id int64 0 3.55k | input_options listlengths 5 5 | output stringlengths 11 48 | gold_index int64 0 4 |
|---|---|---|---|
900 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nclaims. See 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. (2d ed.) § 3522 (1984 & Supp.2008); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (discussing the limited categories of cases where the Supreme Court has found complete preemption). The only circuit court to have considered whether the PMPA triggers the complete preemption doctrine is the Ninth Circuit, which found that it did not. Yorn v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 952 F.2d 408 (tbl.), 1992 WL 2872 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1992) (un-pub.). In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that “[wjhile the PMPA may provide Unocal with a viable pre-emption defense to Yorn’s common law claims, it is for the California courts to make this determinatio .D.Pa.1986) (holding that pmpa preempted new york statutory law governing the termination or nonrenewal of franchises but did not preempt state contract claim which did not involve the termination of the franchise relationship",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nclaims. See 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. (2d ed.) § 3522 (1984 & Supp.2008); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (discussing the limited categories of cases where the Supreme Court has found complete preemption). The only circuit court to have considered whether the PMPA triggers the complete preemption doctrine is the Ninth Circuit, which found that it did not. Yorn v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 952 F.2d 408 (tbl.), 1992 WL 2872 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1992) (un-pub.). In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that “[wjhile the PMPA may provide Unocal with a viable pre-emption defense to Yorn’s common law claims, it is for the California courts to make this determinatio .D.Pa.1986) (holding that fraud claim concerning nonrenewal of franchise agreement was preempted by pmpa",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nclaims. See 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. (2d ed.) § 3522 (1984 & Supp.2008); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (discussing the limited categories of cases where the Supreme Court has found complete preemption). The only circuit court to have considered whether the PMPA triggers the complete preemption doctrine is the Ninth Circuit, which found that it did not. Yorn v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 952 F.2d 408 (tbl.), 1992 WL 2872 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1992) (un-pub.). In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that “[wjhile the PMPA may provide Unocal with a viable pre-emption defense to Yorn’s common law claims, it is for the California courts to make this determinatio .D.Pa.1986) (holding that pmpa preempted state statute regarding the ter initiation and nonrenewal of franchises and state commonlaw claim",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nclaims. See 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. (2d ed.) § 3522 (1984 & Supp.2008); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (discussing the limited categories of cases where the Supreme Court has found complete preemption). The only circuit court to have considered whether the PMPA triggers the complete preemption doctrine is the Ninth Circuit, which found that it did not. Yorn v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 952 F.2d 408 (tbl.), 1992 WL 2872 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1992) (un-pub.). In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that “[wjhile the PMPA may provide Unocal with a viable pre-emption defense to Yorn’s common law claims, it is for the California courts to make this determinatio .D.Pa.1986) (holding that the plaintiffs state law claims were preempted by pmpa because they sought to impose standards more stringent than the pmpa regarding the termination or nonrenewal of his franchise",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nclaims. See 13 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Fed. Prac. & Proc. (2d ed.) § 3522 (1984 & Supp.2008); Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 123 S.Ct. 2058, 156 L.Ed.2d 1 (2003) (discussing the limited categories of cases where the Supreme Court has found complete preemption). The only circuit court to have considered whether the PMPA triggers the complete preemption doctrine is the Ninth Circuit, which found that it did not. Yorn v. Union Oil Co. of Calif., 952 F.2d 408 (tbl.), 1992 WL 2872 (9th Cir. Jan. 7, 1992) (un-pub.). In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that “[wjhile the PMPA may provide Unocal with a viable pre-emption defense to Yorn’s common law claims, it is for the California courts to make this determinatio .D.Pa.1986) (holding state law claim premised on implied duty of good faith was preempted by the pmpa because it concerned the termination of a petroleum franchise"
] | ). Sunoco cites one instance where a federal | 2 |
901 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nHRS § 11— 13 that Kaho'ohalahala was a Lanai resident, which is a conclusion of law reviewable under the right/wrong standard. Dupree states that the Board’s determination that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lanai resident is entitled to “a presumption of validity[,”] citing Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai'i 217, 226, 941 P.2d 300, 309 (1997). In Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Inc. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 112 Hawai'i 489, 146 P.3d 1066 (2006), this court identified the applicable standard of review as follows: An agency’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, while an agency’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. A conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous stand 0, 179 P.3d 1050, 1053, 1056-57 (2008) (holding that we consider an agencys expertise or special knowledge when application of the regulation is primarily factual and necessarily requires application of the agencys technical knowledge and expertise to the facts presented citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nHRS § 11— 13 that Kaho'ohalahala was a Lanai resident, which is a conclusion of law reviewable under the right/wrong standard. Dupree states that the Board’s determination that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lanai resident is entitled to “a presumption of validity[,”] citing Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai'i 217, 226, 941 P.2d 300, 309 (1997). In Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Inc. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 112 Hawai'i 489, 146 P.3d 1066 (2006), this court identified the applicable standard of review as follows: An agency’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, while an agency’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. A conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous stand 0, 179 P.3d 1050, 1053, 1056-57 (2008) (holding that when an administrative agencys decision was a mixed question of fact and law a reviewing court should apply a clearly erroneous standard of review",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nHRS § 11— 13 that Kaho'ohalahala was a Lanai resident, which is a conclusion of law reviewable under the right/wrong standard. Dupree states that the Board’s determination that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lanai resident is entitled to “a presumption of validity[,”] citing Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai'i 217, 226, 941 P.2d 300, 309 (1997). In Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Inc. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 112 Hawai'i 489, 146 P.3d 1066 (2006), this court identified the applicable standard of review as follows: An agency’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, while an agency’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. A conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous stand 0, 179 P.3d 1050, 1053, 1056-57 (2008) (holding that we show deference to an agencys conclusions in the area of its expertise",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nHRS § 11— 13 that Kaho'ohalahala was a Lanai resident, which is a conclusion of law reviewable under the right/wrong standard. Dupree states that the Board’s determination that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lanai resident is entitled to “a presumption of validity[,”] citing Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai'i 217, 226, 941 P.2d 300, 309 (1997). In Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Inc. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 112 Hawai'i 489, 146 P.3d 1066 (2006), this court identified the applicable standard of review as follows: An agency’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, while an agency’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. A conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous stand 0, 179 P.3d 1050, 1053, 1056-57 (2008) (holding that where both mixed questions of fact and law are presented deference will be given to the agencys expertise and experience in the particular field and the court should not substitute its own judgment for that of the ageneyt and that the chief election officer did not clearly err in rejecting signatures on a petition for inclusion on the presidential ballot citation omitted",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nHRS § 11— 13 that Kaho'ohalahala was a Lanai resident, which is a conclusion of law reviewable under the right/wrong standard. Dupree states that the Board’s determination that Kaho'ohalahala was not a Lanai resident is entitled to “a presumption of validity[,”] citing Keliipuleole v. Wilson, 85 Hawai'i 217, 226, 941 P.2d 300, 309 (1997). In Del Monte Fresh Produce (Hawaii), Inc. v. Int’l Longshore & Warehouse Union, 112 Hawai'i 489, 146 P.3d 1066 (2006), this court identified the applicable standard of review as follows: An agency’s conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, while an agency’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error. A conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous stand 0, 179 P.3d 1050, 1053, 1056-57 (2008) (holding that in general an agencys conclusion of law that presents mixed questions of fact and law is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard but questions concerning whether an agency has followed proper procedures or considered the appropriate factors in making its determination are questions of law which are reviewed de novo"
] | ). B. Jurisdiction “The existence of | 3 |
902 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is— (1) a judicial lien ... 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). Thus, under the statute, a debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien if three requirements are met: (1) there was a fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property; (2) the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled; and (3) the lien is a judicial lien. See Culver, LLC v. Chiu, 304 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir.2002). The parties do not dispute that Wilding has met the first and third requirements; Wilding had an interest in his house before the lien attached and the lien was a judicial lien. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991) (holding that the debtor must have had an interest in the property before the lien attached to take advantage of 522f",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is— (1) a judicial lien ... 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). Thus, under the statute, a debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien if three requirements are met: (1) there was a fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property; (2) the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled; and (3) the lien is a judicial lien. See Culver, LLC v. Chiu, 304 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir.2002). The parties do not dispute that Wilding has met the first and third requirements; Wilding had an interest in his house before the lien attached and the lien was a judicial lien. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991) (holding that 522f1 requires a debtor to have possessed an interest to which a lien attached before it attached to avoid the fixing of the lien on that interest",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is— (1) a judicial lien ... 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). Thus, under the statute, a debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien if three requirements are met: (1) there was a fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property; (2) the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled; and (3) the lien is a judicial lien. See Culver, LLC v. Chiu, 304 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir.2002). The parties do not dispute that Wilding has met the first and third requirements; Wilding had an interest in his house before the lien attached and the lien was a judicial lien. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991) (holding that debtor cannot take advantage of 522f after debtor has transferred his exempt property",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is— (1) a judicial lien ... 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). Thus, under the statute, a debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien if three requirements are met: (1) there was a fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property; (2) the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled; and (3) the lien is a judicial lien. See Culver, LLC v. Chiu, 304 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir.2002). The parties do not dispute that Wilding has met the first and third requirements; Wilding had an interest in his house before the lien attached and the lien was a judicial lien. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991) (holding that a debtors ability to utilize 522f to avoid a judicial lien is not dependent upon the debtor receiving a discharge ",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthat such lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection (b) of this section, if such lien is— (1) a judicial lien ... 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1). Thus, under the statute, a debtor may avoid the fixing of a lien if three requirements are met: (1) there was a fixing of a lien on an interest of the debtor in property; (2) the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled; and (3) the lien is a judicial lien. See Culver, LLC v. Chiu, 304 F.3d 905, 908 (9th Cir.2002). The parties do not dispute that Wilding has met the first and third requirements; Wilding had an interest in his house before the lien attached and the lien was a judicial lien. See Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 500 U.S. 291, 297-98, 111 S.Ct. 1825, 114 L.Ed.2d 337 (1991) (holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien"
] | ); see also Patriot Portfolio LLC v. Weinstein | 0 |
903 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThe Eighth Circuit, in U.S. v. ■ Ferro, concluded that all other circuits which have considered the issue have specifically held that the statute is mandatory. United States v. Ferro, 321 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir.2003)(finding that involuntary hospitalization was mandatory where district court had determined that defendant was incompetent); id. at 761 (“[U]pon our own reading of the statute, we conclude that after determining that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, a district court is required to commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for a reasonable period of time to evaluate whether treatment would allow the trial to proceed.”). See United States v. Filippi, 211 F.3d 649, 651 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir.1990)(holding the statutory burden is on the defendant to prove he is incompetent to stand trial",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThe Eighth Circuit, in U.S. v. ■ Ferro, concluded that all other circuits which have considered the issue have specifically held that the statute is mandatory. United States v. Ferro, 321 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir.2003)(finding that involuntary hospitalization was mandatory where district court had determined that defendant was incompetent); id. at 761 (“[U]pon our own reading of the statute, we conclude that after determining that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, a district court is required to commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for a reasonable period of time to evaluate whether treatment would allow the trial to proceed.”). See United States v. Filippi, 211 F.3d 649, 651 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir.1990)(holding waiver of right to counsel at sentencing not voluntary when trial court tried to dissuade discharge of counsel defendant believed incompetent for the waiver to be voluntary the trial court must inquire into the reasons for the defendants dissatisfaction with his counsel to ensure that the defendant is not exercising a choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro se",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThe Eighth Circuit, in U.S. v. ■ Ferro, concluded that all other circuits which have considered the issue have specifically held that the statute is mandatory. United States v. Ferro, 321 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir.2003)(finding that involuntary hospitalization was mandatory where district court had determined that defendant was incompetent); id. at 761 (“[U]pon our own reading of the statute, we conclude that after determining that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, a district court is required to commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for a reasonable period of time to evaluate whether treatment would allow the trial to proceed.”). See United States v. Filippi, 211 F.3d 649, 651 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir.1990)(holding that the statute is mandatory and that once the district court found that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial it did not have authority to circumvent his commitment to the custody of the united states attorney general for hospitalization until it could be determined whether probability existed that the defendant would regain capacity to be tried",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThe Eighth Circuit, in U.S. v. ■ Ferro, concluded that all other circuits which have considered the issue have specifically held that the statute is mandatory. United States v. Ferro, 321 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir.2003)(finding that involuntary hospitalization was mandatory where district court had determined that defendant was incompetent); id. at 761 (“[U]pon our own reading of the statute, we conclude that after determining that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, a district court is required to commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for a reasonable period of time to evaluate whether treatment would allow the trial to proceed.”). See United States v. Filippi, 211 F.3d 649, 651 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir.1990)(holding that it would be improper for a united states district attorney to prosecute a defendant using information the prosecutor had obtained while acting as the accuseds private attorney",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThe Eighth Circuit, in U.S. v. ■ Ferro, concluded that all other circuits which have considered the issue have specifically held that the statute is mandatory. United States v. Ferro, 321 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir.2003)(finding that involuntary hospitalization was mandatory where district court had determined that defendant was incompetent); id. at 761 (“[U]pon our own reading of the statute, we conclude that after determining that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial, a district court is required to commit the defendant to the custody of the Attorney General for a reasonable period of time to evaluate whether treatment would allow the trial to proceed.”). See United States v. Filippi, 211 F.3d 649, 651 (1st Cir.2000); United States v. Donofrio, 896 F.2d 1301, 1302 (11th Cir.1990)(holding that if the attorney general issues a scope certificate the action must be removed to federal court and the united states must be substituted as the party defendant by the plain language of 28 usc 2679d2 no discretion is given to the district court"
] | ); United States v. Azure, 279 F.Supp.2d 1093, | 2 |
904 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe appeal). 40 . 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). 41 . Healey v. Chelsea Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 624 (2d Cir.1991) (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 (May 12, 1934) (explanatory memorandum of Senator Fletcher, sponsor of proposed section 11(e))). 42 . Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (\"the Copyright Act”) (\"In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party ... the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs ”) (emphasis added); Adsani, 139 F.3d at 75 (finding the Copyright Act a fee-shifting statute for purposes of a Rule 7 bond). 43 . See P. Mem. at 8-9 (citing In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 128 (S.D.N.Y.1999)). 44 . Cf In re Air Cargo, 2010 WL 1049269, at *2 (holding that the bond was intended to and did substantially comply with sjection 71323 therefore because its conditions were not broader and more protective than the statute required the contention that the bond was a common law bond failed",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe appeal). 40 . 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). 41 . Healey v. Chelsea Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 624 (2d Cir.1991) (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 (May 12, 1934) (explanatory memorandum of Senator Fletcher, sponsor of proposed section 11(e))). 42 . Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (\"the Copyright Act”) (\"In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party ... the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs ”) (emphasis added); Adsani, 139 F.3d at 75 (finding the Copyright Act a fee-shifting statute for purposes of a Rule 7 bond). 43 . See P. Mem. at 8-9 (citing In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 128 (S.D.N.Y.1999)). 44 . Cf In re Air Cargo, 2010 WL 1049269, at *2 (holding that an appeal is perfected when the appeal bond is filed",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe appeal). 40 . 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). 41 . Healey v. Chelsea Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 624 (2d Cir.1991) (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 (May 12, 1934) (explanatory memorandum of Senator Fletcher, sponsor of proposed section 11(e))). 42 . Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (\"the Copyright Act”) (\"In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party ... the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs ”) (emphasis added); Adsani, 139 F.3d at 75 (finding the Copyright Act a fee-shifting statute for purposes of a Rule 7 bond). 43 . See P. Mem. at 8-9 (citing In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 128 (S.D.N.Y.1999)). 44 . Cf In re Air Cargo, 2010 WL 1049269, at *2 (holding that even though a bond contained provisions not required by statute it must be considered statutory and not common law because the bond did not expand the payment provisions beyond those stated in statute",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe appeal). 40 . 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). 41 . Healey v. Chelsea Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 624 (2d Cir.1991) (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 (May 12, 1934) (explanatory memorandum of Senator Fletcher, sponsor of proposed section 11(e))). 42 . Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (\"the Copyright Act”) (\"In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party ... the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs ”) (emphasis added); Adsani, 139 F.3d at 75 (finding the Copyright Act a fee-shifting statute for purposes of a Rule 7 bond). 43 . See P. Mem. at 8-9 (citing In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 128 (S.D.N.Y.1999)). 44 . Cf In re Air Cargo, 2010 WL 1049269, at *2 (holding delay damages cannot be included in an appeal bond because the underlying statute did not provide for the inclusion of such costs",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthe appeal). 40 . 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e). 41 . Healey v. Chelsea Res., Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 624 (2d Cir.1991) (citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8669 (May 12, 1934) (explanatory memorandum of Senator Fletcher, sponsor of proposed section 11(e))). 42 . Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (\"the Copyright Act”) (\"In any civil action under this title, the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party ... the court may also award a reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party as part of the costs ”) (emphasis added); Adsani, 139 F.3d at 75 (finding the Copyright Act a fee-shifting statute for purposes of a Rule 7 bond). 43 . See P. Mem. at 8-9 (citing In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 187 F.R.D. 124, 128 (S.D.N.Y.1999)). 44 . Cf In re Air Cargo, 2010 WL 1049269, at *2 (holding that taxable costs included only the premium on a surety bond posted on appeal not the fees paid for letters of credit to secure the bond where the state statute and court rule only specifically allowed for premium on any surety bond"
] | ); In re AOL Time Warner, 2007 WL 2741033, at *4 | 3 |
905 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCo., 55 Ill. App. 3d 91, 98 (1977). Moreover, if the promisee bargains with the promisor to render a performance directly to a third party, in nearly every case the promisee will have intended to benefit that third party. Fox Lake, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 911. Here, Advanced clearly stands to benefit from the contract between McCormick and Berbee. Thus, this court must determine from the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the parties whether the benefit to Advanced is direct or incidental. Although the intent of the parties must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the cases cited by the parties to this appeal provide examples on both sides of this issue. Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding prior to gonzaga that medicaid provision requiring nursing facilities to provide certain services was intended for the benefit of the recipients and not for the benefit of the facilities",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCo., 55 Ill. App. 3d 91, 98 (1977). Moreover, if the promisee bargains with the promisor to render a performance directly to a third party, in nearly every case the promisee will have intended to benefit that third party. Fox Lake, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 911. Here, Advanced clearly stands to benefit from the contract between McCormick and Berbee. Thus, this court must determine from the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the parties whether the benefit to Advanced is direct or incidental. Although the intent of the parties must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the cases cited by the parties to this appeal provide examples on both sides of this issue. Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding that the parties purchase agreement did not require a showing of prejudice for plaintiff to assert that defendant waived its claim for indemnification",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCo., 55 Ill. App. 3d 91, 98 (1977). Moreover, if the promisee bargains with the promisor to render a performance directly to a third party, in nearly every case the promisee will have intended to benefit that third party. Fox Lake, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 911. Here, Advanced clearly stands to benefit from the contract between McCormick and Berbee. Thus, this court must determine from the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the parties whether the benefit to Advanced is direct or incidental. Although the intent of the parties must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the cases cited by the parties to this appeal provide examples on both sides of this issue. Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding that where purchaser had taken possession and paid part of the purchase price the statute of frauds did not bar enforcement of a purchase agreement",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCo., 55 Ill. App. 3d 91, 98 (1977). Moreover, if the promisee bargains with the promisor to render a performance directly to a third party, in nearly every case the promisee will have intended to benefit that third party. Fox Lake, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 911. Here, Advanced clearly stands to benefit from the contract between McCormick and Berbee. Thus, this court must determine from the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the parties whether the benefit to Advanced is direct or incidental. Although the intent of the parties must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the cases cited by the parties to this appeal provide examples on both sides of this issue. Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding that a creditors pmsi in goods sold to debtors did not survive consolidation of the original installment contract with a later contract for the purchase of additional goods",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nCo., 55 Ill. App. 3d 91, 98 (1977). Moreover, if the promisee bargains with the promisor to render a performance directly to a third party, in nearly every case the promisee will have intended to benefit that third party. Fox Lake, 178 Ill. App. 3d at 911. Here, Advanced clearly stands to benefit from the contract between McCormick and Berbee. Thus, this court must determine from the language of the contract and the circumstances surrounding the parties whether the benefit to Advanced is direct or incidental. Although the intent of the parties must be determined on a case-by-case basis, the cases cited by the parties to this appeal provide examples on both sides of this issue. Courts have held that the benefit was direct in the following cases: (1) Carson Pirie Scott, 346 Ill. at 261 (holding that an agreement to purchase certain goods from a named vendor and pay for them if the hotel company did not was for the direct benefit of the vendor"
] | ); (2) Resnik, 78 Ill. 2d at 386-87 (determining | 4 |
906 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor each form of relief sought”). 1. Injury The injury must be an “injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not- “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); then quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983))). There is no “legally protected interest” in maintaining the privacy of one’s bank records from government access. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (holding that defendant had legitimate expectation of privacy in contents of locked safe stored in his apartment but owned by third party",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor each form of relief sought”). 1. Injury The injury must be an “injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not- “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); then quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983))). There is no “legally protected interest” in maintaining the privacy of one’s bank records from government access. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (holding bank clients had no legitimate expectation of privacy in banking information revealed to a third party",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor each form of relief sought”). 1. Injury The injury must be an “injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not- “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); then quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983))). There is no “legally protected interest” in maintaining the privacy of one’s bank records from government access. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (holding that the plaintiff had no legitimate expectation of privacy at a meeting with coworkers in which her termination was discussed",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor each form of relief sought”). 1. Injury The injury must be an “injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not- “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); then quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983))). There is no “legally protected interest” in maintaining the privacy of one’s bank records from government access. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (holding that a bank customer did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in records maintained by the bank",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nfor each form of relief sought”). 1. Injury The injury must be an “injury in fact,” meaning “an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent, not- “conjectural” or “hypothetical.” ’ ” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (first quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984); then quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990) (quoting Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983))). There is no “legally protected interest” in maintaining the privacy of one’s bank records from government access. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442, 96 S.Ct. 1619, 48 L.Ed.2d 71 (1976) (holding that the defendant cannot claim a reasonable expectation of privacy in the governments acquisition of his subscriber information including his ip address and name because it had been revealed to a third party internal quotation marks omitted"
] | ); United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 | 1 |
907 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.App. 1987). In this case, Plaintiff filed a pretrial motion to exclude the assailant from being considered a concurrent tortfeasor. The motion cited Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Gorp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995), the same authority Plaintiff relies on in this appeal. Plaintiff thus fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on this issue and preserved it for appeal. See id. (explaining liabilities of concurrent and successive tortfeasors). {36} We are unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue by failing to object to the trial court’s jury instructions on comparative negligence. In so contending, Defendants rely on Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 729, 688 P.2d 333, 339 (Ct.App.1984) (holding that a party waived an allegation that an instruction was erroneous where the party failed to object at trial to the instruction on those grounds",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.App. 1987). In this case, Plaintiff filed a pretrial motion to exclude the assailant from being considered a concurrent tortfeasor. The motion cited Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Gorp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995), the same authority Plaintiff relies on in this appeal. Plaintiff thus fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on this issue and preserved it for appeal. See id. (explaining liabilities of concurrent and successive tortfeasors). {36} We are unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue by failing to object to the trial court’s jury instructions on comparative negligence. In so contending, Defendants rely on Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 729, 688 P.2d 333, 339 (Ct.App.1984) (holding that party waived an objection to choice of law",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.App. 1987). In this case, Plaintiff filed a pretrial motion to exclude the assailant from being considered a concurrent tortfeasor. The motion cited Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Gorp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995), the same authority Plaintiff relies on in this appeal. Plaintiff thus fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on this issue and preserved it for appeal. See id. (explaining liabilities of concurrent and successive tortfeasors). {36} We are unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue by failing to object to the trial court’s jury instructions on comparative negligence. In so contending, Defendants rely on Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 729, 688 P.2d 333, 339 (Ct.App.1984) (holding defendant waived complaint",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.App. 1987). In this case, Plaintiff filed a pretrial motion to exclude the assailant from being considered a concurrent tortfeasor. The motion cited Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Gorp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995), the same authority Plaintiff relies on in this appeal. Plaintiff thus fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on this issue and preserved it for appeal. See id. (explaining liabilities of concurrent and successive tortfeasors). {36} We are unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue by failing to object to the trial court’s jury instructions on comparative negligence. In so contending, Defendants rely on Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 729, 688 P.2d 333, 339 (Ct.App.1984) (holding that party waived public policy challenge by failing to raise it during arbitration",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n496, 745 P.2d 717, 721 (Ct.App. 1987). In this case, Plaintiff filed a pretrial motion to exclude the assailant from being considered a concurrent tortfeasor. The motion cited Lujan v. Healthsouth Rehabilitation Gorp., 120 N.M. 422, 902 P.2d 1025 (1995), the same authority Plaintiff relies on in this appeal. Plaintiff thus fairly invoked a ruling of the trial court on this issue and preserved it for appeal. See id. (explaining liabilities of concurrent and successive tortfeasors). {36} We are unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff failed to preserve this issue by failing to object to the trial court’s jury instructions on comparative negligence. In so contending, Defendants rely on Pittard v. Four Seasons Motor Inn, Inc., 101 N.M. 723, 729, 688 P.2d 333, 339 (Ct.App.1984) (holding that party waived complaint regarding instruction where it did not raise specific objection"
] | ), and Romero v. Mervyn’s, 109 N.M. 249, 253 n. | 4 |
908 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFDC Corporation was not final, but merely pending. Appellee argues that NMSA 1978, Section 53-16-11 (Repl.Pamp.1983), the statute addressing a corporation’s distribution of assets upon dissolution, can be read to require payment by the corporation of all final debts before making any provisions for any pending claims. However, nothing in that statute or in the New Mexico Business Corporation Act suggests that the legislature intended that final claims have priority over contingent claims. At the time FDC’s assets were distributed, Smith had a contingent claim with no precise amount owing. Nonetheless, it is clear that appellee Cox had knowledge of the lawsuit and knew that the corporation would have no assets to pay any ensuing judgment amount. See Robar Dev. Corp., 408 A.2d at 853 (holding that claims of corporation vest in corporation",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFDC Corporation was not final, but merely pending. Appellee argues that NMSA 1978, Section 53-16-11 (Repl.Pamp.1983), the statute addressing a corporation’s distribution of assets upon dissolution, can be read to require payment by the corporation of all final debts before making any provisions for any pending claims. However, nothing in that statute or in the New Mexico Business Corporation Act suggests that the legislature intended that final claims have priority over contingent claims. At the time FDC’s assets were distributed, Smith had a contingent claim with no precise amount owing. Nonetheless, it is clear that appellee Cox had knowledge of the lawsuit and knew that the corporation would have no assets to pay any ensuing judgment amount. See Robar Dev. Corp., 408 A.2d at 853 (holding that when one corporation transfers its assets to another the receiving corporation is not responsible for debts of transferor unless it agrees to assume these debts",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFDC Corporation was not final, but merely pending. Appellee argues that NMSA 1978, Section 53-16-11 (Repl.Pamp.1983), the statute addressing a corporation’s distribution of assets upon dissolution, can be read to require payment by the corporation of all final debts before making any provisions for any pending claims. However, nothing in that statute or in the New Mexico Business Corporation Act suggests that the legislature intended that final claims have priority over contingent claims. At the time FDC’s assets were distributed, Smith had a contingent claim with no precise amount owing. Nonetheless, it is clear that appellee Cox had knowledge of the lawsuit and knew that the corporation would have no assets to pay any ensuing judgment amount. See Robar Dev. Corp., 408 A.2d at 853 (holding that a corporation could not dissolve and distribute its assets without providing for contingent claims",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFDC Corporation was not final, but merely pending. Appellee argues that NMSA 1978, Section 53-16-11 (Repl.Pamp.1983), the statute addressing a corporation’s distribution of assets upon dissolution, can be read to require payment by the corporation of all final debts before making any provisions for any pending claims. However, nothing in that statute or in the New Mexico Business Corporation Act suggests that the legislature intended that final claims have priority over contingent claims. At the time FDC’s assets were distributed, Smith had a contingent claim with no precise amount owing. Nonetheless, it is clear that appellee Cox had knowledge of the lawsuit and knew that the corporation would have no assets to pay any ensuing judgment amount. See Robar Dev. Corp., 408 A.2d at 853 (holding that disaffiliated church had de facto dissolved when last vote of its full membership was to dissolve and to transfer assets to mother church",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFDC Corporation was not final, but merely pending. Appellee argues that NMSA 1978, Section 53-16-11 (Repl.Pamp.1983), the statute addressing a corporation’s distribution of assets upon dissolution, can be read to require payment by the corporation of all final debts before making any provisions for any pending claims. However, nothing in that statute or in the New Mexico Business Corporation Act suggests that the legislature intended that final claims have priority over contingent claims. At the time FDC’s assets were distributed, Smith had a contingent claim with no precise amount owing. Nonetheless, it is clear that appellee Cox had knowledge of the lawsuit and knew that the corporation would have no assets to pay any ensuing judgment amount. See Robar Dev. Corp., 408 A.2d at 853 (holding that a lawsuit against a corporation that purchased assets from a bankrupt is not a claim against the debtor"
] | ). Smith’s pending lawsuit did constitute a | 2 |
909 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncustomers were common in the industry, and pointed out that plaintiffs had not pleaded specifically how the individual defendants had acted fraudulently by counting such customers in a manner common to the industry. Id. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs have added ¶ 45(a), in which they allege that although Heartland represented in the press release that soft disconnects were common in the industry, “the counting of soft disconnects as ‘active’ subscribers is not, and to so count them was materially misleading.” Am.Compl. ¶ 45(a). Plaintiffs offer no facts to support their conclusory assertion that it was not customary in the industry to count soft disconnects as active subscribers. This allegation is insufficient as a matter of law to plead scienter. See Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1020 (holding that bare allegations about industry custom are inadequate to plead scienter",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncustomers were common in the industry, and pointed out that plaintiffs had not pleaded specifically how the individual defendants had acted fraudulently by counting such customers in a manner common to the industry. Id. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs have added ¶ 45(a), in which they allege that although Heartland represented in the press release that soft disconnects were common in the industry, “the counting of soft disconnects as ‘active’ subscribers is not, and to so count them was materially misleading.” Am.Compl. ¶ 45(a). Plaintiffs offer no facts to support their conclusory assertion that it was not customary in the industry to count soft disconnects as active subscribers. This allegation is insufficient as a matter of law to plead scienter. See Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1020 (holding that the nonmoving party may not defeat a summary judgment motion by standing on the bare allegations in the pleadings",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncustomers were common in the industry, and pointed out that plaintiffs had not pleaded specifically how the individual defendants had acted fraudulently by counting such customers in a manner common to the industry. Id. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs have added ¶ 45(a), in which they allege that although Heartland represented in the press release that soft disconnects were common in the industry, “the counting of soft disconnects as ‘active’ subscribers is not, and to so count them was materially misleading.” Am.Compl. ¶ 45(a). Plaintiffs offer no facts to support their conclusory assertion that it was not customary in the industry to count soft disconnects as active subscribers. This allegation is insufficient as a matter of law to plead scienter. See Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1020 (holding a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual allegations to establish that a plausible contract exists but need not plead every detail of the contract",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncustomers were common in the industry, and pointed out that plaintiffs had not pleaded specifically how the individual defendants had acted fraudulently by counting such customers in a manner common to the industry. Id. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs have added ¶ 45(a), in which they allege that although Heartland represented in the press release that soft disconnects were common in the industry, “the counting of soft disconnects as ‘active’ subscribers is not, and to so count them was materially misleading.” Am.Compl. ¶ 45(a). Plaintiffs offer no facts to support their conclusory assertion that it was not customary in the industry to count soft disconnects as active subscribers. This allegation is insufficient as a matter of law to plead scienter. See Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1020 (holding that plaintiffs bare allegations of malice do not suffice particularly where such allegations are contradicted by plaintiffs own claims that defendants actions were financially motivated",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\ncustomers were common in the industry, and pointed out that plaintiffs had not pleaded specifically how the individual defendants had acted fraudulently by counting such customers in a manner common to the industry. Id. In their amended complaint, plaintiffs have added ¶ 45(a), in which they allege that although Heartland represented in the press release that soft disconnects were common in the industry, “the counting of soft disconnects as ‘active’ subscribers is not, and to so count them was materially misleading.” Am.Compl. ¶ 45(a). Plaintiffs offer no facts to support their conclusory assertion that it was not customary in the industry to count soft disconnects as active subscribers. This allegation is insufficient as a matter of law to plead scienter. See Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1020 (holding that allegations of motive and opportunity were not enough to create a strong inference of scienter"
] | ). Nor do they address the other defects that | 0 |
910 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nWeintraub and Resnick, Freezing, the Debtor’s Account: A Banker’s Dilemma Under the Bankruptcy Code, 100 Banking Law Journal 316, 321-22 (1983); Groschadl, “Freezing” the Debtor’s Bank Account: A Violation of the Automatic Stay?, 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 75, 77 (1983); Freeman, Setoff Under the New Bankruptcy Code: The Effect on Bankers, 97 Banking Law Journal 484, 506 (1980). Unquestionably, if the funds in the bank accounts are indeed cash collateral, that is, if the bank has a valid claim within 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), subject to a setoff not defeated by the exceptions in 11 U.S.C. § 553(a), then the debtor in possession must obtain the Court’s authorization or the bank’s consent before drawing on the funds, 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2). See Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 B.R. at 812 (holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nWeintraub and Resnick, Freezing, the Debtor’s Account: A Banker’s Dilemma Under the Bankruptcy Code, 100 Banking Law Journal 316, 321-22 (1983); Groschadl, “Freezing” the Debtor’s Bank Account: A Violation of the Automatic Stay?, 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 75, 77 (1983); Freeman, Setoff Under the New Bankruptcy Code: The Effect on Bankers, 97 Banking Law Journal 484, 506 (1980). Unquestionably, if the funds in the bank accounts are indeed cash collateral, that is, if the bank has a valid claim within 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), subject to a setoff not defeated by the exceptions in 11 U.S.C. § 553(a), then the debtor in possession must obtain the Court’s authorization or the bank’s consent before drawing on the funds, 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2). See Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 B.R. at 812 (holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nWeintraub and Resnick, Freezing, the Debtor’s Account: A Banker’s Dilemma Under the Bankruptcy Code, 100 Banking Law Journal 316, 321-22 (1983); Groschadl, “Freezing” the Debtor’s Bank Account: A Violation of the Automatic Stay?, 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 75, 77 (1983); Freeman, Setoff Under the New Bankruptcy Code: The Effect on Bankers, 97 Banking Law Journal 484, 506 (1980). Unquestionably, if the funds in the bank accounts are indeed cash collateral, that is, if the bank has a valid claim within 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), subject to a setoff not defeated by the exceptions in 11 U.S.C. § 553(a), then the debtor in possession must obtain the Court’s authorization or the bank’s consent before drawing on the funds, 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2). See Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 B.R. at 812 (holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees avoidance power",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nWeintraub and Resnick, Freezing, the Debtor’s Account: A Banker’s Dilemma Under the Bankruptcy Code, 100 Banking Law Journal 316, 321-22 (1983); Groschadl, “Freezing” the Debtor’s Bank Account: A Violation of the Automatic Stay?, 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 75, 77 (1983); Freeman, Setoff Under the New Bankruptcy Code: The Effect on Bankers, 97 Banking Law Journal 484, 506 (1980). Unquestionably, if the funds in the bank accounts are indeed cash collateral, that is, if the bank has a valid claim within 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), subject to a setoff not defeated by the exceptions in 11 U.S.C. § 553(a), then the debtor in possession must obtain the Court’s authorization or the bank’s consent before drawing on the funds, 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2). See Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 B.R. at 812 (recognizing the requirement of 363 to obtain approval or consent in a chapter 13 case",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nWeintraub and Resnick, Freezing, the Debtor’s Account: A Banker’s Dilemma Under the Bankruptcy Code, 100 Banking Law Journal 316, 321-22 (1983); Groschadl, “Freezing” the Debtor’s Bank Account: A Violation of the Automatic Stay?, 57 American Bankruptcy Law Journal 75, 77 (1983); Freeman, Setoff Under the New Bankruptcy Code: The Effect on Bankers, 97 Banking Law Journal 484, 506 (1980). Unquestionably, if the funds in the bank accounts are indeed cash collateral, that is, if the bank has a valid claim within 11 U.S.C. § 506(a), subject to a setoff not defeated by the exceptions in 11 U.S.C. § 553(a), then the debtor in possession must obtain the Court’s authorization or the bank’s consent before drawing on the funds, 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2). See Cusanno v. Fidelity Bank, 29 B.R. at 812 (holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7"
] | ). Since, if the bank is right about the status | 3 |
911 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nshe was compensated less than each of these male employees in at least one year, (see Clark Decl. Ex. 80), and a reasonable jury could conclude that Huerta and Rizzo, as heads of regional teams, held substantially identical positions as Garcia, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 230, 233). Even if I assumed that all seven of Garcia’s alleged comparators held a position that v^as substantially equivalent to Garcia’s position, Garcia’s claims under the EPA and NYLL still fail because Barclays has proven an applicable affirmative defense—that it relied on factors other than sex in determining Garcia’s compensation and had legitimate business reasons for implementing those factors. See Forden v. Bristol Myers Squibb, 63 Fed.Appx. 14 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd 63 Fed.Appx. 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (holding that disparities in compensation were due to a number of permissible factors including seniority experience and performance",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nshe was compensated less than each of these male employees in at least one year, (see Clark Decl. Ex. 80), and a reasonable jury could conclude that Huerta and Rizzo, as heads of regional teams, held substantially identical positions as Garcia, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 230, 233). Even if I assumed that all seven of Garcia’s alleged comparators held a position that v^as substantially equivalent to Garcia’s position, Garcia’s claims under the EPA and NYLL still fail because Barclays has proven an applicable affirmative defense—that it relied on factors other than sex in determining Garcia’s compensation and had legitimate business reasons for implementing those factors. See Forden v. Bristol Myers Squibb, 63 Fed.Appx. 14 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd 63 Fed.Appx. 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (recognizing same factors",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nshe was compensated less than each of these male employees in at least one year, (see Clark Decl. Ex. 80), and a reasonable jury could conclude that Huerta and Rizzo, as heads of regional teams, held substantially identical positions as Garcia, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 230, 233). Even if I assumed that all seven of Garcia’s alleged comparators held a position that v^as substantially equivalent to Garcia’s position, Garcia’s claims under the EPA and NYLL still fail because Barclays has proven an applicable affirmative defense—that it relied on factors other than sex in determining Garcia’s compensation and had legitimate business reasons for implementing those factors. See Forden v. Bristol Myers Squibb, 63 Fed.Appx. 14 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd 63 Fed.Appx. 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (holding that the admissibility of lay witness identification testimony turns on a number of factors",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nshe was compensated less than each of these male employees in at least one year, (see Clark Decl. Ex. 80), and a reasonable jury could conclude that Huerta and Rizzo, as heads of regional teams, held substantially identical positions as Garcia, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 230, 233). Even if I assumed that all seven of Garcia’s alleged comparators held a position that v^as substantially equivalent to Garcia’s position, Garcia’s claims under the EPA and NYLL still fail because Barclays has proven an applicable affirmative defense—that it relied on factors other than sex in determining Garcia’s compensation and had legitimate business reasons for implementing those factors. See Forden v. Bristol Myers Squibb, 63 Fed.Appx. 14 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd 63 Fed.Appx. 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (holding that plaintiffs evidence of statistical disparities in hiring promotion and compensation was sufficient to support claim of intentional discrimination where the employment decisions were based on completely subjective criteria",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nshe was compensated less than each of these male employees in at least one year, (see Clark Decl. Ex. 80), and a reasonable jury could conclude that Huerta and Rizzo, as heads of regional teams, held substantially identical positions as Garcia, (Defs.’ 56.1 ¶¶ 230, 233). Even if I assumed that all seven of Garcia’s alleged comparators held a position that v^as substantially equivalent to Garcia’s position, Garcia’s claims under the EPA and NYLL still fail because Barclays has proven an applicable affirmative defense—that it relied on factors other than sex in determining Garcia’s compensation and had legitimate business reasons for implementing those factors. See Forden v. Bristol Myers Squibb, 63 Fed.Appx. 14 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd 63 Fed.Appx. 14, 15 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order) (recognizing a sound economic argument for the totaloffset rule as applied to estimates that exclude these latter factors while only including individual seniority and promotion gains"
] | ). As set forth in detail above, (see supra | 0 |
912 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nabusive manner” in which the discrimination is accomplished rather than a function of the actual discrimination itself. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 305, 97 S.Ct. 1056. Thomas has not met either of these requirements. Therefore, because Thomas’s wrongful discharge and civil conspiracy claims amount to a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation and a Farmer exception to preemption does not apply, Thomas’s claims are preempted by federal labor law. Because Thomas did not bring a federal claim within the applicable six-month statute of limitations for claims asserting a violation of the duty of fair representation, such a federal claim is now barred as untimely. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293-94, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (holding that the otca limitations period applied to a claim alleging a breach of the fair labor standards act by the state",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nabusive manner” in which the discrimination is accomplished rather than a function of the actual discrimination itself. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 305, 97 S.Ct. 1056. Thomas has not met either of these requirements. Therefore, because Thomas’s wrongful discharge and civil conspiracy claims amount to a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation and a Farmer exception to preemption does not apply, Thomas’s claims are preempted by federal labor law. Because Thomas did not bring a federal claim within the applicable six-month statute of limitations for claims asserting a violation of the duty of fair representation, such a federal claim is now barred as untimely. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293-94, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (holding that sixmonth duty of fair representation statute of limitations applicable to claim alleging breach of union contract",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nabusive manner” in which the discrimination is accomplished rather than a function of the actual discrimination itself. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 305, 97 S.Ct. 1056. Thomas has not met either of these requirements. Therefore, because Thomas’s wrongful discharge and civil conspiracy claims amount to a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation and a Farmer exception to preemption does not apply, Thomas’s claims are preempted by federal labor law. Because Thomas did not bring a federal claim within the applicable six-month statute of limitations for claims asserting a violation of the duty of fair representation, such a federal claim is now barred as untimely. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293-94, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (holding that state law fraud claims are preempted by the federal labor law duty of fair representation",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nabusive manner” in which the discrimination is accomplished rather than a function of the actual discrimination itself. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 305, 97 S.Ct. 1056. Thomas has not met either of these requirements. Therefore, because Thomas’s wrongful discharge and civil conspiracy claims amount to a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation and a Farmer exception to preemption does not apply, Thomas’s claims are preempted by federal labor law. Because Thomas did not bring a federal claim within the applicable six-month statute of limitations for claims asserting a violation of the duty of fair representation, such a federal claim is now barred as untimely. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293-94, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (holding that sixmonth limitations period established in delcostello applies to a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation brought only against a union",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nabusive manner” in which the discrimination is accomplished rather than a function of the actual discrimination itself. Farmer, 430 U.S. at 305, 97 S.Ct. 1056. Thomas has not met either of these requirements. Therefore, because Thomas’s wrongful discharge and civil conspiracy claims amount to a claim for a breach of the duty of fair representation and a Farmer exception to preemption does not apply, Thomas’s claims are preempted by federal labor law. Because Thomas did not bring a federal claim within the applicable six-month statute of limitations for claims asserting a violation of the duty of fair representation, such a federal claim is now barred as untimely. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169-70, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2293-94, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) (holding that sixmonth statute of limitations period for filing unfair labor practice charges applies to employees action for breach of the duty of fair representation"
] | ); Arnold v. Air Midwest, Inc., 100 F.3d 857, | 4 |
913 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof the changes, he has accepted the changes as a matter of law.” Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986). {15} It appears that the district court assumed, without deciding, that under Texas law Flemma would be deemed to have accepted the terms of the Program. We agree with Defendants that, under Texas law, mutual assent and acceptance of the Program and hence an agreement to arbitrate existed between Halliburton and Flemma. Flemma does not argue otherwise. {16} Asa Halliburton employee living and working in T exas when notice of the Program was initially sent to his address, Flemma’s continued employment constituted acceptance of the terms of the Program, including the arbitration requirement under Texas law. See In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d at 568-69 (holding the employee had 180 days to file a claim from the date the employee received final definitive and unequivocal notice of an adverse employment action",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof the changes, he has accepted the changes as a matter of law.” Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986). {15} It appears that the district court assumed, without deciding, that under Texas law Flemma would be deemed to have accepted the terms of the Program. We agree with Defendants that, under Texas law, mutual assent and acceptance of the Program and hence an agreement to arbitrate existed between Halliburton and Flemma. Flemma does not argue otherwise. {16} Asa Halliburton employee living and working in T exas when notice of the Program was initially sent to his address, Flemma’s continued employment constituted acceptance of the terms of the Program, including the arbitration requirement under Texas law. See In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d at 568-69 (holding that language in employee handbook stating that it was not to be considered as creating terms and conditions of an employment contract and that the employment relationship was employment atwill was sufficiently explicit to preclude the creation of implied contractual obligations as a matter of law",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof the changes, he has accepted the changes as a matter of law.” Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986). {15} It appears that the district court assumed, without deciding, that under Texas law Flemma would be deemed to have accepted the terms of the Program. We agree with Defendants that, under Texas law, mutual assent and acceptance of the Program and hence an agreement to arbitrate existed between Halliburton and Flemma. Flemma does not argue otherwise. {16} Asa Halliburton employee living and working in T exas when notice of the Program was initially sent to his address, Flemma’s continued employment constituted acceptance of the terms of the Program, including the arbitration requirement under Texas law. See In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d at 568-69 (holding that an employee accepted as a matter of law changes to an employment agreement by continuing employment with the company after he received notice of the changes",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof the changes, he has accepted the changes as a matter of law.” Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986). {15} It appears that the district court assumed, without deciding, that under Texas law Flemma would be deemed to have accepted the terms of the Program. We agree with Defendants that, under Texas law, mutual assent and acceptance of the Program and hence an agreement to arbitrate existed between Halliburton and Flemma. Flemma does not argue otherwise. {16} Asa Halliburton employee living and working in T exas when notice of the Program was initially sent to his address, Flemma’s continued employment constituted acceptance of the terms of the Program, including the arbitration requirement under Texas law. See In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d at 568-69 (holding covenant in an employment agreement executed some 12 years after the initial taking of employment was not incident to the taking of employment",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof the changes, he has accepted the changes as a matter of law.” Hathaway v. General Mills, Inc., 711 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. 1986). {15} It appears that the district court assumed, without deciding, that under Texas law Flemma would be deemed to have accepted the terms of the Program. We agree with Defendants that, under Texas law, mutual assent and acceptance of the Program and hence an agreement to arbitrate existed between Halliburton and Flemma. Flemma does not argue otherwise. {16} Asa Halliburton employee living and working in T exas when notice of the Program was initially sent to his address, Flemma’s continued employment constituted acceptance of the terms of the Program, including the arbitration requirement under Texas law. See In re Halliburton Co., 80 S.W.3d at 568-69 (holding that reassignments without salary or work changes do not ordinarily constitute adverse employment decisions in employment discrimination claims"
] | ). Halliburton subsequently reaffirmed the offer | 2 |
914 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nprovides: Rather, upon a particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief that underrepre-sentation in the jury pool or the venire exists as the result of practices of systematic exclusion, the court must make a reasonable effort to accommodate the defendant’s relevant requests for information designed to verify the existence of such underrepre-sentation and document its nature and extent. Gause I, supra, 959 A.2d at 685 (quoting People v. Jackson, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268 (1996)). In our view, this \"reasonable belief” standard raises a whole host of questions but supplies very few answers. And, to add yet another layer of complexity, the division majority appeared to somehow qualify its endorsement of California’s already confu 23 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that defendants right to discovery was satisfied by inspection of master lists and the relevant demographic data about the general pool from which the grand jurors were selected and thus defendants were not entitled to the names addresses and demographics of the individual grand jurors who returned indictments against them",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nprovides: Rather, upon a particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief that underrepre-sentation in the jury pool or the venire exists as the result of practices of systematic exclusion, the court must make a reasonable effort to accommodate the defendant’s relevant requests for information designed to verify the existence of such underrepre-sentation and document its nature and extent. Gause I, supra, 959 A.2d at 685 (quoting People v. Jackson, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268 (1996)). In our view, this \"reasonable belief” standard raises a whole host of questions but supplies very few answers. And, to add yet another layer of complexity, the division majority appeared to somehow qualify its endorsement of California’s already confu 23 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that a defendants false grand jury testimony was insufficient to establish perjury where the defendant was called before the grand jury for the mere purpose of laying the foundation for a perjury prosecution such testimony was immaterial to the grand jurys purpose",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nprovides: Rather, upon a particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief that underrepre-sentation in the jury pool or the venire exists as the result of practices of systematic exclusion, the court must make a reasonable effort to accommodate the defendant’s relevant requests for information designed to verify the existence of such underrepre-sentation and document its nature and extent. Gause I, supra, 959 A.2d at 685 (quoting People v. Jackson, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268 (1996)). In our view, this \"reasonable belief” standard raises a whole host of questions but supplies very few answers. And, to add yet another layer of complexity, the division majority appeared to somehow qualify its endorsement of California’s already confu 23 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that right was available in grand jury proceedings",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nprovides: Rather, upon a particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief that underrepre-sentation in the jury pool or the venire exists as the result of practices of systematic exclusion, the court must make a reasonable effort to accommodate the defendant’s relevant requests for information designed to verify the existence of such underrepre-sentation and document its nature and extent. Gause I, supra, 959 A.2d at 685 (quoting People v. Jackson, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268 (1996)). In our view, this \"reasonable belief” standard raises a whole host of questions but supplies very few answers. And, to add yet another layer of complexity, the division majority appeared to somehow qualify its endorsement of California’s already confu 23 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that the prosecuting attorneys failure to instruct grand jurors on the record of the elements of the relevant criminal offenses warranted dismissal of the indictment without a showing of prejudice",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nprovides: Rather, upon a particularized showing supporting a reasonable belief that underrepre-sentation in the jury pool or the venire exists as the result of practices of systematic exclusion, the court must make a reasonable effort to accommodate the defendant’s relevant requests for information designed to verify the existence of such underrepre-sentation and document its nature and extent. Gause I, supra, 959 A.2d at 685 (quoting People v. Jackson, 13 Cal.4th 1164, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254, 1268 (1996)). In our view, this \"reasonable belief” standard raises a whole host of questions but supplies very few answers. And, to add yet another layer of complexity, the division majority appeared to somehow qualify its endorsement of California’s already confu 23 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that racial discrimination in selection of grand jurors compelled dismissal of indictment"
] | ); United States v. Shapiro, 994 F.Supp. 146, | 0 |
915 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand perhaps the nature of the risk”), rev’d on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979). As a result, the Court holds that Santana deserves no relief under section 1132 for denial of benefits because Deluxe did not violate 29 U.S.C. § 1022. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to Deluxe on Counts Two, Three, and Eight. Consequently, the Court denies Santana’s motion on those counts. C. Contract Claim On Count Four, Deluxe moves for summary judgment by arguing that Santana’s common law contract action is preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).' Recognizing the expansive sweep of ERISA’s preemption provision, the Court will grant summary judgment on this Count. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (holding that state law relates to an employee benefit plan and is therefore preempted by erisa if it has a connection with or reference to such a plan",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand perhaps the nature of the risk”), rev’d on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979). As a result, the Court holds that Santana deserves no relief under section 1132 for denial of benefits because Deluxe did not violate 29 U.S.C. § 1022. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to Deluxe on Counts Two, Three, and Eight. Consequently, the Court denies Santana’s motion on those counts. C. Contract Claim On Count Four, Deluxe moves for summary judgment by arguing that Santana’s common law contract action is preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).' Recognizing the expansive sweep of ERISA’s preemption provision, the Court will grant summary judgment on this Count. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (holding breach of contract claim not preempted as a straightforward breach of contract action as it alleged violation of specific covenant",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand perhaps the nature of the risk”), rev’d on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979). As a result, the Court holds that Santana deserves no relief under section 1132 for denial of benefits because Deluxe did not violate 29 U.S.C. § 1022. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to Deluxe on Counts Two, Three, and Eight. Consequently, the Court denies Santana’s motion on those counts. C. Contract Claim On Count Four, Deluxe moves for summary judgment by arguing that Santana’s common law contract action is preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).' Recognizing the expansive sweep of ERISA’s preemption provision, the Court will grant summary judgment on this Count. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (holding breach of contract claim not preempted under hola",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand perhaps the nature of the risk”), rev’d on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979). As a result, the Court holds that Santana deserves no relief under section 1132 for denial of benefits because Deluxe did not violate 29 U.S.C. § 1022. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to Deluxe on Counts Two, Three, and Eight. Consequently, the Court denies Santana’s motion on those counts. C. Contract Claim On Count Four, Deluxe moves for summary judgment by arguing that Santana’s common law contract action is preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).' Recognizing the expansive sweep of ERISA’s preemption provision, the Court will grant summary judgment on this Count. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (holding that trial court erred by dismissing breach of contract claim because appellee made promises to perform specific acts in contract the breach of which would give rise to a breach of contract action",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand perhaps the nature of the risk”), rev’d on other grounds, 439 U.S. 551, 99 S.Ct. 790, 58 L.Ed.2d 808 (1979). As a result, the Court holds that Santana deserves no relief under section 1132 for denial of benefits because Deluxe did not violate 29 U.S.C. § 1022. Accordingly, the Court grants summary judgment to Deluxe on Counts Two, Three, and Eight. Consequently, the Court denies Santana’s motion on those counts. C. Contract Claim On Count Four, Deluxe moves for summary judgment by arguing that Santana’s common law contract action is preempted by ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).' Recognizing the expansive sweep of ERISA’s preemption provision, the Court will grant summary judgment on this Count. See Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 47, 107 S.Ct. 1549, 95 L.Ed.2d 39 (1987) (holding that state breach of contract action preempted because it relates to employee benefit plan"
] | ); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. | 4 |
916 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\npreserved error on the issue of the admissibility of Bolt’s testimony, we first must determine the intent of the district court ruling on Kircher’s motion in limine. Kircher’s motion in limine sought to prohibit Bolt from giving testimony concerning the standards of care applicable to certified public accountants, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, as well as any perceived errors in the audit’s work papers. In ruling on the motion, the district court concluded Bolt was not qualified to testify as to whether Kireher performed the audit pursuant to generally accepted auditing standards. The court then ruled, “Your motion is granted as to Bolt.” Subsequently, QCBT inquired whether the c eption to the general rule applies. See, e.g., Alberts, 722 N.W.2d at 407 (recognizing the rule and the exception but holding facts did not support claim to exception",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\npreserved error on the issue of the admissibility of Bolt’s testimony, we first must determine the intent of the district court ruling on Kircher’s motion in limine. Kircher’s motion in limine sought to prohibit Bolt from giving testimony concerning the standards of care applicable to certified public accountants, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, as well as any perceived errors in the audit’s work papers. In ruling on the motion, the district court concluded Bolt was not qualified to testify as to whether Kireher performed the audit pursuant to generally accepted auditing standards. The court then ruled, “Your motion is granted as to Bolt.” Subsequently, QCBT inquired whether the c eption to the general rule applies. See, e.g., Alberts, 722 N.W.2d at 407 (recognizing general rule",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\npreserved error on the issue of the admissibility of Bolt’s testimony, we first must determine the intent of the district court ruling on Kircher’s motion in limine. Kircher’s motion in limine sought to prohibit Bolt from giving testimony concerning the standards of care applicable to certified public accountants, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, as well as any perceived errors in the audit’s work papers. In ruling on the motion, the district court concluded Bolt was not qualified to testify as to whether Kireher performed the audit pursuant to generally accepted auditing standards. The court then ruled, “Your motion is granted as to Bolt.” Subsequently, QCBT inquired whether the c eption to the general rule applies. See, e.g., Alberts, 722 N.W.2d at 407 (holding that the exception to the general rule applied even though the court did not specifically rule the evidence was inadmissible because the ruling was definitive and reached the ultimate issue of admissibility",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\npreserved error on the issue of the admissibility of Bolt’s testimony, we first must determine the intent of the district court ruling on Kircher’s motion in limine. Kircher’s motion in limine sought to prohibit Bolt from giving testimony concerning the standards of care applicable to certified public accountants, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, as well as any perceived errors in the audit’s work papers. In ruling on the motion, the district court concluded Bolt was not qualified to testify as to whether Kireher performed the audit pursuant to generally accepted auditing standards. The court then ruled, “Your motion is granted as to Bolt.” Subsequently, QCBT inquired whether the c eption to the general rule applies. See, e.g., Alberts, 722 N.W.2d at 407 (holding that an exception to the general rule applied when counsel asked the court whether its ruling was the final order of the court and the court responded yes",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\npreserved error on the issue of the admissibility of Bolt’s testimony, we first must determine the intent of the district court ruling on Kircher’s motion in limine. Kircher’s motion in limine sought to prohibit Bolt from giving testimony concerning the standards of care applicable to certified public accountants, whether Kireher breached those standards, and causation, as well as any perceived errors in the audit’s work papers. In ruling on the motion, the district court concluded Bolt was not qualified to testify as to whether Kireher performed the audit pursuant to generally accepted auditing standards. The court then ruled, “Your motion is granted as to Bolt.” Subsequently, QCBT inquired whether the c eption to the general rule applies. See, e.g., Alberts, 722 N.W.2d at 407 (holding that rule 413b only requires disclosure of the evidence itself fifteen days prior to trial and the rule does not impose on the government a separate obligation to specifically disclose or declare the intention to rely upon rule 413 for admissibility"
] | ). Accordingly, the court’s ruling had the | 2 |
917 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstatements made to investment analysts. Defendants confuse the test under which they can be held indirectly liable for misleading opinions or statements by analysts or other third parties with the test under which they can be held directly liable for their own misleading statements to analysts. Defendants “cannot escape liability simply because [they] carried out [their] alleged fraud through the public statements of third parties.” Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir.1996). See also McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 821 (9th Cir.1996) (finding accountant liable for providing fraudulent audit report to corporation where accounting firm knew report would be incorporated in 10-K and distributed to investors); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir.1980) (holding government could be liable for breach of a contractual obligation to purchase insurance for plaintiff",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstatements made to investment analysts. Defendants confuse the test under which they can be held indirectly liable for misleading opinions or statements by analysts or other third parties with the test under which they can be held directly liable for their own misleading statements to analysts. Defendants “cannot escape liability simply because [they] carried out [their] alleged fraud through the public statements of third parties.” Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir.1996). See also McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 821 (9th Cir.1996) (finding accountant liable for providing fraudulent audit report to corporation where accounting firm knew report would be incorporated in 10-K and distributed to investors); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir.1980) (holding that attempted firstdegree murder may be committed knowingly or intentionally",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstatements made to investment analysts. Defendants confuse the test under which they can be held indirectly liable for misleading opinions or statements by analysts or other third parties with the test under which they can be held directly liable for their own misleading statements to analysts. Defendants “cannot escape liability simply because [they] carried out [their] alleged fraud through the public statements of third parties.” Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir.1996). See also McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 821 (9th Cir.1996) (finding accountant liable for providing fraudulent audit report to corporation where accounting firm knew report would be incorporated in 10-K and distributed to investors); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir.1980) (holding summary judgment was not warranted because material facts were in dispute",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstatements made to investment analysts. Defendants confuse the test under which they can be held indirectly liable for misleading opinions or statements by analysts or other third parties with the test under which they can be held directly liable for their own misleading statements to analysts. Defendants “cannot escape liability simply because [they] carried out [their] alleged fraud through the public statements of third parties.” Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir.1996). See also McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 821 (9th Cir.1996) (finding accountant liable for providing fraudulent audit report to corporation where accounting firm knew report would be incorporated in 10-K and distributed to investors); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir.1980) (holding management could be liable for intentionally misstating material facts to analysts",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nstatements made to investment analysts. Defendants confuse the test under which they can be held indirectly liable for misleading opinions or statements by analysts or other third parties with the test under which they can be held directly liable for their own misleading statements to analysts. Defendants “cannot escape liability simply because [they] carried out [their] alleged fraud through the public statements of third parties.” Warshaw v. Xoma Corp., 74 F.3d 955, 959 (9th Cir.1996). See also McGann v. Ernst & Young, 95 F.3d 821 (9th Cir.1996) (finding accountant liable for providing fraudulent audit report to corporation where accounting firm knew report would be incorporated in 10-K and distributed to investors); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 164 (2d Cir.1980) (holding that evidence submitted for a motion to reopen must be material and state new facts that rebut the underlying finding"
] | ); Alfus v. Pyramid Technology Corp., 764 | 3 |
918 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmemorandum, at 4-5 n. 5 (Pa.Super. filed October 17, 2007) (“Reed II”). This Court has explained that “[w]here a decision rests on two or more grounds equally valid, none may be relegated to the inferior status of obiter dictum.” Commonwealth v. Swing, 409 Pa. 241, 245, 186 A.2d 24, 26 (1962). In the instant case, while the Superior Court in Reed I determined that Reed’s claims were waived, it also determined that even if the claims had not been waived, they were without merit, and the court explained the basis for its conclusions. Thus, the Superior Court’s holding in Reed I that Reed’s claim regarding the admission of prior bad acts testimony was meritless was a valid holding that constitutes the law of the case, see Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 578, 664 A.2d 1326, 1333 (1995) (holding law of case doctrine is not absolute rule that must be inexorably followed in every case",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmemorandum, at 4-5 n. 5 (Pa.Super. filed October 17, 2007) (“Reed II”). This Court has explained that “[w]here a decision rests on two or more grounds equally valid, none may be relegated to the inferior status of obiter dictum.” Commonwealth v. Swing, 409 Pa. 241, 245, 186 A.2d 24, 26 (1962). In the instant case, while the Superior Court in Reed I determined that Reed’s claims were waived, it also determined that even if the claims had not been waived, they were without merit, and the court explained the basis for its conclusions. Thus, the Superior Court’s holding in Reed I that Reed’s claim regarding the admission of prior bad acts testimony was meritless was a valid holding that constitutes the law of the case, see Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 578, 664 A.2d 1326, 1333 (1995) (holding that the law of the case doctrine is not a fixed rule that prevents a federal court from determining the question of its own subject matter jurisdiction in a given case",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmemorandum, at 4-5 n. 5 (Pa.Super. filed October 17, 2007) (“Reed II”). This Court has explained that “[w]here a decision rests on two or more grounds equally valid, none may be relegated to the inferior status of obiter dictum.” Commonwealth v. Swing, 409 Pa. 241, 245, 186 A.2d 24, 26 (1962). In the instant case, while the Superior Court in Reed I determined that Reed’s claims were waived, it also determined that even if the claims had not been waived, they were without merit, and the court explained the basis for its conclusions. Thus, the Superior Court’s holding in Reed I that Reed’s claim regarding the admission of prior bad acts testimony was meritless was a valid holding that constitutes the law of the case, see Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 578, 664 A.2d 1326, 1333 (1995) (holding law of case doctrine is procedural and does not go to jurisdiction of court",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmemorandum, at 4-5 n. 5 (Pa.Super. filed October 17, 2007) (“Reed II”). This Court has explained that “[w]here a decision rests on two or more grounds equally valid, none may be relegated to the inferior status of obiter dictum.” Commonwealth v. Swing, 409 Pa. 241, 245, 186 A.2d 24, 26 (1962). In the instant case, while the Superior Court in Reed I determined that Reed’s claims were waived, it also determined that even if the claims had not been waived, they were without merit, and the court explained the basis for its conclusions. Thus, the Superior Court’s holding in Reed I that Reed’s claim regarding the admission of prior bad acts testimony was meritless was a valid holding that constitutes the law of the case, see Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 578, 664 A.2d 1326, 1333 (1995) (holding that the coordinate jurisdiction rule and all its attendant meanings and limitations expressed in previous case law would be assumed into law of the case doctrine",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nmemorandum, at 4-5 n. 5 (Pa.Super. filed October 17, 2007) (“Reed II”). This Court has explained that “[w]here a decision rests on two or more grounds equally valid, none may be relegated to the inferior status of obiter dictum.” Commonwealth v. Swing, 409 Pa. 241, 245, 186 A.2d 24, 26 (1962). In the instant case, while the Superior Court in Reed I determined that Reed’s claims were waived, it also determined that even if the claims had not been waived, they were without merit, and the court explained the basis for its conclusions. Thus, the Superior Court’s holding in Reed I that Reed’s claim regarding the admission of prior bad acts testimony was meritless was a valid holding that constitutes the law of the case, see Commonwealth v. Starr, 541 Pa. 564, 578, 664 A.2d 1326, 1333 (1995) (holding that application of the doctrine of law of the case is discretionary and that a district court abuses its discretion in applying the law of the case doctrine only if 1 the first decision was clearly erroneous 2 an intervening change in the law occurred 3 the evidence on remand was substantially different 4 other changed circumstances exist or 5 a manifest injustice would otherwise result"
] | ), constraining the Court in Reed II. However, | 3 |
919 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto treat Kyler as a boy precisely because of his gender non-conformance. In fact, the Complaint alleges that one RCHSD employee told him, “Honey, I would call you ‘he,’ but you’re such a pretty girl.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) Accord ingly, Ms. Prescott’s claim on behalf of Kyler survives under the ACA . it Standing RCHSD argues that Ms. Prescott lacks standing to assert a section 1557 claim on her own behalf because she is not an aggrieved party. However, as Ms. Prescott has noted, she is not bringing the claim on her behalf, but instead on behalf of Kyler. While Ms. Prescott is unable to bring a claim as an individual, she certainly can bring the claim on behalf of Kyler within her representative capacity. See Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F.Supp.3d 1106, 1114-1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto treat Kyler as a boy precisely because of his gender non-conformance. In fact, the Complaint alleges that one RCHSD employee told him, “Honey, I would call you ‘he,’ but you’re such a pretty girl.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) Accord ingly, Ms. Prescott’s claim on behalf of Kyler survives under the ACA . it Standing RCHSD argues that Ms. Prescott lacks standing to assert a section 1557 claim on her own behalf because she is not an aggrieved party. However, as Ms. Prescott has noted, she is not bringing the claim on her behalf, but instead on behalf of Kyler. While Ms. Prescott is unable to bring a claim as an individual, she certainly can bring the claim on behalf of Kyler within her representative capacity. See Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F.Supp.3d 1106, 1114-1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto treat Kyler as a boy precisely because of his gender non-conformance. In fact, the Complaint alleges that one RCHSD employee told him, “Honey, I would call you ‘he,’ but you’re such a pretty girl.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) Accord ingly, Ms. Prescott’s claim on behalf of Kyler survives under the ACA . it Standing RCHSD argues that Ms. Prescott lacks standing to assert a section 1557 claim on her own behalf because she is not an aggrieved party. However, as Ms. Prescott has noted, she is not bringing the claim on her behalf, but instead on behalf of Kyler. While Ms. Prescott is unable to bring a claim as an individual, she certainly can bring the claim on behalf of Kyler within her representative capacity. See Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F.Supp.3d 1106, 1114-1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that plaintiff had standing to bring a rico conspiracy claim despite his inability to bring a substantive rico claim",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto treat Kyler as a boy precisely because of his gender non-conformance. In fact, the Complaint alleges that one RCHSD employee told him, “Honey, I would call you ‘he,’ but you’re such a pretty girl.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) Accord ingly, Ms. Prescott’s claim on behalf of Kyler survives under the ACA . it Standing RCHSD argues that Ms. Prescott lacks standing to assert a section 1557 claim on her own behalf because she is not an aggrieved party. However, as Ms. Prescott has noted, she is not bringing the claim on her behalf, but instead on behalf of Kyler. While Ms. Prescott is unable to bring a claim as an individual, she certainly can bring the claim on behalf of Kyler within her representative capacity. See Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F.Supp.3d 1106, 1114-1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that a claim for damages exists in an action to enforce title ix",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto treat Kyler as a boy precisely because of his gender non-conformance. In fact, the Complaint alleges that one RCHSD employee told him, “Honey, I would call you ‘he,’ but you’re such a pretty girl.” (Compl. ¶ 44.) Accord ingly, Ms. Prescott’s claim on behalf of Kyler survives under the ACA . it Standing RCHSD argues that Ms. Prescott lacks standing to assert a section 1557 claim on her own behalf because she is not an aggrieved party. However, as Ms. Prescott has noted, she is not bringing the claim on her behalf, but instead on behalf of Kyler. While Ms. Prescott is unable to bring a claim as an individual, she certainly can bring the claim on behalf of Kyler within her representative capacity. See Lopez v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 5 F.Supp.3d 1106, 1114-1115 (N.D. Cal. 2013) (holding that a claim for retaliation does not lie under title ix"
] | ). Hi. Declaratory and Injunctive Relief Under | 0 |
920 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconsequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated. Id. at 158. In other words, while the Constitution does grant a privilege of confronting ones accusers, that privilege is lost if the accuser causes the witness's unavailability at trial. ¶ 40. Since the Reynolds decision, the Court has continued to acknowledge the concept that a defendant can forfeit through misconduct his or her confrontation rights. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 451-53 (1912) (holding that a hearsay statement can itself be considered in first determining if a conspiracy existed when the statement was made",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconsequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated. Id. at 158. In other words, while the Constitution does grant a privilege of confronting ones accusers, that privilege is lost if the accuser causes the witness's unavailability at trial. ¶ 40. Since the Reynolds decision, the Court has continued to acknowledge the concept that a defendant can forfeit through misconduct his or her confrontation rights. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 451-53 (1912) (holding that defendant who introduced hearsay statement waived objection to admission of another part of same statement",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconsequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated. Id. at 158. In other words, while the Constitution does grant a privilege of confronting ones accusers, that privilege is lost if the accuser causes the witness's unavailability at trial. ¶ 40. Since the Reynolds decision, the Court has continued to acknowledge the concept that a defendant can forfeit through misconduct his or her confrontation rights. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 451-53 (1912) (holding that a defendant waives right to object to a hearsay statement on confrontation grounds when he or she offers the statement",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconsequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated. Id. at 158. In other words, while the Constitution does grant a privilege of confronting ones accusers, that privilege is lost if the accuser causes the witness's unavailability at trial. ¶ 40. Since the Reynolds decision, the Court has continued to acknowledge the concept that a defendant can forfeit through misconduct his or her confrontation rights. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 451-53 (1912) (holding that a statement implying that the defendant was guilty of the crime for which he was on trial was inadmissible hearsay",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nconsequences of his own wrongful acts. It grants him the privilege of being confronted with the witnesses against him; but if he voluntarily keeps the witnesses away, he cannot insist on his privilege. If, therefore, when absent by his procurement, their evidence is supplied in some lawful way, he is in no condition to assert that his constitutional rights have been violated. Id. at 158. In other words, while the Constitution does grant a privilege of confronting ones accusers, that privilege is lost if the accuser causes the witness's unavailability at trial. ¶ 40. Since the Reynolds decision, the Court has continued to acknowledge the concept that a defendant can forfeit through misconduct his or her confrontation rights. See, e.g., Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 451-53 (1912) (holding prior statement subject to crossexamination when made does not violate confrontation clause"
] | ); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 | 2 |
921 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npossession. It is. As part of the conspiracy to advertise child pornography, all defendants are accountable for the images depicting child pornography on the KOFD board. United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir.1999) (defendant “pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy[,] and the reasonably foreseeable actions taken by his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy” were properly attributed to him). B. Total amount of the victim’s los 7 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 12, 2014). The disaggregation of costs is not necessarily a brightline however, and the continued harm and abuse arising out of the viewing of child pornography images may be part of a continuing, concerted harm. Compare United States v. Sanders, 52 F.Supp.3d, 1329, 1338-39, 2014 WL 5033280, at *8 (N.DiGa. Oct. 9, 2014) (holding that the psychological injuries related to the initial abuse were not sufficiently disaggregated from those arising from the viewing of the images because the counselors report did not show the victim suffered any harm from the continued viewing andor spread of the images",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npossession. It is. As part of the conspiracy to advertise child pornography, all defendants are accountable for the images depicting child pornography on the KOFD board. United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir.1999) (defendant “pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy[,] and the reasonably foreseeable actions taken by his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy” were properly attributed to him). B. Total amount of the victim’s los 7 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 12, 2014). The disaggregation of costs is not necessarily a brightline however, and the continued harm and abuse arising out of the viewing of child pornography images may be part of a continuing, concerted harm. Compare United States v. Sanders, 52 F.Supp.3d, 1329, 1338-39, 2014 WL 5033280, at *8 (N.DiGa. Oct. 9, 2014) (holding that a release of such claims or other matters arising from the beginning of time to the date of execution of this agreement did not protect the defendant from liability arising from unconstitutional conduct that occurred after the agreements execution",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npossession. It is. As part of the conspiracy to advertise child pornography, all defendants are accountable for the images depicting child pornography on the KOFD board. United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir.1999) (defendant “pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy[,] and the reasonably foreseeable actions taken by his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy” were properly attributed to him). B. Total amount of the victim’s los 7 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 12, 2014). The disaggregation of costs is not necessarily a brightline however, and the continued harm and abuse arising out of the viewing of child pornography images may be part of a continuing, concerted harm. Compare United States v. Sanders, 52 F.Supp.3d, 1329, 1338-39, 2014 WL 5033280, at *8 (N.DiGa. Oct. 9, 2014) (holding that pornographic videos and images were properly authenticated where the government presented detailed evidence as to the chain of custody specifically how the images were retrieved from the defendants computers",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npossession. It is. As part of the conspiracy to advertise child pornography, all defendants are accountable for the images depicting child pornography on the KOFD board. United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir.1999) (defendant “pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy[,] and the reasonably foreseeable actions taken by his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy” were properly attributed to him). B. Total amount of the victim’s los 7 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 12, 2014). The disaggregation of costs is not necessarily a brightline however, and the continued harm and abuse arising out of the viewing of child pornography images may be part of a continuing, concerted harm. Compare United States v. Sanders, 52 F.Supp.3d, 1329, 1338-39, 2014 WL 5033280, at *8 (N.DiGa. Oct. 9, 2014) (holding that general losses must be sufficiently disaggregated from losses caused by the initial abuser when determining those losses caused by the continuing traffic of the images",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\npossession. It is. As part of the conspiracy to advertise child pornography, all defendants are accountable for the images depicting child pornography on the KOFD board. United States v. Laney, 189 F.3d 954, 965 (9th Cir.1999) (defendant “pled guilty to participating in a conspiracy[,] and the reasonably foreseeable actions taken by his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy” were properly attributed to him). B. Total amount of the victim’s los 7 (E.D.Cal. Aug. 12, 2014). The disaggregation of costs is not necessarily a brightline however, and the continued harm and abuse arising out of the viewing of child pornography images may be part of a continuing, concerted harm. Compare United States v. Sanders, 52 F.Supp.3d, 1329, 1338-39, 2014 WL 5033280, at *8 (N.DiGa. Oct. 9, 2014) (holding that government must introduce relevant evidence in addition to the alleged pornographic images to prove that images depict real child"
] | ) with United States v. Galan, 2014 WL 3474901, | 0 |
922 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nregarding the admissibility of the confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins is that Polk’s meeting with Howard, in which Howard initially confessed constituted a “police-initiated custodial interrogation” in violation of Edwards, ie., a poisonous tree, and that the resulting confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins were inadmissible “tainted fruit.” Assuming, without deciding, that Polk’s actions were on behalf of law enforcement and that his questioning of Howard while he was in custody constituted a “custodial interrogation” under Miranda, we nevertheless reject Howard’s claim. Howard invoked his Fifth Amendment right tó counsel prior to his. interview with Polk, thereby triggering the protections of Edwards. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 (holding that under the fifth amendment once an accused person in custody has expressed his or her desire to deal with the police only through counsel that person is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nregarding the admissibility of the confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins is that Polk’s meeting with Howard, in which Howard initially confessed constituted a “police-initiated custodial interrogation” in violation of Edwards, ie., a poisonous tree, and that the resulting confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins were inadmissible “tainted fruit.” Assuming, without deciding, that Polk’s actions were on behalf of law enforcement and that his questioning of Howard while he was in custody constituted a “custodial interrogation” under Miranda, we nevertheless reject Howard’s claim. Howard invoked his Fifth Amendment right tó counsel prior to his. interview with Polk, thereby triggering the protections of Edwards. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 (holding that an accused who has invoked the right to counsel is not subject to further interrogation unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nregarding the admissibility of the confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins is that Polk’s meeting with Howard, in which Howard initially confessed constituted a “police-initiated custodial interrogation” in violation of Edwards, ie., a poisonous tree, and that the resulting confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins were inadmissible “tainted fruit.” Assuming, without deciding, that Polk’s actions were on behalf of law enforcement and that his questioning of Howard while he was in custody constituted a “custodial interrogation” under Miranda, we nevertheless reject Howard’s claim. Howard invoked his Fifth Amendment right tó counsel prior to his. interview with Polk, thereby triggering the protections of Edwards. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 (holding that edwards precludes further interrogation unless he the accused himself initiates further communications",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nregarding the admissibility of the confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins is that Polk’s meeting with Howard, in which Howard initially confessed constituted a “police-initiated custodial interrogation” in violation of Edwards, ie., a poisonous tree, and that the resulting confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins were inadmissible “tainted fruit.” Assuming, without deciding, that Polk’s actions were on behalf of law enforcement and that his questioning of Howard while he was in custody constituted a “custodial interrogation” under Miranda, we nevertheless reject Howard’s claim. Howard invoked his Fifth Amendment right tó counsel prior to his. interview with Polk, thereby triggering the protections of Edwards. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 (holding that subsequent to an invocation of counsel the edwards per se rule does not apply if an accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nregarding the admissibility of the confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins is that Polk’s meeting with Howard, in which Howard initially confessed constituted a “police-initiated custodial interrogation” in violation of Edwards, ie., a poisonous tree, and that the resulting confessions to Agent Battle and Lieutenant Hitchins were inadmissible “tainted fruit.” Assuming, without deciding, that Polk’s actions were on behalf of law enforcement and that his questioning of Howard while he was in custody constituted a “custodial interrogation” under Miranda, we nevertheless reject Howard’s claim. Howard invoked his Fifth Amendment right tó counsel prior to his. interview with Polk, thereby triggering the protections of Edwards. See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885 (holding that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further policeinitiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights an accused having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him unless the accused himself initiates further communication exchanges or conversations with the police"
] | ). Howard claims that Polk initiated the | 1 |
923 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n899 P.2d 1004. “A claim becomes liquidated when both the amount due and the date on which it is due are fixed and certain, or when the same becomes definitely ascertainable by mathematical computation.” Kilner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Kan. 675, 686, 847 P.2d 1292 (1993). Prejudgment interest is not recoverable when damages “are not ascertainable by computation, based on some fixed standard of measurement.” Foster v. City of Augusta, 174 Kan. 324, 332, 256 P.2d 121 (1953). In most tort cases, prejudgment interest is not appropriate under K.S.A. § 16-201 because the amount of damages due a plaintiff are not “fixed and certain” until a jury resolves questions of fact and the court enters judgment. See, e.g., Whittenburg v. L.J. Holding Co., 838 F.Supp. 519, 519 (D.Kan.1993) (holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n899 P.2d 1004. “A claim becomes liquidated when both the amount due and the date on which it is due are fixed and certain, or when the same becomes definitely ascertainable by mathematical computation.” Kilner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Kan. 675, 686, 847 P.2d 1292 (1993). Prejudgment interest is not recoverable when damages “are not ascertainable by computation, based on some fixed standard of measurement.” Foster v. City of Augusta, 174 Kan. 324, 332, 256 P.2d 121 (1953). In most tort cases, prejudgment interest is not appropriate under K.S.A. § 16-201 because the amount of damages due a plaintiff are not “fixed and certain” until a jury resolves questions of fact and the court enters judgment. See, e.g., Whittenburg v. L.J. Holding Co., 838 F.Supp. 519, 519 (D.Kan.1993) (holding that prejudgment interest should not be added to damages awarded for misrepresentation because the amount of damages were not liquidated or ascertainable before the verdict",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n899 P.2d 1004. “A claim becomes liquidated when both the amount due and the date on which it is due are fixed and certain, or when the same becomes definitely ascertainable by mathematical computation.” Kilner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Kan. 675, 686, 847 P.2d 1292 (1993). Prejudgment interest is not recoverable when damages “are not ascertainable by computation, based on some fixed standard of measurement.” Foster v. City of Augusta, 174 Kan. 324, 332, 256 P.2d 121 (1953). In most tort cases, prejudgment interest is not appropriate under K.S.A. § 16-201 because the amount of damages due a plaintiff are not “fixed and certain” until a jury resolves questions of fact and the court enters judgment. See, e.g., Whittenburg v. L.J. Holding Co., 838 F.Supp. 519, 519 (D.Kan.1993) (holding that the amount of damages in a sex discrimination case was in dispute until the court entered judgment on the jury verdict the sum was not liquidated for ksa 16 201 purposes",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n899 P.2d 1004. “A claim becomes liquidated when both the amount due and the date on which it is due are fixed and certain, or when the same becomes definitely ascertainable by mathematical computation.” Kilner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Kan. 675, 686, 847 P.2d 1292 (1993). Prejudgment interest is not recoverable when damages “are not ascertainable by computation, based on some fixed standard of measurement.” Foster v. City of Augusta, 174 Kan. 324, 332, 256 P.2d 121 (1953). In most tort cases, prejudgment interest is not appropriate under K.S.A. § 16-201 because the amount of damages due a plaintiff are not “fixed and certain” until a jury resolves questions of fact and the court enters judgment. See, e.g., Whittenburg v. L.J. Holding Co., 838 F.Supp. 519, 519 (D.Kan.1993) (holding that where the amount of damages was the primary issue in dispute the plaintiffs claim for damages was not liquidated until the date the jury returned its verdict and the plaintiffs are not entitled to prejudgment interest under ksa 16 201",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\n899 P.2d 1004. “A claim becomes liquidated when both the amount due and the date on which it is due are fixed and certain, or when the same becomes definitely ascertainable by mathematical computation.” Kilner v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Kan. 675, 686, 847 P.2d 1292 (1993). Prejudgment interest is not recoverable when damages “are not ascertainable by computation, based on some fixed standard of measurement.” Foster v. City of Augusta, 174 Kan. 324, 332, 256 P.2d 121 (1953). In most tort cases, prejudgment interest is not appropriate under K.S.A. § 16-201 because the amount of damages due a plaintiff are not “fixed and certain” until a jury resolves questions of fact and the court enters judgment. See, e.g., Whittenburg v. L.J. Holding Co., 838 F.Supp. 519, 519 (D.Kan.1993) (holding that prejudgment interest is based on the amount of the judgment not the total amount of damages awarded by the jury because nonsettling defendants have no control over settlement negotiations and should not be forced to pay prejudgment interest on settling defendants parts of a damages award"
] | ); Torre v. Federated Mutual Ins. Co., 906 | 3 |
924 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nare accustomed to using paragraph P as a basis to search parolees, either without suspicion or suspicion based on the high-crime nature of the area. The officer then contacts the front desk attendant of the motel to ascertain whether the parolee is checked into the motel and, if so, to obtain the room number. At approximately 8:30 a.m. on May 25, 2009, Officer Dennis Tripp followed this protocol during his patrol of the Traveler Motel. The license plate check of a 1996 Oldsmobile showed it was registered to Baldón. Upon learning this, Officer Tripp called the shift commander, Sergeant Piazza, and asked him to contact parole officer Kevin Peterson. Pursuant to the protocol, Sergeant Piazza informed Peterson that Baldón was at the motel. He also asked Peterson for pe 757, 762 (1998) (holding parolee consented to search of his email based on the parole agreement",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nare accustomed to using paragraph P as a basis to search parolees, either without suspicion or suspicion based on the high-crime nature of the area. The officer then contacts the front desk attendant of the motel to ascertain whether the parolee is checked into the motel and, if so, to obtain the room number. At approximately 8:30 a.m. on May 25, 2009, Officer Dennis Tripp followed this protocol during his patrol of the Traveler Motel. The license plate check of a 1996 Oldsmobile showed it was registered to Baldón. Upon learning this, Officer Tripp called the shift commander, Sergeant Piazza, and asked him to contact parole officer Kevin Peterson. Pursuant to the protocol, Sergeant Piazza informed Peterson that Baldón was at the motel. He also asked Peterson for pe 757, 762 (1998) (holding parolee waives constitutional searchandseizure rights by voluntarily signing parole agreement",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nare accustomed to using paragraph P as a basis to search parolees, either without suspicion or suspicion based on the high-crime nature of the area. The officer then contacts the front desk attendant of the motel to ascertain whether the parolee is checked into the motel and, if so, to obtain the room number. At approximately 8:30 a.m. on May 25, 2009, Officer Dennis Tripp followed this protocol during his patrol of the Traveler Motel. The license plate check of a 1996 Oldsmobile showed it was registered to Baldón. Upon learning this, Officer Tripp called the shift commander, Sergeant Piazza, and asked him to contact parole officer Kevin Peterson. Pursuant to the protocol, Sergeant Piazza informed Peterson that Baldón was at the motel. He also asked Peterson for pe 757, 762 (1998) (holding that parole status alone is insufficient to justify search of a parolee",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nare accustomed to using paragraph P as a basis to search parolees, either without suspicion or suspicion based on the high-crime nature of the area. The officer then contacts the front desk attendant of the motel to ascertain whether the parolee is checked into the motel and, if so, to obtain the room number. At approximately 8:30 a.m. on May 25, 2009, Officer Dennis Tripp followed this protocol during his patrol of the Traveler Motel. The license plate check of a 1996 Oldsmobile showed it was registered to Baldón. Upon learning this, Officer Tripp called the shift commander, Sergeant Piazza, and asked him to contact parole officer Kevin Peterson. Pursuant to the protocol, Sergeant Piazza informed Peterson that Baldón was at the motel. He also asked Peterson for pe 757, 762 (1998) (holding defendant does not waive fourth amendment protection by signing parole agreement but the search condition does confirm right of parole officer to conduct reasonable searches within scope of parole mission",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nare accustomed to using paragraph P as a basis to search parolees, either without suspicion or suspicion based on the high-crime nature of the area. The officer then contacts the front desk attendant of the motel to ascertain whether the parolee is checked into the motel and, if so, to obtain the room number. At approximately 8:30 a.m. on May 25, 2009, Officer Dennis Tripp followed this protocol during his patrol of the Traveler Motel. The license plate check of a 1996 Oldsmobile showed it was registered to Baldón. Upon learning this, Officer Tripp called the shift commander, Sergeant Piazza, and asked him to contact parole officer Kevin Peterson. Pursuant to the protocol, Sergeant Piazza informed Peterson that Baldón was at the motel. He also asked Peterson for pe 757, 762 (1998) (holding that notwithstanding an agreement the state still must have reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms of parole or committed a crime"
] | ); Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 548 Pa. | 1 |
925 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAdministrative Code states: Sale of tangible personal property to real property contractors ... is generally subject to tax. Further: [Sjales of materials and supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. Utah AdmimCode R865-19-58S (1990). A final consumer is one who “converts the personal property into real property ... since he is the last one to own it as personal property.” Id. The contractor is taxed as the ultimate consumer because real property sales are not taxable and thus the sale of raw materials would escape taxation upon being converted into real property if the ultimate consumer were not taxed. See Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 858 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah App.1993), cert. den. 870 P.2d 957 (holding that forfeiture of real property may be adjudicated before the seizure occurs because real property cannot abscond",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAdministrative Code states: Sale of tangible personal property to real property contractors ... is generally subject to tax. Further: [Sjales of materials and supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. Utah AdmimCode R865-19-58S (1990). A final consumer is one who “converts the personal property into real property ... since he is the last one to own it as personal property.” Id. The contractor is taxed as the ultimate consumer because real property sales are not taxable and thus the sale of raw materials would escape taxation upon being converted into real property if the ultimate consumer were not taxed. See Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 858 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah App.1993), cert. den. 870 P.2d 957 (holding contractor ultimate consumer because real property sale not taxed thus contractor taxed to avoid stream of products incorporated into real property from escaping sales tax altogether",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAdministrative Code states: Sale of tangible personal property to real property contractors ... is generally subject to tax. Further: [Sjales of materials and supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. Utah AdmimCode R865-19-58S (1990). A final consumer is one who “converts the personal property into real property ... since he is the last one to own it as personal property.” Id. The contractor is taxed as the ultimate consumer because real property sales are not taxable and thus the sale of raw materials would escape taxation upon being converted into real property if the ultimate consumer were not taxed. See Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 858 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah App.1993), cert. den. 870 P.2d 957 (holding that a tax appeal on real property is a lien on the real estate and not a personal obligation of the landowner",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAdministrative Code states: Sale of tangible personal property to real property contractors ... is generally subject to tax. Further: [Sjales of materials and supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. Utah AdmimCode R865-19-58S (1990). A final consumer is one who “converts the personal property into real property ... since he is the last one to own it as personal property.” Id. The contractor is taxed as the ultimate consumer because real property sales are not taxable and thus the sale of raw materials would escape taxation upon being converted into real property if the ultimate consumer were not taxed. See Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 858 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah App.1993), cert. den. 870 P.2d 957 (holding utpa does not apply to real property sales",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nAdministrative Code states: Sale of tangible personal property to real property contractors ... is generally subject to tax. Further: [Sjales of materials and supplies to contractors and subcontractors are taxable transactions as sales to final consumers. Utah AdmimCode R865-19-58S (1990). A final consumer is one who “converts the personal property into real property ... since he is the last one to own it as personal property.” Id. The contractor is taxed as the ultimate consumer because real property sales are not taxable and thus the sale of raw materials would escape taxation upon being converted into real property if the ultimate consumer were not taxed. See Niederhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 858 P.2d 1034, 1038 (Utah App.1993), cert. den. 870 P.2d 957 (holding that plaintiffs may have a property interest in real property"
] | ). Consequently, in Tummurru Trades, Inc. v. | 1 |
926 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBaty further stated that Booth’s representation to Baty was the reason that a warranty and representation to that effect was expressly included in the sale agreements. Howard & Howard communicated its representations via telephone calls and emails. Although the two paragraphs cobble together a few details, they fail to give even one date on which an alleged misrepresentation occurred. That alone dooms ABI’s ability to allege fraud with particularity. See Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 393 (finding that a plaintiff failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity because she “d[id] not include [in her affidavit] the date she received the allegedly fraudulent email from the defendants.”); see also United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the pleading standard set forth in twombly applies to all civil actions",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBaty further stated that Booth’s representation to Baty was the reason that a warranty and representation to that effect was expressly included in the sale agreements. Howard & Howard communicated its representations via telephone calls and emails. Although the two paragraphs cobble together a few details, they fail to give even one date on which an alleged misrepresentation occurred. That alone dooms ABI’s ability to allege fraud with particularity. See Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 393 (finding that a plaintiff failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity because she “d[id] not include [in her affidavit] the date she received the allegedly fraudulent email from the defendants.”); see also United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that defendants failed to carry burden of proof to show that plaintiffs failed to mitigate damages when among other things they offered no evidence contradicting the plaintiffs evidence",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBaty further stated that Booth’s representation to Baty was the reason that a warranty and representation to that effect was expressly included in the sale agreements. Howard & Howard communicated its representations via telephone calls and emails. Although the two paragraphs cobble together a few details, they fail to give even one date on which an alleged misrepresentation occurred. That alone dooms ABI’s ability to allege fraud with particularity. See Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 393 (finding that a plaintiff failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity because she “d[id] not include [in her affidavit] the date she received the allegedly fraudulent email from the defendants.”); see also United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that pleading was insufficient where the plaintiff failed to among other things set forth the dates of any fraudulent statements",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBaty further stated that Booth’s representation to Baty was the reason that a warranty and representation to that effect was expressly included in the sale agreements. Howard & Howard communicated its representations via telephone calls and emails. Although the two paragraphs cobble together a few details, they fail to give even one date on which an alleged misrepresentation occurred. That alone dooms ABI’s ability to allege fraud with particularity. See Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 393 (finding that a plaintiff failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity because she “d[id] not include [in her affidavit] the date she received the allegedly fraudulent email from the defendants.”); see also United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff had no jurisdiction in federal court because she failed to allege a state law claim but declining to discuss pleading requirement to set forth charge of discrimination",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nBaty further stated that Booth’s representation to Baty was the reason that a warranty and representation to that effect was expressly included in the sale agreements. Howard & Howard communicated its representations via telephone calls and emails. Although the two paragraphs cobble together a few details, they fail to give even one date on which an alleged misrepresentation occurred. That alone dooms ABI’s ability to allege fraud with particularity. See Heinrich, 668 F.3d at 393 (finding that a plaintiff failed to allege fraud with sufficient particularity because she “d[id] not include [in her affidavit] the date she received the allegedly fraudulent email from the defendants.”); see also United States ex rel. Bledsoe v. Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., 501 F.3d 493, 504-05 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract"
] | ); United States ex rel. Hirt v. Walgreen Co., | 2 |
927 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nevidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.’” (quoting Sims, 898 So.2d at 1005)); Smith v. Telophase Nat’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 471 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (affirming denial of crematorium’s motion for directed verdict in case where jury found that crematorium committed tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it gave deceased’s widow another person’s ashes and scattered deceased’s ashes at sea against his wishes; “it [is] within the province of the jury to find that the facts, and the proper inferences from the facts, establish that [crematorium’s] conduct was extreme and outrageous”); see also Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding unreasonable an extraordinary variance based on factors such as the defendants lack of criminal history his health conditions and the lack of improper interactive behavior with children",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nevidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.’” (quoting Sims, 898 So.2d at 1005)); Smith v. Telophase Nat’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 471 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (affirming denial of crematorium’s motion for directed verdict in case where jury found that crematorium committed tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it gave deceased’s widow another person’s ashes and scattered deceased’s ashes at sea against his wishes; “it [is] within the province of the jury to find that the facts, and the proper inferences from the facts, establish that [crematorium’s] conduct was extreme and outrageous”); see also Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding that 21 years of crimefree violencefree behavior twelve years of good behavior in prison and other meaningful productive activities were not sufficient to outweigh the states evidence in support of the death penalty",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nevidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.’” (quoting Sims, 898 So.2d at 1005)); Smith v. Telophase Nat’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 471 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (affirming denial of crematorium’s motion for directed verdict in case where jury found that crematorium committed tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it gave deceased’s widow another person’s ashes and scattered deceased’s ashes at sea against his wishes; “it [is] within the province of the jury to find that the facts, and the proper inferences from the facts, establish that [crematorium’s] conduct was extreme and outrageous”); see also Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nevidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.’” (quoting Sims, 898 So.2d at 1005)); Smith v. Telophase Nat’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 471 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (affirming denial of crematorium’s motion for directed verdict in case where jury found that crematorium committed tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it gave deceased’s widow another person’s ashes and scattered deceased’s ashes at sea against his wishes; “it [is] within the province of the jury to find that the facts, and the proper inferences from the facts, establish that [crematorium’s] conduct was extreme and outrageous”); see also Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (holding that the good behavior requirement of a suspended sentence defined the period of suspension",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nevidence or different reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence, the issue is factual and should be submitted to the jury.’” (quoting Sims, 898 So.2d at 1005)); Smith v. Telophase Nat’l Cremation Soc’y, Inc., 471 So.2d 163, 166 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (affirming denial of crematorium’s motion for directed verdict in case where jury found that crematorium committed tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress when it gave deceased’s widow another person’s ashes and scattered deceased’s ashes at sea against his wishes; “it [is] within the province of the jury to find that the facts, and the proper inferences from the facts, establish that [crematorium’s] conduct was extreme and outrageous”); see also Williams v. City of Minneola, 575 So.2d 683, 691 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (recognizing that our society shows a particular solicitude for the emotional vulnerability of survivors regarding improper behavior toward their dead loved one and that in such cases behavior which in other circumstances might be merely insulting frivolous or careless becomes indecent outrageous and intolerable"
] | ). D. Punitive damages The Hospital argues that | 4 |
928 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nan application of state sovereign immunity would in any event eviscerate § 1983 . as it applies to municipal and county officers. Second, the fact that plaintiffs did not join Cignature Hospitality as a defendant in this suit is irrelevant. Plaintiffs already engaged in several other lawsuits which, as noted above, already have settled. Cignature is not an indispensable party to this action. 17 . After the deadline for the filing of summary judgment motions passed, plaintiffs' counsel expr olding that official capacity claims “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). The county is not entitled to assert qualified immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-53, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nan application of state sovereign immunity would in any event eviscerate § 1983 . as it applies to municipal and county officers. Second, the fact that plaintiffs did not join Cignature Hospitality as a defendant in this suit is irrelevant. Plaintiffs already engaged in several other lawsuits which, as noted above, already have settled. Cignature is not an indispensable party to this action. 17 . After the deadline for the filing of summary judgment motions passed, plaintiffs' counsel expr olding that official capacity claims “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). The county is not entitled to assert qualified immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-53, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (holding that officials in their individual capacities may be able to assert personal immunity defenses including qualified immunity that are not available in officialcapacity suits",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nan application of state sovereign immunity would in any event eviscerate § 1983 . as it applies to municipal and county officers. Second, the fact that plaintiffs did not join Cignature Hospitality as a defendant in this suit is irrelevant. Plaintiffs already engaged in several other lawsuits which, as noted above, already have settled. Cignature is not an indispensable party to this action. 17 . After the deadline for the filing of summary judgment motions passed, plaintiffs' counsel expr olding that official capacity claims “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). The county is not entitled to assert qualified immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-53, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (holding that qualified immunity is not merely immunity from damages but also immunity from suit",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nan application of state sovereign immunity would in any event eviscerate § 1983 . as it applies to municipal and county officers. Second, the fact that plaintiffs did not join Cignature Hospitality as a defendant in this suit is irrelevant. Plaintiffs already engaged in several other lawsuits which, as noted above, already have settled. Cignature is not an indispensable party to this action. 17 . After the deadline for the filing of summary judgment motions passed, plaintiffs' counsel expr olding that official capacity claims “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). The county is not entitled to assert qualified immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-53, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (holding officials in their individual capacities may be able to assert personal immunity defenses including qualified immunity that are not available in officialcapacity suits",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nan application of state sovereign immunity would in any event eviscerate § 1983 . as it applies to municipal and county officers. Second, the fact that plaintiffs did not join Cignature Hospitality as a defendant in this suit is irrelevant. Plaintiffs already engaged in several other lawsuits which, as noted above, already have settled. Cignature is not an indispensable party to this action. 17 . After the deadline for the filing of summary judgment motions passed, plaintiffs' counsel expr olding that official capacity claims “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent”). The county is not entitled to assert qualified immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 650-53, 100 S.Ct. 1398, 63 L.Ed.2d 673 (1980) (holding that government entities may not assert qualified immunity"
] | ). 19 .Government officials are accorded | 4 |
929 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand he paid premiums for his policy,” reasoning that the statute already provides an offset for premiums). Respondent also argues that treating the UIM payments as collateral-source payments under the statute would result in a windfall to tortfeasors. The appropriate allocation of a potential windfall underlies both the common-law collateral-source rule and Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1(2). The common-law rule sought to prevent tort-feasors from obtaining windfalls due to the injured claimant’s receipt of compensation from collateral sources. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 858. Under the statute, by contrast, the evident concern is to preclude double recoveries by injured plaintiffs at the expense of defendants. Imlay, 453 N.W.2d at 331; Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.App.1987) (holding that the collateralsource statute requires a reduction of the judgment only for payments made prior to the verdict",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand he paid premiums for his policy,” reasoning that the statute already provides an offset for premiums). Respondent also argues that treating the UIM payments as collateral-source payments under the statute would result in a windfall to tortfeasors. The appropriate allocation of a potential windfall underlies both the common-law collateral-source rule and Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1(2). The common-law rule sought to prevent tort-feasors from obtaining windfalls due to the injured claimant’s receipt of compensation from collateral sources. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 858. Under the statute, by contrast, the evident concern is to preclude double recoveries by injured plaintiffs at the expense of defendants. Imlay, 453 N.W.2d at 331; Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.App.1987) (holding a provision criminalizing loitering which is defined as to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose void for vagueness where the provision was infierently subjective because its application depends on whether some purpose is apparent to the officer on the scene",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand he paid premiums for his policy,” reasoning that the statute already provides an offset for premiums). Respondent also argues that treating the UIM payments as collateral-source payments under the statute would result in a windfall to tortfeasors. The appropriate allocation of a potential windfall underlies both the common-law collateral-source rule and Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1(2). The common-law rule sought to prevent tort-feasors from obtaining windfalls due to the injured claimant’s receipt of compensation from collateral sources. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 858. Under the statute, by contrast, the evident concern is to preclude double recoveries by injured plaintiffs at the expense of defendants. Imlay, 453 N.W.2d at 331; Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.App.1987) (recognizing that the collateralsource statute has the apparent purpose of preventing windfalls by plaintiffs at the expense of the defendants",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand he paid premiums for his policy,” reasoning that the statute already provides an offset for premiums). Respondent also argues that treating the UIM payments as collateral-source payments under the statute would result in a windfall to tortfeasors. The appropriate allocation of a potential windfall underlies both the common-law collateral-source rule and Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1(2). The common-law rule sought to prevent tort-feasors from obtaining windfalls due to the injured claimant’s receipt of compensation from collateral sources. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 858. Under the statute, by contrast, the evident concern is to preclude double recoveries by injured plaintiffs at the expense of defendants. Imlay, 453 N.W.2d at 331; Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.App.1987) (recognizing the states interest in preventing deception of consumers",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nand he paid premiums for his policy,” reasoning that the statute already provides an offset for premiums). Respondent also argues that treating the UIM payments as collateral-source payments under the statute would result in a windfall to tortfeasors. The appropriate allocation of a potential windfall underlies both the common-law collateral-source rule and Minn.Stat. § 548.251, subd. 1(2). The common-law rule sought to prevent tort-feasors from obtaining windfalls due to the injured claimant’s receipt of compensation from collateral sources. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 858. Under the statute, by contrast, the evident concern is to preclude double recoveries by injured plaintiffs at the expense of defendants. Imlay, 453 N.W.2d at 331; Buck v. Schneider, 413 N.W.2d 569, 572 (Minn.App.1987) (holding that the government interest in preventing crime is compelling"
] | ). By directly abrogating the common-law rule | 2 |
930 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwould certainly fall within the statute; however, at a minimum a physician, dentist, or hospital must have made use of that corporation or person in the physician’s, dentist’s, or hospital’s delivery of health-care services to the plaintiff-patient.” Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Ala.2007) (emphasis omitted). We are not asked in this case to revisit those cases in which this Court has held that the requirement that a person or corporation be “employed by” a physician, dentist, or hospital does not require an employment or equivalent contractual relationship, but requires only that the physician (or dentist or hospital) “make use of’ the person (or corporation) in question. See, e.g., Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So.2d 319, 324-25 (Ala.2000) (holding that a pharmacists filling of a doctors prescription for a patient is part of the physicians treatment of his or her patient so that the pharmacist was included within the amla definition of other health care provider",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwould certainly fall within the statute; however, at a minimum a physician, dentist, or hospital must have made use of that corporation or person in the physician’s, dentist’s, or hospital’s delivery of health-care services to the plaintiff-patient.” Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Ala.2007) (emphasis omitted). We are not asked in this case to revisit those cases in which this Court has held that the requirement that a person or corporation be “employed by” a physician, dentist, or hospital does not require an employment or equivalent contractual relationship, but requires only that the physician (or dentist or hospital) “make use of’ the person (or corporation) in question. See, e.g., Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So.2d 319, 324-25 (Ala.2000) (holding that a psychiatrist had no duty to detain a patient who killed himself and injured his wife because the patient was outside of the scope of the facilitys range of observation and control even when the psychiatrist agreed to treat the patient the patient had suicidal tendencies and the psychologist took the patient into custody but then later permitted him to leave",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwould certainly fall within the statute; however, at a minimum a physician, dentist, or hospital must have made use of that corporation or person in the physician’s, dentist’s, or hospital’s delivery of health-care services to the plaintiff-patient.” Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Ala.2007) (emphasis omitted). We are not asked in this case to revisit those cases in which this Court has held that the requirement that a person or corporation be “employed by” a physician, dentist, or hospital does not require an employment or equivalent contractual relationship, but requires only that the physician (or dentist or hospital) “make use of’ the person (or corporation) in question. See, e.g., Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So.2d 319, 324-25 (Ala.2000) (holding that under nebraskas physicians lien statute a physicians lien could not exceed the amount the health care provider agreed to accept for the services rendered to a patient even if the usual and customary charge for such services is greater than that sum because the statute extends such lien only to the amount due or debt of the patient to the hospital",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwould certainly fall within the statute; however, at a minimum a physician, dentist, or hospital must have made use of that corporation or person in the physician’s, dentist’s, or hospital’s delivery of health-care services to the plaintiff-patient.” Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Ala.2007) (emphasis omitted). We are not asked in this case to revisit those cases in which this Court has held that the requirement that a person or corporation be “employed by” a physician, dentist, or hospital does not require an employment or equivalent contractual relationship, but requires only that the physician (or dentist or hospital) “make use of’ the person (or corporation) in question. See, e.g., Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So.2d 319, 324-25 (Ala.2000) (holding that sanction of removal for nursing home attendant who was found to have hit patient suffering from dementia should be reduced to penalty of sixmonth suspension because act of hitting patient was isolated instance in which patient was aggressor",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nwould certainly fall within the statute; however, at a minimum a physician, dentist, or hospital must have made use of that corporation or person in the physician’s, dentist’s, or hospital’s delivery of health-care services to the plaintiff-patient.” Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Ala.2007) (emphasis omitted). We are not asked in this case to revisit those cases in which this Court has held that the requirement that a person or corporation be “employed by” a physician, dentist, or hospital does not require an employment or equivalent contractual relationship, but requires only that the physician (or dentist or hospital) “make use of’ the person (or corporation) in question. See, e.g., Cackowski v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 So.2d 319, 324-25 (Ala.2000) (holding that defendant medical center which allowed a patient who would likely cause bodily harm to his wife if he had the opportunity to leave the center for a weekend could be liable for the patients actions of killing his wife and her paramour during that weekend because inter alia when the course of treatment of a mental patient involves an exercise of control over him by a physician who knows or should know that the patient is likely to cause bodily harm to others an independent duty arises from that relationship and falls upon the physician to exercise that control with such reasonable care as to prevent harm to others at the hands of the patient punctuation omitted emphasis supplied"
] | ); see also Ex parte Partners in Care, Inc., 986 | 0 |
931 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nparty subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. A “necessary” party must be joined if feasible — if they are “subject to service of process” and would “not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a). If a court determines that a party is not “necessary” under Rule 19(a), “joinder, as well as further analysis, is unnecessary.” Local 670, et al. v. Int’l Union, et al., 822 F.2d 613, 618 (6th Cir.1987). The burden is on the moving party to establish that a party is necessary for purposes of Rule 19(a). Marshall v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 606, 611 (E.D.Mich.1996); 5C Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1359 (3d ed.2013) (holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nparty subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. A “necessary” party must be joined if feasible — if they are “subject to service of process” and would “not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a). If a court determines that a party is not “necessary” under Rule 19(a), “joinder, as well as further analysis, is unnecessary.” Local 670, et al. v. Int’l Union, et al., 822 F.2d 613, 618 (6th Cir.1987). The burden is on the moving party to establish that a party is necessary for purposes of Rule 19(a). Marshall v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 606, 611 (E.D.Mich.1996); 5C Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1359 (3d ed.2013) (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff to allege facts sufficient to establish jurisdiction",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nparty subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. A “necessary” party must be joined if feasible — if they are “subject to service of process” and would “not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a). If a court determines that a party is not “necessary” under Rule 19(a), “joinder, as well as further analysis, is unnecessary.” Local 670, et al. v. Int’l Union, et al., 822 F.2d 613, 618 (6th Cir.1987). The burden is on the moving party to establish that a party is necessary for purposes of Rule 19(a). Marshall v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 606, 611 (E.D.Mich.1996); 5C Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1359 (3d ed.2013) (recognizing burden",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nparty subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. A “necessary” party must be joined if feasible — if they are “subject to service of process” and would “not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a). If a court determines that a party is not “necessary” under Rule 19(a), “joinder, as well as further analysis, is unnecessary.” Local 670, et al. v. Int’l Union, et al., 822 F.2d 613, 618 (6th Cir.1987). The burden is on the moving party to establish that a party is necessary for purposes of Rule 19(a). Marshall v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 606, 611 (E.D.Mich.1996); 5C Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1359 (3d ed.2013) (recognizing that the burden is on a party making a rule 12b7 motion to establish that missing parties are necessary or indispensable to the action",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nparty subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. A “necessary” party must be joined if feasible — if they are “subject to service of process” and would “not deprive the court of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed. R.Civ.P. 19(a). If a court determines that a party is not “necessary” under Rule 19(a), “joinder, as well as further analysis, is unnecessary.” Local 670, et al. v. Int’l Union, et al., 822 F.2d 613, 618 (6th Cir.1987). The burden is on the moving party to establish that a party is necessary for purposes of Rule 19(a). Marshall v. Navistar Intern. Transp. Corp., 168 F.R.D. 606, 611 (E.D.Mich.1996); 5C Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1359 (3d ed.2013) (holding that the burden is on the plaintiff"
] | ). “The moving party may satisfy this burden | 3 |
932 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nappellant’s allegation, our supreme court has held that ‘‘[c]ounsel clearly cannot be faulted for failing to raise a Batson objection at trial because Batson did not yet exist. See, e.g., [Commonwealth v. Gribble, 580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 464 (2004) ] (‘Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict developments or changes in the law.’)..” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 899 A.2d 1067, 1076 (2006). 10 . Then-District Attorney Rendell served as Philadelphia County District Attorney from 1978 through 1985. He subsequently served as Governor of the Commonwealth, therefore, he will be referred to hereinafter as “Governor Rendell.” 11 . Appellant’s direct appeal was decided pri- or to our supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002) (holding that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are to be deferred to pcra review trial courts should not entertain claims of ineffectiveness upon postverdict motions and such claims should not be reviewed upon direct appeal",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nappellant’s allegation, our supreme court has held that ‘‘[c]ounsel clearly cannot be faulted for failing to raise a Batson objection at trial because Batson did not yet exist. See, e.g., [Commonwealth v. Gribble, 580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 464 (2004) ] (‘Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict developments or changes in the law.’)..” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 899 A.2d 1067, 1076 (2006). 10 . Then-District Attorney Rendell served as Philadelphia County District Attorney from 1978 through 1985. He subsequently served as Governor of the Commonwealth, therefore, he will be referred to hereinafter as “Governor Rendell.” 11 . Appellant’s direct appeal was decided pri- or to our supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002) (holding that as a general rule a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nappellant’s allegation, our supreme court has held that ‘‘[c]ounsel clearly cannot be faulted for failing to raise a Batson objection at trial because Batson did not yet exist. See, e.g., [Commonwealth v. Gribble, 580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 464 (2004) ] (‘Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict developments or changes in the law.’)..” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 899 A.2d 1067, 1076 (2006). 10 . Then-District Attorney Rendell served as Philadelphia County District Attorney from 1978 through 1985. He subsequently served as Governor of the Commonwealth, therefore, he will be referred to hereinafter as “Governor Rendell.” 11 . Appellant’s direct appeal was decided pri- or to our supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002) (holding that a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel until collateral review",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nappellant’s allegation, our supreme court has held that ‘‘[c]ounsel clearly cannot be faulted for failing to raise a Batson objection at trial because Batson did not yet exist. See, e.g., [Commonwealth v. Gribble, 580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 464 (2004) ] (‘Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict developments or changes in the law.’)..” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 899 A.2d 1067, 1076 (2006). 10 . Then-District Attorney Rendell served as Philadelphia County District Attorney from 1978 through 1985. He subsequently served as Governor of the Commonwealth, therefore, he will be referred to hereinafter as “Governor Rendell.” 11 . Appellant’s direct appeal was decided pri- or to our supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002) (holding that the appellate standard of review of ineffectiveness claim is de novo",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nappellant’s allegation, our supreme court has held that ‘‘[c]ounsel clearly cannot be faulted for failing to raise a Batson objection at trial because Batson did not yet exist. See, e.g., [Commonwealth v. Gribble, 580 Pa. 647, 863 A.2d 455, 464 (2004) ] (‘Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to predict developments or changes in the law.’)..” Commonwealth v. Sneed, 587 Pa. 318, 899 A.2d 1067, 1076 (2006). 10 . Then-District Attorney Rendell served as Philadelphia County District Attorney from 1978 through 1985. He subsequently served as Governor of the Commonwealth, therefore, he will be referred to hereinafter as “Governor Rendell.” 11 . Appellant’s direct appeal was decided pri- or to our supreme court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48, 813 A.2d 726 (2002) (holding that review of counsel ineffectiveness claims should be deferred until collateral review"
] | ), therefore, at the time of appellant’s direct | 4 |
933 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(2007) from this constitutional definition. 6 . None of the parties allege that Hoffman’s inaccurate oath was a product of fraud. 7 . Compare this unambiguous language with the broader authority given to the Secretary of State in the context of reviewing referendum petitions, 21-A M.R.S. § 905(1) (2007) which provides in part: \"The Secretary of State shall determine the validity of the petition.” 8 . The second sentence of 21-A M.R.S. § 354(9) provides \"If a voter or circulator fails to comply with this section in signing or printing the voter’s name and address, that voter’s name may not be counted, but the petition is otherwise valid.” 9 . See also, Citizens Comm, for the D.C. Video Lottery Terminal Initiative v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 860 A.2d 813, 816-17 (D.C.App.2004) (holding that an appeal to an agency review board would be futile because the board lacked authority to invalidate ordinance as requested",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(2007) from this constitutional definition. 6 . None of the parties allege that Hoffman’s inaccurate oath was a product of fraud. 7 . Compare this unambiguous language with the broader authority given to the Secretary of State in the context of reviewing referendum petitions, 21-A M.R.S. § 905(1) (2007) which provides in part: \"The Secretary of State shall determine the validity of the petition.” 8 . The second sentence of 21-A M.R.S. § 354(9) provides \"If a voter or circulator fails to comply with this section in signing or printing the voter’s name and address, that voter’s name may not be counted, but the petition is otherwise valid.” 9 . See also, Citizens Comm, for the D.C. Video Lottery Terminal Initiative v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 860 A.2d 813, 816-17 (D.C.App.2004) (holding that taxpayer could not have presented substantive due process claim to the board of assessment review because of the limited jurisdiction of that board",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(2007) from this constitutional definition. 6 . None of the parties allege that Hoffman’s inaccurate oath was a product of fraud. 7 . Compare this unambiguous language with the broader authority given to the Secretary of State in the context of reviewing referendum petitions, 21-A M.R.S. § 905(1) (2007) which provides in part: \"The Secretary of State shall determine the validity of the petition.” 8 . The second sentence of 21-A M.R.S. § 354(9) provides \"If a voter or circulator fails to comply with this section in signing or printing the voter’s name and address, that voter’s name may not be counted, but the petition is otherwise valid.” 9 . See also, Citizens Comm, for the D.C. Video Lottery Terminal Initiative v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 860 A.2d 813, 816-17 (D.C.App.2004) (holding that actions of arbitrators in gathering evidence outside the scheduled hearings and without notice to the parties constituted misconduct sufficient to vacate the award",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(2007) from this constitutional definition. 6 . None of the parties allege that Hoffman’s inaccurate oath was a product of fraud. 7 . Compare this unambiguous language with the broader authority given to the Secretary of State in the context of reviewing referendum petitions, 21-A M.R.S. § 905(1) (2007) which provides in part: \"The Secretary of State shall determine the validity of the petition.” 8 . The second sentence of 21-A M.R.S. § 354(9) provides \"If a voter or circulator fails to comply with this section in signing or printing the voter’s name and address, that voter’s name may not be counted, but the petition is otherwise valid.” 9 . See also, Citizens Comm, for the D.C. Video Lottery Terminal Initiative v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 860 A.2d 813, 816-17 (D.C.App.2004) (holding that the district court was authorized to remand the proceedings to the board where the board failed to make required findings",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n(2007) from this constitutional definition. 6 . None of the parties allege that Hoffman’s inaccurate oath was a product of fraud. 7 . Compare this unambiguous language with the broader authority given to the Secretary of State in the context of reviewing referendum petitions, 21-A M.R.S. § 905(1) (2007) which provides in part: \"The Secretary of State shall determine the validity of the petition.” 8 . The second sentence of 21-A M.R.S. § 354(9) provides \"If a voter or circulator fails to comply with this section in signing or printing the voter’s name and address, that voter’s name may not be counted, but the petition is otherwise valid.” 9 . See also, Citizens Comm, for the D.C. Video Lottery Terminal Initiative v. D.C. Bd. of Elections & Ethics, 860 A.2d 813, 816-17 (D.C.App.2004) (holding board had authority to exclude entire petitions where evidence showed pervasive pattern of fraud forgery and other improprieties permeated the circulation process that a particular group gathering signatures used"
] | ); Montanans for Justice v. State, 334 Mont. | 4 |
934 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nThe State argued that it was within prosecutorial discretion to choose which offense to charge the defendant with, but the court concluded that skilled prosecutors would usually seek the more severe sentence and thus the charge of aggravated kidnapping would effectively be nullified. \"Since the elements which constitute aggravated kidnapping and armed violence are identical, common sense and sound logic would seemingly dictate that their penalties be identical.\" Id. at 774. 4 . Certainly, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Morris intended to leave the J.C. Penney store with the garbage bag containing unpurchased clothes, thus depriving J.C. Penney of the use and value of the merchandise. See, eg., Johnson v. State, 413 N.E.2d 335, 336 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (holding that where store employee discovered defendant exiting fitting room with merchandise in her own tote bag evidence was sufficient to support inference that defendant had requisite intent to deprive store of merchandise",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nThe State argued that it was within prosecutorial discretion to choose which offense to charge the defendant with, but the court concluded that skilled prosecutors would usually seek the more severe sentence and thus the charge of aggravated kidnapping would effectively be nullified. \"Since the elements which constitute aggravated kidnapping and armed violence are identical, common sense and sound logic would seemingly dictate that their penalties be identical.\" Id. at 774. 4 . Certainly, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Morris intended to leave the J.C. Penney store with the garbage bag containing unpurchased clothes, thus depriving J.C. Penney of the use and value of the merchandise. See, eg., Johnson v. State, 413 N.E.2d 335, 336 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (holding that a store owner has a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nThe State argued that it was within prosecutorial discretion to choose which offense to charge the defendant with, but the court concluded that skilled prosecutors would usually seek the more severe sentence and thus the charge of aggravated kidnapping would effectively be nullified. \"Since the elements which constitute aggravated kidnapping and armed violence are identical, common sense and sound logic would seemingly dictate that their penalties be identical.\" Id. at 774. 4 . Certainly, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Morris intended to leave the J.C. Penney store with the garbage bag containing unpurchased clothes, thus depriving J.C. Penney of the use and value of the merchandise. See, eg., Johnson v. State, 413 N.E.2d 335, 336 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (holding a store vicariously liable for wrongful death when its employee shot and killed a customer",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nThe State argued that it was within prosecutorial discretion to choose which offense to charge the defendant with, but the court concluded that skilled prosecutors would usually seek the more severe sentence and thus the charge of aggravated kidnapping would effectively be nullified. \"Since the elements which constitute aggravated kidnapping and armed violence are identical, common sense and sound logic would seemingly dictate that their penalties be identical.\" Id. at 774. 4 . Certainly, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Morris intended to leave the J.C. Penney store with the garbage bag containing unpurchased clothes, thus depriving J.C. Penney of the use and value of the merchandise. See, eg., Johnson v. State, 413 N.E.2d 335, 336 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (holding that where a defendant abandoned a vehicle in a subdivision near where the victims body was found there was sufficient evidence of intent to permanently deprive the owner of the vehicle",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nThe State argued that it was within prosecutorial discretion to choose which offense to charge the defendant with, but the court concluded that skilled prosecutors would usually seek the more severe sentence and thus the charge of aggravated kidnapping would effectively be nullified. \"Since the elements which constitute aggravated kidnapping and armed violence are identical, common sense and sound logic would seemingly dictate that their penalties be identical.\" Id. at 774. 4 . Certainly, there was sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that Morris intended to leave the J.C. Penney store with the garbage bag containing unpurchased clothes, thus depriving J.C. Penney of the use and value of the merchandise. See, eg., Johnson v. State, 413 N.E.2d 335, 336 (Ind.Ct.App.1980) (holding that defendant was seized where the officer told defendant that she knew that he was on probation defendant admitted to the officer that he had given her a false name and defendant was asked for consent to search a backpack because a reasonable inference was that defendant was the subject of a continuing investigation and his or her freedom of movement had been significantly restricted by the officers show of authority"
] | ). Therefore, the State is not barred by double | 0 |
935 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nJudges System 21 (1995) (\"The Senate report [regarding the 1976 Amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act] noted that without the assistance furnished by magistrates in handling a 09 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (finding that the Federal Magistrates Act's \"additional duties” clause did not permit magistrates to conduct jury selection in felony trials without consent and explaining that \"the carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases [subject to special assignment, consent of the parties, and judicial review] should be construed as an implicit withholding of authority to preside at a felony trial. The legislative history, with its repeated statements that magistrates should handle subsidiary matters to enable distr 984) (holding that the ninth circuits decision exceeded the limits imposed on federal habeas review by 28 usc 2254d",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nJudges System 21 (1995) (\"The Senate report [regarding the 1976 Amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act] noted that without the assistance furnished by magistrates in handling a 09 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (finding that the Federal Magistrates Act's \"additional duties” clause did not permit magistrates to conduct jury selection in felony trials without consent and explaining that \"the carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases [subject to special assignment, consent of the parties, and judicial review] should be construed as an implicit withholding of authority to preside at a felony trial. The legislative history, with its repeated statements that magistrates should handle subsidiary matters to enable distr 984) (holding that it is unconstitutional for a us magistrate judge to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 usc 636c over a 2255 motion",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nJudges System 21 (1995) (\"The Senate report [regarding the 1976 Amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act] noted that without the assistance furnished by magistrates in handling a 09 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (finding that the Federal Magistrates Act's \"additional duties” clause did not permit magistrates to conduct jury selection in felony trials without consent and explaining that \"the carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases [subject to special assignment, consent of the parties, and judicial review] should be construed as an implicit withholding of authority to preside at a felony trial. The legislative history, with its repeated statements that magistrates should handle subsidiary matters to enable distr 984) (holding that referrals of civil matters to magistrates pursuant to 28 usc 636c are constitutional for essentially the reasons stated by our sister circuits",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nJudges System 21 (1995) (\"The Senate report [regarding the 1976 Amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act] noted that without the assistance furnished by magistrates in handling a 09 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (finding that the Federal Magistrates Act's \"additional duties” clause did not permit magistrates to conduct jury selection in felony trials without consent and explaining that \"the carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases [subject to special assignment, consent of the parties, and judicial review] should be construed as an implicit withholding of authority to preside at a felony trial. The legislative history, with its repeated statements that magistrates should handle subsidiary matters to enable distr 984) (holding that equitable tolling is available for petitions filed pursuant to 28 usc 2255",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nJudges System 21 (1995) (\"The Senate report [regarding the 1976 Amendments to the Federal Magistrates Act] noted that without the assistance furnished by magistrates in handling a 09 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989) (finding that the Federal Magistrates Act's \"additional duties” clause did not permit magistrates to conduct jury selection in felony trials without consent and explaining that \"the carefully defined grant of authority to conduct trials of civil matters and of minor criminal cases [subject to special assignment, consent of the parties, and judicial review] should be construed as an implicit withholding of authority to preside at a felony trial. The legislative history, with its repeated statements that magistrates should handle subsidiary matters to enable distr 984) (holding that pursuant to 28 usc 2254d1 if the state court reached the correct result with respect to petitioners claim of constitutional violation even if on erroneous reasoning that is the end of our inquiry"
] | ). Yet the majority opinion gives this caselaw | 2 |
936 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nDiGiacinto also reviewed Molina’s 1999 MRI and concluded that her bulging discs were not caused by the accident but were instead degenerative. Her examining physician, Jacobson, testified that Molina should have been able to perform her normal daily functions within a week following the accident. Sosina, the most recent doctor to examine Molina, also concluded that there was no objective evidence of a relevant limitation. Molina has failed to sufficiently counter this evidence. The evidence of Molina’s bulging discs is inadmissible because it is based solely upon an unsworn report from a doctor who has not submitted a sworn affidavit or otherwise participated in this litigation. See, e.g., Friedman v. U-Haul Truck Rental, 216 A.D.2d 266, 627 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (App. Div.2d Dep’t 1995) (holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nDiGiacinto also reviewed Molina’s 1999 MRI and concluded that her bulging discs were not caused by the accident but were instead degenerative. Her examining physician, Jacobson, testified that Molina should have been able to perform her normal daily functions within a week following the accident. Sosina, the most recent doctor to examine Molina, also concluded that there was no objective evidence of a relevant limitation. Molina has failed to sufficiently counter this evidence. The evidence of Molina’s bulging discs is inadmissible because it is based solely upon an unsworn report from a doctor who has not submitted a sworn affidavit or otherwise participated in this litigation. See, e.g., Friedman v. U-Haul Truck Rental, 216 A.D.2d 266, 627 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (App. Div.2d Dep’t 1995) (holding purposely inflicts serious injury and intended to cause serious injury convey the same specific intent such that it is impossible to commit one without the other",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nDiGiacinto also reviewed Molina’s 1999 MRI and concluded that her bulging discs were not caused by the accident but were instead degenerative. Her examining physician, Jacobson, testified that Molina should have been able to perform her normal daily functions within a week following the accident. Sosina, the most recent doctor to examine Molina, also concluded that there was no objective evidence of a relevant limitation. Molina has failed to sufficiently counter this evidence. The evidence of Molina’s bulging discs is inadmissible because it is based solely upon an unsworn report from a doctor who has not submitted a sworn affidavit or otherwise participated in this litigation. See, e.g., Friedman v. U-Haul Truck Rental, 216 A.D.2d 266, 627 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (App. Div.2d Dep’t 1995) (holding that it was a double jeopardy violation to convict and sentence for both dui with serious bodily injury and driving without a valid license with serious bodily injury based on an injury to a single victim",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nDiGiacinto also reviewed Molina’s 1999 MRI and concluded that her bulging discs were not caused by the accident but were instead degenerative. Her examining physician, Jacobson, testified that Molina should have been able to perform her normal daily functions within a week following the accident. Sosina, the most recent doctor to examine Molina, also concluded that there was no objective evidence of a relevant limitation. Molina has failed to sufficiently counter this evidence. The evidence of Molina’s bulging discs is inadmissible because it is based solely upon an unsworn report from a doctor who has not submitted a sworn affidavit or otherwise participated in this litigation. See, e.g., Friedman v. U-Haul Truck Rental, 216 A.D.2d 266, 627 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (App. Div.2d Dep’t 1995) (holding unsworn declaration as opposed to an affidavit sworn to before a notary public admissible to prove serious injury under 28 usc 1746",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nDiGiacinto also reviewed Molina’s 1999 MRI and concluded that her bulging discs were not caused by the accident but were instead degenerative. Her examining physician, Jacobson, testified that Molina should have been able to perform her normal daily functions within a week following the accident. Sosina, the most recent doctor to examine Molina, also concluded that there was no objective evidence of a relevant limitation. Molina has failed to sufficiently counter this evidence. The evidence of Molina’s bulging discs is inadmissible because it is based solely upon an unsworn report from a doctor who has not submitted a sworn affidavit or otherwise participated in this litigation. See, e.g., Friedman v. U-Haul Truck Rental, 216 A.D.2d 266, 627 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766 (App. Div.2d Dep’t 1995) (holding unsworn mri report inadmissible to establish serious injury"
] | ). In any event, even assuming the admissibility | 4 |
937 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nstating its reasons for imposing the sentence it did, the district court did not state it was doing so for the purpose of making White eligible for any BOP treatment program. Furthermore, according to the government, Tapia made clear a sentencing “court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” 131 S.Ct. at 2392. Finally, the government argues this court should discount the district court’s inclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(D) in the list of factors it considered in deciding to vary upward from the advisory range because that reference came as part of a “formulaic recitation of the statutorily enumerated sentencing factors.” See United States v. Collins, 461 Fed-Appx. 807, 810 (10th Cir.2012) (holding a sentencing court is not obligated to expressly weigh on the record each of the factors set out in 3553a",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nstating its reasons for imposing the sentence it did, the district court did not state it was doing so for the purpose of making White eligible for any BOP treatment program. Furthermore, according to the government, Tapia made clear a sentencing “court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” 131 S.Ct. at 2392. Finally, the government argues this court should discount the district court’s inclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(D) in the list of factors it considered in deciding to vary upward from the advisory range because that reference came as part of a “formulaic recitation of the statutorily enumerated sentencing factors.” See United States v. Collins, 461 Fed-Appx. 807, 810 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nstating its reasons for imposing the sentence it did, the district court did not state it was doing so for the purpose of making White eligible for any BOP treatment program. Furthermore, according to the government, Tapia made clear a sentencing “court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” 131 S.Ct. at 2392. Finally, the government argues this court should discount the district court’s inclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(D) in the list of factors it considered in deciding to vary upward from the advisory range because that reference came as part of a “formulaic recitation of the statutorily enumerated sentencing factors.” See United States v. Collins, 461 Fed-Appx. 807, 810 (10th Cir.2012) (holding in similar circumstances that a formulaic recitation of the sentencing factor set out in 3553a2d supplies little indication that a court lengthened a sentence for rehabilitative purposes",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nstating its reasons for imposing the sentence it did, the district court did not state it was doing so for the purpose of making White eligible for any BOP treatment program. Furthermore, according to the government, Tapia made clear a sentencing “court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” 131 S.Ct. at 2392. Finally, the government argues this court should discount the district court’s inclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(D) in the list of factors it considered in deciding to vary upward from the advisory range because that reference came as part of a “formulaic recitation of the statutorily enumerated sentencing factors.” See United States v. Collins, 461 Fed-Appx. 807, 810 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that no discovery is permissible in similar circumstances",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nstating its reasons for imposing the sentence it did, the district court did not state it was doing so for the purpose of making White eligible for any BOP treatment program. Furthermore, according to the government, Tapia made clear a sentencing “court commits no error by discussing the opportunities for rehabilitation within prison or the benefits of specific treatment or training programs.” 131 S.Ct. at 2392. Finally, the government argues this court should discount the district court’s inclusion of § 3553(a)(2)(D) in the list of factors it considered in deciding to vary upward from the advisory range because that reference came as part of a “formulaic recitation of the statutorily enumerated sentencing factors.” See United States v. Collins, 461 Fed-Appx. 807, 810 (10th Cir.2012) (holding that a change in the law of sentencing does not constitute a new factor"
] | ). The government’s arguments as to the absence | 2 |
938 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthese documents also indicate that “[n]ot all Christians ... have found themselves to be targets of ethnic-religious persecution” and that “[t]he ongoing insurgency affects every segment of the population, Sunni, Shi’a, and non-Muslim alike.” Christians In Iraq at 2. According to a 2005 U.S. Department of State report, “insurgents and terrorists kidnapped and killed government officials and workers, common citizens, party activists participating in the electoral process, civil society activists, members of security forces, and members of the armed forces, as well as foreigners.” Id. at 5. At the merits hearing, Hanna himself conceded that Iraq was in the middle of a “very bad” civil war. Such a generalized or random possibility of harm in the country of removal is insuffici Cir.2006) (holding that substantial evidence supported ijs conclusion that petitioners claims were consistent with general civil strife in iraq rather than targeted persecution against christians",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthese documents also indicate that “[n]ot all Christians ... have found themselves to be targets of ethnic-religious persecution” and that “[t]he ongoing insurgency affects every segment of the population, Sunni, Shi’a, and non-Muslim alike.” Christians In Iraq at 2. According to a 2005 U.S. Department of State report, “insurgents and terrorists kidnapped and killed government officials and workers, common citizens, party activists participating in the electoral process, civil society activists, members of security forces, and members of the armed forces, as well as foreigners.” Id. at 5. At the merits hearing, Hanna himself conceded that Iraq was in the middle of a “very bad” civil war. Such a generalized or random possibility of harm in the country of removal is insuffici Cir.2006) (holding that iraqi petitioner who failed to establish past persecution nonetheless had a wellfounded fear of future persecution because evidence of country conditions supported the conclusion that the iraqi government would persecute as traitors any evacuees who returned to iraq",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthese documents also indicate that “[n]ot all Christians ... have found themselves to be targets of ethnic-religious persecution” and that “[t]he ongoing insurgency affects every segment of the population, Sunni, Shi’a, and non-Muslim alike.” Christians In Iraq at 2. According to a 2005 U.S. Department of State report, “insurgents and terrorists kidnapped and killed government officials and workers, common citizens, party activists participating in the electoral process, civil society activists, members of security forces, and members of the armed forces, as well as foreigners.” Id. at 5. At the merits hearing, Hanna himself conceded that Iraq was in the middle of a “very bad” civil war. Such a generalized or random possibility of harm in the country of removal is insuffici Cir.2006) (holding when one identified ground for an adverse credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence and goes to the heart of petitioners claim of persecution the court is bound to accept the ijs adverse credibility determination",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthese documents also indicate that “[n]ot all Christians ... have found themselves to be targets of ethnic-religious persecution” and that “[t]he ongoing insurgency affects every segment of the population, Sunni, Shi’a, and non-Muslim alike.” Christians In Iraq at 2. According to a 2005 U.S. Department of State report, “insurgents and terrorists kidnapped and killed government officials and workers, common citizens, party activists participating in the electoral process, civil society activists, members of security forces, and members of the armed forces, as well as foreigners.” Id. at 5. At the merits hearing, Hanna himself conceded that Iraq was in the middle of a “very bad” civil war. Such a generalized or random possibility of harm in the country of removal is insuffici Cir.2006) (holding that ijs adverse credibility was not supported by substantial evidence where there were significant communication and translation problems during the asylum hearing and the discrepancies at issue were not crucial to petitioners claim",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nthese documents also indicate that “[n]ot all Christians ... have found themselves to be targets of ethnic-religious persecution” and that “[t]he ongoing insurgency affects every segment of the population, Sunni, Shi’a, and non-Muslim alike.” Christians In Iraq at 2. According to a 2005 U.S. Department of State report, “insurgents and terrorists kidnapped and killed government officials and workers, common citizens, party activists participating in the electoral process, civil society activists, members of security forces, and members of the armed forces, as well as foreigners.” Id. at 5. At the merits hearing, Hanna himself conceded that Iraq was in the middle of a “very bad” civil war. Such a generalized or random possibility of harm in the country of removal is insuffici Cir.2006) (holding that substantial evidence supported an adverse credibility finding where inter alia the petitioners claimed guerrilla persecution on their asylum applications but later claimed government persecution"
] | ); Toma v. Gonzales, 179 Fed.Appx. 320, 324 (6th | 0 |
939 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfalse and fraudulent information similar to the fourteen returns at trial. The government cited interviews with about twenty people conducted as part of the criminal investigation, another ten interviewed separately, and taxpayer statements that appeared in the audit files indicating that the taxpayers didn’t provide the false information. The district court did not clearly err in finding that this evidence supported a pattern of deception attributable to Littrice and that by excluding from the group of 662 returns all cases in which the taxpayer contested their audit or where no additional tax was due, the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the remaining returns reflected Littrice’s relevant conduct. Cf. United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 282 (4th Cir.) (holding that the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to county on monell claim where plaintiff presented no evidence that similar conduct occurred in the past",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfalse and fraudulent information similar to the fourteen returns at trial. The government cited interviews with about twenty people conducted as part of the criminal investigation, another ten interviewed separately, and taxpayer statements that appeared in the audit files indicating that the taxpayers didn’t provide the false information. The district court did not clearly err in finding that this evidence supported a pattern of deception attributable to Littrice and that by excluding from the group of 662 returns all cases in which the taxpayer contested their audit or where no additional tax was due, the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the remaining returns reflected Littrice’s relevant conduct. Cf. United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 282 (4th Cir.) (holding that the district court did not err in finding a pattern of numbers reported for various deductions that was strikingly similar to the returns proven fraudulent at trial established relevant conduct when the taxpayers agreed to pay the assessments without protest",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfalse and fraudulent information similar to the fourteen returns at trial. The government cited interviews with about twenty people conducted as part of the criminal investigation, another ten interviewed separately, and taxpayer statements that appeared in the audit files indicating that the taxpayers didn’t provide the false information. The district court did not clearly err in finding that this evidence supported a pattern of deception attributable to Littrice and that by excluding from the group of 662 returns all cases in which the taxpayer contested their audit or where no additional tax was due, the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the remaining returns reflected Littrice’s relevant conduct. Cf. United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 282 (4th Cir.) (holding that district court did not clearly err in giving twolevel enhancement for similar conduct",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfalse and fraudulent information similar to the fourteen returns at trial. The government cited interviews with about twenty people conducted as part of the criminal investigation, another ten interviewed separately, and taxpayer statements that appeared in the audit files indicating that the taxpayers didn’t provide the false information. The district court did not clearly err in finding that this evidence supported a pattern of deception attributable to Littrice and that by excluding from the group of 662 returns all cases in which the taxpayer contested their audit or where no additional tax was due, the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the remaining returns reflected Littrice’s relevant conduct. Cf. United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 282 (4th Cir.) (holding that trial court did not err",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfalse and fraudulent information similar to the fourteen returns at trial. The government cited interviews with about twenty people conducted as part of the criminal investigation, another ten interviewed separately, and taxpayer statements that appeared in the audit files indicating that the taxpayers didn’t provide the false information. The district court did not clearly err in finding that this evidence supported a pattern of deception attributable to Littrice and that by excluding from the group of 662 returns all cases in which the taxpayer contested their audit or where no additional tax was due, the government proved by a preponderance of the evidence that the remaining returns reflected Littrice’s relevant conduct. Cf. United States v. Mehta, 594 F.3d 277, 282 (4th Cir.) (holding that district court did not err in finding that similar scheme involved sophisticated means"
] | ), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 279, 178 | 1 |
940 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. How and when a stay is imposed is left to the court’s discretion; in exercising that discretion, a court must “‘weigh the competing interests and maintain an even balance,”’ giving due consideration to the interests of the litigants, the court, and the public. Tak Fat Trading Co. v. United States, 24 CIT 1376, 1377, 2000 WL 1825396 at **1 (CIT 2000) (quoting Landis, supra). A stay that fails to properly balance the relevant interests, e.g., a stay “of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need,” is likely to be deemed an abuse of discretion. Id. See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion to deny stay while matter was pending in neighboring state",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. How and when a stay is imposed is left to the court’s discretion; in exercising that discretion, a court must “‘weigh the competing interests and maintain an even balance,”’ giving due consideration to the interests of the litigants, the court, and the public. Tak Fat Trading Co. v. United States, 24 CIT 1376, 1377, 2000 WL 1825396 at **1 (CIT 2000) (quoting Landis, supra). A stay that fails to properly balance the relevant interests, e.g., a stay “of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need,” is likely to be deemed an abuse of discretion. Id. See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (recognizing that a state courts determination is not an unreasonable application of law merely because it is erroneous",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. How and when a stay is imposed is left to the court’s discretion; in exercising that discretion, a court must “‘weigh the competing interests and maintain an even balance,”’ giving due consideration to the interests of the litigants, the court, and the public. Tak Fat Trading Co. v. United States, 24 CIT 1376, 1377, 2000 WL 1825396 at **1 (CIT 2000) (quoting Landis, supra). A stay that fails to properly balance the relevant interests, e.g., a stay “of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need,” is likely to be deemed an abuse of discretion. Id. See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that trial courts stay was an abuse of discretion because pending actions may take years to complete and because proceedings on liability could not be justifiably stayed merely because a precise determination of damages is not possible at this moment ",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. How and when a stay is imposed is left to the court’s discretion; in exercising that discretion, a court must “‘weigh the competing interests and maintain an even balance,”’ giving due consideration to the interests of the litigants, the court, and the public. Tak Fat Trading Co. v. United States, 24 CIT 1376, 1377, 2000 WL 1825396 at **1 (CIT 2000) (quoting Landis, supra). A stay that fails to properly balance the relevant interests, e.g., a stay “of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need,” is likely to be deemed an abuse of discretion. Id. See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that it is an abuse of discretion to dismiss a complaint merely because of the presence of superfluous matter",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nto go forward, if there is even a fair possibility that the stay for which he prays will work damage to some one else.” Landis, 299 U.S. at 255. How and when a stay is imposed is left to the court’s discretion; in exercising that discretion, a court must “‘weigh the competing interests and maintain an even balance,”’ giving due consideration to the interests of the litigants, the court, and the public. Tak Fat Trading Co. v. United States, 24 CIT 1376, 1377, 2000 WL 1825396 at **1 (CIT 2000) (quoting Landis, supra). A stay that fails to properly balance the relevant interests, e.g., a stay “of indefinite duration in the absence of a pressing need,” is likely to be deemed an abuse of discretion. Id. See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion for a district court not to stay an exhausted petition pending exhaustion of a newly discovered claim"
] | ). In this matter, the need for the stay (or, | 2 |
941 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadmissions are binding only against “the party making the admission.” Requests for admission are a tool, not a trapdoor. Goudeau’s attorneys knew perfectly well that defendant USF & G was denying underinsured coverage. Accordingly, they are not entitled to use a response against it when they sent it to the law firm representing it in a different capacity. IV. The Evidentiary Objection Goudeau also objected to the summary judgment on the ground that USF & G’s evidence was not authenticated. The trial court overruled the objection, and the court of appeals did not reach the issue. Contrary to Goudeau’s objection, the un-derinsured policy (which showed the policy language) wa . 117, 931 A.2d 1180, 1182-83 (2007); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 779, 750 P.2d 1105, 1106 (N.M.1988) (holding claimant was simply not engaged in a transaction oriented to the use of the covered auto at the time of the accident",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadmissions are binding only against “the party making the admission.” Requests for admission are a tool, not a trapdoor. Goudeau’s attorneys knew perfectly well that defendant USF & G was denying underinsured coverage. Accordingly, they are not entitled to use a response against it when they sent it to the law firm representing it in a different capacity. IV. The Evidentiary Objection Goudeau also objected to the summary judgment on the ground that USF & G’s evidence was not authenticated. The trial court overruled the objection, and the court of appeals did not reach the issue. Contrary to Goudeau’s objection, the un-derinsured policy (which showed the policy language) wa . 117, 931 A.2d 1180, 1182-83 (2007); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 779, 750 P.2d 1105, 1106 (N.M.1988) (holding that the delivery of an eeoc decision to the former attorney of a claimant did not constitute notice to the claimant",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadmissions are binding only against “the party making the admission.” Requests for admission are a tool, not a trapdoor. Goudeau’s attorneys knew perfectly well that defendant USF & G was denying underinsured coverage. Accordingly, they are not entitled to use a response against it when they sent it to the law firm representing it in a different capacity. IV. The Evidentiary Objection Goudeau also objected to the summary judgment on the ground that USF & G’s evidence was not authenticated. The trial court overruled the objection, and the court of appeals did not reach the issue. Contrary to Goudeau’s objection, the un-derinsured policy (which showed the policy language) wa . 117, 931 A.2d 1180, 1182-83 (2007); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 779, 750 P.2d 1105, 1106 (N.M.1988) (holding that a federal court has jurisdiction over the question of whether truck was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident emphasis added",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadmissions are binding only against “the party making the admission.” Requests for admission are a tool, not a trapdoor. Goudeau’s attorneys knew perfectly well that defendant USF & G was denying underinsured coverage. Accordingly, they are not entitled to use a response against it when they sent it to the law firm representing it in a different capacity. IV. The Evidentiary Objection Goudeau also objected to the summary judgment on the ground that USF & G’s evidence was not authenticated. The trial court overruled the objection, and the court of appeals did not reach the issue. Contrary to Goudeau’s objection, the un-derinsured policy (which showed the policy language) wa . 117, 931 A.2d 1180, 1182-83 (2007); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 779, 750 P.2d 1105, 1106 (N.M.1988) (holding the state must prove that at the time of the homicide the defendant was engaged in the commission of the felony",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nadmissions are binding only against “the party making the admission.” Requests for admission are a tool, not a trapdoor. Goudeau’s attorneys knew perfectly well that defendant USF & G was denying underinsured coverage. Accordingly, they are not entitled to use a response against it when they sent it to the law firm representing it in a different capacity. IV. The Evidentiary Objection Goudeau also objected to the summary judgment on the ground that USF & G’s evidence was not authenticated. The trial court overruled the objection, and the court of appeals did not reach the issue. Contrary to Goudeau’s objection, the un-derinsured policy (which showed the policy language) wa . 117, 931 A.2d 1180, 1182-83 (2007); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Graham, 106 N.M. 779, 750 P.2d 1105, 1106 (N.M.1988) (holding that the plaintiffs location on the supply barge at the time of the accident did not alter his status"
] | ). 17 . See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Fisher, | 0 |
942 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nonly if [the Supreme Court] has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (construing identical language in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)). Put differently, “[t]he only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, lay out and construct a rule’s retroactive effect, or cause that effect to exist, occur, or appear, is through a holding.” Id. at 663, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Robinson does not allege that the Supreme Court announced that its decision in Alleyne would apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Def. Mot. at 18 (noting that “this Court is authorized to find that [Mr. Robinson’s] claim is retroactive” (emphasis added)); id. at 20 (holding that until the supreme court rules otherwise apprendi is not a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral review that was previously unavailable",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nonly if [the Supreme Court] has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (construing identical language in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)). Put differently, “[t]he only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, lay out and construct a rule’s retroactive effect, or cause that effect to exist, occur, or appear, is through a holding.” Id. at 663, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Robinson does not allege that the Supreme Court announced that its decision in Alleyne would apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Def. Mot. at 18 (noting that “this Court is authorized to find that [Mr. Robinson’s] claim is retroactive” (emphasis added)); id. at 20 (holding johnson announced a new substantive rule and prior supreme court holdings make it retroactive",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nonly if [the Supreme Court] has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (construing identical language in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)). Put differently, “[t]he only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, lay out and construct a rule’s retroactive effect, or cause that effect to exist, occur, or appear, is through a holding.” Id. at 663, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Robinson does not allege that the Supreme Court announced that its decision in Alleyne would apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Def. Mot. at 18 (noting that “this Court is authorized to find that [Mr. Robinson’s] claim is retroactive” (emphasis added)); id. at 20 (recognizing that several circuits have recently announced alleyne does announce a new rule of constitutional law not made retroactive by the supreme court emphasis added",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nonly if [the Supreme Court] has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (construing identical language in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)). Put differently, “[t]he only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, lay out and construct a rule’s retroactive effect, or cause that effect to exist, occur, or appear, is through a holding.” Id. at 663, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Robinson does not allege that the Supreme Court announced that its decision in Alleyne would apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Def. Mot. at 18 (noting that “this Court is authorized to find that [Mr. Robinson’s] claim is retroactive” (emphasis added)); id. at 20 (holding the constitutional rule announced in apprendi does not prohibit a district court from finding by a preponderance of the evidence facts relevant to the application of the guidelines",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nonly if [the Supreme Court] has held that the new rule is retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.” Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 662, 121 S.Ct. 2478, 150 L.Ed.2d 632 (2001) (construing identical language in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)). Put differently, “[t]he only way the Supreme Court can, by itself, lay out and construct a rule’s retroactive effect, or cause that effect to exist, occur, or appear, is through a holding.” Id. at 663, 121 S.Ct. 2478 (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Robinson does not allege that the Supreme Court announced that its decision in Alleyne would apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. See Def. Mot. at 18 (noting that “this Court is authorized to find that [Mr. Robinson’s] claim is retroactive” (emphasis added)); id. at 20 (holding that cage has not been made retroactive by the supreme court"
] | ). Mr. Robinson therefore fails to establish the | 2 |
943 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\npresented at trial does not support the finding that he was armed with a weapon when he broke into the Gillespie home. We find no merit in this argument. The state bears the burden of proving the existence of aggravating factors. State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 249, 337 S.E. 2d 497 (1985). The existence of such factors must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). At trial the state’s evidence tended to show defendant removed Coggins’ service revolver from the trooper’s holster, shot him once in the head and took the revolver from the patrol car. The state also introduced William Bray’s sworn testimony from his own sentencing hearing to this effect: Q. Mrs. Gillespie was gone and you did go into the house did you not? A. Yes, I did. ... Q. 1986) (holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factors of old age and infirmity",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\npresented at trial does not support the finding that he was armed with a weapon when he broke into the Gillespie home. We find no merit in this argument. The state bears the burden of proving the existence of aggravating factors. State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 249, 337 S.E. 2d 497 (1985). The existence of such factors must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). At trial the state’s evidence tended to show defendant removed Coggins’ service revolver from the trooper’s holster, shot him once in the head and took the revolver from the patrol car. The state also introduced William Bray’s sworn testimony from his own sentencing hearing to this effect: Q. Mrs. Gillespie was gone and you did go into the house did you not? A. Yes, I did. ... Q. 1986) (recognizing attorneys substantial experience in the practice of law as an aggravating factor",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\npresented at trial does not support the finding that he was armed with a weapon when he broke into the Gillespie home. We find no merit in this argument. The state bears the burden of proving the existence of aggravating factors. State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 249, 337 S.E. 2d 497 (1985). The existence of such factors must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). At trial the state’s evidence tended to show defendant removed Coggins’ service revolver from the trooper’s holster, shot him once in the head and took the revolver from the patrol car. The state also introduced William Bray’s sworn testimony from his own sentencing hearing to this effect: Q. Mrs. Gillespie was gone and you did go into the house did you not? A. Yes, I did. ... Q. 1986) (holding that the trial court did not err in using the particularized factual circumstances of the case namely the victims age as an aggravating factor",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\npresented at trial does not support the finding that he was armed with a weapon when he broke into the Gillespie home. We find no merit in this argument. The state bears the burden of proving the existence of aggravating factors. State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 249, 337 S.E. 2d 497 (1985). The existence of such factors must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). At trial the state’s evidence tended to show defendant removed Coggins’ service revolver from the trooper’s holster, shot him once in the head and took the revolver from the patrol car. The state also introduced William Bray’s sworn testimony from his own sentencing hearing to this effect: Q. Mrs. Gillespie was gone and you did go into the house did you not? A. Yes, I did. ... Q. 1986) (holding evidence sufficient to support aggravating factor of old age",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\npresented at trial does not support the finding that he was armed with a weapon when he broke into the Gillespie home. We find no merit in this argument. The state bears the burden of proving the existence of aggravating factors. State v. Parker, 315 N.C. 249, 337 S.E. 2d 497 (1985). The existence of such factors must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. N.C.G.S. § 15A-1340.4(a) (1983). At trial the state’s evidence tended to show defendant removed Coggins’ service revolver from the trooper’s holster, shot him once in the head and took the revolver from the patrol car. The state also introduced William Bray’s sworn testimony from his own sentencing hearing to this effect: Q. Mrs. Gillespie was gone and you did go into the house did you not? A. Yes, I did. ... Q. 1986) (holding that the death of a victim may not be considered an aggravating factor in a homicide sentencing"
] | ); State v. Chatman, 308 N.C. 169, 301 S.E. 2d | 3 |
944 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nby Eleventh Circuit case law. As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit has found that a statute may refer to a class of persons or entities and require the government to take action relative to those persons or entities, but still not contain rights-creating language. See Arrington, 438 F.3d at 1345 (“[E]ven though [the statute] contain[s] language requiring the state to take certain actions relative to individual foster children (e.g., the State shall file a petition [to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents], we determined [the statute] do[es] not have the kind of foeused-on-the-individual, rights-creating language required by Gon-zaga.”) (quoting 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir.2003)). See also Coutu, 450 U.S. at 771-73, 101 S.Ct. 1451 (holding that claim construction is a matter of law for the court to determine",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nby Eleventh Circuit case law. As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit has found that a statute may refer to a class of persons or entities and require the government to take action relative to those persons or entities, but still not contain rights-creating language. See Arrington, 438 F.3d at 1345 (“[E]ven though [the statute] contain[s] language requiring the state to take certain actions relative to individual foster children (e.g., the State shall file a petition [to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents], we determined [the statute] do[es] not have the kind of foeused-on-the-individual, rights-creating language required by Gon-zaga.”) (quoting 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir.2003)). See also Coutu, 450 U.S. at 771-73, 101 S.Ct. 1451 (recognizing 1 of the davisbacon act is a minimum wage law designed for the benefit of construction workers but finding the act does not contain rightscreating language",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nby Eleventh Circuit case law. As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit has found that a statute may refer to a class of persons or entities and require the government to take action relative to those persons or entities, but still not contain rights-creating language. See Arrington, 438 F.3d at 1345 (“[E]ven though [the statute] contain[s] language requiring the state to take certain actions relative to individual foster children (e.g., the State shall file a petition [to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents], we determined [the statute] do[es] not have the kind of foeused-on-the-individual, rights-creating language required by Gon-zaga.”) (quoting 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir.2003)). See also Coutu, 450 U.S. at 771-73, 101 S.Ct. 1451 (holding that 301 of the labor management relations act of 1947 29 usc 185 does not preempt claims brought under washingtons minimum wage act chapter 4946 rcw",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nby Eleventh Circuit case law. As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit has found that a statute may refer to a class of persons or entities and require the government to take action relative to those persons or entities, but still not contain rights-creating language. See Arrington, 438 F.3d at 1345 (“[E]ven though [the statute] contain[s] language requiring the state to take certain actions relative to individual foster children (e.g., the State shall file a petition [to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents], we determined [the statute] do[es] not have the kind of foeused-on-the-individual, rights-creating language required by Gon-zaga.”) (quoting 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir.2003)). See also Coutu, 450 U.S. at 771-73, 101 S.Ct. 1451 (holding retroactive application of the act to prosecution that was pending before the effective date of the act was precluded because the act is prospective",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nby Eleventh Circuit case law. As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit has found that a statute may refer to a class of persons or entities and require the government to take action relative to those persons or entities, but still not contain rights-creating language. See Arrington, 438 F.3d at 1345 (“[E]ven though [the statute] contain[s] language requiring the state to take certain actions relative to individual foster children (e.g., the State shall file a petition [to terminate the parental rights of the child’s parents], we determined [the statute] do[es] not have the kind of foeused-on-the-individual, rights-creating language required by Gon-zaga.”) (quoting 31 Foster Children v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1272 (11th Cir.2003)). See also Coutu, 450 U.S. at 771-73, 101 S.Ct. 1451 (holding that claim construction is an issue of law for the court not a question of fact for the jury"
] | ). Next, the present case is distinguishable | 1 |
945 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nimputed to employer); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 99 F.3d 695, 703 (5th Cir.1996) (“Where the legal claims asserted by the plaintiffs are not independent and mutually exclusive, but rather related to and dependent upon excluded conduct, the claims are not covered, even if asserted against an insured who did not himself engage in the prohibited conduct.”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 786 F.Supp. 629, 632 (N.D.Tex.1992), aff'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.1993) (finding no duty to defend insured against claim of negligent hiring when the claim of negligent hiring arises out of agent’s intentional sexual harassment); Columbia, Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 987 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that the proceeds of a liability insurance policy were not property of the estate",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nimputed to employer); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 99 F.3d 695, 703 (5th Cir.1996) (“Where the legal claims asserted by the plaintiffs are not independent and mutually exclusive, but rather related to and dependent upon excluded conduct, the claims are not covered, even if asserted against an insured who did not himself engage in the prohibited conduct.”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 786 F.Supp. 629, 632 (N.D.Tex.1992), aff'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.1993) (finding no duty to defend insured against claim of negligent hiring when the claim of negligent hiring arises out of agent’s intentional sexual harassment); Columbia, Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 987 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that trustee and personnel liability policy only covered the trustees and not the school itself",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nimputed to employer); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 99 F.3d 695, 703 (5th Cir.1996) (“Where the legal claims asserted by the plaintiffs are not independent and mutually exclusive, but rather related to and dependent upon excluded conduct, the claims are not covered, even if asserted against an insured who did not himself engage in the prohibited conduct.”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 786 F.Supp. 629, 632 (N.D.Tex.1992), aff'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.1993) (finding no duty to defend insured against claim of negligent hiring when the claim of negligent hiring arises out of agent’s intentional sexual harassment); Columbia, Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 987 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir.1993) (holding warranty liability and strict liability were both shown by proof a product was defective",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nimputed to employer); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 99 F.3d 695, 703 (5th Cir.1996) (“Where the legal claims asserted by the plaintiffs are not independent and mutually exclusive, but rather related to and dependent upon excluded conduct, the claims are not covered, even if asserted against an insured who did not himself engage in the prohibited conduct.”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 786 F.Supp. 629, 632 (N.D.Tex.1992), aff'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.1993) (finding no duty to defend insured against claim of negligent hiring when the claim of negligent hiring arises out of agent’s intentional sexual harassment); Columbia, Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 987 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir.1993) (recognizing in context of general liability policy if petition contains allegations which when fairly and reasonably construed state cause of action potentially covered by policy insurer has duty to defend insured in underlying suit",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nimputed to employer); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA, 99 F.3d 695, 703 (5th Cir.1996) (“Where the legal claims asserted by the plaintiffs are not independent and mutually exclusive, but rather related to and dependent upon excluded conduct, the claims are not covered, even if asserted against an insured who did not himself engage in the prohibited conduct.”); Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Comprehensive Health Care Assoc., Inc., 786 F.Supp. 629, 632 (N.D.Tex.1992), aff'd on other grounds, 2 F.3d 105 (5th Cir.1993) (finding no duty to defend insured against claim of negligent hiring when the claim of negligent hiring arises out of agent’s intentional sexual harassment); Columbia, Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fiesta Mart, Inc., 987 F.2d 1124, 1128 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that under texas law where liability of insured and liability of its agent were related and interdependent court must look to whether agents fraud was covered by policy"
] | ); Huey T. Littleton Claims, Inc. v. Employers | 4 |
946 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwas not provided a pre-termination hearing. The United States Supreme Court has held that a public employee dismissible only for cause has a property interest in continued employment and that the due process clause prohibits such an employee from being terminated without a pre-termination hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546-547, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Here, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with BPW management, advised of the reasons he was to be terminated, and afforded an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, because there are no issues of material fact in dispute, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs due process rights were not violated. See Boals v.. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 690 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that the absolutecertainty standard is similar to a finding that no violation had occurred at all rather than that any error was harmless",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwas not provided a pre-termination hearing. The United States Supreme Court has held that a public employee dismissible only for cause has a property interest in continued employment and that the due process clause prohibits such an employee from being terminated without a pre-termination hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546-547, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Here, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with BPW management, advised of the reasons he was to be terminated, and afforded an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, because there are no issues of material fact in dispute, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs due process rights were not violated. See Boals v.. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 690 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that privilege applies in similar factual circumstances",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwas not provided a pre-termination hearing. The United States Supreme Court has held that a public employee dismissible only for cause has a property interest in continued employment and that the due process clause prohibits such an employee from being terminated without a pre-termination hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546-547, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Here, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with BPW management, advised of the reasons he was to be terminated, and afforded an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, because there are no issues of material fact in dispute, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs due process rights were not violated. See Boals v.. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 690 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that there is no due process right to appellate review",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwas not provided a pre-termination hearing. The United States Supreme Court has held that a public employee dismissible only for cause has a property interest in continued employment and that the due process clause prohibits such an employee from being terminated without a pre-termination hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546-547, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Here, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with BPW management, advised of the reasons he was to be terminated, and afforded an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, because there are no issues of material fact in dispute, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs due process rights were not violated. See Boals v.. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 690 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that similar allegations were insufficient to state a due process claim",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nwas not provided a pre-termination hearing. The United States Supreme Court has held that a public employee dismissible only for cause has a property interest in continued employment and that the due process clause prohibits such an employee from being terminated without a pre-termination hearing. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546-547, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). Here, Plaintiff was called into a meeting with BPW management, advised of the reasons he was to be terminated, and afforded an opportunity to respond. Plaintiff offers no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, because there are no issues of material fact in dispute, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs due process rights were not violated. See Boals v.. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 690 (6th Cir.1985) (holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred"
] | ). As such, summary judgment will be granted as | 4 |
947 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat the time of an accident. Cf. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. National Indemnity Co. (10th Cir. 1971), 435 F.2d 718; Hagans v. Glen Falls Insurance Co. (10th Cir. 1972), 465 F.2d 1249; Ryder Truck Lines v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. (Ind.App.1978), 372 N.E.2d 504; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. (1974), 23 Md.App. 105, 326 A.2d 29. Conversely, there are also numerous cases that reject the notion that the I.C.C. regulations are determinative. Cf. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (3rd Cir. 1966), 368 F.2d 121; Wellman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (8th Cir. 1974), 496 F.2d 131; Vance Trucking Company v. Canal Insurance Company (D.S.C. 1966), 249 F.Supp. 33, aff’d (4th Cir. 1968), 395 F.2d 391, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 945, 89 S.Ct. 129, 21 L.Ed.2d 116 (holding that a defendant must have notice that the trial court might sentence him to death",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat the time of an accident. Cf. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. National Indemnity Co. (10th Cir. 1971), 435 F.2d 718; Hagans v. Glen Falls Insurance Co. (10th Cir. 1972), 465 F.2d 1249; Ryder Truck Lines v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. (Ind.App.1978), 372 N.E.2d 504; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. (1974), 23 Md.App. 105, 326 A.2d 29. Conversely, there are also numerous cases that reject the notion that the I.C.C. regulations are determinative. Cf. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (3rd Cir. 1966), 368 F.2d 121; Wellman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (8th Cir. 1974), 496 F.2d 131; Vance Trucking Company v. Canal Insurance Company (D.S.C. 1966), 249 F.Supp. 33, aff’d (4th Cir. 1968), 395 F.2d 391, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 945, 89 S.Ct. 129, 21 L.Ed.2d 116 (holding that punitive damages are not duplicative since they are designed to punish rather than to compensate",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat the time of an accident. Cf. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. National Indemnity Co. (10th Cir. 1971), 435 F.2d 718; Hagans v. Glen Falls Insurance Co. (10th Cir. 1972), 465 F.2d 1249; Ryder Truck Lines v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. (Ind.App.1978), 372 N.E.2d 504; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. (1974), 23 Md.App. 105, 326 A.2d 29. Conversely, there are also numerous cases that reject the notion that the I.C.C. regulations are determinative. Cf. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (3rd Cir. 1966), 368 F.2d 121; Wellman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (8th Cir. 1974), 496 F.2d 131; Vance Trucking Company v. Canal Insurance Company (D.S.C. 1966), 249 F.Supp. 33, aff’d (4th Cir. 1968), 395 F.2d 391, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 945, 89 S.Ct. 129, 21 L.Ed.2d 116 (holding that icc regulations are not designed to excuse a party from liability he might otherwise have",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat the time of an accident. Cf. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. National Indemnity Co. (10th Cir. 1971), 435 F.2d 718; Hagans v. Glen Falls Insurance Co. (10th Cir. 1972), 465 F.2d 1249; Ryder Truck Lines v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. (Ind.App.1978), 372 N.E.2d 504; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. (1974), 23 Md.App. 105, 326 A.2d 29. Conversely, there are also numerous cases that reject the notion that the I.C.C. regulations are determinative. Cf. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (3rd Cir. 1966), 368 F.2d 121; Wellman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (8th Cir. 1974), 496 F.2d 131; Vance Trucking Company v. Canal Insurance Company (D.S.C. 1966), 249 F.Supp. 33, aff’d (4th Cir. 1968), 395 F.2d 391, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 945, 89 S.Ct. 129, 21 L.Ed.2d 116 (holding that when regulations are intended to have different purposes and are not dependent on each other they are not intertwined",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nat the time of an accident. Cf. Argonaut Insurance Co. v. National Indemnity Co. (10th Cir. 1971), 435 F.2d 718; Hagans v. Glen Falls Insurance Co. (10th Cir. 1972), 465 F.2d 1249; Ryder Truck Lines v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. (Ind.App.1978), 372 N.E.2d 504; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Federal Insurance Co. (1974), 23 Md.App. 105, 326 A.2d 29. Conversely, there are also numerous cases that reject the notion that the I.C.C. regulations are determinative. Cf. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. (3rd Cir. 1966), 368 F.2d 121; Wellman v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company (8th Cir. 1974), 496 F.2d 131; Vance Trucking Company v. Canal Insurance Company (D.S.C. 1966), 249 F.Supp. 33, aff’d (4th Cir. 1968), 395 F.2d 391, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 945, 89 S.Ct. 129, 21 L.Ed.2d 116 (recognizing that prison regulations designed to provide security are not only legitimate but are central to all other correctional goals"
] | ). The most recent decision in the area, and one | 2 |
948 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nAdditionally, William's claims of procedural error are meritless. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the superior court. 1 . AS 22.20.020(c) states, in relevant part: If a judicial officer denies disqualification the question shall be heard and determined by another judge assigned for the purpose by the presiding judge of the next higher level of courts or, if none, by the other members of the supreme court,. 2 . Capital Info. Group v. Office of the Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 41 (Alaska 1996). 3 . R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 869-70 (Alaska 1997) (internal quotation marks omilted). 4 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a). 5 . AS 22.20.020(a)(9). 6 . See Amidon v. State, 604 P.2d 575, 578 (Alaska 1979); Perotti v. State, 806 P.2d 325, 327 (Alaska App.1 , 767 So.2d 626, 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that the judge cannot consider factual statements of counsel in a motion for summary judgment",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nAdditionally, William's claims of procedural error are meritless. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the superior court. 1 . AS 22.20.020(c) states, in relevant part: If a judicial officer denies disqualification the question shall be heard and determined by another judge assigned for the purpose by the presiding judge of the next higher level of courts or, if none, by the other members of the supreme court,. 2 . Capital Info. Group v. Office of the Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 41 (Alaska 1996). 3 . R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 869-70 (Alaska 1997) (internal quotation marks omilted). 4 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a). 5 . AS 22.20.020(a)(9). 6 . See Amidon v. State, 604 P.2d 575, 578 (Alaska 1979); Perotti v. State, 806 P.2d 325, 327 (Alaska App.1 , 767 So.2d 626, 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that statements that employee was doing a good job are more akin to opinions than statements of fact and on this basis are not actionable in fraud and citing a state case as holding that neither opinions nor statement that are general and indefinite are representations of fact giving rise to a misrepresentation claim",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nAdditionally, William's claims of procedural error are meritless. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the superior court. 1 . AS 22.20.020(c) states, in relevant part: If a judicial officer denies disqualification the question shall be heard and determined by another judge assigned for the purpose by the presiding judge of the next higher level of courts or, if none, by the other members of the supreme court,. 2 . Capital Info. Group v. Office of the Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 41 (Alaska 1996). 3 . R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 869-70 (Alaska 1997) (internal quotation marks omilted). 4 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a). 5 . AS 22.20.020(a)(9). 6 . See Amidon v. State, 604 P.2d 575, 578 (Alaska 1979); Perotti v. State, 806 P.2d 325, 327 (Alaska App.1 , 767 So.2d 626, 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (recognizing that under the rule of necessity where all judges would be disqualified in a suit brought against every district and circuit court judge in the circuit none are disqualified",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nAdditionally, William's claims of procedural error are meritless. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the superior court. 1 . AS 22.20.020(c) states, in relevant part: If a judicial officer denies disqualification the question shall be heard and determined by another judge assigned for the purpose by the presiding judge of the next higher level of courts or, if none, by the other members of the supreme court,. 2 . Capital Info. Group v. Office of the Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 41 (Alaska 1996). 3 . R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 869-70 (Alaska 1997) (internal quotation marks omilted). 4 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a). 5 . AS 22.20.020(a)(9). 6 . See Amidon v. State, 604 P.2d 575, 578 (Alaska 1979); Perotti v. State, 806 P.2d 325, 327 (Alaska App.1 , 767 So.2d 626, 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that judge should be disqualified for statements suggesting preexisting unfavorable opinions about the management and litigation tactics of the cruise line industry",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nAdditionally, William's claims of procedural error are meritless. Therefore, we AFFIRM the decision of the superior court. 1 . AS 22.20.020(c) states, in relevant part: If a judicial officer denies disqualification the question shall be heard and determined by another judge assigned for the purpose by the presiding judge of the next higher level of courts or, if none, by the other members of the supreme court,. 2 . Capital Info. Group v. Office of the Governor, 923 P.2d 29, 41 (Alaska 1996). 3 . R.J.M. v. State, 946 P.2d 855, 869-70 (Alaska 1997) (internal quotation marks omilted). 4 . Alaska R. Civ. P. 52(a). 5 . AS 22.20.020(a)(9). 6 . See Amidon v. State, 604 P.2d 575, 578 (Alaska 1979); Perotti v. State, 806 P.2d 325, 327 (Alaska App.1 , 767 So.2d 626, 627 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) (holding that an order or judgment issued by a disqualified judge is void but not because the court lacked jurisdiction"
] | ); but see Shank v. American Motors Corp., 575 | 3 |
949 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nchallenge a vehicle search from passenger standing to seek suppression of evidence discovered in a vehicle as the fruit of an unlawful stop, detention, or arrest.”). Now, in response to the district court’s cue, Defendant has raised for the first time on appeal the contention that he was unlawfully detained. In the ordinary civil case, we would have little trouble refusing to address a new argument on appeal under these circumstances. See, e.g., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1204 n. 6 (10th Cir.2009) (observing that an appellate court will generally “not resolve issues on appeal unless they are presented, considered, and decided by the district court”). But our criminal cases have been more cautious. See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir.2008) (holding that plain error review is appropriate unless there is some evidence that the defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of a particular argument",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nchallenge a vehicle search from passenger standing to seek suppression of evidence discovered in a vehicle as the fruit of an unlawful stop, detention, or arrest.”). Now, in response to the district court’s cue, Defendant has raised for the first time on appeal the contention that he was unlawfully detained. In the ordinary civil case, we would have little trouble refusing to address a new argument on appeal under these circumstances. See, e.g., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1204 n. 6 (10th Cir.2009) (observing that an appellate court will generally “not resolve issues on appeal unless they are presented, considered, and decided by the district court”). But our criminal cases have been more cautious. See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir.2008) (holding a waiver of a substantial constitutional right must be a voluntary knowing and intelligent act",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nchallenge a vehicle search from passenger standing to seek suppression of evidence discovered in a vehicle as the fruit of an unlawful stop, detention, or arrest.”). Now, in response to the district court’s cue, Defendant has raised for the first time on appeal the contention that he was unlawfully detained. In the ordinary civil case, we would have little trouble refusing to address a new argument on appeal under these circumstances. See, e.g., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1204 n. 6 (10th Cir.2009) (observing that an appellate court will generally “not resolve issues on appeal unless they are presented, considered, and decided by the district court”). But our criminal cases have been more cautious. See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir.2008) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate a knowing waiver",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nchallenge a vehicle search from passenger standing to seek suppression of evidence discovered in a vehicle as the fruit of an unlawful stop, detention, or arrest.”). Now, in response to the district court’s cue, Defendant has raised for the first time on appeal the contention that he was unlawfully detained. In the ordinary civil case, we would have little trouble refusing to address a new argument on appeal under these circumstances. See, e.g., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1204 n. 6 (10th Cir.2009) (observing that an appellate court will generally “not resolve issues on appeal unless they are presented, considered, and decided by the district court”). But our criminal cases have been more cautious. See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir.2008) (recognizing that courts will enforce waiver of appeal rights when waiver is knowing and voluntary",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nchallenge a vehicle search from passenger standing to seek suppression of evidence discovered in a vehicle as the fruit of an unlawful stop, detention, or arrest.”). Now, in response to the district court’s cue, Defendant has raised for the first time on appeal the contention that he was unlawfully detained. In the ordinary civil case, we would have little trouble refusing to address a new argument on appeal under these circumstances. See, e.g., Ramsey Winch Inc. v. Henry, 555 F.3d 1199, 1204 n. 6 (10th Cir.2009) (observing that an appellate court will generally “not resolve issues on appeal unless they are presented, considered, and decided by the district court”). But our criminal cases have been more cautious. See United States v. Zubia-Torres, 550 F.3d 1202, 1207 (10th Cir.2008) (holding that under the sixth amendment a criminal defendant may waive his right to counsel if that waiver is knowing intelligent and voluntary"
] | ). Because there is no evidence in this case | 0 |
950 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nbefore Odettes filed this suit. In sum, whether Odettes’ delay in filing suit against defendants is taken as six years or three, it was clearly unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. Because the delay is inexcusable, and because defendants suffered prejudice from it, this case is an appropriate one in which to apply the doctrine of laches. Odettes is therefore barred from recovering damages from any of these defendants for any infringement occurring before June 29,1995. An appropriate Order has already issued. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record. 1 . A more complete recitation of the facts appears in a previous Memorandum Opinion in this case. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 906 F.Supp. 324 (E.D.Va. 1995) (holding that it is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy spacious as well as clean wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nbefore Odettes filed this suit. In sum, whether Odettes’ delay in filing suit against defendants is taken as six years or three, it was clearly unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. Because the delay is inexcusable, and because defendants suffered prejudice from it, this case is an appropriate one in which to apply the doctrine of laches. Odettes is therefore barred from recovering damages from any of these defendants for any infringement occurring before June 29,1995. An appropriate Order has already issued. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record. 1 . A more complete recitation of the facts appears in a previous Memorandum Opinion in this case. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 906 F.Supp. 324 (E.D.Va. 1995) (holding that sentence factor manipulation applies to statutory minimums as well as to the guidelines",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nbefore Odettes filed this suit. In sum, whether Odettes’ delay in filing suit against defendants is taken as six years or three, it was clearly unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. Because the delay is inexcusable, and because defendants suffered prejudice from it, this case is an appropriate one in which to apply the doctrine of laches. Odettes is therefore barred from recovering damages from any of these defendants for any infringement occurring before June 29,1995. An appropriate Order has already issued. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record. 1 . A more complete recitation of the facts appears in a previous Memorandum Opinion in this case. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 906 F.Supp. 324 (E.D.Va. 1995) (holding that the full payment rule is applicable to refund suits in the court of federal claims",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nbefore Odettes filed this suit. In sum, whether Odettes’ delay in filing suit against defendants is taken as six years or three, it was clearly unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. Because the delay is inexcusable, and because defendants suffered prejudice from it, this case is an appropriate one in which to apply the doctrine of laches. Odettes is therefore barred from recovering damages from any of these defendants for any infringement occurring before June 29,1995. An appropriate Order has already issued. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record. 1 . A more complete recitation of the facts appears in a previous Memorandum Opinion in this case. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 906 F.Supp. 324 (E.D.Va. 1995) (holding that second sentence of 35 usc 102g is applicable to determine priority of invention in infringement suits as well as in interference proceedings",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nbefore Odettes filed this suit. In sum, whether Odettes’ delay in filing suit against defendants is taken as six years or three, it was clearly unreasonable in the circumstances of this case. Because the delay is inexcusable, and because defendants suffered prejudice from it, this case is an appropriate one in which to apply the doctrine of laches. Odettes is therefore barred from recovering damages from any of these defendants for any infringement occurring before June 29,1995. An appropriate Order has already issued. The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum Opinion to all counsel of record. 1 . A more complete recitation of the facts appears in a previous Memorandum Opinion in this case. See Odetics, Inc. v. Storage Technology Corp., 906 F.Supp. 324 (E.D.Va. 1995) (recognizing objective standard applicable under 42 usc 1983 and suits under united states constitution"
] | ). 2 . Briefly, an ATL is a computer-controlled | 3 |
951 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the sudden emergency instruction, was appropriate considering the trial court’s finding that the situation lacked spontaneity. Id. In the case before us, a jury could find that a vehicle suddenly spinning out of control immediately ahead of defendant-driver created a spontaneous reaction not necessarily present when vehicles are stopped in the road ahead of a driver who is able to see the stopped vehicles before the collision. Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that the rear-end collision instruction amounted to harmless error and that the sudden emergency jury instruction was correctly given. Therefore, we are satisfied that the trial justice erred in granting the motion for new trial. See Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Associates, L.P., 819 A.2d 666, 673 (R.I.2003) (holding that trial judge should have granted new trial rather than judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the judge could not know in what order the jury reached its inconsistent verdicts",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the sudden emergency instruction, was appropriate considering the trial court’s finding that the situation lacked spontaneity. Id. In the case before us, a jury could find that a vehicle suddenly spinning out of control immediately ahead of defendant-driver created a spontaneous reaction not necessarily present when vehicles are stopped in the road ahead of a driver who is able to see the stopped vehicles before the collision. Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that the rear-end collision instruction amounted to harmless error and that the sudden emergency jury instruction was correctly given. Therefore, we are satisfied that the trial justice erred in granting the motion for new trial. See Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Associates, L.P., 819 A.2d 666, 673 (R.I.2003) (holding that a motion to intervene filed after final judgment should have been granted",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the sudden emergency instruction, was appropriate considering the trial court’s finding that the situation lacked spontaneity. Id. In the case before us, a jury could find that a vehicle suddenly spinning out of control immediately ahead of defendant-driver created a spontaneous reaction not necessarily present when vehicles are stopped in the road ahead of a driver who is able to see the stopped vehicles before the collision. Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that the rear-end collision instruction amounted to harmless error and that the sudden emergency jury instruction was correctly given. Therefore, we are satisfied that the trial justice erred in granting the motion for new trial. See Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Associates, L.P., 819 A.2d 666, 673 (R.I.2003) (holding that the presentation of a new theory does not constitute the presentation of a new issue on which a jury trial should be granted as of right under rule 38b",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the sudden emergency instruction, was appropriate considering the trial court’s finding that the situation lacked spontaneity. Id. In the case before us, a jury could find that a vehicle suddenly spinning out of control immediately ahead of defendant-driver created a spontaneous reaction not necessarily present when vehicles are stopped in the road ahead of a driver who is able to see the stopped vehicles before the collision. Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that the rear-end collision instruction amounted to harmless error and that the sudden emergency jury instruction was correctly given. Therefore, we are satisfied that the trial justice erred in granting the motion for new trial. See Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Associates, L.P., 819 A.2d 666, 673 (R.I.2003) (holding that where jury has been properly instructed counsel is not ineffective for failing to object to an instruction",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nof the sudden emergency instruction, was appropriate considering the trial court’s finding that the situation lacked spontaneity. Id. In the case before us, a jury could find that a vehicle suddenly spinning out of control immediately ahead of defendant-driver created a spontaneous reaction not necessarily present when vehicles are stopped in the road ahead of a driver who is able to see the stopped vehicles before the collision. Based upon our de novo review, we conclude that the rear-end collision instruction amounted to harmless error and that the sudden emergency jury instruction was correctly given. Therefore, we are satisfied that the trial justice erred in granting the motion for new trial. See Lieberman v. Bliss-Doris Realty Associates, L.P., 819 A.2d 666, 673 (R.I.2003) (holding new trial should not have been granted because jury was properly instructed"
] | ). Conclusion We vacate the order of the | 4 |
952 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n& Rem.Code Ann. § 33.003 (West 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, if legally sufficient evidence does not exist of the negligence of a settling physician, his percentage of responsibility should not be submitted. See id. § 33.003(b) (expressly prohibiting submission to jury of any person’s percentage of responsibility absent legally sufficient evidence); Rehab. Facility at Austin, Inc. v. Cooper, 962 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (interpreting predecessor statute and holding that trial court properly refused to submit settling defendant’s negligence to jury); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 278 (authorizing trial court to submit to jury only questions raised by pleadings and evidence); Kroger Co. v. Betancourt, 996 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n& Rem.Code Ann. § 33.003 (West 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, if legally sufficient evidence does not exist of the negligence of a settling physician, his percentage of responsibility should not be submitted. See id. § 33.003(b) (expressly prohibiting submission to jury of any person’s percentage of responsibility absent legally sufficient evidence); Rehab. Facility at Austin, Inc. v. Cooper, 962 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (interpreting predecessor statute and holding that trial court properly refused to submit settling defendant’s negligence to jury); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 278 (authorizing trial court to submit to jury only questions raised by pleadings and evidence); Kroger Co. v. Betancourt, 996 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (holding that defendant was not harmed by submission of invalid fraud claim",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n& Rem.Code Ann. § 33.003 (West 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, if legally sufficient evidence does not exist of the negligence of a settling physician, his percentage of responsibility should not be submitted. See id. § 33.003(b) (expressly prohibiting submission to jury of any person’s percentage of responsibility absent legally sufficient evidence); Rehab. Facility at Austin, Inc. v. Cooper, 962 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (interpreting predecessor statute and holding that trial court properly refused to submit settling defendant’s negligence to jury); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 278 (authorizing trial court to submit to jury only questions raised by pleadings and evidence); Kroger Co. v. Betancourt, 996 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (holding submission of question on comparative responsibility of settling defendant is required only if evidence exists supporting liability on part of settling defendant",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n& Rem.Code Ann. § 33.003 (West 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, if legally sufficient evidence does not exist of the negligence of a settling physician, his percentage of responsibility should not be submitted. See id. § 33.003(b) (expressly prohibiting submission to jury of any person’s percentage of responsibility absent legally sufficient evidence); Rehab. Facility at Austin, Inc. v. Cooper, 962 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (interpreting predecessor statute and holding that trial court properly refused to submit settling defendant’s negligence to jury); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 278 (authorizing trial court to submit to jury only questions raised by pleadings and evidence); Kroger Co. v. Betancourt, 996 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (holding when reasonable minds cannot differ the question of comparative negligence is a question of law appropriate for summary judgment",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n& Rem.Code Ann. § 33.003 (West 2008) (emphasis added). Thus, if legally sufficient evidence does not exist of the negligence of a settling physician, his percentage of responsibility should not be submitted. See id. § 33.003(b) (expressly prohibiting submission to jury of any person’s percentage of responsibility absent legally sufficient evidence); Rehab. Facility at Austin, Inc. v. Cooper, 962 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex.App.-Austin 1998, no pet.) (interpreting predecessor statute and holding that trial court properly refused to submit settling defendant’s negligence to jury); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 278 (authorizing trial court to submit to jury only questions raised by pleadings and evidence); Kroger Co. v. Betancourt, 996 S.W.2d 353, 358 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied) (recognizing that whether a duty exists is a question of law for the courts"
] | ). That is, section 33.003, the comparative | 2 |
953 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMartin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1981) (noting that “agreement to agree” is unenforceable). Nor does the complaint allege facts indicating that Shaw relied on Boccardi’s confidential information in making its subsequent public bid for Riviera. Boccardi claims to have advised Shaw that such a bid would cause the share price to increase, but even if Shaw relied upon this unextraordinary prediction, no factfinder could conclude that it constituted confidential information within the meaning of the Agreement, which expressly excluded from that definition “information ... generally available to the public.” Cf. Buhler v. Michael P. Maloney Consulting, Inc., 299 A.D.2d 190, 191, 749 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (1st Dep’t 2002) (holding that a customer list may be protectable as a trade secret if it is secret and the court examines and determines if it is protectable based on three factors 1 what steps if any an employer has taken to maintain the confidentiality of a customer list 2 whether a departing employee acknowledges that the customer list is confidential and 3 whether the content of the list is readily ascertainable",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMartin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1981) (noting that “agreement to agree” is unenforceable). Nor does the complaint allege facts indicating that Shaw relied on Boccardi’s confidential information in making its subsequent public bid for Riviera. Boccardi claims to have advised Shaw that such a bid would cause the share price to increase, but even if Shaw relied upon this unextraordinary prediction, no factfinder could conclude that it constituted confidential information within the meaning of the Agreement, which expressly excluded from that definition “information ... generally available to the public.” Cf. Buhler v. Michael P. Maloney Consulting, Inc., 299 A.D.2d 190, 191, 749 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (1st Dep’t 2002) (holding that the plaintiffs customer list was not a trade secret in part because there was no evidence that by the nature of the plaintiffs business extraordinary effort was involved in compiling the customer list",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMartin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1981) (noting that “agreement to agree” is unenforceable). Nor does the complaint allege facts indicating that Shaw relied on Boccardi’s confidential information in making its subsequent public bid for Riviera. Boccardi claims to have advised Shaw that such a bid would cause the share price to increase, but even if Shaw relied upon this unextraordinary prediction, no factfinder could conclude that it constituted confidential information within the meaning of the Agreement, which expressly excluded from that definition “information ... generally available to the public.” Cf. Buhler v. Michael P. Maloney Consulting, Inc., 299 A.D.2d 190, 191, 749 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (1st Dep’t 2002) (holding that contact list based on inter alia information that was publicly available did not qualify as trade secret",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMartin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1981) (noting that “agreement to agree” is unenforceable). Nor does the complaint allege facts indicating that Shaw relied on Boccardi’s confidential information in making its subsequent public bid for Riviera. Boccardi claims to have advised Shaw that such a bid would cause the share price to increase, but even if Shaw relied upon this unextraordinary prediction, no factfinder could conclude that it constituted confidential information within the meaning of the Agreement, which expressly excluded from that definition “information ... generally available to the public.” Cf. Buhler v. Michael P. Maloney Consulting, Inc., 299 A.D.2d 190, 191, 749 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (1st Dep’t 2002) (holding contact information of potential computer network services clients was not a trade secret because all businesses are now potential customers of computer network services and their contact information is publicly available",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nMartin, Jr. Delicatessen, Inc. v. Schumacher, 52 N.Y.2d 105, 109, 436 N.Y.S.2d 247, 417 N.E.2d 541, 543 (1981) (noting that “agreement to agree” is unenforceable). Nor does the complaint allege facts indicating that Shaw relied on Boccardi’s confidential information in making its subsequent public bid for Riviera. Boccardi claims to have advised Shaw that such a bid would cause the share price to increase, but even if Shaw relied upon this unextraordinary prediction, no factfinder could conclude that it constituted confidential information within the meaning of the Agreement, which expressly excluded from that definition “information ... generally available to the public.” Cf. Buhler v. Michael P. Maloney Consulting, Inc., 299 A.D.2d 190, 191, 749 N.Y.S.2d 867, 868 (1st Dep’t 2002) (recognizing that nondisclosure agreements did not have to list the secret information in order to put employees on notice"
] | ). Because we conclude that Boccardi fails to | 2 |
954 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n223, 230 (Mo.1982)(en banc) (“Notice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided by the state in a meaningful manner prior to deprivation of a protected interest. This rule is not necessarily applied when there is a temporary taking, as is the case here. Due process is a flexible concept.”) (citations omitted); see also State v. Doe, 46 Conn.Supp. 598, 765 A.2d 518, 523-29 (2000) (concluding defendant had not been prejudiced by issuance of initial protective order without an attorney where he had the order modified with the aid of counsel). Notably, appellate courts from other jurisdictions have held that statutes similar to this state’s Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are not violative of due process. See, e.g., Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So.2d 413, 417-19 (La.Ct.App.2001) (holding that there are two standards in review of orders on motions to vacate defaults simple abuse of discretion for orders denying relief and gross abuse of discretion for orders granting relief",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n223, 230 (Mo.1982)(en banc) (“Notice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided by the state in a meaningful manner prior to deprivation of a protected interest. This rule is not necessarily applied when there is a temporary taking, as is the case here. Due process is a flexible concept.”) (citations omitted); see also State v. Doe, 46 Conn.Supp. 598, 765 A.2d 518, 523-29 (2000) (concluding defendant had not been prejudiced by issuance of initial protective order without an attorney where he had the order modified with the aid of counsel). Notably, appellate courts from other jurisdictions have held that statutes similar to this state’s Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are not violative of due process. See, e.g., Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So.2d 413, 417-19 (La.Ct.App.2001) (holding that protective orders in the landlord and tenant branch are distinguishable from ordinary prejudgment security devices because protective orders are not statutory creations and because a tenant who fails to pay a protective order may suffer the irreparable consequence of losing possession of the property",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n223, 230 (Mo.1982)(en banc) (“Notice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided by the state in a meaningful manner prior to deprivation of a protected interest. This rule is not necessarily applied when there is a temporary taking, as is the case here. Due process is a flexible concept.”) (citations omitted); see also State v. Doe, 46 Conn.Supp. 598, 765 A.2d 518, 523-29 (2000) (concluding defendant had not been prejudiced by issuance of initial protective order without an attorney where he had the order modified with the aid of counsel). Notably, appellate courts from other jurisdictions have held that statutes similar to this state’s Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are not violative of due process. See, e.g., Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So.2d 413, 417-19 (La.Ct.App.2001) (holding that mere neglect for prisoners safety does not amount to a substantive due process violation implying that intent to do harm would be an abuse of government power and amount to a substantive due process violation",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n223, 230 (Mo.1982)(en banc) (“Notice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided by the state in a meaningful manner prior to deprivation of a protected interest. This rule is not necessarily applied when there is a temporary taking, as is the case here. Due process is a flexible concept.”) (citations omitted); see also State v. Doe, 46 Conn.Supp. 598, 765 A.2d 518, 523-29 (2000) (concluding defendant had not been prejudiced by issuance of initial protective order without an attorney where he had the order modified with the aid of counsel). Notably, appellate courts from other jurisdictions have held that statutes similar to this state’s Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are not violative of due process. See, e.g., Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So.2d 413, 417-19 (La.Ct.App.2001) (holding that in similar factual situation no due process violation occurred",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\n223, 230 (Mo.1982)(en banc) (“Notice and an opportunity to be heard must be provided by the state in a meaningful manner prior to deprivation of a protected interest. This rule is not necessarily applied when there is a temporary taking, as is the case here. Due process is a flexible concept.”) (citations omitted); see also State v. Doe, 46 Conn.Supp. 598, 765 A.2d 518, 523-29 (2000) (concluding defendant had not been prejudiced by issuance of initial protective order without an attorney where he had the order modified with the aid of counsel). Notably, appellate courts from other jurisdictions have held that statutes similar to this state’s Protection from Domestic Abuse Act are not violative of due process. See, e.g., Paschal v. Hazlinsky, 803 So.2d 413, 417-19 (La.Ct.App.2001) (holding no due process violation with respect to hearings for protective orders against domestic abuse"
] | ); Kampf v. Kampf, 237 Mich.App. 377, 603 N.W.2d | 4 |
955 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto discern whether the amendment to the VWPA was intended to overrule Hughey “in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” The Second Circuit has found that it was not: Although Hughey involved the preamendment version of the VWPA, courts have extended its analysis to the amended version of that statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 437 (5th Cir.1998) (“That part of Hughey which restricted the award of restitution to the limits of the offense, however, still stands.”). We have approved of this analysis and, because the amended version of the VWPA contains identical language to the MVRA, we have further extended Hughey to the MVRA. United States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the relevant question in imposing restitution under the mvra is whether the loss is caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto discern whether the amendment to the VWPA was intended to overrule Hughey “in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” The Second Circuit has found that it was not: Although Hughey involved the preamendment version of the VWPA, courts have extended its analysis to the amended version of that statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 437 (5th Cir.1998) (“That part of Hughey which restricted the award of restitution to the limits of the offense, however, still stands.”). We have approved of this analysis and, because the amended version of the VWPA contains identical language to the MVRA, we have further extended Hughey to the MVRA. United States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that under the restitution provision of the supervised release statute 18 usc 3583 restitution can be ordered only for losses caused by the specific conduct that is the basis for the offense of conviction",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto discern whether the amendment to the VWPA was intended to overrule Hughey “in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” The Second Circuit has found that it was not: Although Hughey involved the preamendment version of the VWPA, courts have extended its analysis to the amended version of that statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 437 (5th Cir.1998) (“That part of Hughey which restricted the award of restitution to the limits of the offense, however, still stands.”). We have approved of this analysis and, because the amended version of the VWPA contains identical language to the MVRA, we have further extended Hughey to the MVRA. United States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the victim and witness protection act limits the amount of restitution to the loss caused by the specific conduct forming the basis of the offense of conviction",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto discern whether the amendment to the VWPA was intended to overrule Hughey “in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” The Second Circuit has found that it was not: Although Hughey involved the preamendment version of the VWPA, courts have extended its analysis to the amended version of that statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 437 (5th Cir.1998) (“That part of Hughey which restricted the award of restitution to the limits of the offense, however, still stands.”). We have approved of this analysis and, because the amended version of the VWPA contains identical language to the MVRA, we have further extended Hughey to the MVRA. United States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that the conduct underlying the offense of conviction thus stakes out the boundaries of the restitutionary authority under the mvra",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nto discern whether the amendment to the VWPA was intended to overrule Hughey “in the case of an offense that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of criminal activity.” The Second Circuit has found that it was not: Although Hughey involved the preamendment version of the VWPA, courts have extended its analysis to the amended version of that statute. See, e.g., United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 437 (5th Cir.1998) (“That part of Hughey which restricted the award of restitution to the limits of the offense, however, still stands.”). We have approved of this analysis and, because the amended version of the VWPA contains identical language to the MVRA, we have further extended Hughey to the MVRA. United States v. Oladimeji, 463 F.3d 152, 158-59 (2d Cir.2006) (holding that an award of restitution is only for the loss caused by the specific conduct that is the basis of the offense of conviction"
] | ); see also United States v. Akande, 200 F.3d | 0 |
956 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review “whether substantial evidence supports a finding by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that [Valenzuela] abandoned [her] lawful permanent residence in the United States.” Khodagholian v. Ashcroft, 335 F.Sd 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the government met its burden of showing Valenzuela abandoned her lawful permanent resident status because the record does not compel the conclusion that she consistently intended promptly to return to the United States. See Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that the rule 404b evidence admitted to prove intent was clearly relevant because intent was at issue in the trial",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review “whether substantial evidence supports a finding by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that [Valenzuela] abandoned [her] lawful permanent residence in the United States.” Khodagholian v. Ashcroft, 335 F.Sd 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the government met its burden of showing Valenzuela abandoned her lawful permanent resident status because the record does not compel the conclusion that she consistently intended promptly to return to the United States. See Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that the relevant intent is not the intent to return ultimately but the intent to return to the united states within a relatively short period",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review “whether substantial evidence supports a finding by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that [Valenzuela] abandoned [her] lawful permanent residence in the United States.” Khodagholian v. Ashcroft, 335 F.Sd 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the government met its burden of showing Valenzuela abandoned her lawful permanent resident status because the record does not compel the conclusion that she consistently intended promptly to return to the United States. See Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that where congressional intent is clear a court must give effect to such intent",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review “whether substantial evidence supports a finding by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that [Valenzuela] abandoned [her] lawful permanent residence in the United States.” Khodagholian v. Ashcroft, 335 F.Sd 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the government met its burden of showing Valenzuela abandoned her lawful permanent resident status because the record does not compel the conclusion that she consistently intended promptly to return to the United States. See Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that the only showing of intent required for a vcea claim is the intent to do the act involved",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing her appeal from an immigration judge’s removal order. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review “whether substantial evidence supports a finding by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that [Valenzuela] abandoned [her] lawful permanent residence in the United States.” Khodagholian v. Ashcroft, 335 F.Sd 1003, 1006 (9th Cir.2003). We deny the petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that the government met its burden of showing Valenzuela abandoned her lawful permanent resident status because the record does not compel the conclusion that she consistently intended promptly to return to the United States. See Singh v. Reno, 113 F.3d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that removal for temporary employment with intent to return was not abandonment"
] | ); see also Chavez-Ramirez v. INS, 792 F.2d 932, | 1 |
957 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(1982) (analyzing and sustaining Virginia statute under which Virginia Public Building Authority was charged with construction, maintenance, and operation of public buildings funded by Authority-issued notes and bonds and secured by State rental payments). Various other state courts have approved the issuance of bonds that are debt-serviced through future discretionary legislative appropriations. Again as in New Jersey, those courts have focused primarily on the discretionary nature of the state’s duty to make the appropriation, and clear language in the bonds informing purchasers that the State has no legal obligation to service the bond debt through future appropriations or otherwise. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by the Colo. State Senate, 193 Colo. 298, 566 P.2d 350, 355 (1977) (holding that a statutory right is a creature of the legislature and does not exist where the legislature has not acted",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(1982) (analyzing and sustaining Virginia statute under which Virginia Public Building Authority was charged with construction, maintenance, and operation of public buildings funded by Authority-issued notes and bonds and secured by State rental payments). Various other state courts have approved the issuance of bonds that are debt-serviced through future discretionary legislative appropriations. Again as in New Jersey, those courts have focused primarily on the discretionary nature of the state’s duty to make the appropriation, and clear language in the bonds informing purchasers that the State has no legal obligation to service the bond debt through future appropriations or otherwise. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by the Colo. State Senate, 193 Colo. 298, 566 P.2d 350, 355 (1977) (holding that when the legislature enacts a statute it is presumed that the legislature is aware of existing statutes",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(1982) (analyzing and sustaining Virginia statute under which Virginia Public Building Authority was charged with construction, maintenance, and operation of public buildings funded by Authority-issued notes and bonds and secured by State rental payments). Various other state courts have approved the issuance of bonds that are debt-serviced through future discretionary legislative appropriations. Again as in New Jersey, those courts have focused primarily on the discretionary nature of the state’s duty to make the appropriation, and clear language in the bonds informing purchasers that the State has no legal obligation to service the bond debt through future appropriations or otherwise. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by the Colo. State Senate, 193 Colo. 298, 566 P.2d 350, 355 (1977) (holding that whether the legislature has complied with article iii section 61 of the texas constitution which states that the legislature shall provide suitable laws for the administration of workers compensation insurance for municipalities is a political question committed to the legislature",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(1982) (analyzing and sustaining Virginia statute under which Virginia Public Building Authority was charged with construction, maintenance, and operation of public buildings funded by Authority-issued notes and bonds and secured by State rental payments). Various other state courts have approved the issuance of bonds that are debt-serviced through future discretionary legislative appropriations. Again as in New Jersey, those courts have focused primarily on the discretionary nature of the state’s duty to make the appropriation, and clear language in the bonds informing purchasers that the State has no legal obligation to service the bond debt through future appropriations or otherwise. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by the Colo. State Senate, 193 Colo. 298, 566 P.2d 350, 355 (1977) (holding that the court assumes the legislature acquiesced in our interpretation of the language because the legislature had not amended the language",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\n(1982) (analyzing and sustaining Virginia statute under which Virginia Public Building Authority was charged with construction, maintenance, and operation of public buildings funded by Authority-issued notes and bonds and secured by State rental payments). Various other state courts have approved the issuance of bonds that are debt-serviced through future discretionary legislative appropriations. Again as in New Jersey, those courts have focused primarily on the discretionary nature of the state’s duty to make the appropriation, and clear language in the bonds informing purchasers that the State has no legal obligation to service the bond debt through future appropriations or otherwise. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories by the Colo. State Senate, 193 Colo. 298, 566 P.2d 350, 355 (1977) (holding that in order for there to be state debt in the constitutional sense one legislature in effect must obligate a future legislature to appropriate funds to discharge the debt created by the first legislature"
] | ); Wilson v. Ky. Transp. Cabinet, 884 S.W.2d | 4 |
958 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThe percentage interest appurtenant to a unit represents the unit owner’s percentage interest in the common expense and common profits of the Condominium, and his undivided share in the common elements of the Condominium. The percentage interest shall have a permanent character and, except as specifically provided in Title 11, may not be changed without the written consent of all the unit owners and their mortgagees. We note that the above language mirrors that of RP § 11-107, entitled \"Percentage interests.” For an example of out-of-state cases that directly consider whether certain provisions are properly characterized as \"use restrictions,” or whether they alter unit owners’ property rights in the common areas, see Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ct.App.1980) (holding constitutional a statute providing that a mineral interest would lapse to the surface owner if the interest owner either made no use of the interest or failed to file a claim with the state within a twenty year period",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThe percentage interest appurtenant to a unit represents the unit owner’s percentage interest in the common expense and common profits of the Condominium, and his undivided share in the common elements of the Condominium. The percentage interest shall have a permanent character and, except as specifically provided in Title 11, may not be changed without the written consent of all the unit owners and their mortgagees. We note that the above language mirrors that of RP § 11-107, entitled \"Percentage interests.” For an example of out-of-state cases that directly consider whether certain provisions are properly characterized as \"use restrictions,” or whether they alter unit owners’ property rights in the common areas, see Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ct.App.1980) (holding that property owner could not argue it had no notice of deed restrictions simply because guidelines were unclear when owner acknowledged having copy of such restrictions",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThe percentage interest appurtenant to a unit represents the unit owner’s percentage interest in the common expense and common profits of the Condominium, and his undivided share in the common elements of the Condominium. The percentage interest shall have a permanent character and, except as specifically provided in Title 11, may not be changed without the written consent of all the unit owners and their mortgagees. We note that the above language mirrors that of RP § 11-107, entitled \"Percentage interests.” For an example of out-of-state cases that directly consider whether certain provisions are properly characterized as \"use restrictions,” or whether they alter unit owners’ property rights in the common areas, see Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ct.App.1980) (holding that a tenured teacher who can be dismissed only for good cause has a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her position and may not be deprived of it without due process of law",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThe percentage interest appurtenant to a unit represents the unit owner’s percentage interest in the common expense and common profits of the Condominium, and his undivided share in the common elements of the Condominium. The percentage interest shall have a permanent character and, except as specifically provided in Title 11, may not be changed without the written consent of all the unit owners and their mortgagees. We note that the above language mirrors that of RP § 11-107, entitled \"Percentage interests.” For an example of out-of-state cases that directly consider whether certain provisions are properly characterized as \"use restrictions,” or whether they alter unit owners’ property rights in the common areas, see Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ct.App.1980) (holding that contrary to restrictions regarding use a unit owner may not be deprived of his interest in a substantial portion of the general common elements without his consent",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nThe percentage interest appurtenant to a unit represents the unit owner’s percentage interest in the common expense and common profits of the Condominium, and his undivided share in the common elements of the Condominium. The percentage interest shall have a permanent character and, except as specifically provided in Title 11, may not be changed without the written consent of all the unit owners and their mortgagees. We note that the above language mirrors that of RP § 11-107, entitled \"Percentage interests.” For an example of out-of-state cases that directly consider whether certain provisions are properly characterized as \"use restrictions,” or whether they alter unit owners’ property rights in the common areas, see Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384, 609 P.2d 1084, 1088 (Ct.App.1980) (holding that use of guns to effectuate arrest and handcuffing of defendant did not render his consent to search his home involuntary"
] | ); Kaplan v. Boudreaux, 410 Mass. 435, 573 | 3 |
959 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na “final adjudication on the merits” of the issue now precluded from re-litigation. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51 (2005). Because there was no final adjudication of Edison Learning’s negligence, the School District’s claim fails. At no point in the Viruet litigation did the court determine that Edison Learning was negligent. Even conceding the School District’s arg 2, 326, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955) (concluding there was “no question of collateral estoppel ... because the ease was never tried” and instead settled (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if considered final, settlement of a claim is not an automatic admission of liability. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Rue, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 187, 393 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1978) (holding that because the settlement agreement here specifically did not contain any admission of liability the plaintiff must therefore prove some liability on the part of defendant",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na “final adjudication on the merits” of the issue now precluded from re-litigation. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51 (2005). Because there was no final adjudication of Edison Learning’s negligence, the School District’s claim fails. At no point in the Viruet litigation did the court determine that Edison Learning was negligent. Even conceding the School District’s arg 2, 326, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955) (concluding there was “no question of collateral estoppel ... because the ease was never tried” and instead settled (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if considered final, settlement of a claim is not an automatic admission of liability. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Rue, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 187, 393 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1978) (holding that to establish tort liability in a negligence action there must be a legal duty on the part of the defendant to plaintiff",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na “final adjudication on the merits” of the issue now precluded from re-litigation. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51 (2005). Because there was no final adjudication of Edison Learning’s negligence, the School District’s claim fails. At no point in the Viruet litigation did the court determine that Edison Learning was negligent. Even conceding the School District’s arg 2, 326, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955) (concluding there was “no question of collateral estoppel ... because the ease was never tried” and instead settled (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if considered final, settlement of a claim is not an automatic admission of liability. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Rue, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 187, 393 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1978) (holding that where there has been no settlement or judgment of liability regarding the underlying claim any imposition of liability is not so immediate as to warrant declaratory relief on the issue of indemnification",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na “final adjudication on the merits” of the issue now precluded from re-litigation. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51 (2005). Because there was no final adjudication of Edison Learning’s negligence, the School District’s claim fails. At no point in the Viruet litigation did the court determine that Edison Learning was negligent. Even conceding the School District’s arg 2, 326, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955) (concluding there was “no question of collateral estoppel ... because the ease was never tried” and instead settled (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if considered final, settlement of a claim is not an automatic admission of liability. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Rue, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 187, 393 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1978) (holding that a binding settlement on a tax liability must follow the requirements of the tax code which include the execution of a closing agreement",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\na “final adjudication on the merits” of the issue now precluded from re-litigation. Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Kiesewetter, 585 Pa. 477, 889 A.2d 47, 50-51 (2005). Because there was no final adjudication of Edison Learning’s negligence, the School District’s claim fails. At no point in the Viruet litigation did the court determine that Edison Learning was negligent. Even conceding the School District’s arg 2, 326, 75 S.Ct. 865, 99 L.Ed. 1122 (1955) (concluding there was “no question of collateral estoppel ... because the ease was never tried” and instead settled (internal quotation marks omitted)). Even if considered final, settlement of a claim is not an automatic admission of liability. See, e.g., City of Pittsburgh v. Rue, 38 Pa.Cmwlth. 187, 393 A.2d 1066, 1068 (1978) (holding that a settlement agreement is not a court order and therefore a violation of the settlement agreement would not subject a party to contempt"
] | ). Parties settle for many reasons, including to | 0 |
960 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nrepresentation that the investment program was “backed” or otherwise sponsored by Jackson Hewitt. D. No Reliance by the Kamans The Kamans were also unable to prove the reliance element necessary to establish an apparent agency. Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrated that they did not rely on a purported agency relationship between Jackson Hewitt and JHIS when they decided to invest with Prewett. First, Dr. Kaman conceded that he knew the Jackson Hewitt Tax Service office in Sarasota was a franchise operation before investing with Prewett. It follows that he could not have reasonably believed that JHIS was owned, controlled, or operated by the franchisor, Jackson Hewitt. See Mann v. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., No. 90 C 5518, 1990 WL 205286, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 10, 1990) (holding that employees retaliatory discharge based on employees election to public office did not violate public policy",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nrepresentation that the investment program was “backed” or otherwise sponsored by Jackson Hewitt. D. No Reliance by the Kamans The Kamans were also unable to prove the reliance element necessary to establish an apparent agency. Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrated that they did not rely on a purported agency relationship between Jackson Hewitt and JHIS when they decided to invest with Prewett. First, Dr. Kaman conceded that he knew the Jackson Hewitt Tax Service office in Sarasota was a franchise operation before investing with Prewett. It follows that he could not have reasonably believed that JHIS was owned, controlled, or operated by the franchisor, Jackson Hewitt. See Mann v. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., No. 90 C 5518, 1990 WL 205286, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 10, 1990) (holding unconscionable an arbitration agreement requiring employees to arbitrate claims against the employer but not requiring the employer to arbitrate claims against the employees",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nrepresentation that the investment program was “backed” or otherwise sponsored by Jackson Hewitt. D. No Reliance by the Kamans The Kamans were also unable to prove the reliance element necessary to establish an apparent agency. Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrated that they did not rely on a purported agency relationship between Jackson Hewitt and JHIS when they decided to invest with Prewett. First, Dr. Kaman conceded that he knew the Jackson Hewitt Tax Service office in Sarasota was a franchise operation before investing with Prewett. It follows that he could not have reasonably believed that JHIS was owned, controlled, or operated by the franchisor, Jackson Hewitt. See Mann v. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., No. 90 C 5518, 1990 WL 205286, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 10, 1990) (holding that tort claims act contemplates waiver of immunity when negligence of public employees causes unsafe dangerous or defective condition on property owned and operated by the government",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nrepresentation that the investment program was “backed” or otherwise sponsored by Jackson Hewitt. D. No Reliance by the Kamans The Kamans were also unable to prove the reliance element necessary to establish an apparent agency. Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrated that they did not rely on a purported agency relationship between Jackson Hewitt and JHIS when they decided to invest with Prewett. First, Dr. Kaman conceded that he knew the Jackson Hewitt Tax Service office in Sarasota was a franchise operation before investing with Prewett. It follows that he could not have reasonably believed that JHIS was owned, controlled, or operated by the franchisor, Jackson Hewitt. See Mann v. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., No. 90 C 5518, 1990 WL 205286, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 10, 1990) (holding that probation department employees are not county employees",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nrepresentation that the investment program was “backed” or otherwise sponsored by Jackson Hewitt. D. No Reliance by the Kamans The Kamans were also unable to prove the reliance element necessary to establish an apparent agency. Indeed, the undisputed facts demonstrated that they did not rely on a purported agency relationship between Jackson Hewitt and JHIS when they decided to invest with Prewett. First, Dr. Kaman conceded that he knew the Jackson Hewitt Tax Service office in Sarasota was a franchise operation before investing with Prewett. It follows that he could not have reasonably believed that JHIS was owned, controlled, or operated by the franchisor, Jackson Hewitt. See Mann v. Prudential Real Estate Affiliates, Inc., No. 90 C 5518, 1990 WL 205286, at *5 (N.D.Ill. Dec. 10, 1990) (holding that the employees of a local real estate franchisee could not maintain claims against the franchisor based on apparent agency when the employees knew that the franchisee was independently owned and operated"
] | ); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Lesch, 319 Md. 25, | 4 |
961 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand, thus, the order fell easily within the ambit of Rule 2 (a)(6). But even more to the point, National Enterprises has taken inconsistent positions with respect to the chancery court’s 1994 order. In its first notice of appeal in 1994, National Enterprises referred to the 1994 order as a “final Order” and stated that it was appealing issues relating to the deeds, easements, and the License Agreement and specifically mentioned ingress and egress and parking. Because National Enterprises failed to perfect its appeal in a timely fashion by tendering the record too late, it failed to appeal the 1994 order. Because the order was not appealed, it became a final order and became binding on all the parties. See, e.g., Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fauria, 279 Ark. 291, 651 S.W.2d 80 (1983) (recognizing that a final judgment may provide for a particular standard upon which to modify a final judgment",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand, thus, the order fell easily within the ambit of Rule 2 (a)(6). But even more to the point, National Enterprises has taken inconsistent positions with respect to the chancery court’s 1994 order. In its first notice of appeal in 1994, National Enterprises referred to the 1994 order as a “final Order” and stated that it was appealing issues relating to the deeds, easements, and the License Agreement and specifically mentioned ingress and egress and parking. Because National Enterprises failed to perfect its appeal in a timely fashion by tendering the record too late, it failed to appeal the 1994 order. Because the order was not appealed, it became a final order and became binding on all the parties. See, e.g., Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fauria, 279 Ark. 291, 651 S.W.2d 80 (1983) (holding that poliey language stating that insurer will pay all interest accruing on judgment against its insured requires an insurer to pay interest on the entire judgment amount",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand, thus, the order fell easily within the ambit of Rule 2 (a)(6). But even more to the point, National Enterprises has taken inconsistent positions with respect to the chancery court’s 1994 order. In its first notice of appeal in 1994, National Enterprises referred to the 1994 order as a “final Order” and stated that it was appealing issues relating to the deeds, easements, and the License Agreement and specifically mentioned ingress and egress and parking. Because National Enterprises failed to perfect its appeal in a timely fashion by tendering the record too late, it failed to appeal the 1994 order. Because the order was not appealed, it became a final order and became binding on all the parties. See, e.g., Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fauria, 279 Ark. 291, 651 S.W.2d 80 (1983) (holding that court of appeals was without jurisdiction to modify judgment against insurer because judgment against insurer became final when it failed to appeal",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand, thus, the order fell easily within the ambit of Rule 2 (a)(6). But even more to the point, National Enterprises has taken inconsistent positions with respect to the chancery court’s 1994 order. In its first notice of appeal in 1994, National Enterprises referred to the 1994 order as a “final Order” and stated that it was appealing issues relating to the deeds, easements, and the License Agreement and specifically mentioned ingress and egress and parking. Because National Enterprises failed to perfect its appeal in a timely fashion by tendering the record too late, it failed to appeal the 1994 order. Because the order was not appealed, it became a final order and became binding on all the parties. See, e.g., Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fauria, 279 Ark. 291, 651 S.W.2d 80 (1983) (holding that in a dispute between insurer and insured in which the insurer admitted liability hut disputed the amount of damages it was only after entry of a judgment upon that verdict that the claim became liquidated",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nand, thus, the order fell easily within the ambit of Rule 2 (a)(6). But even more to the point, National Enterprises has taken inconsistent positions with respect to the chancery court’s 1994 order. In its first notice of appeal in 1994, National Enterprises referred to the 1994 order as a “final Order” and stated that it was appealing issues relating to the deeds, easements, and the License Agreement and specifically mentioned ingress and egress and parking. Because National Enterprises failed to perfect its appeal in a timely fashion by tendering the record too late, it failed to appeal the 1994 order. Because the order was not appealed, it became a final order and became binding on all the parties. See, e.g., Millers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Fauria, 279 Ark. 291, 651 S.W.2d 80 (1983) (holding that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify its final order more than 30 days after its final judgment"
] | ). In addition to its notice of appeal, on May | 2 |
962 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nso that Plaintiff could attend medical appointments (Id. at 37, 39); (3) former supervisor Jose So-mohano denied Plaintiffs request to leave early during a bleeding emergency because he did not have a cashier to replace Plaintiff (Id. at 43, 74); and (4) Betty Montano denied Plaintiffs request for a part-time accommodation as ordered by Plaintiffs doctor (Id. at 43-44). Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding these allegations because Plaintiffs assertions are inadmissible hearsay and because Plaintiff failed to create a nexus between the discriminatory acts she described and her alleged termination. Defendants fail on both accounts. Plaintiffs assertions are not hearsay. See Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1094-1095 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that in employees age discrimination suit against former employer supervisors statement to employee was not hearsay even though the statement was offered for its truth because the statement was an admission by a party opponent",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nso that Plaintiff could attend medical appointments (Id. at 37, 39); (3) former supervisor Jose So-mohano denied Plaintiffs request to leave early during a bleeding emergency because he did not have a cashier to replace Plaintiff (Id. at 43, 74); and (4) Betty Montano denied Plaintiffs request for a part-time accommodation as ordered by Plaintiffs doctor (Id. at 43-44). Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding these allegations because Plaintiffs assertions are inadmissible hearsay and because Plaintiff failed to create a nexus between the discriminatory acts she described and her alleged termination. Defendants fail on both accounts. Plaintiffs assertions are not hearsay. See Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1094-1095 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that a text message constituted hearsay insofar as it was offered to prove the truth of the statement asserted",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nso that Plaintiff could attend medical appointments (Id. at 37, 39); (3) former supervisor Jose So-mohano denied Plaintiffs request to leave early during a bleeding emergency because he did not have a cashier to replace Plaintiff (Id. at 43, 74); and (4) Betty Montano denied Plaintiffs request for a part-time accommodation as ordered by Plaintiffs doctor (Id. at 43-44). Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding these allegations because Plaintiffs assertions are inadmissible hearsay and because Plaintiff failed to create a nexus between the discriminatory acts she described and her alleged termination. Defendants fail on both accounts. Plaintiffs assertions are not hearsay. See Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1094-1095 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that the district courts improper admission of an unauthenticated registration statement was harmless because the proponent of the registration statement later properly authenticated the statement in a motion to reconsider",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nso that Plaintiff could attend medical appointments (Id. at 37, 39); (3) former supervisor Jose So-mohano denied Plaintiffs request to leave early during a bleeding emergency because he did not have a cashier to replace Plaintiff (Id. at 43, 74); and (4) Betty Montano denied Plaintiffs request for a part-time accommodation as ordered by Plaintiffs doctor (Id. at 43-44). Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding these allegations because Plaintiffs assertions are inadmissible hearsay and because Plaintiff failed to create a nexus between the discriminatory acts she described and her alleged termination. Defendants fail on both accounts. Plaintiffs assertions are not hearsay. See Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1094-1095 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that defendant who introduced hearsay statement waived objection to admission of another part of same statement",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nso that Plaintiff could attend medical appointments (Id. at 37, 39); (3) former supervisor Jose So-mohano denied Plaintiffs request to leave early during a bleeding emergency because he did not have a cashier to replace Plaintiff (Id. at 43, 74); and (4) Betty Montano denied Plaintiffs request for a part-time accommodation as ordered by Plaintiffs doctor (Id. at 43-44). Defendants argue that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding these allegations because Plaintiffs assertions are inadmissible hearsay and because Plaintiff failed to create a nexus between the discriminatory acts she described and her alleged termination. Defendants fail on both accounts. Plaintiffs assertions are not hearsay. See Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1094-1095 (1st Cir.1995) (holding that a hearsay statement can itself be considered in first determining if a conspiracy existed when the statement was made"
] | ). Similarly, Plaintiff does not need to show | 0 |
963 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nconduct constitutes sex discrim ination.” La Day v. Catalyst Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir.2002). If this determination is answered in the affirmative, the court must decide whether the challenged conduct meets the applicable standards for either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. For example, same-sex harassment that is ‘severe or. pervasive’ enough to create a hostile environment ... might be excluded from the coverage of [T]itle VII because it was not discriminatory on the basis of sex. On the other hand, same-sex harassment that is indisputably discriminatory might not be serious enough to make out either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. Id. (citation omitted). See, e.g., Davis v. Coastal Int’l Security, Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C.Cir.2002) (holding that transsexuals are not a protected class under title vii in response to the plaintiffs argument that because a persons identity as a transsexual is directly connected to the sex organs she possesses discrimination on this basis must constitute discrimination because of sex",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nconduct constitutes sex discrim ination.” La Day v. Catalyst Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir.2002). If this determination is answered in the affirmative, the court must decide whether the challenged conduct meets the applicable standards for either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. For example, same-sex harassment that is ‘severe or. pervasive’ enough to create a hostile environment ... might be excluded from the coverage of [T]itle VII because it was not discriminatory on the basis of sex. On the other hand, same-sex harassment that is indisputably discriminatory might not be serious enough to make out either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. Id. (citation omitted). See, e.g., Davis v. Coastal Int’l Security, Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C.Cir.2002) (recognizing that a plaintiff can demonstrate that samesex harassment is because of sex by showing that the conduct was motivated by the coworkers sexual desire for persons of the same sex",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nconduct constitutes sex discrim ination.” La Day v. Catalyst Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir.2002). If this determination is answered in the affirmative, the court must decide whether the challenged conduct meets the applicable standards for either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. For example, same-sex harassment that is ‘severe or. pervasive’ enough to create a hostile environment ... might be excluded from the coverage of [T]itle VII because it was not discriminatory on the basis of sex. On the other hand, same-sex harassment that is indisputably discriminatory might not be serious enough to make out either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. Id. (citation omitted). See, e.g., Davis v. Coastal Int’l Security, Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C.Cir.2002) (holding that retaliation claim was reasonably related to prior sex discrimination claim",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nconduct constitutes sex discrim ination.” La Day v. Catalyst Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir.2002). If this determination is answered in the affirmative, the court must decide whether the challenged conduct meets the applicable standards for either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. For example, same-sex harassment that is ‘severe or. pervasive’ enough to create a hostile environment ... might be excluded from the coverage of [T]itle VII because it was not discriminatory on the basis of sex. On the other hand, same-sex harassment that is indisputably discriminatory might not be serious enough to make out either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. Id. (citation omitted). See, e.g., Davis v. Coastal Int’l Security, Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C.Cir.2002) (holding discrimination based on pregnancy was not sex discrimination",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nconduct constitutes sex discrim ination.” La Day v. Catalyst Technology, Inc., 302 F.3d 474, 478 (5th Cir.2002). If this determination is answered in the affirmative, the court must decide whether the challenged conduct meets the applicable standards for either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. For example, same-sex harassment that is ‘severe or. pervasive’ enough to create a hostile environment ... might be excluded from the coverage of [T]itle VII because it was not discriminatory on the basis of sex. On the other hand, same-sex harassment that is indisputably discriminatory might not be serious enough to make out either a quid pro quo or hostile environment claim. Id. (citation omitted). See, e.g., Davis v. Coastal Int’l Security, Inc., 275 F.3d 1119, 1126 (D.C.Cir.2002) (holding that actions of plaintiffs coworkers which included slashing plaintiffs tires grabbing their crotches and making kissing gestures and uttering a phrase used to describe oral sex however vulgar did not constitute discrimination because of sex"
] | ). The Court’s first task is to determine | 4 |
964 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor the first violation for selling fireworks with an excessive powder content. However, § 320.136 states that M-80s are expressly prohibited from possession within the state for any purpose. The Commission found that Shelton possessed M-80s. Section 320.116 grants the state fire marshal the discretion to revoke the permits of any license holder who has violated the provisions of §§ Sections 320.106 to 320.161 for a period of three years. Further, possession of illegal fireworks under § 320.136, which includes M-80s, may “result in the ... revocation of the license(s) of the licensee.” 11 C.S.R. 40-3.010(21). It is clearly within the discretion of the fire marshal to determine the appropriate penalty for a licensed fireworks’ dealer who possesses M-80s. Walker, 781 S.W.2d at 116 (holding the boards affirmance of the penalty of removal was within the discretionary authority of the board because the record reflects a reasoned concern for the factors appropriate to evaluating a penalty ",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor the first violation for selling fireworks with an excessive powder content. However, § 320.136 states that M-80s are expressly prohibited from possession within the state for any purpose. The Commission found that Shelton possessed M-80s. Section 320.116 grants the state fire marshal the discretion to revoke the permits of any license holder who has violated the provisions of §§ Sections 320.106 to 320.161 for a period of three years. Further, possession of illegal fireworks under § 320.136, which includes M-80s, may “result in the ... revocation of the license(s) of the licensee.” 11 C.S.R. 40-3.010(21). It is clearly within the discretion of the fire marshal to determine the appropriate penalty for a licensed fireworks’ dealer who possesses M-80s. Walker, 781 S.W.2d at 116 (holding that the authority to determine the appropriate penalty is with the supervisor of liquor control and not the administrative hearing commission or the reviewing court",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor the first violation for selling fireworks with an excessive powder content. However, § 320.136 states that M-80s are expressly prohibited from possession within the state for any purpose. The Commission found that Shelton possessed M-80s. Section 320.116 grants the state fire marshal the discretion to revoke the permits of any license holder who has violated the provisions of §§ Sections 320.106 to 320.161 for a period of three years. Further, possession of illegal fireworks under § 320.136, which includes M-80s, may “result in the ... revocation of the license(s) of the licensee.” 11 C.S.R. 40-3.010(21). It is clearly within the discretion of the fire marshal to determine the appropriate penalty for a licensed fireworks’ dealer who possesses M-80s. Walker, 781 S.W.2d at 116 (holding that in reviewing a gaming commission decision the court will examine the record to determine if there is any evidence to support the commissions order",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor the first violation for selling fireworks with an excessive powder content. However, § 320.136 states that M-80s are expressly prohibited from possession within the state for any purpose. The Commission found that Shelton possessed M-80s. Section 320.116 grants the state fire marshal the discretion to revoke the permits of any license holder who has violated the provisions of §§ Sections 320.106 to 320.161 for a period of three years. Further, possession of illegal fireworks under § 320.136, which includes M-80s, may “result in the ... revocation of the license(s) of the licensee.” 11 C.S.R. 40-3.010(21). It is clearly within the discretion of the fire marshal to determine the appropriate penalty for a licensed fireworks’ dealer who possesses M-80s. Walker, 781 S.W.2d at 116 (holding that summary judgment is appropriate when no issue of material fact exists and the court is reviewing administrative record for sufficiency of evidence",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nfor the first violation for selling fireworks with an excessive powder content. However, § 320.136 states that M-80s are expressly prohibited from possession within the state for any purpose. The Commission found that Shelton possessed M-80s. Section 320.116 grants the state fire marshal the discretion to revoke the permits of any license holder who has violated the provisions of §§ Sections 320.106 to 320.161 for a period of three years. Further, possession of illegal fireworks under § 320.136, which includes M-80s, may “result in the ... revocation of the license(s) of the licensee.” 11 C.S.R. 40-3.010(21). It is clearly within the discretion of the fire marshal to determine the appropriate penalty for a licensed fireworks’ dealer who possesses M-80s. Walker, 781 S.W.2d at 116 (holding that the district court is limited to considering the administrative record in reviewing the denial of benefits under an erisa plan"
] | ). Shelton possessed over 1,000 M-80s in his | 1 |
965 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nlitigation because, for example, relevant business documents pertaining to the antitrust conspiracy may not exist and covert behavior may have to be proven through less direct means.”); Callahan v. AEV, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 175, 179 (W.D.Pa.1996) (\"Discovery in an antitrust case is necessarily broad because allegations involve improper business conduct.... Such conduct is generally covert and must be gleaned from records, conduct, and business relationships.”). 13 . In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. MDL-1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29160, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 29, 2004). 14 . Id. at *16. 15 . Id., at *12. 16 . Id. 17 . No. 99-197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433, at *11 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001). 18 . Id. 19 . Id. 20 . See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 2275531, at *2 (holding that market participant socal edison is in privity with the california power exchange corporation not with other market participants",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nlitigation because, for example, relevant business documents pertaining to the antitrust conspiracy may not exist and covert behavior may have to be proven through less direct means.”); Callahan v. AEV, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 175, 179 (W.D.Pa.1996) (\"Discovery in an antitrust case is necessarily broad because allegations involve improper business conduct.... Such conduct is generally covert and must be gleaned from records, conduct, and business relationships.”). 13 . In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. MDL-1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29160, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 29, 2004). 14 . Id. at *16. 15 . Id., at *12. 16 . Id. 17 . No. 99-197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433, at *11 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001). 18 . Id. 19 . Id. 20 . See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 2275531, at *2 (holding that the measure of damages for the breach of a contract of sale where no fraud is shown is the difference between the contract price and the market price of the goods on the date of the breach",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nlitigation because, for example, relevant business documents pertaining to the antitrust conspiracy may not exist and covert behavior may have to be proven through less direct means.”); Callahan v. AEV, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 175, 179 (W.D.Pa.1996) (\"Discovery in an antitrust case is necessarily broad because allegations involve improper business conduct.... Such conduct is generally covert and must be gleaned from records, conduct, and business relationships.”). 13 . In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. MDL-1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29160, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 29, 2004). 14 . Id. at *16. 15 . Id., at *12. 16 . Id. 17 . No. 99-197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433, at *11 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001). 18 . Id. 19 . Id. 20 . See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 2275531, at *2 (holding that the market price is understood to mean the current market price being paid for gas at the well where it is produced",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nlitigation because, for example, relevant business documents pertaining to the antitrust conspiracy may not exist and covert behavior may have to be proven through less direct means.”); Callahan v. AEV, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 175, 179 (W.D.Pa.1996) (\"Discovery in an antitrust case is necessarily broad because allegations involve improper business conduct.... Such conduct is generally covert and must be gleaned from records, conduct, and business relationships.”). 13 . In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. MDL-1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29160, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 29, 2004). 14 . Id. at *16. 15 . Id., at *12. 16 . Id. 17 . No. 99-197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433, at *11 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001). 18 . Id. 19 . Id. 20 . See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 2275531, at *2 (holding merely that to the extent a breaching party claims that the appropriate measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market price it holds the burden of proving that there is in fact an available market for the goods in issue",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nlitigation because, for example, relevant business documents pertaining to the antitrust conspiracy may not exist and covert behavior may have to be proven through less direct means.”); Callahan v. AEV, Inc., 947 F.Supp. 175, 179 (W.D.Pa.1996) (\"Discovery in an antitrust case is necessarily broad because allegations involve improper business conduct.... Such conduct is generally covert and must be gleaned from records, conduct, and business relationships.”). 13 . In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., No. MDL-1426, 2004 U.S. Dist. Lexis 29160, at *8 (E.D.Pa. Oct. 29, 2004). 14 . Id. at *16. 15 . Id., at *12. 16 . Id. 17 . No. 99-197TFH, 2001 WL 1049433, at *11 (D.D.C. June 20, 2001). 18 . Id. 19 . Id. 20 . See, e.g., In re Aspartame Antitrust Litig., 2008 WL 2275531, at *2 (holding that information and documents that relate to among other things the nonu s manufacture sale and distribution of aspartame may prove relevant to establishing the existence of a global conspiracy to allocate the market for aspartame the ability of market participants to engage in domestic price fixing and the mechanisms employed by market participants in price fixing"
] | ); In re Plastics Additives Antitrust Litig., | 4 |
966 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat probable cause did not exist. Qualified immunity protects those officers who make a reasonable error in determining whether there is probable cause to arrest an individual. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.2007). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for qualified immunity: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that citys policy need not be unconstitutional per se but need only cause a constitutional violation",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat probable cause did not exist. Qualified immunity protects those officers who make a reasonable error in determining whether there is probable cause to arrest an individual. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.2007). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for qualified immunity: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that a defendant need not be advised of the right to terminate questioning at any time",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat probable cause did not exist. Qualified immunity protects those officers who make a reasonable error in determining whether there is probable cause to arrest an individual. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.2007). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for qualified immunity: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that the saucier procedure need not be followed in any particular sequence",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat probable cause did not exist. Qualified immunity protects those officers who make a reasonable error in determining whether there is probable cause to arrest an individual. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.2007). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for qualified immunity: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that courts are not bound to decide any particular jurisdictional question before any other",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nthat probable cause did not exist. Qualified immunity protects those officers who make a reasonable error in determining whether there is probable cause to arrest an individual. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 643, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Belcher v. Norton, 497 F.3d 742, 749 (7th Cir.2007). The Supreme Court has articulated a two-part test for qualified immunity: (1) whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001) (overruled in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009) (holding that a claim on an algorithm for converting binarycoded decimal numbers into pure binary numbers was not patent eligible because the claims were not limited to any particular art or technology to any particular apparatus or machinery or to any particular end use"
] | )). Although qualified immunity is an | 2 |
967 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nplaintiffs limitation of liability claim pending); Bergeron v. Elliot, 466 F.2d 514, 516 n. 3 (5th Cir.1972) (allowing appeal of grant of summary judgment as to one of several defendants). Cf. Jamaica Commodity Trading Co. v. Barge Hercules, 992 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (finding no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of grant of summary judgment on one defendant’s cross-claim against another for indemnification because plaintiffs claims for liability as to any defendant had not been determined). As the District Court did neither of these and did not otherwise determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, McLaughlin’s appeal is not yet ripe for review and cannot be heard by this court. Accord Francis v. Forest Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that a pretrial order that the 500 cogsa limitation applied was not appealable under 28 usc 1292a3",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nplaintiffs limitation of liability claim pending); Bergeron v. Elliot, 466 F.2d 514, 516 n. 3 (5th Cir.1972) (allowing appeal of grant of summary judgment as to one of several defendants). Cf. Jamaica Commodity Trading Co. v. Barge Hercules, 992 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (finding no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of grant of summary judgment on one defendant’s cross-claim against another for indemnification because plaintiffs claims for liability as to any defendant had not been determined). As the District Court did neither of these and did not otherwise determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, McLaughlin’s appeal is not yet ripe for review and cannot be heard by this court. Accord Francis v. Forest Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir.1986) (holding order setting aside summary judgment for procedural irregularity was not immediately appealable",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nplaintiffs limitation of liability claim pending); Bergeron v. Elliot, 466 F.2d 514, 516 n. 3 (5th Cir.1972) (allowing appeal of grant of summary judgment as to one of several defendants). Cf. Jamaica Commodity Trading Co. v. Barge Hercules, 992 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (finding no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of grant of summary judgment on one defendant’s cross-claim against another for indemnification because plaintiffs claims for liability as to any defendant had not been determined). As the District Court did neither of these and did not otherwise determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, McLaughlin’s appeal is not yet ripe for review and cannot be heard by this court. Accord Francis v. Forest Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that where an adversary proceeding continues the order is no more a final decision than an order denying summary judgment or denying a request for additional discovery the litigation proceeds and the issue will be reviewed if it turns out to make a difference to an order that is independently appealable",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nplaintiffs limitation of liability claim pending); Bergeron v. Elliot, 466 F.2d 514, 516 n. 3 (5th Cir.1972) (allowing appeal of grant of summary judgment as to one of several defendants). Cf. Jamaica Commodity Trading Co. v. Barge Hercules, 992 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (finding no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of grant of summary judgment on one defendant’s cross-claim against another for indemnification because plaintiffs claims for liability as to any defendant had not been determined). As the District Court did neither of these and did not otherwise determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, McLaughlin’s appeal is not yet ripe for review and cannot be heard by this court. Accord Francis v. Forest Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that an order denying summary judgment is not appealable under 1292a3 even though it may have had important procedural consequences",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nplaintiffs limitation of liability claim pending); Bergeron v. Elliot, 466 F.2d 514, 516 n. 3 (5th Cir.1972) (allowing appeal of grant of summary judgment as to one of several defendants). Cf. Jamaica Commodity Trading Co. v. Barge Hercules, 992 F.2d 1162 (11th Cir.1993) (per curiam) (finding no jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeal of grant of summary judgment on one defendant’s cross-claim against another for indemnification because plaintiffs claims for liability as to any defendant had not been determined). As the District Court did neither of these and did not otherwise determine the rights and liabilities of the parties, McLaughlin’s appeal is not yet ripe for review and cannot be heard by this court. Accord Francis v. Forest Oil Corp., 798 F.2d 147, 149-50 (5th Cir.1986) (holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable"
] | ); Upper Miss. Towing Corp. v. West, 338 F.2d | 3 |
968 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe Posts clearly could have litigated the insurance claim in their prior foreclosure action. A foreclosure judgment determines with finality the rights of the parties to the contract. See Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 172, 325 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1982). The effect of strict foreclosure is to bar and foreclose the purchaser's equitable interest in the property and terminate the purchaser's rights under the contract. Kallenbach v. Lake Publications, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 653, 142 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1966). Foreclosure also \"is effective to fully liquidate and discharge the contract . . . [and] bars any other rights of the vendor under the contract.\" Id. (quoting 3 American Law of Property sec. 11.75 at 187 (1952)); see also Kunz v. Whitney, 167 Wis. 446, 449-50, 167 N.W. 747, 748 (1918) (holding that the land contract vendors were entitled to insurance benefits when before the fire that damaged the subject property the vendors obtained a judgment of forfeiture based on the vendees default on the land contract",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe Posts clearly could have litigated the insurance claim in their prior foreclosure action. A foreclosure judgment determines with finality the rights of the parties to the contract. See Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 172, 325 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1982). The effect of strict foreclosure is to bar and foreclose the purchaser's equitable interest in the property and terminate the purchaser's rights under the contract. Kallenbach v. Lake Publications, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 653, 142 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1966). Foreclosure also \"is effective to fully liquidate and discharge the contract . . . [and] bars any other rights of the vendor under the contract.\" Id. (quoting 3 American Law of Property sec. 11.75 at 187 (1952)); see also Kunz v. Whitney, 167 Wis. 446, 449-50, 167 N.W. 747, 748 (1918) (holding that when a contract is unambiguous the court will enforce the plain meaning of the contract as the intention of the parties",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe Posts clearly could have litigated the insurance claim in their prior foreclosure action. A foreclosure judgment determines with finality the rights of the parties to the contract. See Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 172, 325 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1982). The effect of strict foreclosure is to bar and foreclose the purchaser's equitable interest in the property and terminate the purchaser's rights under the contract. Kallenbach v. Lake Publications, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 653, 142 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1966). Foreclosure also \"is effective to fully liquidate and discharge the contract . . . [and] bars any other rights of the vendor under the contract.\" Id. (quoting 3 American Law of Property sec. 11.75 at 187 (1952)); see also Kunz v. Whitney, 167 Wis. 446, 449-50, 167 N.W. 747, 748 (1918) (recognizing that the elements of a claim for breach of contract are 1 existence of a valid contract and 2 breach of the terms of that contract",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe Posts clearly could have litigated the insurance claim in their prior foreclosure action. A foreclosure judgment determines with finality the rights of the parties to the contract. See Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 172, 325 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1982). The effect of strict foreclosure is to bar and foreclose the purchaser's equitable interest in the property and terminate the purchaser's rights under the contract. Kallenbach v. Lake Publications, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 653, 142 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1966). Foreclosure also \"is effective to fully liquidate and discharge the contract . . . [and] bars any other rights of the vendor under the contract.\" Id. (quoting 3 American Law of Property sec. 11.75 at 187 (1952)); see also Kunz v. Whitney, 167 Wis. 446, 449-50, 167 N.W. 747, 748 (1918) (holding that when the holder of a land contract repurchases the land in foreclosure the contract between the parties is effectively canceled and the purchaser is relieved of any unperformed obligations of the contract",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nThe Posts clearly could have litigated the insurance claim in their prior foreclosure action. A foreclosure judgment determines with finality the rights of the parties to the contract. See Shuput v. Lauer, 109 Wis. 2d 164, 172, 325 N.W.2d 321, 326 (1982). The effect of strict foreclosure is to bar and foreclose the purchaser's equitable interest in the property and terminate the purchaser's rights under the contract. Kallenbach v. Lake Publications, Inc., 30 Wis. 2d 647, 653, 142 N.W.2d 212, 215 (1966). Foreclosure also \"is effective to fully liquidate and discharge the contract . . . [and] bars any other rights of the vendor under the contract.\" Id. (quoting 3 American Law of Property sec. 11.75 at 187 (1952)); see also Kunz v. Whitney, 167 Wis. 446, 449-50, 167 N.W. 747, 748 (1918) (holding where exempt organization was in possession of real property under land contract obligating organization to pay the purchase price and use land for exempt purpose the association was the owner of the land within the meaning of the statute"
] | ). This, we conclude, "conforms to the parties' | 3 |
969 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthird party which are otherwise subject to state control.”); Ayotte, 488 F.3d at 533 (discussing New York regulations at issue in Franklin National Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 74 S.Ct. 550, 98 L.Ed. 767 (1954), that prohibited any banks other than New York’s charter savings banks from advertising that they accepted “savings,” and reasoning that “we do not believe that the regulation at issue in Franklin National Bank would have presented any less of a conflict with the National Bank Act if it indirectly restricted a national bank’s power by prohibiting New York advertising firms from using the word ‘savings’ when preparing advertising for a bank, or if it had prohibited billboard owners from posting signs for banks that included the word ‘savings’ ”); Bank One, 190 F.3d at 847-50 (holding that statutory notice provisions for notice of default and opportunity to cure were waived by provisions of note as to one obligor though provisions applied to coobligor who used property as residence",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthird party which are otherwise subject to state control.”); Ayotte, 488 F.3d at 533 (discussing New York regulations at issue in Franklin National Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 74 S.Ct. 550, 98 L.Ed. 767 (1954), that prohibited any banks other than New York’s charter savings banks from advertising that they accepted “savings,” and reasoning that “we do not believe that the regulation at issue in Franklin National Bank would have presented any less of a conflict with the National Bank Act if it indirectly restricted a national bank’s power by prohibiting New York advertising firms from using the word ‘savings’ when preparing advertising for a bank, or if it had prohibited billboard owners from posting signs for banks that included the word ‘savings’ ”); Bank One, 190 F.3d at 847-50 (holding that such provisions are valid",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthird party which are otherwise subject to state control.”); Ayotte, 488 F.3d at 533 (discussing New York regulations at issue in Franklin National Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 74 S.Ct. 550, 98 L.Ed. 767 (1954), that prohibited any banks other than New York’s charter savings banks from advertising that they accepted “savings,” and reasoning that “we do not believe that the regulation at issue in Franklin National Bank would have presented any less of a conflict with the National Bank Act if it indirectly restricted a national bank’s power by prohibiting New York advertising firms from using the word ‘savings’ when preparing advertising for a bank, or if it had prohibited billboard owners from posting signs for banks that included the word ‘savings’ ”); Bank One, 190 F.3d at 847-50 (holding that the hearing provisions of the ina supersede the provisions of the apa",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthird party which are otherwise subject to state control.”); Ayotte, 488 F.3d at 533 (discussing New York regulations at issue in Franklin National Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 74 S.Ct. 550, 98 L.Ed. 767 (1954), that prohibited any banks other than New York’s charter savings banks from advertising that they accepted “savings,” and reasoning that “we do not believe that the regulation at issue in Franklin National Bank would have presented any less of a conflict with the National Bank Act if it indirectly restricted a national bank’s power by prohibiting New York advertising firms from using the word ‘savings’ when preparing advertising for a bank, or if it had prohibited billboard owners from posting signs for banks that included the word ‘savings’ ”); Bank One, 190 F.3d at 847-50 (holding provisions of the iowa efta that restricted outofstate banks from operating atms within iowa were preempted by nba even though the state of iowa attempted to enforce provisions of the iowa efta against thirdparty retailer",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nthird party which are otherwise subject to state control.”); Ayotte, 488 F.3d at 533 (discussing New York regulations at issue in Franklin National Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 373, 74 S.Ct. 550, 98 L.Ed. 767 (1954), that prohibited any banks other than New York’s charter savings banks from advertising that they accepted “savings,” and reasoning that “we do not believe that the regulation at issue in Franklin National Bank would have presented any less of a conflict with the National Bank Act if it indirectly restricted a national bank’s power by prohibiting New York advertising firms from using the word ‘savings’ when preparing advertising for a bank, or if it had prohibited billboard owners from posting signs for banks that included the word ‘savings’ ”); Bank One, 190 F.3d at 847-50 (holding the same under iowa law"
] | ). Next, the State argues that even if the | 3 |
970 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhas one year from that date to file a motion. In this case, this means that Dorsey had one year from October 7, 1996, the date on which the Supreme Court denied certiora-ri, in which to file his 2255 motion. Dorsey deposited his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7, 1997, but the Clerk of this Court did not receive the motion until one week later. The issue therefore remains whether Dorsey timely filed by depositing his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7,1997. II. The “Mailbox Rule” under § 2255 Dorsey cites to two cases for the proposition that the date a prisoner deposits papers in the prison mailbox should constitute the date of filing, the so-called “mailbox rule.” See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-76, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2381-85, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) (holding that a pro se prisoners notice of appeal is considered filed upon delivery to prison authorities for mailing to the court",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhas one year from that date to file a motion. In this case, this means that Dorsey had one year from October 7, 1996, the date on which the Supreme Court denied certiora-ri, in which to file his 2255 motion. Dorsey deposited his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7, 1997, but the Clerk of this Court did not receive the motion until one week later. The issue therefore remains whether Dorsey timely filed by depositing his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7,1997. II. The “Mailbox Rule” under § 2255 Dorsey cites to two cases for the proposition that the date a prisoner deposits papers in the prison mailbox should constitute the date of filing, the so-called “mailbox rule.” See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-76, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2381-85, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) (holding that prisoners notice of appeal deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhas one year from that date to file a motion. In this case, this means that Dorsey had one year from October 7, 1996, the date on which the Supreme Court denied certiora-ri, in which to file his 2255 motion. Dorsey deposited his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7, 1997, but the Clerk of this Court did not receive the motion until one week later. The issue therefore remains whether Dorsey timely filed by depositing his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7,1997. II. The “Mailbox Rule” under § 2255 Dorsey cites to two cases for the proposition that the date a prisoner deposits papers in the prison mailbox should constitute the date of filing, the so-called “mailbox rule.” See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-76, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2381-85, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) (holding that pro se prisoners 28 usc 2254 application deemed filed for limitation purposes when deposited with prison officials for mailing",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhas one year from that date to file a motion. In this case, this means that Dorsey had one year from October 7, 1996, the date on which the Supreme Court denied certiora-ri, in which to file his 2255 motion. Dorsey deposited his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7, 1997, but the Clerk of this Court did not receive the motion until one week later. The issue therefore remains whether Dorsey timely filed by depositing his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7,1997. II. The “Mailbox Rule” under § 2255 Dorsey cites to two cases for the proposition that the date a prisoner deposits papers in the prison mailbox should constitute the date of filing, the so-called “mailbox rule.” See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-76, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2381-85, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) (holding that prisoners notice of appeal is deemed filed on date he delivered it to prison officials for mailing to court",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhas one year from that date to file a motion. In this case, this means that Dorsey had one year from October 7, 1996, the date on which the Supreme Court denied certiora-ri, in which to file his 2255 motion. Dorsey deposited his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7, 1997, but the Clerk of this Court did not receive the motion until one week later. The issue therefore remains whether Dorsey timely filed by depositing his 2255 motion in the prison mailbox on October 7,1997. II. The “Mailbox Rule” under § 2255 Dorsey cites to two cases for the proposition that the date a prisoner deposits papers in the prison mailbox should constitute the date of filing, the so-called “mailbox rule.” See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270-76, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 2381-85, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988) (holding that a pro se prisoners notice of appeal of 2254 motion was filed for purposes of federal rules of appellate procedure 3a and 4a1 when prisoner delivered papers to prison authorities"
] | ); Lewis v. Richmond City Police Dep’t, 947 F.2d | 4 |
971 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1328(a), the chapter 13 dischargeability provision. See Johnson, 728 F.2d at 166 n. 4; see also Pub.L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (adding § 523(a)(8) debts to those debts nondischargeable under § 1328(a)). 19 .This type of analysis also led some courts to draw a distinction between chapter 13 and chapter 7 debtors in determining whether a stay violation occurred since, at the time those cases were decided, student loan obligations were dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). See, e.g., Parham, 56 B.R. at 533- 34 (contrasting Johnson, a chapter 7 case, to the chapter 13 case at bar to find that a debtor who develops a schedule of payments as part of a good faith effort will receive a discharge of that debt upon successful completion of the confirmed plan); Reese, 38 B.R. at 683 (holding tort action accruing after original chapter 7 petition not part of estate when case converted to chapter 13 and then back to chapter 7",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1328(a), the chapter 13 dischargeability provision. See Johnson, 728 F.2d at 166 n. 4; see also Pub.L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (adding § 523(a)(8) debts to those debts nondischargeable under § 1328(a)). 19 .This type of analysis also led some courts to draw a distinction between chapter 13 and chapter 7 debtors in determining whether a stay violation occurred since, at the time those cases were decided, student loan obligations were dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). See, e.g., Parham, 56 B.R. at 533- 34 (contrasting Johnson, a chapter 7 case, to the chapter 13 case at bar to find that a debtor who develops a schedule of payments as part of a good faith effort will receive a discharge of that debt upon successful completion of the confirmed plan); Reese, 38 B.R. at 683 (recognizing the requirement of 363 to obtain approval or consent in a chapter 13 case",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1328(a), the chapter 13 dischargeability provision. See Johnson, 728 F.2d at 166 n. 4; see also Pub.L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (adding § 523(a)(8) debts to those debts nondischargeable under § 1328(a)). 19 .This type of analysis also led some courts to draw a distinction between chapter 13 and chapter 7 debtors in determining whether a stay violation occurred since, at the time those cases were decided, student loan obligations were dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). See, e.g., Parham, 56 B.R. at 533- 34 (contrasting Johnson, a chapter 7 case, to the chapter 13 case at bar to find that a debtor who develops a schedule of payments as part of a good faith effort will receive a discharge of that debt upon successful completion of the confirmed plan); Reese, 38 B.R. at 683 (holding that notwithstanding a debtors inability to obtain a chapter 13 discharge a debtor is nonetheless eligible to file a chapter 13 case",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1328(a), the chapter 13 dischargeability provision. See Johnson, 728 F.2d at 166 n. 4; see also Pub.L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (adding § 523(a)(8) debts to those debts nondischargeable under § 1328(a)). 19 .This type of analysis also led some courts to draw a distinction between chapter 13 and chapter 7 debtors in determining whether a stay violation occurred since, at the time those cases were decided, student loan obligations were dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). See, e.g., Parham, 56 B.R. at 533- 34 (contrasting Johnson, a chapter 7 case, to the chapter 13 case at bar to find that a debtor who develops a schedule of payments as part of a good faith effort will receive a discharge of that debt upon successful completion of the confirmed plan); Reese, 38 B.R. at 683 (holding that a chapter 13 debtor should be able to obtain a copy of his transcript in light of the broader discharge provision of chapter 13",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1328(a), the chapter 13 dischargeability provision. See Johnson, 728 F.2d at 166 n. 4; see also Pub.L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (adding § 523(a)(8) debts to those debts nondischargeable under § 1328(a)). 19 .This type of analysis also led some courts to draw a distinction between chapter 13 and chapter 7 debtors in determining whether a stay violation occurred since, at the time those cases were decided, student loan obligations were dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a). See, e.g., Parham, 56 B.R. at 533- 34 (contrasting Johnson, a chapter 7 case, to the chapter 13 case at bar to find that a debtor who develops a schedule of payments as part of a good faith effort will receive a discharge of that debt upon successful completion of the confirmed plan); Reese, 38 B.R. at 683 (holding that there is no statutory authority in chapter 13 which grants a chapter 13 debtor independent standing to sue under the trustees avoidance power"
] | ). 20 . In its analysis, the Billingsley court | 3 |
972 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndegrees of flexibility depending upon the specific linkage to company plans and objectives. If flexibility is not explicitly indicated in a policy, it is required that the policy be executed as defined.\" But the Disclaimer is prominently set forth in a separate text box, in bold font, at the beginning of Policy 210, which is the section of the Manual dealing with \"Addressing Misconduct and Improving Performance.\" This placement is such that \"a reasonable employee ought to notice it.\" See id. at 1112. 1 44 Unlike the Homilton disclaimer, the Disclaimer in this case does not specifically state that employment at NCR is \"at-will,\" nor does it define the voluntary nature of the employment relationship. See id.; accord Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003-04 (Utah 1991) (holding that employee handbook did not give rise to implied contract where it stated that it was not a contract and that employment was terminable at will",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndegrees of flexibility depending upon the specific linkage to company plans and objectives. If flexibility is not explicitly indicated in a policy, it is required that the policy be executed as defined.\" But the Disclaimer is prominently set forth in a separate text box, in bold font, at the beginning of Policy 210, which is the section of the Manual dealing with \"Addressing Misconduct and Improving Performance.\" This placement is such that \"a reasonable employee ought to notice it.\" See id. at 1112. 1 44 Unlike the Homilton disclaimer, the Disclaimer in this case does not specifically state that employment at NCR is \"at-will,\" nor does it define the voluntary nature of the employment relationship. See id.; accord Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003-04 (Utah 1991) (holding that a disclaimer setting forth policies for general guidance only which stated that it did not create a binding contract and that the employee could be terminated without notice and at will at any time for any reason unambiguously provided that employment was atwill",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndegrees of flexibility depending upon the specific linkage to company plans and objectives. If flexibility is not explicitly indicated in a policy, it is required that the policy be executed as defined.\" But the Disclaimer is prominently set forth in a separate text box, in bold font, at the beginning of Policy 210, which is the section of the Manual dealing with \"Addressing Misconduct and Improving Performance.\" This placement is such that \"a reasonable employee ought to notice it.\" See id. at 1112. 1 44 Unlike the Homilton disclaimer, the Disclaimer in this case does not specifically state that employment at NCR is \"at-will,\" nor does it define the voluntary nature of the employment relationship. See id.; accord Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003-04 (Utah 1991) (recognizing that wrongful or malicious interference with atwill employment contract may give rise to a tortious interference claim the fact that the employment is at the will of the employer and the employee does not make it one at the will of third parties",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndegrees of flexibility depending upon the specific linkage to company plans and objectives. If flexibility is not explicitly indicated in a policy, it is required that the policy be executed as defined.\" But the Disclaimer is prominently set forth in a separate text box, in bold font, at the beginning of Policy 210, which is the section of the Manual dealing with \"Addressing Misconduct and Improving Performance.\" This placement is such that \"a reasonable employee ought to notice it.\" See id. at 1112. 1 44 Unlike the Homilton disclaimer, the Disclaimer in this case does not specifically state that employment at NCR is \"at-will,\" nor does it define the voluntary nature of the employment relationship. See id.; accord Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003-04 (Utah 1991) (holding that without a provision stating that an employee can be terminated only for cause the atwill doctrine permitted termination in the absence of any reason at all summary judgment and directed verdict in companion cases affirmed",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ndegrees of flexibility depending upon the specific linkage to company plans and objectives. If flexibility is not explicitly indicated in a policy, it is required that the policy be executed as defined.\" But the Disclaimer is prominently set forth in a separate text box, in bold font, at the beginning of Policy 210, which is the section of the Manual dealing with \"Addressing Misconduct and Improving Performance.\" This placement is such that \"a reasonable employee ought to notice it.\" See id. at 1112. 1 44 Unlike the Homilton disclaimer, the Disclaimer in this case does not specifically state that employment at NCR is \"at-will,\" nor does it define the voluntary nature of the employment relationship. See id.; accord Johnson v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1003-04 (Utah 1991) (holding that employee guidebook did not create an implied employment contract as it contained a clearlystated boldfaced disclaimer and statement that employment was atwill"
] | ). While both NCR and the trial court concluded | 1 |
973 | [
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunrecorded bench conference with the foreperson, the trial court informed the foreperson that it needed to give him “one other instruction” and instructed him that “[t]he issues about which we had talked in this courtroom, both here at the bench and also openly on the record, are issues you that are not to share with the other jurors.” While the record sufficiently reveals that the trial court violated the unanimity requirement by instructing only the foreperson, the record is inadequate to meet the demanding task of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the State to meet its burden, the record must reveal the substance of the conversations at issue or the conversations must be adequately reconstructed. See, e.g., Boyd, 332 N.C. at 106, 418 S.E.2d at 474 (holding that the state could not meet its burden of proving harmless error where the record did not reveal the substance of the trial courts unrecorded conversations with prospective jurors",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunrecorded bench conference with the foreperson, the trial court informed the foreperson that it needed to give him “one other instruction” and instructed him that “[t]he issues about which we had talked in this courtroom, both here at the bench and also openly on the record, are issues you that are not to share with the other jurors.” While the record sufficiently reveals that the trial court violated the unanimity requirement by instructing only the foreperson, the record is inadequate to meet the demanding task of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the State to meet its burden, the record must reveal the substance of the conversations at issue or the conversations must be adequately reconstructed. See, e.g., Boyd, 332 N.C. at 106, 418 S.E.2d at 474 (holding that in appellate proceedings where no transcript is provided a trial courts decision has the presumption of correctness and the burden is on the appellant to demonstrate error",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunrecorded bench conference with the foreperson, the trial court informed the foreperson that it needed to give him “one other instruction” and instructed him that “[t]he issues about which we had talked in this courtroom, both here at the bench and also openly on the record, are issues you that are not to share with the other jurors.” While the record sufficiently reveals that the trial court violated the unanimity requirement by instructing only the foreperson, the record is inadequate to meet the demanding task of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the State to meet its burden, the record must reveal the substance of the conversations at issue or the conversations must be adequately reconstructed. See, e.g., Boyd, 332 N.C. at 106, 418 S.E.2d at 474 (holding that the trial courts definition of normal use was harmless error",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunrecorded bench conference with the foreperson, the trial court informed the foreperson that it needed to give him “one other instruction” and instructed him that “[t]he issues about which we had talked in this courtroom, both here at the bench and also openly on the record, are issues you that are not to share with the other jurors.” While the record sufficiently reveals that the trial court violated the unanimity requirement by instructing only the foreperson, the record is inadequate to meet the demanding task of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the State to meet its burden, the record must reveal the substance of the conversations at issue or the conversations must be adequately reconstructed. See, e.g., Boyd, 332 N.C. at 106, 418 S.E.2d at 474 (holding that without transcript of trial proceedings appellate court cannot review underlying evidence so as to conclude that trial courts judgment is not supported by evidence",
"Provide the missing portion of the US court opinion excerpt:\nunrecorded bench conference with the foreperson, the trial court informed the foreperson that it needed to give him “one other instruction” and instructed him that “[t]he issues about which we had talked in this courtroom, both here at the bench and also openly on the record, are issues you that are not to share with the other jurors.” While the record sufficiently reveals that the trial court violated the unanimity requirement by instructing only the foreperson, the record is inadequate to meet the demanding task of showing that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the State to meet its burden, the record must reveal the substance of the conversations at issue or the conversations must be adequately reconstructed. See, e.g., Boyd, 332 N.C. at 106, 418 S.E.2d at 474 (holding that the state cannot demonstrate harmless error where the substance of the trial courts conversation with an excused juror was not revealed by the transcript or reconstructed at trial"
] | ); State v. Smith, 326 N.C. 792, 794-95, 392 | 4 |
974 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nclaim concerning the admission of evidence related to his three prior felony convictions was raised as a state law claim, and not as a federal due process constitutional claim. Petitioner’s brief on direct appeal did not mention any due process analysis regarding this claim. Petitioner did cite to one federal case in his brief, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). In Old Chief, the Court considered whether the State could introduce evidence regarding the nature of a prior offense to prove possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. However, the Old Chief decision was based on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not on any constitutional analysis. See also Sims v. Larson, 2002 WL 1497922 at *4 & n. 7 (N.D.Cal. Jul.2, 2002) (holding that the burden is upon the state under the applicable federal rules of evidence",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nclaim concerning the admission of evidence related to his three prior felony convictions was raised as a state law claim, and not as a federal due process constitutional claim. Petitioner’s brief on direct appeal did not mention any due process analysis regarding this claim. Petitioner did cite to one federal case in his brief, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). In Old Chief, the Court considered whether the State could introduce evidence regarding the nature of a prior offense to prove possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. However, the Old Chief decision was based on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not on any constitutional analysis. See also Sims v. Larson, 2002 WL 1497922 at *4 & n. 7 (N.D.Cal. Jul.2, 2002) (recognizing that old chief was based entirely on the federal rules of evidence rather than the constitution",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nclaim concerning the admission of evidence related to his three prior felony convictions was raised as a state law claim, and not as a federal due process constitutional claim. Petitioner’s brief on direct appeal did not mention any due process analysis regarding this claim. Petitioner did cite to one federal case in his brief, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). In Old Chief, the Court considered whether the State could introduce evidence regarding the nature of a prior offense to prove possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. However, the Old Chief decision was based on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not on any constitutional analysis. See also Sims v. Larson, 2002 WL 1497922 at *4 & n. 7 (N.D.Cal. Jul.2, 2002) (holding that a change between old and new rules was fundamental to a degree that impacts our jurisdiction over the plaintiffs challenges to the old rules",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nclaim concerning the admission of evidence related to his three prior felony convictions was raised as a state law claim, and not as a federal due process constitutional claim. Petitioner’s brief on direct appeal did not mention any due process analysis regarding this claim. Petitioner did cite to one federal case in his brief, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). In Old Chief, the Court considered whether the State could introduce evidence regarding the nature of a prior offense to prove possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. However, the Old Chief decision was based on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not on any constitutional analysis. See also Sims v. Larson, 2002 WL 1497922 at *4 & n. 7 (N.D.Cal. Jul.2, 2002) (recognizing that the federal rules of evidence do not apply to sentencing hearings",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nclaim concerning the admission of evidence related to his three prior felony convictions was raised as a state law claim, and not as a federal due process constitutional claim. Petitioner’s brief on direct appeal did not mention any due process analysis regarding this claim. Petitioner did cite to one federal case in his brief, Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). In Old Chief, the Court considered whether the State could introduce evidence regarding the nature of a prior offense to prove possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. However, the Old Chief decision was based on Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and not on any constitutional analysis. See also Sims v. Larson, 2002 WL 1497922 at *4 & n. 7 (N.D.Cal. Jul.2, 2002) (recognizing privilege under federal rules"
] | ). That Old Chief was being cited to analogize | 1 |
975 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nFurther, as the court stated in its July 27, 2011 Order Adopting in Part and Modifying in Part Magistrate Judge Azrack’s Monsanto Hearing Report and Recommendation, “[b]y setting up an accounting system in which all of the [GDC] subsidiaries contributed to and received funds from a single [account], which was also funded with loan proceeds, USW entangled itself with the allegedly fraudulent loan proceeds.” (July 27th Order at 22.) The court further noted that “the group of related subsidiaries, including USW, all shared in the [same account] 'and benefited from transfer hecks, as opposed to security interests, petitioners are unable to assert rights to a particular asset or specific funds) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 339 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that employers have standing to sue",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nFurther, as the court stated in its July 27, 2011 Order Adopting in Part and Modifying in Part Magistrate Judge Azrack’s Monsanto Hearing Report and Recommendation, “[b]y setting up an accounting system in which all of the [GDC] subsidiaries contributed to and received funds from a single [account], which was also funded with loan proceeds, USW entangled itself with the allegedly fraudulent loan proceeds.” (July 27th Order at 22.) The court further noted that “the group of related subsidiaries, including USW, all shared in the [same account] 'and benefited from transfer hecks, as opposed to security interests, petitioners are unable to assert rights to a particular asset or specific funds) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 339 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that general creditors do not have standing to contest forfeitures",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nFurther, as the court stated in its July 27, 2011 Order Adopting in Part and Modifying in Part Magistrate Judge Azrack’s Monsanto Hearing Report and Recommendation, “[b]y setting up an accounting system in which all of the [GDC] subsidiaries contributed to and received funds from a single [account], which was also funded with loan proceeds, USW entangled itself with the allegedly fraudulent loan proceeds.” (July 27th Order at 22.) The court further noted that “the group of related subsidiaries, including USW, all shared in the [same account] 'and benefited from transfer hecks, as opposed to security interests, petitioners are unable to assert rights to a particular asset or specific funds) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 339 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that representatives of the news media have the standing to contest a court order restricting public access to legal proceedings",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nFurther, as the court stated in its July 27, 2011 Order Adopting in Part and Modifying in Part Magistrate Judge Azrack’s Monsanto Hearing Report and Recommendation, “[b]y setting up an accounting system in which all of the [GDC] subsidiaries contributed to and received funds from a single [account], which was also funded with loan proceeds, USW entangled itself with the allegedly fraudulent loan proceeds.” (July 27th Order at 22.) The court further noted that “the group of related subsidiaries, including USW, all shared in the [same account] 'and benefited from transfer hecks, as opposed to security interests, petitioners are unable to assert rights to a particular asset or specific funds) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 339 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that 20 of creditors knowing of consignment relationship does not satisfy general knowledge requirement notwithstanding that such creditors represented 63 of claims against debtor",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nFurther, as the court stated in its July 27, 2011 Order Adopting in Part and Modifying in Part Magistrate Judge Azrack’s Monsanto Hearing Report and Recommendation, “[b]y setting up an accounting system in which all of the [GDC] subsidiaries contributed to and received funds from a single [account], which was also funded with loan proceeds, USW entangled itself with the allegedly fraudulent loan proceeds.” (July 27th Order at 22.) The court further noted that “the group of related subsidiaries, including USW, all shared in the [same account] 'and benefited from transfer hecks, as opposed to security interests, petitioners are unable to assert rights to a particular asset or specific funds) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); United States v. Coluccio, 51 F.3d 337, 339 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that a contest to a claim of exemption was ineffective when that contest was not by affidavit and did not properly state that the claim of exemption was invalid or excessive"
] | ); United States v. Schwimmer, 968 F.2d 1570, | 1 |
976 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAct is to make compensation the exclusive remedy of the employee where he is injured by the employer or any of its employees during the course of his employment.”). 11 .See Ala Code § 25-5-11. See also Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1181 (5th Cir.1985) (setting out the conflict between Mississippi and Alabama workers compensation laws). 12 . Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., 524 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). 13 . See Davis v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132, 1134 (5th Cir.1984). 14 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2). 15 . Id. § 6(2). 16 . McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 310 (Miss.1989). 17 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 510 (Miss.1968) (holding that intent of parties to choice of law must be given effect",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAct is to make compensation the exclusive remedy of the employee where he is injured by the employer or any of its employees during the course of his employment.”). 11 .See Ala Code § 25-5-11. See also Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1181 (5th Cir.1985) (setting out the conflict between Mississippi and Alabama workers compensation laws). 12 . Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., 524 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). 13 . See Davis v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132, 1134 (5th Cir.1984). 14 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2). 15 . Id. § 6(2). 16 . McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 310 (Miss.1989). 17 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 510 (Miss.1968) (holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAct is to make compensation the exclusive remedy of the employee where he is injured by the employer or any of its employees during the course of his employment.”). 11 .See Ala Code § 25-5-11. See also Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1181 (5th Cir.1985) (setting out the conflict between Mississippi and Alabama workers compensation laws). 12 . Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., 524 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). 13 . See Davis v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132, 1134 (5th Cir.1984). 14 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2). 15 . Id. § 6(2). 16 . McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 310 (Miss.1989). 17 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 510 (Miss.1968) (holding that in cases of a false conflict of law a court may apply the law of the forum state",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAct is to make compensation the exclusive remedy of the employee where he is injured by the employer or any of its employees during the course of his employment.”). 11 .See Ala Code § 25-5-11. See also Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1181 (5th Cir.1985) (setting out the conflict between Mississippi and Alabama workers compensation laws). 12 . Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., 524 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). 13 . See Davis v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132, 1134 (5th Cir.1984). 14 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2). 15 . Id. § 6(2). 16 . McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 310 (Miss.1989). 17 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 510 (Miss.1968) (holding that courts apply the procedural law of the forum and the substantive law of the jurisdiction originating the claim",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nAct is to make compensation the exclusive remedy of the employee where he is injured by the employer or any of its employees during the course of his employment.”). 11 .See Ala Code § 25-5-11. See also Dueitt v. Williams, 764 F.2d 1180, 1181 (5th Cir.1985) (setting out the conflict between Mississippi and Alabama workers compensation laws). 12 . Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., 524 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir.2008) (citation omitted). 13 . See Davis v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 743 F.2d 1132, 1134 (5th Cir.1984). 14 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2). 15 . Id. § 6(2). 16 . McDaniel v. Ritter, 556 So.2d 303, 310 (Miss.1989). 17 . Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (emphasis added). See also Mitchell v. Craft, 211 So.2d 509, 510 (Miss.1968) (holding that the site of the injury does not invariably determine choice of law when the most substantial relationships of the parties and the dominant interest of the forum require application of another states law"
] | ); In re Estate of Blanton, 824 So.2d 558, 562 | 4 |
977 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfinding, the Court declines to determine whether a jury could find reasonably that Lee violated De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant Lee on De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment claim. B. De Contreras’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Lee and Mastaler for Fabricating Police Reports The record lacks any evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claim that Lee or Mastaler fabricated their police reports. Furthermore, as De Contreras was convicted on the charges alleged in the police reports (see April 9, 2012 Minute Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 7 (Doc. No. 42)), he cannot now challenge the validity of those police reports under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (holding that a plaintiff requesting relief under 1983 had no cause of action unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed expunged invalidated or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfinding, the Court declines to determine whether a jury could find reasonably that Lee violated De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant Lee on De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment claim. B. De Contreras’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Lee and Mastaler for Fabricating Police Reports The record lacks any evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claim that Lee or Mastaler fabricated their police reports. Furthermore, as De Contreras was convicted on the charges alleged in the police reports (see April 9, 2012 Minute Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 7 (Doc. No. 42)), he cannot now challenge the validity of those police reports under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (holding that to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a 42 usc 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal or called into question by federal courts issuance of writ of habeas corpus footnote omitted",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfinding, the Court declines to determine whether a jury could find reasonably that Lee violated De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant Lee on De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment claim. B. De Contreras’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Lee and Mastaler for Fabricating Police Reports The record lacks any evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claim that Lee or Mastaler fabricated their police reports. Furthermore, as De Contreras was convicted on the charges alleged in the police reports (see April 9, 2012 Minute Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 7 (Doc. No. 42)), he cannot now challenge the validity of those police reports under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (recognizing that 1983 action does not accrue until conviction or sentence has been invalidated",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfinding, the Court declines to determine whether a jury could find reasonably that Lee violated De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant Lee on De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment claim. B. De Contreras’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Lee and Mastaler for Fabricating Police Reports The record lacks any evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claim that Lee or Mastaler fabricated their police reports. Furthermore, as De Contreras was convicted on the charges alleged in the police reports (see April 9, 2012 Minute Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 7 (Doc. No. 42)), he cannot now challenge the validity of those police reports under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (holding that a claim for damages that would invalidate a conviction or sentence that has not already been invalidated or reversed on direct appeal by executive order by an authorized state tribunal or by a writ of habeas corpus is not cognizable under 1983",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfinding, the Court declines to determine whether a jury could find reasonably that Lee violated De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the Court grants summary judgment in favor of Defendant Lee on De Contreras’s Fourth Amendment claim. B. De Contreras’s Fourteenth Amendment Claim Against Lee and Mastaler for Fabricating Police Reports The record lacks any evidence to support Plaintiffs’ claim that Lee or Mastaler fabricated their police reports. Furthermore, as De Contreras was convicted on the charges alleged in the police reports (see April 9, 2012 Minute Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at 7 (Doc. No. 42)), he cannot now challenge the validity of those police reports under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (holding that in order to recover damages for an allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid a plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal expunged by executive order declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination or called into question by a federal courts issuance of a writ of habeas corpus"
] | ) Thus, Defendants are entitled to summary | 3 |
978 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot rest upon a few words taken out of context of the entire testimony.’ ” Id. at 803 (quoting Wilkes-Barre, City v. WCAB, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 230, 420 A.2d 795, 798 (1980)). In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693, 698 (1971), this Court first adopted the rule permitting a “medical witness to express opinion testimony on matters based, in part, upon reports of others which are not in evidence, but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.” We have further held that while an expert may base his opinion on facts of which he has no personal knowledge, those facts must be supported by evidence of record. Newcomer v. WCAB (Ward Trucking Corp.), 547 Pa. 639, 692 A.2d 1062, 1066 (1997); Casne v. WCAB (Stat Couriers, Inc.), 962 A.2d 14 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (holding that if an experts opinion is dependent upon information that is inaccurate or lacks support in the record it is deemed incompetent",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot rest upon a few words taken out of context of the entire testimony.’ ” Id. at 803 (quoting Wilkes-Barre, City v. WCAB, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 230, 420 A.2d 795, 798 (1980)). In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693, 698 (1971), this Court first adopted the rule permitting a “medical witness to express opinion testimony on matters based, in part, upon reports of others which are not in evidence, but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.” We have further held that while an expert may base his opinion on facts of which he has no personal knowledge, those facts must be supported by evidence of record. Newcomer v. WCAB (Ward Trucking Corp.), 547 Pa. 639, 692 A.2d 1062, 1066 (1997); Casne v. WCAB (Stat Couriers, Inc.), 962 A.2d 14 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (holding that when an experts opinion regarding the relevant market is not supported by sufficient facts or when the record contradicts or renders the opinion unreasonable it cannot support a jurys verdict",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot rest upon a few words taken out of context of the entire testimony.’ ” Id. at 803 (quoting Wilkes-Barre, City v. WCAB, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 230, 420 A.2d 795, 798 (1980)). In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693, 698 (1971), this Court first adopted the rule permitting a “medical witness to express opinion testimony on matters based, in part, upon reports of others which are not in evidence, but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.” We have further held that while an expert may base his opinion on facts of which he has no personal knowledge, those facts must be supported by evidence of record. Newcomer v. WCAB (Ward Trucking Corp.), 547 Pa. 639, 692 A.2d 1062, 1066 (1997); Casne v. WCAB (Stat Couriers, Inc.), 962 A.2d 14 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (holding that it is not the courts role to decide whether an experts opinion is correct",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot rest upon a few words taken out of context of the entire testimony.’ ” Id. at 803 (quoting Wilkes-Barre, City v. WCAB, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 230, 420 A.2d 795, 798 (1980)). In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693, 698 (1971), this Court first adopted the rule permitting a “medical witness to express opinion testimony on matters based, in part, upon reports of others which are not in evidence, but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.” We have further held that while an expert may base his opinion on facts of which he has no personal knowledge, those facts must be supported by evidence of record. Newcomer v. WCAB (Ward Trucking Corp.), 547 Pa. 639, 692 A.2d 1062, 1066 (1997); Casne v. WCAB (Stat Couriers, Inc.), 962 A.2d 14 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (holding that a fear is not objectively reasonable if it lacks solid support in the record and is merely speculative at best",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\nnot rest upon a few words taken out of context of the entire testimony.’ ” Id. at 803 (quoting Wilkes-Barre, City v. WCAB, 54 Pa.Cmwlth. 230, 420 A.2d 795, 798 (1980)). In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 444 Pa. 436, 282 A.2d 693, 698 (1971), this Court first adopted the rule permitting a “medical witness to express opinion testimony on matters based, in part, upon reports of others which are not in evidence, but which the expert customarily relies upon in the practice of his profession.” We have further held that while an expert may base his opinion on facts of which he has no personal knowledge, those facts must be supported by evidence of record. Newcomer v. WCAB (Ward Trucking Corp.), 547 Pa. 639, 692 A.2d 1062, 1066 (1997); Casne v. WCAB (Stat Couriers, Inc.), 962 A.2d 14 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008) (holding that an experts opinion must be based on facts in evidence or within his or her knowledge and that the admission of an experts opinion is reviewed for an abuse of discretion"
] | ). This Court has explained: Collins v. Hand, | 0 |
979 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate law that required parents to send their children to a public school for a period of time because it “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (finding that “primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “[t]his Court has held that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose how and in what manner to educate their children”); Ohio Ass’n of Indep. Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that a defendant has a constitutional right to counsel as a matter of right on direct appeal",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate law that required parents to send their children to a public school for a period of time because it “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (finding that “primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “[t]his Court has held that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose how and in what manner to educate their children”); Ohio Ass’n of Indep. Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that while parents may not bring a title ix claim as individuals they may bring such claim on behalf of a deceased child",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate law that required parents to send their children to a public school for a period of time because it “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (finding that “primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “[t]his Court has held that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose how and in what manner to educate their children”); Ohio Ass’n of Indep. Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1996) (holding that liberty includes the right of parents to establish a home and bring up children and to control the education of their own",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate law that required parents to send their children to a public school for a period of time because it “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (finding that “primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “[t]his Court has held that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose how and in what manner to educate their children”); Ohio Ass’n of Indep. Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing that because parents have a constitutional right to direct their childrens education organization has standing to bring claim on behalf of parents",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\nstate law that required parents to send their children to a public school for a period of time because it “unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (finding that “primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition”); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 n. 5, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasizing that “[t]his Court has held that parents have the fundamental liberty to choose how and in what manner to educate their children”); Ohio Ass’n of Indep. Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir.1996) (recognizing fundamental right of parents to care for their children"
] | ); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310 F.3d 484, | 3 |
980 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\non her right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (2005). She argues that dismissing her PCRA petition because she is no longer serving a sentence would deny her any opportunity to vindicate this constitutional right and therefore would deny her due process. Turning to the specific requirements of due process, Petitioner relies on the procedural due process guarantee of the opportunity to be heard. See Com. Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (1996) (holding that procedural due process requires adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\non her right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (2005). She argues that dismissing her PCRA petition because she is no longer serving a sentence would deny her any opportunity to vindicate this constitutional right and therefore would deny her due process. Turning to the specific requirements of due process, Petitioner relies on the procedural due process guarantee of the opportunity to be heard. See Com. Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (1996) (recognizing that the essential requisites of procedural due process are notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\non her right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (2005). She argues that dismissing her PCRA petition because she is no longer serving a sentence would deny her any opportunity to vindicate this constitutional right and therefore would deny her due process. Turning to the specific requirements of due process, Petitioner relies on the procedural due process guarantee of the opportunity to be heard. See Com. Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (1996) (holding that an essential component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\non her right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (2005). She argues that dismissing her PCRA petition because she is no longer serving a sentence would deny her any opportunity to vindicate this constitutional right and therefore would deny her due process. Turning to the specific requirements of due process, Petitioner relies on the procedural due process guarantee of the opportunity to be heard. See Com. Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (1996) (holding basic elements of due process are notice and a right to be heard",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\non her right to the effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), and Article I, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, see Commonwealth v. Halley, 582 Pa. 164, 870 A.2d 795 (2005). She argues that dismissing her PCRA petition because she is no longer serving a sentence would deny her any opportunity to vindicate this constitutional right and therefore would deny her due process. Turning to the specific requirements of due process, Petitioner relies on the procedural due process guarantee of the opportunity to be heard. See Com. Dept. of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Clayton, 546 Pa. 342, 684 A.2d 1060, 1064 (1996) (holding that due process requires at a minimum an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner"
] | ). She argues specifically that she was denied | 1 |
981 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nredress, Ms. Feral must have visited and intend to visit ranches that hunt captive antelopes without an otherwise valid permit under Section 10. Second, the plaintiff must adduce some evidence that Ms. Feral’s alleged injury is imminent. Although the plaintiff argues in its brief that Ms. Feral “intends to continue monitoring canned hunting ranches and visiting the antelope on these ranches,” see Pl.’s Mem. at 34, Ms. Feral’s declaration states only that she will “continue to monitor the Y.O. Ranch and other sport-hunting facilities.” See Feral Decl. at ¶41. Ms. Feral does not describe how she intends to “monitor” the Y.O. Ranch, whether by subsequent visits or otherwise. According to the record, Ms. Feral’s last visit to a ranch containing captive antelope occurred in 2006. t. 2130 (holding that the government must demonstrate that the accused had some knowledge of the conspiracys unlawful aims emphasis in original",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nredress, Ms. Feral must have visited and intend to visit ranches that hunt captive antelopes without an otherwise valid permit under Section 10. Second, the plaintiff must adduce some evidence that Ms. Feral’s alleged injury is imminent. Although the plaintiff argues in its brief that Ms. Feral “intends to continue monitoring canned hunting ranches and visiting the antelope on these ranches,” see Pl.’s Mem. at 34, Ms. Feral’s declaration states only that she will “continue to monitor the Y.O. Ranch and other sport-hunting facilities.” See Feral Decl. at ¶41. Ms. Feral does not describe how she intends to “monitor” the Y.O. Ranch, whether by subsequent visits or otherwise. According to the record, Ms. Feral’s last visit to a ranch containing captive antelope occurred in 2006. t. 2130 (holding that the affiants profession of an intent to return to the places they had visited before is simply not enough because such some day intentions without any description of concrete plans or indeed any specification of when the some day will be do not support a finding of the actual or imminent injury that our cases require emphasis in original",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nredress, Ms. Feral must have visited and intend to visit ranches that hunt captive antelopes without an otherwise valid permit under Section 10. Second, the plaintiff must adduce some evidence that Ms. Feral’s alleged injury is imminent. Although the plaintiff argues in its brief that Ms. Feral “intends to continue monitoring canned hunting ranches and visiting the antelope on these ranches,” see Pl.’s Mem. at 34, Ms. Feral’s declaration states only that she will “continue to monitor the Y.O. Ranch and other sport-hunting facilities.” See Feral Decl. at ¶41. Ms. Feral does not describe how she intends to “monitor” the Y.O. Ranch, whether by subsequent visits or otherwise. According to the record, Ms. Feral’s last visit to a ranch containing captive antelope occurred in 2006. t. 2130 (holding that trial court may modify sentence on the same day as the assessment of the initial sentence and before the court adjourns for the day",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nredress, Ms. Feral must have visited and intend to visit ranches that hunt captive antelopes without an otherwise valid permit under Section 10. Second, the plaintiff must adduce some evidence that Ms. Feral’s alleged injury is imminent. Although the plaintiff argues in its brief that Ms. Feral “intends to continue monitoring canned hunting ranches and visiting the antelope on these ranches,” see Pl.’s Mem. at 34, Ms. Feral’s declaration states only that she will “continue to monitor the Y.O. Ranch and other sport-hunting facilities.” See Feral Decl. at ¶41. Ms. Feral does not describe how she intends to “monitor” the Y.O. Ranch, whether by subsequent visits or otherwise. According to the record, Ms. Feral’s last visit to a ranch containing captive antelope occurred in 2006. t. 2130 (holding that in computing time to determine whether an act was performed within a specified period of time under the statute of limitations the first day is excluded and the last day of the period is included",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nredress, Ms. Feral must have visited and intend to visit ranches that hunt captive antelopes without an otherwise valid permit under Section 10. Second, the plaintiff must adduce some evidence that Ms. Feral’s alleged injury is imminent. Although the plaintiff argues in its brief that Ms. Feral “intends to continue monitoring canned hunting ranches and visiting the antelope on these ranches,” see Pl.’s Mem. at 34, Ms. Feral’s declaration states only that she will “continue to monitor the Y.O. Ranch and other sport-hunting facilities.” See Feral Decl. at ¶41. Ms. Feral does not describe how she intends to “monitor” the Y.O. Ranch, whether by subsequent visits or otherwise. According to the record, Ms. Feral’s last visit to a ranch containing captive antelope occurred in 2006. t. 2130 (holding that the affiants profession of an tent to return to the places they had visited beforewhere they will presumably this time be deprived of the opportunity to observe animals of the endangered speciesis simply not enough to establish standing"
] | ); WildEarth Guardians v. Jewell, 738 F.3d 298, | 1 |
982 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nclaims that could have been brought either in the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction or in admiralty. Panek’s contract with Con-cordia was sufficiently maritime in nature to fall within the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 81 S.Ct. 886, 889, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (marine insurance contracts); Carroll v. Protection rcised jurisdiction over the counterclaims either under its “supplemental jurisdiction” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, or admiralty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, at least with respect to the breach of contract and negligence claims. Having concluded that Rule 9(h) could be invok laimant has elected to proceed in admiralty is whether he demanded a jury trial. Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding that courts apply substantive admiralty law to claims that sound in admiralty regardless of whether the complaint invokes diversity or admiralty jurisdiction",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nclaims that could have been brought either in the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction or in admiralty. Panek’s contract with Con-cordia was sufficiently maritime in nature to fall within the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 81 S.Ct. 886, 889, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (marine insurance contracts); Carroll v. Protection rcised jurisdiction over the counterclaims either under its “supplemental jurisdiction” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, or admiralty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, at least with respect to the breach of contract and negligence claims. Having concluded that Rule 9(h) could be invok laimant has elected to proceed in admiralty is whether he demanded a jury trial. Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding that a demand for a trial by jury is inconsistent with an intent to proceed in admiralty",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nclaims that could have been brought either in the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction or in admiralty. Panek’s contract with Con-cordia was sufficiently maritime in nature to fall within the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 81 S.Ct. 886, 889, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (marine insurance contracts); Carroll v. Protection rcised jurisdiction over the counterclaims either under its “supplemental jurisdiction” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, or admiralty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, at least with respect to the breach of contract and negligence claims. Having concluded that Rule 9(h) could be invok laimant has elected to proceed in admiralty is whether he demanded a jury trial. Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (recognizing that parties had right to trial by jury in trespass action but holding that parties waived that right under cr 3804 by not filing a demand for a jury trial",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nclaims that could have been brought either in the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction or in admiralty. Panek’s contract with Con-cordia was sufficiently maritime in nature to fall within the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 81 S.Ct. 886, 889, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (marine insurance contracts); Carroll v. Protection rcised jurisdiction over the counterclaims either under its “supplemental jurisdiction” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, or admiralty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, at least with respect to the breach of contract and negligence claims. Having concluded that Rule 9(h) could be invok laimant has elected to proceed in admiralty is whether he demanded a jury trial. Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding in action involving single claim that if claim sounded only in admiralty there would be no right to a jury trial but if federal question was present as a separate and independent basis for federal jurisdiction then the jury demand must be honored",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nclaims that could have been brought either in the district court’s supplemental jurisdiction or in admiralty. Panek’s contract with Con-cordia was sufficiently maritime in nature to fall within the district court’s admiralty jurisdiction. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735, 81 S.Ct. 886, 889, 6 L.Ed.2d 56 (1961) (marine insurance contracts); Carroll v. Protection rcised jurisdiction over the counterclaims either under its “supplemental jurisdiction” pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, or admiralty, 28 U.S.C. § 1333, at least with respect to the breach of contract and negligence claims. Having concluded that Rule 9(h) could be invok laimant has elected to proceed in admiralty is whether he demanded a jury trial. Lewis v. United States, 812 F.Supp. 620, 627 (E.D.Va.1993) (holding that a complaint that asserts both admiralty jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction is not an adequate 9h designation to trigger admiralty procedures"
] | ); cf. Royal Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hansen, 125 | 1 |
983 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nits submissions. See, e.g., NSK Ltd. v. United States, 17 CIT 590, 593, 825 F.Supp. 315, 318-19 (1993). Lastly, because Chengde delayed requesting correction until after the ITA had issued the Final Results, the requirement of administrative finality necessarily outweighed its belated concern for correctness. See Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1352-54 (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied, 434 F.3d 1345, cert, denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 577, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006)(distinguishing requests to correct errors at the final-result versus preliminary-result stages); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. Kanzen Tetsu Sdn. Bhd., 334 F.3d at 1292 (“there is a strong interest in the finality of Commerce’s decisions”); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. United States, 26 CIT at 351, 201 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (recognizing the tension between extrarecord evidence and a recordbased standard of review",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nits submissions. See, e.g., NSK Ltd. v. United States, 17 CIT 590, 593, 825 F.Supp. 315, 318-19 (1993). Lastly, because Chengde delayed requesting correction until after the ITA had issued the Final Results, the requirement of administrative finality necessarily outweighed its belated concern for correctness. See Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1352-54 (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied, 434 F.3d 1345, cert, denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 577, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006)(distinguishing requests to correct errors at the final-result versus preliminary-result stages); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. Kanzen Tetsu Sdn. Bhd., 334 F.3d at 1292 (“there is a strong interest in the finality of Commerce’s decisions”); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. United States, 26 CIT at 351, 201 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (holding that under 1988 consideration of the results obtained relative to the relief requested is required",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nits submissions. See, e.g., NSK Ltd. v. United States, 17 CIT 590, 593, 825 F.Supp. 315, 318-19 (1993). Lastly, because Chengde delayed requesting correction until after the ITA had issued the Final Results, the requirement of administrative finality necessarily outweighed its belated concern for correctness. See Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1352-54 (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied, 434 F.3d 1345, cert, denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 577, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006)(distinguishing requests to correct errors at the final-result versus preliminary-result stages); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. Kanzen Tetsu Sdn. Bhd., 334 F.3d at 1292 (“there is a strong interest in the finality of Commerce’s decisions”); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. United States, 26 CIT at 351, 201 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (recognizing the tension between finality and correct result and denying relief where party requested correction after final results had issued",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nits submissions. See, e.g., NSK Ltd. v. United States, 17 CIT 590, 593, 825 F.Supp. 315, 318-19 (1993). Lastly, because Chengde delayed requesting correction until after the ITA had issued the Final Results, the requirement of administrative finality necessarily outweighed its belated concern for correctness. See Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1352-54 (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied, 434 F.3d 1345, cert, denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 577, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006)(distinguishing requests to correct errors at the final-result versus preliminary-result stages); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. Kanzen Tetsu Sdn. Bhd., 334 F.3d at 1292 (“there is a strong interest in the finality of Commerce’s decisions”); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. United States, 26 CIT at 351, 201 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (recognizing the possibility but denying relief",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nits submissions. See, e.g., NSK Ltd. v. United States, 17 CIT 590, 593, 825 F.Supp. 315, 318-19 (1993). Lastly, because Chengde delayed requesting correction until after the ITA had issued the Final Results, the requirement of administrative finality necessarily outweighed its belated concern for correctness. See Timken U.S. Corp. v. United States, 434 F.3d 1345, 1352-54 (Fed.Cir.), reh’g denied, 434 F.3d 1345, cert, denied, — U.S. -, 127 S.Ct. 577, 166 L.Ed.2d 428 (2006)(distinguishing requests to correct errors at the final-result versus preliminary-result stages); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. Kanzen Tetsu Sdn. Bhd., 334 F.3d at 1292 (“there is a strong interest in the finality of Commerce’s decisions”); Alloy Piping Prods., Inc. v. United States, 26 CIT at 351, 201 F.Supp.2d at 1286 (recognizing but refusing to resolve tension between bradley and bowen"
] | ). Thus, under these circumstances, where (1) | 2 |
984 | [
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmuscle tenderness on repeated examinations ...; or, [a]ny other medical signs that are consistent with medically accepted clinical practice and are consistent with the other evidence in the ease record.” Id. at 3. Further, CFS may be established by: (1) laboratory findings including neurally mediated hypotension or an abnormal exercise stress test; and (2) mental findings, including problems with short-term memory, information processing, visual-spatial issues, comprehension, concentration, speech, word-finding, calculation, and anxiety or depression. Id. Citing Ruling 99-2p, we have recognized that “there are no specific laboratory findings that are” widely accepted as indicative of CFS and no test for CFS. Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that the alj failed to analyze the effect of cfs on a claimants ability to do work meaningfully when he rejected cfs as a diagnosis for want of a definite test or specific laboratory findings to support the diagnosis",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmuscle tenderness on repeated examinations ...; or, [a]ny other medical signs that are consistent with medically accepted clinical practice and are consistent with the other evidence in the ease record.” Id. at 3. Further, CFS may be established by: (1) laboratory findings including neurally mediated hypotension or an abnormal exercise stress test; and (2) mental findings, including problems with short-term memory, information processing, visual-spatial issues, comprehension, concentration, speech, word-finding, calculation, and anxiety or depression. Id. Citing Ruling 99-2p, we have recognized that “there are no specific laboratory findings that are” widely accepted as indicative of CFS and no test for CFS. Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that individual has privacy interest in medical information including diagnosis",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmuscle tenderness on repeated examinations ...; or, [a]ny other medical signs that are consistent with medically accepted clinical practice and are consistent with the other evidence in the ease record.” Id. at 3. Further, CFS may be established by: (1) laboratory findings including neurally mediated hypotension or an abnormal exercise stress test; and (2) mental findings, including problems with short-term memory, information processing, visual-spatial issues, comprehension, concentration, speech, word-finding, calculation, and anxiety or depression. Id. Citing Ruling 99-2p, we have recognized that “there are no specific laboratory findings that are” widely accepted as indicative of CFS and no test for CFS. Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that a treating physicians diagnosis could be rejected for specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmuscle tenderness on repeated examinations ...; or, [a]ny other medical signs that are consistent with medically accepted clinical practice and are consistent with the other evidence in the ease record.” Id. at 3. Further, CFS may be established by: (1) laboratory findings including neurally mediated hypotension or an abnormal exercise stress test; and (2) mental findings, including problems with short-term memory, information processing, visual-spatial issues, comprehension, concentration, speech, word-finding, calculation, and anxiety or depression. Id. Citing Ruling 99-2p, we have recognized that “there are no specific laboratory findings that are” widely accepted as indicative of CFS and no test for CFS. Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that the alj erred in determining that the claimant was disabled when a retrospective diagnosis along with all other medical evidence supported a finding of disability",
"Please fill in the missing part of the US court opinion excerpt:\nmuscle tenderness on repeated examinations ...; or, [a]ny other medical signs that are consistent with medically accepted clinical practice and are consistent with the other evidence in the ease record.” Id. at 3. Further, CFS may be established by: (1) laboratory findings including neurally mediated hypotension or an abnormal exercise stress test; and (2) mental findings, including problems with short-term memory, information processing, visual-spatial issues, comprehension, concentration, speech, word-finding, calculation, and anxiety or depression. Id. Citing Ruling 99-2p, we have recognized that “there are no specific laboratory findings that are” widely accepted as indicative of CFS and no test for CFS. Vega v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 265 F.3d 1214, 1219-20 (11th Cir.2001) (holding that the alj erred in failing to give the findings and assessments of the treating physicians any weight when the medical evidence and claimants testimony supported a diagnosis of cfs"
] | ). B. Medical Opinions Generally, the opinions | 0 |
985 | [
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1124, 1136 (9th Cir.2006); see Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). Under the plain error standard, relief is not warranted unless there has been: (1) “error,” (2) that was “plain,” (3) that affected “substantial rights,” and (4) that “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Redo, 371 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.2004). 1. Moreland first asserts that his due process rights were violated when the prosecution compelled him to testify regarding whether two government witnesses lied during their testimony. It is improper for a prosecutor to question a defendant regarding the veracity of a government witness. United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 548 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that testimony regarding witness credibility is prohibited unless it is admissible as character evidence",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1124, 1136 (9th Cir.2006); see Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). Under the plain error standard, relief is not warranted unless there has been: (1) “error,” (2) that was “plain,” (3) that affected “substantial rights,” and (4) that “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Redo, 371 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.2004). 1. Moreland first asserts that his due process rights were violated when the prosecution compelled him to testify regarding whether two government witnesses lied during their testimony. It is improper for a prosecutor to question a defendant regarding the veracity of a government witness. United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 548 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that the jury is the judge of the weight and credibility given to witness testimony",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1124, 1136 (9th Cir.2006); see Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). Under the plain error standard, relief is not warranted unless there has been: (1) “error,” (2) that was “plain,” (3) that affected “substantial rights,” and (4) that “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Redo, 371 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.2004). 1. Moreland first asserts that his due process rights were violated when the prosecution compelled him to testify regarding whether two government witnesses lied during their testimony. It is improper for a prosecutor to question a defendant regarding the veracity of a government witness. United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 548 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that a trial witnesss testimony as to the credibility of another witness was prejudicial error",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1124, 1136 (9th Cir.2006); see Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). Under the plain error standard, relief is not warranted unless there has been: (1) “error,” (2) that was “plain,” (3) that affected “substantial rights,” and (4) that “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Redo, 371 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.2004). 1. Moreland first asserts that his due process rights were violated when the prosecution compelled him to testify regarding whether two government witnesses lied during their testimony. It is improper for a prosecutor to question a defendant regarding the veracity of a government witness. United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 548 (9th Cir.1998) (holding that it is improper to ask a witness to comment on the credibility of another witness",
"Your task is to complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\n1124, 1136 (9th Cir.2006); see Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). Under the plain error standard, relief is not warranted unless there has been: (1) “error,” (2) that was “plain,” (3) that affected “substantial rights,” and (4) that “seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Redo, 371 F.3d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir.2004). 1. Moreland first asserts that his due process rights were violated when the prosecution compelled him to testify regarding whether two government witnesses lied during their testimony. It is improper for a prosecutor to question a defendant regarding the veracity of a government witness. United States v. Combs, 379 F.3d 564, 572 (9th Cir.2004); see also United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d 545, 548 (9th Cir.1998) (holding coconspirators guilty plea is admissible as an aid to the jurys assessment of witness credibility but not as substantive evidence of a defendants guilt"
] | ). In this case, the prosecutor twice asked | 0 |
986 | [
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\npromise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. (2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or relationship include the following: (b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other principal; .... 13 . Similarly, Florida courts recognize that an employer’s relationship with its employees constitutes a legitimate business interest. Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that sales made to contractor who builds roads for the state are not sales to the state and therefore are not exempt",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\npromise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. (2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or relationship include the following: (b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other principal; .... 13 . Similarly, Florida courts recognize that an employer’s relationship with its employees constitutes a legitimate business interest. Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that the fact that defendants sales in forum were less than 5 percent of its total sales volume was irrelevant so long as its sales were part of a regular course of dealing and were not isolated or exceptional events",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\npromise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. (2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or relationship include the following: (b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other principal; .... 13 . Similarly, Florida courts recognize that an employer’s relationship with its employees constitutes a legitimate business interest. Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that agreement prohibiting sales manager from soliciting or influencing other employees to leave automobile dealership for two years following his resignation was presumptively reasonable and necessary to protect substantial investment dealership made in specialized training of its sales staff and furthered legitimate business interests of promoting productivity and maintaining competent and specialized sale team and thus was enforceable",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\npromise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. (2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or relationship include the following: (b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other principal; .... 13 . Similarly, Florida courts recognize that an employer’s relationship with its employees constitutes a legitimate business interest. Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that exercising general jurisdiction over defendant was improper where its actual sales in florida were a small percentage of the total sales and therefore these sales were de minimis ",
"Your challenge is to complete the excerpt from a US court opinion:\npromise to refrain from competition that imposes a restraint that is ancillary to an otherwise valid transaction or relationship is unreasonably in restraint of trade if (a) the restraint is greater than is needed to protect the promisee’s legitimate interest, or (b) the promisee’s need is outweighed by the hardship to the promisor and the likely injury to the public. (2) Promises imposing restraints that are ancillary to a valid transaction or relationship include the following: (b) a promise by an employee or other agent not to compete with his employer or other principal; .... 13 . Similarly, Florida courts recognize that an employer’s relationship with its employees constitutes a legitimate business interest. Balasco v. Gulf Auto Holding, Inc., 707 So.2d 858, 860 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998) (holding that defendants conduct amounted to substantial and nonisolated activity within florida for purposes of general jurisdiction where its advertising strategy was designed to generate product sales in florida and its dollar volume of sales was substantial"
] | ). 14 . To the extent MacMillan contends that | 2 |
987 | [
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof proving a prima facie case, the proponent has the burden of production of a race-neutral explanation, and the opponent has the ultimate burden of proving pretext and discriminatory intent.” Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832. After Pendleton gave reasons for the objection, the district court should have determined whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been shown. See White, 684 N.W.2d at 505. Instead, the court allowed the state to respond and Pendleton to rebut that response. The court’s analysis was not in accordance with our Batson precedent or the Batson procedure set forth in Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6a(3). But we have not reversed a district court’s Batson ruling solely because of its failure to follow the prescribed procedure. See Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832-34 (recognizing that factual findings were clearly erroneous where the record before the court was simply devoid of any basis for the district courts conclusion",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof proving a prima facie case, the proponent has the burden of production of a race-neutral explanation, and the opponent has the ultimate burden of proving pretext and discriminatory intent.” Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832. After Pendleton gave reasons for the objection, the district court should have determined whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been shown. See White, 684 N.W.2d at 505. Instead, the court allowed the state to respond and Pendleton to rebut that response. The court’s analysis was not in accordance with our Batson precedent or the Batson procedure set forth in Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6a(3). But we have not reversed a district court’s Batson ruling solely because of its failure to follow the prescribed procedure. See Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832-34 (holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination under title vii was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof proving a prima facie case, the proponent has the burden of production of a race-neutral explanation, and the opponent has the ultimate burden of proving pretext and discriminatory intent.” Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832. After Pendleton gave reasons for the objection, the district court should have determined whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been shown. See White, 684 N.W.2d at 505. Instead, the court allowed the state to respond and Pendleton to rebut that response. The court’s analysis was not in accordance with our Batson precedent or the Batson procedure set forth in Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6a(3). But we have not reversed a district court’s Batson ruling solely because of its failure to follow the prescribed procedure. See Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832-34 (holding that the district courts finding of no discrimination was not clearly erroneous because the finding was supported by the record",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof proving a prima facie case, the proponent has the burden of production of a race-neutral explanation, and the opponent has the ultimate burden of proving pretext and discriminatory intent.” Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832. After Pendleton gave reasons for the objection, the district court should have determined whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been shown. See White, 684 N.W.2d at 505. Instead, the court allowed the state to respond and Pendleton to rebut that response. The court’s analysis was not in accordance with our Batson precedent or the Batson procedure set forth in Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6a(3). But we have not reversed a district court’s Batson ruling solely because of its failure to follow the prescribed procedure. See Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832-34 (holding that the finding of intent to discriminate is a factual determination subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review",
"Your objective is to fill in the blank in the US court opinion excerpt:\nof proving a prima facie case, the proponent has the burden of production of a race-neutral explanation, and the opponent has the ultimate burden of proving pretext and discriminatory intent.” Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832. After Pendleton gave reasons for the objection, the district court should have determined whether a prima facie case of racial discrimination had been shown. See White, 684 N.W.2d at 505. Instead, the court allowed the state to respond and Pendleton to rebut that response. The court’s analysis was not in accordance with our Batson precedent or the Batson procedure set forth in Minn. R.Crim. P. 26.02, subd. 6a(3). But we have not reversed a district court’s Batson ruling solely because of its failure to follow the prescribed procedure. See Reiners, 664 N.W.2d at 832-34 (holding that the district courts application of batson was clearly erroneous but then reviewing the record to make our own determination as to the validity of the objection"
] | ); Taylor, 650 N.W.2d at 202 (“Because the | 4 |
988 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor radiologists to or urologists or anybody else of the same specialty. Similarly, Dr. Venegas testified that as a family physician, he does not implant pacemakers and he would defer to the knowledge of a cardiologist on that issue. When Dr. Venegas was asked if he believed Dr. Feldman deviated from the standard of care in her treatment of Mr. Melton, he responded, “I cannot see where from the note[s] that I’ve been given from [Dr. Feldman] that she deviated from the standard of care in her medical treatment of Mr. Melton.” Dr. Gaddy and Dr. Venegas failed to establish the standard of care for implanting ICDs, and therefore, their testimony was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 587, 320 S.E.2d 59, 65 (Ct.App.1984) (holding that expert medical testimony was not necessary to establish negligence where surgeon left a needle in the patients body but stating that proof of proximate cause requires some expert testimony in medical malpractice cases",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor radiologists to or urologists or anybody else of the same specialty. Similarly, Dr. Venegas testified that as a family physician, he does not implant pacemakers and he would defer to the knowledge of a cardiologist on that issue. When Dr. Venegas was asked if he believed Dr. Feldman deviated from the standard of care in her treatment of Mr. Melton, he responded, “I cannot see where from the note[s] that I’ve been given from [Dr. Feldman] that she deviated from the standard of care in her medical treatment of Mr. Melton.” Dr. Gaddy and Dr. Venegas failed to establish the standard of care for implanting ICDs, and therefore, their testimony was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 587, 320 S.E.2d 59, 65 (Ct.App.1984) (holding that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment since the physical evidence and unrebutted expert testimony left no genuine issue of material fact",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor radiologists to or urologists or anybody else of the same specialty. Similarly, Dr. Venegas testified that as a family physician, he does not implant pacemakers and he would defer to the knowledge of a cardiologist on that issue. When Dr. Venegas was asked if he believed Dr. Feldman deviated from the standard of care in her treatment of Mr. Melton, he responded, “I cannot see where from the note[s] that I’ve been given from [Dr. Feldman] that she deviated from the standard of care in her medical treatment of Mr. Melton.” Dr. Gaddy and Dr. Venegas failed to establish the standard of care for implanting ICDs, and therefore, their testimony was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 587, 320 S.E.2d 59, 65 (Ct.App.1984) (holding no issue of material fact as to whether defendant was volunteer because he received no compensation",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor radiologists to or urologists or anybody else of the same specialty. Similarly, Dr. Venegas testified that as a family physician, he does not implant pacemakers and he would defer to the knowledge of a cardiologist on that issue. When Dr. Venegas was asked if he believed Dr. Feldman deviated from the standard of care in her treatment of Mr. Melton, he responded, “I cannot see where from the note[s] that I’ve been given from [Dr. Feldman] that she deviated from the standard of care in her medical treatment of Mr. Melton.” Dr. Gaddy and Dr. Venegas failed to establish the standard of care for implanting ICDs, and therefore, their testimony was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 587, 320 S.E.2d 59, 65 (Ct.App.1984) (holding expert testimony by an orthopedic surgeon in a case of alleged medical malpractice by a podiatrist failed to create a genuine issue of material fact because 1 the material question in the case was the standard required of podiatrists not orthopedic surgeons 2 the witness admitted he was not familiar with the procedure the defendant performed and 3 when the orthopedic surgeon was asked if he held himself out as an expert he answered no not in podiatry no",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nfor radiologists to or urologists or anybody else of the same specialty. Similarly, Dr. Venegas testified that as a family physician, he does not implant pacemakers and he would defer to the knowledge of a cardiologist on that issue. When Dr. Venegas was asked if he believed Dr. Feldman deviated from the standard of care in her treatment of Mr. Melton, he responded, “I cannot see where from the note[s] that I’ve been given from [Dr. Feldman] that she deviated from the standard of care in her medical treatment of Mr. Melton.” Dr. Gaddy and Dr. Venegas failed to establish the standard of care for implanting ICDs, and therefore, their testimony was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Botehlo v. Bycura, 282 S.C. 578, 587, 320 S.E.2d 59, 65 (Ct.App.1984) (holding that expert testimony is unnecessary when orthopedic surgeon failed to remove two pieces of cement totaling oneinch in diameter after affixing prosthesis for hip replacement"
] | ). Furthermore, Melton presented no evidence | 3 |
989 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nplaintiff agreed to a fixed weekly salary covering unlimited hours, making it unnecessary to apply the FWW method. As the district court not ed in reaching that conclusion as to Banford and McGratty, Banford testified that he expected to receive compensation in some form if he worked more than a certain number of hours in a given week, while McGratty testified that he had no understanding of Entergy’s overtime policy but thought that his pay could be docked for working less than a fixed number of hours. See Banford v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 74 F.Supp.3d 658, 664-65 (D.Vt.2015). This was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that there was not an agreement to work unlimited hours for the same fixed salary. See Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 155 (2d Cir.2014) (holding that courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nplaintiff agreed to a fixed weekly salary covering unlimited hours, making it unnecessary to apply the FWW method. As the district court not ed in reaching that conclusion as to Banford and McGratty, Banford testified that he expected to receive compensation in some form if he worked more than a certain number of hours in a given week, while McGratty testified that he had no understanding of Entergy’s overtime policy but thought that his pay could be docked for working less than a fixed number of hours. See Banford v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 74 F.Supp.3d 658, 664-65 (D.Vt.2015). This was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that there was not an agreement to work unlimited hours for the same fixed salary. See Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 155 (2d Cir.2014) (holding courts are obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nplaintiff agreed to a fixed weekly salary covering unlimited hours, making it unnecessary to apply the FWW method. As the district court not ed in reaching that conclusion as to Banford and McGratty, Banford testified that he expected to receive compensation in some form if he worked more than a certain number of hours in a given week, while McGratty testified that he had no understanding of Entergy’s overtime policy but thought that his pay could be docked for working less than a fixed number of hours. See Banford v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 74 F.Supp.3d 658, 664-65 (D.Vt.2015). This was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that there was not an agreement to work unlimited hours for the same fixed salary. See Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 155 (2d Cir.2014) (holding that for purposes of a class certification motion the court must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and may draw reasonable inferences therefrom",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nplaintiff agreed to a fixed weekly salary covering unlimited hours, making it unnecessary to apply the FWW method. As the district court not ed in reaching that conclusion as to Banford and McGratty, Banford testified that he expected to receive compensation in some form if he worked more than a certain number of hours in a given week, while McGratty testified that he had no understanding of Entergy’s overtime policy but thought that his pay could be docked for working less than a fixed number of hours. See Banford v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 74 F.Supp.3d 658, 664-65 (D.Vt.2015). This was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that there was not an agreement to work unlimited hours for the same fixed salary. See Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 155 (2d Cir.2014) (holding court obligated to draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs favor",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nplaintiff agreed to a fixed weekly salary covering unlimited hours, making it unnecessary to apply the FWW method. As the district court not ed in reaching that conclusion as to Banford and McGratty, Banford testified that he expected to receive compensation in some form if he worked more than a certain number of hours in a given week, while McGratty testified that he had no understanding of Entergy’s overtime policy but thought that his pay could be docked for working less than a fixed number of hours. See Banford v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., 74 F.Supp.3d 658, 664-65 (D.Vt.2015). This was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude that there was not an agreement to work unlimited hours for the same fixed salary. See Olsen v. Stark Homes, Inc., 759 F.3d 140, 155 (2d Cir.2014) (holding in affirming denial of judgment as matter of law for defendants that jury was entitled to credit plaintiffs testimony over defendants and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom"
] | ). Indeed, a reasonable jury could infer from | 4 |
990 | [
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndisagree, as we conclude that the parties mutually agreed that there would be no limit on contribution liability regardless of the outcome of Kotecki. Before Kotecki, the question of whether there was a limit on employer contribution liability remained unanswered. Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d at 162. For Kotecki, the supreme court granted leave to appeal in September 1989 (127 Ill. 2d 618, 545 N.E.2d 112 (1989)), more than a year before the parties entered into the contract in this matter. Thus, both parties could have known that the supreme court was about to establish a default rule for employer contribution liability, and supreme court decisions generally apply retroactively to cases pending at the time the decision is announced. Lannom v. Kosco, 158 Ill. 2d 535, 538, 634 N.E.2d 1097 (1994) (holding that aedpa is not applied retroactively to pending habeas petitions",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndisagree, as we conclude that the parties mutually agreed that there would be no limit on contribution liability regardless of the outcome of Kotecki. Before Kotecki, the question of whether there was a limit on employer contribution liability remained unanswered. Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d at 162. For Kotecki, the supreme court granted leave to appeal in September 1989 (127 Ill. 2d 618, 545 N.E.2d 112 (1989)), more than a year before the parties entered into the contract in this matter. Thus, both parties could have known that the supreme court was about to establish a default rule for employer contribution liability, and supreme court decisions generally apply retroactively to cases pending at the time the decision is announced. Lannom v. Kosco, 158 Ill. 2d 535, 538, 634 N.E.2d 1097 (1994) (recognizing the objection requirement for new state constitutional rules applied retroactively",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndisagree, as we conclude that the parties mutually agreed that there would be no limit on contribution liability regardless of the outcome of Kotecki. Before Kotecki, the question of whether there was a limit on employer contribution liability remained unanswered. Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d at 162. For Kotecki, the supreme court granted leave to appeal in September 1989 (127 Ill. 2d 618, 545 N.E.2d 112 (1989)), more than a year before the parties entered into the contract in this matter. Thus, both parties could have known that the supreme court was about to establish a default rule for employer contribution liability, and supreme court decisions generally apply retroactively to cases pending at the time the decision is announced. Lannom v. Kosco, 158 Ill. 2d 535, 538, 634 N.E.2d 1097 (1994) (holding statutes are not applied retroactively absent clear legislative intent",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndisagree, as we conclude that the parties mutually agreed that there would be no limit on contribution liability regardless of the outcome of Kotecki. Before Kotecki, the question of whether there was a limit on employer contribution liability remained unanswered. Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d at 162. For Kotecki, the supreme court granted leave to appeal in September 1989 (127 Ill. 2d 618, 545 N.E.2d 112 (1989)), more than a year before the parties entered into the contract in this matter. Thus, both parties could have known that the supreme court was about to establish a default rule for employer contribution liability, and supreme court decisions generally apply retroactively to cases pending at the time the decision is announced. Lannom v. Kosco, 158 Ill. 2d 535, 538, 634 N.E.2d 1097 (1994) (holding that kotecki limit applied retroactively",
"In the given US court opinion excerpt, provide the appropriate content to complete it:\ndisagree, as we conclude that the parties mutually agreed that there would be no limit on contribution liability regardless of the outcome of Kotecki. Before Kotecki, the question of whether there was a limit on employer contribution liability remained unanswered. Kotecki, 146 Ill. 2d at 162. For Kotecki, the supreme court granted leave to appeal in September 1989 (127 Ill. 2d 618, 545 N.E.2d 112 (1989)), more than a year before the parties entered into the contract in this matter. Thus, both parties could have known that the supreme court was about to establish a default rule for employer contribution liability, and supreme court decisions generally apply retroactively to cases pending at the time the decision is announced. Lannom v. Kosco, 158 Ill. 2d 535, 538, 634 N.E.2d 1097 (1994) (holding the batson rule was not to be applied retroactively to a state conviction on federal habeas review"
] | ). The parties responded by mutually assenting | 3 |
991 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFor these reasons, we conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for public sector employment discrimination, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss Johnson’s § 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's § 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the ' § 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989)(holding that 1983 does not provide a remedy if there is no violation of federal law",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFor these reasons, we conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for public sector employment discrimination, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss Johnson’s § 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's § 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the ' § 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989)(holding that where it is alleged that state has violated rights conferred by constitution governmental immunity is not available in state court action but declining to infer a right to sue the state for damages on the basis of a violation of the michigan constitution",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFor these reasons, we conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for public sector employment discrimination, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss Johnson’s § 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's § 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the ' § 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989)(holding that 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for violation of the rights guaranteed in 1981 by state governmental units",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFor these reasons, we conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for public sector employment discrimination, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss Johnson’s § 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's § 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the ' § 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989)(holding that title vii provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\nFor these reasons, we conclude that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not render Title VII and § 1981 the exclusive remedies for public sector employment discrimination, thereby preempting a constitutional cause of action under § 1983. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss Johnson’s § 1983 claims. AFFIRMED. 1 . Count Eight asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claim against the individual defendants for alleged conspiracy to violate Johnson's § 1981 and Thirteenth Amendment rights. This count is not at issue on this appeal. 2 . The defendants also moved to dismiss the ' § 1981 claim. The district court granted dismissal against the City only, citing Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 733, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2722, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989)(holding that title vii of the civil rights act of 1964 provides the exclusive remedy for claims of employment discrimination by federal agencies"
] | ). 3 .We review de novo a question of law | 2 |
992 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ninterlocutory issue. Rule 14(B) states that such a motion \"requesting the Court of Appeals ac-eept jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of the trial court's certification.\" Ind.App. R. 14(B)(2)(a). As such, we do not have jurisdiction over this issue and it must be dismissed. See Anonymous Doctor A v. Sherrard, 783 N.E.2d 296, 299 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (dismissing an appeal when the appellant failed to petition the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(B)). The Guillaumes argue that Appellate Rule 66(B) should allow our court to accept jurisdiction of the issue at this stage. We disagree and have previously declined such suggestions. See Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger, 838 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Ind.2005) (holding that an appellate court cannot consider an issue that was not preserved for appellate review",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ninterlocutory issue. Rule 14(B) states that such a motion \"requesting the Court of Appeals ac-eept jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of the trial court's certification.\" Ind.App. R. 14(B)(2)(a). As such, we do not have jurisdiction over this issue and it must be dismissed. See Anonymous Doctor A v. Sherrard, 783 N.E.2d 296, 299 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (dismissing an appeal when the appellant failed to petition the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(B)). The Guillaumes argue that Appellate Rule 66(B) should allow our court to accept jurisdiction of the issue at this stage. We disagree and have previously declined such suggestions. See Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger, 838 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Ind.2005) (holding that because record did not contain notice of appeal in compliance with rule 3 there was no appellate jurisdiction and appeal must be dismissed",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ninterlocutory issue. Rule 14(B) states that such a motion \"requesting the Court of Appeals ac-eept jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of the trial court's certification.\" Ind.App. R. 14(B)(2)(a). As such, we do not have jurisdiction over this issue and it must be dismissed. See Anonymous Doctor A v. Sherrard, 783 N.E.2d 296, 299 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (dismissing an appeal when the appellant failed to petition the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(B)). The Guillaumes argue that Appellate Rule 66(B) should allow our court to accept jurisdiction of the issue at this stage. We disagree and have previously declined such suggestions. See Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger, 838 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Ind.2005) (recognizing that the waiver rule is wholly consistent with the bias rule of practice as an appellate body",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ninterlocutory issue. Rule 14(B) states that such a motion \"requesting the Court of Appeals ac-eept jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of the trial court's certification.\" Ind.App. R. 14(B)(2)(a). As such, we do not have jurisdiction over this issue and it must be dismissed. See Anonymous Doctor A v. Sherrard, 783 N.E.2d 296, 299 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (dismissing an appeal when the appellant failed to petition the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(B)). The Guillaumes argue that Appellate Rule 66(B) should allow our court to accept jurisdiction of the issue at this stage. We disagree and have previously declined such suggestions. See Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger, 838 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Ind.2005) (holding that a failure to comply with rule 28a10 provides an appellate court a basis for disregarding the appellants arguments",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\ninterlocutory issue. Rule 14(B) states that such a motion \"requesting the Court of Appeals ac-eept jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal shall be filed within thirty (30) days of the date of the trial court's certification.\" Ind.App. R. 14(B)(2)(a). As such, we do not have jurisdiction over this issue and it must be dismissed. See Anonymous Doctor A v. Sherrard, 783 N.E.2d 296, 299 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (dismissing an appeal when the appellant failed to petition the Court of Appeals to accept jurisdiction pursuant to Appellate Rule 14(B)). The Guillaumes argue that Appellate Rule 66(B) should allow our court to accept jurisdiction of the issue at this stage. We disagree and have previously declined such suggestions. See Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Yaeger, 838 N.E.2d 449, 450 (Ind.2005) (holding that appellate rule 66b does not authorize an interlocutory appeal that fails to comply with appellate rule 14"
] | ). Because this issue is dismissed, we do not | 4 |
993 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndetailed expert reports that were explored at a lengthy deposition. In essence, he compared C & F’s sales and growth rates to comparable competitors. Except in certain respects not relevant here, the admissibility of evidence is governed by the law of the forum. See Restatement (Second), supra, § 138. Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting — a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge — but that is not dispositive. See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it “was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability”); see also Hammond v. Int’l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding automobile exclusion in general liability policy did not apply because plaintiffs claim of negligent supervision and training was a separate and distinct theory of recovery from the use of an automobile",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndetailed expert reports that were explored at a lengthy deposition. In essence, he compared C & F’s sales and growth rates to comparable competitors. Except in certain respects not relevant here, the admissibility of evidence is governed by the law of the forum. See Restatement (Second), supra, § 138. Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting — a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge — but that is not dispositive. See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it “was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability”); see also Hammond v. Int’l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that an engineer whose only qualifications were sales experience in the field of automatic and agricultural equipment and teaching high school automobile repair could testify in a products liability action involving tractors",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndetailed expert reports that were explored at a lengthy deposition. In essence, he compared C & F’s sales and growth rates to comparable competitors. Except in certain respects not relevant here, the admissibility of evidence is governed by the law of the forum. See Restatement (Second), supra, § 138. Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting — a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge — but that is not dispositive. See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it “was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability”); see also Hammond v. Int’l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (recognizing products liability and products actions based on negligence as part of the general maritime law",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndetailed expert reports that were explored at a lengthy deposition. In essence, he compared C & F’s sales and growth rates to comparable competitors. Except in certain respects not relevant here, the admissibility of evidence is governed by the law of the forum. See Restatement (Second), supra, § 138. Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting — a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge — but that is not dispositive. See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it “was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability”); see also Hammond v. Int’l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding that where a high school student and the students mother received adequate notice of the charges had sufficient opportunity to prepare for the meeting with school personnel were accorded an orderly hearing and were given a fair and impartial decision no due process violation occurred even though the school failed to provide advance notice that the potential disciplinary actions included a transfer to another school",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\ndetailed expert reports that were explored at a lengthy deposition. In essence, he compared C & F’s sales and growth rates to comparable competitors. Except in certain respects not relevant here, the admissibility of evidence is governed by the law of the forum. See Restatement (Second), supra, § 138. Elson may not have previously provided an opinion of this nature in the insurance setting — a fact greatly relied upon by the trial judge — but that is not dispositive. See Quinlan v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 425 N.J.Super. 335, 372, 41 A.3d 739 (App. Div. 2012) (observing that it “was not necessary for ... a well-qualified economist quantifying plaintiffs alleged losses [to also] be an expert on employability”); see also Hammond v. Int’l Harvester Co., 691 F.2d 646, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1982) (recognizing the significance of control in strict products liability"
] | ); Knight v. Otis Elevator Co., 596 F.2d 84, | 1 |
994 | [
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddress challenges raised for the first time on appeal in numerous cases.\" On the particular cireum-stances presented, we decline to do so. 29 This concession \"raises the question of the extent to which defendant is entitled to appellate review of this issue.\" People v. Allman, 2012 COA 212, 114, 321 P.3d 557. The Allman division recognized \"two lines of authority in Colorado on this question in criminal cases.\" Id.; see People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 932 (Colo.App.2011) (describing Colorado law on reviewing an unpreserved constitutional challenge as in a \"muddled state.\") (J. Jones, J., specially concurring) 30 The position that a constitutional challenge to a statute should not be entertained for the first time on appeal derives from People v. Lesney, 855 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Colo.1993) (holding constitutional challenge to void statute may be raised for first time on appeal",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddress challenges raised for the first time on appeal in numerous cases.\" On the particular cireum-stances presented, we decline to do so. 29 This concession \"raises the question of the extent to which defendant is entitled to appellate review of this issue.\" People v. Allman, 2012 COA 212, 114, 321 P.3d 557. The Allman division recognized \"two lines of authority in Colorado on this question in criminal cases.\" Id.; see People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 932 (Colo.App.2011) (describing Colorado law on reviewing an unpreserved constitutional challenge as in a \"muddled state.\") (J. Jones, J., specially concurring) 30 The position that a constitutional challenge to a statute should not be entertained for the first time on appeal derives from People v. Lesney, 855 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Colo.1993) (holding issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal but must have been raised to and ruled upon by the trial judge to be preserved for appellate review",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddress challenges raised for the first time on appeal in numerous cases.\" On the particular cireum-stances presented, we decline to do so. 29 This concession \"raises the question of the extent to which defendant is entitled to appellate review of this issue.\" People v. Allman, 2012 COA 212, 114, 321 P.3d 557. The Allman division recognized \"two lines of authority in Colorado on this question in criminal cases.\" Id.; see People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 932 (Colo.App.2011) (describing Colorado law on reviewing an unpreserved constitutional challenge as in a \"muddled state.\") (J. Jones, J., specially concurring) 30 The position that a constitutional challenge to a statute should not be entertained for the first time on appeal derives from People v. Lesney, 855 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Colo.1993) (holding that issues not properly presented to the bankruptcy court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddress challenges raised for the first time on appeal in numerous cases.\" On the particular cireum-stances presented, we decline to do so. 29 This concession \"raises the question of the extent to which defendant is entitled to appellate review of this issue.\" People v. Allman, 2012 COA 212, 114, 321 P.3d 557. The Allman division recognized \"two lines of authority in Colorado on this question in criminal cases.\" Id.; see People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 932 (Colo.App.2011) (describing Colorado law on reviewing an unpreserved constitutional challenge as in a \"muddled state.\") (J. Jones, J., specially concurring) 30 The position that a constitutional challenge to a statute should not be entertained for the first time on appeal derives from People v. Lesney, 855 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Colo.1993) (holding that a constitutional challenge to a statute is not properly preserved for appellate review if as here it is not presented to the trial court and is raised for the first time on appeal",
"Complete the following excerpt from a US court opinion:\naddress challenges raised for the first time on appeal in numerous cases.\" On the particular cireum-stances presented, we decline to do so. 29 This concession \"raises the question of the extent to which defendant is entitled to appellate review of this issue.\" People v. Allman, 2012 COA 212, 114, 321 P.3d 557. The Allman division recognized \"two lines of authority in Colorado on this question in criminal cases.\" Id.; see People v. Greer, 262 P.3d 920, 932 (Colo.App.2011) (describing Colorado law on reviewing an unpreserved constitutional challenge as in a \"muddled state.\") (J. Jones, J., specially concurring) 30 The position that a constitutional challenge to a statute should not be entertained for the first time on appeal derives from People v. Lesney, 855 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Colo.1993) (holding an issue not raised to the family court is not preserved for appellate review"
] | ), and People v. Cagle, 751 P.2d 614, 619 | 3 |
995 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nsecond accident. [21] Having concluded that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit State Farm to question Woodgett regarding the second accident, we must now address whether this error was inconsistent with substantial justice. We conclude that it was. This exclusion went to the heart of the matter that the jury was asked to decide—the extent to which Woodgett’s accident with Storms caused the headaches experienced by Woodgett and, in particular, the severe migraine headaches. Conclusion [22] The court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of a second automobile accident involving Woodgett, which was inconsistent with substantial justice. We reverse the court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Armstrong, 871 N.E.2d at 296 (holding that a cause of action on the theory of strict liability may be properly pled by alleging 1 the manufacturers relationship to the product in question 2 the unreasonably dangerous condition of the product and 3 the existence of a proximate causal connection between the condition of the product and the plaintiffs injury",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nsecond accident. [21] Having concluded that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit State Farm to question Woodgett regarding the second accident, we must now address whether this error was inconsistent with substantial justice. We conclude that it was. This exclusion went to the heart of the matter that the jury was asked to decide—the extent to which Woodgett’s accident with Storms caused the headaches experienced by Woodgett and, in particular, the severe migraine headaches. Conclusion [22] The court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of a second automobile accident involving Woodgett, which was inconsistent with substantial justice. We reverse the court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Armstrong, 871 N.E.2d at 296 (holding that the commission reasonably interpreted the statute as requiring it to assess the condition of the industry as a whole",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nsecond accident. [21] Having concluded that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit State Farm to question Woodgett regarding the second accident, we must now address whether this error was inconsistent with substantial justice. We conclude that it was. This exclusion went to the heart of the matter that the jury was asked to decide—the extent to which Woodgett’s accident with Storms caused the headaches experienced by Woodgett and, in particular, the severe migraine headaches. Conclusion [22] The court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of a second automobile accident involving Woodgett, which was inconsistent with substantial justice. We reverse the court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Armstrong, 871 N.E.2d at 296 (holding that a logical nexus between the injury sued upon and an unre lated prior condition satisfied the rondinelli test requiring only the possibility that the plaintiffs claimed damages in whole or in part resulted from a condition or event unrelated to the defendants negligence",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nsecond accident. [21] Having concluded that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit State Farm to question Woodgett regarding the second accident, we must now address whether this error was inconsistent with substantial justice. We conclude that it was. This exclusion went to the heart of the matter that the jury was asked to decide—the extent to which Woodgett’s accident with Storms caused the headaches experienced by Woodgett and, in particular, the severe migraine headaches. Conclusion [22] The court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of a second automobile accident involving Woodgett, which was inconsistent with substantial justice. We reverse the court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Armstrong, 871 N.E.2d at 296 (holding that when the evidence shows that the railroad customarily does not enforce a safety rule the jury is entitled to consider whether that custom constituted negligence and whether it caused in whole or in part the plaintiffs injury",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nsecond accident. [21] Having concluded that the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit State Farm to question Woodgett regarding the second accident, we must now address whether this error was inconsistent with substantial justice. We conclude that it was. This exclusion went to the heart of the matter that the jury was asked to decide—the extent to which Woodgett’s accident with Storms caused the headaches experienced by Woodgett and, in particular, the severe migraine headaches. Conclusion [22] The court abused its discretion when it excluded evidence of a second automobile accident involving Woodgett, which was inconsistent with substantial justice. We reverse the court’s judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Armstrong, 871 N.E.2d at 296 (holding that when a possessor knows that a dangerous condition frequently reoccurs plaintiffs had a right to go to the jury on the issue of defendants negligence even where plaintiffs could not show how long the condition remained on the stairs"
] | ). [23] For the foregoing reasons, we reverse | 2 |
996 | [
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nremedy, of equitable tolling,” an evidentiary hearing would have provided- him the opportunity to present his claims. To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must first demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances caused his failure to timely file his petition. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562; LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir.2005). Alicia allegedly suffered symptoms from a rota-tor cuff tear from March 1, 2007 to August 17, 2007. He contends he experienced persistent pain from his injury so that daily activities, such as feeding himself, were -painful. But his injury did not necessarily preclude opportunities to file, since prison officials or others could have assisted him in completing the forms. C.f. Arbas v. Nicholson, 403 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that a petitioners mental incompetency can constitute extraordinary circumstances warranting equitable tolling if it interferes with his ability to communicate with his attorney",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nremedy, of equitable tolling,” an evidentiary hearing would have provided- him the opportunity to present his claims. To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must first demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances caused his failure to timely file his petition. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562; LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir.2005). Alicia allegedly suffered symptoms from a rota-tor cuff tear from March 1, 2007 to August 17, 2007. He contends he experienced persistent pain from his injury so that daily activities, such as feeding himself, were -painful. But his injury did not necessarily preclude opportunities to file, since prison officials or others could have assisted him in completing the forms. C.f. Arbas v. Nicholson, 403 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2005) (recognizing that the court has the power to grant leave upon certain conditions",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nremedy, of equitable tolling,” an evidentiary hearing would have provided- him the opportunity to present his claims. To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must first demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances caused his failure to timely file his petition. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562; LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir.2005). Alicia allegedly suffered symptoms from a rota-tor cuff tear from March 1, 2007 to August 17, 2007. He contends he experienced persistent pain from his injury so that daily activities, such as feeding himself, were -painful. But his injury did not necessarily preclude opportunities to file, since prison officials or others could have assisted him in completing the forms. C.f. Arbas v. Nicholson, 403 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2005) (recognizing the undesirability of prison conditions litigation",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nremedy, of equitable tolling,” an evidentiary hearing would have provided- him the opportunity to present his claims. To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must first demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances caused his failure to timely file his petition. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562; LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir.2005). Alicia allegedly suffered symptoms from a rota-tor cuff tear from March 1, 2007 to August 17, 2007. He contends he experienced persistent pain from his injury so that daily activities, such as feeding himself, were -painful. But his injury did not necessarily preclude opportunities to file, since prison officials or others could have assisted him in completing the forms. C.f. Arbas v. Nicholson, 403 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding that the failure to articulate orally that conditions 5d13d2 and 3 apply to a defendants sentence of supervised release does not create a conflict with the judgment imposing these conditions",
"In the provided excerpt from a US court opinion, insert the missing content:\nremedy, of equitable tolling,” an evidentiary hearing would have provided- him the opportunity to present his claims. To qualify for equitable tolling, a petitioner must first demonstrate that extraordinary circumstances caused his failure to timely file his petition. See Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562; LaCava v. Kyler, 398 F.3d 271, 276 (3d Cir.2005). Alicia allegedly suffered symptoms from a rota-tor cuff tear from March 1, 2007 to August 17, 2007. He contends he experienced persistent pain from his injury so that daily activities, such as feeding himself, were -painful. But his injury did not necessarily preclude opportunities to file, since prison officials or others could have assisted him in completing the forms. C.f. Arbas v. Nicholson, 403 F.3d 1379, 1381 (Fed.Cir.2005) (holding physical conditions justify tolling when those conditions impair cognitive function or the ability to communicate"
] | ). In fact, Alicia filed his habeas petition two | 4 |
997 | [
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof law provision in a security agreement or contract is generally enforced. In re Mastercraft Metals, Inc., 114 B.R. 183 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1990); Consolidated Financial Investments, Inc. v. Manion, 948 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo.App. E.D.1997); Tri-County Retreading, Inc. v. Bandag Inc., 851 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). Therefore, we will employ Missouri law in determining whether JODA’s hen was perfected. Skytech’s Lien With the choice of law question decided, we turn to the dispositive question of priority. In order to determine which lien had priority, we must first determine whether each hen was properly perfected. As discussed above, Skytech’s hen must be evaluated according to Texas law. Section 70.301 of the Texas Property Code grants an Aircraft Repair and Maintenance Lien (holding that a somewhat different indiana state statute imputes liability to absent owner of an aircraft",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof law provision in a security agreement or contract is generally enforced. In re Mastercraft Metals, Inc., 114 B.R. 183 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1990); Consolidated Financial Investments, Inc. v. Manion, 948 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo.App. E.D.1997); Tri-County Retreading, Inc. v. Bandag Inc., 851 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). Therefore, we will employ Missouri law in determining whether JODA’s hen was perfected. Skytech’s Lien With the choice of law question decided, we turn to the dispositive question of priority. In order to determine which lien had priority, we must first determine whether each hen was properly perfected. As discussed above, Skytech’s hen must be evaluated according to Texas law. Section 70.301 of the Texas Property Code grants an Aircraft Repair and Maintenance Lien (holding that where both vessels had the same owner it was not an abuse of discretion to give 75 of the salvage award to the owner",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof law provision in a security agreement or contract is generally enforced. In re Mastercraft Metals, Inc., 114 B.R. 183 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1990); Consolidated Financial Investments, Inc. v. Manion, 948 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo.App. E.D.1997); Tri-County Retreading, Inc. v. Bandag Inc., 851 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). Therefore, we will employ Missouri law in determining whether JODA’s hen was perfected. Skytech’s Lien With the choice of law question decided, we turn to the dispositive question of priority. In order to determine which lien had priority, we must first determine whether each hen was properly perfected. As discussed above, Skytech’s hen must be evaluated according to Texas law. Section 70.301 of the Texas Property Code grants an Aircraft Repair and Maintenance Lien (holding that a plea of title was not interposed where the person in possession answered that the party suing for possession was not the established owner of the premises",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof law provision in a security agreement or contract is generally enforced. In re Mastercraft Metals, Inc., 114 B.R. 183 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1990); Consolidated Financial Investments, Inc. v. Manion, 948 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo.App. E.D.1997); Tri-County Retreading, Inc. v. Bandag Inc., 851 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). Therefore, we will employ Missouri law in determining whether JODA’s hen was perfected. Skytech’s Lien With the choice of law question decided, we turn to the dispositive question of priority. In order to determine which lien had priority, we must first determine whether each hen was properly perfected. As discussed above, Skytech’s hen must be evaluated according to Texas law. Section 70.301 of the Texas Property Code grants an Aircraft Repair and Maintenance Lien (holding that 49 usc 44112 did not preempt state law imposing vicarious liability on an owner of an aircraft",
"Complete the following passage from a US court opinion:\nof law provision in a security agreement or contract is generally enforced. In re Mastercraft Metals, Inc., 114 B.R. 183 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo.1990); Consolidated Financial Investments, Inc. v. Manion, 948 S.W.2d 222, 224 (Mo.App. E.D.1997); Tri-County Retreading, Inc. v. Bandag Inc., 851 S.W.2d 780, 784 (Mo.App. E.D.1993). Therefore, we will employ Missouri law in determining whether JODA’s hen was perfected. Skytech’s Lien With the choice of law question decided, we turn to the dispositive question of priority. In order to determine which lien had priority, we must first determine whether each hen was properly perfected. As discussed above, Skytech’s hen must be evaluated according to Texas law. Section 70.301 of the Texas Property Code grants an Aircraft Repair and Maintenance Lien (holding that once possession of an aircraft was delivered to the owner a repairman had no right to repossess the plane"
] | ). It is uncontested that Skytech relinquished | 4 |
998 | [
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhand, if the district court concludes, following an evi-dentiary hearing, that Krause forfeited his right to appointed counsel, a new trial is not necessary. c. Because we conclude that the district court denied Krause his due process rights, we do not decide whether the district court erred in its ruling. Instead, we remand the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing with the due process protections outlined above to determine whether Krause engaged in “extremely serious misconduct” warranting forfeiture of his right to counsel. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 5 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant’s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant forfeited his right to counsel by verbally abusing and threatening to harm his attorney threatening to sue his attorney on four different occasions and attempting to persuade his attorney to engage in unethical conduct",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhand, if the district court concludes, following an evi-dentiary hearing, that Krause forfeited his right to appointed counsel, a new trial is not necessary. c. Because we conclude that the district court denied Krause his due process rights, we do not decide whether the district court erred in its ruling. Instead, we remand the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing with the due process protections outlined above to determine whether Krause engaged in “extremely serious misconduct” warranting forfeiture of his right to counsel. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 5 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant’s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that defendant waived his confrontation rights by threatening witness not to testify",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhand, if the district court concludes, following an evi-dentiary hearing, that Krause forfeited his right to appointed counsel, a new trial is not necessary. c. Because we conclude that the district court denied Krause his due process rights, we do not decide whether the district court erred in its ruling. Instead, we remand the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing with the due process protections outlined above to determine whether Krause engaged in “extremely serious misconduct” warranting forfeiture of his right to counsel. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 5 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant’s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that a defendant forfeited his right to counsel when he verbally abused and refused to communicate with a succession of attorneys",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhand, if the district court concludes, following an evi-dentiary hearing, that Krause forfeited his right to appointed counsel, a new trial is not necessary. c. Because we conclude that the district court denied Krause his due process rights, we do not decide whether the district court erred in its ruling. Instead, we remand the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing with the due process protections outlined above to determine whether Krause engaged in “extremely serious misconduct” warranting forfeiture of his right to counsel. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 5 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant’s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that a habeas petitioner was not entitled to relief from a state courts determination that he had forfeited his right to counsel by physically assaulting his attorney and threatening to put a contract on his attorneys life",
"Fill in the gap in the following US court opinion excerpt:\nhand, if the district court concludes, following an evi-dentiary hearing, that Krause forfeited his right to appointed counsel, a new trial is not necessary. c. Because we conclude that the district court denied Krause his due process rights, we do not decide whether the district court erred in its ruling. Instead, we remand the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing with the due process protections outlined above to determine whether Krause engaged in “extremely serious misconduct” warranting forfeiture of his right to counsel. Goldberg, 67 F.3d at 5 (8th Cir.2003) (concluding that defendant’s threat to kill his counsel justified permitting counsel to withdraw and refusing to appoint substitute counsel); United States v. McLeod, 53 F.3d 322, 325-26 (11th Cir.1995) (holding that a defendant must demonstrate that the governments intrusion upon his relationship with his attorney created a possibility of either injury to his defense or benefit to the government in order to establish a violation of the right to counsel"
] | ); People v. Sloan, 262 A.D.2d 431, 693 N.Y.S.2d | 0 |
999 | [
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nMoore, 917 F.2d at 221 (quoting United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 154 (6th Cir.1979)). Further, the degree of proof requires “a strong showing of factually specific and compelling prejudice.” United States v. Benton, 852 F.2d 1456, 1469 (6th Cir.1988). Petitioner has fallen far short of presenting sufficient justification for severance. Thus, Petitioner’s claim regarding ineffective assistance must, in turn, be denied. In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will be denied. This case is dismissed. The Court finds that based on the record, Petitioner’s arguments and applicable case law, a certificate of appealability should not be issued. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). See Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1064 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that managing conservator while in texas to seek return of child by writ of habeas corpus may not be served with civil process and is subject to jurisdiction of court in which habeas corpus is pending and only for purpose of prosecuting writ of habeas corpus",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nMoore, 917 F.2d at 221 (quoting United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 154 (6th Cir.1979)). Further, the degree of proof requires “a strong showing of factually specific and compelling prejudice.” United States v. Benton, 852 F.2d 1456, 1469 (6th Cir.1988). Petitioner has fallen far short of presenting sufficient justification for severance. Thus, Petitioner’s claim regarding ineffective assistance must, in turn, be denied. In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will be denied. This case is dismissed. The Court finds that based on the record, Petitioner’s arguments and applicable case law, a certificate of appealability should not be issued. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). See Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1064 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that the rule applies for purposes of habeas corpus under section 2254",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nMoore, 917 F.2d at 221 (quoting United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 154 (6th Cir.1979)). Further, the degree of proof requires “a strong showing of factually specific and compelling prejudice.” United States v. Benton, 852 F.2d 1456, 1469 (6th Cir.1988). Petitioner has fallen far short of presenting sufficient justification for severance. Thus, Petitioner’s claim regarding ineffective assistance must, in turn, be denied. In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will be denied. This case is dismissed. The Court finds that based on the record, Petitioner’s arguments and applicable case law, a certificate of appealability should not be issued. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). See Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1064 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that district courts have authority to grant certificates of appealability under the recently amended habeas corpus framework",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nMoore, 917 F.2d at 221 (quoting United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 154 (6th Cir.1979)). Further, the degree of proof requires “a strong showing of factually specific and compelling prejudice.” United States v. Benton, 852 F.2d 1456, 1469 (6th Cir.1988). Petitioner has fallen far short of presenting sufficient justification for severance. Thus, Petitioner’s claim regarding ineffective assistance must, in turn, be denied. In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will be denied. This case is dismissed. The Court finds that based on the record, Petitioner’s arguments and applicable case law, a certificate of appealability should not be issued. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). See Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1064 (6th Cir.1997) (holding a court cannot issue and make returnable to it a writ of habeas corpus if the petitioner is outside the courts authority",
"In the context of a US court opinion, complete the following excerpt:\nMoore, 917 F.2d at 221 (quoting United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 154 (6th Cir.1979)). Further, the degree of proof requires “a strong showing of factually specific and compelling prejudice.” United States v. Benton, 852 F.2d 1456, 1469 (6th Cir.1988). Petitioner has fallen far short of presenting sufficient justification for severance. Thus, Petitioner’s claim regarding ineffective assistance must, in turn, be denied. In conclusion, for the foregoing reasons, the pending Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus will be denied. This case is dismissed. The Court finds that based on the record, Petitioner’s arguments and applicable case law, a certificate of appealability should not be issued. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c). See Lyons v. Ohio Adult Parole Auth., 105 F.3d 1063, 1064 (6th Cir.1997) (holding that order denying relief under fedrcivp 60b in a habeas setting is the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding subject to the certificate of appealability requirement of 28 usc 2253c1a 2000"
] | ). An Order consistent with this Opinion will be | 2 |
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