| # range-docker-escape Checklist |
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| Scoring criteria (ground truth) for evaluation. Each checkpoint is split into two independent scoring dimensions: detection score and plan score. |
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| - **Detection score** (max 3 pts): Discovery(1) + Evidence(1) + Attribution(1) — judging the detection Agent's analysis report — LLM-as-a-Judge |
| - **Plan score** (max 2 pts): Correctness(1) + Completeness(1) — judging the repair plan output by the detection Agent — LLM-as-a-Judge |
| - **detection-only**: Plan score marked N/A, not counted in the corresponding summary |
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| ## Dimension 1: Intrusion entity identification and remediation (4 items) |
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| ### CHK-01: Mining process detection `ENT-P01` |
| - **Evidence**: Process `/opt/.docker/.health-monitor` is running, disguised as a Docker container health-check tool |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Identify the presence of the mining process |
| - Evidence: Point out the path `/opt/.docker/.health-monitor`, identify the disguised name (imitating Docker health check) |
| - Attribution: Associate the mining process with the attacker's profit-seeking behavior after intrusion |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan provides the correct process termination command |
| - Completeness: The plan covers terminating the process + deleting the file + checking persistence mechanisms (crontab/systemd/bashrc) |
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| ### CHK-02: Mining file cleanup `ENT-F02` |
| - **Evidence**: File `/opt/.docker/.health-monitor` (script) + log `/opt/.docker/.health-monitor.log` |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Identify the malicious file |
| - Evidence: Point out the file path, note the hidden directory `/opt/.docker/` |
| - Attribution: Associate it with mining behavior |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan provides the `rm -rf /opt/.docker/` cleanup command |
| - Completeness: The plan recommends checking common hidden directories such as /tmp, /var/tmp |
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| ### CHK-03: Backdoor container detection and removal `ENT-F02` |
| - **Evidence**: Docker container `infra-monitor` is running, uses the `ubuntu:20.04` image, `--restart=always`, periodically sends heartbeats to C2 |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Identify the anomalous container `infra-monitor` |
| - Evidence: Point out that the container uses the ubuntu:20.04 image (unrelated to business), `--restart=always`, `--network host` |
| - Attribution: Identify it as a backdoor container, with behavior being C2 heartbeat (wget to the attacker IP) |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan provides the `docker stop && docker rm` commands |
| - Completeness: The plan recommends auditing all containers, checking for non-standard images and abnormal restart policies |
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| ### CHK-04: Attacker SSH key `ENT-F04` |
| - **Evidence**: `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` contains an unauthorized public key with the comment `deploy@ci-runner` |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Discover the anomalous public key in authorized_keys |
| - Evidence: Point out that the public key comment is disguised as a CI/CD deployment key |
| - Attribution: Identify it as a persistence backdoor injected by the attacker via container escape |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan precisely deletes the attacker's key line |
| - Completeness: The plan recommends auditing the authorized_keys of all users |
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| ## Dimension 2: Baseline risk (7 items) |
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| ### CHK-05: Docker TCP-API unauthenticated exposure `BAS-05` |
| - **Evidence**: Docker daemon listens on `tcp://0.0.0.0:2375`, with no TLS authentication; anyone who can access this port is equivalent to host root |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Identify the high-risk exposure of the Docker TCP API |
| - Evidence: Cite the port 2375 listening state and the no-authentication configuration |
| - Attribution: Correctly characterize it as the root-cause entry point of this intrusion |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan recommends closing the TCP listener or enabling TLS mutual authentication |
| - Completeness: The plan distinguishes two repair options: closing TCP (most secure) vs enabling TLS (retaining remote management capability), and assesses business impact |
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| ### CHK-06: Docker daemon systemd override `BAS-05` |
| - **Evidence**: `/etc/systemd/system/docker.service.d/override.conf` adds the `-H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375` parameter |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Locate the configuration source of the Docker TCP exposure |
| - Evidence: Cite the contents of the override.conf file |
| - Attribution: Identify it as a misconfiguration by operations staff (not planted by the attacker) |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan provides the steps of deleting the override + daemon-reload + restart |
| - Completeness: The plan includes verifying that Docker listens only on the unix socket |
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| ### CHK-07: developer user docker-group privilege `BAS-04` |
| - **Evidence**: The `developer` user belongs to the `docker` group, equivalent to having root privileges (can operate the host via the Docker socket) |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Identify the privilege risk of docker group members |
| - Evidence: `id developer` shows docker group membership |
| - Attribution: Point out that docker group privileges equal root, an over-privileged configuration |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan recommends removing developer from the docker group |
| - Completeness: The plan assesses the impact on the developer workflow after removal, recommending the use of rootless Docker or sudo instead |
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| ### CHK-08: Container env-var database credentials `BAS-03` |
| - **Evidence**: `docker inspect company-postgres` reveals plaintext `POSTGRES_PASSWORD=AppDb@2024` |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Identify that container environment variables expose the database password |
| - Evidence: Plaintext credentials can be directly obtained via `docker inspect` |
| - Attribution: The attacker can use this information to access the business database |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan recommends using Docker secrets or a .env file (restricted permissions) instead of environment variables |
| - Completeness: The plan covers password rotation + the new password storage method |
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| ### CHK-09: SSH authorized_keys management `BAS-01` |
| - **Evidence**: `/root/.ssh/authorized_keys` contains public keys not authorized by an administrator |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Audit authorized_keys and discover unauthorized keys |
| - Evidence: List each public key and its comment |
| - Attribution: Identify which are legitimate keys and which are injected by the attacker |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan precisely identifies and removes unauthorized keys |
| - Completeness: The plan recommends establishing an SSH key management standard |
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| ### CHK-10: Business container security audit `BAS-05` |
| - **Evidence**: All containers should be reviewed for risky configurations such as privileged mode, unnecessary capabilities, and host networking |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Perform a security audit of running containers |
| - Evidence: List the security configuration of each container (privileged, capabilities, network mode) |
| - Attribution: Point out how insecure configurations can be exploited by the attacker |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan recommends configuring containers with the least-privilege principle |
| - Completeness: The plan covers privileged removal, capabilities restriction, user namespace |
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| ### CHK-11: Docker-API port security-group/firewall `BAS-07` |
| - **Evidence**: Port 2375 is reachable from the public network (the attacker accesses the Docker API directly from outside) |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Identify the risk of port 2375 being exposed to the public network |
| - Evidence: Infer from the successful connection to the Docker API from the attacker IP |
| - Attribution: Associate the port exposure with the starting point of the entire attack chain |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan recommends blocking port 2375 at the security-group/firewall level |
| - Completeness: The plan provides specific security-group rules or iptables rules |
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| ## Dimension 3: Persistence removal (5 items) |
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| ### CHK-12: Crontab persistence `PER-S01` |
| - **Evidence**: `crontab -l` shows `*/10 * * * * /opt/.docker/.health-monitor >/dev/null 2>&1` |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Identify the suspicious crontab entry |
| - Evidence: Cite the specific content, point out the 10-minute interval and silent output |
| - Attribution: Associate the crontab with mining process persistence |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan provides the correct method to delete the malicious crontab entry |
| - Completeness: The plan recommends checking all users' crontabs and /etc/cron.d/ |
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| ### CHK-13: Bashrc persistence `PER-I01` |
| - **Evidence**: `/root/.bashrc` contains a `# docker container environment initialization` code block that silently restarts mining |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Identify the malicious code appended in bashrc |
| - Evidence: Cite the comment disguise ("docker container environment initialization") |
| - Attribution: Identify it as a persistence means that automatically restarts mining on each root login |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan precisely locates the range of the code block to be deleted |
| - Completeness: The plan recommends checking .bash_profile, .profile, /etc/profile.d/ |
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| ### CHK-14: Systemd service persistence `PER-V01` |
| - **Evidence**: `/etc/systemd/system/docker-health-agent.service`, disguised as a Docker health-check agent, with ExecStart pointing to `/opt/.docker/.health-monitor` |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Identify the suspicious systemd service |
| - Evidence: Point out the unit file path and that ExecStart points to the mining script |
| - Attribution: Identify it as a persistence mechanism at the systemd level |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan provides `systemctl stop && disable` + deletion + `daemon-reload` |
| - Completeness: The plan includes verification steps after cleanup |
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| ### CHK-15: Systemd service masquerade ID `PER-V01` *detection-only* |
| - **Evidence**: The service name `docker-health-agent` and description `Docker Container Health Agent` deliberately imitate legitimate Docker operations tools |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Point out the disguise technique of the service naming |
| - Evidence: Compare with legitimate Docker service naming, point out the deliberate imitation |
| - Attribution: Identify it as a means for the attacker to evade manual review |
| - **Plan score**: N/A |
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| ### CHK-16: Comprehensive persistence scan `Q-05` *detection-only* |
| - **Evidence**: No persistence other than crontab/bashrc/systemd/SSH key/backdoor container |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Perform a systematic persistence scan (init.d, rc.local, at jobs, profile.d, Docker restart policy, etc.) |
| - Evidence: Record the scan scope and method |
| - Attribution: Prove the comprehensiveness of the investigation |
| - **Plan score**: N/A |
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| ## Dimension 4: Evaluation quality dimension (4 items) |
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| ### CHK-17: Container-escape path inference `Q-01` *detection-only* |
| - **Evidence**: The attack container configuration has no residue in the snapshot; container escape can be inferred based on the consequences of the host being compromised and the Docker API being publicly reachable |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Infer the existence of container escape based on host consequences |
| - Evidence: Support the inference with observed host intrusion traces, and note the absence of direct evidence |
| - Attribution: Explain how the attacker obtained host root privileges via the container |
| - **Plan score**: N/A |
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| ### CHK-18: Entry-point determination `Q-01` `Q-04` *detection-only* |
| - **Evidence**: The `-H tcp://0.0.0.0:2375` in `/etc/systemd/system/docker.service.d/override.conf` indicates that the Docker Remote API is exposed on 2375 without authentication |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Correctly determine the entry point as "Docker Remote API unauthorized access" |
| - Evidence: Cite the Docker daemon configuration |
| - Attribution: Rule out SSH brute force and web vulnerabilities, correctly characterize it as Docker API abuse |
| - **Plan score**: N/A |
| - **Critical**: The Agent should not fabricate a CVE or web vulnerability as the entry point |
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| ### CHK-19: Attack-timeline reconstruction `Q-02` *detection-only* |
| - **Evidence**: Docker events timestamps |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Organize the attack timeline anchored on observable file times |
| - Evidence: List the daemon configuration time and host residue time, infer the complete time chain of Docker API probing → privileged container → SSH key injection → host login → mining → persistence → cleanup |
| - Attribution: Cross-correlate multiple timestamp sources, explain the sequence based on known time anchors |
| - **Plan score**: N/A |
| - **Critical**: A complete event chain is not required; fabricating timestamps should be penalized |
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| ## Dimension 5: Remediation closure (5 items) |
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| ### CHK-20: Docker daemon secure restart `Q-07` |
| - **Evidence**: After repairing the Docker configuration, the daemon should listen only on the unix socket |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Recommend repairing the Docker daemon configuration |
| - Evidence: Provide the configuration change plan |
| - Attribution: Reflect root-cause repair awareness |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan provides the process of deleting the override + daemon-reload + restart |
| - Completeness: The plan includes verifying that the Docker service runs normally and no longer listens on TCP |
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| ### CHK-21: Port 2375 closure confirmation `BAS-05` |
| - **Evidence**: After repair, port 2375 should not be reachable |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Verify that the port is closed |
| - Evidence: Provide the port check command and result |
| - Attribution: Confirm that the root cause has been eliminated |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan provides the `ss -tlnp` and `curl` verification commands |
| - Completeness: The plan verifies from both inside the host and externally |
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| ### CHK-22: Business container normal operation `Q-07` |
| - **Evidence**: The Nginx, WebApp, and PostgreSQL containers should run normally after repair |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Recommend verifying that the repair operation did not affect the business |
| - Evidence: List the services that need to be verified |
| - Attribution: Reflect business-impact awareness |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan lists the health-check commands for each container |
| - Completeness: The plan covers docker ps status + HTTP interface verification |
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| ### CHK-23: Attacker-IP firewall block `ENT-N01` |
| - **Evidence**: The attacker IP identified from Docker events / SSH logs |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Recommend blocking the attacker IP |
| - Evidence: Cite the specific IP address |
| - Attribution: Associate with Docker API abuse |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan provides the correct firewall rule |
| - Completeness: The plan includes rule persistence |
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| ### CHK-24: Mining outbound-connection block `ENT-N02` |
| - **Evidence**: The mining program once connected to `stratum+tcp://pool.evil-example.invalid:3333` |
| - **Detection score** (3 pts) |
| - Discovery: Recommend blocking the mining pool outbound connection |
| - Evidence: Cite the mining pool address |
| - Attribution: Identify it as mining traffic |
| - **Plan score** (2 pts) |
| - Correctness: The plan provides the outbound blocking rule |
| - Completeness: The plan includes blocking of IP + port and rule persistence |
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