individual and
+collective readiness, and ensure the welfare of those in their charge.
+- *Professionalism*. Just as the military is a profession, so too is the practice of law. Members of
+the Marine Corps legal community are part of two distinct, yet similar, professions, both bound to follow ethical and professional responsibilities.
+- *Mission accomplishment*. The Marine Corps legal community provides timely and accurate
+legal support that enables commanders to accomplish their missions, supports commanders in maintaining good order and discipline, protects individual rights, and enhances personal and
+unit readiness.
+
+## Types Of Legal Support And Functional Areas
+
+There are two types of Service-level legal support: command legal advice and legal services support. Command legal advice is primarily provided by a command's SJA and the SJA's staff, while legal services support is primarily provided by regional legal services support sections (LSSSs) and their subordinate legal services support teams (LSSTs). Chapter 2 provides further discussion. Command legal advice and legal services support are provided across six functional areas: military justice, international and operational law, administrative law, civil law, legal assistance, and legal administration. Chapter 3 describes each of these functional areas in detail.
+
+This Page Intentionally Left Blank
+
+## Chapter 2 Command Legal Advice And Legal Services Support
+
+". . . having a lawyer that understands the culture . . . is critical in our [Marine Corps] culture and in the credibility of our judge advocates."
+ Lieutenant General Richard F. Natonski Final Report of the Independent Review Panel to Study the Judge Advocate Requirements of the Department of the Navy Members of the legal community provide support to commanders in two different ways: command legal advice, primarily provided by SJAs, and legal services support, primarily provided by legal services support organizations. An understanding of each is necessary for commanders, their staffs, and members of the legal community to ensure that those with the right skills and knowledge perform required legal tasks.
+
+## Command Legal Advice
+
+Command legal advice is the legal advice provided by judge advocates in their role as command advisors, generally while in a SJA billet. The provision of command legal advice is a component of command and control. Legal advice helps inform the commander's decision-making process with respect to ensuring good order and discipline, maintaining unit readiness, and accomplishing assigned missions. Command legal advice includes, but is not limited to, that advice required by law and regulation. The term "command legal advice" specifically refers to the independent legal advice provided by judge advocates in accordance with United States Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, subtitle C, part I, chap. 506, sec. 5046, S*taff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps*. This legal advice is independent because judge advocates who provide the advice are not subject to evaluation of, or supervision in the content of, their advice beyond the commander for whom they work. Command legal advice requirements exist at nearly every level of command. General officers in command and other commanders exercising general court-martial convening authority (GCMCA)
+must fulfill statutory and regulatory duties that require legal advice from a judge advocate. The duties of these commanders and their staffs that require legal advice are numerous, diverse, and situation dependent. These duties exist in garrison, during operations and exercises, and in combat. The legal advice requirements of commanders who do not exercise GCMCA are generally fulfilled by a superior commander's SJA. However, some subordinate commanders have sufficient command legal advice requirements to justify the full-time assignment of a Marine Corps judge advocate to serve as a special staff officer. Such assignments occur frequently, resulting in judge advocates assigned to Marine expeditionary units, special purpose MAGTFs, regimental landing teams, and others, depending on the size, mission requirements, and scale of the MAGTF. A Marine Corps judge advocate may also be assigned to a Marine Forces Special Operations Command-led special operations task force depending on mission requirements. Command legal advice requirements originate from the varied and complex areas of military justice and operational law. In July 1775, General George Washington and the Continental Congress appointed a judge advocate general to help manage the discipline of the newly created army.
+
+Washington foresaw that commanders would require uniformed lawyers to assist in following and administering the specialized body of laws that apply to Service members and the laws that govern armed conflict. While the judge advocate began as an administrator of the criminal justice system, the operational legal needs of commanders, particularly advice on the law of war, grew quickly during and following the Civil War. As the legal issues confronting commanders and Service members have evolved and expanded, so have the areas in which uniformed lawyers support commanders. While military justice and operational law continue to be cornerstone functions of the Marine Corps legal community, the legal communities responsibilities have expanded to include administrative and civil law. The education, training, experience, and shared ethos that judge advocates offer commanders make them qualified to advise and support on nonlegal issues as well.
+
+## Legal Services Support
+
+Legal services support are recurring legal support tasks that are executed to implement a commander's decision; sustain the force; and support Service members, retirees, and their families. Legal services support falls within general sustainment or tactical-level logistics, depending on the organization providing the services. See Marine Corps Tactical Publications (MCTPs) 3-40B, Tactical-Level Logistics, and 3-40G, *Services in an Expeditionary Environment*, for more detailed information. Legal services support tasks are executed across all legal support functional areas.
+
+Legal services support is primarily provided by the LSSSs and their subordinate LSST. The LSSSs and LSSTs are located within the supporting establishment, specifically Marine Corps Installations Command, where they provide continuous legal services support to all Marine Corps units as a function of general sustainment.
+
+The office of the SJA resides with the headquarters element of each major subordinate command to the MAGTF. As part of this headquarters element, their primary role is command legal advice as a component of command and control; however, the office of the SJA can provide limited legal services support capabilities to their units as part of the command services subfunction of tacticallevel logistics. These tasks are limited to those within the organic capability of the SJA's office.
+
+Limited legal services support is provided to individual clients when that service capability is organic to the SJA's office and does not interfere with the attorney-client relationship between the SJA and the Department of the Navy. Legal services support to a deployed MAGTF is task-organized based on mission requirements. The Marine logistics groups (MLGs) have legal community personnel on their tables of organization who work in the supporting establishment when not deployed. The MLGs can recall these personnel if mission requirements dictate. For example, if a more robust, forward-placed legal services support is required, the MLG can task-organize an LSST using the Marines recalled from the supporting establishment. Legal services support provided by the MLG in general support of the MAGTF is a subfunction of the combat service support services function of tactical-level logistics. The largest legal services support requirement is military justice, which exists everywhere Marines serve. The manner in which Marine Corps commanders use military justice to maintain good order and discipline reflects the Marine Corps culture and expeditionary nature, as well as the warrior ethos of Marines. Legal assistance for the personal, civil legal affairs of Service members also exists wherever Marines serve. The location and activity of the MAGTFcombat, forward-deployed operations and exercises, afloat, or in garrisonaffect the manner in which legal services support requirements, whether military justice, legal assistance, or another functional area, are fulfilled.
+
+This Page Intentionally Left Blank
+
+## Chapter 3 Functional Areas
+
+"It's just the potential, especially in a combat environment for mistakes to be made, some of which potentially could have a strategic level impact. . . . How many situations were averted because of the 'hands on' training, guidance, advice, et cetera that was really daily from an assigned embedded Judge Advocate? We'll never know."
+ Lieutenant Colonel Willard A. Buhl Marine Corps Gazette, "The Battalion Judge Advocate"
+The Marine legal community provides the Marine Corps with six functional areas
+
+- Military justice. - International and operational law. - Administrative law. - Civil law. - Legal assistance. - Legal administration.
+The primary purpose of the tasks entailed in each of the functional areas is to enhance mission accomplishment, unit readiness, quality of life, and, when necessary, to protect the rights of affected parties. The legal community enables effective and efficient operations by providing commanders, Marines, Sailors, and their families legal solutions wherever and whenever required.
+
+Note: Some legal functions are provided at the departmental level, including environmental law, civilian personnel and labor law, real property and land use law, and acquisition law, among others. Support to the Marine Corps in these areas is provided by the Office of Counsel for the Commandant, a component of the Department of the Navy Office of General Counsel.
+
+The backbone of each of these six functions is the ability to recruit and retain the right people, to educate and train them, to assign them properly, and to promote processes that ensure efficient and effective legal advice. Each of these functions, along with the capabilities they offer, are described in the following paragraphs.
+
+## Military Justice
+
+The Marine Corps legal community provides the following military justice capabilities at the Service-level: prosecution, defense, legal assistance to victims of crime, court reporting, and posttrial review. These capabilities also include advising commanders on the appropriate disposition of such misconduct, as well as giving general legal advice throughout the legal process. Certain military justice capabilities are provided by the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, including trial and appellate judiciary and appellate counsel. Members of the Marine Corps legal community work alongside Navy personnel in these billets to represent the values and interests of the Marine Corps. The Nation expects and our laws require that justice and due process are rendered before Service members are deprived of their life, liberty, or property. Congress and the President have provided the Military Services with the UCMJ and *Manual for Courts-Martial United States* that ensures due process rights are afforded to those accused of crimes while maintaining the interest of justice and the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. The Preamble to the Manual for Courts-Martial United States best captures this dynamic: "The purpose of military law is to promote justice, to assist in maintaining good order and discipline in the armed forces, to promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment, and thereby to strengthen the national security of the United States." As identified in chapter 2, judge advocates in the US military originated with General Washington's need to administer military justice in order to maintain good order and discipline in the Continental Army. The origin of the Marine Corps legal community as its own distinct community is a direct result of the military justice requirements of commanders following Congress' passage of the UCMJ and follow-on legislation. Much like General Washington's first judge advocate, Marine Corps judge advocates assist commanders in understanding and applying complex areas of the law, thus freeing them and their staffs to focus on fighting and winning wars. Members of the Marine Corps legal community perform the vital role of supporting commanders' efforts to ensure a high state of discipline within the Marine Corps, while simultaneously maintaining justice for individuals. An effective, efficient, and fair military justice system enables the Marine Corps to execute military justice tasks while maintaining a standard worthy of the Nation's trust and confidence.
+
+## International And Operational Law
+
+International and operational law addresses all laws, both international and domestic, that impact the ability of the Marine Corps to conduct training, exercises, and operations. This includes areas such as the law of war, status of forces agreements, and rules of engagement.
+
+This function also encompasses such divergent areas as operational fiscal law, military justice and foreign criminal jurisdiction, intelligence operations and oversight, operations in cyberspace, and domestic operations.
+
+While the United States has implemented rules and regulations enforcing the law of war as far back as 1775, the function of international and operational law is a relatively recent development. Since the late 1970s, operational law has grown significantly within the Department of Defense (DOD), including the establishment of operational legal departments within Service headquarters. From the mid-1980s, within the Marine Corps operating forces, operational law support was provided primarily by the Marine Corps component commands, Marine expeditionary forces, and major subordinate command SJAs. After 11 September 2001, the increasingly complex nature of the environments within which military commanders found themselves operating led them to request the integration of legal advice with planning, training, and operations. As a result, the day-to-day practice of international and operational law is now almost exclusively the province of the judge advocate directly supporting the commander. Ultimately, Marine Corps success depends upon members of the Marine Corps legal community having the experience and adaptability to perform effectively in the operational environment. For example, the requirement for international and operational law expertise within the Marine Corps continues to increase as our involvement in intelligence and cyberspace operations increase. As special staff officers ingrained in the Service culture, Marine Corps judge advocatesand the enlisted personnel who support their effortshelp commanders conduct successful operations across the entire spectrum.
+
+## Administrative Law
+
+Administrative law addresses the statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions governing the establishment, functioning, and command of military organizations, as well as administrative actions regarding military personnel. This function includes command and regulatory authority, administrative investigations, officer and enlisted administrative separations, adverse administrative actions, and government ethics. The administrative law function has grown significantly since the 1950s. Substantial litigation and many changes to Title 10 and implementing regulations have made all aspects of administrative law more complex and considerably rule-based. This necessitates corresponding legal expertise to properly advise commanders. The fulfillment of the administrative law function facilitates the maintenance of good order and discipline and enables commanders to investigate incidents, pursue administrative corrective actions, maintain standards of conduct, and optimize individual and unit performance. The three largest subfunctions of administrative law are administrative investigations, military personnel law, and government ethics.
+
+Administrative Investigations By far the most common administrative investigation is the command investigation. A command investigation serves to search out, develop, assemble, analyze, and record all available information related to the incident under investigation, allowing for a fully informed decision. The commander's use of command investigations serves many purposes, to include protecting the rights and benefits of individual Marines; assisting in making line of duty determinations; recognizing and recording the bases for corrective actions, remedies, and new processes; improving command management and administration; publishing lessons learned; resolving disputes and operational questions; facilitating the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures; and maintaining accountability of individual Marines. The complex nature of rules associated with investigations, as well as the potential for administrative, nonjudicial, or judicial follow-on actions, necessitates the constant involvement of legal personnel. See the Judge Advocate General Instruction (JAGINST) 5800.7F, *Manual of the Judge Advocate General*, for information on how to conduct a command investigation.
+
+Military Personnel Law Military personnel law is the second significant subfunction of administrative law. It is the statutory and regulatory law governing actions and matters specified in United States Code, Title 10, *Armed Forces*, relating to officer and enlisted active, reserve, and retired uniformed Service members of all grades. Such actions and matters include policies and decisions relating to uniforms, leave and liberty, accessions, training, assignment and distribution, promotion (including presidential nominations and appointments, as well as adverse promotion actions such as delay, withhold, and removal), separation (including retirements and involuntary administrative separation), and officer personnel actions and records related to misconduct and substandard performance. Prevalent among the activities within administrative law is the administrative separation of both officers and enlisted Marines.
+
+Government Ethics Government ethics (also referred to as standards of conduct) is the third primary subfunction of administrative law. It involves specific legal and ethical requirements imposed upon the Marine Corps, including relations with and support to non-Federal entities, financial disclosure requirements, fundraising, and gifts to and among Marines. Compliance with government ethics helps Marine Corps leaders and the Marine Corps maintain the public trust by placing loyalty to the Constitution, law, and ethical principles above private gain and entitlement.
+
+## Civil Law
+
+Civil law addresses the statutes, regulations, and judicial decisions that govern the rights and duties of military organizations and installations with regard to civil authorities, as well as interactions with civilian personnel requesting information or making claims against the United States. The majority of issues within this function fall under the category of interactions with civil authorities, including service of process, foreign criminal jurisdiction, defense support of civil authorities, domestic operational law, and the duties of a special assistant US attorney. Defense support of civil authorities and domestic operational law issues primarily emerge when the military supports civilian authorities during civil disturbances and natural disasters. Marine Corps judge advocates can be designated as special assistant US attorneys to represent Federal and DOD interests in the prosecution of civilians who allegedly commit crimes on military installations. Claims against the Government can present a significant issue for commanders, particularly in a deployed environment. Military operations and exercises entail the movement of personnel and equipment, often across great distances. Damage, loss, and injuries often occur, resulting in claims against the US Government. The claims subfunction of civil law provides for the prompt investigation, impartial adjudication, fair settlement, and timely payment of such claims. Claims emerging from military operations and exercises may be brought under a variety of statutes or international agreements or as alternatives to claims, such as solatia payments (i.e., damages awarded to a plaintiff in compensation for personal suffering or grief arising from injury) and statutory authority to pay battle damage claims in combat operations. The diverse capabilities offered by the civil law function contribute directly and indirectly to military readiness and combat effectiveness. The civil law support provided by the Marine Corps legal community helps Marine Corps leaders protect and promote the rights and duties of military organizations relative to civil authorities and protect the Federal interest from misconduct by civilians aboard military installations. The fair and just settlement of claims helps maintain morale when Service members suffer personal property loss as a result of military operations or when the local population, including foreign nationals, suffers harm during military operations and exercises.
+
+## Legal Assistance
+
+Legal assistance addresses the personal legal needs of individual Marines, Sailors, and their family members, increasing their personal readiness, and thus unit readiness. The legal assistance function provides support in the following areas: family law, estate planning (including wills), powers of attorney, naturalization, landlord-tenant law, consumer law, tax law, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, and other personal, civil legal affairs. Legal assistance for Marines going through the Disability Evaluation System is provided through the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy.
+
+The legal assistance function focuses on ensuring that Marines and their families receive sound legal advice that responds to their unique, individual needs. This allows Marines to resolve personal legal issues that could otherwise distract them from accomplishing the mission and decrease unit readiness. The legal assistance support that Marines receive while deployed helps them take care of themselves and their families, thereby enabling Marines to concentrate on their operational duties and the mission.
+
+## Legal Administration
+
+Legal administration is the sixth function of legal support. This function encompasses those tasks and associated capabilitiessome unique to legal supportnecessary for the internal administration of legal organizations. These tasks and associated capabilities include, but are not limited to, correspondence, budget, embarkation for deployment, and information technology. Information technology for the Marine Corps legal community is specialized and requires a unique mix of technical and legal knowledge.
+
+## Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
+
+Like all other commands, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps (HQMC) requires all six functions of Service-level legal support. However, many of the legal requirements within HQMC, though they fall within the six functions, are unique and concern the authorities of the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC); the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps; the Director, Marine Corps Staff; the Deputy Commandants; or Marine Corps functions and responsibilities relative to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the US Navy, various Government entities, and elected or appointed officials. The Judge Advocate Division (JAD) is responsible for supporting these unique HQMC legal functions. The legal services support needs of HQMC are provided by the regional LSSS. Departmental-level legal support to HQMC is provided by the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy or by the Office of the Counsel to the Commandant, a subordinate office of the General Counsel of the Department of the Navy.
+
+## Chapter 4 Organization, Roles, And Responsibilities
+
+"A commander needs instantaneous legal advice, but the tyranny of distance in Iraq prevents getting help from outside the unit, especially judge advocate help, when the help is needed.
+
+My battalion JA [judge advocate] was crucial to the success of the battalion's detainee processing, which continues to get more complex and requires careful oversight to ensure the packages are complete and the detainee stays incarcerated. In dealing with locals, especially sheiks, my lawyer was particularly helpful. In Iraqi culture sheiks consider the CO [commanding officer] a very important man if he has his own lawyer. Perceived status is everything. Furthermore, in a culture like Iraq's where personal relationships are essential and everything is subject to negotiation and deal making, a lawyer's education, training, and insights are invaluable. I always took my lawyer with me when talking to locals. An infantry battalion simply cannot fight a COIN [counterinsurgency] operation without a judge advocate on the battalion staff."
+The Marine Corps legal community facilitates the efficient and effective provision of legal support to both the operational forces and the supporting establishment. This is a significant challenge because the legal support requirements within the operational forces and supporting establishment are dynamic and susceptible to sudden change. Furthermore, there are two competing legal support missions: military justice and international and operational law. Military justice is the predominant mission while in garrison; while during exercises, operations, and combat, international and operational law is the focus (see chap. 3). Therefore, the legal community is organized so that all legal support functions are fulfilled in a manner that ensures the best support to commanders. As currently organized, each GCMCA (and certain subordinate commanders, as discussed in the Command Legal Advice paragraph of chapter 2) has an SJA to provide command legal advice and basic levels of legal services support. All legal services support beyond the organic capability of the SJA office is provided in garrison by one of four regional LSSSs and their nine subordinate LSSTs. Each LSSS (and its subordinate LSSTs) is located within one of the regional Marine Corps installations commands. In garrison, the majority of legal personnel are assigned to the LSSS or LSST to support the military justice function. When combat or other operations arise, operational commanders can recall legal personnel working in the LSSS or LSST to augment the SJA office and to establish an LSST in the MLG to provide forward-positioned legal services support. The LSST established by the MLG is flexible and scalable based on the needs of the supported MAGTF. This organizational structure maximizes the use of legal Marines in garrison while still providing a ready pool for deployment, thus reducing the total number of Marines needed to provide legal support. Commanders ultimately determine legal support requirements and priorities, assuming the risks associated with any particular legal support plan. Because legal support personnel and resources are finite, a recurring prioritization of legal support requirements among various commands is normal. The current organizational structure of the Marine Corps legal community is inherently flexible and readily capable of task organization based upon the requirements of the MAGTF. It accounts for the fact that command legal advice and legal services support are, in essence, two sides of the same coin. The structure of the Marine Corps legal community works because its members are Marines who understand the interrelationship between command legal advice and legal services support. That understanding is derived from a career progression that includes billets in both types of legal support, as well as unrestricted billets.
+
+## Staff Judge Advocate To The Commandant Of The Marine Corps
+
+The SJA to the CMC is the senior uniformed legal advisor to the CMC and performs duties relating to legal matters arising in the Marine Corps, and other duties as directed by the Secretary of the Navy or CMC. The specific responsibilities of the SJA to the CMC are numerous, diverse, and often situation dependent. The SJA's specific roles and responsibilities are discussed in the following subparagraphs. See Marine Corps Order (MCO) 5430.2, Roles and Responsibilities of the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps, for further guidance.
+
+Senior Uniformed Legal Advisor The SJA to the CMC is the senior uniformed legal advisor to the CMC as well as HQMC staff and agencies. In this role, the SJA to the CMC provides independent legal advice, counsel, and guidance on any matter within the SJA's cognizance, and any matter that may be assigned.
+
+Director, Judge Advocate Division The SJA to the CMC serves as the director of the JAD, located within HQMC. As director of the JAD, the SJA to the CMC supervises and manages various branches in support of the Secretary of the Navy, CMC, and HQMC.
+Proponent for Command Legal Advice and Legal Services Support The SJA to the CMC is the functional proponent for command legal advice and legal services support. In this role, the SJA to the CMC assists the CMC and HQMC officials with the execution of their Title 10 responsibilities to train, organize, and equip organic legal support essential to a global expeditionary force. The SJA to the CMC does this by, among other things, identifying capabilities, deficiencies, and solutions related to legal support structure and staffing. This includes the authority to advise the Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration on legal structure and the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs on the assignment of legal personnel. This special authority is in recognition of the "unique requirements of the legal mission and professional development of the legal community," per SECNAVINST 5430.27D, Responsibility of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for Supervision and Provision of Certain Legal Services.
+
+Supervisor of the Legal Community The SJA to the CMC serves as functional supervisor of the Marine Corps legal community with the responsibility of overseeing and supervising the provision of legal support tasks within the Marine Corps on behalf of the CMC. This includes the authority to formulate, promulgate, implement, supervise, inspect, and enforce standards of practice and the use of uniform standards and procedures for the performance of legal support tasks. This authority does not include direction and control of individual legal community personnel in the performance of their duties. Direction and control of legal personnel remains an inherent function and responsibility of the respective commander. The SJA to the CMC executes a legal support inspection program and sends members of the staff to visit legal support providers around the world as an extension of the functional supervisory role.
+
+Oversight of Legal Personnel The SJA to the CMC exercises professional responsibility oversight over all Marine Corps judge advocates, legal administrative officers, and legal services specialists, and over those civilian legal support personnel who practice law under the SJA's cognizance. For Marines, this authority exists regardless of assignment within or outside the Marine Corps, with the exception of trial and appellate judges.
+
+## Judge Advocate Division, Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
+
+The JAD serves two primary purposes. The first is to assist the SJA to the CMC in advising the Secretary of the Navy, CMC, and HQMC on legal matters. The second is to assist the SJA to the CMC in providing oversight of the Marine Corps legal community on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy and the CMC. The SJA to the CMC simultaneously serves as director of the JAD. The JAD is organized into branches and also contains an individual mobilization augmentee (IMA) detachment to supervise reserve legal services support. The branches cover all six functions of legal support, including the unique legal requirements of HQMC discussed in the Headquarters, United States Marine Corps paragraph of chapter 3. The provision of reserve legal support and the JAD IMA detachment are discussed in detail later in this chapter.
+
+## Staff Judge Advocate
+
+The SJA is a command's principal legal advisor and a member of the commander's special staff. The SJA advises the commander and staff on all matters within the SJA's cognizance, which includes all six functions of legal support, as well as any other matters on which the commander seeks advice. Staff judge advocates may be unable to provide the complete range of legal services support; available services are determined by the organic capabilities of the SJA's office.
+
+Staff judge advocates are assigned at all levels of command, though they are primarily assigned to general officers in command and other GCMCAs. Subordinate commanders with significant command legal advice requirements are also assigned judge advocates, as discussed in the Command Legal Advice paragraph of chapter 2. By statute and regulation, many decisions require advice by an SJA before the commander can act.
+
+Commanders are often required to speak directly to their SJA. For example, Article 6(b), UCMJ, requires convening authorities to "communicate directly with their staff judge advocates" in military justice matters. Regardless of statutes and regulations, commanders should seek the advice of their SJAs whenever necessary, including recommendations on courses of action (COAs). Many commanders routinely seek out their SJAs' opinions on other matters, often due to the special skills that legal training brings and the independent nature of their legal advice. As stated in United States Code, Title 10, section 5046, *Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps*, no one within the DOD may interfere with a judge advocate's ability to provide independent legal advice to commanders.
+
+## Types Of Courts-Martial Convening Authorities
+
+Summary court-martial (SCM) convening authority typically rests with any person who may convene a general court-martial (GCM) or special court-martial (SPCM). An SCM is a noncriminal forum that consists of one, impartial, active-duty commissioned officer, preferably O-3 or above, who conducts the trial proceedings and makes all the decisions required in the case. An SCM may try any person subject to the UCMJ, except commissioned officers, warrant officers, cadets, and midshipmen, typically for minor offenses. Perhaps the most important limitation on the jurisdiction of an SCM is that a Marine may refuse to be tried by an SCM, even if the Marine has previously refused nonjudicial punishment. In a trial by SCM, an accused has a right to consult with a defense counsel before trial, but does not have a right to be represented by a detailed military defense counsel at the hearing. Special court-martial convening authority typically rests with battalion/squadron or higher commanders. An SPCM is normally composed of a military judge alone or a military judge and other panel members, a legally competent trial counsel (prosecutor), and a defense counsel. The Government provides the accused with defense counsel at no expense. An enlisted Marine tried by SPCM may demand that at least one-third of the panel members be enlisted Service members.
+
+An SPCM may try any Marine for any noncapital (non-death penalty) offense under the UCMJ.
+
+An individual cannot refuse to be tried by a SPCM. General court-martial convening authority typically rests with a general officer who is the commander of an installation or major subordinate command or higher. A GCM is composed of a military judge alone or a military judge and other panel members, as well as legally qualified trial and defense counsel. The GCMCA may refer any person subject to the UCMJ for any offense made punishable by the UCMJ to any level of court-martial; however, prior to referral to a GCM, the GCMCA must comply with the requirements of Article 32, UCMJ (preliminary hearing), and Article 34, UCMJ (advice of SJA). A GCM may, upon conviction, recommend any punishment authorized by the UCMJ. An individual cannot refuse to be tried by a GCM.
+
+Further information on the three types of courts-martial and their jurisdiction and composition can be found in the most current edition of the *Manual for Courts-Martial United States*, the JAGINST 5800.7F, Manual of the Judge Advocate General, and MCO P5800.16A, Marine Corps Manual for Legal Administration (Short Title: LEGADMINMAN).
+
+## Legal Services Support Sections And Legal Services Support Teams
+
+Legal services support outside the organic capability of the SJA is provided by consolidated legal services support organizations. These organizations are task-organized in a variety of sizes and capability sets. Marine Corps Installations Command has a permanent LSSSs for each of its four regions: Marine Corps Installations National Capital Region, Marine Corps Installations East, Marine Corps Installations West, and Marine Corps Installations Pacific. Each of the four LSSSs has between one and three subordinate LSSTs. The LSSSs and LSSTs geographically consolidate the provision of legal services support in garrison to develop greater unity of effort, to increase levels of professional supervision, and to create organizational efficiency, synergy, and flexibility. Consolidation while in garrison also helps to maintain continuity, depth, and breadth of experience in legal services support when legal Marines are not required for operational duties. Ultimately, the flexibility and regional reach of the LSSS allows leadership to provide the right Marines for the right legal services support tasks.
+
+## The Marine Corps Defense Services Organization
+
+The Marine Corps Defense Services Organization (also referred to as the DSO) is a functionally independent organization that provides zealous, ethical, and effective representation to Marines and Sailors in order to protect and promote individual rights under the law and regulations. The head of the Marine Corps Defense Services Organization is the Chief Defense Counsel of the Marine Corps. To maintain functional independence, the Chief Defense Counsel of the Marine Corps works directly for the SJA to the CMC.
+
+## The Victims' Legal Counsel Organization
+
+Congress established the authority for victims' legal counsel under United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces, subtitle A, part II, chap. 53, secs. 1044, *Legal Assistance*, and 1044e, Special Victims' Counsel for victims of sex-related offenses, and chap. 80, sec. 1565b, Victims of sexual assault: access to legal assistance and services of Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Sexual Assault Victim Advocates. The victims' legal counsel primary duties are to advise and represent victims as required by law, regulation, and policies and procedures issued by the Victims' Legal Counsel Organization officer in charge. While the victims' legal counsel primarily operates in the military justice functional area, the placement of their statutory authority in close proximity to the authority for legal assistance clarifies the nature of the services that victims' legal counsel provide. The Victims' Legal Counsel Organization, which supervises the victims' legal counsel, is also functionally independent and provides ethical and effective representation to eligible clients in order to protect and promote individual rights under the law and regulations. The head of the Victims' Legal Counsel Organization is the officer in charge of the Victims' Legal Counsel Organization. To maintain functional independence, the officer in charge works directly for the SJA to the CMC.
+
+## Reserve Legal Support
+
+Like the Active Component of the Marine Corps, the Reserve Component has a legal community that helps provide legal support to the active and reserve forces. The organization of reserve legal support is similar to that of the Active Component. However, unlike in the Active Component, reserve legal services support billets are consolidated in one IMA detachment located within JAD, HQMC. The head of the JAD IMA detachment is competitively selected by the reserve senior leader board. The JAD IMA detachment contains branches to execute reserve legal services support tasks and assists in the execution of active duty legal services support tasks. The JAD IMA detachment also includes reserve legal billets that support departmental functions. Nondepartmental, reserve command legal advice billets remain on the table of the organization of the supported command. Although the JAD IMA detachment is placed within HQMC, its members are located throughout the United States in order to more easily provide support to local active duty and reserve commands.
+
+## Chapter 5 Role Of The Judge Advocate In The Marine Corps Planning Process
+
+"Decisions were impacted by legal considerations at every level. . . . Lawyers proved invaluable in the decision-making process."
+The tenets of the Marine Corps Planning Processtop-down planning, single-battle concept, and integrated planningguide the commander's use of staff to plan and execute military operations. Today, most commanders engaged in operations have a judge advocate available for planning. In general terms, the judge advocate is the legal planner and advisor to the process. In order to effectively fill the role as advisor and planner, the judge advocate must be an effective staff officer who understands not only the laws and regulations, but also the military process and operation in which the command is engaged. Depending on the unit procedures and desires of the commander, legal advice is passed in different methods to different audiences within the process. When the commander is attempting to frame the problem, the judge advocate's role is to provide an overview and general principles of the applicable rules. From there, the judge advocate's attention will turn to a particular cell or issue brought to light during development of the plan. As the planning process develops, the judge advocate refines the general overview to apply to a particular issue within a COA. The judge advocate must be able to capture any advice in a form that appropriately supports the planning process and that may be included in any subsequent operational plans or orders.
+
+## Legal Advice During The Planning Process
+
+During planning, effective legal advice is built on the following three cornerstones:
+
+- *Knowledge of the law*. All judge advocates must possess knowledge of the relevant and
+applicable law and regulations in order to be effective advisors and planners.
+- *Knowledge of the situation*. Knowledge of the situation shapes the framework for the advice.
+This knowledge is gained through integration into the process, which is designed to develop
+the ability to understand and analyze the situation. A staff properly executing the battle rhythm
+in an operational environment is perpetually updating its knowledge of a situation and the planning process merely isolates a problem into a manageable framework in order to achieve a solution.
+- *Knowledge of the process*. Understanding the planning process, whether it is deliberate or crisis
+action planning, enables a judge advocate to take knowledge of the law as it applies to a situation and integrate this knowledge into the plan. Effective integration of the entire staff, including the
+judge advocate, will prevent wasting valuable time and effort on a plan that should have been eliminated at its inception. As MAGTF officers with knowledge of Marine Corps Warfighting
+Publication 5-10, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, Marine Corps judge advocates are uniquely equipped to provide specialized legal advice as a part of the overall staff.
+
+## Measure Of Performance And Measure Of Effectiveness
+
+The role of a judge advocate within a staff is to help generate and maintain tempo for a commander through the application of timely, correct, and complete legal advice. A solid foundational knowledge of the law, the situation, and the planning process supports the warfighting function of command and control by illuminating the commander's decision-making process through effective prioritization of requirements and enhances a judge advocate's value within a staff. The following four factors should be used to measure the performance and effectiveness of legal advice during the planning process:
+
+- *Timeliness*. Legal advice must be available to all who require it when needed. - *Accuracy*. Legal advice is accurate when the applicable laws and regulations are correctly
+applied to the facts and situation. As operations evolve, so must the legal advice.
+- *Completeness*. The advice must address all legal requirements and meet the needs of the plan as
+it moves forward and new COAs are developed or new issues arise.
+- *Utility*. Judge advocates must provide advice in such a manner as to be meaningful to
+commanders, planners, and other staff members unable to navigate the legal complexities presented by the applicable rules and regulations.
+The manner in which these measures are met will vary within each unit. However, effective unit procedures will produce and capture legal advice in such a way that all these measures are met.
+
+The judge advocate must understand the planning process and the implementing procedures in order to identify when and where legal advice is needed. Meeting these measures of performance and measures of effectiveness should be what commanders expect of any judge advocate engaged in the planning process.
+
+## Early Integration: Problem Framing
+
+Problem framing presents the first and best opportunity for the judge advocate to educate the commander, staff, and planners on the legal parameters of the operation. To be effective, the judge advocate must have access to all members of the staff and subordinate commanders, as well as the operational information required for planning. Early access and integration help weave the applicable rules into the entire planning process. Early education in laws and regulations helps to steer the commander, staff, and planners away from legally unsupportable COAs and focuses them on viable solutions. The early explanation of the rules applicable to any operation will act as a force multiplier. As an educator during the problem framing stage, the judge advocate provides relevant, timely, and accurate advice that is essential to the plan.
+
+## Further Integration: Achieving Accuracy And Completeness
+
+Just as all planners will continue to refine their input, so will the judge advocate refine and update advice as it applies to the developing situation. In continuing to participate in the process in this manner, the judge advocate ensures all advice is accurate and complete. As the planners fill in the details through COA development and COA war game, so will the judge advocate fill in the details of the broad legal parameters that were initially provided to the planners.
+
+For example, the commander may direct the development of two COAs looking at two entirely different methods of troop insertion, one via ground and the other via air. While operating under the general rules initially presented, the judge advocate would be concerned with ensuring that the two COAs are lawful. Within the legal parameters of the theater, air lifting troops could present very different issues from those encountered in planning a ground insertion. This process of refining legal advice continues from COA development to COA war game. Course of action war game involves a detailed assessment of each COA, to include support estimates as they relate to the enemy and the other elements of the battlespace. The support estimate for the judge advocate goes further than simply determining there are no legal issues; the assessment of the COAs presents the legal planner another opportunity to refine the advice in light of what is expected to play out on the battlefield. The assessment process also allows the judge advocate to further educate the planners in the applicable rules in even greater detail as legal issues present themselves. The refinement of advice and guidance continues and intensifies as the process moves to COA comparison and decision. The comparison is often an open forum event. Commanders, planners, and staffs gather to present the COAs and provide assessments of supportability based upon their area of expertise and knowledge of the environment and the plan. The staff may simply provide estimates by recording a vote on a matrix. However, because the next step is a decision point for the commanderdetermining which COA is to be pursuedthe commander may want to hear not only whether a COA is supportable, but also the reasons that the COA is supportable based upon a staff member's area of expertise. Having initially been an advisor, the judge advocate must now formulate a legal opinion for the commander as to why one particular COA is better or worse than another. Typically, it is not enough to say that all COAs are equally supportable. However, the judge advocate is not a tactician and should refrain from providing tactical critiques, instead focusing on the lawfulness of the tactics. It is important to note that Marine judge advocates are subject to the same assessment, selection, basic training, and continuing education as other officers. So while the judge advocate should avoid tactical advice, an understanding of tactics is essential to provide the best advice on the lawfulness of various tactics. That knowledge of operational matters, which ultimately improves the quality of legal advice, is one of many reasons judge advocates are unrestricted officers and organic to commands. Provided the judge advocate is fully immersed and integrated into the process, a judge advocate should possess sufficient insight into the entirety of the situation to be able to advise why one plan is legally preferable to another.
+
+Completeness as a measure of performance and measure of effectiveness is not fulfilled simply because the advice has been delivered to the commander. Once the decision is made, whether in a confirmation brief or the writing of an order, the judge advocate must take all of the advice that was provided throughout the process and package the advice in its final form. This final act ensures the completeness of the legal advice. The judge advocate must ensure the measures of performance and measures of effectiveness of timeliness, accuracy, completeness, and usability are met within the planning process. To do so requires the judge advocate to be fully integrated into the process from the earliest point. Ideally, this means serving as an educator on the legal environment during the problem framing stage, thereby assisting commanders and decision makers to better understand the environment. The judge advocate then refines the advice from a broad spectrum of rules to particular applications within COA development and COA war game. In this refinement, the judge advocate's advice becomes more accurate and complete. As the process comes to a decision point, all that has been learned is distilled into usable information in the form of an opinion. This opinion can either be woven into the plan or described within an appendix. Most importantly, the judge advocate is effective only if the judge advocate understands both the law and the process in which the advice and guidance are provided.
+
+## Section Ii. Terms And Definitions
+
+active dutyFull-time duty in the active military service of the United States, including active duty or full-time training duty of the Reserve Component. (DOD Dictionary) command1. The authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. 2. An order given by a commander; that is, the will of the commander expressed for the purpose of bringing about a particular action. 3. A unit or units, an organization, or an area under the command of one individual. (DOD Dictionary) command and controlThe exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (DOD Dictionary) The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. Command and control is one of the six warfighting functions. Also called C2. (MCRP 1-10.2) defense support of civil authoritiesSupport provided by US Federal military forces, Department of Defense civilians, Department of Defense contract personnel, Department of Defense component assets, and National Guard forces (when the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. Also called **DSCA**. Also known as **civil support**.
+
+(DOD Dictionary) detaineeAny person captured, detained, or otherwise under the control of Department of Defense personnel. (DOD Dictionary). expeditionary forceAn armed force organized to achieve a specific objective in a foreign country. (DOD Dictionary) force1. An aggregation of military personnel, weapon systems, equipment, and necessary support, or combination thereof. 2. A major subdivision of a fleet. (DOD Dictionary) individual mobilization augmenteeAn individual reservist attending drills who receives training and is preassigned to an Active Component organization, a Selective Service System, or a Federal Emergency Management Agency billet that must be filled on, or shortly after, mobilization. Also called IMA. (DOD Dictionary) judge advocateAn officer of the Judge Advocate General's Corps of the Army, Air Force, or Navy, or officers of the Marine Corps or Coast Guard designated as a judge advocate. Also called JA. (DOD Dictionary)
+law of warThat part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities. Also called **the law of armed conflict**. See also **rules of engagement**. (DOD Dictionary) measure of effectivenessAn indicator used to measure a current system state, with change indicated by comparing multiple observations over time. Also called MOE. See also **mission**.
+
+(DOD Dictionary) measure of performanceAn indicator used to measure a friendly action that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. Also called MOP. (DOD Dictionary) mission1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (DOD Dictionary) Tasks assigned by the President to the combatant commanders in the Unified Command Plan. (MCRP 1-10.2) organicAssigned to and forming an essential part of a military organization as listed in its table of organization for the Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps, and are assigned to the operating forces for the Navy. (DOD Dictionary)
+readinessThe ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions.
+
+(DOD Dictionary) Reserve ComponentThe Armed Forces of the United States Reserve Component consists of the Army National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Navy Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. Also called RC. (DOD Dictionary) rules of engagementDirectives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. See also **law of war**.
+
+(DOD Dictionary) staff judge advocateA judge advocate so designated in the Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps, and the principal legal advisor of a Navy, Coast Guard, or joint force command who is a judge advocate. Also called SJA. (DOD Dictionary) sustainmentThe provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. (DOD Dictionary)
+This Page Intentionally Left Blank
+
+## References And Related Publications United States Code
+
+United States Code, Title 10, Armed Forces
+Subtitle A, part II, chap. 47, Uniform Code of Military Justice
+Subtitle A, part II, chap. 53, sec. 1044, Legal Assistance
+Subtitle A, part II, chap. 53, sec. 1044e, Special Victims' Counsel for victims of
+sex-related offenses
+Subtitle A, part II, chap. 80, sec. 1565b, Victims of sexual assault: access to legal assistance
+and services of Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Sexual Assault Victim Advocates
+Subtitle C, part I, chap. 506, sec. 5046, Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the
+Marine Corps
+Subtitle C, part II, chap. 539, sec. 5587a, Regular Marine Corps: judge advocates
+
+## Department Of Defense
+
+Manual for Courts-Martial United States
+
+## Joint Issuances
+
+DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
+
+## Secretary Of The Navy Instructions (Secnavinsts)
+
+| 1120.9_                                                                      | Designation of Officers of the Regular Marine Corps and Marine Corps Reserve    |
+|------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
+| as Marine Corps Judge Advocates                                              |                                                                                 |
+| 5430.27_                                                                     | Responsibility of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy and the Staff Judge    |
+| Advocate to the Commandant of the Marine Corps for Supervision and Provision |                                                                                 |
+| of Certain Legal Services                                                    |                                                                                 |
+
+## United States Marine Corps
+
+Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP)
+5-10
+Marine Corps Planning Process
+Marine Corps Tactical Publications (MCTPs)
+3-40B
+Tactical-Level Logistics
+3-40G
+Services in an Expeditionary Environment
+Marine Corps Orders (MCOs)
+P5800.16_
+Marine Corps Manual for Legal Administration (Short Title: LEGADMINMAN)
+w/changes 17
+5430.2
+Roles and Responsibilities of the Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant of the
+Marine Corps
+
+## United States Navy
+
+Judge Advocate General Instruction (JAGINST)
+5800.7_
+Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGMAN)
+
+## Miscellaneous
+
+Colonel Raymond E. Ruhlmann III "The Battalion Judge Advocate." *Marine Corps Gazette*, vol. 91, issue 3, March 2007, pp. 4041. Final Report of the Independent Review Panel to Study the Judge Advocate Requirements of the Department of the Navy. US Senate Committee on Army Services, Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 2011. Keeva, Steven "Lawyers in the War Room." *ABA Journal*, vol. 77, December 1991, pp. 5259. (77 A.B.A.J. 52).
+
+## To Our Readers
+
+Changes: Readers of this publication are encouraged to submit suggestions and changes to Doctrine Control Branch via e-mail: doctrine@usmc.mil. Suggestions and changes must include the following information:
+
+- Location of change
+Publication number and title Current page number Paragraph number (if applicable)
+Line number Figure or table number (if applicable)
+- Nature of change
+Addition/deletion of text Proposed new text
+Additional copies: If this publication is not an electronic only distribution, a printed copy may be obtained from Marine Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA 31704-5001, by following the instructions in MCBul 5600, Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications Status. An electronic copy may be obtained from the United States Marine Corps Doctrine web page: https://homeport.usmc.mil/sites/mcdoctrine/SitePages/Home.aspx