index int64 0 4.08k | text stringlengths 34 4.9k ⌀ | url stringclasses 38
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|---|---|---|
27 | 82 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
FIGURE 3-6 Configure storage locations.
NOTE Your organization should have a specific plan in place for sizing the server
hardware and designating Active Directory storage locations. You’ll want to ensure
the server you use is powerful enough to handle authenticatio... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
28 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 83
19. When the wizard finishes configuring Active Directory, click Finish. You are
then prompted to restart the computer. Click Restart Now to reboot.
After installing Active Directory, you should verify the installation. Start by
examining the installation log, which... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
29 | 84 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
You can create installation media by completing the following steps:
1. Log on to a domain controller. On a writable domain controller, the account
you use must be a member of the Administrators, Server Operators, Domain
Admins, or Enterprise Admins group. On a rea... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
30 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 85
10. You can now complete the rest of the installation as discussed in the section
titled “Adding Writable Domain Controllers Using Replication” earlier in this
chapter. Continue with the rest of the steps and perform the postinstallation
checks as well.
REAL WORLD... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
31 | 86 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
NOTE Values you must specify are shown in bold. You can set Password to * if
you do not want to include it in the answer fi le. When you run Dcpromo to initiate
the unattended installation, you will be prompted for the password.
TIP SafeModeAdminPassword sets the D... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
32 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 87
; Set SafeModeAdminPassword later
SafeModeAdminPassword=
; Run-time flags (optional)
RebootOnCompletion=Yes
8. After you create the answer fi le, you can start the unattended installation by
entering the following at a command prompt:
dcpromo /unattend:"PathToAnswer... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
33 | 88 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
Decommissioning Domain Controllers
When you no longer need a domain controller, you can decommission it and
remove it from service. Running the Active Directory Domain Services Installation
Wizard (Dcpromo.exe) on the domain controller allows you to remove Active Di... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
34 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 89
You can avoid problems by (1) removing the preferred bridgehead server
designation prior to demoting the domain controller and thereby allowing
Active Directory to select the bridgehead servers to use, or (2) ensuring one
or more additional preferred bridgehead serv... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
35 | 90 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
Removing Additional Domain Controllers
You can remove an additional domain controller from a domain by completing the
following steps:
1. Start the Active Directory Domain Services Installation Wizard by clicking
Start, typing dcpromo in the Search box, and pressin... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
36 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 91
4. On the Delete The Domain page, click Next without making a selection. If
the domain controller is the last in the domain, you’ll see a warning like the
one shown in Figure 3-9. In this case, I recommend clicking No and then
clicking Cancel, which will exit the w... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
37 | 92 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
FIGURE 3-10 Ensure that you don’t accidentally remove the last replica of application
partitions.
FIGURE 3-11 Verify that you want to remove DNS delegations. | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
38 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 93
8. If you are removing DNS delegations, the Active Directory Domain Services
Installation Wizard then examines the DNS configuration, checking your credentials and attempting to contact a DNS server in the domain. If you need
additional credentials to remove DNS de... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
39 | 94 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
REAL WORLD When you remove a domain controller, the related server object is removed from the domain directory partition automatically. However, the server object
representing the retired domain controller in the configuration directory partition can
have child obj... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
40 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 95
4. The rest of the installation proceeds as previously discussed. Continue with
steps 6 through 11 of the previous section, “Removing Additional Domain
Controllers.” Note the following:
If you are removing the last domain controller from a domain, the wizard
ver... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
41 | 96 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
4. If the account that is being used to remove AD DS is different from the
account in the parent domain that has the privileges that are required to
remove a DNS delegation, you must specify the account that can remove the
DNS delegation by entering the following ... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
42 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 97
If the domain controller is the last DNS server for one or more Active Directory–
integrated DNS zones that it hosts, Dcpromo will exit with an error. You can force
Dcpromo to proceed using the following additional parameter.
/IgnoreIsLastDNSServerForZone:yes
If the ... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
43 | 98 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
You can restart a domain controller in Directory Services Restore Mode manually
by pressing the F8 key during domain controller startup. You must then log on by
using the Directory Services Restore Mode password for the local Administrator account. A disadvantage o... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
44 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 99
2. On the General tab, in Startup Selection, click Normal Startup, and then click
OK.
3. The domain controller restarts in normal mode.
To restart a domain controller in Directory Services Restore Mode using the BCD
editor, complete the following steps:
1. Click S... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
45 | 100 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
FIGURE 3-14 Review each removal warning in turn.
4. The Active Directory Domain Services Installation Wizard starts. On the
Welcome page, click Next.
5. On the Force The Removal Of Active Directory Domain Services page, shown
in Figure 3-15, review the informatio... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
46 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 101
6. If the domain controller is a DNS server with zones integrated with Active Directory, you’ll see a warning stating one or more Active Directory–integrated
zones will be deleted. Before continuing by clicking OK, you should ensure
that there is another DNS serve... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
47 | 102 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
This option should also suppress errors related to the domain controller being a
global catalog server, a DNS server, or both.
When the command-line execution completes, Dcpromo exits with a return
code. A return code of 1 to 10 indicates success. A return code of ... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
48 | Deploying Writable Domain Controllers CHAPTER 3 103
6. In the Deleting Domain Controller dialog box, select This Domain Controller Is Permanently Offline And Can No Longer Be Demoted, and then click
Delete.
7. If the domain controller was a global catalog server, in the Delete Domain
Controller dialog box, click Y... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
49 | 104 CHAPTER 3 Deploying Writable Domain Controllers
6. At the metadata cleanup prompt, enter the following command: quit.
7. At the ntdsutil prompt, enter the following command: quit.
Confirming Removal of Deleted Server Objects
When you remove a domain controller, the related server object is removed from
the doma... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
50 | 321
Index
A resource records, 34, 204
AAAA resource records, 204
AB performance counters, 218
access control
adding domain local groups, 153
adding global groups, 153
functionality, 5
accounts. See specific user accounts
Active Directory, 3, 5, 22–27
Active Directory Administrative
Center, 26
Active Directory Domain S... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
51 | 322
Allowed To Authenticate permission
Allowed To Authenticate permission,
256–257
answer files
adding RODCs using, 115–119
adding writable domain controllers using, 85–87
removing domain controllers
using, 95–97
staged installations using,
123–126
Asynchronous Thread Queue, 218
ATQ performance counters, 218
attrib... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
52 | 323
domain controllers
DNSDelegationUserName
parameter, 54
DNSOnNetwork parameter, 54
DomainLevel parameter, 54
DomainNetBiosName parameter,
54
forcing removal of domain controllers, 99–102
ForestLevel parameter, 55
InstallDNS parameter, 55
installing AD DS binaries, 41
LogPath parameter, 55
NewDomain parameter, 55
... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
53 | 324
Domain Controllers group
directory partitions, 31
disaster recovery considerations,
33, 278–279
displaying connection objects, 221
domain naming master, 168
dynamic IP addresses, 41
easy renaming, 37–38
encrypted data considerations,
42, 76
forcing removal, 97–104
functionality, 10
global catalog servers, 74, 88,... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
54 | 325
Group object class
Event ID 1168, 290
Event ID 1268, 151
Event ID 1646, 287
Event ID 16645, 177
Event ID 16651, 177–178
Event ID 1668, 155
Event ID 1702, 163
Event ID 1703, 163
Event ID 1704, 163
Event ID 5774, 205
event logs, 219
Event Viewer, 151, 205
explicit trusts, 229, 232
external trusts
authentication acros... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
55 | 326
Group Policy Creator Owners group
Group Policy Creator Owners
group, 23
Try Next Closest Site Group Policy
setting, 205
Group Policy Creator Owners group,
23, 130
Group Policy Management,
206, 277
group type conversion, 37–38
groups. See specific user groups
H
hard disks
checking for free disk space,
287–288
w... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
56 | 327
outgoing trusts
replication, 144, 218–220
replication attributes, 163
universal group membership
caching, 155–157
msDS-AuthenticatedToAccountList
attribute, 128
msDS-NeverRevealGroup attribute,
128
msDS-Preferred-GC-Site attribute,
155
msDS-RevealedUsers attribute, 128
msDS-Reveal-OnDemandGroup
attribute, 128
... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
57 | 328
parent domains
one-way external, 242
one-way forest, 249
one-way realm, 252
one-way shortcut, 245–246
P
parent domains, 7, 232
PAS (partial attribute set)
adding attributes, 163
changing, 163
defined, 158
Password Replication Policy
allowing/denying accounts,
130–132
attributes, 128
configuring, 127, 129
delegatin... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
58 | 329
sites
RODCs (read-only domain controllers)
adding to domains, 108–119
adding using answer files/command line, 115–119
adding using replication, 109–115
attaching, 121–122, 125–126
creating account, 120–121,
123–125
decommissioning, 126–127
defined, 10
deploying, 39
establishing infrastructure, 36
functionality, ... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
59 | 330
SMB (Server Message Block)
SMB (Server Message Block), 193
SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol)
replication support, 194, 196
site link support, 207–208, 210
SMTP Server feature, 207
SPN (service principal name), 165
SRV resource records
cleaning up old references, 286
controlling registration, 152
DNS server consi... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
60 | 331
zone transfers
nowait parameter, 265
query parameter, 266
rediscover parameter, 265
register parameter, 265, 269
reliable parameter, 266, 268
resync parameter, 265
stripchart parameter, 265, 267–268
syncfromflags parameter, 266,
268–269
threads parameter, 265
unregister parameter, 265, 269
update parameter, 266, 2... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
61 | 332
About the Author
William R. Stanek (http://www.williamstanek.com/) was born in Burlington,
Wisconsin, where he attended public schools, including Janes Elementary School
in Racine, Wisconsin. He is the second youngest of five children. After a career in
the military, he settled in Washington State, having been c... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
62 | 333
In 1997, William was dubbed “A Face Behind the Future” in a feature article
about his life in The (Wash.) Olympian. At that time he was breaking new ground
in shaping the future of business on the Internet. Today William continues to help
shape the future of Internet business and technology in general, writing a... | https://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780735626485/samplepages/9780735626485.pdf |
0 | Detecting and Mitigating
Active Directory
Compromises
First published: September 2024 | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
1 | null | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
2 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises ii
Introduction
This guidance – authored by the Australian Signals Directorate (ASD), the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency (CISA), the National Security Agency (NSA), the Canadian Centre for Cyber Security (CCCS), the New Zealand
National... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
3 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises iii
Understanding Active Directory
For many organisations, Active Directory consists of thousands of objects interacting with each other via a complex set
of permissions, configurations and relationships. Understanding object permissions and the relations... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
4 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises iv
Table of contents
Introduction i
Understanding Active Directory iii
Detecting and mitigating Active Directory compromises 1
Kerberoasting 2
Authentication Server Response (AS-REP) Roasting 4
Password spraying 6
MachineAccountQuota compromise 9
Unconstra... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
5 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises v
Domain Controller events 55
Active Directory Certificate Services Certificate Authority (AD CS CA) events 57
Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) events 57
Microsoft Entra Connect server events 58
Computer objects configured for unconstrained del... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
6 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 1
Detecting and mitigating Active Directory
compromises
There are many known and observed techniques used to compromise AD DS, AD CS and AD FS. Malicious actors target
these services to escalate their privileges and move laterally across enterprise IT ne... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
7 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 2
Implementing Microsoft’s Enterprise Access Model makes many techniques utilised against Active Directory
significantly more difficult to execute and renders some of them impossible. Malicious actors will need to resort to
more complex and riskier techn... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
8 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 3
The following security controls should be implemented to mitigate Kerberoasting:
Minimise the number of user objects configured with SPNs. This reduces the attack surface for malicious actors
to execute Kerberoasting.
Create user objects with SPNs a... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
9 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 4
should be fewer instances of event 4769 with RC4 encryption,
making it easier to identify potential Kerberoasting activity.
Common offensive security tools used by malicious actors to perform
Kerberoasting will set the Ticket Options value to ‘0x40800... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
10 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 5
considered legacy IT and are less common. If organisations have applications and systems that use a version of
Kerberos earlier than version 5, then they may configure user objects to not require Kerberos pre-authentication,
leaving the environment vuln... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
11 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 6
event is triggered multiple times in a short timeframe, it may indicate
AS-REP Roasting has occurred.
Malicious actors will commonly try to retrieve TGT tickets with Rivest
Cipher 4 (RC4) encryption as these TGT tickets are easier to crack to
reveal t... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
12 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 7
While MFA can be effective at mitigating password spraying by malicious actors attempting to gain initial access, it is
largely ineffective at mitigating password spraying if malicious actors have already gained initial access. This is because
the mali... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
13 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 8
Scan networks at least monthly to identify any credentials that are being stored in the clear. Malicious actors
scan networks for cleartext credentials to use in password spraying. Locating and removing these cleartext
credentials proactively mitigat... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
14 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 9
4648 Source of Password
Spraying, such as a
domain joined
workstation or
server
This event is generated when a logon is attempted using explicit
credentials. If password spraying is executed on a domain joined
system, this event is generated for ea... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
15 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 10
Figure 3: Overview of a MachineAccountQuota compromise
A MachineAccountQuota compromise can also be used as part of another compromise, known as KrbRelayUp. On
systems in domains where LDAP signing is not enforced, which is the default in Active Direct... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
16 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 11
Detecting a MachineAccountQuota compromise
Every time a computer object is created in Active Directory, event 4741 is generated and includes information about
the object’s properties and who created it. This event can be analysed to determine whether t... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
17 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 12
Unconstrained delegation and the Domain Controller Print Spooler service
Malicious actors can leverage unconstrained delegation and target the Print Spooler service on Domain Controllers.
The Print Spooler service is targeted for misuse to force a syst... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
18 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 13
Table 5. Events that detect an unconstrained delegation compromise
Event ID Source Description
4103 Computer objects
configured for
unconstrained
delegation
This event is generated when PowerShell executes and logs pipeline
execution details. Common... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
19 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 14
GPP passwords are known as cpasswords and are stored in the system volume (SYSVOL) directory, which exists on
every Domain Controller and is readable by all users in a domain. The passwords are encrypted to protect them from
unauthorised disclosure. H... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
20 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 15
requested using built-in tools, allowing malicious actors to live off the land to minimise the risk of detection. This
certificate remains valid even if the user object specified in the certificate changes its password. The certificate is only
invalid... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
21 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 16
Remove EKUs that enable user authentication. This prevents malicious actors from exploiting the certificate to
authenticate as other users.
Limit access to AD CS CA servers to only privileged users that require access. This may be a smaller subset ... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
22 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 17
Table 6. Events that detect an AD CS compromise
Event ID Source Description
39 Domain Controllers This event is generated when no strong certificate mappings can be
found, and the certificate does not have a new Security Identifier
(SID) extension tha... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
23 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 18
introduce vulnerable conditions, such as modification of enrolment
rights to a certificate template.
Golden Certificate
A Golden Certificate is a persistence technique that expands upon an AD CS compromise. If malicious actors obtain
administrative ac... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
24 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 19
Centrally log and analyse AD CS CA logs in a timely manner to identify malicious activity. If malicious actors
gain privileged access to a CA, this activity should be identified as soon as possible to respond and limit the
impact.
Detecting a Golden... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
25 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 20
execution relating to these tools may indicate a Golden
Certificate.
4876 Root and subordinate
CAs
This event is triggered when a backup of the CA database is
started. This does not return any logs for exporting the private
key, but may be an indica... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
26 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 21
The successful execution of DCSync by malicious actors signifies the complete compromise of an Active Directory
domain. The loss of all user and computer object password hashes, and the KRBTGT password hash, can be difficult to
recover from as it requ... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
27 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 22
Ensure LAN Manager (LM) password hashes are not used. This can be enforced by requiring and updating
passwords to be a minimum of 15-characters. LM only supports passwords up to 14-characters in length and
passwords that are 15-characters or more will... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
28 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 23
file, malicious actors can use native tools, such as the Volume Shadow Copy Service and Ntdsutil. Some of the
information stored in the ntds.dit file is encrypted. To decrypt all of this information, malicious actors need to retrieve
the SYSTEM hive f... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
29 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 24
The following security controls should be implemented to mitigate dumping ntds.dit:
Limit access to Domain Controllers to only privileged users that require access. This reduces the number of
opportunities for malicious actors to gain access to Domai... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
30 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 25
4103 Domain Controllers This event is generated when PowerShell executes and logs pipeline
execution details. Malicious actors commonly leverage PowerShell in
their compromises. Analysing this event for PowerShell execution
relating to the ntds.dit f... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
31 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 26
a new Active Directory domain with new user and computer objects and destroying the old, compromised domain.
For many organisations, these recovery activities would be significant, costly and disruptive.
The KRBTGT user object
The KRBTGT user object is... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
32 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 27
Change the KRBTGT password every 12 months, or when the domain has been compromised or suspected to
have been compromised. Changing the KRBTGT password will invalidate any existing Golden Tickets that are
being used.
• To effectively change the KRBT... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
33 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 28
been forged and a Golden Ticket may have occurred. If the TGT has
been forged offline, event 4768 will not exist as it was never
requested from the KDC on a Domain Controller.
4769 Domain Controllers This event is generated when a TGS ticket is reques... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
34 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 29
Services that can be exploited by a Silver Ticket include the Common Internet File System service (which provides
access to the computer object’s file system), LDAP (which is used to query Active Directory), the Microsoft Structured
Query Language (SQ... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
35 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 30
Table 11. Events that detect a Silver Ticket
Event ID Source Description
4624 Target computer This event is generated when an account is logged into a
computer. It can be correlated and analysed with event 4627 for
signs of a potential Silver Ticket.
... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
36 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 31
Figure 7: Overview of a Golden SAML
If a Relying Party (RP) such as Microsoft Entra ID trusts the MFA claims of the identity provider, such as an AD FS
server, then a Golden SAML can bypass any MFA controls and allow malicious actors to persist even if ... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
37 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 32
Mitigating a Golden SAML
Mitigating a Golden SAML requires protecting the AD FS service account, securing access to AD FS servers,
implementing system hardening, and conducting effective logging and analysis. The AD FS service account is critical to
t... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
38 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 33
Rotate AD FS token-signing and encryption certificates every 12 months, or sooner if an AD FS server has been
compromised or suspected to have been compromised. Both certificates need to be rotated twice in rapid
succession to revoke all existing AD... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
39 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 34
1202 AD FS Servers This event is generated when AD FS validates a new credential as
part of the authentication process with a service provider, such as
Microsoft 365 or Azure. A Golden SAML bypasses AD FS servers,
resulting in the absence of this eve... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
40 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 35
save a copy of a user object’s cleartext password anytime they authenticate using PTA. These techniques can be
effective for maintaining persistence, as they allow malicious actors to impersonate other users and minimise the risk
of detection.
Mitigat... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
41 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 36
Encrypt and securely store backups of Microsoft Entra Connect and limit access to only Backup Administrators.
Backups of Microsoft Entra Connect servers need to be afforded the same security as the actual Microsoft Entra
Connect servers. Malicious ac... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
42 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 37
identify unusual password synchronisation activity that could
indicate a compromise against Microsoft Entra Connect.
657 Microsoft Entra
Connect Servers
This event is generated when a password change request is
successfully sent to Microsoft Entra ID... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
43 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 38
When a trust is established between two domains, a Trusted Domain Object (TDO) is created in Active Directory. The
TDO has a password that is shared between both domains in a trust relationship. Additionally, the password is stored
in Active Directory... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
44 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 39
from to access Domain Controllers. Monitoring Domain Controllers for unusual authentication events and system
activity is also important.
The following security controls should be implemented to mitigate a one-way domain trust bypass:
Limit access to... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
45 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 40
for unusual PowerShell executions on Domain Controllers may
indicate the TDO has been compromised.
4104 Domain Controllers This event is generated when PowerShell executes code to capture
scripts and commands. Common malicious tools used to retrieve t... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
46 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 41
on objects. This also applies to user objects that have been migrated from one domain to another. In such cases, once
user objects are migrated and appropriate accesses configured, the ‘sIDHistory’ attribute should be cleared.
The following security co... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
47 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 42
4738 Domain Controllers This event is generated when the ‘sIDHistory’ attribute is modified
for a user object.
Skeleton Key
Skeleton Key is malware that overrides the NTLM and Kerberos authentication process and sets a password – called
the Skeleton K... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
48 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 43
Running the LSASS process in protected mode (forming part of LSA protection) can be configured through group
policy. Auditing can be enabled to log which drivers do not meet Microsoft’s signing requirements and are prevented
from loading.
This protect... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
49 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 44
Detecting Skeleton Key
Detecting Skeleton Key requires monitoring the LSASS process on a Domain Controller. Typically, a Skeleton Key will
be performed on every Domain Controller in a domain to ensure all malicious authentication attempts are successfu... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
50 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 45
for PowerShell execution relating to a Skeleton Key may indicate a
compromise.
4104 Domain Controllers This event is generated when code is executed by PowerShell,
capturing scripts and the commands run. Abnormal script execution
should be investigate... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
51 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 46
Detecting Active Directory compromises with
canaries
Detecting Active Directory compromises can be difficult, time consuming and resource intensive, even for
organisations with mature security information and event management (SIEM) and security opera... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
52 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 47
Further information
The Information Security Manual is a cyber security framework that organisations can apply to protect their systems
and data from cyber threats. The advice in Strategies to Mitigate Cyber Security Incidents, along with its Essential... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
53 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 48
New Zealand organisations: If you require more information or further support, please contact us on
info@ncsc.govt.nz.
U.S. organizations: To report suspicious or malicious activity related to information found in this guidance, contact
CISA's 24/7 O... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
54 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 49
Appendix A – Active Directory security controls
Table 17 shows a checklist representing the mitigations for each of the Active Directory compromises detailed in this
guidance.
Table 17. Active Directory security controls checklist
Mitigating Kerberoas... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
55 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 50
☐ Configure unprivileged user objects so they cannot add computer objects to the domain.
☐ Ensure the Domain Computers security group is not a member of privileged security groups.
☐ Ensure the Domain Computers security group does not have write privile... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
56 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 51
☐ Only use AD CS CA servers for AD CS and do not install any non-security-related services or applications.
☐ Encrypt and securely store backups of AD CS CA servers and limit access to only Backup Administrators.
☐ Centrally log and analyse AD CS CA ser... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
57 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 52
☐ Limit access to Domain Controllers to only privileged users that require access.
☐ Restrict privileged access pathways to Domain Controllers to jump servers and secure admin
workstations using only the ports and services that are required for adminis... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
58 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 53
☐ Restrict privileged access pathways to AD FS servers to jump servers and secure admin workstations
using only the ports and services that are required.
☐ Only use AD FS servers for AD FS and ensure no other non-security-related services or applicatio... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
59 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 54
☐ Restrict privileged access pathways to Domain Controllers to jump servers and secure admin
workstations using only the ports and services that are required for administration.
☐ Encrypt and securely store backups of Domain Controllers and limit acces... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
60 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 55
Appendix B – Active Directory events
Table 18 through Table 23 contain the recommended event IDs to log and monitor to detect the Active Directory
compromises detailed in this guidance.
The below tables contain the recommended events to log and monitor... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
61 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 56
Bypass, SID History,
Skeleton Key
4624 Password Spray,
MachineAccountQu
ota, Unconstrained
Delegation
An account is successfully logged on.
4625 AS-REP Roasting,
Password Spray
An account fails to log on.
4656 Dumping ntds.dit A handle to an object i... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
62 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 57
Ticket, One-way
Trust Bypass
4769 Kerberoasting,
Golden Ticket
A TGS is requested.
4770 Unconstrained
Delegation
A Kerberos TGT is renewed.
4771 Password Spray Kerberos pre-authentication fails.
5136 Kerberoasting, ASREP Roasting
A directory service... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
63 | Detecting and Mitigating Microsoft Active Directory Compromises 58
Table 20. Events that detect compromises involving AD FS servers
Event ID Compromise Description
70 Golden SAML A Certificate Private Key was acquired.
307 Golden SAML The Federation Service configuration was changed.
510 Golden SAML Additional informat... | https://media.defense.gov/2024/Sep/25/2003553985/-1/-1/0/CTR-Detecting-and-Mitigating-AD-Compromises.PDF |
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