id int64 0 3.55k | input_options listlengths 5 5 | output stringlengths 11 48 | gold_index int64 0 4 |
|---|---|---|---|
800 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nlikely to cause material harm to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Id., at 8. It further pointed out that the news media in that case had been allowed access to materials considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment and that this was consistent with “a public right of access to materials considered in rulings on dispositive pre-trial motions . . .” Id., at 8. The Court held, however, that the right to public access “does not extend to documents submitted to a court in connection with discovery proceedings,” id., at 11, and concluded that “discovery proceedings are fundamentally different from proceedings to which the courts have recognized a public right of F.2d 139, 146-48 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, sub nom. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 484 U.S. 953 (1984) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it modified a protective order after settlement to permit public access to pretrial materials in spite of a protective order to the contrary which it viewed as having had been initially justified",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nlikely to cause material harm to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Id., at 8. It further pointed out that the news media in that case had been allowed access to materials considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment and that this was consistent with “a public right of access to materials considered in rulings on dispositive pre-trial motions . . .” Id., at 8. The Court held, however, that the right to public access “does not extend to documents submitted to a court in connection with discovery proceedings,” id., at 11, and concluded that “discovery proceedings are fundamentally different from proceedings to which the courts have recognized a public right of F.2d 139, 146-48 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, sub nom. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 484 U.S. 953 (1984) (holding that a publishing company had no constitutional or other right of access to pretrial documents not filed with the court and declining to overturn the district courts denial of a motion to vacate a protective order to which the parties had stipulated",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nlikely to cause material harm to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Id., at 8. It further pointed out that the news media in that case had been allowed access to materials considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment and that this was consistent with “a public right of access to materials considered in rulings on dispositive pre-trial motions . . .” Id., at 8. The Court held, however, that the right to public access “does not extend to documents submitted to a court in connection with discovery proceedings,” id., at 11, and concluded that “discovery proceedings are fundamentally different from proceedings to which the courts have recognized a public right of F.2d 139, 146-48 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, sub nom. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 484 U.S. 953 (1984) (holding that issuance of a protective order or other probable cause of abuse precludes court ordered mediation",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nlikely to cause material harm to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Id., at 8. It further pointed out that the news media in that case had been allowed access to materials considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment and that this was consistent with “a public right of access to materials considered in rulings on dispositive pre-trial motions . . .” Id., at 8. The Court held, however, that the right to public access “does not extend to documents submitted to a court in connection with discovery proceedings,” id., at 11, and concluded that “discovery proceedings are fundamentally different from proceedings to which the courts have recognized a public right of F.2d 139, 146-48 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, sub nom. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 484 U.S. 953 (1984) (holding that protective orders in the landlord and tenant branch are distinguishable from ordinary prejudgment security devices because protective orders are not statutory creations and because a tenant who fails to pay a protective order may suffer the irreparable consequence of losing possession of the property",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nlikely to cause material harm to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Id., at 8. It further pointed out that the news media in that case had been allowed access to materials considered in connection with a motion for summary judgment and that this was consistent with “a public right of access to materials considered in rulings on dispositive pre-trial motions . . .” Id., at 8. The Court held, however, that the right to public access “does not extend to documents submitted to a court in connection with discovery proceedings,” id., at 11, and concluded that “discovery proceedings are fundamentally different from proceedings to which the courts have recognized a public right of F.2d 139, 146-48 (2nd Cir. 1987), cert. denied, sub nom. Dow Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 484 U.S. 953 (1984) (holding that court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendants a protective order where plaintiff failed to request discovery until nine days before the deadline"
] | ). In doing so, the Court stressed that (unlike | 0 |
801 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin addressing jury questions. But we know that “analytically correct” answers to a jury may unnecessarily — and improperly — influence a jury. See Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir.2003); see also id. at 994-98 (discussing cases). Furthermore, even if not improper, we recognize that some influence on the jury’s deliberations is difficult to avoid when the jury is troubled enough to seek advice. “The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight.... Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge’s last word is apt to be the decisive word.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. United States v. Sacco, 869 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that sufficiency of the evidence review should be independent of the jurys determination that evidence on another count was insufficient",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin addressing jury questions. But we know that “analytically correct” answers to a jury may unnecessarily — and improperly — influence a jury. See Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir.2003); see also id. at 994-98 (discussing cases). Furthermore, even if not improper, we recognize that some influence on the jury’s deliberations is difficult to avoid when the jury is troubled enough to seek advice. “The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight.... Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge’s last word is apt to be the decisive word.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. United States v. Sacco, 869 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that suppression of evidence by the prosecution of evidence favorable to the defendant upon request violates the defendants right to due process where the evidence is material",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin addressing jury questions. But we know that “analytically correct” answers to a jury may unnecessarily — and improperly — influence a jury. See Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir.2003); see also id. at 994-98 (discussing cases). Furthermore, even if not improper, we recognize that some influence on the jury’s deliberations is difficult to avoid when the jury is troubled enough to seek advice. “The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight.... Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge’s last word is apt to be the decisive word.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. United States v. Sacco, 869 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir.1989) (holding prosecutors argument that defense counsels goal was to keep evidence from the jury was improper",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin addressing jury questions. But we know that “analytically correct” answers to a jury may unnecessarily — and improperly — influence a jury. See Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir.2003); see also id. at 994-98 (discussing cases). Furthermore, even if not improper, we recognize that some influence on the jury’s deliberations is difficult to avoid when the jury is troubled enough to seek advice. “The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight.... Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge’s last word is apt to be the decisive word.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. United States v. Sacco, 869 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir.1989) (holding that defendant failed to preserve for appeal argument that trial court inadequately recharged the jury after jury requested a written definition of a charge when after discussing the issue defendant explicitly agreed with trial courts response to the jurys request",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nin addressing jury questions. But we know that “analytically correct” answers to a jury may unnecessarily — and improperly — influence a jury. See Arizona v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 988, 994 (9th Cir.2003); see also id. at 994-98 (discussing cases). Furthermore, even if not improper, we recognize that some influence on the jury’s deliberations is difficult to avoid when the jury is troubled enough to seek advice. “The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight.... Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge’s last word is apt to be the decisive word.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); cf. United States v. Sacco, 869 F.2d 499, 501-02 (9th Cir.1989) (recognizing that a careful response to a jurys request for specific pieces of evidence can keep the jury from overvaluing any one piece of evidence"
] | ); United States v. Frazin, 780 F.2d 1461, 1469 | 4 |
802 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nciting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 882, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). Any statements obtained in violation of this precept are presumed involuntary, unless the suspect himself initiat (noting that, in normal parlance, “I think I’m going to get a lawyer” constitutes an affirmative request for the assistance of an attorney); Commonwealth v. Corriveau, 396 Mass. 319, 331 (1985) (concluding that a suspect did not invoke his right to counsel with the remark, “It’s beginning to sound like I need a lawyer”); Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 387 (1984) (finding that, “I guess I’ll have to have a lawyer for this,” was not an unambiguous request for an attorney); Commonwealth v. Barros, 56 Mass.App.Ct. 675, 681 (2002) (holding that statement i think i should call my lawyer was an unequivocal request for counsel",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nciting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 882, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). Any statements obtained in violation of this precept are presumed involuntary, unless the suspect himself initiat (noting that, in normal parlance, “I think I’m going to get a lawyer” constitutes an affirmative request for the assistance of an attorney); Commonwealth v. Corriveau, 396 Mass. 319, 331 (1985) (concluding that a suspect did not invoke his right to counsel with the remark, “It’s beginning to sound like I need a lawyer”); Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 387 (1984) (finding that, “I guess I’ll have to have a lawyer for this,” was not an unambiguous request for an attorney); Commonwealth v. Barros, 56 Mass.App.Ct. 675, 681 (2002) (holding do you think i need a lawyer to be ambiguous",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nciting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 882, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). Any statements obtained in violation of this precept are presumed involuntary, unless the suspect himself initiat (noting that, in normal parlance, “I think I’m going to get a lawyer” constitutes an affirmative request for the assistance of an attorney); Commonwealth v. Corriveau, 396 Mass. 319, 331 (1985) (concluding that a suspect did not invoke his right to counsel with the remark, “It’s beginning to sound like I need a lawyer”); Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 387 (1984) (finding that, “I guess I’ll have to have a lawyer for this,” was not an unambiguous request for an attorney); Commonwealth v. Barros, 56 Mass.App.Ct. 675, 681 (2002) (holding that a suspect made an acceptable request for counsel by stating i dont think i want to talk to you anymore without a lawyer",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nciting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 882, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). Any statements obtained in violation of this precept are presumed involuntary, unless the suspect himself initiat (noting that, in normal parlance, “I think I’m going to get a lawyer” constitutes an affirmative request for the assistance of an attorney); Commonwealth v. Corriveau, 396 Mass. 319, 331 (1985) (concluding that a suspect did not invoke his right to counsel with the remark, “It’s beginning to sound like I need a lawyer”); Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 387 (1984) (finding that, “I guess I’ll have to have a lawyer for this,” was not an unambiguous request for an attorney); Commonwealth v. Barros, 56 Mass.App.Ct. 675, 681 (2002) (holding i might want to talk to an attorney to be ambiguous",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nciting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966); Commonwealth v. Brant, 380 Mass. 876, 882, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980). Any statements obtained in violation of this precept are presumed involuntary, unless the suspect himself initiat (noting that, in normal parlance, “I think I’m going to get a lawyer” constitutes an affirmative request for the assistance of an attorney); Commonwealth v. Corriveau, 396 Mass. 319, 331 (1985) (concluding that a suspect did not invoke his right to counsel with the remark, “It’s beginning to sound like I need a lawyer”); Commonwealth v. Pennellatore, 392 Mass. 382, 387 (1984) (finding that, “I guess I’ll have to have a lawyer for this,” was not an unambiguous request for an attorney); Commonwealth v. Barros, 56 Mass.App.Ct. 675, 681 (2002) (holding that the state courts conclusion that a suspect did not unambiguously request counsel was not unreasonable when during a postmiranda interview the suspect stated i think i would like to talk to a lawyer after which the police stopped questioning him left the room and did not resume questioning until the suspect explicitly said he did not want a lawyer and wanted to continue talking"
] | ). Neither “a mere inquiry regarding the need | 2 |
803 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.1985) (interpreting a provision insuring against embezzlement and employee fraud in the subrogation context); First Nat’l Bank of Fort Walton Beach v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 416 F.2d 52, 57 (5th Cir.1969) (interpreting a provision requiring the bank act “in good faith and in the usual course of business”); Eglin Nat’l Bank v. Home Indem. Co., 583 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir.1978) (interpreting a provision insuring against “dishonest or fraudulent acts” by employees). These cases are inapposite. Courts outside the Eleventh Circuit have interpreted Exclusion H’s “caused by an Employee” language in widely differing fashions. Compare Empire Bank, 27 F.3d at 335 (“[T]he bond language excludes losses caused by a bank employee, whether negligent or not.”), with Manitowoc, 485 F.3d at 980 (holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.1985) (interpreting a provision insuring against embezzlement and employee fraud in the subrogation context); First Nat’l Bank of Fort Walton Beach v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 416 F.2d 52, 57 (5th Cir.1969) (interpreting a provision requiring the bank act “in good faith and in the usual course of business”); Eglin Nat’l Bank v. Home Indem. Co., 583 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir.1978) (interpreting a provision insuring against “dishonest or fraudulent acts” by employees). These cases are inapposite. Courts outside the Eleventh Circuit have interpreted Exclusion H’s “caused by an Employee” language in widely differing fashions. Compare Empire Bank, 27 F.3d at 335 (“[T]he bond language excludes losses caused by a bank employee, whether negligent or not.”), with Manitowoc, 485 F.3d at 980 (holding an employees actions in disregarding his doctors warnings were negligent",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.1985) (interpreting a provision insuring against embezzlement and employee fraud in the subrogation context); First Nat’l Bank of Fort Walton Beach v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 416 F.2d 52, 57 (5th Cir.1969) (interpreting a provision requiring the bank act “in good faith and in the usual course of business”); Eglin Nat’l Bank v. Home Indem. Co., 583 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir.1978) (interpreting a provision insuring against “dishonest or fraudulent acts” by employees). These cases are inapposite. Courts outside the Eleventh Circuit have interpreted Exclusion H’s “caused by an Employee” language in widely differing fashions. Compare Empire Bank, 27 F.3d at 335 (“[T]he bond language excludes losses caused by a bank employee, whether negligent or not.”), with Manitowoc, 485 F.3d at 980 (holding exclusion h does not apply where employees were merely negligent",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.1985) (interpreting a provision insuring against embezzlement and employee fraud in the subrogation context); First Nat’l Bank of Fort Walton Beach v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 416 F.2d 52, 57 (5th Cir.1969) (interpreting a provision requiring the bank act “in good faith and in the usual course of business”); Eglin Nat’l Bank v. Home Indem. Co., 583 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir.1978) (interpreting a provision insuring against “dishonest or fraudulent acts” by employees). These cases are inapposite. Courts outside the Eleventh Circuit have interpreted Exclusion H’s “caused by an Employee” language in widely differing fashions. Compare Empire Bank, 27 F.3d at 335 (“[T]he bond language excludes losses caused by a bank employee, whether negligent or not.”), with Manitowoc, 485 F.3d at 980 (holding that section 4149 did not apply to the plaintiffs state law claims of breach of duty to protect foster care children from harm and of negligent supervision negligent entrustment and negligent failure to warn",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCir.1985) (interpreting a provision insuring against embezzlement and employee fraud in the subrogation context); First Nat’l Bank of Fort Walton Beach v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 416 F.2d 52, 57 (5th Cir.1969) (interpreting a provision requiring the bank act “in good faith and in the usual course of business”); Eglin Nat’l Bank v. Home Indem. Co., 583 F.2d 1281, 1285 (5th Cir.1978) (interpreting a provision insuring against “dishonest or fraudulent acts” by employees). These cases are inapposite. Courts outside the Eleventh Circuit have interpreted Exclusion H’s “caused by an Employee” language in widely differing fashions. Compare Empire Bank, 27 F.3d at 335 (“[T]he bond language excludes losses caused by a bank employee, whether negligent or not.”), with Manitowoc, 485 F.3d at 980 (holding negligent misrepresentation sufficient"
] | ). The bond itself does not define the term. The | 2 |
804 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthe eases were tried.” Id. at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042. Cabina-tan’s ease was tried months before Cabagbag was decided. Therefore, we examine Cabi-natan’s claim under the ^re-Cabagbag standard. Under the pve-Cabagbag standard, ‘“we must examine all aspects of the trial, including the opening statements, the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the arguments to the jury, and the general instructions given by the court, to determine whether the jury’s attention was adequately drawn to the identification evidence.’ ” Cabagbag, 127 Hawai'i at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042 (quoting Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 405, 894 P.2d at 102). The jury’s attention must be adequately drawn to the identification evidence such that specific instructions are unnecessary. See Pahio, 58 Haw. at 331, 568 P.2d at 1206 (holding that an identification instruction was unnecessary because of the crossexamination of the prosecution witnesses and the arguments to the juiy",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthe eases were tried.” Id. at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042. Cabina-tan’s ease was tried months before Cabagbag was decided. Therefore, we examine Cabi-natan’s claim under the ^re-Cabagbag standard. Under the pve-Cabagbag standard, ‘“we must examine all aspects of the trial, including the opening statements, the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the arguments to the jury, and the general instructions given by the court, to determine whether the jury’s attention was adequately drawn to the identification evidence.’ ” Cabagbag, 127 Hawai'i at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042 (quoting Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 405, 894 P.2d at 102). The jury’s attention must be adequately drawn to the identification evidence such that specific instructions are unnecessary. See Pahio, 58 Haw. at 331, 568 P.2d at 1206 (holding in a tax fraud case that a goodfaith instruction was unnecessary because the trial judge adequately instructed the jury on willfulness",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthe eases were tried.” Id. at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042. Cabina-tan’s ease was tried months before Cabagbag was decided. Therefore, we examine Cabi-natan’s claim under the ^re-Cabagbag standard. Under the pve-Cabagbag standard, ‘“we must examine all aspects of the trial, including the opening statements, the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the arguments to the jury, and the general instructions given by the court, to determine whether the jury’s attention was adequately drawn to the identification evidence.’ ” Cabagbag, 127 Hawai'i at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042 (quoting Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 405, 894 P.2d at 102). The jury’s attention must be adequately drawn to the identification evidence such that specific instructions are unnecessary. See Pahio, 58 Haw. at 331, 568 P.2d at 1206 (holding that the defendants failure to call the insufficiency of the evidence to the trial courts attention rendered the issue not preserved",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthe eases were tried.” Id. at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042. Cabina-tan’s ease was tried months before Cabagbag was decided. Therefore, we examine Cabi-natan’s claim under the ^re-Cabagbag standard. Under the pve-Cabagbag standard, ‘“we must examine all aspects of the trial, including the opening statements, the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the arguments to the jury, and the general instructions given by the court, to determine whether the jury’s attention was adequately drawn to the identification evidence.’ ” Cabagbag, 127 Hawai'i at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042 (quoting Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 405, 894 P.2d at 102). The jury’s attention must be adequately drawn to the identification evidence such that specific instructions are unnecessary. See Pahio, 58 Haw. at 331, 568 P.2d at 1206 (holding that the requested instruction was not required under rule 4325c because even assuming that the requested instruction was a correct statement of law the trial judge exercised his discretion properly",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nthe eases were tried.” Id. at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042. Cabina-tan’s ease was tried months before Cabagbag was decided. Therefore, we examine Cabi-natan’s claim under the ^re-Cabagbag standard. Under the pve-Cabagbag standard, ‘“we must examine all aspects of the trial, including the opening statements, the cross-examination of prosecution witnesses, the arguments to the jury, and the general instructions given by the court, to determine whether the jury’s attention was adequately drawn to the identification evidence.’ ” Cabagbag, 127 Hawai'i at 317, 277 P.3d at 1042 (quoting Okumura, 78 Hawai'i at 405, 894 P.2d at 102). The jury’s attention must be adequately drawn to the identification evidence such that specific instructions are unnecessary. See Pahio, 58 Haw. at 331, 568 P.2d at 1206 (holding that various aspects of the trial adequately directed the jurys attention to the identification evidence and made defendants requested instruction unnecessary"
] | ). Here, we cannot say that the arguments of | 4 |
805 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nweave through the labyrinth of criminal statutes, administrative code provisions, and not-yet-codified agency rules is inconsistent with the “process” our Founding Fathers believed we were due before being charged with criminal offenses. No person of ordinary intelligence could determine what he is prohibited to possess or deal by the term “synthetic drug” in Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-10(a) and 11, based on Ind.Code §§ 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. Therefore the portions of Ind.Code §§ 35-48-4-10(a) and 11 in effect at the time of Ashfaque’s alleged offenses are void for vagueness to the extent they rely on definitions, including unnamed substances “structurally derived” from other substances, found in Ind.Code §§ 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. See Health-script, 770 N.E.2d at 816 (holding such statutes are not analogous statutes of limitation for erisa purposes",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nweave through the labyrinth of criminal statutes, administrative code provisions, and not-yet-codified agency rules is inconsistent with the “process” our Founding Fathers believed we were due before being charged with criminal offenses. No person of ordinary intelligence could determine what he is prohibited to possess or deal by the term “synthetic drug” in Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-10(a) and 11, based on Ind.Code §§ 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. Therefore the portions of Ind.Code §§ 35-48-4-10(a) and 11 in effect at the time of Ashfaque’s alleged offenses are void for vagueness to the extent they rely on definitions, including unnamed substances “structurally derived” from other substances, found in Ind.Code §§ 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. See Health-script, 770 N.E.2d at 816 (holding the requirement that a person search through multiple statutes then through the administrative code lacks the sufficient definiteness that due process requires for penal statutes",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nweave through the labyrinth of criminal statutes, administrative code provisions, and not-yet-codified agency rules is inconsistent with the “process” our Founding Fathers believed we were due before being charged with criminal offenses. No person of ordinary intelligence could determine what he is prohibited to possess or deal by the term “synthetic drug” in Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-10(a) and 11, based on Ind.Code §§ 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. Therefore the portions of Ind.Code §§ 35-48-4-10(a) and 11 in effect at the time of Ashfaque’s alleged offenses are void for vagueness to the extent they rely on definitions, including unnamed substances “structurally derived” from other substances, found in Ind.Code §§ 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. See Health-script, 770 N.E.2d at 816 (holding the voidforvagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nweave through the labyrinth of criminal statutes, administrative code provisions, and not-yet-codified agency rules is inconsistent with the “process” our Founding Fathers believed we were due before being charged with criminal offenses. No person of ordinary intelligence could determine what he is prohibited to possess or deal by the term “synthetic drug” in Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-10(a) and 11, based on Ind.Code §§ 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. Therefore the portions of Ind.Code §§ 35-48-4-10(a) and 11 in effect at the time of Ashfaque’s alleged offenses are void for vagueness to the extent they rely on definitions, including unnamed substances “structurally derived” from other substances, found in Ind.Code §§ 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. See Health-script, 770 N.E.2d at 816 (holding the double jeopardy clause applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nweave through the labyrinth of criminal statutes, administrative code provisions, and not-yet-codified agency rules is inconsistent with the “process” our Founding Fathers believed we were due before being charged with criminal offenses. No person of ordinary intelligence could determine what he is prohibited to possess or deal by the term “synthetic drug” in Ind. Code §§ 35-48-4-10(a) and 11, based on Ind.Code §§ 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. Therefore the portions of Ind.Code §§ 35-48-4-10(a) and 11 in effect at the time of Ashfaque’s alleged offenses are void for vagueness to the extent they rely on definitions, including unnamed substances “structurally derived” from other substances, found in Ind.Code §§ 35-31.5-2-321(9) and 25-26-13-4.1. See Health-script, 770 N.E.2d at 816 (holding that the statutes abrogated the common law"
] | ). [19]We distinguish our holding here from | 1 |
806 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninsurance carriers mentioned in section 14 are the confidential communications with Horizon’s legal counsel and Horizon’s insurance carriers referred to in section 3.10. Under the plain meaning of the contract between Aon and Horizon, Aon is not Horizon’s agent except when Aon communicates with Horizon’s legal counsel or passes on these communications with counsel to Horizon’s insurance carriers. However, relative to the alleged acts or omissions at issue in this case, Horizon’s claims ai*e not based on any such communications. Therefore, we conclude that Aon was not acting as Horizon’s agent under the unambiguous language of the Agreement. See Environmental Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 626-29, 2009 WL 237063, at *16-18 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet. h.) (holding there was no evidence to support the existence of any alleged fiduciary duty",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninsurance carriers mentioned in section 14 are the confidential communications with Horizon’s legal counsel and Horizon’s insurance carriers referred to in section 3.10. Under the plain meaning of the contract between Aon and Horizon, Aon is not Horizon’s agent except when Aon communicates with Horizon’s legal counsel or passes on these communications with counsel to Horizon’s insurance carriers. However, relative to the alleged acts or omissions at issue in this case, Horizon’s claims ai*e not based on any such communications. Therefore, we conclude that Aon was not acting as Horizon’s agent under the unambiguous language of the Agreement. See Environmental Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 626-29, 2009 WL 237063, at *16-18 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet. h.) (holding that an attorney who breaches a fiduciary duty to a client forfeits his right to compensation without any requirement that the client prove actual harm",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninsurance carriers mentioned in section 14 are the confidential communications with Horizon’s legal counsel and Horizon’s insurance carriers referred to in section 3.10. Under the plain meaning of the contract between Aon and Horizon, Aon is not Horizon’s agent except when Aon communicates with Horizon’s legal counsel or passes on these communications with counsel to Horizon’s insurance carriers. However, relative to the alleged acts or omissions at issue in this case, Horizon’s claims ai*e not based on any such communications. Therefore, we conclude that Aon was not acting as Horizon’s agent under the unambiguous language of the Agreement. See Environmental Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 626-29, 2009 WL 237063, at *16-18 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet. h.) (holding that broker owed no fiduciary duty to client as a matter of law",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninsurance carriers mentioned in section 14 are the confidential communications with Horizon’s legal counsel and Horizon’s insurance carriers referred to in section 3.10. Under the plain meaning of the contract between Aon and Horizon, Aon is not Horizon’s agent except when Aon communicates with Horizon’s legal counsel or passes on these communications with counsel to Horizon’s insurance carriers. However, relative to the alleged acts or omissions at issue in this case, Horizon’s claims ai*e not based on any such communications. Therefore, we conclude that Aon was not acting as Horizon’s agent under the unambiguous language of the Agreement. See Environmental Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 626-29, 2009 WL 237063, at *16-18 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet. h.) (holding law enforcement owed duty similar to that owed by dshs under rcw 2644050",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ninsurance carriers mentioned in section 14 are the confidential communications with Horizon’s legal counsel and Horizon’s insurance carriers referred to in section 3.10. Under the plain meaning of the contract between Aon and Horizon, Aon is not Horizon’s agent except when Aon communicates with Horizon’s legal counsel or passes on these communications with counsel to Horizon’s insurance carriers. However, relative to the alleged acts or omissions at issue in this case, Horizon’s claims ai*e not based on any such communications. Therefore, we conclude that Aon was not acting as Horizon’s agent under the unambiguous language of the Agreement. See Environmental Procedures, Inc. v. Guidry, 282 S.W.3d 602, 626-29, 2009 WL 237063, at *16-18 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet. h.) (holding that relationship between executor and estates beneficiaries is one that gives rise to fiduciary duty as matter of law"
] | ); Ramco Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Anglo-Dutch (Tenge) | 2 |
807 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nPetitioner’s claim that his sentence violated his due process rights. III. EiToneous Factual Basis for Sentencing Petitioner next contends that his sentence was based, in part, on an erroneous understanding of the facts. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the Government erroneously informed the court that Petitioner told the probation officer that he had previously transported drugs into the State of Hawaii. Petitioner further claims that the court relied on this false information in determining Petitioner’s sentence. Petitioner did not raise this argument when he appealed his conviction. Where a defendant fails to raise a non-constitutional challenge to his sentencing on direct appeal, the claim is deemed waived. See United States v. Schlesinger, 49 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that errors not raised before the trial court will not generally be considered on appeal",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nPetitioner’s claim that his sentence violated his due process rights. III. EiToneous Factual Basis for Sentencing Petitioner next contends that his sentence was based, in part, on an erroneous understanding of the facts. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the Government erroneously informed the court that Petitioner told the probation officer that he had previously transported drugs into the State of Hawaii. Petitioner further claims that the court relied on this false information in determining Petitioner’s sentence. Petitioner did not raise this argument when he appealed his conviction. Where a defendant fails to raise a non-constitutional challenge to his sentencing on direct appeal, the claim is deemed waived. See United States v. Schlesinger, 49 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that this court follows the rule that nonconstitutional sentencing errors that have not been raised on direct appeal have been waived and generally may not be reviewed by way of 28 usc 2255",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nPetitioner’s claim that his sentence violated his due process rights. III. EiToneous Factual Basis for Sentencing Petitioner next contends that his sentence was based, in part, on an erroneous understanding of the facts. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the Government erroneously informed the court that Petitioner told the probation officer that he had previously transported drugs into the State of Hawaii. Petitioner further claims that the court relied on this false information in determining Petitioner’s sentence. Petitioner did not raise this argument when he appealed his conviction. Where a defendant fails to raise a non-constitutional challenge to his sentencing on direct appeal, the claim is deemed waived. See United States v. Schlesinger, 49 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir.1994) (holding claims must be raised on direct appeal or waived",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nPetitioner’s claim that his sentence violated his due process rights. III. EiToneous Factual Basis for Sentencing Petitioner next contends that his sentence was based, in part, on an erroneous understanding of the facts. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the Government erroneously informed the court that Petitioner told the probation officer that he had previously transported drugs into the State of Hawaii. Petitioner further claims that the court relied on this false information in determining Petitioner’s sentence. Petitioner did not raise this argument when he appealed his conviction. Where a defendant fails to raise a non-constitutional challenge to his sentencing on direct appeal, the claim is deemed waived. See United States v. Schlesinger, 49 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir.1994) (holding ineffectivetrialassistance claim may be brought in 28 usc 2255 proceeding regardless of whether claim could have been raised on direct appeal",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nPetitioner’s claim that his sentence violated his due process rights. III. EiToneous Factual Basis for Sentencing Petitioner next contends that his sentence was based, in part, on an erroneous understanding of the facts. Specifically, Petitioner asserts that the Government erroneously informed the court that Petitioner told the probation officer that he had previously transported drugs into the State of Hawaii. Petitioner further claims that the court relied on this false information in determining Petitioner’s sentence. Petitioner did not raise this argument when he appealed his conviction. Where a defendant fails to raise a non-constitutional challenge to his sentencing on direct appeal, the claim is deemed waived. See United States v. Schlesinger, 49 F.3d 483, 485 (9th Cir.1994) (holding that nonconstitutional claims that could have been raised on direct appeal may not be asserted in a collateral proceeding"
] | ). In such a circumstance, the court may only | 1 |
808 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngiven multiple opportunities to do so. 2 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 3 . Sanders does not assert the Government was in contact with the victim at some point prior to the day before the start of the trial, nor does Sanders allege the Government in any way delayed informing him regarding its meeting with the victim, during which the victim was shown the photographic lineup. Moreover, we need not consider Sanders' claim the photographic lineup was \"unduly suggestive,” as he raises this argument for the first time in his reply brief. See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1289 (11th Cir.1999) (holding argument not raised in opening brief but raised for the first time in reply brief was waived",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngiven multiple opportunities to do so. 2 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 3 . Sanders does not assert the Government was in contact with the victim at some point prior to the day before the start of the trial, nor does Sanders allege the Government in any way delayed informing him regarding its meeting with the victim, during which the victim was shown the photographic lineup. Moreover, we need not consider Sanders' claim the photographic lineup was \"unduly suggestive,” as he raises this argument for the first time in his reply brief. See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1289 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a partys failure to raise an issue in the opening brief waived the issue even though the party raised the issue in his reply brief",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngiven multiple opportunities to do so. 2 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 3 . Sanders does not assert the Government was in contact with the victim at some point prior to the day before the start of the trial, nor does Sanders allege the Government in any way delayed informing him regarding its meeting with the victim, during which the victim was shown the photographic lineup. Moreover, we need not consider Sanders' claim the photographic lineup was \"unduly suggestive,” as he raises this argument for the first time in his reply brief. See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1289 (11th Cir.1999) (holding argument is waived when raised for first time in reply brief",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngiven multiple opportunities to do so. 2 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 3 . Sanders does not assert the Government was in contact with the victim at some point prior to the day before the start of the trial, nor does Sanders allege the Government in any way delayed informing him regarding its meeting with the victim, during which the victim was shown the photographic lineup. Moreover, we need not consider Sanders' claim the photographic lineup was \"unduly suggestive,” as he raises this argument for the first time in his reply brief. See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1289 (11th Cir.1999) (holding an appellant who raised an issue for the first time in his reply brief waived the claim",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ngiven multiple opportunities to do so. 2 . In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to close of business on September 30, 1981. 3 . Sanders does not assert the Government was in contact with the victim at some point prior to the day before the start of the trial, nor does Sanders allege the Government in any way delayed informing him regarding its meeting with the victim, during which the victim was shown the photographic lineup. Moreover, we need not consider Sanders' claim the photographic lineup was \"unduly suggestive,” as he raises this argument for the first time in his reply brief. See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1289 (11th Cir.1999) (holding that a contention raised for the first time in a reply brief was waived"
] | ). 4 . Contrary to Sanders' contention, the | 3 |
809 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nNor is there any indication that Diatek intended to be bound by any particular offer prior to finalizing the contracts on September 14, 2001. Jon Wilson, who engaged in talks with potential distributors during the summer of 2001, characterized those talks as “preliminary discussion[s].” He summarized his message to the distributors as: “We have a new dialysis catheter. We are looking for distribution. It is going to be pretty much a standard deal.” The Federal Circuit has distinguished between language that suggests a legal offer — such as “I offer” or “I promise” — and language that merely suggests preliminary negotiations' — such as “I quote” or “are you interested.” Group One, 254 F.3d at 1048; see also Linear Tech. Corp. v. Mircrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1050 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (holding that speaking to potential customers to determine an appropriate price does not constitute an offer for sale",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nNor is there any indication that Diatek intended to be bound by any particular offer prior to finalizing the contracts on September 14, 2001. Jon Wilson, who engaged in talks with potential distributors during the summer of 2001, characterized those talks as “preliminary discussion[s].” He summarized his message to the distributors as: “We have a new dialysis catheter. We are looking for distribution. It is going to be pretty much a standard deal.” The Federal Circuit has distinguished between language that suggests a legal offer — such as “I offer” or “I promise” — and language that merely suggests preliminary negotiations' — such as “I quote” or “are you interested.” Group One, 254 F.3d at 1048; see also Linear Tech. Corp. v. Mircrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1050 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (holding an unaccepted settlement offer or offer of judgment does not moot a plaintiffs case emphasis added",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nNor is there any indication that Diatek intended to be bound by any particular offer prior to finalizing the contracts on September 14, 2001. Jon Wilson, who engaged in talks with potential distributors during the summer of 2001, characterized those talks as “preliminary discussion[s].” He summarized his message to the distributors as: “We have a new dialysis catheter. We are looking for distribution. It is going to be pretty much a standard deal.” The Federal Circuit has distinguished between language that suggests a legal offer — such as “I offer” or “I promise” — and language that merely suggests preliminary negotiations' — such as “I quote” or “are you interested.” Group One, 254 F.3d at 1048; see also Linear Tech. Corp. v. Mircrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1050 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (recognizing that settlement discussions do not constitute an offer of judgment",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nNor is there any indication that Diatek intended to be bound by any particular offer prior to finalizing the contracts on September 14, 2001. Jon Wilson, who engaged in talks with potential distributors during the summer of 2001, characterized those talks as “preliminary discussion[s].” He summarized his message to the distributors as: “We have a new dialysis catheter. We are looking for distribution. It is going to be pretty much a standard deal.” The Federal Circuit has distinguished between language that suggests a legal offer — such as “I offer” or “I promise” — and language that merely suggests preliminary negotiations' — such as “I quote” or “are you interested.” Group One, 254 F.3d at 1048; see also Linear Tech. Corp. v. Mircrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1050 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (holding that a price quotation can amount to an offer creating the power of acceptance if it appears from the price quote that assent to the quote is all that is needed to ripen the offer into a contract",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nNor is there any indication that Diatek intended to be bound by any particular offer prior to finalizing the contracts on September 14, 2001. Jon Wilson, who engaged in talks with potential distributors during the summer of 2001, characterized those talks as “preliminary discussion[s].” He summarized his message to the distributors as: “We have a new dialysis catheter. We are looking for distribution. It is going to be pretty much a standard deal.” The Federal Circuit has distinguished between language that suggests a legal offer — such as “I offer” or “I promise” — and language that merely suggests preliminary negotiations' — such as “I quote” or “are you interested.” Group One, 254 F.3d at 1048; see also Linear Tech. Corp. v. Mircrel, Inc., 275 F.3d 1040, 1050 (Fed.Cir. 2001) (holding that an offer to donate cannot be an offer to sell"
] | ). Wilson’s characterization places his talks | 0 |
810 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbring an individual action under § 1132(a)(3). See 516 U.S. 489, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996). Although Varity interpreted § 1132(a)(3) to authorize individual suits, its holding is not as broad as Wilson contends. The Supreme Court ruled that an individual can sue under § 1132(a)(3), but he or she must: (1) only seek equitable relief, and (2) have no more specific means of relief available. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 508-15, 116 S.Ct. 1065; Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1997). Wilson’s claim seeks damages in the amount of the rehabilitation expenses, not injunctive relief. Furthermore, the remedy for a claim that a plan participant’s benefits were improperly denied is specifically provided for in § 1132(a)(1)(B). See Turner, 127 F.3d at 200 (holding that an individual who brings a lawsuit pursuant to 1132a1b to challenge a denial of disability benefits does not also have a right to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty under 1132a3",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbring an individual action under § 1132(a)(3). See 516 U.S. 489, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996). Although Varity interpreted § 1132(a)(3) to authorize individual suits, its holding is not as broad as Wilson contends. The Supreme Court ruled that an individual can sue under § 1132(a)(3), but he or she must: (1) only seek equitable relief, and (2) have no more specific means of relief available. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 508-15, 116 S.Ct. 1065; Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1997). Wilson’s claim seeks damages in the amount of the rehabilitation expenses, not injunctive relief. Furthermore, the remedy for a claim that a plan participant’s benefits were improperly denied is specifically provided for in § 1132(a)(1)(B). See Turner, 127 F.3d at 200 (holding that 1132a1b affords the plaintiff adequate relief for her benefits claim and a cause of action under 1132a3 is thus not appropriate",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbring an individual action under § 1132(a)(3). See 516 U.S. 489, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996). Although Varity interpreted § 1132(a)(3) to authorize individual suits, its holding is not as broad as Wilson contends. The Supreme Court ruled that an individual can sue under § 1132(a)(3), but he or she must: (1) only seek equitable relief, and (2) have no more specific means of relief available. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 508-15, 116 S.Ct. 1065; Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1997). Wilson’s claim seeks damages in the amount of the rehabilitation expenses, not injunctive relief. Furthermore, the remedy for a claim that a plan participant’s benefits were improperly denied is specifically provided for in § 1132(a)(1)(B). See Turner, 127 F.3d at 200 (holding that action to recover erisa benefits under the subject plan are legal in nature and that plaintiff is constitutionally entitled to trial by jury on any claim raised under 1132a1b",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbring an individual action under § 1132(a)(3). See 516 U.S. 489, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996). Although Varity interpreted § 1132(a)(3) to authorize individual suits, its holding is not as broad as Wilson contends. The Supreme Court ruled that an individual can sue under § 1132(a)(3), but he or she must: (1) only seek equitable relief, and (2) have no more specific means of relief available. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 508-15, 116 S.Ct. 1065; Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1997). Wilson’s claim seeks damages in the amount of the rehabilitation expenses, not injunctive relief. Furthermore, the remedy for a claim that a plan participant’s benefits were improperly denied is specifically provided for in § 1132(a)(1)(B). See Turner, 127 F.3d at 200 (holding plaintiff had no claim under 1132a3 because his grievance that benefits were denied is specifically addressed in 1132a1b",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nbring an individual action under § 1132(a)(3). See 516 U.S. 489, 116 S.Ct. 1065, 134 L.Ed.2d 130 (1996). Although Varity interpreted § 1132(a)(3) to authorize individual suits, its holding is not as broad as Wilson contends. The Supreme Court ruled that an individual can sue under § 1132(a)(3), but he or she must: (1) only seek equitable relief, and (2) have no more specific means of relief available. See Varity, 516 U.S. at 508-15, 116 S.Ct. 1065; Turner v. Fallon Community Health Plan, 127 F.3d 196, 200 (1st Cir.1997). Wilson’s claim seeks damages in the amount of the rehabilitation expenses, not injunctive relief. Furthermore, the remedy for a claim that a plan participant’s benefits were improperly denied is specifically provided for in § 1132(a)(1)(B). See Turner, 127 F.3d at 200 (holding that no ada violation was shown because the disabled were not denied benefits that were otherwise available"
] | ). Thus, even if Wilson amended Count V, he | 3 |
811 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof devices with whom one communicates. Nor does it raise novel issues distinct from those long since resolved in the context of telephone communication, with which society has lived for the nearly forty years since Smith was decided. Like telephone companies, Internet service providers require that identifying information be disclosed in order to make communication among electronic devices possible. In light of the Smith rule, no reasonable person could maintain a privacy interest in that sort of information. We therefore join the other circuits that have considered this narrow question and hold that collecting IP address information devoid of content is “constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register.” Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510; see, e.g., Wheelock, 772 F.3d at 828 (holding that state officials cannot have been expected to predict the future course of constitutional law internal quotation marks omitted",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof devices with whom one communicates. Nor does it raise novel issues distinct from those long since resolved in the context of telephone communication, with which society has lived for the nearly forty years since Smith was decided. Like telephone companies, Internet service providers require that identifying information be disclosed in order to make communication among electronic devices possible. In light of the Smith rule, no reasonable person could maintain a privacy interest in that sort of information. We therefore join the other circuits that have considered this narrow question and hold that collecting IP address information devoid of content is “constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register.” Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510; see, e.g., Wheelock, 772 F.3d at 828 (holding that computer users do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in their bulletin board subscriber information because they have conveyed it to another person",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof devices with whom one communicates. Nor does it raise novel issues distinct from those long since resolved in the context of telephone communication, with which society has lived for the nearly forty years since Smith was decided. Like telephone companies, Internet service providers require that identifying information be disclosed in order to make communication among electronic devices possible. In light of the Smith rule, no reasonable person could maintain a privacy interest in that sort of information. We therefore join the other circuits that have considered this narrow question and hold that collecting IP address information devoid of content is “constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register.” Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510; see, e.g., Wheelock, 772 F.3d at 828 (holding that the defendant cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the governments acquisition of his subscriber information including his ip address and name because it had been revealed to a third party internal quotation marks omitted",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof devices with whom one communicates. Nor does it raise novel issues distinct from those long since resolved in the context of telephone communication, with which society has lived for the nearly forty years since Smith was decided. Like telephone companies, Internet service providers require that identifying information be disclosed in order to make communication among electronic devices possible. In light of the Smith rule, no reasonable person could maintain a privacy interest in that sort of information. We therefore join the other circuits that have considered this narrow question and hold that collecting IP address information devoid of content is “constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register.” Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510; see, e.g., Wheelock, 772 F.3d at 828 (holding that information from reliable entity confirming that defendant was the internet subscriber associated with the ip addresses at issue and used screen name involved in crime supported probable cause for warrant",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof devices with whom one communicates. Nor does it raise novel issues distinct from those long since resolved in the context of telephone communication, with which society has lived for the nearly forty years since Smith was decided. Like telephone companies, Internet service providers require that identifying information be disclosed in order to make communication among electronic devices possible. In light of the Smith rule, no reasonable person could maintain a privacy interest in that sort of information. We therefore join the other circuits that have considered this narrow question and hold that collecting IP address information devoid of content is “constitutionally indistinguishable from the use of a pen register.” Forrester, 512 F.3d at 510; see, e.g., Wheelock, 772 F.3d at 828 (holding bank clients had no legitimate expectation of privacy in banking information revealed to a third party"
] | ); Christie, 624 F.3d at 573 (holding that there | 2 |
812 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n931 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir.1991); Stanley v. United States, 140 F.3d 1023, 1027 (Fed.Cir.1998) (dicta); Bilzerian v. United States, 86 F.3d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (dicta); Clark v. United States, 63 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir.1995) (dicta); O'Bryant v. United States, 49 F.3d 340, 345-47 & n. 8 (7th Cir.1995) (dicta). Because only tax liabilities may be assessed as a deficiency, Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1375, 1379, 1381-83 (Fed.Cir.2005); United States v. Frontone, 383 F.3d 656, 659-61 (7th Cir.2004), Beer necessarily held that an erroneous rebate refund revives tax liability. See also Brookhurst, 931 F.2d at 557-58 (recognizing that an erroneous rebate refund makes a previously paid tax liability “unpaid”); Frontone, 383 F.3d at 657, 659-61 (holding that a tax refund claim must be dismissed if the principal tax deficiency has not been paid in full",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n931 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir.1991); Stanley v. United States, 140 F.3d 1023, 1027 (Fed.Cir.1998) (dicta); Bilzerian v. United States, 86 F.3d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (dicta); Clark v. United States, 63 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir.1995) (dicta); O'Bryant v. United States, 49 F.3d 340, 345-47 & n. 8 (7th Cir.1995) (dicta). Because only tax liabilities may be assessed as a deficiency, Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1375, 1379, 1381-83 (Fed.Cir.2005); United States v. Frontone, 383 F.3d 656, 659-61 (7th Cir.2004), Beer necessarily held that an erroneous rebate refund revives tax liability. See also Brookhurst, 931 F.2d at 557-58 (recognizing that an erroneous rebate refund makes a previously paid tax liability “unpaid”); Frontone, 383 F.3d at 657, 659-61 (holding refund of discriminatory tax required because predeprivation remedy not clearly available for tax years at issue",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n931 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir.1991); Stanley v. United States, 140 F.3d 1023, 1027 (Fed.Cir.1998) (dicta); Bilzerian v. United States, 86 F.3d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (dicta); Clark v. United States, 63 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir.1995) (dicta); O'Bryant v. United States, 49 F.3d 340, 345-47 & n. 8 (7th Cir.1995) (dicta). Because only tax liabilities may be assessed as a deficiency, Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1375, 1379, 1381-83 (Fed.Cir.2005); United States v. Frontone, 383 F.3d 656, 659-61 (7th Cir.2004), Beer necessarily held that an erroneous rebate refund revives tax liability. See also Brookhurst, 931 F.2d at 557-58 (recognizing that an erroneous rebate refund makes a previously paid tax liability “unpaid”); Frontone, 383 F.3d at 657, 659-61 (holding that after the then twoyear limitation period for the filing of a refund application had passed the state was entitled to assume that its tax revenues need not be refunded under any circumstance",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n931 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir.1991); Stanley v. United States, 140 F.3d 1023, 1027 (Fed.Cir.1998) (dicta); Bilzerian v. United States, 86 F.3d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (dicta); Clark v. United States, 63 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir.1995) (dicta); O'Bryant v. United States, 49 F.3d 340, 345-47 & n. 8 (7th Cir.1995) (dicta). Because only tax liabilities may be assessed as a deficiency, Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1375, 1379, 1381-83 (Fed.Cir.2005); United States v. Frontone, 383 F.3d 656, 659-61 (7th Cir.2004), Beer necessarily held that an erroneous rebate refund revives tax liability. See also Brookhurst, 931 F.2d at 557-58 (recognizing that an erroneous rebate refund makes a previously paid tax liability “unpaid”); Frontone, 383 F.3d at 657, 659-61 (holding that because the amount of the debtors obligation to the government exceeded the amount of their income tax refund the refund did not become property of the estate and could not be exempted",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n931 F.2d 554, 557 (9th Cir.1991); Stanley v. United States, 140 F.3d 1023, 1027 (Fed.Cir.1998) (dicta); Bilzerian v. United States, 86 F.3d 1067, 1069 (11th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (dicta); Clark v. United States, 63 F.3d 83, 87 (1st Cir.1995) (dicta); O'Bryant v. United States, 49 F.3d 340, 345-47 & n. 8 (7th Cir.1995) (dicta). Because only tax liabilities may be assessed as a deficiency, Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. United States, 417 F.3d 1375, 1379, 1381-83 (Fed.Cir.2005); United States v. Frontone, 383 F.3d 656, 659-61 (7th Cir.2004), Beer necessarily held that an erroneous rebate refund revives tax liability. See also Brookhurst, 931 F.2d at 557-58 (recognizing that an erroneous rebate refund makes a previously paid tax liability “unpaid”); Frontone, 383 F.3d at 657, 659-61 (holding that an erroneous rebate refund revives tax liability because the ultimate source of the irss claim to the amount erroneously refunded is a tax owed"
] | ); cf. IRC § 6211 (counting (presumably | 4 |
813 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndisclosure of its content and by failing to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. We apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 329 F.3d 700, 709 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, for procedural due process claims, the Mathews test is “a general test that applies in all but a few contexts”); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (NCORI), 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.2001) (applying the Mathews test in a similar context); Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (ADC), 70 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir.1995) (same); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality) (holding that the proper test for balancing national security interests with a persons due process rights is the mathews balancing test",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndisclosure of its content and by failing to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. We apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 329 F.3d 700, 709 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, for procedural due process claims, the Mathews test is “a general test that applies in all but a few contexts”); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (NCORI), 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.2001) (applying the Mathews test in a similar context); Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (ADC), 70 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir.1995) (same); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality) (holding that in performing the pickering balancing test the district court was proper in first assessing the value from the first amendment perspective of the employees speech",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndisclosure of its content and by failing to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. We apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 329 F.3d 700, 709 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, for procedural due process claims, the Mathews test is “a general test that applies in all but a few contexts”); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (NCORI), 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.2001) (applying the Mathews test in a similar context); Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (ADC), 70 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir.1995) (same); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality) (holding admissibility of polygraph evidence should be resolved under fedrevid 403 balancing test but reliability of polygraph test may be included to determine how probative particular polygraph test is",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndisclosure of its content and by failing to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. We apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 329 F.3d 700, 709 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, for procedural due process claims, the Mathews test is “a general test that applies in all but a few contexts”); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (NCORI), 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.2001) (applying the Mathews test in a similar context); Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (ADC), 70 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir.1995) (same); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality) (holding that where a party claims a document is privileged and the trial court fails to conduct an in camera review or balancing test the trial court has departed from the essential requirements of the law",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndisclosure of its content and by failing to provide adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to respond. We apply the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). See California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 329 F.3d 700, 709 n. 8 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining that, for procedural due process claims, the Mathews test is “a general test that applies in all but a few contexts”); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep’t of State (NCORI), 251 F.3d 192, 208-09 (D.C.Cir.2001) (applying the Mathews test in a similar context); Am-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno (ADC), 70 F.3d 1045, 1061 (9th Cir.1995) (same); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29, 124 S.Ct. 2633, 159 L.Ed.2d 578 (2004) (plurality) (holding that m m produce properly applied the lear balancing test"
] | ). Under the Mathews balancing test, we “must | 0 |
814 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ninto at Plaintiffs urging. Lastly, Plaintiff does not allege, nor do the facts suggests the existence of fraud or undue influence at the time the Agreement was drafted and signed. After considering all the relevant factors, this Court concludes that the forum selection clause agreed to by the parties is reasonable and appropriate in this particular matter. Therefore, under Bremen, and its more local progeny, this Court holds that, pursuant to the Agreement, proper venue for resolution of this matter is in Salt Lake City, Utah. TRANSFER As noted above, having upheld the forum selection clause, this Court finds that in the interest of justice transfer of this matter to Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is most appropriate. Janko v. Outboard Marine Corp., 605 F.Supp. 51 (W.D.Okla.l985)(holding that a forum selection clause should control absent a strong showing that it be set aside as unreasonable unjust or invalid",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ninto at Plaintiffs urging. Lastly, Plaintiff does not allege, nor do the facts suggests the existence of fraud or undue influence at the time the Agreement was drafted and signed. After considering all the relevant factors, this Court concludes that the forum selection clause agreed to by the parties is reasonable and appropriate in this particular matter. Therefore, under Bremen, and its more local progeny, this Court holds that, pursuant to the Agreement, proper venue for resolution of this matter is in Salt Lake City, Utah. TRANSFER As noted above, having upheld the forum selection clause, this Court finds that in the interest of justice transfer of this matter to Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is most appropriate. Janko v. Outboard Marine Corp., 605 F.Supp. 51 (W.D.Okla.l985)(holding that a forum selection clause should not be enforced where a consumer is told by a corporate agent to ignore boilerplate contract language containing a forum selection clause where there is a material difference in bargaining power and where the forum designated by the contract has little to do with the transaction and is gravely inconvenient for the parties and witnesses",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ninto at Plaintiffs urging. Lastly, Plaintiff does not allege, nor do the facts suggests the existence of fraud or undue influence at the time the Agreement was drafted and signed. After considering all the relevant factors, this Court concludes that the forum selection clause agreed to by the parties is reasonable and appropriate in this particular matter. Therefore, under Bremen, and its more local progeny, this Court holds that, pursuant to the Agreement, proper venue for resolution of this matter is in Salt Lake City, Utah. TRANSFER As noted above, having upheld the forum selection clause, this Court finds that in the interest of justice transfer of this matter to Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is most appropriate. Janko v. Outboard Marine Corp., 605 F.Supp. 51 (W.D.Okla.l985)(holding that corporations owned and controlled by the party signing the contract containing the forum selection clause may be bound by the clause",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ninto at Plaintiffs urging. Lastly, Plaintiff does not allege, nor do the facts suggests the existence of fraud or undue influence at the time the Agreement was drafted and signed. After considering all the relevant factors, this Court concludes that the forum selection clause agreed to by the parties is reasonable and appropriate in this particular matter. Therefore, under Bremen, and its more local progeny, this Court holds that, pursuant to the Agreement, proper venue for resolution of this matter is in Salt Lake City, Utah. TRANSFER As noted above, having upheld the forum selection clause, this Court finds that in the interest of justice transfer of this matter to Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is most appropriate. Janko v. Outboard Marine Corp., 605 F.Supp. 51 (W.D.Okla.l985)(holding that when action arising under contract containing venue selection clause is filed in court other than that specified in clause case will be transferred to forum selected by contract unless venue selection clause is unreasonable and unjust or invalid due to fraud or overreaching",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ninto at Plaintiffs urging. Lastly, Plaintiff does not allege, nor do the facts suggests the existence of fraud or undue influence at the time the Agreement was drafted and signed. After considering all the relevant factors, this Court concludes that the forum selection clause agreed to by the parties is reasonable and appropriate in this particular matter. Therefore, under Bremen, and its more local progeny, this Court holds that, pursuant to the Agreement, proper venue for resolution of this matter is in Salt Lake City, Utah. TRANSFER As noted above, having upheld the forum selection clause, this Court finds that in the interest of justice transfer of this matter to Utah pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) is most appropriate. Janko v. Outboard Marine Corp., 605 F.Supp. 51 (W.D.Okla.l985)(holding that a forum selection clause was not enforceable against defendants that were not parties to the contract"
] | ), See also Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp., 571 | 3 |
815 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nalso explained herein. 7 . The Court considers Plaintiffs’ allegations of a Fifth Amendment right to privacy as analogous and indistinguishable from the courts have recognized as a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. See Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 385 F.3d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that intimate association and privacy rights find protection in the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003))). Courts have recognized that there are associational freedoms attached to the First Amendment. Christensen v. County of Boone, Il., 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir.2007) (holding that njeither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute and congress may prohibit federal employees from participating in political activities in view of its interest in maintaining a nonpartisan work force",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nalso explained herein. 7 . The Court considers Plaintiffs’ allegations of a Fifth Amendment right to privacy as analogous and indistinguishable from the courts have recognized as a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. See Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 385 F.3d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that intimate association and privacy rights find protection in the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003))). Courts have recognized that there are associational freedoms attached to the First Amendment. Christensen v. County of Boone, Il., 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir.2007) (holding that regulating the location of adult films does not violate the first amendment and citing as support the proposition that reasonable regulations of the time place and manner of protected speech where those regulations are necessary to further significant governmental interests are permitted by the first amendment",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nalso explained herein. 7 . The Court considers Plaintiffs’ allegations of a Fifth Amendment right to privacy as analogous and indistinguishable from the courts have recognized as a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. See Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 385 F.3d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that intimate association and privacy rights find protection in the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003))). Courts have recognized that there are associational freedoms attached to the First Amendment. Christensen v. County of Boone, Il., 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir.2007) (recognizing first amendment retaliation right",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nalso explained herein. 7 . The Court considers Plaintiffs’ allegations of a Fifth Amendment right to privacy as analogous and indistinguishable from the courts have recognized as a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. See Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 385 F.3d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that intimate association and privacy rights find protection in the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003))). Courts have recognized that there are associational freedoms attached to the First Amendment. Christensen v. County of Boone, Il., 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir.2007) (recognizing a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the first amendment citing jaycees 468 us at 618 104 sct 3244",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nalso explained herein. 7 . The Court considers Plaintiffs’ allegations of a Fifth Amendment right to privacy as analogous and indistinguishable from the courts have recognized as a Fourteenth Amendment right to privacy. See Flaskamp v. Dearborn Pub. Schs., 385 F.3d 935, 941-42 (6th Cir.2004) (explaining that intimate association and privacy rights find protection in the substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) and Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003))). Courts have recognized that there are associational freedoms attached to the First Amendment. Christensen v. County of Boone, Il., 483 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir.2007) (recognizing even federal constitutional right of association does not apply to the right of one individual to associate with another"
] | ). However, the freedom to enter into | 3 |
816 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat costs were unreasonable. See, e.g., Kern County v. Ginn, 194 Cal. Rptr. 512, 516 (1983); Horner v. Marine Eng’r’s Ass’n., 1 Cal-Rptr. 113, 117 (1959). TCW has failed to demonstrate that the deposition in question was not reasonably necessary at the time it was taken. The interpreter fees in the amount of $300.00 will accordingly be allowed by the Court as costs. E. Depositions 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits deposition expenses to be awarded as costs. Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Lab, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1990). TCW is correct in stating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld decisions of district courts that deny costs for depositions solely because they were not used at trial. Wash. State Dept. of Transp. v. Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that court reviews trial courts decision to release a defendant for abuse of discretion",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat costs were unreasonable. See, e.g., Kern County v. Ginn, 194 Cal. Rptr. 512, 516 (1983); Horner v. Marine Eng’r’s Ass’n., 1 Cal-Rptr. 113, 117 (1959). TCW has failed to demonstrate that the deposition in question was not reasonably necessary at the time it was taken. The interpreter fees in the amount of $300.00 will accordingly be allowed by the Court as costs. E. Depositions 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits deposition expenses to be awarded as costs. Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Lab, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1990). TCW is correct in stating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld decisions of district courts that deny costs for depositions solely because they were not used at trial. Wash. State Dept. of Transp. v. Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat costs were unreasonable. See, e.g., Kern County v. Ginn, 194 Cal. Rptr. 512, 516 (1983); Horner v. Marine Eng’r’s Ass’n., 1 Cal-Rptr. 113, 117 (1959). TCW has failed to demonstrate that the deposition in question was not reasonably necessary at the time it was taken. The interpreter fees in the amount of $300.00 will accordingly be allowed by the Court as costs. E. Depositions 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits deposition expenses to be awarded as costs. Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Lab, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1990). TCW is correct in stating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld decisions of district courts that deny costs for depositions solely because they were not used at trial. Wash. State Dept. of Transp. v. Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the supreme courts proper scope of review of a trial courts decision in a trial de novo of an assessment matter is whether the decision of the trial court was clearly erroneous",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat costs were unreasonable. See, e.g., Kern County v. Ginn, 194 Cal. Rptr. 512, 516 (1983); Horner v. Marine Eng’r’s Ass’n., 1 Cal-Rptr. 113, 117 (1959). TCW has failed to demonstrate that the deposition in question was not reasonably necessary at the time it was taken. The interpreter fees in the amount of $300.00 will accordingly be allowed by the Court as costs. E. Depositions 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits deposition expenses to be awarded as costs. Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Lab, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1990). TCW is correct in stating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld decisions of district courts that deny costs for depositions solely because they were not used at trial. Wash. State Dept. of Transp. v. Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that decision on waiver of affirmative defense normally is within district courts discretion",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nthat costs were unreasonable. See, e.g., Kern County v. Ginn, 194 Cal. Rptr. 512, 516 (1983); Horner v. Marine Eng’r’s Ass’n., 1 Cal-Rptr. 113, 117 (1959). TCW has failed to demonstrate that the deposition in question was not reasonably necessary at the time it was taken. The interpreter fees in the amount of $300.00 will accordingly be allowed by the Court as costs. E. Depositions 28 U.S.C. § 1920 permits deposition expenses to be awarded as costs. Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Lab, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1990). TCW is correct in stating that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld decisions of district courts that deny costs for depositions solely because they were not used at trial. Wash. State Dept. of Transp. v. Natural Gas Co., 59 F.3d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that denial of amendment is within discretion of trial court"
] | ). The Ninth Circuit has never, however, stated | 1 |
817 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Eighth Circuit held that the state law claims were indeed preempted by ERISA, reasoning that the plaintiffs’ claims all relied on Mr. Kuhl’s status as a beneficiary under the employer’s health benefits plan and arose from the administration of benefits under the plan. Id. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that [ajrtful pleading by characterizing Lincoln National’s actions in refusing to pay for the surgery as “cancellation” or by characterizing the same administrative decisions as “malpractice” does not change the fact that plaintiffs’ claims are based on the contention that Lincoln National improperly processed [Mr.] Kuhl’s claim for medical benefits. Id. at 303; see also Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F.Supp. 110, 114 (D.Md.1994) (recognizing validity of cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Eighth Circuit held that the state law claims were indeed preempted by ERISA, reasoning that the plaintiffs’ claims all relied on Mr. Kuhl’s status as a beneficiary under the employer’s health benefits plan and arose from the administration of benefits under the plan. Id. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that [ajrtful pleading by characterizing Lincoln National’s actions in refusing to pay for the surgery as “cancellation” or by characterizing the same administrative decisions as “malpractice” does not change the fact that plaintiffs’ claims are based on the contention that Lincoln National improperly processed [Mr.] Kuhl’s claim for medical benefits. Id. at 303; see also Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F.Supp. 110, 114 (D.Md.1994) (holding that employees claims for medical malpractice negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress against an hmo arising out of refusal to pay for surgery were integrally and inextricably related to their employee benefit plan and therefore preempted",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Eighth Circuit held that the state law claims were indeed preempted by ERISA, reasoning that the plaintiffs’ claims all relied on Mr. Kuhl’s status as a beneficiary under the employer’s health benefits plan and arose from the administration of benefits under the plan. Id. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that [ajrtful pleading by characterizing Lincoln National’s actions in refusing to pay for the surgery as “cancellation” or by characterizing the same administrative decisions as “malpractice” does not change the fact that plaintiffs’ claims are based on the contention that Lincoln National improperly processed [Mr.] Kuhl’s claim for medical benefits. Id. at 303; see also Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F.Supp. 110, 114 (D.Md.1994) (recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Eighth Circuit held that the state law claims were indeed preempted by ERISA, reasoning that the plaintiffs’ claims all relied on Mr. Kuhl’s status as a beneficiary under the employer’s health benefits plan and arose from the administration of benefits under the plan. Id. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that [ajrtful pleading by characterizing Lincoln National’s actions in refusing to pay for the surgery as “cancellation” or by characterizing the same administrative decisions as “malpractice” does not change the fact that plaintiffs’ claims are based on the contention that Lincoln National improperly processed [Mr.] Kuhl’s claim for medical benefits. Id. at 303; see also Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F.Supp. 110, 114 (D.Md.1994) (recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe Eighth Circuit held that the state law claims were indeed preempted by ERISA, reasoning that the plaintiffs’ claims all relied on Mr. Kuhl’s status as a beneficiary under the employer’s health benefits plan and arose from the administration of benefits under the plan. Id. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that [ajrtful pleading by characterizing Lincoln National’s actions in refusing to pay for the surgery as “cancellation” or by characterizing the same administrative decisions as “malpractice” does not change the fact that plaintiffs’ claims are based on the contention that Lincoln National improperly processed [Mr.] Kuhl’s claim for medical benefits. Id. at 303; see also Pomeroy v. Johns Hopkins Med. Servs., Inc., 868 F.Supp. 110, 114 (D.Md.1994) (holding that a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted where it arose out of the same conduct as a preempted contract claim"
] | ). 4. Plaintiffs’ State Law Claims Initially, we | 1 |
818 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof “disposal” is “clear,” 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 915 F.2d at 1362, whether the definition includes passive soil migration is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuit courts have taken a variety of approaches. Those opinions cannot be shoehorned into the dichotomy of a classic circuit split. Rather, a careful reading of their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of views, depending in large part on the factual circumstances of the case. Compare United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding that absent “any evidence that there was human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances occurred on the property,” there is no “disposal”), ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that prior owners are not liable for the gradual spread of contamination underground",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof “disposal” is “clear,” 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 915 F.2d at 1362, whether the definition includes passive soil migration is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuit courts have taken a variety of approaches. Those opinions cannot be shoehorned into the dichotomy of a classic circuit split. Rather, a careful reading of their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of views, depending in large part on the factual circumstances of the case. Compare United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding that absent “any evidence that there was human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances occurred on the property,” there is no “disposal”), ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir.1997) (holding past owners liable for the disposal of hazardous wastes that leaked from an underground storage tank",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof “disposal” is “clear,” 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 915 F.2d at 1362, whether the definition includes passive soil migration is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuit courts have taken a variety of approaches. Those opinions cannot be shoehorned into the dichotomy of a classic circuit split. Rather, a careful reading of their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of views, depending in large part on the factual circumstances of the case. Compare United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding that absent “any evidence that there was human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances occurred on the property,” there is no “disposal”), ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that all property owners affected by a residential use permit are necessary parties",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof “disposal” is “clear,” 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 915 F.2d at 1362, whether the definition includes passive soil migration is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuit courts have taken a variety of approaches. Those opinions cannot be shoehorned into the dichotomy of a classic circuit split. Rather, a careful reading of their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of views, depending in large part on the factual circumstances of the case. Compare United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding that absent “any evidence that there was human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances occurred on the property,” there is no “disposal”), ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof “disposal” is “clear,” 3550 Stevens Creek Assocs., 915 F.2d at 1362, whether the definition includes passive soil migration is an issue of first impression in this circuit. Other circuit courts have taken a variety of approaches. Those opinions cannot be shoehorned into the dichotomy of a classic circuit split. Rather, a careful reading of their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of views, depending in large part on the factual circumstances of the case. Compare United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir.2000) (concluding that absent “any evidence that there was human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances occurred on the property,” there is no “disposal”), ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 359 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that subsequent property owners were bound by prior owners agreement to restrict building density and preserve certain portions of land as a condition of the original zoning approval"
] | ), and United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d | 0 |
819 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof cool reflection.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(1); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211. Sudden passion must arise at the time of the offense and cannot result solely from former provocation. Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 213. Neither ordinary anger nor fear alone raises an issue on sudden passion arising from adequate cause. See id. at 213-14; see also Naasz v. State, 974 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd) (stating defendant’s testimony of being upset and angry over culmination of events did not rise to level of adequate cause). Similarly, a defendant may not rely on a cause of his own making to support an argument for sudden passion. See Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211 (holding evidence legally sufficient under sections d and e",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof cool reflection.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(1); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211. Sudden passion must arise at the time of the offense and cannot result solely from former provocation. Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 213. Neither ordinary anger nor fear alone raises an issue on sudden passion arising from adequate cause. See id. at 213-14; see also Naasz v. State, 974 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd) (stating defendant’s testimony of being upset and angry over culmination of events did not rise to level of adequate cause). Similarly, a defendant may not rely on a cause of his own making to support an argument for sudden passion. See Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211 (holding evidence legally insufficient",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof cool reflection.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(1); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211. Sudden passion must arise at the time of the offense and cannot result solely from former provocation. Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 213. Neither ordinary anger nor fear alone raises an issue on sudden passion arising from adequate cause. See id. at 213-14; see also Naasz v. State, 974 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd) (stating defendant’s testimony of being upset and angry over culmination of events did not rise to level of adequate cause). Similarly, a defendant may not rely on a cause of his own making to support an argument for sudden passion. See Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211 (holding evidence legally sufficient",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof cool reflection.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(1); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211. Sudden passion must arise at the time of the offense and cannot result solely from former provocation. Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 213. Neither ordinary anger nor fear alone raises an issue on sudden passion arising from adequate cause. See id. at 213-14; see also Naasz v. State, 974 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd) (stating defendant’s testimony of being upset and angry over culmination of events did not rise to level of adequate cause). Similarly, a defendant may not rely on a cause of his own making to support an argument for sudden passion. See Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211 (holding that ordinary anger or causes of defendants own making are not legally adequate causes",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nof cool reflection.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 19.02(a)(1); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211. Sudden passion must arise at the time of the offense and cannot result solely from former provocation. Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 213. Neither ordinary anger nor fear alone raises an issue on sudden passion arising from adequate cause. See id. at 213-14; see also Naasz v. State, 974 S.W.2d 418, 425 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1998, pet. ref'd) (stating defendant’s testimony of being upset and angry over culmination of events did not rise to level of adequate cause). Similarly, a defendant may not rely on a cause of his own making to support an argument for sudden passion. See Smith v. State, 355 S.W.3d 138, 147 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. filed); see also Hernandez, 127 S.W.3d at 211 (holding district court may properly on its own motion dismiss an action as to defendants who have not moved to dismiss where such defendants are in a position similar to that of moving defendants or where claims against such defendants are integrally related"
] | ); Trevino v. State, 157 S.W.3d 818, 822 n. 4 | 3 |
820 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmust show that the class of plaintiffs is so large that joinder of all members would be “impracticable.” In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir.1982). Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in a national scheme to illegally fix the wholesale price of Potash. The class Plaintiffs seek to represent contains thousands of farm co-ops, agricultural distributors and farmers who purchased potash between April 1987 and July 8, 1994. (Pis.’ Mem. in Supp. of Class Cert, at 5.) Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ showing of the numerosity requirement, and based upon the geographical dispersion and number of putative class members, the Court finds that such a challenge would be unavailing. Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that joinder of all putative membe (D.Minn.1990) (holding that alleged pricefixing conspiracy involved common questions relating to the existence and proof of illegal agreement",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmust show that the class of plaintiffs is so large that joinder of all members would be “impracticable.” In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir.1982). Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in a national scheme to illegally fix the wholesale price of Potash. The class Plaintiffs seek to represent contains thousands of farm co-ops, agricultural distributors and farmers who purchased potash between April 1987 and July 8, 1994. (Pis.’ Mem. in Supp. of Class Cert, at 5.) Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ showing of the numerosity requirement, and based upon the geographical dispersion and number of putative class members, the Court finds that such a challenge would be unavailing. Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that joinder of all putative membe (D.Minn.1990) (recognizing that the government carved out a portion of a larger conspiracy and alleged it as a separate conspiracy",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmust show that the class of plaintiffs is so large that joinder of all members would be “impracticable.” In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir.1982). Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in a national scheme to illegally fix the wholesale price of Potash. The class Plaintiffs seek to represent contains thousands of farm co-ops, agricultural distributors and farmers who purchased potash between April 1987 and July 8, 1994. (Pis.’ Mem. in Supp. of Class Cert, at 5.) Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ showing of the numerosity requirement, and based upon the geographical dispersion and number of putative class members, the Court finds that such a challenge would be unavailing. Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that joinder of all putative membe (D.Minn.1990) (holding that the notion of enterprise conspiracy has largely rendered the old distinction between single conspiracy and multiple conspiracy irrelevant to rico conspiracy charges",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmust show that the class of plaintiffs is so large that joinder of all members would be “impracticable.” In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir.1982). Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in a national scheme to illegally fix the wholesale price of Potash. The class Plaintiffs seek to represent contains thousands of farm co-ops, agricultural distributors and farmers who purchased potash between April 1987 and July 8, 1994. (Pis.’ Mem. in Supp. of Class Cert, at 5.) Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ showing of the numerosity requirement, and based upon the geographical dispersion and number of putative class members, the Court finds that such a challenge would be unavailing. Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that joinder of all putative membe (D.Minn.1990) (recognizing that ajntitrust pricefixing conspiracy cases by their nature deal with common legal and factual questions about the existence scope and effect of the alleged conspiracy",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nmust show that the class of plaintiffs is so large that joinder of all members would be “impracticable.” In re Federal Skywalk Cases, 680 F.2d 1175, 1178 (8th Cir.1982). Plaintiffs allege Defendants engaged in a national scheme to illegally fix the wholesale price of Potash. The class Plaintiffs seek to represent contains thousands of farm co-ops, agricultural distributors and farmers who purchased potash between April 1987 and July 8, 1994. (Pis.’ Mem. in Supp. of Class Cert, at 5.) Defendants do not challenge Plaintiffs’ showing of the numerosity requirement, and based upon the geographical dispersion and number of putative class members, the Court finds that such a challenge would be unavailing. Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown that joinder of all putative membe (D.Minn.1990) (holding that two conspiracies existed where the members of the second conspiracy did not know about the first conspiracy did not benefit from the first conspiracy and were connected with the first conspiracy only through a middleman"
] | ); see generally 4 Herbert B. Newberg & Alba | 3 |
821 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“Mere ‘knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement’ is not sufficient.” Id. at 1368 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In establishing the predicated direct infringement, a patentee need not present direct evidence of infringement, because a finding that the accused device contains all the limitations of the asserted claims may be done with direct or circumstantial evidence. 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 449 Fed.Appx. 923, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that direct evidence of defendants dna found at the scene was direct evidence merely of a circumstance that suggested his participation in the burglary and theft but was not direct evidence of his participation in the burglary",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“Mere ‘knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement’ is not sufficient.” Id. at 1368 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In establishing the predicated direct infringement, a patentee need not present direct evidence of infringement, because a finding that the accused device contains all the limitations of the asserted claims may be done with direct or circumstantial evidence. 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 449 Fed.Appx. 923, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding circumstantial evidence has equivalent standing to direct evidence in criminal prosecution",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“Mere ‘knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement’ is not sufficient.” Id. at 1368 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In establishing the predicated direct infringement, a patentee need not present direct evidence of infringement, because a finding that the accused device contains all the limitations of the asserted claims may be done with direct or circumstantial evidence. 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 449 Fed.Appx. 923, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that direct and circumstantial evidence are to be given the same weight when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“Mere ‘knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement’ is not sufficient.” Id. at 1368 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In establishing the predicated direct infringement, a patentee need not present direct evidence of infringement, because a finding that the accused device contains all the limitations of the asserted claims may be done with direct or circumstantial evidence. 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 449 Fed.Appx. 923, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that circumstantial evidence was sufficient to show that a method step was carried out by the direct infringer even in the absence of direct evidence for direct infringer",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n“Mere ‘knowledge of the acts alleged to constitute infringement’ is not sufficient.” Id. at 1368 (quoting DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). In establishing the predicated direct infringement, a patentee need not present direct evidence of infringement, because a finding that the accused device contains all the limitations of the asserted claims may be done with direct or circumstantial evidence. 02 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., Ltd., 449 Fed.Appx. 923, 928 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Symantec Corp. v. Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc., 522 F.3d 1279, 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2008)); Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (recognizing the difficulty of determining a nonspeculative hypotheticallicense damages amount when the infringer is a direct competitor"
] | ). For example, “use of instruction manuals [may | 3 |
822 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n6 (1998). According to Kansas case law the generally accepted meaning of an accident is “an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often accompanied by a manifestation of force.” Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 553, 867 P.2d 325 (1994). According to USF & G, the allegations of negligent misrepresentations and negligence in inspecting the minivan and reporting the history of the minivan do not fit the generally accepted meaning of an “accident.” The Kansas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether negligent misrepresentation or negligence in discovering and reporting safety defects constitutes an “accident.” This court believes that, if faced with the issue, the . of New York, 32 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1258 (D.Kan. 1998) (holding that negligently allowing a statute of limitations to run does not constitute an ethical violation",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n6 (1998). According to Kansas case law the generally accepted meaning of an accident is “an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often accompanied by a manifestation of force.” Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 553, 867 P.2d 325 (1994). According to USF & G, the allegations of negligent misrepresentations and negligence in inspecting the minivan and reporting the history of the minivan do not fit the generally accepted meaning of an “accident.” The Kansas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether negligent misrepresentation or negligence in discovering and reporting safety defects constitutes an “accident.” This court believes that, if faced with the issue, the . of New York, 32 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1258 (D.Kan. 1998) (holding that negligent construction is not sudden unexpected or unanticipated and does not constitute an accident",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n6 (1998). According to Kansas case law the generally accepted meaning of an accident is “an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often accompanied by a manifestation of force.” Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 553, 867 P.2d 325 (1994). According to USF & G, the allegations of negligent misrepresentations and negligence in inspecting the minivan and reporting the history of the minivan do not fit the generally accepted meaning of an “accident.” The Kansas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether negligent misrepresentation or negligence in discovering and reporting safety defects constitutes an “accident.” This court believes that, if faced with the issue, the . of New York, 32 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1258 (D.Kan. 1998) (holding that the injunction did not constitute a claim",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n6 (1998). According to Kansas case law the generally accepted meaning of an accident is “an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often accompanied by a manifestation of force.” Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 553, 867 P.2d 325 (1994). According to USF & G, the allegations of negligent misrepresentations and negligence in inspecting the minivan and reporting the history of the minivan do not fit the generally accepted meaning of an “accident.” The Kansas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether negligent misrepresentation or negligence in discovering and reporting safety defects constitutes an “accident.” This court believes that, if faced with the issue, the . of New York, 32 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1258 (D.Kan. 1998) (holding that the insurer did not have a duty to defend because the pleadings alleged that the defendants had acted intentionally rather than negligently",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n6 (1998). According to Kansas case law the generally accepted meaning of an accident is “an undesigned, sudden, and unexpected event, usually of an afflictive or unfortunate character, and often accompanied by a manifestation of force.” Harris v. Richards, 254 Kan. 549, 553, 867 P.2d 325 (1994). According to USF & G, the allegations of negligent misrepresentations and negligence in inspecting the minivan and reporting the history of the minivan do not fit the generally accepted meaning of an “accident.” The Kansas Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether negligent misrepresentation or negligence in discovering and reporting safety defects constitutes an “accident.” This court believes that, if faced with the issue, the . of New York, 32 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1258 (D.Kan. 1998) (holding that the claim that the defendants negligently provided investment advice did not constitute an accident"
] | ); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Mike Miller | 4 |
823 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhave moved for summary judgment does not permit the entry of a summary judgment if disputes remain as to material facts. However, cross motions for summary judgments do authorize the court to assume that there is no evidence which needs to be considered other than that which has been filed by the parties. Harrison W. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Co., 662 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Am. Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir.1976)(“[F]iling of cross-motions under Rule 56, F.R. Civ. P. raises the inference that there is no evidence other than the pleadings and supporting instruments to be considered, and so the trial court need only examine those materials in ascertaining whether an issue of material fact exists.” (8th Cir.1996)(holding that the district court has no affirmative obligation to plumb the record to procure material facts",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhave moved for summary judgment does not permit the entry of a summary judgment if disputes remain as to material facts. However, cross motions for summary judgments do authorize the court to assume that there is no evidence which needs to be considered other than that which has been filed by the parties. Harrison W. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Co., 662 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Am. Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir.1976)(“[F]iling of cross-motions under Rule 56, F.R. Civ. P. raises the inference that there is no evidence other than the pleadings and supporting instruments to be considered, and so the trial court need only examine those materials in ascertaining whether an issue of material fact exists.” (8th Cir.1996)(holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct ",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhave moved for summary judgment does not permit the entry of a summary judgment if disputes remain as to material facts. However, cross motions for summary judgments do authorize the court to assume that there is no evidence which needs to be considered other than that which has been filed by the parties. Harrison W. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Co., 662 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Am. Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir.1976)(“[F]iling of cross-motions under Rule 56, F.R. Civ. P. raises the inference that there is no evidence other than the pleadings and supporting instruments to be considered, and so the trial court need only examine those materials in ascertaining whether an issue of material fact exists.” (8th Cir.1996)(holding state has affirmative duty to disclose favorable and material evidence to defense",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhave moved for summary judgment does not permit the entry of a summary judgment if disputes remain as to material facts. However, cross motions for summary judgments do authorize the court to assume that there is no evidence which needs to be considered other than that which has been filed by the parties. Harrison W. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Co., 662 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Am. Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir.1976)(“[F]iling of cross-motions under Rule 56, F.R. Civ. P. raises the inference that there is no evidence other than the pleadings and supporting instruments to be considered, and so the trial court need only examine those materials in ascertaining whether an issue of material fact exists.” (8th Cir.1996)(holding that the court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhave moved for summary judgment does not permit the entry of a summary judgment if disputes remain as to material facts. However, cross motions for summary judgments do authorize the court to assume that there is no evidence which needs to be considered other than that which has been filed by the parties. Harrison W. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Co., 662 F.2d 690, 692 (10th Cir.1981) (citations omitted). See Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Am. Commodity Exch., Inc., 546 F.2d 1361, 1366 (10th Cir.1976)(“[F]iling of cross-motions under Rule 56, F.R. Civ. P. raises the inference that there is no evidence other than the pleadings and supporting instruments to be considered, and so the trial court need only examine those materials in ascertaining whether an issue of material fact exists.” (8th Cir.1996)(holding that the court had no obligation to search large record extract"
] | ). “The district court has discretion to go | 0 |
824 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCURIAM. Opal Coleman appeals from an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in favor of the Arkansas Department of Correction, Varner Unit (ADC), in her Title VII action alleging discrimination and constructive discharge on the basis of her race (African-American). For reversal, Coleman argues that (1) the district court erroneously construed her complaint as simply raising claims of a hostile work environment and constructive discharge, rather than discrimination; (2) she produced sufficient evidence of d 6 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that selfserving deposition testimony standing alone is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCURIAM. Opal Coleman appeals from an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in favor of the Arkansas Department of Correction, Varner Unit (ADC), in her Title VII action alleging discrimination and constructive discharge on the basis of her race (African-American). For reversal, Coleman argues that (1) the district court erroneously construed her complaint as simply raising claims of a hostile work environment and constructive discharge, rather than discrimination; (2) she produced sufficient evidence of d 6 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding affidavits based on conclusory allegations insufficient at summary judgment",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCURIAM. Opal Coleman appeals from an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in favor of the Arkansas Department of Correction, Varner Unit (ADC), in her Title VII action alleging discrimination and constructive discharge on the basis of her race (African-American). For reversal, Coleman argues that (1) the district court erroneously construed her complaint as simply raising claims of a hostile work environment and constructive discharge, rather than discrimination; (2) she produced sufficient evidence of d 6 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that party may not rely on conclusory statements or an argument that the affidavits in support of the motion for summary judgment are not credible",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCURIAM. Opal Coleman appeals from an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in favor of the Arkansas Department of Correction, Varner Unit (ADC), in her Title VII action alleging discrimination and constructive discharge on the basis of her race (African-American). For reversal, Coleman argues that (1) the district court erroneously construed her complaint as simply raising claims of a hostile work environment and constructive discharge, rather than discrimination; (2) she produced sufficient evidence of d 6 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that affidavits that are conclusory and based on hearsay can not be used to oppose motion for summary judgment",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nCURIAM. Opal Coleman appeals from an order of the District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas granting summary judgment in favor of the Arkansas Department of Correction, Varner Unit (ADC), in her Title VII action alleging discrimination and constructive discharge on the basis of her race (African-American). For reversal, Coleman argues that (1) the district court erroneously construed her complaint as simply raising claims of a hostile work environment and constructive discharge, rather than discrimination; (2) she produced sufficient evidence of d 6 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding conclusory statements in affidavits and deposition testimony standing alone are insufficient to withstand a properlysupported motion for summary judgment"
] | ). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the | 4 |
825 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n“regardless of whether the respondent has been tried, acquitted, or convicted in a court for the alleged criminal offense.” This language makes it clear that a disciplinary violation premised on a violation of law is separate from the initiation or outcome of criminal proceedings based on the same conduct. Behm’s argument that he cannot be found to have violated the rules at issue without an express finding of intent is also without merit. While this Court has held that “in order to sustain a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), the Bar must prove intent,” this Court has also stated that the intent ele ment can be satisfied “merely by showing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.” Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So.2d 76, 81 (Fla.2005); see also Fla. Bar v. Riggs, 944 So.2d 167, 171 (Fla.2006) (holding that attorneys engaging in conduct involving dishonesty amounts to conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n“regardless of whether the respondent has been tried, acquitted, or convicted in a court for the alleged criminal offense.” This language makes it clear that a disciplinary violation premised on a violation of law is separate from the initiation or outcome of criminal proceedings based on the same conduct. Behm’s argument that he cannot be found to have violated the rules at issue without an express finding of intent is also without merit. While this Court has held that “in order to sustain a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), the Bar must prove intent,” this Court has also stated that the intent ele ment can be satisfied “merely by showing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.” Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So.2d 76, 81 (Fla.2005); see also Fla. Bar v. Riggs, 944 So.2d 167, 171 (Fla.2006) (holding intent as an element for disciplining an attorney for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty fraud deceit or misrepresentation is proven by establishing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n“regardless of whether the respondent has been tried, acquitted, or convicted in a court for the alleged criminal offense.” This language makes it clear that a disciplinary violation premised on a violation of law is separate from the initiation or outcome of criminal proceedings based on the same conduct. Behm’s argument that he cannot be found to have violated the rules at issue without an express finding of intent is also without merit. While this Court has held that “in order to sustain a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), the Bar must prove intent,” this Court has also stated that the intent ele ment can be satisfied “merely by showing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.” Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So.2d 76, 81 (Fla.2005); see also Fla. Bar v. Riggs, 944 So.2d 167, 171 (Fla.2006) (holding that an infamous crime under the arkansas constitution is a crime involving elements of deceit and dishonesty",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n“regardless of whether the respondent has been tried, acquitted, or convicted in a court for the alleged criminal offense.” This language makes it clear that a disciplinary violation premised on a violation of law is separate from the initiation or outcome of criminal proceedings based on the same conduct. Behm’s argument that he cannot be found to have violated the rules at issue without an express finding of intent is also without merit. While this Court has held that “in order to sustain a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), the Bar must prove intent,” this Court has also stated that the intent ele ment can be satisfied “merely by showing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.” Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So.2d 76, 81 (Fla.2005); see also Fla. Bar v. Riggs, 944 So.2d 167, 171 (Fla.2006) (holding that reliance is not an element to be proven under securities fraud in indiana",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\n“regardless of whether the respondent has been tried, acquitted, or convicted in a court for the alleged criminal offense.” This language makes it clear that a disciplinary violation premised on a violation of law is separate from the initiation or outcome of criminal proceedings based on the same conduct. Behm’s argument that he cannot be found to have violated the rules at issue without an express finding of intent is also without merit. While this Court has held that “in order to sustain a violation of rule 4-8.4(c), the Bar must prove intent,” this Court has also stated that the intent ele ment can be satisfied “merely by showing that the conduct was deliberate or knowing.” Fla. Bar v. Brown, 905 So.2d 76, 81 (Fla.2005); see also Fla. Bar v. Riggs, 944 So.2d 167, 171 (Fla.2006) (holding that in the context of federal immigration law the amount of loss to the victim of fraud or deceit does not refer to an element of the fraud or deceit but rather refers to the particular circumstances in which an offender committed fraud or deceit"
] | ); Fla. Bar v. Barley, 881 So.2d 163, 169 | 1 |
826 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhave shown that he signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen; therefore, it would have rebutted the librarian’s statement that Mitchell was at the canteen instead of checking in at his assigned housing unit. Due process requires a DHO to produce and review evidence alleged by a prisoner to be supportive of his defense unless do ing so would be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 813-14 (10th Cir.2007). But assuming, without deciding, that the DHO in this case committed error by refusing to consider the work-crew log, the error was harmless to Mitchell and therefore cannot form the basis of a due process claim. See Howard, 487 F.3d at 814-15 & n. 5 (holding that error will not be presumed from a silent record and that without the relevant transcript there is insufficient evidence to review the alleged error and the appellant carries the burden of demonstrating the alleged error in the record",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhave shown that he signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen; therefore, it would have rebutted the librarian’s statement that Mitchell was at the canteen instead of checking in at his assigned housing unit. Due process requires a DHO to produce and review evidence alleged by a prisoner to be supportive of his defense unless do ing so would be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 813-14 (10th Cir.2007). But assuming, without deciding, that the DHO in this case committed error by refusing to consider the work-crew log, the error was harmless to Mitchell and therefore cannot form the basis of a due process claim. See Howard, 487 F.3d at 814-15 & n. 5 (recognizing that a dhos unjustified refusal to review a videotape alleged to be exculpatory might constitute harmless error and remanding to the district court to make a determination of harmlessness on a fuller factual record",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhave shown that he signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen; therefore, it would have rebutted the librarian’s statement that Mitchell was at the canteen instead of checking in at his assigned housing unit. Due process requires a DHO to produce and review evidence alleged by a prisoner to be supportive of his defense unless do ing so would be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 813-14 (10th Cir.2007). But assuming, without deciding, that the DHO in this case committed error by refusing to consider the work-crew log, the error was harmless to Mitchell and therefore cannot form the basis of a due process claim. See Howard, 487 F.3d at 814-15 & n. 5 (holding that the district courts review of a partial and truncated record was error and remanding the case for review on the entire administrative record",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhave shown that he signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen; therefore, it would have rebutted the librarian’s statement that Mitchell was at the canteen instead of checking in at his assigned housing unit. Due process requires a DHO to produce and review evidence alleged by a prisoner to be supportive of his defense unless do ing so would be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 813-14 (10th Cir.2007). But assuming, without deciding, that the DHO in this case committed error by refusing to consider the work-crew log, the error was harmless to Mitchell and therefore cannot form the basis of a due process claim. See Howard, 487 F.3d at 814-15 & n. 5 (holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhave shown that he signed in at his housing unit before proceeding to the canteen; therefore, it would have rebutted the librarian’s statement that Mitchell was at the canteen instead of checking in at his assigned housing unit. Due process requires a DHO to produce and review evidence alleged by a prisoner to be supportive of his defense unless do ing so would be “unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Howard v. U.S. Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808, 813-14 (10th Cir.2007). But assuming, without deciding, that the DHO in this case committed error by refusing to consider the work-crew log, the error was harmless to Mitchell and therefore cannot form the basis of a due process claim. See Howard, 487 F.3d at 814-15 & n. 5 (holding that chapman harmless error review will be conducted when error is tested for harmlessness for the first time on habeas"
] | ); of. Grossman v. Bruce, 447 F.3d 801, 805 | 1 |
827 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nHospital, 911 F.Supp. 1213, 1221 (W.D.Mo.1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir.1995)(“[o]nee a relevant market has been established, the Court must next determine whether the proposed consolidation will have anti-competitive effects”). Plaintiffs have not shown any anticompetitive effects whatsoever that will result from the merger. Plaintiffs have simply made eonclu-sory allegations that the merged entity will have significant market power and that the merger will significantly limit competition without any evidence of the same. Also, there seem to be significant efficiencies realized from this merger that plaintiffs have failed to address. F.T.C. v. Butterworth Health Corporation, 946 F.Supp. 1285, 1300-02 (W.D.Mich.1996), aff'd., 121 F.3d 708, 1997 WL 420543 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that court had no supplemental jurisdiction over claim by shareholder for breach of merger agreement that was the subject of the dispute between the merger partners over which the district court had subject matter jurisdiction",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nHospital, 911 F.Supp. 1213, 1221 (W.D.Mo.1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir.1995)(“[o]nee a relevant market has been established, the Court must next determine whether the proposed consolidation will have anti-competitive effects”). Plaintiffs have not shown any anticompetitive effects whatsoever that will result from the merger. Plaintiffs have simply made eonclu-sory allegations that the merged entity will have significant market power and that the merger will significantly limit competition without any evidence of the same. Also, there seem to be significant efficiencies realized from this merger that plaintiffs have failed to address. F.T.C. v. Butterworth Health Corporation, 946 F.Supp. 1285, 1300-02 (W.D.Mich.1996), aff'd., 121 F.3d 708, 1997 WL 420543 (6th Cir.1997) (recognizing exceptions to the continuous ownership requirement in certain merger cases",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nHospital, 911 F.Supp. 1213, 1221 (W.D.Mo.1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir.1995)(“[o]nee a relevant market has been established, the Court must next determine whether the proposed consolidation will have anti-competitive effects”). Plaintiffs have not shown any anticompetitive effects whatsoever that will result from the merger. Plaintiffs have simply made eonclu-sory allegations that the merged entity will have significant market power and that the merger will significantly limit competition without any evidence of the same. Also, there seem to be significant efficiencies realized from this merger that plaintiffs have failed to address. F.T.C. v. Butterworth Health Corporation, 946 F.Supp. 1285, 1300-02 (W.D.Mich.1996), aff'd., 121 F.3d 708, 1997 WL 420543 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that the trial court did not err in its refusal to consider the borrowers defense of merger on appeal since the defense was outside the subject matter jurisdiction of the trial court",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nHospital, 911 F.Supp. 1213, 1221 (W.D.Mo.1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir.1995)(“[o]nee a relevant market has been established, the Court must next determine whether the proposed consolidation will have anti-competitive effects”). Plaintiffs have not shown any anticompetitive effects whatsoever that will result from the merger. Plaintiffs have simply made eonclu-sory allegations that the merged entity will have significant market power and that the merger will significantly limit competition without any evidence of the same. Also, there seem to be significant efficiencies realized from this merger that plaintiffs have failed to address. F.T.C. v. Butterworth Health Corporation, 946 F.Supp. 1285, 1300-02 (W.D.Mich.1996), aff'd., 121 F.3d 708, 1997 WL 420543 (6th Cir.1997) (recognizing the efficiencies defense in merger cases",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nHospital, 911 F.Supp. 1213, 1221 (W.D.Mo.1995), aff’d, 69 F.3d 260, 269-70 (8th Cir.1995)(“[o]nee a relevant market has been established, the Court must next determine whether the proposed consolidation will have anti-competitive effects”). Plaintiffs have not shown any anticompetitive effects whatsoever that will result from the merger. Plaintiffs have simply made eonclu-sory allegations that the merged entity will have significant market power and that the merger will significantly limit competition without any evidence of the same. Also, there seem to be significant efficiencies realized from this merger that plaintiffs have failed to address. F.T.C. v. Butterworth Health Corporation, 946 F.Supp. 1285, 1300-02 (W.D.Mich.1996), aff'd., 121 F.3d 708, 1997 WL 420543 (6th Cir.1997) (recognizing defense in securities case"
] | ); Department of Justice and Federal Trade | 3 |
828 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n” Id. at 1079 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52, 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549). Therefore, a state law is preempted if it adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. Id. (citing Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 379, 122 S.Ct. 2151). The Kentucky Act essentially creates a statutory bad faith claim. Cummings v. Thomas Industries, Inc., 812 F.Supp. 99, 101 (W.D.Ky.1993) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky.1988)). A plaintiff may recover “such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation” of the Act. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 446.070. The plain language of this statute permits, at a bare minimum, compensatory damages. In addition, a plaintiff can recover damages for anxiety and mental anguish. FB Ins. Co. v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Ky.Ct.App.1993) (holding that wifes recovery for loss of consortium should not be reduced by the proportion of negligence attributable to husband because claim for loss of consortium is independent of the damages claim of the injured spouse",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n” Id. at 1079 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52, 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549). Therefore, a state law is preempted if it adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. Id. (citing Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 379, 122 S.Ct. 2151). The Kentucky Act essentially creates a statutory bad faith claim. Cummings v. Thomas Industries, Inc., 812 F.Supp. 99, 101 (W.D.Ky.1993) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky.1988)). A plaintiff may recover “such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation” of the Act. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 446.070. The plain language of this statute permits, at a bare minimum, compensatory damages. In addition, a plaintiff can recover damages for anxiety and mental anguish. FB Ins. Co. v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Ky.Ct.App.1993) (holding the trial court did not err by instructing the jury that the plaintiff could be awarded damages for anxiety mental anguish and loss of consortium for a violation of the kentucky act",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n” Id. at 1079 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52, 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549). Therefore, a state law is preempted if it adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. Id. (citing Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 379, 122 S.Ct. 2151). The Kentucky Act essentially creates a statutory bad faith claim. Cummings v. Thomas Industries, Inc., 812 F.Supp. 99, 101 (W.D.Ky.1993) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky.1988)). A plaintiff may recover “such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation” of the Act. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 446.070. The plain language of this statute permits, at a bare minimum, compensatory damages. In addition, a plaintiff can recover damages for anxiety and mental anguish. FB Ins. Co. v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Ky.Ct.App.1993) (recognizing cause of action for loss of consortium",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n” Id. at 1079 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52, 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549). Therefore, a state law is preempted if it adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. Id. (citing Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 379, 122 S.Ct. 2151). The Kentucky Act essentially creates a statutory bad faith claim. Cummings v. Thomas Industries, Inc., 812 F.Supp. 99, 101 (W.D.Ky.1993) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky.1988)). A plaintiff may recover “such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation” of the Act. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 446.070. The plain language of this statute permits, at a bare minimum, compensatory damages. In addition, a plaintiff can recover damages for anxiety and mental anguish. FB Ins. Co. v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Ky.Ct.App.1993) (holding that trial court did not err",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\n” Id. at 1079 (quoting Pilot Life, 481 U.S. at 52, 54, 107 S.Ct. 1549). Therefore, a state law is preempted if it adds to the judicial remedies available under ERISA. Id. (citing Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 379, 122 S.Ct. 2151). The Kentucky Act essentially creates a statutory bad faith claim. Cummings v. Thomas Industries, Inc., 812 F.Supp. 99, 101 (W.D.Ky.1993) (citing State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 (Ky.1988)). A plaintiff may recover “such damages as he sustained by reason of the violation” of the Act. Ky.Rev.Stat. § 446.070. The plain language of this statute permits, at a bare minimum, compensatory damages. In addition, a plaintiff can recover damages for anxiety and mental anguish. FB Ins. Co. v. Jones, 864 S.W.2d 926, 929 (Ky.Ct.App.1993) (recognizing loss of consortium claims"
] | ). By comparison, ERISA limits plaintiffs | 1 |
829 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nowed to a governmental unit. 341 B.R. at 50. However, that bare restatement of the rule in § 1322(a)(4) does not help determine the meaning of “owed directly to or recoverable by a governmental unit.” In fact that was not even the question presented in Sanders. Rather the question in that case was whether § 1322(a)(2) required priority claims to be paid in the order specified in § 507, so that a domestic support obligation under § 507(a)(1) would be paid in full before administrative expenses under § 507(a)(2). Id. at 49-50. The bankruptcy court held that it did not. Id. at 50 aff'd, Alabama Dep’t of Human Res. v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 347 B.R. 776 (N.D.Ala.2006). See also In re Lanigan, 101 B.R. 530, 532 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986) (citing In re Parker, 21 B.R. 692, 694 (E.D.Tenn.1982)) (holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nowed to a governmental unit. 341 B.R. at 50. However, that bare restatement of the rule in § 1322(a)(4) does not help determine the meaning of “owed directly to or recoverable by a governmental unit.” In fact that was not even the question presented in Sanders. Rather the question in that case was whether § 1322(a)(2) required priority claims to be paid in the order specified in § 507, so that a domestic support obligation under § 507(a)(1) would be paid in full before administrative expenses under § 507(a)(2). Id. at 49-50. The bankruptcy court held that it did not. Id. at 50 aff'd, Alabama Dep’t of Human Res. v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 347 B.R. 776 (N.D.Ala.2006). See also In re Lanigan, 101 B.R. 530, 532 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986) (citing In re Parker, 21 B.R. 692, 694 (E.D.Tenn.1982)) (holding that a plan under chapter 13 although confirmed was invalid because it failed to comply with the mandatory provisions of 11 usc 1322a2 requiring full payment of all claims entitled to priority",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nowed to a governmental unit. 341 B.R. at 50. However, that bare restatement of the rule in § 1322(a)(4) does not help determine the meaning of “owed directly to or recoverable by a governmental unit.” In fact that was not even the question presented in Sanders. Rather the question in that case was whether § 1322(a)(2) required priority claims to be paid in the order specified in § 507, so that a domestic support obligation under § 507(a)(1) would be paid in full before administrative expenses under § 507(a)(2). Id. at 49-50. The bankruptcy court held that it did not. Id. at 50 aff'd, Alabama Dep’t of Human Res. v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 347 B.R. 776 (N.D.Ala.2006). See also In re Lanigan, 101 B.R. 530, 532 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986) (citing In re Parker, 21 B.R. 692, 694 (E.D.Tenn.1982)) (holding that priority claims can be paid concurrently with other creditors over the life of a chapter 13 plan",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nowed to a governmental unit. 341 B.R. at 50. However, that bare restatement of the rule in § 1322(a)(4) does not help determine the meaning of “owed directly to or recoverable by a governmental unit.” In fact that was not even the question presented in Sanders. Rather the question in that case was whether § 1322(a)(2) required priority claims to be paid in the order specified in § 507, so that a domestic support obligation under § 507(a)(1) would be paid in full before administrative expenses under § 507(a)(2). Id. at 49-50. The bankruptcy court held that it did not. Id. at 50 aff'd, Alabama Dep’t of Human Res. v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 347 B.R. 776 (N.D.Ala.2006). See also In re Lanigan, 101 B.R. 530, 532 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986) (citing In re Parker, 21 B.R. 692, 694 (E.D.Tenn.1982)) (holding that child support arrearages may not be included in a chapter 13 plan",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nowed to a governmental unit. 341 B.R. at 50. However, that bare restatement of the rule in § 1322(a)(4) does not help determine the meaning of “owed directly to or recoverable by a governmental unit.” In fact that was not even the question presented in Sanders. Rather the question in that case was whether § 1322(a)(2) required priority claims to be paid in the order specified in § 507, so that a domestic support obligation under § 507(a)(1) would be paid in full before administrative expenses under § 507(a)(2). Id. at 49-50. The bankruptcy court held that it did not. Id. at 50 aff'd, Alabama Dep’t of Human Res. v. Sanders (In re Sanders), 347 B.R. 776 (N.D.Ala.2006). See also In re Lanigan, 101 B.R. 530, 532 (Bankr.N.D.Ill.1986) (citing In re Parker, 21 B.R. 692, 694 (E.D.Tenn.1982)) (holding that a creditors failure to vote or to object to a chapter 11 plan constitutes acceptance of the plan"
] | ). Thus, Sanders does not illuminate the | 2 |
830 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnot only because of the form, but also, because it is an appearance by a corporation, and not the work of an attorney. This court has held that because Rule 7, of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, applies only to individuals, a corporate entity may only appear in court though an attorney. Dell Development Corp. v. Best Industrial Uniform Supply Co., Inc., 743 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied). As we stated in Dell, “where a corporation chooses to represent itself through a non-attorney officer, it does so at its own risk; to do so may be viewed as negligence.” Id. However, the failure of appellant to file an answer through an attorney does not prevent the response from precluding a default judgment. See also R.T.A International, 915 S.W.2d at 151 (holding that the plaintiff did not establish a waiver where the defendants answer had put the plaintiff on notice of an arbitration defense",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnot only because of the form, but also, because it is an appearance by a corporation, and not the work of an attorney. This court has held that because Rule 7, of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, applies only to individuals, a corporate entity may only appear in court though an attorney. Dell Development Corp. v. Best Industrial Uniform Supply Co., Inc., 743 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied). As we stated in Dell, “where a corporation chooses to represent itself through a non-attorney officer, it does so at its own risk; to do so may be viewed as negligence.” Id. However, the failure of appellant to file an answer through an attorney does not prevent the response from precluding a default judgment. See also R.T.A International, 915 S.W.2d at 151 (holding appellant could not obtain a new trial so that jury could answer liability question because the charge instructed the jury not to answer the question based on its answer to a prior question and because appellant did not object to this instruction",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnot only because of the form, but also, because it is an appearance by a corporation, and not the work of an attorney. This court has held that because Rule 7, of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, applies only to individuals, a corporate entity may only appear in court though an attorney. Dell Development Corp. v. Best Industrial Uniform Supply Co., Inc., 743 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied). As we stated in Dell, “where a corporation chooses to represent itself through a non-attorney officer, it does so at its own risk; to do so may be viewed as negligence.” Id. However, the failure of appellant to file an answer through an attorney does not prevent the response from precluding a default judgment. See also R.T.A International, 915 S.W.2d at 151 (holding that where answer omits certain formalities required by the rules of procedure it does not render the answer ineffective so as to entitle the plaintiff to a default judgment",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnot only because of the form, but also, because it is an appearance by a corporation, and not the work of an attorney. This court has held that because Rule 7, of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, applies only to individuals, a corporate entity may only appear in court though an attorney. Dell Development Corp. v. Best Industrial Uniform Supply Co., Inc., 743 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied). As we stated in Dell, “where a corporation chooses to represent itself through a non-attorney officer, it does so at its own risk; to do so may be viewed as negligence.” Id. However, the failure of appellant to file an answer through an attorney does not prevent the response from precluding a default judgment. See also R.T.A International, 915 S.W.2d at 151 (holding failure to object to conditioning instructions waived error arising from the jurys failure to answer question when answer could not be implied and that lack of objection waived right to new trial to have jury answer questions",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nnot only because of the form, but also, because it is an appearance by a corporation, and not the work of an attorney. This court has held that because Rule 7, of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, applies only to individuals, a corporate entity may only appear in court though an attorney. Dell Development Corp. v. Best Industrial Uniform Supply Co., Inc., 743 S.W.2d 302, 303 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied). As we stated in Dell, “where a corporation chooses to represent itself through a non-attorney officer, it does so at its own risk; to do so may be viewed as negligence.” Id. However, the failure of appellant to file an answer through an attorney does not prevent the response from precluding a default judgment. See also R.T.A International, 915 S.W.2d at 151 (holding that the defense of insufficient process was waived because it was not raised by the defendant in its answer but later in its response to the plaintiffs request for default judgment"
] | ). Appellant’s first point of error is | 2 |
831 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nat the time of death of [a] loved one.” In the case of Mrs. Gendek, the condition has caused the onset of major depression “with characteristics of recurrent crying spells, feelings of self-reproach, [and] impairment of concentration.” As for Mr. Gendek, Dr. Rubin was of the opinion that Mr. Gendek has repressed his emotions, resulting in a “blunting of affect and response to his own inner life.” The Gendeks brought an action for compensatory damages against several defendants, including the doctors, nurses, and hospital, allegedly responsible for causing their child’s death. After defendants had answered plaintiffs’ complaint, defendants Mercer Medical Center moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim for negligent infliction of e N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988) (recognizing torts of intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nat the time of death of [a] loved one.” In the case of Mrs. Gendek, the condition has caused the onset of major depression “with characteristics of recurrent crying spells, feelings of self-reproach, [and] impairment of concentration.” As for Mr. Gendek, Dr. Rubin was of the opinion that Mr. Gendek has repressed his emotions, resulting in a “blunting of affect and response to his own inner life.” The Gendeks brought an action for compensatory damages against several defendants, including the doctors, nurses, and hospital, allegedly responsible for causing their child’s death. After defendants had answered plaintiffs’ complaint, defendants Mercer Medical Center moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim for negligent infliction of e N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988) (holding that the law does not recognize a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress every time an employer negligently fails to comply with performance evaluation procedures resulting in an employees termination and emotional distress",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nat the time of death of [a] loved one.” In the case of Mrs. Gendek, the condition has caused the onset of major depression “with characteristics of recurrent crying spells, feelings of self-reproach, [and] impairment of concentration.” As for Mr. Gendek, Dr. Rubin was of the opinion that Mr. Gendek has repressed his emotions, resulting in a “blunting of affect and response to his own inner life.” The Gendeks brought an action for compensatory damages against several defendants, including the doctors, nurses, and hospital, allegedly responsible for causing their child’s death. After defendants had answered plaintiffs’ complaint, defendants Mercer Medical Center moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim for negligent infliction of e N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988) (holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nat the time of death of [a] loved one.” In the case of Mrs. Gendek, the condition has caused the onset of major depression “with characteristics of recurrent crying spells, feelings of self-reproach, [and] impairment of concentration.” As for Mr. Gendek, Dr. Rubin was of the opinion that Mr. Gendek has repressed his emotions, resulting in a “blunting of affect and response to his own inner life.” The Gendeks brought an action for compensatory damages against several defendants, including the doctors, nurses, and hospital, allegedly responsible for causing their child’s death. After defendants had answered plaintiffs’ complaint, defendants Mercer Medical Center moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim for negligent infliction of e N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988) (recognizing claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress when hospital negligently failed to release to parents their sons braindead corpse",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nat the time of death of [a] loved one.” In the case of Mrs. Gendek, the condition has caused the onset of major depression “with characteristics of recurrent crying spells, feelings of self-reproach, [and] impairment of concentration.” As for Mr. Gendek, Dr. Rubin was of the opinion that Mr. Gendek has repressed his emotions, resulting in a “blunting of affect and response to his own inner life.” The Gendeks brought an action for compensatory damages against several defendants, including the doctors, nurses, and hospital, allegedly responsible for causing their child’s death. After defendants had answered plaintiffs’ complaint, defendants Mercer Medical Center moved for partial summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim for negligent infliction of e N.J. 523, 538 A.2d 346 (1988) (recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress"
] | ). Our cases also recognize indirect claims for | 3 |
832 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis argument is without merit. We have recognized that an IJ need not first identify the particular pieces of missing, relevant evidence, and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant before relying on a lack of corroboration to support an adverse credibility finding. See Maladho Djehe Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 633-34 (2d Cir.2006); cf. Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that an IJ must follow these steps in denying a claim based solely on insufficient corroboration, as opposed to adverse credibility). In light of the agency’s reasonable adverse credibility finding, it did not err in denying Herath Mudiyan-selage’s applications for relief. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (recognizing that a withholding of removal claim necessarily fails if the applicant is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the factual predicate for the claims is the same",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis argument is without merit. We have recognized that an IJ need not first identify the particular pieces of missing, relevant evidence, and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant before relying on a lack of corroboration to support an adverse credibility finding. See Maladho Djehe Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 633-34 (2d Cir.2006); cf. Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that an IJ must follow these steps in denying a claim based solely on insufficient corroboration, as opposed to adverse credibility). In light of the agency’s reasonable adverse credibility finding, it did not err in denying Herath Mudiyan-selage’s applications for relief. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (recognizing that withholding of removal claims must fail if petitioner is unable to show the objective likelihood of persecution needed to make out an asylum claim and the claims are based on the same factual predicate",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis argument is without merit. We have recognized that an IJ need not first identify the particular pieces of missing, relevant evidence, and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant before relying on a lack of corroboration to support an adverse credibility finding. See Maladho Djehe Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 633-34 (2d Cir.2006); cf. Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that an IJ must follow these steps in denying a claim based solely on insufficient corroboration, as opposed to adverse credibility). In light of the agency’s reasonable adverse credibility finding, it did not err in denying Herath Mudiyan-selage’s applications for relief. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that although the ij did not explicitly analyze the cat claim the denial of the claim was linguistically separate from the denials of asylum and withholding under the ina",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis argument is without merit. We have recognized that an IJ need not first identify the particular pieces of missing, relevant evidence, and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant before relying on a lack of corroboration to support an adverse credibility finding. See Maladho Djehe Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 633-34 (2d Cir.2006); cf. Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that an IJ must follow these steps in denying a claim based solely on insufficient corroboration, as opposed to adverse credibility). In light of the agency’s reasonable adverse credibility finding, it did not err in denying Herath Mudiyan-selage’s applications for relief. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that when the asylum withholding of removal and cat claims are based on the same factual predicate a credibility ruling necessarily forecloses relief in each",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis argument is without merit. We have recognized that an IJ need not first identify the particular pieces of missing, relevant evidence, and show that this evidence was reasonably available to the applicant before relying on a lack of corroboration to support an adverse credibility finding. See Maladho Djehe Diallo v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 624, 633-34 (2d Cir.2006); cf. Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193, 198 (2d Cir.2009) (noting that an IJ must follow these steps in denying a claim based solely on insufficient corroboration, as opposed to adverse credibility). In light of the agency’s reasonable adverse credibility finding, it did not err in denying Herath Mudiyan-selage’s applications for relief. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the agency need not analyze separately a withholding of removal claim based on the same facts as an applicants asylum claim"
] | ); Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 | 4 |
833 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 33 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). Given that Section 501.008 of the Government Code precludes an inmate from filing suit until he has exhausted his remedies through the grievance system, an inmate’s failure to provide the required information subjects his suit to dismissal. See Smith, 33 S.W.3d at 341. The second purpose served by Section 14.005(a)’s requirements is that the information provided by the inmate will enable the trial court to determine whether the inmate has filed his claim within the time period specified by subsection (b). See Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied); but see Francis v. TDCJ-CID, 188 S.W.3d 799, 803-04 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)(holding that even in absence of copy of written decision inmates affidavit and notations on grievance form provided trial court with information necessary to determine whether inmates suit was filed within statutory time period",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 33 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). Given that Section 501.008 of the Government Code precludes an inmate from filing suit until he has exhausted his remedies through the grievance system, an inmate’s failure to provide the required information subjects his suit to dismissal. See Smith, 33 S.W.3d at 341. The second purpose served by Section 14.005(a)’s requirements is that the information provided by the inmate will enable the trial court to determine whether the inmate has filed his claim within the time period specified by subsection (b). See Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied); but see Francis v. TDCJ-CID, 188 S.W.3d 799, 803-04 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)(recognizing first amendment retaliation claim where official filed a disciplinary report following an inmates filing of a grievance",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 33 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). Given that Section 501.008 of the Government Code precludes an inmate from filing suit until he has exhausted his remedies through the grievance system, an inmate’s failure to provide the required information subjects his suit to dismissal. See Smith, 33 S.W.3d at 341. The second purpose served by Section 14.005(a)’s requirements is that the information provided by the inmate will enable the trial court to determine whether the inmate has filed his claim within the time period specified by subsection (b). See Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied); but see Francis v. TDCJ-CID, 188 S.W.3d 799, 803-04 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)(holding that inmates have no constitutionallyprotected liberty interest in access to grievance procedure",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 33 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). Given that Section 501.008 of the Government Code precludes an inmate from filing suit until he has exhausted his remedies through the grievance system, an inmate’s failure to provide the required information subjects his suit to dismissal. See Smith, 33 S.W.3d at 341. The second purpose served by Section 14.005(a)’s requirements is that the information provided by the inmate will enable the trial court to determine whether the inmate has filed his claim within the time period specified by subsection (b). See Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied); but see Francis v. TDCJ-CID, 188 S.W.3d 799, 803-04 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)(holding that even if information in an affidavit was provided in reckless disregard of the truth appropriate course of action is to sever that information from the affidavit and determine whether sufficient information remained in order for the magistrate to find probable cause",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nv. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice-Institutional Division, 33 S.W.3d 338, 341 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, pet. denied). Given that Section 501.008 of the Government Code precludes an inmate from filing suit until he has exhausted his remedies through the grievance system, an inmate’s failure to provide the required information subjects his suit to dismissal. See Smith, 33 S.W.3d at 341. The second purpose served by Section 14.005(a)’s requirements is that the information provided by the inmate will enable the trial court to determine whether the inmate has filed his claim within the time period specified by subsection (b). See Moore v. Zeller, 153 S.W.3d 262, 264 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2004, pet. denied); but see Francis v. TDCJ-CID, 188 S.W.3d 799, 803-04 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2006, no pet.)(holding that district court erred in dismissing inmates complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies when court did not address inmates allegation that prison officials failed to provide necessary grievance forms"
] | ). If the inmate does not file his suit within | 0 |
834 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nor motive.’ ” Duggan v. State, 285 Ga. 363, 366 (677 SE2d 92) (2009) (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 158 (115 SCt 696, 130 LE2d 574) (1995)). “ ‘If the statement was made later, proof of the statement does not assist the jury to evaluate the witness’s testimony because the reliability of the statement is subj ect to the same doubt as the trial testimony.’” Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112, 119 (674 SE2d 280) (2009) (citation omitted). Applying this principle, this Court has held that a co-defendant’s prior statement made with the alleged motive of currying favor with the State to obtain a plea agreement is not admissible as a prior consistent statement when the co-defendant testifies for the State at trial. See Mister v. State, 286 Ga. 303, 307 (687 SE2d 471) (2009) (holding that no constitutional violation occurred where state prosecutor did not allow defendant to withdraw guilty plea and reinstated additional charges after defendant violated plea agreement by failing to testify truthfully at codefendants trial",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nor motive.’ ” Duggan v. State, 285 Ga. 363, 366 (677 SE2d 92) (2009) (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 158 (115 SCt 696, 130 LE2d 574) (1995)). “ ‘If the statement was made later, proof of the statement does not assist the jury to evaluate the witness’s testimony because the reliability of the statement is subj ect to the same doubt as the trial testimony.’” Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112, 119 (674 SE2d 280) (2009) (citation omitted). Applying this principle, this Court has held that a co-defendant’s prior statement made with the alleged motive of currying favor with the State to obtain a plea agreement is not admissible as a prior consistent statement when the co-defendant testifies for the State at trial. See Mister v. State, 286 Ga. 303, 307 (687 SE2d 471) (2009) (holding that a codefendants prior statements made at his guilty plea hearing were not admissible to corroborate his trial testimony because the witnesss guilty plea hearing did not predate any improper motive he may have had to testify against the defendant",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nor motive.’ ” Duggan v. State, 285 Ga. 363, 366 (677 SE2d 92) (2009) (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 158 (115 SCt 696, 130 LE2d 574) (1995)). “ ‘If the statement was made later, proof of the statement does not assist the jury to evaluate the witness’s testimony because the reliability of the statement is subj ect to the same doubt as the trial testimony.’” Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112, 119 (674 SE2d 280) (2009) (citation omitted). Applying this principle, this Court has held that a co-defendant’s prior statement made with the alleged motive of currying favor with the State to obtain a plea agreement is not admissible as a prior consistent statement when the co-defendant testifies for the State at trial. See Mister v. State, 286 Ga. 303, 307 (687 SE2d 471) (2009) (holding that the defendants guilty plea was valid where the district court carefully questioned the defendant about whether he understood the consequences of his guilty plea",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nor motive.’ ” Duggan v. State, 285 Ga. 363, 366 (677 SE2d 92) (2009) (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 158 (115 SCt 696, 130 LE2d 574) (1995)). “ ‘If the statement was made later, proof of the statement does not assist the jury to evaluate the witness’s testimony because the reliability of the statement is subj ect to the same doubt as the trial testimony.’” Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112, 119 (674 SE2d 280) (2009) (citation omitted). Applying this principle, this Court has held that a co-defendant’s prior statement made with the alleged motive of currying favor with the State to obtain a plea agreement is not admissible as a prior consistent statement when the co-defendant testifies for the State at trial. See Mister v. State, 286 Ga. 303, 307 (687 SE2d 471) (2009) (holding that although defendant is not entitled to appeal from his guilty plea as a matter of right his arguments challenging the factual basis for his guilty plea are reviewable pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nor motive.’ ” Duggan v. State, 285 Ga. 363, 366 (677 SE2d 92) (2009) (citing Tome v. United States, 513 U. S. 150, 158 (115 SCt 696, 130 LE2d 574) (1995)). “ ‘If the statement was made later, proof of the statement does not assist the jury to evaluate the witness’s testimony because the reliability of the statement is subj ect to the same doubt as the trial testimony.’” Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112, 119 (674 SE2d 280) (2009) (citation omitted). Applying this principle, this Court has held that a co-defendant’s prior statement made with the alleged motive of currying favor with the State to obtain a plea agreement is not admissible as a prior consistent statement when the co-defendant testifies for the State at trial. See Mister v. State, 286 Ga. 303, 307 (687 SE2d 471) (2009) (holding that a defendants guilty plea was unconditional where the guilty plea was not in writing and the government did not consent to it being conditional"
] | ). See also Moon v. State, 288 Ga. 508, 511-512 | 1 |
835 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndeclined to provide a breath sample. At some point during or after the booking process, appellant complained of chest and wrist pain, so the police called for an ambulance. The trial court found appellant guilty of DWI, and this appeal followed. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his DWI conviction. A. Standard of Review When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (holding that jackson standard is only standard to use when determining sufficiency of evidence",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndeclined to provide a breath sample. At some point during or after the booking process, appellant complained of chest and wrist pain, so the police called for an ambulance. The trial court found appellant guilty of DWI, and this appeal followed. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his DWI conviction. A. Standard of Review When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (holding that appellate court could not review the sufficiency of the evidence based on a particular legal standard because that standard was not submitted to the jury and no party objected to the charge on this ground or requested that the jury be charged using this standard",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndeclined to provide a breath sample. At some point during or after the booking process, appellant complained of chest and wrist pain, so the police called for an ambulance. The trial court found appellant guilty of DWI, and this appeal followed. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his DWI conviction. A. Standard of Review When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (holding that the standard of review for the sufficiency of the evidence is the same as the standard for denying a motion for a directed verdict",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndeclined to provide a breath sample. At some point during or after the booking process, appellant complained of chest and wrist pain, so the police called for an ambulance. The trial court found appellant guilty of DWI, and this appeal followed. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his DWI conviction. A. Standard of Review When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (holding the applicable standard of review in addressing the sufficiency of the evidence is manifest error",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndeclined to provide a breath sample. At some point during or after the booking process, appellant complained of chest and wrist pain, so the police called for an ambulance. The trial court found appellant guilty of DWI, and this appeal followed. Sufficiency of the Evidence In his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his DWI conviction. A. Standard of Review When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 859 (Tex.Crim.App.2011) (holding that the standard of proof for dischargeability actions is the preponderance of the evidence standard"
] | ). Our review of “all of the evidence” includes | 0 |
836 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate habeas court’s findings of fact were objectively unreasonable. We assume arguendo, that the district court concluded, for the six reasons it gave, that they were not objectively reasonable. 6 . See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (reasoning that trial court determinations of credibility and demeanor, which are entitled to \"special deference” on direct review, deserve \"no less” respect in habeas proceedings). 7 .. The state contends that Broolcs \"was unlawful insofar as it departed from [Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 620 (5th Cir.1994)], which held that '[t]he Supreme C nd therefore nonprecedential, see 5th Cir. R. 47.5, their reasoning is persuasive. 9 . See Rivas v. Thaler, 432 Fed.Appx. 395, 404 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (holding that district courts decision that trial counsels failure to object to crawford material was based on a reasonable trial strategy and did not constitute deficient performance under washingtons first prong was not debatable",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate habeas court’s findings of fact were objectively unreasonable. We assume arguendo, that the district court concluded, for the six reasons it gave, that they were not objectively reasonable. 6 . See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (reasoning that trial court determinations of credibility and demeanor, which are entitled to \"special deference” on direct review, deserve \"no less” respect in habeas proceedings). 7 .. The state contends that Broolcs \"was unlawful insofar as it departed from [Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 620 (5th Cir.1994)], which held that '[t]he Supreme C nd therefore nonprecedential, see 5th Cir. R. 47.5, their reasoning is persuasive. 9 . See Rivas v. Thaler, 432 Fed.Appx. 395, 404 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (holding that counsel could have reasonably determined that the trial court would not sustain a rule 403 objection therefore counsels failure to object to this evidence was not deficient performance",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate habeas court’s findings of fact were objectively unreasonable. We assume arguendo, that the district court concluded, for the six reasons it gave, that they were not objectively reasonable. 6 . See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (reasoning that trial court determinations of credibility and demeanor, which are entitled to \"special deference” on direct review, deserve \"no less” respect in habeas proceedings). 7 .. The state contends that Broolcs \"was unlawful insofar as it departed from [Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 620 (5th Cir.1994)], which held that '[t]he Supreme C nd therefore nonprecedential, see 5th Cir. R. 47.5, their reasoning is persuasive. 9 . See Rivas v. Thaler, 432 Fed.Appx. 395, 404 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (holding counsels failure to object to victim impact testimony and evidence was not ineffective assistance of counsel when the trial record was silent as to counsels strategy",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate habeas court’s findings of fact were objectively unreasonable. We assume arguendo, that the district court concluded, for the six reasons it gave, that they were not objectively reasonable. 6 . See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (reasoning that trial court determinations of credibility and demeanor, which are entitled to \"special deference” on direct review, deserve \"no less” respect in habeas proceedings). 7 .. The state contends that Broolcs \"was unlawful insofar as it departed from [Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 620 (5th Cir.1994)], which held that '[t]he Supreme C nd therefore nonprecedential, see 5th Cir. R. 47.5, their reasoning is persuasive. 9 . See Rivas v. Thaler, 432 Fed.Appx. 395, 404 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (holding that counsels failure to object or request a limiting instruction for evidence of defendants incarceration was sound trial strategy",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate habeas court’s findings of fact were objectively unreasonable. We assume arguendo, that the district court concluded, for the six reasons it gave, that they were not objectively reasonable. 6 . See, e.g., Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984) (reasoning that trial court determinations of credibility and demeanor, which are entitled to \"special deference” on direct review, deserve \"no less” respect in habeas proceedings). 7 .. The state contends that Broolcs \"was unlawful insofar as it departed from [Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612, 620 (5th Cir.1994)], which held that '[t]he Supreme C nd therefore nonprecedential, see 5th Cir. R. 47.5, their reasoning is persuasive. 9 . See Rivas v. Thaler, 432 Fed.Appx. 395, 404 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (holding that failure to object to properly admitted evidence was not deficient performance by trial counsel"
] | ). Again, Rivas is not precedential but is | 0 |
837 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 223-24 (4th Cir.1999) (“[Sjervice of process is not legally defective simply because the complaint misnames the defendant in some insignificant way.”). Technical defects in the form of the summons and the complaint do not invalidate an otherwise proper and successful delivery of process under Fed. R.Civ.P. 4. Mid-Continent Wood Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir.1991) (citing United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir.1984)). In other contexts, federal courts have determined that a technical defect in the service of process does not invalidate the service where the plaintiff has substantially complied with the appropriate state-law rule. Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 829-30 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that state of south dakota does not have criminal jurisdiction over indians in indian country",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 223-24 (4th Cir.1999) (“[Sjervice of process is not legally defective simply because the complaint misnames the defendant in some insignificant way.”). Technical defects in the form of the summons and the complaint do not invalidate an otherwise proper and successful delivery of process under Fed. R.Civ.P. 4. Mid-Continent Wood Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir.1991) (citing United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir.1984)). In other contexts, federal courts have determined that a technical defect in the service of process does not invalidate the service where the plaintiff has substantially complied with the appropriate state-law rule. Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 829-30 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that service to defendants business address resulted in total failure to serve process rather than mere technical defect and thus could not be cured by rule 415f",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 223-24 (4th Cir.1999) (“[Sjervice of process is not legally defective simply because the complaint misnames the defendant in some insignificant way.”). Technical defects in the form of the summons and the complaint do not invalidate an otherwise proper and successful delivery of process under Fed. R.Civ.P. 4. Mid-Continent Wood Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir.1991) (citing United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir.1984)). In other contexts, federal courts have determined that a technical defect in the service of process does not invalidate the service where the plaintiff has substantially complied with the appropriate state-law rule. Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 829-30 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that there was no duty to answer a complaint after removal but pointing out that south dakota law will excuse a technical defect in the service of process where a plaintiff has otherwise substantially complied with the appropriate rule",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 223-24 (4th Cir.1999) (“[Sjervice of process is not legally defective simply because the complaint misnames the defendant in some insignificant way.”). Technical defects in the form of the summons and the complaint do not invalidate an otherwise proper and successful delivery of process under Fed. R.Civ.P. 4. Mid-Continent Wood Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir.1991) (citing United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir.1984)). In other contexts, federal courts have determined that a technical defect in the service of process does not invalidate the service where the plaintiff has substantially complied with the appropriate state-law rule. Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 829-30 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that affidavit submitted to the court after the plaintiffs motion to remand was sufficient to cure the defect in the removal petition",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nMut. Fire Ins. Co., 188 F.3d 218, 223-24 (4th Cir.1999) (“[Sjervice of process is not legally defective simply because the complaint misnames the defendant in some insignificant way.”). Technical defects in the form of the summons and the complaint do not invalidate an otherwise proper and successful delivery of process under Fed. R.Civ.P. 4. Mid-Continent Wood Prods., Inc. v. Harris, 936 F.2d 297, 301 (7th Cir.1991) (citing United Food & Commercial Workers Union v. Alpha Beta Co., 736 F.2d 1371 (9th Cir.1984)). In other contexts, federal courts have determined that a technical defect in the service of process does not invalidate the service where the plaintiff has substantially complied with the appropriate state-law rule. Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 829-30 (8th Cir.2003) (holding that service of a statecourt summons and complaint after removal to federal court is valid service"
] | ); Freeman v. Freeman, 2002 WL 539061, at *1 n. | 2 |
838 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndard or limitation that Esso is allegedly violating under CWA. The CWA provides that a civil action may be brought against anyone “alleged to be in violation of [¶]... ] an effluent standard or limitation of this chapter.” See 33 USC 1365(a)(1). Effluent standard or limitation is d ed in the interior of the island constitutes water in the territorial seas. See United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1941) (a body of water is “a navigable water of the United States” if (1) it presently, or (2) has been or was in the past, or (3) could be made in the future by reasonable improvements, susceptible for use in interstate or foreign commerce.), but see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.1975) (holding that the plaintiff must demonstrate that defendants contacts with the united states as a whole support the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the constitution and laws of the united states",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndard or limitation that Esso is allegedly violating under CWA. The CWA provides that a civil action may be brought against anyone “alleged to be in violation of [¶]... ] an effluent standard or limitation of this chapter.” See 33 USC 1365(a)(1). Effluent standard or limitation is d ed in the interior of the island constitutes water in the territorial seas. See United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1941) (a body of water is “a navigable water of the United States” if (1) it presently, or (2) has been or was in the past, or (3) could be made in the future by reasonable improvements, susceptible for use in interstate or foreign commerce.), but see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.1975) (holding that wetlands adjacent to navigable waters are included in the term territorial waters",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndard or limitation that Esso is allegedly violating under CWA. The CWA provides that a civil action may be brought against anyone “alleged to be in violation of [¶]... ] an effluent standard or limitation of this chapter.” See 33 USC 1365(a)(1). Effluent standard or limitation is d ed in the interior of the island constitutes water in the territorial seas. See United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1941) (a body of water is “a navigable water of the United States” if (1) it presently, or (2) has been or was in the past, or (3) could be made in the future by reasonable improvements, susceptible for use in interstate or foreign commerce.), but see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.1975) (holding that as used in the cwa the term waters of the united states is not limited to the traditional tests of navigability",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndard or limitation that Esso is allegedly violating under CWA. The CWA provides that a civil action may be brought against anyone “alleged to be in violation of [¶]... ] an effluent standard or limitation of this chapter.” See 33 USC 1365(a)(1). Effluent standard or limitation is d ed in the interior of the island constitutes water in the territorial seas. See United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1941) (a body of water is “a navigable water of the United States” if (1) it presently, or (2) has been or was in the past, or (3) could be made in the future by reasonable improvements, susceptible for use in interstate or foreign commerce.), but see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.1975) (holding that the land under navigable waters was not granted by the constitution to the united states but was reserved to the states respectively and that new states have the same rights jurisdiction and sovereignty over the soil under navigable water as the original states",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\ndard or limitation that Esso is allegedly violating under CWA. The CWA provides that a civil action may be brought against anyone “alleged to be in violation of [¶]... ] an effluent standard or limitation of this chapter.” See 33 USC 1365(a)(1). Effluent standard or limitation is d ed in the interior of the island constitutes water in the territorial seas. See United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 61 S.Ct. 291, 85 L.Ed. 243 (1941) (a body of water is “a navigable water of the United States” if (1) it presently, or (2) has been or was in the past, or (3) could be made in the future by reasonable improvements, susceptible for use in interstate or foreign commerce.), but see Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685, 686 (D.D.C.1975) (holding that the term includes in the cwa allows for additional unstated meanings"
] | ); Rivera Torres, 826 F.2d at 154-55 (citing | 2 |
839 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrefusal was not triggered.” Id. at 408. The same is true of the transfer of the Share from the Partnership to the LLC. There was no meaningful change in control of the property. There was no desire to sell, no bona fide offer or purchase, nor were there any terms of sale of any kind. Simply put, the transfer did not invoke the right of first refusal provision. This conclusion is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Creque v. Texaco Antilles Ltd., 409 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir.2005) (“A right of first refusal to purchase real property is not triggered by the mere conveyance of that property. Only when the conveyance is marked by arms’ length dealing and a change in control of the property may that right be exercised.”); McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 532 (Wyo.2000) (recognizing enforceability of right of first refusal when burdened property is part of integrated transaction with sale of unburdened property",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrefusal was not triggered.” Id. at 408. The same is true of the transfer of the Share from the Partnership to the LLC. There was no meaningful change in control of the property. There was no desire to sell, no bona fide offer or purchase, nor were there any terms of sale of any kind. Simply put, the transfer did not invoke the right of first refusal provision. This conclusion is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Creque v. Texaco Antilles Ltd., 409 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir.2005) (“A right of first refusal to purchase real property is not triggered by the mere conveyance of that property. Only when the conveyance is marked by arms’ length dealing and a change in control of the property may that right be exercised.”); McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 532 (Wyo.2000) (recognizing step transaction doctrine whereby courts must consider all steps of transaction in light of entire transaction so that substance of transaction will control over form of each step",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrefusal was not triggered.” Id. at 408. The same is true of the transfer of the Share from the Partnership to the LLC. There was no meaningful change in control of the property. There was no desire to sell, no bona fide offer or purchase, nor were there any terms of sale of any kind. Simply put, the transfer did not invoke the right of first refusal provision. This conclusion is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Creque v. Texaco Antilles Ltd., 409 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir.2005) (“A right of first refusal to purchase real property is not triggered by the mere conveyance of that property. Only when the conveyance is marked by arms’ length dealing and a change in control of the property may that right be exercised.”); McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 532 (Wyo.2000) (holding that when determining the proper amount for a burdened property that was purchased in a package only two methods suggest themselves as arguably appropriate 1 a determination of the fair market value of the property burdened by the right of first refusal or 2 a determination of the portion of the purchase price which based on the percentage of the fair market value of the entire package represented by the property burdened by the right of first refusal should be allocated to the property burdened by the right of first refusal",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrefusal was not triggered.” Id. at 408. The same is true of the transfer of the Share from the Partnership to the LLC. There was no meaningful change in control of the property. There was no desire to sell, no bona fide offer or purchase, nor were there any terms of sale of any kind. Simply put, the transfer did not invoke the right of first refusal provision. This conclusion is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Creque v. Texaco Antilles Ltd., 409 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir.2005) (“A right of first refusal to purchase real property is not triggered by the mere conveyance of that property. Only when the conveyance is marked by arms’ length dealing and a change in control of the property may that right be exercised.”); McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 532 (Wyo.2000) (holding that transfer of property from an individual to a corporation wholly owned by the same individual was not a sale triggering a right of first refusal",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nrefusal was not triggered.” Id. at 408. The same is true of the transfer of the Share from the Partnership to the LLC. There was no meaningful change in control of the property. There was no desire to sell, no bona fide offer or purchase, nor were there any terms of sale of any kind. Simply put, the transfer did not invoke the right of first refusal provision. This conclusion is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Creque v. Texaco Antilles Ltd., 409 F.3d 150, 155 (3d Cir.2005) (“A right of first refusal to purchase real property is not triggered by the mere conveyance of that property. Only when the conveyance is marked by arms’ length dealing and a change in control of the property may that right be exercised.”); McGuire v. Lowery, 2 P.3d 527, 532 (Wyo.2000) (holding that for a transaction to constitute a sale and trigger a first right of refusal it must involve an armslength transaction resulting in an actual change in control of the burdened property rather than simply moving it from the individual owners to an entity controlled by them"
] | ); Wallasey Tenants Ass’n v. Varner, 892 A.2d | 4 |
840 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis that any person — may it be a parent, school system employee, or concerned citizen while on school premises or a school bus — who dares to speak critically to school officials at any time in the presence of minors must leave the premises when so ordered by a school official or face arrest and prosecution for a misdemeanor. Though the statute ostensibly only criminalizes the speech after the speaker refuses to leave school premises, the result is the same: the speaker is silenced, either through his or her absence on the school premises or school bus or through subsequent prosecution, based on the content of his or her speech, be it at a high school football game or a parent-teacher conference. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (109 SCt 2746, 105 LE2d 661) (1989) (holding that even in a public forum the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time place or manner of protected speech provided the restrictions are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis that any person — may it be a parent, school system employee, or concerned citizen while on school premises or a school bus — who dares to speak critically to school officials at any time in the presence of minors must leave the premises when so ordered by a school official or face arrest and prosecution for a misdemeanor. Though the statute ostensibly only criminalizes the speech after the speaker refuses to leave school premises, the result is the same: the speaker is silenced, either through his or her absence on the school premises or school bus or through subsequent prosecution, based on the content of his or her speech, be it at a high school football game or a parent-teacher conference. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (109 SCt 2746, 105 LE2d 661) (1989) (recognizing that time place and manner restrictions must be content neutral",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis that any person — may it be a parent, school system employee, or concerned citizen while on school premises or a school bus — who dares to speak critically to school officials at any time in the presence of minors must leave the premises when so ordered by a school official or face arrest and prosecution for a misdemeanor. Though the statute ostensibly only criminalizes the speech after the speaker refuses to leave school premises, the result is the same: the speaker is silenced, either through his or her absence on the school premises or school bus or through subsequent prosecution, based on the content of his or her speech, be it at a high school football game or a parent-teacher conference. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (109 SCt 2746, 105 LE2d 661) (1989) (holding that a quick look analysis was inappropriate for restrictions imposed by professional association of dentists on member advertising where the likelihood of noncompetitive effects of restrictions were not obvious and restrictions could plausibly be thought to have procompetitive effect on competition",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis that any person — may it be a parent, school system employee, or concerned citizen while on school premises or a school bus — who dares to speak critically to school officials at any time in the presence of minors must leave the premises when so ordered by a school official or face arrest and prosecution for a misdemeanor. Though the statute ostensibly only criminalizes the speech after the speaker refuses to leave school premises, the result is the same: the speaker is silenced, either through his or her absence on the school premises or school bus or through subsequent prosecution, based on the content of his or her speech, be it at a high school football game or a parent-teacher conference. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (109 SCt 2746, 105 LE2d 661) (1989) (holding restrictions embodied in content neutral statute must be narrowly tailored to serve significant government interest while leaving open sufficient alternative channels of communication",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nis that any person — may it be a parent, school system employee, or concerned citizen while on school premises or a school bus — who dares to speak critically to school officials at any time in the presence of minors must leave the premises when so ordered by a school official or face arrest and prosecution for a misdemeanor. Though the statute ostensibly only criminalizes the speech after the speaker refuses to leave school premises, the result is the same: the speaker is silenced, either through his or her absence on the school premises or school bus or through subsequent prosecution, based on the content of his or her speech, be it at a high school football game or a parent-teacher conference. Cf. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781 (109 SCt 2746, 105 LE2d 661) (1989) (recognizing prudential concerns underlying antitrust standing restrictions"
] | ). Decided October 31, 2016. Jason R. Clark; | 1 |
841 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAbility to Perform, Job With or Without Accommodation Gil claims that in spite of his impaired vision, “he was at all times during his employment with Vortex, able to perform the essential functions of his job.” Compl. ¶ 46. Vortex does not dispute this assertion, but argues that Gil’s discrimination claims must fail because he never requested an accommodation for his impairment. See Culhane v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 69 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 2007 WL 1630093, at *7 (Mass.App.Ct. June 6, 2007) (affirming dismissal of a claim at the summary judgment stage where “[t]he accommodations the plaintiff asserts should have been provided were ... never requested or even suggested by the plaintiff’). See also Otolo v. Middlesex Sheriff's Office, 2007 WL 4248122, at *4 (Mass.Super. Nov. 14, 2007) (holding that an employer is not liable where it takes reasonable steps to provide an accommodation and the employee is responsible for a breakdown in the process of identifying a reasonable accommodation",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAbility to Perform, Job With or Without Accommodation Gil claims that in spite of his impaired vision, “he was at all times during his employment with Vortex, able to perform the essential functions of his job.” Compl. ¶ 46. Vortex does not dispute this assertion, but argues that Gil’s discrimination claims must fail because he never requested an accommodation for his impairment. See Culhane v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 69 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 2007 WL 1630093, at *7 (Mass.App.Ct. June 6, 2007) (affirming dismissal of a claim at the summary judgment stage where “[t]he accommodations the plaintiff asserts should have been provided were ... never requested or even suggested by the plaintiff’). See also Otolo v. Middlesex Sheriff's Office, 2007 WL 4248122, at *4 (Mass.Super. Nov. 14, 2007) (holding that a person must request a reasonable accommodation before he has been terminated he cannot wait until he is terminated and then months later request reinstatement and demand a reasonable accommodation",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAbility to Perform, Job With or Without Accommodation Gil claims that in spite of his impaired vision, “he was at all times during his employment with Vortex, able to perform the essential functions of his job.” Compl. ¶ 46. Vortex does not dispute this assertion, but argues that Gil’s discrimination claims must fail because he never requested an accommodation for his impairment. See Culhane v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 69 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 2007 WL 1630093, at *7 (Mass.App.Ct. June 6, 2007) (affirming dismissal of a claim at the summary judgment stage where “[t]he accommodations the plaintiff asserts should have been provided were ... never requested or even suggested by the plaintiff’). See also Otolo v. Middlesex Sheriff's Office, 2007 WL 4248122, at *4 (Mass.Super. Nov. 14, 2007) (holding that teachers request for four months leave was not a reasonable accommodation",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAbility to Perform, Job With or Without Accommodation Gil claims that in spite of his impaired vision, “he was at all times during his employment with Vortex, able to perform the essential functions of his job.” Compl. ¶ 46. Vortex does not dispute this assertion, but argues that Gil’s discrimination claims must fail because he never requested an accommodation for his impairment. See Culhane v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 69 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 2007 WL 1630093, at *7 (Mass.App.Ct. June 6, 2007) (affirming dismissal of a claim at the summary judgment stage where “[t]he accommodations the plaintiff asserts should have been provided were ... never requested or even suggested by the plaintiff’). See also Otolo v. Middlesex Sheriff's Office, 2007 WL 4248122, at *4 (Mass.Super. Nov. 14, 2007) (holding failure to immediately approve request for accommodation even for employee with known disability did not constitute denial of reasonable accommodation where employer was working on solution over several months",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAbility to Perform, Job With or Without Accommodation Gil claims that in spite of his impaired vision, “he was at all times during his employment with Vortex, able to perform the essential functions of his job.” Compl. ¶ 46. Vortex does not dispute this assertion, but argues that Gil’s discrimination claims must fail because he never requested an accommodation for his impairment. See Culhane v. Baystate Med. Ctr., Inc., 69 Mass.App.Ct. 1106, 2007 WL 1630093, at *7 (Mass.App.Ct. June 6, 2007) (affirming dismissal of a claim at the summary judgment stage where “[t]he accommodations the plaintiff asserts should have been provided were ... never requested or even suggested by the plaintiff’). See also Otolo v. Middlesex Sheriff's Office, 2007 WL 4248122, at *4 (Mass.Super. Nov. 14, 2007) (holding that the disabled individual bears the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and showing that that accommodation is objectively reasonable and that the defendant was entitled to prevail because the plaintiffs proposed accommodation of remaining on unpaid medical leave until another customer service or receptionist position opened up was not a reasonable accommodation under the ada"
] | ). Gil responds “that there is no need for [him] | 1 |
842 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe trial court is properly presented to this Court. Because we find the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction with respect to the permanent injunction and the order was interlocutory with respect to the preliminary injunction, we vacate in part and remand in part for further proceedings. I. Permanent Injunction “A permanent injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy and may only properly issue after a full consideration of the merits of a case.” Shishko v. Whitley, 64 N.C. App. 668, 671, 308 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1983). “A judge conducting a hearing to determine whether a temporary restraining order should be continued as a preliminary injunction . . . has no jurisdiction to determine a controversy on its merits.” Everette v. Taylor, 77 N.C. App. 442, 444, 335 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1985) (holding it was error for the court to issue a permanent injunction at a hearing to show cause why a temporary restraining order should not be continued via a preliminary injunction",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe trial court is properly presented to this Court. Because we find the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction with respect to the permanent injunction and the order was interlocutory with respect to the preliminary injunction, we vacate in part and remand in part for further proceedings. I. Permanent Injunction “A permanent injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy and may only properly issue after a full consideration of the merits of a case.” Shishko v. Whitley, 64 N.C. App. 668, 671, 308 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1983). “A judge conducting a hearing to determine whether a temporary restraining order should be continued as a preliminary injunction . . . has no jurisdiction to determine a controversy on its merits.” Everette v. Taylor, 77 N.C. App. 442, 444, 335 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1985) (holding that plaintiffs were not entitled to a preliminary injunction",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe trial court is properly presented to this Court. Because we find the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction with respect to the permanent injunction and the order was interlocutory with respect to the preliminary injunction, we vacate in part and remand in part for further proceedings. I. Permanent Injunction “A permanent injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy and may only properly issue after a full consideration of the merits of a case.” Shishko v. Whitley, 64 N.C. App. 668, 671, 308 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1983). “A judge conducting a hearing to determine whether a temporary restraining order should be continued as a preliminary injunction . . . has no jurisdiction to determine a controversy on its merits.” Everette v. Taylor, 77 N.C. App. 442, 444, 335 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1985) (holding that the standard for permanent injunction is the same as that for preliminary injunction with the one exception being that the plaintiff must show actual success on the merits rather than likelihood of success",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe trial court is properly presented to this Court. Because we find the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction with respect to the permanent injunction and the order was interlocutory with respect to the preliminary injunction, we vacate in part and remand in part for further proceedings. I. Permanent Injunction “A permanent injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy and may only properly issue after a full consideration of the merits of a case.” Shishko v. Whitley, 64 N.C. App. 668, 671, 308 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1983). “A judge conducting a hearing to determine whether a temporary restraining order should be continued as a preliminary injunction . . . has no jurisdiction to determine a controversy on its merits.” Everette v. Taylor, 77 N.C. App. 442, 444, 335 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1985) (holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nthe trial court is properly presented to this Court. Because we find the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction with respect to the permanent injunction and the order was interlocutory with respect to the preliminary injunction, we vacate in part and remand in part for further proceedings. I. Permanent Injunction “A permanent injunction is an extraordinary equitable remedy and may only properly issue after a full consideration of the merits of a case.” Shishko v. Whitley, 64 N.C. App. 668, 671, 308 S.E.2d 448, 450 (1983). “A judge conducting a hearing to determine whether a temporary restraining order should be continued as a preliminary injunction . . . has no jurisdiction to determine a controversy on its merits.” Everette v. Taylor, 77 N.C. App. 442, 444, 335 S.E.2d 212, 214 (1985) (holding that a hearing must be held to determine credibility in preliminary injunction cases"
] | ). “[Where] the judgment entered [is] beyond the | 0 |
843 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.\" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The narrowest ground for the court's disposition in Williams is that of the lead opinion and Justice Thomas: the subject report was not testimonial. But, as the Arizona Supreme Court recently explained, the plurality's 'primary purpose' test nor Justice Thomas's solemnity standard can be deemed a subset of the other; therefore, there is no binding rule for determining when reports are testimonial.\" State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 306 P.3d 48, 63 (2013) (citing United States v. Alcon Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir.2003) (holding an issue not preserved when one ground is raised to the trial court and another ground is raised on appeal",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.\" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The narrowest ground for the court's disposition in Williams is that of the lead opinion and Justice Thomas: the subject report was not testimonial. But, as the Arizona Supreme Court recently explained, the plurality's 'primary purpose' test nor Justice Thomas's solemnity standard can be deemed a subset of the other; therefore, there is no binding rule for determining when reports are testimonial.\" State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 306 P.3d 48, 63 (2013) (citing United States v. Alcon Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that animal husbandry operations were included in the definition of farm even if the animals do not touch the ground graze on the land or feed from crops grown on the land and holding that land used to support buildings used in the production of agricultural products is a productive use of the land",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.\" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The narrowest ground for the court's disposition in Williams is that of the lead opinion and Justice Thomas: the subject report was not testimonial. But, as the Arizona Supreme Court recently explained, the plurality's 'primary purpose' test nor Justice Thomas's solemnity standard can be deemed a subset of the other; therefore, there is no binding rule for determining when reports are testimonial.\" State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 306 P.3d 48, 63 (2013) (citing United States v. Alcon Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that there is no first amendment or common law right of access to documents which played no role in a judicial decision",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.\" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The narrowest ground for the court's disposition in Williams is that of the lead opinion and Justice Thomas: the subject report was not testimonial. But, as the Arizona Supreme Court recently explained, the plurality's 'primary purpose' test nor Justice Thomas's solemnity standard can be deemed a subset of the other; therefore, there is no binding rule for determining when reports are testimonial.\" State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 306 P.3d 48, 63 (2013) (citing United States v. Alcon Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that when no single standard legitimately constitutes the narrowest ground for a decision on that issue there is then no law of the land",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof the Court may be viewed as the position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.\" Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193, 97 S.Ct. 990, 993, 51 L.Ed.2d 260 (1977) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The narrowest ground for the court's disposition in Williams is that of the lead opinion and Justice Thomas: the subject report was not testimonial. But, as the Arizona Supreme Court recently explained, the plurality's 'primary purpose' test nor Justice Thomas's solemnity standard can be deemed a subset of the other; therefore, there is no binding rule for determining when reports are testimonial.\" State v. Medina, 232 Ariz. 391, 306 P.3d 48, 63 (2013) (citing United States v. Alcon Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir.2003) (holding that the deed and not the historical description of the land determines what land constitutes the forfeitable property"
] | ). We agree, and apply Williams accordingly. [¶ | 3 |
844 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbut seeks a review and reversal of the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment. But see In re Rodriquez, 258 F.3d at 759 (finding the appeal moot because the appellant was challenging the sale of property from the bankruptcy estate where there was no stay pending appeal); Wintz, 219 F.3d at 812 (finding the appeal moot because the appellants failed to obtain a stay pending appeal and thus were barred from attempting to overturn the sale of the property from the bankruptcy estate). In the final analysis, though, this panel cannot provide relief. If we were to rule in favor of Appellant on the summary judgment issue, Appellant could perhaps seek money damages from the proceeds of the sale received by the bankruptcy estate. See In re Popkin & Stem, 223 F.3d 764, 766 n. 2 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that exhaustion is required under the plra even if the plaintiff seeks only money damages and money damages are not available as relief",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbut seeks a review and reversal of the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment. But see In re Rodriquez, 258 F.3d at 759 (finding the appeal moot because the appellant was challenging the sale of property from the bankruptcy estate where there was no stay pending appeal); Wintz, 219 F.3d at 812 (finding the appeal moot because the appellants failed to obtain a stay pending appeal and thus were barred from attempting to overturn the sale of the property from the bankruptcy estate). In the final analysis, though, this panel cannot provide relief. If we were to rule in favor of Appellant on the summary judgment issue, Appellant could perhaps seek money damages from the proceeds of the sale received by the bankruptcy estate. See In re Popkin & Stem, 223 F.3d 764, 766 n. 2 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that the loss of trade secrets cannot be measured in money damages",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbut seeks a review and reversal of the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment. But see In re Rodriquez, 258 F.3d at 759 (finding the appeal moot because the appellant was challenging the sale of property from the bankruptcy estate where there was no stay pending appeal); Wintz, 219 F.3d at 812 (finding the appeal moot because the appellants failed to obtain a stay pending appeal and thus were barred from attempting to overturn the sale of the property from the bankruptcy estate). In the final analysis, though, this panel cannot provide relief. If we were to rule in favor of Appellant on the summary judgment issue, Appellant could perhaps seek money damages from the proceeds of the sale received by the bankruptcy estate. See In re Popkin & Stem, 223 F.3d 764, 766 n. 2 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that even if the sale cannot be undone nor property specifically awarded parties may still receive money damages for their loss",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbut seeks a review and reversal of the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment. But see In re Rodriquez, 258 F.3d at 759 (finding the appeal moot because the appellant was challenging the sale of property from the bankruptcy estate where there was no stay pending appeal); Wintz, 219 F.3d at 812 (finding the appeal moot because the appellants failed to obtain a stay pending appeal and thus were barred from attempting to overturn the sale of the property from the bankruptcy estate). In the final analysis, though, this panel cannot provide relief. If we were to rule in favor of Appellant on the summary judgment issue, Appellant could perhaps seek money damages from the proceeds of the sale received by the bankruptcy estate. See In re Popkin & Stem, 223 F.3d 764, 766 n. 2 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that attorneys fees may be awarded against a public official even when the official is immune from money damages",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nbut seeks a review and reversal of the bankruptcy court’s summary judgment. But see In re Rodriquez, 258 F.3d at 759 (finding the appeal moot because the appellant was challenging the sale of property from the bankruptcy estate where there was no stay pending appeal); Wintz, 219 F.3d at 812 (finding the appeal moot because the appellants failed to obtain a stay pending appeal and thus were barred from attempting to overturn the sale of the property from the bankruptcy estate). In the final analysis, though, this panel cannot provide relief. If we were to rule in favor of Appellant on the summary judgment issue, Appellant could perhaps seek money damages from the proceeds of the sale received by the bankruptcy estate. See In re Popkin & Stem, 223 F.3d 764, 766 n. 2 (8th Cir.2000) (holding that the loss of money from a bank account does not constitute irreparable harm because that loss can be compensat ed by money damages"
] | ). However, obtaining money damages equal to the | 2 |
845 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndirection and discretion of the child's parents.\"); of CCRS, 892 P.2d at 258 (comparing cases from other jurisdictions, in which babysitters or temporary caregivers were determined not to have \"physical custody\" of a child, with case of the prospective adoptive parents at issue, who had total care of the child with the intention that they would ultimately adopt the child). 110 Accordingly, when determining whether a nonparent, who shares physical care of a child with a parent, has standing under section 14-10-123(1)(c), a court considers the nature, frequency, and duration of the contacts between the child and nonparent and between the child and parent. See .S., 264 P.3d at 625; LF., 121 P.3d at 270; In re V.R.P.F., 989 P.2d 512, 514 (Colo.App.1997); see also E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 554 (holding that the requisites for in loco parentis status are the actual care and custody of a child by a nonparent who assumes parental duties because the parent generally due to his or her absence is unable or unwilling to care for the child",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndirection and discretion of the child's parents.\"); of CCRS, 892 P.2d at 258 (comparing cases from other jurisdictions, in which babysitters or temporary caregivers were determined not to have \"physical custody\" of a child, with case of the prospective adoptive parents at issue, who had total care of the child with the intention that they would ultimately adopt the child). 110 Accordingly, when determining whether a nonparent, who shares physical care of a child with a parent, has standing under section 14-10-123(1)(c), a court considers the nature, frequency, and duration of the contacts between the child and nonparent and between the child and parent. See .S., 264 P.3d at 625; LF., 121 P.3d at 270; In re V.R.P.F., 989 P.2d 512, 514 (Colo.App.1997); see also E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 554 (recognizing the existence of the special relationship",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndirection and discretion of the child's parents.\"); of CCRS, 892 P.2d at 258 (comparing cases from other jurisdictions, in which babysitters or temporary caregivers were determined not to have \"physical custody\" of a child, with case of the prospective adoptive parents at issue, who had total care of the child with the intention that they would ultimately adopt the child). 110 Accordingly, when determining whether a nonparent, who shares physical care of a child with a parent, has standing under section 14-10-123(1)(c), a court considers the nature, frequency, and duration of the contacts between the child and nonparent and between the child and parent. See .S., 264 P.3d at 625; LF., 121 P.3d at 270; In re V.R.P.F., 989 P.2d 512, 514 (Colo.App.1997); see also E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 554 (holding that the modification order itself must be signed before the child turns eighteen",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndirection and discretion of the child's parents.\"); of CCRS, 892 P.2d at 258 (comparing cases from other jurisdictions, in which babysitters or temporary caregivers were determined not to have \"physical custody\" of a child, with case of the prospective adoptive parents at issue, who had total care of the child with the intention that they would ultimately adopt the child). 110 Accordingly, when determining whether a nonparent, who shares physical care of a child with a parent, has standing under section 14-10-123(1)(c), a court considers the nature, frequency, and duration of the contacts between the child and nonparent and between the child and parent. See .S., 264 P.3d at 625; LF., 121 P.3d at 270; In re V.R.P.F., 989 P.2d 512, 514 (Colo.App.1997); see also E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 554 (holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndirection and discretion of the child's parents.\"); of CCRS, 892 P.2d at 258 (comparing cases from other jurisdictions, in which babysitters or temporary caregivers were determined not to have \"physical custody\" of a child, with case of the prospective adoptive parents at issue, who had total care of the child with the intention that they would ultimately adopt the child). 110 Accordingly, when determining whether a nonparent, who shares physical care of a child with a parent, has standing under section 14-10-123(1)(c), a court considers the nature, frequency, and duration of the contacts between the child and nonparent and between the child and parent. See .S., 264 P.3d at 625; LF., 121 P.3d at 270; In re V.R.P.F., 989 P.2d 512, 514 (Colo.App.1997); see also E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 554 (recognizing that nonparent standing turns on the quality of the relationship between the nonparent and the child"
] | ). { 11 For example, in EZ.L.M.C., the partner | 4 |
846 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAlthough public policy arguments are not resolved by juries, they require that the court understand what happened to a plaintiff, a question only answered after a. judge has heard evidence detailing the circumstances that resulted in an injury. See Lodge, 246 Conn. at 578, 717 A.2d 215 (resolving public policy question after trial); Jaworski, 241 Conn. at 408, 696 A.2d 332 (same). To address public policy for the first time at this stage in the litigation deprives the Munns of the opportunity to rebut Hotch-kiss’s version of events. How, for example, could the Munns have known that they needed to offer evidence of “the normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review”? Even if Hotchkiss had adequately preserved its argument, however, it should not be excused from (holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAlthough public policy arguments are not resolved by juries, they require that the court understand what happened to a plaintiff, a question only answered after a. judge has heard evidence detailing the circumstances that resulted in an injury. See Lodge, 246 Conn. at 578, 717 A.2d 215 (resolving public policy question after trial); Jaworski, 241 Conn. at 408, 696 A.2d 332 (same). To address public policy for the first time at this stage in the litigation deprives the Munns of the opportunity to rebut Hotch-kiss’s version of events. How, for example, could the Munns have known that they needed to offer evidence of “the normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review”? Even if Hotchkiss had adequately preserved its argument, however, it should not be excused from (holding that new yorks public policy does not bar insurance coverage for disparate impact employment discrimination but noting that the state of new york insurance department has stated that it is against public policy to provide insurance coverage for intentional acts of discrimination",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAlthough public policy arguments are not resolved by juries, they require that the court understand what happened to a plaintiff, a question only answered after a. judge has heard evidence detailing the circumstances that resulted in an injury. See Lodge, 246 Conn. at 578, 717 A.2d 215 (resolving public policy question after trial); Jaworski, 241 Conn. at 408, 696 A.2d 332 (same). To address public policy for the first time at this stage in the litigation deprives the Munns of the opportunity to rebut Hotch-kiss’s version of events. How, for example, could the Munns have known that they needed to offer evidence of “the normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review”? Even if Hotchkiss had adequately preserved its argument, however, it should not be excused from (holding first that tortfeasor could have foreseen that victims employers insurance premiums might increase and then deciding that public policy precluded liability for those increases",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAlthough public policy arguments are not resolved by juries, they require that the court understand what happened to a plaintiff, a question only answered after a. judge has heard evidence detailing the circumstances that resulted in an injury. See Lodge, 246 Conn. at 578, 717 A.2d 215 (resolving public policy question after trial); Jaworski, 241 Conn. at 408, 696 A.2d 332 (same). To address public policy for the first time at this stage in the litigation deprives the Munns of the opportunity to rebut Hotch-kiss’s version of events. How, for example, could the Munns have known that they needed to offer evidence of “the normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review”? Even if Hotchkiss had adequately preserved its argument, however, it should not be excused from (holding first that injuries sustained during contact sports were foreseeable then deciding that public policy insulated the defendant from liability for those injuries",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAlthough public policy arguments are not resolved by juries, they require that the court understand what happened to a plaintiff, a question only answered after a. judge has heard evidence detailing the circumstances that resulted in an injury. See Lodge, 246 Conn. at 578, 717 A.2d 215 (resolving public policy question after trial); Jaworski, 241 Conn. at 408, 696 A.2d 332 (same). To address public policy for the first time at this stage in the litigation deprives the Munns of the opportunity to rebut Hotch-kiss’s version of events. How, for example, could the Munns have known that they needed to offer evidence of “the normal expectations of the participants in the activity under review”? Even if Hotchkiss had adequately preserved its argument, however, it should not be excused from (holding that a standard employers liability policy is not an ocean marine policy"
] | ). There is no public policy exemption | 2 |
847 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhen a complaint seeking review of governmental action is combined with one or more counts alleging causes of action that are independent of the court’s review of the governmental action, the court will be called upon to act in two distinct capacities — as an appellate court and as a trial court. Because of the distinction in the nature of the claims, the procedure for resolution of the claims will differ as well. Thus, the rules require that the party filing a combined complaint must immediately seek an order from the court specifying the future course of the proceedings in order, to avoid confusion in the processing of the complaint. See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(i). The motion must be filed within ten days after the filing of the complaint. See id. [¶ 15] 98 ME 71, ¶ 9, 708 A.2d 1027, 1030 (holding that delay is waived when the defendant makes dilatory pleadings and motions",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhen a complaint seeking review of governmental action is combined with one or more counts alleging causes of action that are independent of the court’s review of the governmental action, the court will be called upon to act in two distinct capacities — as an appellate court and as a trial court. Because of the distinction in the nature of the claims, the procedure for resolution of the claims will differ as well. Thus, the rules require that the party filing a combined complaint must immediately seek an order from the court specifying the future course of the proceedings in order, to avoid confusion in the processing of the complaint. See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(i). The motion must be filed within ten days after the filing of the complaint. See id. [¶ 15] 98 ME 71, ¶ 9, 708 A.2d 1027, 1030 (holding sanctions were appropriate due to prejudice imposed on other party from failure to disclose subject matter of expert testimony",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhen a complaint seeking review of governmental action is combined with one or more counts alleging causes of action that are independent of the court’s review of the governmental action, the court will be called upon to act in two distinct capacities — as an appellate court and as a trial court. Because of the distinction in the nature of the claims, the procedure for resolution of the claims will differ as well. Thus, the rules require that the party filing a combined complaint must immediately seek an order from the court specifying the future course of the proceedings in order, to avoid confusion in the processing of the complaint. See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(i). The motion must be filed within ten days after the filing of the complaint. See id. [¶ 15] 98 ME 71, ¶ 9, 708 A.2d 1027, 1030 (holding sanctions were appropriate when the party had no reasonable justification for his repeated failures to designate an expert",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhen a complaint seeking review of governmental action is combined with one or more counts alleging causes of action that are independent of the court’s review of the governmental action, the court will be called upon to act in two distinct capacities — as an appellate court and as a trial court. Because of the distinction in the nature of the claims, the procedure for resolution of the claims will differ as well. Thus, the rules require that the party filing a combined complaint must immediately seek an order from the court specifying the future course of the proceedings in order, to avoid confusion in the processing of the complaint. See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(i). The motion must be filed within ten days after the filing of the complaint. See id. [¶ 15] 98 ME 71, ¶ 9, 708 A.2d 1027, 1030 (holding sanctions were appropriate when excessive responsive pleadings were filed for purposes of delay",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nWhen a complaint seeking review of governmental action is combined with one or more counts alleging causes of action that are independent of the court’s review of the governmental action, the court will be called upon to act in two distinct capacities — as an appellate court and as a trial court. Because of the distinction in the nature of the claims, the procedure for resolution of the claims will differ as well. Thus, the rules require that the party filing a combined complaint must immediately seek an order from the court specifying the future course of the proceedings in order, to avoid confusion in the processing of the complaint. See M.R. Civ. P. 80B(i). The motion must be filed within ten days after the filing of the complaint. See id. [¶ 15] 98 ME 71, ¶ 9, 708 A.2d 1027, 1030 (holding sanctions were appropriate where party filed motions merely for purposes of delay"
] | ); Saucier, 1998 ME 61, ¶ 6, 708 A.2d at 283 | 3 |
848 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nviolated the Ind. Rules of Professional Conduct and is against public policy. Finally, Appellants argue that, even if only the March 2002 event is covered by the Engagemen f the Farm Account in 1997 and the distribution to Beverly and termination of the Irrevocable Trust in February 1998 are related in any way to the sale of property held by Vernon’s Trust on March 14, 2002. From the amended complaint and the parties’ descriptions of the events, the three events appear to be completely separate allegations of malpractice. Consequently, the alleged arbitrable issue is separable from the nonarbitrable issues, and both arbitration and the litigation can proceed at the same time. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1241, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) (holding that the federal arbitration act requires district courts to compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nviolated the Ind. Rules of Professional Conduct and is against public policy. Finally, Appellants argue that, even if only the March 2002 event is covered by the Engagemen f the Farm Account in 1997 and the distribution to Beverly and termination of the Irrevocable Trust in February 1998 are related in any way to the sale of property held by Vernon’s Trust on March 14, 2002. From the amended complaint and the parties’ descriptions of the events, the three events appear to be completely separate allegations of malpractice. Consequently, the alleged arbitrable issue is separable from the nonarbitrable issues, and both arbitration and the litigation can proceed at the same time. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1241, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) (holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nviolated the Ind. Rules of Professional Conduct and is against public policy. Finally, Appellants argue that, even if only the March 2002 event is covered by the Engagemen f the Farm Account in 1997 and the distribution to Beverly and termination of the Irrevocable Trust in February 1998 are related in any way to the sale of property held by Vernon’s Trust on March 14, 2002. From the amended complaint and the parties’ descriptions of the events, the three events appear to be completely separate allegations of malpractice. Consequently, the alleged arbitrable issue is separable from the nonarbitrable issues, and both arbitration and the litigation can proceed at the same time. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1241, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) (holding that rookerfeldman precludes jurisdiction over a federal lawsuit to compel arbitration under the federal arbitration act because the action was inextricably intertwined with the plaintiffs failed statelaw action to compel arbitration under the louisiana arbitration act",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nviolated the Ind. Rules of Professional Conduct and is against public policy. Finally, Appellants argue that, even if only the March 2002 event is covered by the Engagemen f the Farm Account in 1997 and the distribution to Beverly and termination of the Irrevocable Trust in February 1998 are related in any way to the sale of property held by Vernon’s Trust on March 14, 2002. From the amended complaint and the parties’ descriptions of the events, the three events appear to be completely separate allegations of malpractice. Consequently, the alleged arbitrable issue is separable from the nonarbitrable issues, and both arbitration and the litigation can proceed at the same time. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1241, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) (holding that district courts are required to compel arbitration of claims subject to arbitration clause even if the result is piecemeal litigation",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nviolated the Ind. Rules of Professional Conduct and is against public policy. Finally, Appellants argue that, even if only the March 2002 event is covered by the Engagemen f the Farm Account in 1997 and the distribution to Beverly and termination of the Irrevocable Trust in February 1998 are related in any way to the sale of property held by Vernon’s Trust on March 14, 2002. From the amended complaint and the parties’ descriptions of the events, the three events appear to be completely separate allegations of malpractice. Consequently, the alleged arbitrable issue is separable from the nonarbitrable issues, and both arbitration and the litigation can proceed at the same time. See, e.g., Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 218, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 1241, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985) (holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration"
] | ). For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part | 0 |
849 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhelp establish the existence of an unconstitutional practice or custom — cannot be readily deduced from simply reading the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4. See Model Instruction 9.4 (“ ‘Practice or custom’ means any permanent, widespread, well-settled practice or custom that constitutes a standard operating procedure of the defendant.”); see also Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1067 (observing that “juries are not clairvoyant” and will not know to follow a particular legal principle “unless they are told to do so”). Accordingly, in the context of this case the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4 was “an incomplete, and therefore incorrect, statement of the law.” Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1066; see also Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that if jury instructions viewed as a whole fairly state the applicable law to the jury the failure to give particular instructions will not be error",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhelp establish the existence of an unconstitutional practice or custom — cannot be readily deduced from simply reading the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4. See Model Instruction 9.4 (“ ‘Practice or custom’ means any permanent, widespread, well-settled practice or custom that constitutes a standard operating procedure of the defendant.”); see also Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1067 (observing that “juries are not clairvoyant” and will not know to follow a particular legal principle “unless they are told to do so”). Accordingly, in the context of this case the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4 was “an incomplete, and therefore incorrect, statement of the law.” Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1066; see also Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that a jury is presumed to follow the trial courts instructions",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhelp establish the existence of an unconstitutional practice or custom — cannot be readily deduced from simply reading the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4. See Model Instruction 9.4 (“ ‘Practice or custom’ means any permanent, widespread, well-settled practice or custom that constitutes a standard operating procedure of the defendant.”); see also Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1067 (observing that “juries are not clairvoyant” and will not know to follow a particular legal principle “unless they are told to do so”). Accordingly, in the context of this case the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4 was “an incomplete, and therefore incorrect, statement of the law.” Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1066; see also Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that the ninth circuit erred because the state appellate courts conclusion that one incorrect statement in jury instructions did not render the instructions likely to mislead the jury was not unreasonable",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhelp establish the existence of an unconstitutional practice or custom — cannot be readily deduced from simply reading the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4. See Model Instruction 9.4 (“ ‘Practice or custom’ means any permanent, widespread, well-settled practice or custom that constitutes a standard operating procedure of the defendant.”); see also Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1067 (observing that “juries are not clairvoyant” and will not know to follow a particular legal principle “unless they are told to do so”). Accordingly, in the context of this case the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4 was “an incomplete, and therefore incorrect, statement of the law.” Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1066; see also Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that jury instructions must allow the jury to determine the issues presented intelligently",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nhelp establish the existence of an unconstitutional practice or custom — cannot be readily deduced from simply reading the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4. See Model Instruction 9.4 (“ ‘Practice or custom’ means any permanent, widespread, well-settled practice or custom that constitutes a standard operating procedure of the defendant.”); see also Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1067 (observing that “juries are not clairvoyant” and will not know to follow a particular legal principle “unless they are told to do so”). Accordingly, in the context of this case the definition of practice or custom in Model Instruction 9.4 was “an incomplete, and therefore incorrect, statement of the law.” Norwood, 591 F.3d at 1066; see also Fikes v. Cleghorn, 47 F.3d 1011, 1013 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that district court did not abuse its discretion in giving jury instructions that taken together fairly and adequately conveyed the issues to the jury"
] | ). Further, by stating that a practice or custom | 3 |
850 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddress was defendant’s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father’s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant’s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant’s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996). 5 . Although we do not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee’s behalf, we note that Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F) provides, \"No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him.” \"In evaluating pp.2000) (holding that the court cannot conclude that failure of service resulted from defendants rejection of delivery where letters sent to defendant were returned stating unclaimed and not at this address",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddress was defendant’s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father’s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant’s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant’s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996). 5 . Although we do not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee’s behalf, we note that Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F) provides, \"No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him.” \"In evaluating pp.2000) (holding that rule 415f worked to cure deficiencies in service of process in action to enforce a judgment lien on real estate where service was provided at debtors last residential address known to lienholder because address was used during underlying lawsuit lienholders attorney checked county record to verify address information debtor did receive summons and residential address was on the former situs of debtors business",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddress was defendant’s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father’s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant’s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant’s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996). 5 . Although we do not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee’s behalf, we note that Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F) provides, \"No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him.” \"In evaluating pp.2000) (holding that trial rule 415f will not cure defective service of process where no person authorized by the rules was actually served",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddress was defendant’s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father’s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant’s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant’s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996). 5 . Although we do not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee’s behalf, we note that Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F) provides, \"No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him.” \"In evaluating pp.2000) (holding that service to defendants business address resulted in total failure to serve process rather than mere technical defect and thus could not be cured by rule 415f",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddress was defendant’s usual place of abode, where defendant received all his mail at father's address, listed father’s address on accident report, defendant's insurance company maintained defendant’s address as that of his father, and address listed on defendant’s driver's license was that of his father both at time service was attempted and at time defendant sought to set aside default judgment), trans. denied (1996). 5 . Although we do not undertake the burden of developing an argument on the appellee’s behalf, we note that Indiana Trial Rule 4.15(F) provides, \"No summons or the service thereof shall be set aside or be adjudged insufficient when either is reasonably calculated to inform the person to be served that an action has been instituted against him.” \"In evaluating pp.2000) (holding while there may be some case law to support plaintiffs argument the majority approach is that the failure to attach process defect is merely procedural and that this particular procedural defect may be cured"
] | ), trans. denied. If service of process is not | 3 |
851 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto move for the exclusion of time, it argues that this failure did not contribute to the delay. Instead, the government contends that Koerber caused the delay in January 2011 by requesting (and receiving) an indefinite pretrial-motion-cutoff date. In evaluating the government’s position, we note that we later address how Koerber’s role in the trial delays might affect the STA analysis. But first we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering this 42-day period as part of the government’s “pattern of neglect” leading to the STA violation. The January 27, 2011 continuance for pretrial motions did not trigger an excludable delay in the STA clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1); Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 204, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010) (holding an excludable period under 2912074a commences on the day immediately after the filing of a defendants pretrial motion",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto move for the exclusion of time, it argues that this failure did not contribute to the delay. Instead, the government contends that Koerber caused the delay in January 2011 by requesting (and receiving) an indefinite pretrial-motion-cutoff date. In evaluating the government’s position, we note that we later address how Koerber’s role in the trial delays might affect the STA analysis. But first we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering this 42-day period as part of the government’s “pattern of neglect” leading to the STA violation. The January 27, 2011 continuance for pretrial motions did not trigger an excludable delay in the STA clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1); Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 204, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010) (holding that motion challenging pretrial detention was excludable under act",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto move for the exclusion of time, it argues that this failure did not contribute to the delay. Instead, the government contends that Koerber caused the delay in January 2011 by requesting (and receiving) an indefinite pretrial-motion-cutoff date. In evaluating the government’s position, we note that we later address how Koerber’s role in the trial delays might affect the STA analysis. But first we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering this 42-day period as part of the government’s “pattern of neglect” leading to the STA violation. The January 27, 2011 continuance for pretrial motions did not trigger an excludable delay in the STA clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1); Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 204, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010) (holding that time granted for preparing pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under 3161h1 but is excludable only after the district court enters appropriate findings under 3161h7a",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto move for the exclusion of time, it argues that this failure did not contribute to the delay. Instead, the government contends that Koerber caused the delay in January 2011 by requesting (and receiving) an indefinite pretrial-motion-cutoff date. In evaluating the government’s position, we note that we later address how Koerber’s role in the trial delays might affect the STA analysis. But first we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering this 42-day period as part of the government’s “pattern of neglect” leading to the STA violation. The January 27, 2011 continuance for pretrial motions did not trigger an excludable delay in the STA clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1); Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 204, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010) (holding that time excluded from a speedy trial clock for pretrial motion preparation is not automatically excluded under 3161h1 but may only be excluded when a court makes appropriate reasonableness findings under 3161h7",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nto move for the exclusion of time, it argues that this failure did not contribute to the delay. Instead, the government contends that Koerber caused the delay in January 2011 by requesting (and receiving) an indefinite pretrial-motion-cutoff date. In evaluating the government’s position, we note that we later address how Koerber’s role in the trial delays might affect the STA analysis. But first we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering this 42-day period as part of the government’s “pattern of neglect” leading to the STA violation. The January 27, 2011 continuance for pretrial motions did not trigger an excludable delay in the STA clock. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1); Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196, 204, 130 S.Ct. 1345, 176 L.Ed.2d 54 (2010) (holding that the time granted to prepare pretrial motions is not automatically excludable under 3161h1 but may be excluded only when a court grants a continuance based on appropriate findings under 3161h7"
] | ). In addition, “defense responsibility for | 2 |
852 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndefendants also say that the prosecution presented false evidence to the grand jury in order to secure an indictment. We have reviewed the evidence and conclude that there is no evidence to indicate that the government’s testimony and evidence before the grand jury was false. The majority of the arguments presented by the defendants go to the weight and interpretations of the evidence, instead of demonstrating actual false statements made by the government. In addition, many of the arguably false statements appear to be about information that is not material to the case. The Ninth Circuit appears to focus on the materiality of statements when analyzing whether there has been government misconduct that warrants sanctions. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.1977) (holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndefendants also say that the prosecution presented false evidence to the grand jury in order to secure an indictment. We have reviewed the evidence and conclude that there is no evidence to indicate that the government’s testimony and evidence before the grand jury was false. The majority of the arguments presented by the defendants go to the weight and interpretations of the evidence, instead of demonstrating actual false statements made by the government. In addition, many of the arguably false statements appear to be about information that is not material to the case. The Ninth Circuit appears to focus on the materiality of statements when analyzing whether there has been government misconduct that warrants sanctions. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.1977) (holding that tribal courts are not subject to the fifth amendments requirement of indictment by grand jury",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndefendants also say that the prosecution presented false evidence to the grand jury in order to secure an indictment. We have reviewed the evidence and conclude that there is no evidence to indicate that the government’s testimony and evidence before the grand jury was false. The majority of the arguments presented by the defendants go to the weight and interpretations of the evidence, instead of demonstrating actual false statements made by the government. In addition, many of the arguably false statements appear to be about information that is not material to the case. The Ninth Circuit appears to focus on the materiality of statements when analyzing whether there has been government misconduct that warrants sanctions. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.1977) (holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendants motion in arrest of judgment when the indictment lacked a material element and it was not apparent that the grand jury based the indictment on facts that satisfy this element of the crime and that the only permissible cure was to send the matter back to the grand jury",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndefendants also say that the prosecution presented false evidence to the grand jury in order to secure an indictment. We have reviewed the evidence and conclude that there is no evidence to indicate that the government’s testimony and evidence before the grand jury was false. The majority of the arguments presented by the defendants go to the weight and interpretations of the evidence, instead of demonstrating actual false statements made by the government. In addition, many of the arguably false statements appear to be about information that is not material to the case. The Ninth Circuit appears to focus on the materiality of statements when analyzing whether there has been government misconduct that warrants sanctions. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.1977) (recognizing that a constructive amendment to an indictment occurs when either the government the court or both broadens the possible bases for conviction beyond those presented by the grand jury",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\ndefendants also say that the prosecution presented false evidence to the grand jury in order to secure an indictment. We have reviewed the evidence and conclude that there is no evidence to indicate that the government’s testimony and evidence before the grand jury was false. The majority of the arguments presented by the defendants go to the weight and interpretations of the evidence, instead of demonstrating actual false statements made by the government. In addition, many of the arguably false statements appear to be about information that is not material to the case. The Ninth Circuit appears to focus on the materiality of statements when analyzing whether there has been government misconduct that warrants sanctions. See United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1338 (9th Cir.1977) (holding that in the situation of a possible dismissal of an indictment because of possible grand jury tampering only where knowing perjury relating to a material matter has been presented to the grand jury should the trial judge dismiss an otherwise valid indictment"
] | ) Post-Indictment The second argument focus on | 4 |
853 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndid have a prepetition legal interest in that case. At the time of bankruptcy, § 172 of the Internal Revenue Code gave the debtor a claim for a tax refund if certain conditions were met. It was the combination of the law and the conditions made legally relevant by the law that conferred on the debtor a prepetition legal interest: the claim for a refund. In that way, the Segal debtors’ claim for a refund is similar to the prepetition accrual of a cause of action that results in a post-petition judgment in the debtor’s favor. In such eases, the debtor’s cause of action is a prepetition legal interest — ■§ 541(a)(1) property- — -that brings the postpetition judgment into the estate as proceeds under § 541(a)(6). See, e.g., Wieburg v. GTE Southwest Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that claims harming the debtor corporation that arose from prepetition conduct become property of the estate under 11 usc 541a1",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndid have a prepetition legal interest in that case. At the time of bankruptcy, § 172 of the Internal Revenue Code gave the debtor a claim for a tax refund if certain conditions were met. It was the combination of the law and the conditions made legally relevant by the law that conferred on the debtor a prepetition legal interest: the claim for a refund. In that way, the Segal debtors’ claim for a refund is similar to the prepetition accrual of a cause of action that results in a post-petition judgment in the debtor’s favor. In such eases, the debtor’s cause of action is a prepetition legal interest — ■§ 541(a)(1) property- — -that brings the postpetition judgment into the estate as proceeds under § 541(a)(6). See, e.g., Wieburg v. GTE Southwest Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that causes of action for age and sex discrimination that arose prepetition were property of the bankruptcy estate",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndid have a prepetition legal interest in that case. At the time of bankruptcy, § 172 of the Internal Revenue Code gave the debtor a claim for a tax refund if certain conditions were met. It was the combination of the law and the conditions made legally relevant by the law that conferred on the debtor a prepetition legal interest: the claim for a refund. In that way, the Segal debtors’ claim for a refund is similar to the prepetition accrual of a cause of action that results in a post-petition judgment in the debtor’s favor. In such eases, the debtor’s cause of action is a prepetition legal interest — ■§ 541(a)(1) property- — -that brings the postpetition judgment into the estate as proceeds under § 541(a)(6). See, e.g., Wieburg v. GTE Southwest Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir.2001) (holding that to make out the fourth element of a prima facie case of sex discrimination plaintiff must prove that males remained in similar positions and similarly for age discrimination that she was otherwise discharged because of her age",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndid have a prepetition legal interest in that case. At the time of bankruptcy, § 172 of the Internal Revenue Code gave the debtor a claim for a tax refund if certain conditions were met. It was the combination of the law and the conditions made legally relevant by the law that conferred on the debtor a prepetition legal interest: the claim for a refund. In that way, the Segal debtors’ claim for a refund is similar to the prepetition accrual of a cause of action that results in a post-petition judgment in the debtor’s favor. In such eases, the debtor’s cause of action is a prepetition legal interest — ■§ 541(a)(1) property- — -that brings the postpetition judgment into the estate as proceeds under § 541(a)(6). See, e.g., Wieburg v. GTE Southwest Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir.2001) (holding lost future wages recovered pursuant to a prepetition cause of action are property of the estate",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ndid have a prepetition legal interest in that case. At the time of bankruptcy, § 172 of the Internal Revenue Code gave the debtor a claim for a tax refund if certain conditions were met. It was the combination of the law and the conditions made legally relevant by the law that conferred on the debtor a prepetition legal interest: the claim for a refund. In that way, the Segal debtors’ claim for a refund is similar to the prepetition accrual of a cause of action that results in a post-petition judgment in the debtor’s favor. In such eases, the debtor’s cause of action is a prepetition legal interest — ■§ 541(a)(1) property- — -that brings the postpetition judgment into the estate as proceeds under § 541(a)(6). See, e.g., Wieburg v. GTE Southwest Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir.2001) (holding age discrimination claim barred"
] | ). Here, by contrast, Burgess suffered the crop | 1 |
854 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(emphases added). Thus, contrary to Vester’s contention on appeal, the United States Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between “uncounseled” convictions, and those that were secured with “ineffective” counsel. Accordingly, Yester’s claim that his “ineffective counsel” amounted to “no counsel,” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and collateral attack on his prior convictions, must fail. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held in Custis that the right to collaterally attack a prior criminal conviction in a subsequent proceeding for enhancement purposes is limited to the actual denial of counsel. Id.; see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 378, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 1581, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001); United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir.1996) (recognizing collateral attack on void order",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(emphases added). Thus, contrary to Vester’s contention on appeal, the United States Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between “uncounseled” convictions, and those that were secured with “ineffective” counsel. Accordingly, Yester’s claim that his “ineffective counsel” amounted to “no counsel,” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and collateral attack on his prior convictions, must fail. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held in Custis that the right to collaterally attack a prior criminal conviction in a subsequent proceeding for enhancement purposes is limited to the actual denial of counsel. Id.; see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 378, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 1581, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001); United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(emphases added). Thus, contrary to Vester’s contention on appeal, the United States Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between “uncounseled” convictions, and those that were secured with “ineffective” counsel. Accordingly, Yester’s claim that his “ineffective counsel” amounted to “no counsel,” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and collateral attack on his prior convictions, must fail. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held in Custis that the right to collaterally attack a prior criminal conviction in a subsequent proceeding for enhancement purposes is limited to the actual denial of counsel. Id.; see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 378, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 1581, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001); United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that where a defendants claim did not amount to a complete denial of counsel it could not form the basis of a collateral attack",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(emphases added). Thus, contrary to Vester’s contention on appeal, the United States Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between “uncounseled” convictions, and those that were secured with “ineffective” counsel. Accordingly, Yester’s claim that his “ineffective counsel” amounted to “no counsel,” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and collateral attack on his prior convictions, must fail. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held in Custis that the right to collaterally attack a prior criminal conviction in a subsequent proceeding for enhancement purposes is limited to the actual denial of counsel. Id.; see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 378, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 1581, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001); United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that when the law of the circuit was so firmly against him petitioner did not have to raise an issue to preserve it as a basis for collateral attack later on",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n(emphases added). Thus, contrary to Vester’s contention on appeal, the United States Supreme Court has made a clear distinction between “uncounseled” convictions, and those that were secured with “ineffective” counsel. Accordingly, Yester’s claim that his “ineffective counsel” amounted to “no counsel,” for purposes of the Sixth Amendment and collateral attack on his prior convictions, must fail. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court explicitly held in Custis that the right to collaterally attack a prior criminal conviction in a subsequent proceeding for enhancement purposes is limited to the actual denial of counsel. Id.; see also Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 378, 121 S.Ct. 1578, 1581, 149 L.Ed.2d 590 (2001); United States v. Simpson, 94 F.3d 1373, 1381 (10th Cir.1996) (holding that the complete denial of counsel on direct appeal requires a finding of prejudice"
] | ). Although the Custis decision concerned the | 2 |
855 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nonly if “the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines. ...” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1) (emphasis added). The central dispute in this appeal is the meaning of “applicable to” and “applicable guidelines.” The government contends that, in this case, the applicable guidelines are the Career Offender guidelines because Pleasant qualified as a Career Offender, even though he was not sentenced under those guidelines. Pleasant argues that, under Freeman, the applicable guideline is § 2D1.1 because the plea agreement called for sentencing to be imposed under that provision. The commentary to § 1B1.10 addresses this very question. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (holding that commentary is not authoritative if it is inconsistent with or a plainly erroneous reading of the guideline it interprets or explains",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nonly if “the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines. ...” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1) (emphasis added). The central dispute in this appeal is the meaning of “applicable to” and “applicable guidelines.” The government contends that, in this case, the applicable guidelines are the Career Offender guidelines because Pleasant qualified as a Career Offender, even though he was not sentenced under those guidelines. Pleasant argues that, under Freeman, the applicable guideline is § 2D1.1 because the plea agreement called for sentencing to be imposed under that provision. The commentary to § 1B1.10 addresses this very question. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (holding that commentary to the guidelines is treated as an agencys interpretation of its own legislative rule",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nonly if “the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines. ...” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1) (emphasis added). The central dispute in this appeal is the meaning of “applicable to” and “applicable guidelines.” The government contends that, in this case, the applicable guidelines are the Career Offender guidelines because Pleasant qualified as a Career Offender, even though he was not sentenced under those guidelines. Pleasant argues that, under Freeman, the applicable guideline is § 2D1.1 because the plea agreement called for sentencing to be imposed under that provision. The commentary to § 1B1.10 addresses this very question. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (holding that guidelines and commentary have force of law that may not be disregarded by sentencing judge",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nonly if “the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines. ...” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1) (emphasis added). The central dispute in this appeal is the meaning of “applicable to” and “applicable guidelines.” The government contends that, in this case, the applicable guidelines are the Career Offender guidelines because Pleasant qualified as a Career Offender, even though he was not sentenced under those guidelines. Pleasant argues that, under Freeman, the applicable guideline is § 2D1.1 because the plea agreement called for sentencing to be imposed under that provision. The commentary to § 1B1.10 addresses this very question. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (holding that commentary accompanying guidelines is binding",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nonly if “the guideline range applicable to that defendant has subsequently been lowered as a result of an amendment to the Guidelines. ...” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(1) (emphasis added). The central dispute in this appeal is the meaning of “applicable to” and “applicable guidelines.” The government contends that, in this case, the applicable guidelines are the Career Offender guidelines because Pleasant qualified as a Career Offender, even though he was not sentenced under those guidelines. Pleasant argues that, under Freeman, the applicable guideline is § 2D1.1 because the plea agreement called for sentencing to be imposed under that provision. The commentary to § 1B1.10 addresses this very question. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (holding that guidelines commentary is generally authoritative"
] | ). Specifically, Application Note 1(A) clarifies | 4 |
856 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\npayment. Indeed, payments to the plaintiff do not “suggest! ] ... affirmative misconduct,” which is “a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the United States.” Conax, 824 F.2d at 1131 (rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that the government was estopped from challenging a contract on which it had completed payment). Because payments alone are insufficient to establish affirmative misconduct, the defendant’s partial payments of attorneys’ fees, likewise, are insufficient. Furthermore, failing to raise arguments in an administrative due process hearing does not constitute affirmative misconduct absent a showing, by the plaintiff, that the omission was anything more than “ordinary negligence.” See Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that fair use is an affirmative defense",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\npayment. Indeed, payments to the plaintiff do not “suggest! ] ... affirmative misconduct,” which is “a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the United States.” Conax, 824 F.2d at 1131 (rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that the government was estopped from challenging a contract on which it had completed payment). Because payments alone are insufficient to establish affirmative misconduct, the defendant’s partial payments of attorneys’ fees, likewise, are insufficient. Furthermore, failing to raise arguments in an administrative due process hearing does not constitute affirmative misconduct absent a showing, by the plaintiff, that the omission was anything more than “ordinary negligence.” See Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that defendant does not waive an affirmative defense if defendant raises it at a pragmatically sufficient time such as summary judgment and the defendants failure raise the affirmative defense in its answer did not cause the plaintiff prejudice",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\npayment. Indeed, payments to the plaintiff do not “suggest! ] ... affirmative misconduct,” which is “a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the United States.” Conax, 824 F.2d at 1131 (rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that the government was estopped from challenging a contract on which it had completed payment). Because payments alone are insufficient to establish affirmative misconduct, the defendant’s partial payments of attorneys’ fees, likewise, are insufficient. Furthermore, failing to raise arguments in an administrative due process hearing does not constitute affirmative misconduct absent a showing, by the plaintiff, that the omission was anything more than “ordinary negligence.” See Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that the court has an affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\npayment. Indeed, payments to the plaintiff do not “suggest! ] ... affirmative misconduct,” which is “a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the United States.” Conax, 824 F.2d at 1131 (rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that the government was estopped from challenging a contract on which it had completed payment). Because payments alone are insufficient to establish affirmative misconduct, the defendant’s partial payments of attorneys’ fees, likewise, are insufficient. Furthermore, failing to raise arguments in an administrative due process hearing does not constitute affirmative misconduct absent a showing, by the plaintiff, that the omission was anything more than “ordinary negligence.” See Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (holding that a failure to advise even when the defendant has an affirmative obligation to do so is not the same as engaging in affirmative misconduct ",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\npayment. Indeed, payments to the plaintiff do not “suggest! ] ... affirmative misconduct,” which is “a prerequisite to a finding of estoppel against the United States.” Conax, 824 F.2d at 1131 (rejecting the plaintiffs assertion that the government was estopped from challenging a contract on which it had completed payment). Because payments alone are insufficient to establish affirmative misconduct, the defendant’s partial payments of attorneys’ fees, likewise, are insufficient. Furthermore, failing to raise arguments in an administrative due process hearing does not constitute affirmative misconduct absent a showing, by the plaintiff, that the omission was anything more than “ordinary negligence.” See Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted) (recognizing that federal preemption is affirmative defense as to which defendant has burden of proof"
] | ); see also American Sav. v. Bell, 562 F.Supp. | 3 |
857 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwhere the rights of employees may be vindicated to the fullest extent possible under our workers’ compensation statutory scheme. For example, in Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants, a player on the roster of the Washington NFL football team brought in Maryland a workers’ compensation claim for game injuries sustained in various forums—some in Maryland, and some out of state. 428 Md. 270, 275-76, 51 A.3d 586, 589-90 (2012). McCants’ employment contract contained a forum-selection clause choosing Virginia law, but we allowed McCants nonetheless to maintain a claim in Maryland for the injuries sustained here and out-of-state. McCants, 428 Md. at 288, 51 A.3d at 596-97; see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 197 Md.App. 463, 471, 474, 14 A.3d 678, 682, 684 (2011), aff'd, 428 Md. 198, 51 A.3d 544 (2012) (holding that employee must prove that the sole reason for their discharge was their filing of a workers compensation claim to prevail on a claim of wrongful discharge under marylands workers compensation act",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwhere the rights of employees may be vindicated to the fullest extent possible under our workers’ compensation statutory scheme. For example, in Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants, a player on the roster of the Washington NFL football team brought in Maryland a workers’ compensation claim for game injuries sustained in various forums—some in Maryland, and some out of state. 428 Md. 270, 275-76, 51 A.3d 586, 589-90 (2012). McCants’ employment contract contained a forum-selection clause choosing Virginia law, but we allowed McCants nonetheless to maintain a claim in Maryland for the injuries sustained here and out-of-state. McCants, 428 Md. at 288, 51 A.3d at 596-97; see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 197 Md.App. 463, 471, 474, 14 A.3d 678, 682, 684 (2011), aff'd, 428 Md. 198, 51 A.3d 544 (2012) (holding that when an employee suffers an injury from an unexplained fall while the employee is on the job and performing the duties of his employment that injury is eligible for compensation under the workers compensation act",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwhere the rights of employees may be vindicated to the fullest extent possible under our workers’ compensation statutory scheme. For example, in Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants, a player on the roster of the Washington NFL football team brought in Maryland a workers’ compensation claim for game injuries sustained in various forums—some in Maryland, and some out of state. 428 Md. 270, 275-76, 51 A.3d 586, 589-90 (2012). McCants’ employment contract contained a forum-selection clause choosing Virginia law, but we allowed McCants nonetheless to maintain a claim in Maryland for the injuries sustained here and out-of-state. McCants, 428 Md. at 288, 51 A.3d at 596-97; see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 197 Md.App. 463, 471, 474, 14 A.3d 678, 682, 684 (2011), aff'd, 428 Md. 198, 51 A.3d 544 (2012) (holding that because maryland law expressly creates right to file workers compensation claim action exists for wrongful discharge for termination based solely on the filing of a workers compensation claim",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwhere the rights of employees may be vindicated to the fullest extent possible under our workers’ compensation statutory scheme. For example, in Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants, a player on the roster of the Washington NFL football team brought in Maryland a workers’ compensation claim for game injuries sustained in various forums—some in Maryland, and some out of state. 428 Md. 270, 275-76, 51 A.3d 586, 589-90 (2012). McCants’ employment contract contained a forum-selection clause choosing Virginia law, but we allowed McCants nonetheless to maintain a claim in Maryland for the injuries sustained here and out-of-state. McCants, 428 Md. at 288, 51 A.3d at 596-97; see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 197 Md.App. 463, 471, 474, 14 A.3d 678, 682, 684 (2011), aff'd, 428 Md. 198, 51 A.3d 544 (2012) (holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwhere the rights of employees may be vindicated to the fullest extent possible under our workers’ compensation statutory scheme. For example, in Pro-Football, Inc. v. McCants, a player on the roster of the Washington NFL football team brought in Maryland a workers’ compensation claim for game injuries sustained in various forums—some in Maryland, and some out of state. 428 Md. 270, 275-76, 51 A.3d 586, 589-90 (2012). McCants’ employment contract contained a forum-selection clause choosing Virginia law, but we allowed McCants nonetheless to maintain a claim in Maryland for the injuries sustained here and out-of-state. McCants, 428 Md. at 288, 51 A.3d at 596-97; see Pro-Football, Inc. v. Tupa, 197 Md.App. 463, 471, 474, 14 A.3d 678, 682, 684 (2011), aff'd, 428 Md. 198, 51 A.3d 544 (2012) (holding that a player on the roster of the washington nfl football team was a covered employee under 9203a of the workers compensation statute despite working intermittently in maryland playing games at fedex field and primarily in virginia practicing"
] | ). Although significant differences exist | 4 |
858 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nEd., Charleston Reorganized School Dist. No. 1, 599 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Mo.App.1980). There is no requirement, however, that any board member actually sign the written decision. See Willis v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 189, 196 (Mo.App.1980) (applying this rule to the termination of a tenured teacher rendered pursuant to §§ 168.118-.120); Brown v. Weir, 675 S.W.2d 135, 138-40 (Mo.App.1984) (applying the same rule to the termination of a teacher pursuant to § 168.221). The relevant question is simply whether the document containing the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision signed by Board President Riffle represents the written decision of the Board. See, e.g., Moesch v. Moniteau County R-1 School District Board of Education, 257 S.W.3d 661, 662-64 (Mo.App.2008) (holding that petitioners status as school board members does not permit them to step into the shoes of the school board and invoke its right to appeal",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nEd., Charleston Reorganized School Dist. No. 1, 599 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Mo.App.1980). There is no requirement, however, that any board member actually sign the written decision. See Willis v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 189, 196 (Mo.App.1980) (applying this rule to the termination of a tenured teacher rendered pursuant to §§ 168.118-.120); Brown v. Weir, 675 S.W.2d 135, 138-40 (Mo.App.1984) (applying the same rule to the termination of a teacher pursuant to § 168.221). The relevant question is simply whether the document containing the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision signed by Board President Riffle represents the written decision of the Board. See, e.g., Moesch v. Moniteau County R-1 School District Board of Education, 257 S.W.3d 661, 662-64 (Mo.App.2008) (holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nEd., Charleston Reorganized School Dist. No. 1, 599 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Mo.App.1980). There is no requirement, however, that any board member actually sign the written decision. See Willis v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 189, 196 (Mo.App.1980) (applying this rule to the termination of a tenured teacher rendered pursuant to §§ 168.118-.120); Brown v. Weir, 675 S.W.2d 135, 138-40 (Mo.App.1984) (applying the same rule to the termination of a teacher pursuant to § 168.221). The relevant question is simply whether the document containing the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision signed by Board President Riffle represents the written decision of the Board. See, e.g., Moesch v. Moniteau County R-1 School District Board of Education, 257 S.W.3d 661, 662-64 (Mo.App.2008) (holding that a reviewing court is not to substitute its decision for that of the board",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nEd., Charleston Reorganized School Dist. No. 1, 599 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Mo.App.1980). There is no requirement, however, that any board member actually sign the written decision. See Willis v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 189, 196 (Mo.App.1980) (applying this rule to the termination of a tenured teacher rendered pursuant to §§ 168.118-.120); Brown v. Weir, 675 S.W.2d 135, 138-40 (Mo.App.1984) (applying the same rule to the termination of a teacher pursuant to § 168.221). The relevant question is simply whether the document containing the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision signed by Board President Riffle represents the written decision of the Board. See, e.g., Moesch v. Moniteau County R-1 School District Board of Education, 257 S.W.3d 661, 662-64 (Mo.App.2008) (holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nEd., Charleston Reorganized School Dist. No. 1, 599 S.W.2d 254, 255-56 (Mo.App.1980). There is no requirement, however, that any board member actually sign the written decision. See Willis v. School Dist. of Kansas City, 606 S.W.2d 189, 196 (Mo.App.1980) (applying this rule to the termination of a tenured teacher rendered pursuant to §§ 168.118-.120); Brown v. Weir, 675 S.W.2d 135, 138-40 (Mo.App.1984) (applying the same rule to the termination of a teacher pursuant to § 168.221). The relevant question is simply whether the document containing the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decision signed by Board President Riffle represents the written decision of the Board. See, e.g., Moesch v. Moniteau County R-1 School District Board of Education, 257 S.W.3d 661, 662-64 (Mo.App.2008) (holding that the findings of fact conclusions of law and decision signed by the school board president constituted the decision of the board"
] | ); Willis, 606 S.W.2d at 196 (holding that the | 4 |
859 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninjury, sickness, or disease. The Penn National policies contain no language requiring the cause of injury to be identifiable before coverage is triggered. Our interpretation of the Penn National policies is confirmed by comparable cases applying the first manifestation rule to determine trigger of coverage under third party liability insurance policies. These cases consistently identify the initial manifestation of injury as the trigger of coverage. See D’Auria, 507 A.2d at 862 (“[A]n ‘occurrence’ happens when injury is reasonably apparent, not at the time the cause of injury occurs.”) (emphasis in orig inal); App the effects of an injury caused by the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings first manifested when the wrongful suit was filed); Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (holding that the effects of injury caused by discriminatory employment policies first manifested when the policies were implemented",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninjury, sickness, or disease. The Penn National policies contain no language requiring the cause of injury to be identifiable before coverage is triggered. Our interpretation of the Penn National policies is confirmed by comparable cases applying the first manifestation rule to determine trigger of coverage under third party liability insurance policies. These cases consistently identify the initial manifestation of injury as the trigger of coverage. See D’Auria, 507 A.2d at 862 (“[A]n ‘occurrence’ happens when injury is reasonably apparent, not at the time the cause of injury occurs.”) (emphasis in orig inal); App the effects of an injury caused by the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings first manifested when the wrongful suit was filed); Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (holding that where policies exclude coverage for injuries that are intended or expected the exclusion is applicable if the insured acts with the intent or expectation that bodily injury will result even though the bodily injury that does result is different either in character or magnitude from the injury that was intended",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninjury, sickness, or disease. The Penn National policies contain no language requiring the cause of injury to be identifiable before coverage is triggered. Our interpretation of the Penn National policies is confirmed by comparable cases applying the first manifestation rule to determine trigger of coverage under third party liability insurance policies. These cases consistently identify the initial manifestation of injury as the trigger of coverage. See D’Auria, 507 A.2d at 862 (“[A]n ‘occurrence’ happens when injury is reasonably apparent, not at the time the cause of injury occurs.”) (emphasis in orig inal); App the effects of an injury caused by the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings first manifested when the wrongful suit was filed); Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (holding that an injury is not within the scope of employment after the employee has left work unless the injury was caused by the employers negligence",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninjury, sickness, or disease. The Penn National policies contain no language requiring the cause of injury to be identifiable before coverage is triggered. Our interpretation of the Penn National policies is confirmed by comparable cases applying the first manifestation rule to determine trigger of coverage under third party liability insurance policies. These cases consistently identify the initial manifestation of injury as the trigger of coverage. See D’Auria, 507 A.2d at 862 (“[A]n ‘occurrence’ happens when injury is reasonably apparent, not at the time the cause of injury occurs.”) (emphasis in orig inal); App the effects of an injury caused by the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings first manifested when the wrongful suit was filed); Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (holding that where the employment of the injured employees was the occasion of the injury the injuries arose out of employment",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ninjury, sickness, or disease. The Penn National policies contain no language requiring the cause of injury to be identifiable before coverage is triggered. Our interpretation of the Penn National policies is confirmed by comparable cases applying the first manifestation rule to determine trigger of coverage under third party liability insurance policies. These cases consistently identify the initial manifestation of injury as the trigger of coverage. See D’Auria, 507 A.2d at 862 (“[A]n ‘occurrence’ happens when injury is reasonably apparent, not at the time the cause of injury occurs.”) (emphasis in orig inal); App the effects of an injury caused by the tort of wrongful use of civil proceedings first manifested when the wrongful suit was filed); Appalachian Ins. Co., 676 F.2d 56 (holding that employment practices which are neutral in form but which result in discriminatory effects are prohibited unless justified by business necessity"
] | ). In these cases, there was no potential for an | 0 |
860 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, refiners that sold oil to plaintiff were required to pay a tax on that oil because plaintiff was not registered as a producer with the IRS. During that period plaintiff paid refiners approximately $178,-000 in costs attributable to this tax. Plaintiff did not pass these increased costs on to its customers, though some of them used the fuel for tax-exempt purposes. Walsh argues that the tax was erroneously or illegally collected because it met statutory requirements, and that plaintiff merits a refund on equitable considerations under an implied-in-fact contract with defendant. DECISION Plaintiff admitted during oral argument that the statutes impose a tax upon the original seller of the fuel. See Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 205, 95 S.Ct. 1605, 1609, 44 L.Ed.2d 110 (1975) (holding that a retailer lacked standing to challenge a federal excise tax assessed against a thirdparty fuel supplier even where the retailer was required by contract to pay the supplier an amount equal to the excise tax upfront at the time of purchase since the alleged injury in the form of increased fuel costs was not occasionedby the government",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, refiners that sold oil to plaintiff were required to pay a tax on that oil because plaintiff was not registered as a producer with the IRS. During that period plaintiff paid refiners approximately $178,-000 in costs attributable to this tax. Plaintiff did not pass these increased costs on to its customers, though some of them used the fuel for tax-exempt purposes. Walsh argues that the tax was erroneously or illegally collected because it met statutory requirements, and that plaintiff merits a refund on equitable considerations under an implied-in-fact contract with defendant. DECISION Plaintiff admitted during oral argument that the statutes impose a tax upon the original seller of the fuel. See Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 205, 95 S.Ct. 1605, 1609, 44 L.Ed.2d 110 (1975) (holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on distributors not retailers",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, refiners that sold oil to plaintiff were required to pay a tax on that oil because plaintiff was not registered as a producer with the IRS. During that period plaintiff paid refiners approximately $178,-000 in costs attributable to this tax. Plaintiff did not pass these increased costs on to its customers, though some of them used the fuel for tax-exempt purposes. Walsh argues that the tax was erroneously or illegally collected because it met statutory requirements, and that plaintiff merits a refund on equitable considerations under an implied-in-fact contract with defendant. DECISION Plaintiff admitted during oral argument that the statutes impose a tax upon the original seller of the fuel. See Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 205, 95 S.Ct. 1605, 1609, 44 L.Ed.2d 110 (1975) (holding that the legal incidence of a federal excise tax on gasoline falls upon the statutory producer and not the purchaser of the gasoline",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, refiners that sold oil to plaintiff were required to pay a tax on that oil because plaintiff was not registered as a producer with the IRS. During that period plaintiff paid refiners approximately $178,-000 in costs attributable to this tax. Plaintiff did not pass these increased costs on to its customers, though some of them used the fuel for tax-exempt purposes. Walsh argues that the tax was erroneously or illegally collected because it met statutory requirements, and that plaintiff merits a refund on equitable considerations under an implied-in-fact contract with defendant. DECISION Plaintiff admitted during oral argument that the statutes impose a tax upon the original seller of the fuel. See Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 205, 95 S.Ct. 1605, 1609, 44 L.Ed.2d 110 (1975) (holding that a person who finds a purchaser for a property falls precisely within the statutory definition of a real estate broker",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nhowever, refiners that sold oil to plaintiff were required to pay a tax on that oil because plaintiff was not registered as a producer with the IRS. During that period plaintiff paid refiners approximately $178,-000 in costs attributable to this tax. Plaintiff did not pass these increased costs on to its customers, though some of them used the fuel for tax-exempt purposes. Walsh argues that the tax was erroneously or illegally collected because it met statutory requirements, and that plaintiff merits a refund on equitable considerations under an implied-in-fact contract with defendant. DECISION Plaintiff admitted during oral argument that the statutes impose a tax upon the original seller of the fuel. See Gurley v. Rhoden, 421 U.S. 200, 205, 95 S.Ct. 1605, 1609, 44 L.Ed.2d 110 (1975) (holding that the legal incidence of the kansas fuel tax falls on the distributor"
] | ). While it is not disputed that plaintiff lost | 2 |
861 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, that private contractual arrangements are not subject to constitutional requirements of objective standards. Id. 20. In the private sector, standards of reasonableness are commonly applied or implied which take into account the facts and the circumstances. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 55-1-102(3) (1961) (stating that under the Uniform Commercial Code, “parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable”); Watson Truck & Supply Co. v. Males, 111 N.M. 57, 60, 801 P.2d 639, 642 (1990) (every contract imposes upon parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982) (holding that the right to support is not subject to waiver by either parent",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, that private contractual arrangements are not subject to constitutional requirements of objective standards. Id. 20. In the private sector, standards of reasonableness are commonly applied or implied which take into account the facts and the circumstances. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 55-1-102(3) (1961) (stating that under the Uniform Commercial Code, “parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable”); Watson Truck & Supply Co. v. Males, 111 N.M. 57, 60, 801 P.2d 639, 642 (1990) (every contract imposes upon parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982) (holding that the right of approval is subject to standards of reasonableness implied by law",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, that private contractual arrangements are not subject to constitutional requirements of objective standards. Id. 20. In the private sector, standards of reasonableness are commonly applied or implied which take into account the facts and the circumstances. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 55-1-102(3) (1961) (stating that under the Uniform Commercial Code, “parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable”); Watson Truck & Supply Co. v. Males, 111 N.M. 57, 60, 801 P.2d 639, 642 (1990) (every contract imposes upon parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982) (holding that there is no constitutional right to refuse chemical testing under the implied consent law",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, that private contractual arrangements are not subject to constitutional requirements of objective standards. Id. 20. In the private sector, standards of reasonableness are commonly applied or implied which take into account the facts and the circumstances. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 55-1-102(3) (1961) (stating that under the Uniform Commercial Code, “parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable”); Watson Truck & Supply Co. v. Males, 111 N.M. 57, 60, 801 P.2d 639, 642 (1990) (every contract imposes upon parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982) (holding claims based on the fair labor standards act subject to arbitration",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, that private contractual arrangements are not subject to constitutional requirements of objective standards. Id. 20. In the private sector, standards of reasonableness are commonly applied or implied which take into account the facts and the circumstances. See, e.g., NMSA 1978, § 55-1-102(3) (1961) (stating that under the Uniform Commercial Code, “parties may by agreement determine the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable”); Watson Truck & Supply Co. v. Males, 111 N.M. 57, 60, 801 P.2d 639, 642 (1990) (every contract imposes upon parties a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement); Boss Barbara, Inc. v. Newbill, 97 N.M. 239, 241, 638 P.2d 1084, 1086 (1982) (holding that unilateral right to select independent counsel is subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing"
] | ). 21. Although New Mexico has never dealt | 1 |
862 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis Lawsuit? Our conclusion that the D’Oench doctrine has not been preempted by statute is reinforced by an examination of Motorcity’s argument that §§ 1821(d)(9)(A) and 1823(e)(1) are inapplicable because Motorcity repaid its loan to Southeast before the FDIC was appointed receiver. Pointing to § 1823(e)(l)’s reference to an “agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the [FDIC’s] interest ... in any asset acquired by it,” Motorcity contends that § 1823(e)(1) does not bar any claims against the FDIC that do not affect the value of a specific asset of the bank, such as a note, acquired by the FDIC. Because it repaid its note, Motorcity argues that there is no longer any specific asset to which the alleged oral agreements relate. See Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 37 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that section 1823e is narrower than the doench doctrine and that section 1823e applies only to cases involving a specific asset",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis Lawsuit? Our conclusion that the D’Oench doctrine has not been preempted by statute is reinforced by an examination of Motorcity’s argument that §§ 1821(d)(9)(A) and 1823(e)(1) are inapplicable because Motorcity repaid its loan to Southeast before the FDIC was appointed receiver. Pointing to § 1823(e)(l)’s reference to an “agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the [FDIC’s] interest ... in any asset acquired by it,” Motorcity contends that § 1823(e)(1) does not bar any claims against the FDIC that do not affect the value of a specific asset of the bank, such as a note, acquired by the FDIC. Because it repaid its note, Motorcity argues that there is no longer any specific asset to which the alleged oral agreements relate. See Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 37 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that 1823e applies only when the fdics interest in a specific asset would be impaired by the alleged secret agreement",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis Lawsuit? Our conclusion that the D’Oench doctrine has not been preempted by statute is reinforced by an examination of Motorcity’s argument that §§ 1821(d)(9)(A) and 1823(e)(1) are inapplicable because Motorcity repaid its loan to Southeast before the FDIC was appointed receiver. Pointing to § 1823(e)(l)’s reference to an “agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the [FDIC’s] interest ... in any asset acquired by it,” Motorcity contends that § 1823(e)(1) does not bar any claims against the FDIC that do not affect the value of a specific asset of the bank, such as a note, acquired by the FDIC. Because it repaid its note, Motorcity argues that there is no longer any specific asset to which the alleged oral agreements relate. See Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 37 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that claims that do not diminish or defeat the fdics interest in any specific asset are nevertheless doench barred in light of the established purpose of the doench doctrine to protect the fdics reliance on the banks records",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis Lawsuit? Our conclusion that the D’Oench doctrine has not been preempted by statute is reinforced by an examination of Motorcity’s argument that §§ 1821(d)(9)(A) and 1823(e)(1) are inapplicable because Motorcity repaid its loan to Southeast before the FDIC was appointed receiver. Pointing to § 1823(e)(l)’s reference to an “agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the [FDIC’s] interest ... in any asset acquired by it,” Motorcity contends that § 1823(e)(1) does not bar any claims against the FDIC that do not affect the value of a specific asset of the bank, such as a note, acquired by the FDIC. Because it repaid its note, Motorcity argues that there is no longer any specific asset to which the alleged oral agreements relate. See Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 37 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that defendant defrauded fdic when actions diluted value of fdics security interest thereby being likely to frustrate and impair the fdics ability to realize the benefit of the interest",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthis Lawsuit? Our conclusion that the D’Oench doctrine has not been preempted by statute is reinforced by an examination of Motorcity’s argument that §§ 1821(d)(9)(A) and 1823(e)(1) are inapplicable because Motorcity repaid its loan to Southeast before the FDIC was appointed receiver. Pointing to § 1823(e)(l)’s reference to an “agreement which tends to diminish or defeat the [FDIC’s] interest ... in any asset acquired by it,” Motorcity contends that § 1823(e)(1) does not bar any claims against the FDIC that do not affect the value of a specific asset of the bank, such as a note, acquired by the FDIC. Because it repaid its note, Motorcity argues that there is no longer any specific asset to which the alleged oral agreements relate. See Murphy v. FDIC, 61 F.3d 34, 37 (D.C.Cir.1995) (holding that the commonlaw doench doctrine applies to bar suit even when the rtc does not acquire a specific asset whose value is affected by the alleged secret agreement"
] | ); Inn at Saratoga Assocs. v. FDIC, 60 F.3d 78 | 1 |
863 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndefendant, plaintiff has failed to establish that he filed a refund claim for the second quarter of 1988, as required before filing a suit for refund. Def.’s MTD at 7; see I.R.C. § 7422(a). In his objection to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff included a Form 843 refund claim dated April 7, 2000, and received May 2, 2000. Pl.’s Obj. Exh. B. This claim is for the tax period from January 1987 through 1988. Id. As discussed above, the IRS denied plaintiffs refund claims for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1987 on February 14, 1997. Def.’s MTD Exh. A. Filing a second claim for these tax periods, as plaintiff appears to do with his Form 843 claim in exhibit B, does not alter the statute of limitations for those claims. See Jones v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 424, 425 (1992) (holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndefendant, plaintiff has failed to establish that he filed a refund claim for the second quarter of 1988, as required before filing a suit for refund. Def.’s MTD at 7; see I.R.C. § 7422(a). In his objection to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff included a Form 843 refund claim dated April 7, 2000, and received May 2, 2000. Pl.’s Obj. Exh. B. This claim is for the tax period from January 1987 through 1988. Id. As discussed above, the IRS denied plaintiffs refund claims for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1987 on February 14, 1997. Def.’s MTD Exh. A. Filing a second claim for these tax periods, as plaintiff appears to do with his Form 843 claim in exhibit B, does not alter the statute of limitations for those claims. See Jones v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 424, 425 (1992) (holding that although the filing of suit and service of citation interrupt the running of the statute its dismissal for want of prosecution will have the same effect as if the suit had never been filed",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndefendant, plaintiff has failed to establish that he filed a refund claim for the second quarter of 1988, as required before filing a suit for refund. Def.’s MTD at 7; see I.R.C. § 7422(a). In his objection to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff included a Form 843 refund claim dated April 7, 2000, and received May 2, 2000. Pl.’s Obj. Exh. B. This claim is for the tax period from January 1987 through 1988. Id. As discussed above, the IRS denied plaintiffs refund claims for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1987 on February 14, 1997. Def.’s MTD Exh. A. Filing a second claim for these tax periods, as plaintiff appears to do with his Form 843 claim in exhibit B, does not alter the statute of limitations for those claims. See Jones v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 424, 425 (1992) (holding that taxpayers filing of a second set of claims after the first set had been disallowed had no effect on the running of the statute of limitations",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndefendant, plaintiff has failed to establish that he filed a refund claim for the second quarter of 1988, as required before filing a suit for refund. Def.’s MTD at 7; see I.R.C. § 7422(a). In his objection to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff included a Form 843 refund claim dated April 7, 2000, and received May 2, 2000. Pl.’s Obj. Exh. B. This claim is for the tax period from January 1987 through 1988. Id. As discussed above, the IRS denied plaintiffs refund claims for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1987 on February 14, 1997. Def.’s MTD Exh. A. Filing a second claim for these tax periods, as plaintiff appears to do with his Form 843 claim in exhibit B, does not alter the statute of limitations for those claims. See Jones v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 424, 425 (1992) (holding that the running of the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\ndefendant, plaintiff has failed to establish that he filed a refund claim for the second quarter of 1988, as required before filing a suit for refund. Def.’s MTD at 7; see I.R.C. § 7422(a). In his objection to defendant’s motion to dismiss, plaintiff included a Form 843 refund claim dated April 7, 2000, and received May 2, 2000. Pl.’s Obj. Exh. B. This claim is for the tax period from January 1987 through 1988. Id. As discussed above, the IRS denied plaintiffs refund claims for the second, third, and fourth quarters of 1987 on February 14, 1997. Def.’s MTD Exh. A. Filing a second claim for these tax periods, as plaintiff appears to do with his Form 843 claim in exhibit B, does not alter the statute of limitations for those claims. See Jones v. United States, 26 Cl.Ct. 424, 425 (1992) (holding neither a lack of prejudice to the defendant nor the running of the statute of limitations constitutes good cause"
] | ); I.R.C. § 6532(a)(4) (“Any consideration, | 2 |
864 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwhen, under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court might well conclude that Rodrigues had failed to state a claim because he has not alleged that Pacheco had notice of the charge or an opportunity to conciliate. The Court need not resolve this difficult question, however, because it determines below that the plaintiff has stated a colorable state law claim against Pacheco for interference with contractual relations. 2. Interference with Contractual Relations Genlyte argues that the claim against Pacheco for tortious interference with contractual relations is preempted by c. 151B. The weight of authority holds otherwise. While c. 151B’s remedial scheme preempts all other state statutory causes of action, see, e.g., Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 557-558, 664 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996) (holding a pleading will not be sufficient to state a claim under the civil rights act if the allegations are mere conclusions",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwhen, under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court might well conclude that Rodrigues had failed to state a claim because he has not alleged that Pacheco had notice of the charge or an opportunity to conciliate. The Court need not resolve this difficult question, however, because it determines below that the plaintiff has stated a colorable state law claim against Pacheco for interference with contractual relations. 2. Interference with Contractual Relations Genlyte argues that the claim against Pacheco for tortious interference with contractual relations is preempted by c. 151B. The weight of authority holds otherwise. While c. 151B’s remedial scheme preempts all other state statutory causes of action, see, e.g., Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 557-558, 664 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996) (holding that civil rights claims under 42 usc 1981 and 1982 are personal injury tort claims",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwhen, under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court might well conclude that Rodrigues had failed to state a claim because he has not alleged that Pacheco had notice of the charge or an opportunity to conciliate. The Court need not resolve this difficult question, however, because it determines below that the plaintiff has stated a colorable state law claim against Pacheco for interference with contractual relations. 2. Interference with Contractual Relations Genlyte argues that the claim against Pacheco for tortious interference with contractual relations is preempted by c. 151B. The weight of authority holds otherwise. While c. 151B’s remedial scheme preempts all other state statutory causes of action, see, e.g., Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 557-558, 664 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996) (holding that c 151b precludes claims under mass gen l c 214 1c civil rights act and equal rights act",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwhen, under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court might well conclude that Rodrigues had failed to state a claim because he has not alleged that Pacheco had notice of the charge or an opportunity to conciliate. The Court need not resolve this difficult question, however, because it determines below that the plaintiff has stated a colorable state law claim against Pacheco for interference with contractual relations. 2. Interference with Contractual Relations Genlyte argues that the claim against Pacheco for tortious interference with contractual relations is preempted by c. 151B. The weight of authority holds otherwise. While c. 151B’s remedial scheme preempts all other state statutory causes of action, see, e.g., Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 557-558, 664 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996) (holding that damages based on the abstract value of constitutional rights are not a permissible element of compensatory damages in action under civil rights act of 1871",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwhen, under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court might well conclude that Rodrigues had failed to state a claim because he has not alleged that Pacheco had notice of the charge or an opportunity to conciliate. The Court need not resolve this difficult question, however, because it determines below that the plaintiff has stated a colorable state law claim against Pacheco for interference with contractual relations. 2. Interference with Contractual Relations Genlyte argues that the claim against Pacheco for tortious interference with contractual relations is preempted by c. 151B. The weight of authority holds otherwise. While c. 151B’s remedial scheme preempts all other state statutory causes of action, see, e.g., Green v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 422 Mass. 551, 557-558, 664 N.E.2d 808, 813 (1996) (holding that 16 of the urban mass transit act 1656 of the federalaid highway act and other acts created no substantive rights sufficient to invoke 1983"
] | ), an employee is not foreclosed, under | 2 |
865 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nare given, a remand is presumed to be general. Moore, 131 F.3d at 598. Upon limited remand, the district court in Jeross was not required to “begin anew,” and thus could rely upon the procedural rights provided to the defendants prior to remand. See United States v. Ramsdale, 179 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir.1999) (noting that upon limited remand, when the issues under consideration are restricted, the defendant does not have a right to allocute under Rule 32). Here, unlike in Jeross, the remand was general as it contained no express limitation, thereby requiring the district court to conduct resentencing de novo. Accordingly, the district court was required to provide Garcia-Robles the right to be present and allocute. See United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 151 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that the information contained in a presentence report is reliable because it is based upon the presentence officers research of the records contact with relevant agencies and the gathering of information which is required to be included in a presentence report",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nare given, a remand is presumed to be general. Moore, 131 F.3d at 598. Upon limited remand, the district court in Jeross was not required to “begin anew,” and thus could rely upon the procedural rights provided to the defendants prior to remand. See United States v. Ramsdale, 179 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir.1999) (noting that upon limited remand, when the issues under consideration are restricted, the defendant does not have a right to allocute under Rule 32). Here, unlike in Jeross, the remand was general as it contained no express limitation, thereby requiring the district court to conduct resentencing de novo. Accordingly, the district court was required to provide Garcia-Robles the right to be present and allocute. See United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 151 (6th Cir.1996) (holding the district court need not provide de novo review where the objections are frivolous conclusive or too general because the burden is on the parties to pinpoint those portions of the magistrates report that the district court must specifically consider",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nare given, a remand is presumed to be general. Moore, 131 F.3d at 598. Upon limited remand, the district court in Jeross was not required to “begin anew,” and thus could rely upon the procedural rights provided to the defendants prior to remand. See United States v. Ramsdale, 179 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir.1999) (noting that upon limited remand, when the issues under consideration are restricted, the defendant does not have a right to allocute under Rule 32). Here, unlike in Jeross, the remand was general as it contained no express limitation, thereby requiring the district court to conduct resentencing de novo. Accordingly, the district court was required to provide Garcia-Robles the right to be present and allocute. See United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 151 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that review of the construction of a sentencing statute is de novo",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nare given, a remand is presumed to be general. Moore, 131 F.3d at 598. Upon limited remand, the district court in Jeross was not required to “begin anew,” and thus could rely upon the procedural rights provided to the defendants prior to remand. See United States v. Ramsdale, 179 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir.1999) (noting that upon limited remand, when the issues under consideration are restricted, the defendant does not have a right to allocute under Rule 32). Here, unlike in Jeross, the remand was general as it contained no express limitation, thereby requiring the district court to conduct resentencing de novo. Accordingly, the district court was required to provide Garcia-Robles the right to be present and allocute. See United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 151 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that sentencing upon general remand is to be de novo requiring the district court to consider new objections to the presentence report",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nare given, a remand is presumed to be general. Moore, 131 F.3d at 598. Upon limited remand, the district court in Jeross was not required to “begin anew,” and thus could rely upon the procedural rights provided to the defendants prior to remand. See United States v. Ramsdale, 179 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir.1999) (noting that upon limited remand, when the issues under consideration are restricted, the defendant does not have a right to allocute under Rule 32). Here, unlike in Jeross, the remand was general as it contained no express limitation, thereby requiring the district court to conduct resentencing de novo. Accordingly, the district court was required to provide Garcia-Robles the right to be present and allocute. See United States v. Jennings, 83 F.3d 145, 151 (6th Cir.1996) (holding in the criminal context that a district courts obligation to make a de novo determination with respect to the portions of a magistrate judges report and recommendation to which objections are made did not require a de novo hearing"
] | ). V. Next, Garcia-Robles asserts that the | 3 |
866 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n862 Mass. 684, 687, 290 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1972). See also Jacques B. Gelin & David W. Miller, The Federal Law of Eminent Domain § 4.1 (1982) (elaborating on the applicable legal standard); 4A Nichols at § 14A.01[2] (“Because it is proper for the trier to consider all elements which are a natural and proximate result of the taking and which could legitimately affect the price that a prospective purchaser would pay for the land, facts of the impact upon the remainder during the course of construction, although temporal i 5th Cir.1966) (recognizing viability of claim for severance damages based on prospective buyers’ likely fear of hazards arising from construction of power line carrying high voltage electricity); United States v. 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that local buyers fear of possible knapweed infestation legitimately affected calculation of severance damages",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n862 Mass. 684, 687, 290 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1972). See also Jacques B. Gelin & David W. Miller, The Federal Law of Eminent Domain § 4.1 (1982) (elaborating on the applicable legal standard); 4A Nichols at § 14A.01[2] (“Because it is proper for the trier to consider all elements which are a natural and proximate result of the taking and which could legitimately affect the price that a prospective purchaser would pay for the land, facts of the impact upon the remainder during the course of construction, although temporal i 5th Cir.1966) (recognizing viability of claim for severance damages based on prospective buyers’ likely fear of hazards arising from construction of power line carrying high voltage electricity); United States v. 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that increased fear of flooding was a matter that factfinder could properly consider in assessing severance damages",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n862 Mass. 684, 687, 290 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1972). See also Jacques B. Gelin & David W. Miller, The Federal Law of Eminent Domain § 4.1 (1982) (elaborating on the applicable legal standard); 4A Nichols at § 14A.01[2] (“Because it is proper for the trier to consider all elements which are a natural and proximate result of the taking and which could legitimately affect the price that a prospective purchaser would pay for the land, facts of the impact upon the remainder during the course of construction, although temporal i 5th Cir.1966) (recognizing viability of claim for severance damages based on prospective buyers’ likely fear of hazards arising from construction of power line carrying high voltage electricity); United States v. 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that stigma damages were properly included in calculation of severance damages where proximity of gas pipeline could trigger fears about possible mishaps",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n862 Mass. 684, 687, 290 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1972). See also Jacques B. Gelin & David W. Miller, The Federal Law of Eminent Domain § 4.1 (1982) (elaborating on the applicable legal standard); 4A Nichols at § 14A.01[2] (“Because it is proper for the trier to consider all elements which are a natural and proximate result of the taking and which could legitimately affect the price that a prospective purchaser would pay for the land, facts of the impact upon the remainder during the course of construction, although temporal i 5th Cir.1966) (recognizing viability of claim for severance damages based on prospective buyers’ likely fear of hazards arising from construction of power line carrying high voltage electricity); United States v. 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that a calculation of the amount of loss is a factual finding",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\n862 Mass. 684, 687, 290 N.E.2d 160, 162 (1972). See also Jacques B. Gelin & David W. Miller, The Federal Law of Eminent Domain § 4.1 (1982) (elaborating on the applicable legal standard); 4A Nichols at § 14A.01[2] (“Because it is proper for the trier to consider all elements which are a natural and proximate result of the taking and which could legitimately affect the price that a prospective purchaser would pay for the land, facts of the impact upon the remainder during the course of construction, although temporal i 5th Cir.1966) (recognizing viability of claim for severance damages based on prospective buyers’ likely fear of hazards arising from construction of power line carrying high voltage electricity); United States v. 33.5 Acres of Land, 789 F.2d 1396, 1399-1400 (9th Cir.1986) (holding that severance pay policy was part of employment contract"
] | ); United States v. Easement and Right of Way, | 0 |
867 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlanguage of the statute to suggest that such a limited interpretation was intended by the legislature. See generally State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, T11, 144 P.3d 1152 (\"[Legislative] intent is most readily ascertainable by looking to the plain language of the statute.\"). To the contrary, regularity of contact appears to be irrelevant to this analysis, as the statute lists several individuals as being in a position of special trust whose relationship to the child may be even more remote than a cohabitant of a noncustodial parent, such as aunts and uncles, who may have infrequent contact with their nieces and nephews, and babysitters, who may come into contact with their charges only a single time. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(4)(h); see also Rowley, 2008 UT App 233, 113, 189 P.3d 109 (recognizing the existence of the special relationship",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlanguage of the statute to suggest that such a limited interpretation was intended by the legislature. See generally State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, T11, 144 P.3d 1152 (\"[Legislative] intent is most readily ascertainable by looking to the plain language of the statute.\"). To the contrary, regularity of contact appears to be irrelevant to this analysis, as the statute lists several individuals as being in a position of special trust whose relationship to the child may be even more remote than a cohabitant of a noncustodial parent, such as aunts and uncles, who may have infrequent contact with their nieces and nephews, and babysitters, who may come into contact with their charges only a single time. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(4)(h); see also Rowley, 2008 UT App 233, 113, 189 P.3d 109 (holding that the special relationship exception did not apply because the decedent was not in defendants custody",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlanguage of the statute to suggest that such a limited interpretation was intended by the legislature. See generally State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, T11, 144 P.3d 1152 (\"[Legislative] intent is most readily ascertainable by looking to the plain language of the statute.\"). To the contrary, regularity of contact appears to be irrelevant to this analysis, as the statute lists several individuals as being in a position of special trust whose relationship to the child may be even more remote than a cohabitant of a noncustodial parent, such as aunts and uncles, who may have infrequent contact with their nieces and nephews, and babysitters, who may come into contact with their charges only a single time. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(4)(h); see also Rowley, 2008 UT App 233, 113, 189 P.3d 109 (holding that the special relationship exception does not apply to the relationship between a student and a school",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlanguage of the statute to suggest that such a limited interpretation was intended by the legislature. See generally State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, T11, 144 P.3d 1152 (\"[Legislative] intent is most readily ascertainable by looking to the plain language of the statute.\"). To the contrary, regularity of contact appears to be irrelevant to this analysis, as the statute lists several individuals as being in a position of special trust whose relationship to the child may be even more remote than a cohabitant of a noncustodial parent, such as aunts and uncles, who may have infrequent contact with their nieces and nephews, and babysitters, who may come into contact with their charges only a single time. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(4)(h); see also Rowley, 2008 UT App 233, 113, 189 P.3d 109 (holding that the position of special trust is not dependent on the closeness of the defendants relationship with the child",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nlanguage of the statute to suggest that such a limited interpretation was intended by the legislature. See generally State v. Carreno, 2006 UT 59, T11, 144 P.3d 1152 (\"[Legislative] intent is most readily ascertainable by looking to the plain language of the statute.\"). To the contrary, regularity of contact appears to be irrelevant to this analysis, as the statute lists several individuals as being in a position of special trust whose relationship to the child may be even more remote than a cohabitant of a noncustodial parent, such as aunts and uncles, who may have infrequent contact with their nieces and nephews, and babysitters, who may come into contact with their charges only a single time. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(4)(h); see also Rowley, 2008 UT App 233, 113, 189 P.3d 109 (holding that courier is not in position of trust"
] | ). 8 . Although Watkins now argues that he | 3 |
868 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nit takes a case to make its way to the Courts of Appeals, in the majority of the cases cited above the sale closings had already taken place, this distinction is not determinative. In those cases, the courts were not asked to draw a distinction between sales before closings and sales after closing. The critical step is approval by the bankruptcy court, not closing. See, e.g., In re Stadium Management Corp., 895 F.2d at 849; In re Vetter Corp., 724 F.2d at 55-56. Debtor has provided no case law which supports the proposition that appeal of an order authorizing a sale is not moot after approval of the sale but before closing. To the contrary, the courts that have examined this issue have held that the appeal is moot even before closing. See In re Southwest Products, Inc., 144 B.R. at 105 (holding appeal moot on this basis",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nit takes a case to make its way to the Courts of Appeals, in the majority of the cases cited above the sale closings had already taken place, this distinction is not determinative. In those cases, the courts were not asked to draw a distinction between sales before closings and sales after closing. The critical step is approval by the bankruptcy court, not closing. See, e.g., In re Stadium Management Corp., 895 F.2d at 849; In re Vetter Corp., 724 F.2d at 55-56. Debtor has provided no case law which supports the proposition that appeal of an order authorizing a sale is not moot after approval of the sale but before closing. To the contrary, the courts that have examined this issue have held that the appeal is moot even before closing. See In re Southwest Products, Inc., 144 B.R. at 105 (holding that the fact that the sale may not be fully consummated does not prevent a determination that the appeal is moot because section 363m does not require the purchaser to take irreversible steps consummating the sale before the absence of a stay will render an appeal moot",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nit takes a case to make its way to the Courts of Appeals, in the majority of the cases cited above the sale closings had already taken place, this distinction is not determinative. In those cases, the courts were not asked to draw a distinction between sales before closings and sales after closing. The critical step is approval by the bankruptcy court, not closing. See, e.g., In re Stadium Management Corp., 895 F.2d at 849; In re Vetter Corp., 724 F.2d at 55-56. Debtor has provided no case law which supports the proposition that appeal of an order authorizing a sale is not moot after approval of the sale but before closing. To the contrary, the courts that have examined this issue have held that the appeal is moot even before closing. See In re Southwest Products, Inc., 144 B.R. at 105 (holding that action challenging united states forest services approval of a timber sale became moot when challenged sale was halted as a result of an administrative appeal",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nit takes a case to make its way to the Courts of Appeals, in the majority of the cases cited above the sale closings had already taken place, this distinction is not determinative. In those cases, the courts were not asked to draw a distinction between sales before closings and sales after closing. The critical step is approval by the bankruptcy court, not closing. See, e.g., In re Stadium Management Corp., 895 F.2d at 849; In re Vetter Corp., 724 F.2d at 55-56. Debtor has provided no case law which supports the proposition that appeal of an order authorizing a sale is not moot after approval of the sale but before closing. To the contrary, the courts that have examined this issue have held that the appeal is moot even before closing. See In re Southwest Products, Inc., 144 B.R. at 105 (holding that subsequent to a judicial sale the report of the sale must be made to and ratified by the court before a deed for the property is given by the trustee to the purchaser",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nit takes a case to make its way to the Courts of Appeals, in the majority of the cases cited above the sale closings had already taken place, this distinction is not determinative. In those cases, the courts were not asked to draw a distinction between sales before closings and sales after closing. The critical step is approval by the bankruptcy court, not closing. See, e.g., In re Stadium Management Corp., 895 F.2d at 849; In re Vetter Corp., 724 F.2d at 55-56. Debtor has provided no case law which supports the proposition that appeal of an order authorizing a sale is not moot after approval of the sale but before closing. To the contrary, the courts that have examined this issue have held that the appeal is moot even before closing. See In re Southwest Products, Inc., 144 B.R. at 105 (holding that payment does not moot a confirmation request"
] | ); see also In re Exennium, Inc., 715 F.2d 1401, | 1 |
869 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nby Tus-chner was reasonable in law. According to the district court, although our court ultimately disagreed with the conclusion that Tuschner controlled Zahareas, “the SEC’s legal position was at least a colorable, reasonable attempt at defining an otherwise undefined phrase.” (Id. at 12.) Third, relying on the undisputed communications and dealings between Tuschner and Za-hareas, the district court found that the SEC’s factual basis was reasonable. The fact that the district court and our court found for the SEC at various stages in the litigation does not automatically grant the government immunity from EAJA liability. See Herman v. Schwent, 177 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir.1999) (reversing district court and granting attorney’s fees); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, 53 F.3d at 885 (recognizing that an advisory opinion is one that offers an opinion on a moot issue",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nby Tus-chner was reasonable in law. According to the district court, although our court ultimately disagreed with the conclusion that Tuschner controlled Zahareas, “the SEC’s legal position was at least a colorable, reasonable attempt at defining an otherwise undefined phrase.” (Id. at 12.) Third, relying on the undisputed communications and dealings between Tuschner and Za-hareas, the district court found that the SEC’s factual basis was reasonable. The fact that the district court and our court found for the SEC at various stages in the litigation does not automatically grant the government immunity from EAJA liability. See Herman v. Schwent, 177 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir.1999) (reversing district court and granting attorney’s fees); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, 53 F.3d at 885 (recognizing ajlthough presiding judge mccormicks opinion in davis is labeled a concurring opinion it was joined by a majority of the court and may be regarded as an opinion for the court",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nby Tus-chner was reasonable in law. According to the district court, although our court ultimately disagreed with the conclusion that Tuschner controlled Zahareas, “the SEC’s legal position was at least a colorable, reasonable attempt at defining an otherwise undefined phrase.” (Id. at 12.) Third, relying on the undisputed communications and dealings between Tuschner and Za-hareas, the district court found that the SEC’s factual basis was reasonable. The fact that the district court and our court found for the SEC at various stages in the litigation does not automatically grant the government immunity from EAJA liability. See Herman v. Schwent, 177 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir.1999) (reversing district court and granting attorney’s fees); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, 53 F.3d at 885 (holding that an administrative agencys decision may not be based upon inadmissible expert opinion",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nby Tus-chner was reasonable in law. According to the district court, although our court ultimately disagreed with the conclusion that Tuschner controlled Zahareas, “the SEC’s legal position was at least a colorable, reasonable attempt at defining an otherwise undefined phrase.” (Id. at 12.) Third, relying on the undisputed communications and dealings between Tuschner and Za-hareas, the district court found that the SEC’s factual basis was reasonable. The fact that the district court and our court found for the SEC at various stages in the litigation does not automatically grant the government immunity from EAJA liability. See Herman v. Schwent, 177 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir.1999) (reversing district court and granting attorney’s fees); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, 53 F.3d at 885 (holding a medical opinion to be not significantly probative where the opinion was contrary to other substantial record evidence",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nby Tus-chner was reasonable in law. According to the district court, although our court ultimately disagreed with the conclusion that Tuschner controlled Zahareas, “the SEC’s legal position was at least a colorable, reasonable attempt at defining an otherwise undefined phrase.” (Id. at 12.) Third, relying on the undisputed communications and dealings between Tuschner and Za-hareas, the district court found that the SEC’s factual basis was reasonable. The fact that the district court and our court found for the SEC at various stages in the litigation does not automatically grant the government immunity from EAJA liability. See Herman v. Schwent, 177 F.3d 1063 (8th Cir.1999) (reversing district court and granting attorney’s fees); Friends of the Boundary Waters Wilderness, 53 F.3d at 885 (holding that the district court erred in denying fees by relying too heavily upon its original opinion and judge magills dissent from our decision reversing that opinion"
] | ). Instead, we must fully analyze the facts and | 4 |
870 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbelow the 50 percent mark, but such mathematical uncertainty is not fatal to the guideline’s validity, and we have previously concluded that criminal provisions featuring the “substantial” language survive facial challenge. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (ordinance requiring licensing of store selling “ ‘significant or substantial’ ” amount of sexually oriented merchandise was not void for vagueness); see also VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir.2010) (language of zoning ordinance defining sexually oriented business as establishment with “substantial or significant portion” of goods in adult merchandise not unconstitutionally vague); ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418-19 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that safety standards regarding the safe design and use of trampolines including astm standards were admissible on the issue of the defendants negligence even though the defendants were unaware of the standards",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbelow the 50 percent mark, but such mathematical uncertainty is not fatal to the guideline’s validity, and we have previously concluded that criminal provisions featuring the “substantial” language survive facial challenge. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (ordinance requiring licensing of store selling “ ‘significant or substantial’ ” amount of sexually oriented merchandise was not void for vagueness); see also VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir.2010) (language of zoning ordinance defining sexually oriented business as establishment with “substantial or significant portion” of goods in adult merchandise not unconstitutionally vague); ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418-19 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that determining legislative intent is a question of law",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbelow the 50 percent mark, but such mathematical uncertainty is not fatal to the guideline’s validity, and we have previously concluded that criminal provisions featuring the “substantial” language survive facial challenge. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (ordinance requiring licensing of store selling “ ‘significant or substantial’ ” amount of sexually oriented merchandise was not void for vagueness); see also VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir.2010) (language of zoning ordinance defining sexually oriented business as establishment with “substantial or significant portion” of goods in adult merchandise not unconstitutionally vague); ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418-19 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that the title of legislation is relevant to legislative intent",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbelow the 50 percent mark, but such mathematical uncertainty is not fatal to the guideline’s validity, and we have previously concluded that criminal provisions featuring the “substantial” language survive facial challenge. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (ordinance requiring licensing of store selling “ ‘significant or substantial’ ” amount of sexually oriented merchandise was not void for vagueness); see also VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir.2010) (language of zoning ordinance defining sexually oriented business as establishment with “substantial or significant portion” of goods in adult merchandise not unconstitutionally vague); ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418-19 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that legislative consent to suit must be by clear and unambiguous language in either a statute or by other express legislative permission",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nbelow the 50 percent mark, but such mathematical uncertainty is not fatal to the guideline’s validity, and we have previously concluded that criminal provisions featuring the “substantial” language survive facial challenge. See Doctor John’s, Inc. v. City of Roy, 465 F.3d 1150, 1159 (10th Cir.2006) (ordinance requiring licensing of store selling “ ‘significant or substantial’ ” amount of sexually oriented merchandise was not void for vagueness); see also VIP of Berlin, LLC v. Town of Berlin, 593 F.3d 179, 187-88 (2d Cir.2010) (language of zoning ordinance defining sexually oriented business as establishment with “substantial or significant portion” of goods in adult merchandise not unconstitutionally vague); ILQ Invs., Inc. v. City of Rochester, 25 F.3d 1413, 1418-19 (8th Cir.1994) (holding that substantial or significant is not devoid of meaningful legislative standards "
] | ). Moreover, we cannot say the sentencing court | 4 |
871 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nshall be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same. A separate fund shall be established for each of the several objects for which the said grants are hereby made or confirmed, and whenever any moneys shall be in any manner derived from any of said land the same shall be deposited by the state treasurer in the fund coiresponding to the grant under which the particular land producing such moneys was by this Act conveyed or confirmed. No moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for deposit in any other, or for any object other than that for which the land producing the same was granted or confirmed. (Emphasis added.) Congress deleted the italicized portion in 1957. 71 Stat. 457-58. 8 . Cf. Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 596, 790 P.2d 242, 251 (1990) (holding that article 10 section 8 of the arizona constitution did not create greater restrictions than the enabling act on exchanges of trust lands because section 8 provided that every disposition of or contract concerning trust lands would be null and void if not made in substantial conformity with the provisions of the enabling act",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nshall be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same. A separate fund shall be established for each of the several objects for which the said grants are hereby made or confirmed, and whenever any moneys shall be in any manner derived from any of said land the same shall be deposited by the state treasurer in the fund coiresponding to the grant under which the particular land producing such moneys was by this Act conveyed or confirmed. No moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for deposit in any other, or for any object other than that for which the land producing the same was granted or confirmed. (Emphasis added.) Congress deleted the italicized portion in 1957. 71 Stat. 457-58. 8 . Cf. Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 596, 790 P.2d 242, 251 (1990) (holding that the beneficiary of a trust was not the real party in interest regarding rights owned by the trust",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nshall be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same. A separate fund shall be established for each of the several objects for which the said grants are hereby made or confirmed, and whenever any moneys shall be in any manner derived from any of said land the same shall be deposited by the state treasurer in the fund coiresponding to the grant under which the particular land producing such moneys was by this Act conveyed or confirmed. No moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for deposit in any other, or for any object other than that for which the land producing the same was granted or confirmed. (Emphasis added.) Congress deleted the italicized portion in 1957. 71 Stat. 457-58. 8 . Cf. Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 596, 790 P.2d 242, 251 (1990) (holding that a state can require firebreaks around housing on trust property adjacent to forest lands",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nshall be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same. A separate fund shall be established for each of the several objects for which the said grants are hereby made or confirmed, and whenever any moneys shall be in any manner derived from any of said land the same shall be deposited by the state treasurer in the fund coiresponding to the grant under which the particular land producing such moneys was by this Act conveyed or confirmed. No moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for deposit in any other, or for any object other than that for which the land producing the same was granted or confirmed. (Emphasis added.) Congress deleted the italicized portion in 1957. 71 Stat. 457-58. 8 . Cf. Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 596, 790 P.2d 242, 251 (1990) (holding that the state has no special sovereign interest in managing lands held in trust",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nshall be subject to the same trusts as the lands producing the same. A separate fund shall be established for each of the several objects for which the said grants are hereby made or confirmed, and whenever any moneys shall be in any manner derived from any of said land the same shall be deposited by the state treasurer in the fund coiresponding to the grant under which the particular land producing such moneys was by this Act conveyed or confirmed. No moneys shall ever be taken from one fund for deposit in any other, or for any object other than that for which the land producing the same was granted or confirmed. (Emphasis added.) Congress deleted the italicized portion in 1957. 71 Stat. 457-58. 8 . Cf. Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 596, 790 P.2d 242, 251 (1990) (holding that billboard was not structure within meaning of the zoning enabling act g l c 40 25"
] | ). 9 . The Commissioner points out that the | 0 |
872 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhead. Further examination of the baby revealed eighteen unexplained rib, leg and arm fractures in various stages of healing, in addition to a skull fracture. The mother denied any knowledge of the injuries except for the skull fracture, which she explained was accidental. DCF was notified and initiated an investigation. DCF subsequently sought termination of both parents’ rights pursuant to sections 89.806(l)(f), (g) Florida Statutes (2010). The record shows that the evidence presented to the trial court did not rea undamental liberty interest, DCF must establish that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child or children from serious harm. Id. at 571; see also J.C. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 937 So.2d 184, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that although parents have a fundamental right to the care and custody of their children they have no fundamental right to allocate support to their children as they see fit",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhead. Further examination of the baby revealed eighteen unexplained rib, leg and arm fractures in various stages of healing, in addition to a skull fracture. The mother denied any knowledge of the injuries except for the skull fracture, which she explained was accidental. DCF was notified and initiated an investigation. DCF subsequently sought termination of both parents’ rights pursuant to sections 89.806(l)(f), (g) Florida Statutes (2010). The record shows that the evidence presented to the trial court did not rea undamental liberty interest, DCF must establish that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child or children from serious harm. Id. at 571; see also J.C. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 937 So.2d 184, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhead. Further examination of the baby revealed eighteen unexplained rib, leg and arm fractures in various stages of healing, in addition to a skull fracture. The mother denied any knowledge of the injuries except for the skull fracture, which she explained was accidental. DCF was notified and initiated an investigation. DCF subsequently sought termination of both parents’ rights pursuant to sections 89.806(l)(f), (g) Florida Statutes (2010). The record shows that the evidence presented to the trial court did not rea undamental liberty interest, DCF must establish that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child or children from serious harm. Id. at 571; see also J.C. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 937 So.2d 184, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding that natural parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the care custody and management of their children",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhead. Further examination of the baby revealed eighteen unexplained rib, leg and arm fractures in various stages of healing, in addition to a skull fracture. The mother denied any knowledge of the injuries except for the skull fracture, which she explained was accidental. DCF was notified and initiated an investigation. DCF subsequently sought termination of both parents’ rights pursuant to sections 89.806(l)(f), (g) Florida Statutes (2010). The record shows that the evidence presented to the trial court did not rea undamental liberty interest, DCF must establish that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child or children from serious harm. Id. at 571; see also J.C. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 937 So.2d 184, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (recognizing in dictum parents right to care custody management and companionship of their children",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nhead. Further examination of the baby revealed eighteen unexplained rib, leg and arm fractures in various stages of healing, in addition to a skull fracture. The mother denied any knowledge of the injuries except for the skull fracture, which she explained was accidental. DCF was notified and initiated an investigation. DCF subsequently sought termination of both parents’ rights pursuant to sections 89.806(l)(f), (g) Florida Statutes (2010). The record shows that the evidence presented to the trial court did not rea undamental liberty interest, DCF must establish that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child or children from serious harm. Id. at 571; see also J.C. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., 937 So.2d 184, 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (holding care custody and control of children is a fundamental right"
] | ); L.D. v. Dept. of Children and Family Servs., | 2 |
873 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe prosecutor explained that he was requesting the amendment only because he was unsure whether the multiple diamonds embedded in the ring were properly characterized as “clusters.” It is unclear whether Nations’s argument on appeal is intended to challenge this amendment, as her brief does not mention the ring. In any event, this amendment was also permissible.. The State is permitted to amend the indictment to correct “the description of any property or thing,” provided the amendment is not material or prejudicial. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-13 (Rev. 2015); see Jackson v. State, 450 So.2d 1081, 1082 (Miss.1984) (explaining that “[t]he indictment could have been amended” to allege theft of “rib eye roasts” rather than “rib eye steak”); Bennett v. State, 211 So.2d 520, 522 (Miss.1968) (holding that an indictment gave sufficient notice when the indictment charged the elements of the offense",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe prosecutor explained that he was requesting the amendment only because he was unsure whether the multiple diamonds embedded in the ring were properly characterized as “clusters.” It is unclear whether Nations’s argument on appeal is intended to challenge this amendment, as her brief does not mention the ring. In any event, this amendment was also permissible.. The State is permitted to amend the indictment to correct “the description of any property or thing,” provided the amendment is not material or prejudicial. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-13 (Rev. 2015); see Jackson v. State, 450 So.2d 1081, 1082 (Miss.1984) (explaining that “[t]he indictment could have been amended” to allege theft of “rib eye roasts” rather than “rib eye steak”); Bennett v. State, 211 So.2d 520, 522 (Miss.1968) (holding that the amendment of the indictment was permissible under the statutory predecessor to code 192231 because the amendment did not within the meaning of the statute change the nature of the offense charged in the original indictment",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe prosecutor explained that he was requesting the amendment only because he was unsure whether the multiple diamonds embedded in the ring were properly characterized as “clusters.” It is unclear whether Nations’s argument on appeal is intended to challenge this amendment, as her brief does not mention the ring. In any event, this amendment was also permissible.. The State is permitted to amend the indictment to correct “the description of any property or thing,” provided the amendment is not material or prejudicial. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-13 (Rev. 2015); see Jackson v. State, 450 So.2d 1081, 1082 (Miss.1984) (explaining that “[t]he indictment could have been amended” to allege theft of “rib eye roasts” rather than “rib eye steak”); Bennett v. State, 211 So.2d 520, 522 (Miss.1968) (holding that the indictment was permissibly amended to change the brand name of the barbed wire stolen",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe prosecutor explained that he was requesting the amendment only because he was unsure whether the multiple diamonds embedded in the ring were properly characterized as “clusters.” It is unclear whether Nations’s argument on appeal is intended to challenge this amendment, as her brief does not mention the ring. In any event, this amendment was also permissible.. The State is permitted to amend the indictment to correct “the description of any property or thing,” provided the amendment is not material or prejudicial. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-13 (Rev. 2015); see Jackson v. State, 450 So.2d 1081, 1082 (Miss.1984) (explaining that “[t]he indictment could have been amended” to allege theft of “rib eye roasts” rather than “rib eye steak”); Bennett v. State, 211 So.2d 520, 522 (Miss.1968) (holding that the amendment made to the indictment in this case was not authorized by code 192231 because the amended indictment materially changed the nature of the offense originally charged",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe prosecutor explained that he was requesting the amendment only because he was unsure whether the multiple diamonds embedded in the ring were properly characterized as “clusters.” It is unclear whether Nations’s argument on appeal is intended to challenge this amendment, as her brief does not mention the ring. In any event, this amendment was also permissible.. The State is permitted to amend the indictment to correct “the description of any property or thing,” provided the amendment is not material or prejudicial. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-17-13 (Rev. 2015); see Jackson v. State, 450 So.2d 1081, 1082 (Miss.1984) (explaining that “[t]he indictment could have been amended” to allege theft of “rib eye roasts” rather than “rib eye steak”); Bennett v. State, 211 So.2d 520, 522 (Miss.1968) (holding that the indictment was permissibly amended to change the description of a stolen watch"
] | ); Andrews v. State, 220 Miss. 28, 31, 70 So.2d | 4 |
874 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncrime. In accordance with our reasoning in Mordica, therefore, section 784.045(l)(b) defines a specific intent crime because the statute requires the knowing commission of a battery on a pregnant woman. Appellant is thus correct to argue that the doctrine of transferred intent does not operate in the instant case to elevate V.M.’s general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to violate section 784.045(l)(b). See (Mordica, 618 So.2d at 304-05)(“In this case, the state could not apply the doctrine of transferred intent to enhance the severity of the crime from simple battery to battery of a law enforcement officer by only proving that simple battery against the inmate was intended.”). See also D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding where school principal was struck while trying to stop student fight transferred intent operates to transfer students intent to commit simple battery on classmate thus negating conviction for attempted battery on school official which requires heightened level of intent",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncrime. In accordance with our reasoning in Mordica, therefore, section 784.045(l)(b) defines a specific intent crime because the statute requires the knowing commission of a battery on a pregnant woman. Appellant is thus correct to argue that the doctrine of transferred intent does not operate in the instant case to elevate V.M.’s general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to violate section 784.045(l)(b). See (Mordica, 618 So.2d at 304-05)(“In this case, the state could not apply the doctrine of transferred intent to enhance the severity of the crime from simple battery to battery of a law enforcement officer by only proving that simple battery against the inmate was intended.”). See also D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that battery is an inherently included offense of aggravated battery",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncrime. In accordance with our reasoning in Mordica, therefore, section 784.045(l)(b) defines a specific intent crime because the statute requires the knowing commission of a battery on a pregnant woman. Appellant is thus correct to argue that the doctrine of transferred intent does not operate in the instant case to elevate V.M.’s general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to violate section 784.045(l)(b). See (Mordica, 618 So.2d at 304-05)(“In this case, the state could not apply the doctrine of transferred intent to enhance the severity of the crime from simple battery to battery of a law enforcement officer by only proving that simple battery against the inmate was intended.”). See also D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that under maryland common law an assault is an attempted battery an actual battery or a combination of the two",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncrime. In accordance with our reasoning in Mordica, therefore, section 784.045(l)(b) defines a specific intent crime because the statute requires the knowing commission of a battery on a pregnant woman. Appellant is thus correct to argue that the doctrine of transferred intent does not operate in the instant case to elevate V.M.’s general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to violate section 784.045(l)(b). See (Mordica, 618 So.2d at 304-05)(“In this case, the state could not apply the doctrine of transferred intent to enhance the severity of the crime from simple battery to battery of a law enforcement officer by only proving that simple battery against the inmate was intended.”). See also D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding that prior battery was admissible to prove defendants intent to injure",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncrime. In accordance with our reasoning in Mordica, therefore, section 784.045(l)(b) defines a specific intent crime because the statute requires the knowing commission of a battery on a pregnant woman. Appellant is thus correct to argue that the doctrine of transferred intent does not operate in the instant case to elevate V.M.’s general intent to commit a simple battery on her brother to the specific intent required to violate section 784.045(l)(b). See (Mordica, 618 So.2d at 304-05)(“In this case, the state could not apply the doctrine of transferred intent to enhance the severity of the crime from simple battery to battery of a law enforcement officer by only proving that simple battery against the inmate was intended.”). See also D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (holding sentence enhancement statute did not create offense of attempted battery on school employee and thus minors adjudication of delinquency should have been based on finding that minor committed attempted battery"
] | ). Nevertheless, we affirm appellant’s | 0 |
875 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndays of receiving the notice of right to sue). Ms. Scott never served the defendant in that case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on January 21, 2000. Ms. Scott filed a second lawsuit on July 21, 2000. However, Ms. Scott also did not serve the defendant in the second case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on February 6, 2001. This circuit has held “that the filing of a complaint that is dismissed without prejudice does not toll the statutory filing period of Title VII.” Brown, 926 F.2d at 961. We reasoned that “as a general rule, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as though the action had never been brought.” Id. Other courts have applied this rule to ADA claims, see Chico-Velez v. Roche Prods., Inc., 139 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that a review committee of the kansas board for discipline of attorneys had the authority to dismiss a complaint against an attorney with or without prejudice and when dismissal was ordered without specifying the nature of the dismissal the dismissal was without prejudice to the filing of later proceedings on the same matter",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndays of receiving the notice of right to sue). Ms. Scott never served the defendant in that case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on January 21, 2000. Ms. Scott filed a second lawsuit on July 21, 2000. However, Ms. Scott also did not serve the defendant in the second case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on February 6, 2001. This circuit has held “that the filing of a complaint that is dismissed without prejudice does not toll the statutory filing period of Title VII.” Brown, 926 F.2d at 961. We reasoned that “as a general rule, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as though the action had never been brought.” Id. Other courts have applied this rule to ADA claims, see Chico-Velez v. Roche Prods., Inc., 139 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that the dismissal without prejudice of the plaintiffs first action doomed his ada claim because the ninetyday filing period had run",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndays of receiving the notice of right to sue). Ms. Scott never served the defendant in that case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on January 21, 2000. Ms. Scott filed a second lawsuit on July 21, 2000. However, Ms. Scott also did not serve the defendant in the second case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on February 6, 2001. This circuit has held “that the filing of a complaint that is dismissed without prejudice does not toll the statutory filing period of Title VII.” Brown, 926 F.2d at 961. We reasoned that “as a general rule, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as though the action had never been brought.” Id. Other courts have applied this rule to ADA claims, see Chico-Velez v. Roche Prods., Inc., 139 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir.1998) (holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndays of receiving the notice of right to sue). Ms. Scott never served the defendant in that case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on January 21, 2000. Ms. Scott filed a second lawsuit on July 21, 2000. However, Ms. Scott also did not serve the defendant in the second case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on February 6, 2001. This circuit has held “that the filing of a complaint that is dismissed without prejudice does not toll the statutory filing period of Title VII.” Brown, 926 F.2d at 961. We reasoned that “as a general rule, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as though the action had never been brought.” Id. Other courts have applied this rule to ADA claims, see Chico-Velez v. Roche Prods., Inc., 139 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir.1998) (holding borough could not appeal dismissal of complaint without prejudice because dismissal without prejudice is comparable to a nonsuit under the former practice of lavf ",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\ndays of receiving the notice of right to sue). Ms. Scott never served the defendant in that case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on January 21, 2000. Ms. Scott filed a second lawsuit on July 21, 2000. However, Ms. Scott also did not serve the defendant in the second case, and the court dismissed it without prejudice on February 6, 2001. This circuit has held “that the filing of a complaint that is dismissed without prejudice does not toll the statutory filing period of Title VII.” Brown, 926 F.2d at 961. We reasoned that “as a general rule, a voluntary dismissal without prejudice leaves the parties as though the action had never been brought.” Id. Other courts have applied this rule to ADA claims, see Chico-Velez v. Roche Prods., Inc., 139 F.3d 56, 59 (1st Cir.1998) (holding district court had no authority to require plaintiffs to obtain courts permission to dismiss defendant who had not served answer or motion for summary judgment as plaintiffs had absolute right to dismissal without prejudice and thus court could not sanction plaintiffs for filing notice of voluntary dismissal rather than motion"
] | ). As the district court observed, application | 1 |
876 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n1223, 1228 (7th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Badalamenti, No. S.S. 84 Cr. 236CPNL), 1985 WL 2572, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1985) (referring to a second indictment that would be returned after dismissal of a first indictment because of section 2517(5) violations, the same situation as in this case, as a “superseding” indictment). Therefore, the court holds that the second indictment in this case can properly be referred to as a “superseding” indictment. The superseding-versus-new-indictment issue might have been an interesting and relevant debate if the Speedy Trial Act or the statute of limitations were the focus of defendants’ appeals from the Detention Order, because those are the only situations in which it matters whether an indictment is a superseding indictme (D.C.1979) (holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n1223, 1228 (7th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Badalamenti, No. S.S. 84 Cr. 236CPNL), 1985 WL 2572, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1985) (referring to a second indictment that would be returned after dismissal of a first indictment because of section 2517(5) violations, the same situation as in this case, as a “superseding” indictment). Therefore, the court holds that the second indictment in this case can properly be referred to as a “superseding” indictment. The superseding-versus-new-indictment issue might have been an interesting and relevant debate if the Speedy Trial Act or the statute of limitations were the focus of defendants’ appeals from the Detention Order, because those are the only situations in which it matters whether an indictment is a superseding indictme (D.C.1979) (holding that the law of the case doctrine posits that when a court decides upon a rule of law that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n1223, 1228 (7th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Badalamenti, No. S.S. 84 Cr. 236CPNL), 1985 WL 2572, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1985) (referring to a second indictment that would be returned after dismissal of a first indictment because of section 2517(5) violations, the same situation as in this case, as a “superseding” indictment). Therefore, the court holds that the second indictment in this case can properly be referred to as a “superseding” indictment. The superseding-versus-new-indictment issue might have been an interesting and relevant debate if the Speedy Trial Act or the statute of limitations were the focus of defendants’ appeals from the Detention Order, because those are the only situations in which it matters whether an indictment is a superseding indictme (D.C.1979) (holding that the application of the fair use doctrine at the pleading stage is appropriate",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n1223, 1228 (7th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Badalamenti, No. S.S. 84 Cr. 236CPNL), 1985 WL 2572, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1985) (referring to a second indictment that would be returned after dismissal of a first indictment because of section 2517(5) violations, the same situation as in this case, as a “superseding” indictment). Therefore, the court holds that the second indictment in this case can properly be referred to as a “superseding” indictment. The superseding-versus-new-indictment issue might have been an interesting and relevant debate if the Speedy Trial Act or the statute of limitations were the focus of defendants’ appeals from the Detention Order, because those are the only situations in which it matters whether an indictment is a superseding indictme (D.C.1979) (holding that for all intents and purposes the instant case is the same action that was brought previously we therefore find the application of the doctrine of the law of the case to be appropriate",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\n1223, 1228 (7th Cir.1994) (same); United States v. Badalamenti, No. S.S. 84 Cr. 236CPNL), 1985 WL 2572, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 1985) (referring to a second indictment that would be returned after dismissal of a first indictment because of section 2517(5) violations, the same situation as in this case, as a “superseding” indictment). Therefore, the court holds that the second indictment in this case can properly be referred to as a “superseding” indictment. The superseding-versus-new-indictment issue might have been an interesting and relevant debate if the Speedy Trial Act or the statute of limitations were the focus of defendants’ appeals from the Detention Order, because those are the only situations in which it matters whether an indictment is a superseding indictme (D.C.1979) (holding that the degree of the loss of use of a body part is a question of fact whether the loss is for all practical intents and purposes is a question of law"
] | ); United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654, | 3 |
877 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nend of the spectrum, in that Scott Brooks was an indirect cause of these injuries, but we cannot conclude that Scott Brooks is outside the scope of USSG § 5K2.1 or USSG § 5K2.2. Unintended consequences are often the result of reckless behavior, and while perhaps Scott Brooks could not have anticipated the particular sequence of events, Scott Brooks should have foreseen the possibility of serious physical harm to another as a result of his actions. We see no basis for foreclosing a departure under USSG § 5K2.1 or USSG § 5K2.2 when a defendant helps put into motion a chain of events that risks serious injury or death, even when an intent to harm is entirely absent and the defendant was not directly responsible for the death. Cf. United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 100-01 (1st Cir.2002) (holding it error to give selfdefense instruction requiring that defendant believe his actions were necessary to avert death or great bodily harm when defendant claimed that the victims death was accidental",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nend of the spectrum, in that Scott Brooks was an indirect cause of these injuries, but we cannot conclude that Scott Brooks is outside the scope of USSG § 5K2.1 or USSG § 5K2.2. Unintended consequences are often the result of reckless behavior, and while perhaps Scott Brooks could not have anticipated the particular sequence of events, Scott Brooks should have foreseen the possibility of serious physical harm to another as a result of his actions. We see no basis for foreclosing a departure under USSG § 5K2.1 or USSG § 5K2.2 when a defendant helps put into motion a chain of events that risks serious injury or death, even when an intent to harm is entirely absent and the defendant was not directly responsible for the death. Cf. United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 100-01 (1st Cir.2002) (holding a reasonable recipient would have perceived the letter as a serious expression of an intent to harm",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nend of the spectrum, in that Scott Brooks was an indirect cause of these injuries, but we cannot conclude that Scott Brooks is outside the scope of USSG § 5K2.1 or USSG § 5K2.2. Unintended consequences are often the result of reckless behavior, and while perhaps Scott Brooks could not have anticipated the particular sequence of events, Scott Brooks should have foreseen the possibility of serious physical harm to another as a result of his actions. We see no basis for foreclosing a departure under USSG § 5K2.1 or USSG § 5K2.2 when a defendant helps put into motion a chain of events that risks serious injury or death, even when an intent to harm is entirely absent and the defendant was not directly responsible for the death. Cf. United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 100-01 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that in a 18 usc 922g1 prosecution ussg 5k21 upward departure was warranted because the defendant should have foreseen the possibility of serious harm as a result of his actions even though the defendant harbored no intent to harm and was not directly responsible for the death",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nend of the spectrum, in that Scott Brooks was an indirect cause of these injuries, but we cannot conclude that Scott Brooks is outside the scope of USSG § 5K2.1 or USSG § 5K2.2. Unintended consequences are often the result of reckless behavior, and while perhaps Scott Brooks could not have anticipated the particular sequence of events, Scott Brooks should have foreseen the possibility of serious physical harm to another as a result of his actions. We see no basis for foreclosing a departure under USSG § 5K2.1 or USSG § 5K2.2 when a defendant helps put into motion a chain of events that risks serious injury or death, even when an intent to harm is entirely absent and the defendant was not directly responsible for the death. Cf. United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 100-01 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that a death sentence for a conviction for the rape of a child where the crime did not result and was not intended to result in death of the victim was barred by the eighth amendment",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nend of the spectrum, in that Scott Brooks was an indirect cause of these injuries, but we cannot conclude that Scott Brooks is outside the scope of USSG § 5K2.1 or USSG § 5K2.2. Unintended consequences are often the result of reckless behavior, and while perhaps Scott Brooks could not have anticipated the particular sequence of events, Scott Brooks should have foreseen the possibility of serious physical harm to another as a result of his actions. We see no basis for foreclosing a departure under USSG § 5K2.1 or USSG § 5K2.2 when a defendant helps put into motion a chain of events that risks serious injury or death, even when an intent to harm is entirely absent and the defendant was not directly responsible for the death. Cf. United States v. Diaz, 285 F.3d 92, 100-01 (1st Cir.2002) (holding that defendant was responsible for the delay from the withdrawal of his guilty plea"
] | ); United States v. Fortier, 242 F.3d 1224, | 2 |
878 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, the Appellant in this case conceded that United States v. Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2006), prevents this Court from dismissing this appeal and remanding with instructions that the district court enter a new judgment as in Fuller. See Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d at 51-52 (holding that where trial counsel was not ineffective appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise claim of ineffectiveness of trial counsel",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, the Appellant in this case conceded that United States v. Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2006), prevents this Court from dismissing this appeal and remanding with instructions that the district court enter a new judgment as in Fuller. See Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d at 51-52 (holding that an issue was not properly before the court on appeal because the trial court did not have the opportunity to make any findings of fact regarding it",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, the Appellant in this case conceded that United States v. Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2006), prevents this Court from dismissing this appeal and remanding with instructions that the district court enter a new judgment as in Fuller. See Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d at 51-52 (holding that because it was not clear on the present record unlike in fuller that morenoriveras trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective the court should dismiss the appeal as untimely and the defendant would have the opportunity to develop the recordand seek a remedy for his trial counsels alleged ineffectiveness should he prove that trial counsel failed to timely file a requested appealin a 2255 motion before the district court",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, the Appellant in this case conceded that United States v. Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2006), prevents this Court from dismissing this appeal and remanding with instructions that the district court enter a new judgment as in Fuller. See Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d at 51-52 (holding that a defendant whose new trial motion is based on the alleged ineffectiveness of trial counsel may bypass rule 33s sevenday time limit only if his claim that his counsel was ineffective was based on information unavailable to the defendant at the time of trial",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nhowever, the Appellant in this case conceded that United States v. Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2006), prevents this Court from dismissing this appeal and remanding with instructions that the district court enter a new judgment as in Fuller. See Moreno-Rivera, 472 F.3d at 51-52 (holding a party must timely present his legal theories to the trial court so as to give the trial court an opportunity to rule properly"
] | ). The Appellant requested, in the alternative, | 2 |
879 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndecision to waive his right to counsel. 3 . Our concurring colleague, Judge Katzmann, disagrees with our characterization of the quoted language as dictum. In his view, the Supreme Court would not have vacated the state judgment of conviction if it had not been satisfied that Faretta knowingly exercised his right to self-representation; thus, the Court’s discussion of what constitutes a \"knowing and intelligent” waiver of the right to counsel “was essential to its conclusion that Faretta’s constitutional rights had been violated.” Infra at 566. We are not convinced. Given Faretta's recognition of a constitutional right to represent oneself, the Court might well have vacated the state conviction and remanded the case even without a finding of a valid waiver of the right t 1984) (holding that for a trial judge to accept a defendants guilty plea without an affirmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary violates the defendants constitutional rights",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndecision to waive his right to counsel. 3 . Our concurring colleague, Judge Katzmann, disagrees with our characterization of the quoted language as dictum. In his view, the Supreme Court would not have vacated the state judgment of conviction if it had not been satisfied that Faretta knowingly exercised his right to self-representation; thus, the Court’s discussion of what constitutes a \"knowing and intelligent” waiver of the right to counsel “was essential to its conclusion that Faretta’s constitutional rights had been violated.” Infra at 566. We are not convinced. Given Faretta's recognition of a constitutional right to represent oneself, the Court might well have vacated the state conviction and remanded the case even without a finding of a valid waiver of the right t 1984) (holding that right to challenge factual basis is waived by guilty plea",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndecision to waive his right to counsel. 3 . Our concurring colleague, Judge Katzmann, disagrees with our characterization of the quoted language as dictum. In his view, the Supreme Court would not have vacated the state judgment of conviction if it had not been satisfied that Faretta knowingly exercised his right to self-representation; thus, the Court’s discussion of what constitutes a \"knowing and intelligent” waiver of the right to counsel “was essential to its conclusion that Faretta’s constitutional rights had been violated.” Infra at 566. We are not convinced. Given Faretta's recognition of a constitutional right to represent oneself, the Court might well have vacated the state conviction and remanded the case even without a finding of a valid waiver of the right t 1984) (holding that factual basis inquiry is one way of satisfying the constitutional requirement that a guilty plea be voluntary and intelligent but it is not mandated by due process",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndecision to waive his right to counsel. 3 . Our concurring colleague, Judge Katzmann, disagrees with our characterization of the quoted language as dictum. In his view, the Supreme Court would not have vacated the state judgment of conviction if it had not been satisfied that Faretta knowingly exercised his right to self-representation; thus, the Court’s discussion of what constitutes a \"knowing and intelligent” waiver of the right to counsel “was essential to its conclusion that Faretta’s constitutional rights had been violated.” Infra at 566. We are not convinced. Given Faretta's recognition of a constitutional right to represent oneself, the Court might well have vacated the state conviction and remanded the case even without a finding of a valid waiver of the right t 1984) (holding that a voluntary and intelligent plea of guilty is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndecision to waive his right to counsel. 3 . Our concurring colleague, Judge Katzmann, disagrees with our characterization of the quoted language as dictum. In his view, the Supreme Court would not have vacated the state judgment of conviction if it had not been satisfied that Faretta knowingly exercised his right to self-representation; thus, the Court’s discussion of what constitutes a \"knowing and intelligent” waiver of the right to counsel “was essential to its conclusion that Faretta’s constitutional rights had been violated.” Infra at 566. We are not convinced. Given Faretta's recognition of a constitutional right to represent oneself, the Court might well have vacated the state conviction and remanded the case even without a finding of a valid waiver of the right t 1984) (holding that due process requires state courts to make an affirmative showing that a guilty plea is intelligent and voluntary"
] | ); see also United States v. Medina, 944 F.2d | 2 |
880 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ntwice for the same offense arising from the same act. See State v. Craft, 685 So.2d 1292 (Fla.1996). Accordingly, because Appellant was twice convicted for the same offense arising from a single episode, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court vacate Appellant’s conviction on Count I. We also remand for recalculation of the score sheet and re-sentencing since the vacated conviction will result in a reduced sentencing range. See Johnson v. State, 744 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(re-manding for re-sentencing where one of defendant’s convictions was vacated and the appellate court was unable to conclude that the defendant’s sentence would have been the same had the trial court used a properly prepared score sheet); Roy v. State, 711 So.2d 1848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding habitual offender sentence rendered any errors in guidelines score sheet harmless",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ntwice for the same offense arising from the same act. See State v. Craft, 685 So.2d 1292 (Fla.1996). Accordingly, because Appellant was twice convicted for the same offense arising from a single episode, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court vacate Appellant’s conviction on Count I. We also remand for recalculation of the score sheet and re-sentencing since the vacated conviction will result in a reduced sentencing range. See Johnson v. State, 744 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(re-manding for re-sentencing where one of defendant’s convictions was vacated and the appellate court was unable to conclude that the defendant’s sentence would have been the same had the trial court used a properly prepared score sheet); Roy v. State, 711 So.2d 1848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding that resentencing is required",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ntwice for the same offense arising from the same act. See State v. Craft, 685 So.2d 1292 (Fla.1996). Accordingly, because Appellant was twice convicted for the same offense arising from a single episode, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court vacate Appellant’s conviction on Count I. We also remand for recalculation of the score sheet and re-sentencing since the vacated conviction will result in a reduced sentencing range. See Johnson v. State, 744 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(re-manding for re-sentencing where one of defendant’s convictions was vacated and the appellate court was unable to conclude that the defendant’s sentence would have been the same had the trial court used a properly prepared score sheet); Roy v. State, 711 So.2d 1848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding that seventh application for postconviction relief which was rejected because evidence on which it was based was not properly authenticated was properly filed",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ntwice for the same offense arising from the same act. See State v. Craft, 685 So.2d 1292 (Fla.1996). Accordingly, because Appellant was twice convicted for the same offense arising from a single episode, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court vacate Appellant’s conviction on Count I. We also remand for recalculation of the score sheet and re-sentencing since the vacated conviction will result in a reduced sentencing range. See Johnson v. State, 744 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(re-manding for re-sentencing where one of defendant’s convictions was vacated and the appellate court was unable to conclude that the defendant’s sentence would have been the same had the trial court used a properly prepared score sheet); Roy v. State, 711 So.2d 1848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding that on a motion for postconviction relief defendant was entitled to reduction of points based upon a vacated conviction which resulted in a reduced sentencing range which required resentencing with a corrected score sheet",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ntwice for the same offense arising from the same act. See State v. Craft, 685 So.2d 1292 (Fla.1996). Accordingly, because Appellant was twice convicted for the same offense arising from a single episode, we reverse and remand with directions that the trial court vacate Appellant’s conviction on Count I. We also remand for recalculation of the score sheet and re-sentencing since the vacated conviction will result in a reduced sentencing range. See Johnson v. State, 744 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)(re-manding for re-sentencing where one of defendant’s convictions was vacated and the appellate court was unable to conclude that the defendant’s sentence would have been the same had the trial court used a properly prepared score sheet); Roy v. State, 711 So.2d 1848 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)(holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal"
] | ). AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and | 3 |
881 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshe could not perform the quintessential function of regularly attending work. Cf. Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F.Supp. 481, 485 (W.D.Tenn.1986) (stating an employee “who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise”), aff'd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir.1987). Other jurisdictions agree that irregular attendance renders a person unqualified for most types of employment and thus susceptible to legitimate termination. Cf. Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529-30 (D.C.Cir.1994) (affirming district court’s holding that plaintiffs prolonged, frequent, and unpredictable absences rendered her unqualified for any government job because “coming to work regularly” is an “essential function”); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs. Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that even though instructor possessed the necessary teaching skills and performed well when she was at work her frequent absences rendered her unable to function effectively as a teacher",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshe could not perform the quintessential function of regularly attending work. Cf. Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F.Supp. 481, 485 (W.D.Tenn.1986) (stating an employee “who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise”), aff'd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir.1987). Other jurisdictions agree that irregular attendance renders a person unqualified for most types of employment and thus susceptible to legitimate termination. Cf. Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529-30 (D.C.Cir.1994) (affirming district court’s holding that plaintiffs prolonged, frequent, and unpredictable absences rendered her unqualified for any government job because “coming to work regularly” is an “essential function”); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs. Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.1994) (holding the employee was clearly within the zone of her employment even though not at her work station because she was on the universitys premises the campus",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshe could not perform the quintessential function of regularly attending work. Cf. Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F.Supp. 481, 485 (W.D.Tenn.1986) (stating an employee “who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise”), aff'd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir.1987). Other jurisdictions agree that irregular attendance renders a person unqualified for most types of employment and thus susceptible to legitimate termination. Cf. Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529-30 (D.C.Cir.1994) (affirming district court’s holding that plaintiffs prolonged, frequent, and unpredictable absences rendered her unqualified for any government job because “coming to work regularly” is an “essential function”); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs. Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that allegations that employees supervisors yelled at her told her she was a poor manager and gave her poor evaluations chastised her in front of customers and once required her to work with an injured back were insufficient to state title vii claim",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshe could not perform the quintessential function of regularly attending work. Cf. Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F.Supp. 481, 485 (W.D.Tenn.1986) (stating an employee “who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise”), aff'd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir.1987). Other jurisdictions agree that irregular attendance renders a person unqualified for most types of employment and thus susceptible to legitimate termination. Cf. Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529-30 (D.C.Cir.1994) (affirming district court’s holding that plaintiffs prolonged, frequent, and unpredictable absences rendered her unqualified for any government job because “coming to work regularly” is an “essential function”); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs. Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that because the plaintiffs skills had deteriorated during the period she claims she was paid less than a male employee who performed equal work the plaintiff was not entitled to proceed further under the epa",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nshe could not perform the quintessential function of regularly attending work. Cf. Wimbley v. Bolger, 642 F.Supp. 481, 485 (W.D.Tenn.1986) (stating an employee “who does not come to work cannot perform any of his job functions, essential or otherwise”), aff'd, 831 F.2d 298 (6th Cir.1987). Other jurisdictions agree that irregular attendance renders a person unqualified for most types of employment and thus susceptible to legitimate termination. Cf. Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525, 529-30 (D.C.Cir.1994) (affirming district court’s holding that plaintiffs prolonged, frequent, and unpredictable absences rendered her unqualified for any government job because “coming to work regularly” is an “essential function”); Tyndall v. National Educ. Ctrs. Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir.1994) (holding that relative to the threat that she posed physically separating tina cortez from her telephone taking her by the arm escorting her from her home taking the keys to her home and locking the door and placing her in the locked back seat of a patrol car was excessive force as well as an unlawful seizure under the fourth amendment"
] | ); Tuttle v. Henry J. Kaiser Co., 921 F.2d 183, | 0 |
882 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nGiven this, the trial court on remand had no discretion to deny United’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment which was based on the unreasonableness of Telus-nor’s failure to attend the IMEs. The appellate division was similarly bound by this Court’s opinion in Comprehensive I, as well as by its own prior determination on the issue of “reasonableness.” Accordingly, we find that the appellate division’s decision before us failed to apply the correct law when it failed to follow the law of the case as established in Comprehen sive I. See Juliano, 801 So.2d at 105 (“The doctrine of the law of the case requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court ... through all subsequent stages of the proceedings.”); see also Dougherty, 23 So.3d at 158 (holding that district courts of appeal have jurisdiction to review by common law certiorari decision of circuit court upholding county court conviction obtained in violation of constitution",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nGiven this, the trial court on remand had no discretion to deny United’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment which was based on the unreasonableness of Telus-nor’s failure to attend the IMEs. The appellate division was similarly bound by this Court’s opinion in Comprehensive I, as well as by its own prior determination on the issue of “reasonableness.” Accordingly, we find that the appellate division’s decision before us failed to apply the correct law when it failed to follow the law of the case as established in Comprehen sive I. See Juliano, 801 So.2d at 105 (“The doctrine of the law of the case requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court ... through all subsequent stages of the proceedings.”); see also Dougherty, 23 So.3d at 158 (holding that this court will consider a petition for a writ of certiorari only after the court of appeals has overruled the application for rehearing on the point challenged in the petition implying that the decision by the court of criminal appeals must be final before certiorari review would be available",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nGiven this, the trial court on remand had no discretion to deny United’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment which was based on the unreasonableness of Telus-nor’s failure to attend the IMEs. The appellate division was similarly bound by this Court’s opinion in Comprehensive I, as well as by its own prior determination on the issue of “reasonableness.” Accordingly, we find that the appellate division’s decision before us failed to apply the correct law when it failed to follow the law of the case as established in Comprehen sive I. See Juliano, 801 So.2d at 105 (“The doctrine of the law of the case requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court ... through all subsequent stages of the proceedings.”); see also Dougherty, 23 So.3d at 158 (holding that circuit court failed to apply the correct law when it failed to enforce its prior decision after this court issued a denial of certiorari review in morningside civic assn v dougherty 944 so2d 370 fla 3d dca 2006 table",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nGiven this, the trial court on remand had no discretion to deny United’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment which was based on the unreasonableness of Telus-nor’s failure to attend the IMEs. The appellate division was similarly bound by this Court’s opinion in Comprehensive I, as well as by its own prior determination on the issue of “reasonableness.” Accordingly, we find that the appellate division’s decision before us failed to apply the correct law when it failed to follow the law of the case as established in Comprehen sive I. See Juliano, 801 So.2d at 105 (“The doctrine of the law of the case requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court ... through all subsequent stages of the proceedings.”); see also Dougherty, 23 So.3d at 158 (holding that review by common law certiorari in district courts of appeal is limited to circuit court decisions constituting denial of procedural due process application of incorrect law or miscarriage of justice",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nGiven this, the trial court on remand had no discretion to deny United’s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment which was based on the unreasonableness of Telus-nor’s failure to attend the IMEs. The appellate division was similarly bound by this Court’s opinion in Comprehensive I, as well as by its own prior determination on the issue of “reasonableness.” Accordingly, we find that the appellate division’s decision before us failed to apply the correct law when it failed to follow the law of the case as established in Comprehen sive I. See Juliano, 801 So.2d at 105 (“The doctrine of the law of the case requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court ... through all subsequent stages of the proceedings.”); see also Dougherty, 23 So.3d at 158 (holding that this court laeks the authority to review a sentencing courts denial of a downward departure unless the court failed to understand its authority to do so"
] | ). Comprehensive, however, asserts that this | 2 |
883 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwhile exclusion of present claimants appears to have limited the opposition, it did not completely eliminate it. 14 . See Koniak, Feasting, supra note 4, at 1058; Crampton, supra note 4, at 829-30. 15 .In addition, the settlement’s silence regarding the actual compensation that claimants can expect — other than various caps and limitations on recovery — makes it difficult for class members and courts to evaluate the settlement. That lack of information might be one of the reasons that the intervenors chose not to attack the settlement’s substantive fairness on appeal. 16 . The Ninth Circuit has held that a class action certified under rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) cannot bind absent plaintiffs unless they are allowed to opt out. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that a district of columbia consumer protection statute that authorized representative actions and did not reference class action requirements or mandate class certification was a separate and distinct procedural vehicle from a class action and thus did not constitute a class action under cafa",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwhile exclusion of present claimants appears to have limited the opposition, it did not completely eliminate it. 14 . See Koniak, Feasting, supra note 4, at 1058; Crampton, supra note 4, at 829-30. 15 .In addition, the settlement’s silence regarding the actual compensation that claimants can expect — other than various caps and limitations on recovery — makes it difficult for class members and courts to evaluate the settlement. That lack of information might be one of the reasons that the intervenors chose not to attack the settlement’s substantive fairness on appeal. 16 . The Ninth Circuit has held that a class action certified under rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) cannot bind absent plaintiffs unless they are allowed to opt out. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that the right of all putative members of a proposed class in an action filed pursuant to kansass class action rule of civil procedure to file a separate action is preserved pending the determination of whether the initial case shall be maintained as a class action",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwhile exclusion of present claimants appears to have limited the opposition, it did not completely eliminate it. 14 . See Koniak, Feasting, supra note 4, at 1058; Crampton, supra note 4, at 829-30. 15 .In addition, the settlement’s silence regarding the actual compensation that claimants can expect — other than various caps and limitations on recovery — makes it difficult for class members and courts to evaluate the settlement. That lack of information might be one of the reasons that the intervenors chose not to attack the settlement’s substantive fairness on appeal. 16 . The Ninth Circuit has held that a class action certified under rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) cannot bind absent plaintiffs unless they are allowed to opt out. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that a class action judgment awarding money damages will not bind an absent plaintiff without adequate notice",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwhile exclusion of present claimants appears to have limited the opposition, it did not completely eliminate it. 14 . See Koniak, Feasting, supra note 4, at 1058; Crampton, supra note 4, at 829-30. 15 .In addition, the settlement’s silence regarding the actual compensation that claimants can expect — other than various caps and limitations on recovery — makes it difficult for class members and courts to evaluate the settlement. That lack of information might be one of the reasons that the intervenors chose not to attack the settlement’s substantive fairness on appeal. 16 . The Ninth Circuit has held that a class action certified under rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) cannot bind absent plaintiffs unless they are allowed to opt out. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nwhile exclusion of present claimants appears to have limited the opposition, it did not completely eliminate it. 14 . See Koniak, Feasting, supra note 4, at 1058; Crampton, supra note 4, at 829-30. 15 .In addition, the settlement’s silence regarding the actual compensation that claimants can expect — other than various caps and limitations on recovery — makes it difficult for class members and courts to evaluate the settlement. That lack of information might be one of the reasons that the intervenors chose not to attack the settlement’s substantive fairness on appeal. 16 . The Ninth Circuit has held that a class action certified under rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) cannot bind absent plaintiffs unless they are allowed to opt out. Brown v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 982 F.2d 386 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that absent plaintiffs were not bound by a rule 23blb2 class action for money damages because the original class action court did not have personal jurisdiction over the plaintiffs and did not provide them with an optout right"
] | ), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 511 | 4 |
884 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\norganized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada, with its principal place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada.” In response, Wade averred in his answer, “Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph one (1) of Plaintiffs petition.” Further, Wade’s first affirmative defense averred, “The court lacks jurisdiction to hear and enter orders regarding this matter because the Plaintiff is not in good standing with the State of Nevada and is therefore restricted from bringing suit or participating in litigation.” As a threshold matter, Wade’s cursory denial of AllStar’s paragraph one is inadequate under Rule 55.13. It is well established that a general denial of allegations of corporate capacity or existence fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 55.13. See id. (holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\norganized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada, with its principal place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada.” In response, Wade averred in his answer, “Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph one (1) of Plaintiffs petition.” Further, Wade’s first affirmative defense averred, “The court lacks jurisdiction to hear and enter orders regarding this matter because the Plaintiff is not in good standing with the State of Nevada and is therefore restricted from bringing suit or participating in litigation.” As a threshold matter, Wade’s cursory denial of AllStar’s paragraph one is inadequate under Rule 55.13. It is well established that a general denial of allegations of corporate capacity or existence fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 55.13. See id. (holding bare allegation of social friendship insufficient",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\norganized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada, with its principal place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada.” In response, Wade averred in his answer, “Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph one (1) of Plaintiffs petition.” Further, Wade’s first affirmative defense averred, “The court lacks jurisdiction to hear and enter orders regarding this matter because the Plaintiff is not in good standing with the State of Nevada and is therefore restricted from bringing suit or participating in litigation.” As a threshold matter, Wade’s cursory denial of AllStar’s paragraph one is inadequate under Rule 55.13. It is well established that a general denial of allegations of corporate capacity or existence fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 55.13. See id. (holding that making a nonfrivolous allegation is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\norganized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada, with its principal place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada.” In response, Wade averred in his answer, “Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph one (1) of Plaintiffs petition.” Further, Wade’s first affirmative defense averred, “The court lacks jurisdiction to hear and enter orders regarding this matter because the Plaintiff is not in good standing with the State of Nevada and is therefore restricted from bringing suit or participating in litigation.” As a threshold matter, Wade’s cursory denial of AllStar’s paragraph one is inadequate under Rule 55.13. It is well established that a general denial of allegations of corporate capacity or existence fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 55.13. See id. (holding that a mere allegation of fraud is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to the pslra",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\norganized and existing under the laws of the State of Nevada, with its principal place of business in Las Vegas, Nevada.” In response, Wade averred in his answer, “Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraph one (1) of Plaintiffs petition.” Further, Wade’s first affirmative defense averred, “The court lacks jurisdiction to hear and enter orders regarding this matter because the Plaintiff is not in good standing with the State of Nevada and is therefore restricted from bringing suit or participating in litigation.” As a threshold matter, Wade’s cursory denial of AllStar’s paragraph one is inadequate under Rule 55.13. It is well established that a general denial of allegations of corporate capacity or existence fails to satisfy the requirements of Rule 55.13. See id. (holding that a denial of each and every allegation is insufficient under rule 5513"
] | ); Student Loan Mkt. Ass’n v. Holloway, 25 | 4 |
885 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, and the me or benefit need not necessarily be commercial.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, ¶ 1, 351 N.E.2d 454 of syllabus (Ohio 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) (emphasis added). Thus, Ohio law prohibits the publication of another’s name or likeness in a commercial use that draws from that persons “reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity.” Id. at 231, 351 N.E.2d 454. Nevertheless, several exceptions exist to this common law right. First, incidental use of one’s name or likeness is permissible. See e.g., Vinci v. American Can Company, 69 Ohio App.3d 727, 591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1990) (holding that member of a large class of health care providers available to the insured was only a potential and incidental beneficiary of the contract and thus not entitled to recover thereunder",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, and the me or benefit need not necessarily be commercial.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, ¶ 1, 351 N.E.2d 454 of syllabus (Ohio 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) (emphasis added). Thus, Ohio law prohibits the publication of another’s name or likeness in a commercial use that draws from that persons “reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity.” Id. at 231, 351 N.E.2d 454. Nevertheless, several exceptions exist to this common law right. First, incidental use of one’s name or likeness is permissible. See e.g., Vinci v. American Can Company, 69 Ohio App.3d 727, 591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1990) (holding that informational blurbs about charles vinci the 1956 and 1960 weightlifting olympic gold medalist on dixie cups was merely incidental to the promotion of the dixie cups and thus permissible",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, and the me or benefit need not necessarily be commercial.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, ¶ 1, 351 N.E.2d 454 of syllabus (Ohio 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) (emphasis added). Thus, Ohio law prohibits the publication of another’s name or likeness in a commercial use that draws from that persons “reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity.” Id. at 231, 351 N.E.2d 454. Nevertheless, several exceptions exist to this common law right. First, incidental use of one’s name or likeness is permissible. See e.g., Vinci v. American Can Company, 69 Ohio App.3d 727, 591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1990) (holding that service and notice in a technical sense are incidental where the main purpose of obtaining the appearance of parties and their participation is accomplished",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, and the me or benefit need not necessarily be commercial.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, ¶ 1, 351 N.E.2d 454 of syllabus (Ohio 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) (emphasis added). Thus, Ohio law prohibits the publication of another’s name or likeness in a commercial use that draws from that persons “reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity.” Id. at 231, 351 N.E.2d 454. Nevertheless, several exceptions exist to this common law right. First, incidental use of one’s name or likeness is permissible. See e.g., Vinci v. American Can Company, 69 Ohio App.3d 727, 591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1990) (holding that the mention of olympic athletes names was incidental to the promotion of dixie cups and thus not a violation of ohios common law right of appropriation because the use was purely informational and there was no implication that the athletes used supported or promoted the product",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nof another is subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, and the me or benefit need not necessarily be commercial.” Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, ¶ 1, 351 N.E.2d 454 of syllabus (Ohio 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) (emphasis added). Thus, Ohio law prohibits the publication of another’s name or likeness in a commercial use that draws from that persons “reputation, prestige, or other value associated with him, for purposes of publicity.” Id. at 231, 351 N.E.2d 454. Nevertheless, several exceptions exist to this common law right. First, incidental use of one’s name or likeness is permissible. See e.g., Vinci v. American Can Company, 69 Ohio App.3d 727, 591 N.E.2d 793 (Ohio 1990) (holding that an incidental beneficiary does not have standing to sue for breach of a contract"
] | ) Second, one’s name and appearance, in and of | 1 |
886 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na particular degree, license, or education. Id.; Leaf, 590 N.W.2d at 535 (“[N]o particular education is required; experience is sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.”); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 1994) (“Although licensing carries a presumption of qualification to testify in the given field, ‘learning and experience may provide the essential elements of qualifica tion.’” (quoting Ganrud v. Smith, 206 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Iowa 1973))). Rule 5.702 does not impose a requirement for how an expert is to become qualified and does not distinguish between whether an expert is qualified or unqualified based on whether he or she belongs to a particular profession or has a particular degree. Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 689; see also Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 888 (holding that refugees who have already acquired lpr status are ineligible for a 209c waiver in light of the language in that adjustment of status can be granted to an alien who has not acquired permanent resident status",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na particular degree, license, or education. Id.; Leaf, 590 N.W.2d at 535 (“[N]o particular education is required; experience is sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.”); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 1994) (“Although licensing carries a presumption of qualification to testify in the given field, ‘learning and experience may provide the essential elements of qualifica tion.’” (quoting Ganrud v. Smith, 206 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Iowa 1973))). Rule 5.702 does not impose a requirement for how an expert is to become qualified and does not distinguish between whether an expert is qualified or unqualified based on whether he or she belongs to a particular profession or has a particular degree. Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 689; see also Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 888 (holding that no tax liens may attach to property after the fdic acquired title",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na particular degree, license, or education. Id.; Leaf, 590 N.W.2d at 535 (“[N]o particular education is required; experience is sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.”); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 1994) (“Although licensing carries a presumption of qualification to testify in the given field, ‘learning and experience may provide the essential elements of qualifica tion.’” (quoting Ganrud v. Smith, 206 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Iowa 1973))). Rule 5.702 does not impose a requirement for how an expert is to become qualified and does not distinguish between whether an expert is qualified or unqualified based on whether he or she belongs to a particular profession or has a particular degree. Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 689; see also Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 888 (recognizing expertise acquired through experience is every bit as good as expertise acquired academically",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na particular degree, license, or education. Id.; Leaf, 590 N.W.2d at 535 (“[N]o particular education is required; experience is sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.”); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 1994) (“Although licensing carries a presumption of qualification to testify in the given field, ‘learning and experience may provide the essential elements of qualifica tion.’” (quoting Ganrud v. Smith, 206 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Iowa 1973))). Rule 5.702 does not impose a requirement for how an expert is to become qualified and does not distinguish between whether an expert is qualified or unqualified based on whether he or she belongs to a particular profession or has a particular degree. Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 689; see also Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 888 (holding statute requiring dealers to keep records of all motor vehicles acquired as junk is lawful",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\na particular degree, license, or education. Id.; Leaf, 590 N.W.2d at 535 (“[N]o particular education is required; experience is sufficient to qualify a witness as an expert.”); Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 886 (Iowa 1994) (“Although licensing carries a presumption of qualification to testify in the given field, ‘learning and experience may provide the essential elements of qualifica tion.’” (quoting Ganrud v. Smith, 206 N.W.2d 311, 315 (Iowa 1973))). Rule 5.702 does not impose a requirement for how an expert is to become qualified and does not distinguish between whether an expert is qualified or unqualified based on whether he or she belongs to a particular profession or has a particular degree. Ranes, 778 N.W.2d at 689; see also Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 888 (holding that equity acquired due to improving property is subject to cap"
] | ). Moreover, the witness does not need to be a | 2 |
887 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmay well result in a different social recognition of social groups opposed to gang violence, even if the gang in question is the same. 8 . The Third and Seventh Circuits invalidated the pre W-G-R-/M-EV-G- \"particularity” and \"social visibility” requirements on the ground that they were inconsistent with prior BIA precedent and therefore were not entitled to Chevron deference. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.2011) (\"Since the ‘social visibility' requirement is inconsistent with past BIA decisions, we conclude that it is an unreasonable addition to the requirements for establishing refugee status where that status turns upon persecution on account of membership in a particular social group.”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that deference is owed to an agencys interpretation of its own categorical exclusion regulations so long as that interpretation is not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmay well result in a different social recognition of social groups opposed to gang violence, even if the gang in question is the same. 8 . The Third and Seventh Circuits invalidated the pre W-G-R-/M-EV-G- \"particularity” and \"social visibility” requirements on the ground that they were inconsistent with prior BIA precedent and therefore were not entitled to Chevron deference. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.2011) (\"Since the ‘social visibility' requirement is inconsistent with past BIA decisions, we conclude that it is an unreasonable addition to the requirements for establishing refugee status where that status turns upon persecution on account of membership in a particular social group.”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir.2009) (holding interpretation may not be inconsistent with regulation",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmay well result in a different social recognition of social groups opposed to gang violence, even if the gang in question is the same. 8 . The Third and Seventh Circuits invalidated the pre W-G-R-/M-EV-G- \"particularity” and \"social visibility” requirements on the ground that they were inconsistent with prior BIA precedent and therefore were not entitled to Chevron deference. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.2011) (\"Since the ‘social visibility' requirement is inconsistent with past BIA decisions, we conclude that it is an unreasonable addition to the requirements for establishing refugee status where that status turns upon persecution on account of membership in a particular social group.”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that the interpretation of social visibility is inconsistent with previous decisions and makes no sense",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmay well result in a different social recognition of social groups opposed to gang violence, even if the gang in question is the same. 8 . The Third and Seventh Circuits invalidated the pre W-G-R-/M-EV-G- \"particularity” and \"social visibility” requirements on the ground that they were inconsistent with prior BIA precedent and therefore were not entitled to Chevron deference. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.2011) (\"Since the ‘social visibility' requirement is inconsistent with past BIA decisions, we conclude that it is an unreasonable addition to the requirements for establishing refugee status where that status turns upon persecution on account of membership in a particular social group.”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir.2009) (holding erisa plan interpretation is simply one of contract interpretation",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmay well result in a different social recognition of social groups opposed to gang violence, even if the gang in question is the same. 8 . The Third and Seventh Circuits invalidated the pre W-G-R-/M-EV-G- \"particularity” and \"social visibility” requirements on the ground that they were inconsistent with prior BIA precedent and therefore were not entitled to Chevron deference. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att'y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 604 (3d Cir.2011) (\"Since the ‘social visibility' requirement is inconsistent with past BIA decisions, we conclude that it is an unreasonable addition to the requirements for establishing refugee status where that status turns upon persecution on account of membership in a particular social group.”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615 (7th Cir.2009) (holding that the defendants ability to give directions and make decisions on a course of action for himself was inconsistent with the intoxication defense"
] | ). 9 . The IJ failed to grant Pirir-Boc relief | 2 |
888 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nv. Power Auth. of the State of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 649, 652, 602 N.Y.S.2d 588, 621 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y.1993) (same). These cases teach that fair market value is not to be determined in a rarefied realm of abstract calculation, but from the perspective of a hypothetical buyer in the real world — even if her perception of value is based partially on misinformation or (arguably) exaggerated fears about uncertain future events. Other courts, in the same or similar circumstances, have held that the anticipation of increased interference or potential hazards on the land remaining after a taking, which one court has labeled “stigma damages,” can be considered in assessing severance damages. See, e.g., Vector Pipeline, L.P., v. 68.55 Acres of Land, 157 F.Supp.2d 949, 957 (N.D.Ill.2001) (holding that actual damages under respa included emotional damages",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nv. Power Auth. of the State of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 649, 652, 602 N.Y.S.2d 588, 621 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y.1993) (same). These cases teach that fair market value is not to be determined in a rarefied realm of abstract calculation, but from the perspective of a hypothetical buyer in the real world — even if her perception of value is based partially on misinformation or (arguably) exaggerated fears about uncertain future events. Other courts, in the same or similar circumstances, have held that the anticipation of increased interference or potential hazards on the land remaining after a taking, which one court has labeled “stigma damages,” can be considered in assessing severance damages. See, e.g., Vector Pipeline, L.P., v. 68.55 Acres of Land, 157 F.Supp.2d 949, 957 (N.D.Ill.2001) (holding that increased fear of flooding was a matter that factfinder could properly consider in assessing severance damages",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nv. Power Auth. of the State of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 649, 652, 602 N.Y.S.2d 588, 621 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y.1993) (same). These cases teach that fair market value is not to be determined in a rarefied realm of abstract calculation, but from the perspective of a hypothetical buyer in the real world — even if her perception of value is based partially on misinformation or (arguably) exaggerated fears about uncertain future events. Other courts, in the same or similar circumstances, have held that the anticipation of increased interference or potential hazards on the land remaining after a taking, which one court has labeled “stigma damages,” can be considered in assessing severance damages. See, e.g., Vector Pipeline, L.P., v. 68.55 Acres of Land, 157 F.Supp.2d 949, 957 (N.D.Ill.2001) (holding that local buyers fear of possible knapweed infestation legitimately affected calculation of severance damages",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nv. Power Auth. of the State of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 649, 652, 602 N.Y.S.2d 588, 621 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y.1993) (same). These cases teach that fair market value is not to be determined in a rarefied realm of abstract calculation, but from the perspective of a hypothetical buyer in the real world — even if her perception of value is based partially on misinformation or (arguably) exaggerated fears about uncertain future events. Other courts, in the same or similar circumstances, have held that the anticipation of increased interference or potential hazards on the land remaining after a taking, which one court has labeled “stigma damages,” can be considered in assessing severance damages. See, e.g., Vector Pipeline, L.P., v. 68.55 Acres of Land, 157 F.Supp.2d 949, 957 (N.D.Ill.2001) (recognizing concept of stigma damages as they apply to property which is in fact contaminated",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nv. Power Auth. of the State of New York, 81 N.Y.2d 649, 652, 602 N.Y.S.2d 588, 621 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (N.Y.1993) (same). These cases teach that fair market value is not to be determined in a rarefied realm of abstract calculation, but from the perspective of a hypothetical buyer in the real world — even if her perception of value is based partially on misinformation or (arguably) exaggerated fears about uncertain future events. Other courts, in the same or similar circumstances, have held that the anticipation of increased interference or potential hazards on the land remaining after a taking, which one court has labeled “stigma damages,” can be considered in assessing severance damages. See, e.g., Vector Pipeline, L.P., v. 68.55 Acres of Land, 157 F.Supp.2d 949, 957 (N.D.Ill.2001) (holding that stigma damages were properly included in calculation of severance damages where proximity of gas pipeline could trigger fears about possible mishaps"
] | ); United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, 80 F.3d | 4 |
889 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nUrena, 162 S.W,3d at 551. There may be more than one proximate cause of an occurrence. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 774. Unlike a negligent activity' claim, a premises defect claim is not based on the defendant’s malfeasance, but on its non-feasance. Id. at 776. That is, “a premises defect claim is based on the property itself being unsafe,” not on the defendant’s activity. ShumaJce, 199 S.W.3d at 284 (emphasis added). Negligence in the premises defect context thus means “failure to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition which the owner or occupier [of land] knows about or in the exercise of ordinary care should know about.” Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 753 (quoting Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 264); see Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 787-88 (holding the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the premises owner when the evidence showed no one had been injured by the condition in question and the premises owner had received no complaints about the condition in question during a tenyear period",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nUrena, 162 S.W,3d at 551. There may be more than one proximate cause of an occurrence. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 774. Unlike a negligent activity' claim, a premises defect claim is not based on the defendant’s malfeasance, but on its non-feasance. Id. at 776. That is, “a premises defect claim is based on the property itself being unsafe,” not on the defendant’s activity. ShumaJce, 199 S.W.3d at 284 (emphasis added). Negligence in the premises defect context thus means “failure to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition which the owner or occupier [of land] knows about or in the exercise of ordinary care should know about.” Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 753 (quoting Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 264); see Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 787-88 (holding that premises owner had duty to use degree of care in performing activities that owner of ordinary prudence would use under same or similar circumstances",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nUrena, 162 S.W,3d at 551. There may be more than one proximate cause of an occurrence. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 774. Unlike a negligent activity' claim, a premises defect claim is not based on the defendant’s malfeasance, but on its non-feasance. Id. at 776. That is, “a premises defect claim is based on the property itself being unsafe,” not on the defendant’s activity. ShumaJce, 199 S.W.3d at 284 (emphasis added). Negligence in the premises defect context thus means “failure to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition which the owner or occupier [of land] knows about or in the exercise of ordinary care should know about.” Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 753 (quoting Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 264); see Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 787-88 (holding that negligence in premises defect context generally means failure to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate unreasonable risk of harm created by premises condition about which owner or occupier of land is aware",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nUrena, 162 S.W,3d at 551. There may be more than one proximate cause of an occurrence. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 774. Unlike a negligent activity' claim, a premises defect claim is not based on the defendant’s malfeasance, but on its non-feasance. Id. at 776. That is, “a premises defect claim is based on the property itself being unsafe,” not on the defendant’s activity. ShumaJce, 199 S.W.3d at 284 (emphasis added). Negligence in the premises defect context thus means “failure to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition which the owner or occupier [of land] knows about or in the exercise of ordinary care should know about.” Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 753 (quoting Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 264); see Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 787-88 (holding police officer who was shot by occupier of premises could not recover from premises owner for injuries the officer should have reasonably expected to sustain while engaged in the line of duty",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nUrena, 162 S.W,3d at 551. There may be more than one proximate cause of an occurrence. Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 774. Unlike a negligent activity' claim, a premises defect claim is not based on the defendant’s malfeasance, but on its non-feasance. Id. at 776. That is, “a premises defect claim is based on the property itself being unsafe,” not on the defendant’s activity. ShumaJce, 199 S.W.3d at 284 (emphasis added). Negligence in the premises defect context thus means “failure to use ordinary care to reduce or eliminate an unreasonable risk of harm created by a premises condition which the owner or occupier [of land] knows about or in the exercise of ordinary care should know about.” Timberwalk, 972 S.W.2d at 753 (quoting Keetch, 845 S.W.2d at 264); see Del Lago, 307 S.W.3d at 787-88 (holding that a business owner has a duty to use reasonable care to maintain premises in a reasonably safe condition for patrons"
] | ). In such circumstances, the property owner has | 2 |
890 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nadministrator is not dispositive, it is certainly not irrelevant.” Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 309 (5th Cir.1984). The court in that case held the defendant, although not formally appointed a trustee, to be a fiduciary where she was “represented” in various documents as a trustee and took actions in an official capacity as trustee. See id. Defendant asserts that he did not understand “in a technical sense” the meaning of the terms “trustee” or “plan administrator.” The Fifth Circuit rejected just such an argument in Donovan, supra, at 308 n. 4, noting the “long standing and generally accepted principle of contract law that ... a person who intentionally signs a document is bound by its contents.” See also Miller v. Lay Trucking Company, 606 F.Supp. 1326, 1334-35 (N.D.Ind.1985) (holding that plan language giving plan administrator power to determine which employees are eligible to participate in the plan and providing all parties dealing with the plan an interpretation of plan provisions on request indicates deferential standard of review of trustee eligibility decisions",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nadministrator is not dispositive, it is certainly not irrelevant.” Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 309 (5th Cir.1984). The court in that case held the defendant, although not formally appointed a trustee, to be a fiduciary where she was “represented” in various documents as a trustee and took actions in an official capacity as trustee. See id. Defendant asserts that he did not understand “in a technical sense” the meaning of the terms “trustee” or “plan administrator.” The Fifth Circuit rejected just such an argument in Donovan, supra, at 308 n. 4, noting the “long standing and generally accepted principle of contract law that ... a person who intentionally signs a document is bound by its contents.” See also Miller v. Lay Trucking Company, 606 F.Supp. 1326, 1334-35 (N.D.Ind.1985) (holding that because no plan document granted discretion to the plan administrator and because the fiduciaries had not expressly delegated their discretionary authority to the plan administrator the district court properly employed the de novo standard of review",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nadministrator is not dispositive, it is certainly not irrelevant.” Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 309 (5th Cir.1984). The court in that case held the defendant, although not formally appointed a trustee, to be a fiduciary where she was “represented” in various documents as a trustee and took actions in an official capacity as trustee. See id. Defendant asserts that he did not understand “in a technical sense” the meaning of the terms “trustee” or “plan administrator.” The Fifth Circuit rejected just such an argument in Donovan, supra, at 308 n. 4, noting the “long standing and generally accepted principle of contract law that ... a person who intentionally signs a document is bound by its contents.” See also Miller v. Lay Trucking Company, 606 F.Supp. 1326, 1334-35 (N.D.Ind.1985) (holding abuse of discretion review is appropriate when erisa plan grants discretion to the plan administrator",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nadministrator is not dispositive, it is certainly not irrelevant.” Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 309 (5th Cir.1984). The court in that case held the defendant, although not formally appointed a trustee, to be a fiduciary where she was “represented” in various documents as a trustee and took actions in an official capacity as trustee. See id. Defendant asserts that he did not understand “in a technical sense” the meaning of the terms “trustee” or “plan administrator.” The Fifth Circuit rejected just such an argument in Donovan, supra, at 308 n. 4, noting the “long standing and generally accepted principle of contract law that ... a person who intentionally signs a document is bound by its contents.” See also Miller v. Lay Trucking Company, 606 F.Supp. 1326, 1334-35 (N.D.Ind.1985) (holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nadministrator is not dispositive, it is certainly not irrelevant.” Donovan v. Mercer, 747 F.2d 304, 309 (5th Cir.1984). The court in that case held the defendant, although not formally appointed a trustee, to be a fiduciary where she was “represented” in various documents as a trustee and took actions in an official capacity as trustee. See id. Defendant asserts that he did not understand “in a technical sense” the meaning of the terms “trustee” or “plan administrator.” The Fifth Circuit rejected just such an argument in Donovan, supra, at 308 n. 4, noting the “long standing and generally accepted principle of contract law that ... a person who intentionally signs a document is bound by its contents.” See also Miller v. Lay Trucking Company, 606 F.Supp. 1326, 1334-35 (N.D.Ind.1985) (holding that one who is named in documents as plan administrator signs documents as plan administrator and assumes discretionary authority in the administration of the pension plan is a fiduciary"
] | ). This court holds that a person who is | 4 |
891 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nBy all accounts, the executed Partnership Agreement was the result of an arm’s length transaction. Also, the Partnership Agreement specifically, allowed for the payment of developer fees, and several other provisions effectively established that Dr. Cravens .knew so. Given Dr. Cravens’s individual characteristics, abilities, and appreciation of the facts and circumstances at or before the time of the alleged misrepresentation, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Dr. Cravens justifiably relied upon any representation that developer fees would not be paid until after a construction loan was secured. See Atlas Props., Inc. v. Republic Waste Servs of Tex., Ltd., No. 02-11-00332-CV, 2012 WL 579442, at *2-3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that it is unreasonable for plaintiffs to rely on oral representations made before a contract when the contract contained a clause which expressed",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nBy all accounts, the executed Partnership Agreement was the result of an arm’s length transaction. Also, the Partnership Agreement specifically, allowed for the payment of developer fees, and several other provisions effectively established that Dr. Cravens .knew so. Given Dr. Cravens’s individual characteristics, abilities, and appreciation of the facts and circumstances at or before the time of the alleged misrepresentation, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Dr. Cravens justifiably relied upon any representation that developer fees would not be paid until after a construction loan was secured. See Atlas Props., Inc. v. Republic Waste Servs of Tex., Ltd., No. 02-11-00332-CV, 2012 WL 579442, at *2-3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that party could not justifiably rely upon oral representations thatwere directly contradicted by terms of written agreement",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nBy all accounts, the executed Partnership Agreement was the result of an arm’s length transaction. Also, the Partnership Agreement specifically, allowed for the payment of developer fees, and several other provisions effectively established that Dr. Cravens .knew so. Given Dr. Cravens’s individual characteristics, abilities, and appreciation of the facts and circumstances at or before the time of the alleged misrepresentation, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Dr. Cravens justifiably relied upon any representation that developer fees would not be paid until after a construction loan was secured. See Atlas Props., Inc. v. Republic Waste Servs of Tex., Ltd., No. 02-11-00332-CV, 2012 WL 579442, at *2-3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that a person could not reasonably rely on oral representations that contradict a written document",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nBy all accounts, the executed Partnership Agreement was the result of an arm’s length transaction. Also, the Partnership Agreement specifically, allowed for the payment of developer fees, and several other provisions effectively established that Dr. Cravens .knew so. Given Dr. Cravens’s individual characteristics, abilities, and appreciation of the facts and circumstances at or before the time of the alleged misrepresentation, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Dr. Cravens justifiably relied upon any representation that developer fees would not be paid until after a construction loan was secured. See Atlas Props., Inc. v. Republic Waste Servs of Tex., Ltd., No. 02-11-00332-CV, 2012 WL 579442, at *2-3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that the parties agreement was superseded by a subsequent agreement that stated that it comprises the entire agreement and supersedes all prior understandings and representations oral or written between the parties",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nBy all accounts, the executed Partnership Agreement was the result of an arm’s length transaction. Also, the Partnership Agreement specifically, allowed for the payment of developer fees, and several other provisions effectively established that Dr. Cravens .knew so. Given Dr. Cravens’s individual characteristics, abilities, and appreciation of the facts and circumstances at or before the time of the alleged misrepresentation, we hold that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Dr. Cravens justifiably relied upon any representation that developer fees would not be paid until after a construction loan was secured. See Atlas Props., Inc. v. Republic Waste Servs of Tex., Ltd., No. 02-11-00332-CV, 2012 WL 579442, at *2-3 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth Feb. 23, 2012, no pet.) (mem.op.) (holding that plaintiff could not have reasonably relied on an oral representation that the atwill provision of his employment contract did not apply to him when he entered into the contract that expressly contradicted the oral representations"
] | ); cf. Gulf Liquids New River Project, LLC v. | 1 |
892 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt argued that the constitutional question was “not particularly meaningful” on a motion to dismiss, as an order denying the motion would not enter “final judgment” and an order granting the motion would be subject to the same de novo standard of review on a bankruptcy appeal as a report and recommendation in a “non-core” proceeding. See In re Refco Inc. (Memphis Holdings), 461 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011). This reasoning is flawed. It confuses the power to enter final judgment with the right to appeal. If there is no appeal, the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a final judgment dismissing the claim and is given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect. See Tel-tronics Servs. v. L M Ericsson Tele-comms., Inc., 642 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir.1981) (holding parent company bound in subsequent action by res judicata effect of judgment against subsidiary",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt argued that the constitutional question was “not particularly meaningful” on a motion to dismiss, as an order denying the motion would not enter “final judgment” and an order granting the motion would be subject to the same de novo standard of review on a bankruptcy appeal as a report and recommendation in a “non-core” proceeding. See In re Refco Inc. (Memphis Holdings), 461 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011). This reasoning is flawed. It confuses the power to enter final judgment with the right to appeal. If there is no appeal, the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a final judgment dismissing the claim and is given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect. See Tel-tronics Servs. v. L M Ericsson Tele-comms., Inc., 642 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir.1981) (holding judgment under fed rcivp 12b6 is entitled to res judicata effect",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt argued that the constitutional question was “not particularly meaningful” on a motion to dismiss, as an order denying the motion would not enter “final judgment” and an order granting the motion would be subject to the same de novo standard of review on a bankruptcy appeal as a report and recommendation in a “non-core” proceeding. See In re Refco Inc. (Memphis Holdings), 461 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011). This reasoning is flawed. It confuses the power to enter final judgment with the right to appeal. If there is no appeal, the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a final judgment dismissing the claim and is given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect. See Tel-tronics Servs. v. L M Ericsson Tele-comms., Inc., 642 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that dismissal on res judicata grounds is proper under rule 12b6 unless a disputed issue of material fact exists",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt argued that the constitutional question was “not particularly meaningful” on a motion to dismiss, as an order denying the motion would not enter “final judgment” and an order granting the motion would be subject to the same de novo standard of review on a bankruptcy appeal as a report and recommendation in a “non-core” proceeding. See In re Refco Inc. (Memphis Holdings), 461 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011). This reasoning is flawed. It confuses the power to enter final judgment with the right to appeal. If there is no appeal, the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a final judgment dismissing the claim and is given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect. See Tel-tronics Servs. v. L M Ericsson Tele-comms., Inc., 642 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that lear does not abrogate general principles of res judicata or the res judicata effect of a consent decree regarding patent validity",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCourt argued that the constitutional question was “not particularly meaningful” on a motion to dismiss, as an order denying the motion would not enter “final judgment” and an order granting the motion would be subject to the same de novo standard of review on a bankruptcy appeal as a report and recommendation in a “non-core” proceeding. See In re Refco Inc. (Memphis Holdings), 461 B.R. 181, 185 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2011). This reasoning is flawed. It confuses the power to enter final judgment with the right to appeal. If there is no appeal, the grant of the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a final judgment dismissing the claim and is given res judicata and collateral estoppel effect. See Tel-tronics Servs. v. L M Ericsson Tele-comms., Inc., 642 F.2d 31, 34-35 (2d Cir.1981) (holding that dismissal of case on statute of limitations grounds is final judgment and barring appeal has res judicata effect"
] | ); Corbett v. MacDonald Moving Servs., Inc., 124 | 1 |
893 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nraised the issue of the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 278.03 (2010), which provides for a waiver of the payment of taxes during the pendency of a tax appeal petition upon a showing of hardship in its motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated on October 28, 2009, to transfer the case to the district court for immediate referral back to the tax court pursuant to Eñe Mining Company v. Commissioner of Revenue, 343 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1984). The district court immediately transferred the case back to the tax court, and the tax court did not rule on the constitutional issue. The Minnesota Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the portion of an appeal that challenges the constitutiona see also Ritchie v. City of Green Bay, 215 Wis. 433, 254 N.W. 113, 115 (1934) (holding that in action by property owner to recover land taken by eminent domain current titleholder to land might be necessary party if district court were to restore land to plaintiff",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nraised the issue of the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 278.03 (2010), which provides for a waiver of the payment of taxes during the pendency of a tax appeal petition upon a showing of hardship in its motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated on October 28, 2009, to transfer the case to the district court for immediate referral back to the tax court pursuant to Eñe Mining Company v. Commissioner of Revenue, 343 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1984). The district court immediately transferred the case back to the tax court, and the tax court did not rule on the constitutional issue. The Minnesota Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the portion of an appeal that challenges the constitutiona see also Ritchie v. City of Green Bay, 215 Wis. 433, 254 N.W. 113, 115 (1934) (holding that a cause of action for damages to property resulting from a permanent nuisance accrues to the owner of the land at the time the injury begins to affect the land and mere transfer of the land by deed does not transfer the claim for damages",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nraised the issue of the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 278.03 (2010), which provides for a waiver of the payment of taxes during the pendency of a tax appeal petition upon a showing of hardship in its motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated on October 28, 2009, to transfer the case to the district court for immediate referral back to the tax court pursuant to Eñe Mining Company v. Commissioner of Revenue, 343 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1984). The district court immediately transferred the case back to the tax court, and the tax court did not rule on the constitutional issue. The Minnesota Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the portion of an appeal that challenges the constitutiona see also Ritchie v. City of Green Bay, 215 Wis. 433, 254 N.W. 113, 115 (1934) (holding that the deed and not the historical description of the land determines what land constitutes the forfeitable property",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nraised the issue of the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 278.03 (2010), which provides for a waiver of the payment of taxes during the pendency of a tax appeal petition upon a showing of hardship in its motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated on October 28, 2009, to transfer the case to the district court for immediate referral back to the tax court pursuant to Eñe Mining Company v. Commissioner of Revenue, 343 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1984). The district court immediately transferred the case back to the tax court, and the tax court did not rule on the constitutional issue. The Minnesota Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the portion of an appeal that challenges the constitutiona see also Ritchie v. City of Green Bay, 215 Wis. 433, 254 N.W. 113, 115 (1934) (holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nraised the issue of the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 278.03 (2010), which provides for a waiver of the payment of taxes during the pendency of a tax appeal petition upon a showing of hardship in its motion for summary judgment, the parties stipulated on October 28, 2009, to transfer the case to the district court for immediate referral back to the tax court pursuant to Eñe Mining Company v. Commissioner of Revenue, 343 N.W.2d 261, 264 (Minn. 1984). The district court immediately transferred the case back to the tax court, and the tax court did not rule on the constitutional issue. The Minnesota Tax Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the portion of an appeal that challenges the constitutiona see also Ritchie v. City of Green Bay, 215 Wis. 433, 254 N.W. 113, 115 (1934) (holding that the owner of the land could not bring a 93a action against a prior owner of the land who was not the seller because there was no business connection between the two parties"
] | ). But see, e.g., People ex rel. Thompson v. St. | 3 |
894 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe fault of the person injured. 3 . Morgan also urges us to find that the Marquises’ filing with the trial court of a tendered M.R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment- — once while their motion for summary judgment was pending and again after she rejected the offer — was an improper attempt to influence the court. Although we agree with Morgan that such an offer should not be filed with a court unless accepted, there is no indication in the record that the court in this case was influenced in any way by the filings, and Morgan acknowledges that the error is not sufficient standing alone to warrant vacating the summary judgment. 4 . See also Murphy v. Buonato, 42 Conn.App. 239, 679 A.2d 411, 417-18 (1996); Docherty v. Sadler, 293 Ill.App.3d 892, 228 Ill.Dec. 460, 689 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1997) (holding that strict compliance is not required",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe fault of the person injured. 3 . Morgan also urges us to find that the Marquises’ filing with the trial court of a tendered M.R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment- — once while their motion for summary judgment was pending and again after she rejected the offer — was an improper attempt to influence the court. Although we agree with Morgan that such an offer should not be filed with a court unless accepted, there is no indication in the record that the court in this case was influenced in any way by the filings, and Morgan acknowledges that the error is not sufficient standing alone to warrant vacating the summary judgment. 4 . See also Murphy v. Buonato, 42 Conn.App. 239, 679 A.2d 411, 417-18 (1996); Docherty v. Sadler, 293 Ill.App.3d 892, 228 Ill.Dec. 460, 689 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1997) (holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe fault of the person injured. 3 . Morgan also urges us to find that the Marquises’ filing with the trial court of a tendered M.R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment- — once while their motion for summary judgment was pending and again after she rejected the offer — was an improper attempt to influence the court. Although we agree with Morgan that such an offer should not be filed with a court unless accepted, there is no indication in the record that the court in this case was influenced in any way by the filings, and Morgan acknowledges that the error is not sufficient standing alone to warrant vacating the summary judgment. 4 . See also Murphy v. Buonato, 42 Conn.App. 239, 679 A.2d 411, 417-18 (1996); Docherty v. Sadler, 293 Ill.App.3d 892, 228 Ill.Dec. 460, 689 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1997) (holding that notice not required because cercla is a strict liability statute",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe fault of the person injured. 3 . Morgan also urges us to find that the Marquises’ filing with the trial court of a tendered M.R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment- — once while their motion for summary judgment was pending and again after she rejected the offer — was an improper attempt to influence the court. Although we agree with Morgan that such an offer should not be filed with a court unless accepted, there is no indication in the record that the court in this case was influenced in any way by the filings, and Morgan acknowledges that the error is not sufficient standing alone to warrant vacating the summary judgment. 4 . See also Murphy v. Buonato, 42 Conn.App. 239, 679 A.2d 411, 417-18 (1996); Docherty v. Sadler, 293 Ill.App.3d 892, 228 Ill.Dec. 460, 689 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1997) (recognizing strict product liability actions",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nthe fault of the person injured. 3 . Morgan also urges us to find that the Marquises’ filing with the trial court of a tendered M.R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment- — once while their motion for summary judgment was pending and again after she rejected the offer — was an improper attempt to influence the court. Although we agree with Morgan that such an offer should not be filed with a court unless accepted, there is no indication in the record that the court in this case was influenced in any way by the filings, and Morgan acknowledges that the error is not sufficient standing alone to warrant vacating the summary judgment. 4 . See also Murphy v. Buonato, 42 Conn.App. 239, 679 A.2d 411, 417-18 (1996); Docherty v. Sadler, 293 Ill.App.3d 892, 228 Ill.Dec. 460, 689 N.E.2d 332, 335 (1997) (holding that a tenyearold boy injured by a dog while caring for it was not protected by states strict liability statute"
] | ); Wilcoxen v. Paige, 174 Ill.App.3d 541, 124 | 4 |
895 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ngained by looking beyond the allegations of the complaint. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., No. 88-1503, — F.2d - (10th Cir. March 21, 1991) (Westlaw 35967) (concluding, based on “extensive findings of fact in [an underlying case] indicating that the pollution at issue ... was intended by defendants,” that the pollution was not “accidental” and granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (“Under New Hampshire law, the complaint and the policy alone may be sufficient for a determination of no coverage. Independent evidence, of course, may be needed if the compl 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976) (holding that insurer had a continuing duty to defend",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ngained by looking beyond the allegations of the complaint. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., No. 88-1503, — F.2d - (10th Cir. March 21, 1991) (Westlaw 35967) (concluding, based on “extensive findings of fact in [an underlying case] indicating that the pollution at issue ... was intended by defendants,” that the pollution was not “accidental” and granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (“Under New Hampshire law, the complaint and the policy alone may be sufficient for a determination of no coverage. Independent evidence, of course, may be needed if the compl 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976) (holding that under new york law for an insurer to have no duty to defend the court must find as a matter of law that based on the pleadings there was no possible factual or legal basis on which the insurer might eventually be held obligated to indemnify the insured",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ngained by looking beyond the allegations of the complaint. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., No. 88-1503, — F.2d - (10th Cir. March 21, 1991) (Westlaw 35967) (concluding, based on “extensive findings of fact in [an underlying case] indicating that the pollution at issue ... was intended by defendants,” that the pollution was not “accidental” and granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (“Under New Hampshire law, the complaint and the policy alone may be sufficient for a determination of no coverage. Independent evidence, of course, may be needed if the compl 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976) (holding based on deposition which revealed that defective materials were used and construction was contrary to workmanship standards that insurer had no duty to defend because damages should have been expected by the insured",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ngained by looking beyond the allegations of the complaint. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., No. 88-1503, — F.2d - (10th Cir. March 21, 1991) (Westlaw 35967) (concluding, based on “extensive findings of fact in [an underlying case] indicating that the pollution at issue ... was intended by defendants,” that the pollution was not “accidental” and granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (“Under New Hampshire law, the complaint and the policy alone may be sufficient for a determination of no coverage. Independent evidence, of course, may be needed if the compl 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976) (holding that a cgl policy such as the one at issue here does not insure against claims for defective or negligent workmanship or construction because defective workmanship does not constitute an accident and therefore claims for defective or negligent workmanship do not constitute an occurrence under the policy",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\ngained by looking beyond the allegations of the complaint. See, e.g., American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., No. 88-1503, — F.2d - (10th Cir. March 21, 1991) (Westlaw 35967) (concluding, based on “extensive findings of fact in [an underlying case] indicating that the pollution at issue ... was intended by defendants,” that the pollution was not “accidental” and granting insurer’s motion for summary judgment that it did not have a duty to defend or indemnify); Great Lakes Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (“Under New Hampshire law, the complaint and the policy alone may be sufficient for a determination of no coverage. Independent evidence, of course, may be needed if the compl 72, 240 N.W.2d 310 (1976) (holding that an insurer had a duty to defend the insured until it could establish that those claims were not supported by the facts"
] | ); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Sunnes, 77 Or.App. | 2 |
896 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwith a significant portion of the proceeds from the sale of the Ambassador building. Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony that Thad had check cashing privileges at a casino and that he gambled the day before filing for bankruptcy was merely cumulative evidence of Thad’s gambling proclivities. Given the substantial non-gambling evidence supporting Thad and Theresa’s convictions (discussed below), and the cumulative nature of Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony, there is not a “significant possibility’ that the evidence had a substantial impact on the jury’s verdict. See Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d at 210; see also United States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir.2007) (“The erroneous introduction of cumulative evidence was harmless error.”); United States v. Mortazavi, 702 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that error from the erroneous admission of evidence was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendants guilt",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwith a significant portion of the proceeds from the sale of the Ambassador building. Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony that Thad had check cashing privileges at a casino and that he gambled the day before filing for bankruptcy was merely cumulative evidence of Thad’s gambling proclivities. Given the substantial non-gambling evidence supporting Thad and Theresa’s convictions (discussed below), and the cumulative nature of Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony, there is not a “significant possibility’ that the evidence had a substantial impact on the jury’s verdict. See Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d at 210; see also United States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir.2007) (“The erroneous introduction of cumulative evidence was harmless error.”); United States v. Mortazavi, 702 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1983) (holding improperly admitted evidence was harmless error given the overwhelming evidence of guilt",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwith a significant portion of the proceeds from the sale of the Ambassador building. Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony that Thad had check cashing privileges at a casino and that he gambled the day before filing for bankruptcy was merely cumulative evidence of Thad’s gambling proclivities. Given the substantial non-gambling evidence supporting Thad and Theresa’s convictions (discussed below), and the cumulative nature of Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony, there is not a “significant possibility’ that the evidence had a substantial impact on the jury’s verdict. See Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d at 210; see also United States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir.2007) (“The erroneous introduction of cumulative evidence was harmless error.”); United States v. Mortazavi, 702 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that the trial courts erroneous admission of an experts opinion that the defendant was guilty was harmless where the prosecution produced overwhelming evidence of guilt",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwith a significant portion of the proceeds from the sale of the Ambassador building. Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony that Thad had check cashing privileges at a casino and that he gambled the day before filing for bankruptcy was merely cumulative evidence of Thad’s gambling proclivities. Given the substantial non-gambling evidence supporting Thad and Theresa’s convictions (discussed below), and the cumulative nature of Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony, there is not a “significant possibility’ that the evidence had a substantial impact on the jury’s verdict. See Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d at 210; see also United States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir.2007) (“The erroneous introduction of cumulative evidence was harmless error.”); United States v. Mortazavi, 702 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that the admission of a family photo was harmless error in light of the overwhelming evidence in support of the conviction",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nwith a significant portion of the proceeds from the sale of the Ambassador building. Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony that Thad had check cashing privileges at a casino and that he gambled the day before filing for bankruptcy was merely cumulative evidence of Thad’s gambling proclivities. Given the substantial non-gambling evidence supporting Thad and Theresa’s convictions (discussed below), and the cumulative nature of Cox’s and Trahan’s testimony, there is not a “significant possibility’ that the evidence had a substantial impact on the jury’s verdict. See Sanchez-Sotelo, 8 F.3d at 210; see also United States v. Hall, 500 F.3d 439, 444 (5th Cir.2007) (“The erroneous introduction of cumulative evidence was harmless error.”); United States v. Mortazavi, 702 F.2d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that any error in admission of demonstrative aid was harmless because evidence of defendants guilt was overwhelming"
] | ). Any error in admitting Cox’s and Trahan’s | 0 |
897 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCalifornia Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have addressed Medina's other arguments in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 2 . A \"pedicab” is a bicycle with a passenger compartment attached to the rear. 3 . The Sixth Circuit took the lead by following the first approach in Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 371-72 (6th Cir.1999); see also Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 718 (6th Cir.2003). By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has elected to pursue the second approach. See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.2003); see also Saiz v. Burnett, 296 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that when presented with petitioners claim based upon state and federal law and the state court confined its analysis to state law aedpa deference does not apply",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCalifornia Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have addressed Medina's other arguments in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 2 . A \"pedicab” is a bicycle with a passenger compartment attached to the rear. 3 . The Sixth Circuit took the lead by following the first approach in Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 371-72 (6th Cir.1999); see also Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 718 (6th Cir.2003). By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has elected to pursue the second approach. See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.2003); see also Saiz v. Burnett, 296 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that if the state court correctly applied chapman federal courts do not apply brecht unless the state courts chapman analysis violated aedpa",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCalifornia Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have addressed Medina's other arguments in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 2 . A \"pedicab” is a bicycle with a passenger compartment attached to the rear. 3 . The Sixth Circuit took the lead by following the first approach in Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 371-72 (6th Cir.1999); see also Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 718 (6th Cir.2003). By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has elected to pursue the second approach. See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.2003); see also Saiz v. Burnett, 296 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that federal courts should apply state substantive law",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCalifornia Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have addressed Medina's other arguments in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 2 . A \"pedicab” is a bicycle with a passenger compartment attached to the rear. 3 . The Sixth Circuit took the lead by following the first approach in Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 371-72 (6th Cir.1999); see also Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 718 (6th Cir.2003). By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has elected to pursue the second approach. See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.2003); see also Saiz v. Burnett, 296 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that where state rules of civil procedure apply to courts of the state they do not apply to adjudicatory proceedings before state agencies",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCalifornia Court of Appeal’s harmless error analysis was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief. AFFIRMED. 1 . We have addressed Medina's other arguments in a concurrently filed memorandum disposition. 2 . A \"pedicab” is a bicycle with a passenger compartment attached to the rear. 3 . The Sixth Circuit took the lead by following the first approach in Nevers v. Killinger, 169 F.3d 352, 371-72 (6th Cir.1999); see also Hill v. Hofbauer, 337 F.3d 706, 718 (6th Cir.2003). By contrast, the Tenth Circuit has elected to pursue the second approach. See Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1220, 1224 (10th Cir.2003); see also Saiz v. Burnett, 296 F.3d 1008, 1012-13 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that district courts do not have appellate jurisdiction over state courts"
] | ). Other circuits have reserved judgment. See, | 1 |
898 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLagunas to at least ten years incarceration.” Lagunas I, 214 Fed.Appx. at 845. Thereafter, the United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission) issued Amendment 706 which modified the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c) downward two levels for crack cocaine, effective November 1, 2007, and retroactive as of March 3, 2008. In February 2008, Mr. Lagunas filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the changes in the Drug Quantity Table and the resulting two-level reduction in offense levels. See Lagunas II, 309 Fed.Appx. at 266. Following appointment of counsel for Mr. Lagunas and pleadings filed by the parties, the district court filed an order denying Mr. Lagunas’s § 3582(c) mot U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2335, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (holding the minimum mandatory threemonth custodial sentence for second offenders under former dwi provisions of njsa 39450 reflects the intention to prohibit suspended sentences",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLagunas to at least ten years incarceration.” Lagunas I, 214 Fed.Appx. at 845. Thereafter, the United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission) issued Amendment 706 which modified the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c) downward two levels for crack cocaine, effective November 1, 2007, and retroactive as of March 3, 2008. In February 2008, Mr. Lagunas filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the changes in the Drug Quantity Table and the resulting two-level reduction in offense levels. See Lagunas II, 309 Fed.Appx. at 266. Following appointment of counsel for Mr. Lagunas and pleadings filed by the parties, the district court filed an order denying Mr. Lagunas’s § 3582(c) mot U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2335, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (holding the revised mandatory minimum sentences in the fair sentencing act applied to preaet offenders sentenced after august 3 2010",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLagunas to at least ten years incarceration.” Lagunas I, 214 Fed.Appx. at 845. Thereafter, the United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission) issued Amendment 706 which modified the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c) downward two levels for crack cocaine, effective November 1, 2007, and retroactive as of March 3, 2008. In February 2008, Mr. Lagunas filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the changes in the Drug Quantity Table and the resulting two-level reduction in offense levels. See Lagunas II, 309 Fed.Appx. at 266. Following appointment of counsel for Mr. Lagunas and pleadings filed by the parties, the district court filed an order denying Mr. Lagunas’s § 3582(c) mot U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2335, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (holding that even if the minimum mandatory exceeds the statutory maximum the court must impose the minimum mandatory",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLagunas to at least ten years incarceration.” Lagunas I, 214 Fed.Appx. at 845. Thereafter, the United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission) issued Amendment 706 which modified the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c) downward two levels for crack cocaine, effective November 1, 2007, and retroactive as of March 3, 2008. In February 2008, Mr. Lagunas filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the changes in the Drug Quantity Table and the resulting two-level reduction in offense levels. See Lagunas II, 309 Fed.Appx. at 266. Following appointment of counsel for Mr. Lagunas and pleadings filed by the parties, the district court filed an order denying Mr. Lagunas’s § 3582(c) mot U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2335, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (holding that a district court commits reversible error when it sentences a defendant to less than the statutory minimum where no exception to the mandatory minimum applies",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nLagunas to at least ten years incarceration.” Lagunas I, 214 Fed.Appx. at 845. Thereafter, the United States Sentencing Commission (Sentencing Commission) issued Amendment 706 which modified the Drug Quantity Table in U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(c) downward two levels for crack cocaine, effective November 1, 2007, and retroactive as of March 3, 2008. In February 2008, Mr. Lagunas filed a motion to reduce his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on the changes in the Drug Quantity Table and the resulting two-level reduction in offense levels. See Lagunas II, 309 Fed.Appx. at 266. Following appointment of counsel for Mr. Lagunas and pleadings filed by the parties, the district court filed an order denying Mr. Lagunas’s § 3582(c) mot U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 2321, 2335, 183 L.Ed.2d 250 (2012) (holding that the operative provision in determining the defendants applicable sentencing range is the statutory minimum not the crack cocaine guideline and that the defendants were still subject to the mandatory minimum upon which their substantial assistance departures and thus them ultimate sentences were based"
] | ). In addition, the Act directed the Sentencing | 1 |
899 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nit did not reach the question of immunity. Given the conclusions we have reached, however, it is necessary for us to do so. Under § 820.2, a public employee cannot be held liable for any injury resulting from “his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” The City correctly asserts that § 820.2 applies to county social workers engaged in investigating allegations of child abuse, and extends to other public employees whom those social workers “reasonably enlist to assist in the investigation.” Newton v. County of Napa, 217 Cal.App.3d 1551, 266 Cal.Rptr. 682, 687 (Cal.App.1990); Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 271 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519-20 (Cal.App.1990) (holding failure to exercise discretion is abuse of discretion",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nit did not reach the question of immunity. Given the conclusions we have reached, however, it is necessary for us to do so. Under § 820.2, a public employee cannot be held liable for any injury resulting from “his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” The City correctly asserts that § 820.2 applies to county social workers engaged in investigating allegations of child abuse, and extends to other public employees whom those social workers “reasonably enlist to assist in the investigation.” Newton v. County of Napa, 217 Cal.App.3d 1551, 266 Cal.Rptr. 682, 687 (Cal.App.1990); Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 271 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519-20 (Cal.App.1990) (holding that the workers compensation act is to be liberally construed in the employees favor and any doubt in its construction is thus resolved in favor of the employee",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nit did not reach the question of immunity. Given the conclusions we have reached, however, it is necessary for us to do so. Under § 820.2, a public employee cannot be held liable for any injury resulting from “his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” The City correctly asserts that § 820.2 applies to county social workers engaged in investigating allegations of child abuse, and extends to other public employees whom those social workers “reasonably enlist to assist in the investigation.” Newton v. County of Napa, 217 Cal.App.3d 1551, 266 Cal.Rptr. 682, 687 (Cal.App.1990); Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 271 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519-20 (Cal.App.1990) (holding that social workers immunity is designed to protect the continu ing exercise of discretion in favor of the protection of minor children",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nit did not reach the question of immunity. Given the conclusions we have reached, however, it is necessary for us to do so. Under § 820.2, a public employee cannot be held liable for any injury resulting from “his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” The City correctly asserts that § 820.2 applies to county social workers engaged in investigating allegations of child abuse, and extends to other public employees whom those social workers “reasonably enlist to assist in the investigation.” Newton v. County of Napa, 217 Cal.App.3d 1551, 266 Cal.Rptr. 682, 687 (Cal.App.1990); Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 271 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519-20 (Cal.App.1990) (holding that in its review of the irs exercise of discretion the court is limited to a review of the administrative record",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nit did not reach the question of immunity. Given the conclusions we have reached, however, it is necessary for us to do so. Under § 820.2, a public employee cannot be held liable for any injury resulting from “his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.” The City correctly asserts that § 820.2 applies to county social workers engaged in investigating allegations of child abuse, and extends to other public employees whom those social workers “reasonably enlist to assist in the investigation.” Newton v. County of Napa, 217 Cal.App.3d 1551, 266 Cal.Rptr. 682, 687 (Cal.App.1990); Alicia T. v. County of Los Angeles, 222 Cal.App.3d 869, 271 Cal.Rptr. 513, 519-20 (Cal.App.1990) (holding that under mayfield the exercise of discretion based on a mistaken premise of law can be a failure to properly exercise discretion"
] | ). This immunity provides complete protection | 2 |
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