ranges/docker-escape/checklist.en.md

range-docker-escape Checklist

Scoring criteria (ground truth) for evaluation. Each checkpoint is split into two independent scoring dimensions: detection score and plan score.

• Detection score (max 3 pts): Discovery(1) + Evidence(1) + Attribution(1) — judging the detection Agent's analysis report — LLM-as-a-Judge
• Plan score (max 2 pts): Correctness(1) + Completeness(1) — judging the repair plan output by the detection Agent — LLM-as-a-Judge
• detection-only: Plan score marked N/A, not counted in the corresponding summary

Dimension 1: Intrusion entity identification and remediation (4 items)

CHK-01: Mining process detection ENT-P01

• Evidence: Process /opt/.docker/.health-monitor is running, disguised as a Docker container health-check tool
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Identify the presence of the mining process
  • Evidence: Point out the path /opt/.docker/.health-monitor, identify the disguised name (imitating Docker health check)
  • Attribution: Associate the mining process with the attacker's profit-seeking behavior after intrusion
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan provides the correct process termination command
  • Completeness: The plan covers terminating the process + deleting the file + checking persistence mechanisms (crontab/systemd/bashrc)

CHK-02: Mining file cleanup ENT-F02

• Evidence: File /opt/.docker/.health-monitor (script) + log /opt/.docker/.health-monitor.log
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Identify the malicious file
  • Evidence: Point out the file path, note the hidden directory /opt/.docker/
  • Attribution: Associate it with mining behavior
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan provides the rm -rf /opt/.docker/ cleanup command
  • Completeness: The plan recommends checking common hidden directories such as /tmp, /var/tmp

CHK-03: Backdoor container detection and removal ENT-F02

• Evidence: Docker container infra-monitor is running, uses the ubuntu:20.04 image, --restart=always, periodically sends heartbeats to C2
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Identify the anomalous container infra-monitor
  • Evidence: Point out that the container uses the ubuntu:20.04 image (unrelated to business), --restart=always, --network host
  • Attribution: Identify it as a backdoor container, with behavior being C2 heartbeat (wget to the attacker IP)
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan provides the docker stop && docker rm commands
  • Completeness: The plan recommends auditing all containers, checking for non-standard images and abnormal restart policies

CHK-04: Attacker SSH key ENT-F04

• Evidence: /root/.ssh/authorized_keys contains an unauthorized public key with the comment deploy@ci-runner
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Discover the anomalous public key in authorized_keys
  • Evidence: Point out that the public key comment is disguised as a CI/CD deployment key
  • Attribution: Identify it as a persistence backdoor injected by the attacker via container escape
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan precisely deletes the attacker's key line
  • Completeness: The plan recommends auditing the authorized_keys of all users

Dimension 2: Baseline risk (7 items)

CHK-05: Docker TCP-API unauthenticated exposure BAS-05

• Evidence: Docker daemon listens on tcp://0.0.0.0:2375, with no TLS authentication; anyone who can access this port is equivalent to host root
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Identify the high-risk exposure of the Docker TCP API
  • Evidence: Cite the port 2375 listening state and the no-authentication configuration
  • Attribution: Correctly characterize it as the root-cause entry point of this intrusion
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan recommends closing the TCP listener or enabling TLS mutual authentication
  • Completeness: The plan distinguishes two repair options: closing TCP (most secure) vs enabling TLS (retaining remote management capability), and assesses business impact

CHK-06: Docker daemon systemd override BAS-05

• Evidence: /etc/systemd/system/docker.service.d/override.conf adds the -H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375 parameter
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Locate the configuration source of the Docker TCP exposure
  • Evidence: Cite the contents of the override.conf file
  • Attribution: Identify it as a misconfiguration by operations staff (not planted by the attacker)
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan provides the steps of deleting the override + daemon-reload + restart
  • Completeness: The plan includes verifying that Docker listens only on the unix socket

CHK-07: developer user docker-group privilege BAS-04

• Evidence: The developer user belongs to the docker group, equivalent to having root privileges (can operate the host via the Docker socket)
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Identify the privilege risk of docker group members
  • Evidence: id developer shows docker group membership
  • Attribution: Point out that docker group privileges equal root, an over-privileged configuration
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan recommends removing developer from the docker group
  • Completeness: The plan assesses the impact on the developer workflow after removal, recommending the use of rootless Docker or sudo instead

CHK-08: Container env-var database credentials BAS-03

• Evidence: docker inspect company-postgres reveals plaintext POSTGRES_PASSWORD=AppDb@2024
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Identify that container environment variables expose the database password
  • Evidence: Plaintext credentials can be directly obtained via docker inspect
  • Attribution: The attacker can use this information to access the business database
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan recommends using Docker secrets or a .env file (restricted permissions) instead of environment variables
  • Completeness: The plan covers password rotation + the new password storage method

CHK-09: SSH authorized_keys management BAS-01

• Evidence: /root/.ssh/authorized_keys contains public keys not authorized by an administrator
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Audit authorized_keys and discover unauthorized keys
  • Evidence: List each public key and its comment
  • Attribution: Identify which are legitimate keys and which are injected by the attacker
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan precisely identifies and removes unauthorized keys
  • Completeness: The plan recommends establishing an SSH key management standard

CHK-10: Business container security audit BAS-05

• Evidence: All containers should be reviewed for risky configurations such as privileged mode, unnecessary capabilities, and host networking
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Perform a security audit of running containers
  • Evidence: List the security configuration of each container (privileged, capabilities, network mode)
  • Attribution: Point out how insecure configurations can be exploited by the attacker
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan recommends configuring containers with the least-privilege principle
  • Completeness: The plan covers privileged removal, capabilities restriction, user namespace

CHK-11: Docker-API port security-group/firewall BAS-07

• Evidence: Port 2375 is reachable from the public network (the attacker accesses the Docker API directly from outside)
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Identify the risk of port 2375 being exposed to the public network
  • Evidence: Infer from the successful connection to the Docker API from the attacker IP
  • Attribution: Associate the port exposure with the starting point of the entire attack chain
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan recommends blocking port 2375 at the security-group/firewall level
  • Completeness: The plan provides specific security-group rules or iptables rules

Dimension 3: Persistence removal (5 items)

CHK-12: Crontab persistence PER-S01

• Evidence: crontab -l shows */10 * * * * /opt/.docker/.health-monitor >/dev/null 2>&1
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Identify the suspicious crontab entry
  • Evidence: Cite the specific content, point out the 10-minute interval and silent output
  • Attribution: Associate the crontab with mining process persistence
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan provides the correct method to delete the malicious crontab entry
  • Completeness: The plan recommends checking all users' crontabs and /etc/cron.d/

CHK-13: Bashrc persistence PER-I01

• Evidence: /root/.bashrc contains a # docker container environment initialization code block that silently restarts mining
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Identify the malicious code appended in bashrc
  • Evidence: Cite the comment disguise ("docker container environment initialization")
  • Attribution: Identify it as a persistence means that automatically restarts mining on each root login
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan precisely locates the range of the code block to be deleted
  • Completeness: The plan recommends checking .bash_profile, .profile, /etc/profile.d/

CHK-14: Systemd service persistence PER-V01

• Evidence: /etc/systemd/system/docker-health-agent.service, disguised as a Docker health-check agent, with ExecStart pointing to /opt/.docker/.health-monitor
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Identify the suspicious systemd service
  • Evidence: Point out the unit file path and that ExecStart points to the mining script
  • Attribution: Identify it as a persistence mechanism at the systemd level
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan provides systemctl stop && disable + deletion + daemon-reload
  • Completeness: The plan includes verification steps after cleanup

CHK-15: Systemd service masquerade ID PER-V01 detection-only

• Evidence: The service name docker-health-agent and description Docker Container Health Agent deliberately imitate legitimate Docker operations tools
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Point out the disguise technique of the service naming
  • Evidence: Compare with legitimate Docker service naming, point out the deliberate imitation
  • Attribution: Identify it as a means for the attacker to evade manual review
• Plan score: N/A

CHK-16: Comprehensive persistence scan Q-05 detection-only

• Evidence: No persistence other than crontab/bashrc/systemd/SSH key/backdoor container
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Perform a systematic persistence scan (init.d, rc.local, at jobs, profile.d, Docker restart policy, etc.)
  • Evidence: Record the scan scope and method
  • Attribution: Prove the comprehensiveness of the investigation
• Plan score: N/A

Dimension 4: Evaluation quality dimension (4 items)

CHK-17: Container-escape path inference Q-01 detection-only

• Evidence: The attack container configuration has no residue in the snapshot; container escape can be inferred based on the consequences of the host being compromised and the Docker API being publicly reachable
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Infer the existence of container escape based on host consequences
  • Evidence: Support the inference with observed host intrusion traces, and note the absence of direct evidence
  • Attribution: Explain how the attacker obtained host root privileges via the container
• Plan score: N/A

CHK-18: Entry-point determination Q-01 Q-04 detection-only

• Evidence: The -H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375 in /etc/systemd/system/docker.service.d/override.conf indicates that the Docker Remote API is exposed on 2375 without authentication
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Correctly determine the entry point as "Docker Remote API unauthorized access"
  • Evidence: Cite the Docker daemon configuration
  • Attribution: Rule out SSH brute force and web vulnerabilities, correctly characterize it as Docker API abuse
• Plan score: N/A
• Critical: The Agent should not fabricate a CVE or web vulnerability as the entry point

CHK-19: Attack-timeline reconstruction Q-02 detection-only

• Evidence: Docker events timestamps
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Organize the attack timeline anchored on observable file times
  • Evidence: List the daemon configuration time and host residue time, infer the complete time chain of Docker API probing → privileged container → SSH key injection → host login → mining → persistence → cleanup
  • Attribution: Cross-correlate multiple timestamp sources, explain the sequence based on known time anchors
• Plan score: N/A
• Critical: A complete event chain is not required; fabricating timestamps should be penalized

Dimension 5: Remediation closure (5 items)

CHK-20: Docker daemon secure restart Q-07

• Evidence: After repairing the Docker configuration, the daemon should listen only on the unix socket
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Recommend repairing the Docker daemon configuration
  • Evidence: Provide the configuration change plan
  • Attribution: Reflect root-cause repair awareness
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan provides the process of deleting the override + daemon-reload + restart
  • Completeness: The plan includes verifying that the Docker service runs normally and no longer listens on TCP

CHK-21: Port 2375 closure confirmation BAS-05

• Evidence: After repair, port 2375 should not be reachable
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Verify that the port is closed
  • Evidence: Provide the port check command and result
  • Attribution: Confirm that the root cause has been eliminated
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan provides the ss -tlnp and curl verification commands
  • Completeness: The plan verifies from both inside the host and externally

CHK-22: Business container normal operation Q-07

• Evidence: The Nginx, WebApp, and PostgreSQL containers should run normally after repair
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Recommend verifying that the repair operation did not affect the business
  • Evidence: List the services that need to be verified
  • Attribution: Reflect business-impact awareness
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan lists the health-check commands for each container
  • Completeness: The plan covers docker ps status + HTTP interface verification

CHK-23: Attacker-IP firewall block ENT-N01

• Evidence: The attacker IP identified from Docker events / SSH logs
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Recommend blocking the attacker IP
  • Evidence: Cite the specific IP address
  • Attribution: Associate with Docker API abuse
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan provides the correct firewall rule
  • Completeness: The plan includes rule persistence

CHK-24: Mining outbound-connection block ENT-N02

• Evidence: The mining program once connected to stratum+tcp://pool.evil-example.invalid:3333
• Detection score (3 pts)
  • Discovery: Recommend blocking the mining pool outbound connection
  • Evidence: Cite the mining pool address
  • Attribution: Identify it as mining traffic
• Plan score (2 pts)
  • Correctness: The plan provides the outbound blocking rule
  • Completeness: The plan includes blocking of IP + port and rule persistence