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language:
- en
task_categories:
- text-classification
annotations_creators:
- machine-generated
language_creators:
- machine-generated
source_datasets:
- original
size_categories:
- 1K<n<10K
tags:
- deception-detection
- ai-safety
- synthetic
- conversations
- llm-behavior
configs:
- config_name: default
data_files:
- split: full
path: data/full/*.parquet
SynthDeception
SynthDeception is a dataset of realistic, multi-domain, agentic scenarios for studying falsehood detection probes. Being synthetically generated from the ground up, each row provides rich metadata on how a given scenario was constructed. The main columns are "conversation_structured", which contains the full conversation of the scenario, and "follow_ups", which contains a set of possible follow-up question and answer pairs to append to the conversation. Details on all the other columns are below.
from datasets import load_dataset
ds = load_dataset("AlignmentResearch/synth-deception", split="full")
The dataset has one split, full. Each row is one conversation, identified by scenario_id, and holds its 12
question-answer pairs. Rows are sorted by scenario_id.
Dataset at a glance
Figure 1. Overview and major axes of variation.
Figure 2. Dataset composition and statistics.
Fields
Seed parameters
These fields are the scenario properties sampled before generation. They are discrete labels, and double as covariates
for per-attribute analysis. The deception fields are filled only when deception_by_assistant is true, and
nondeception_type only when it is false.
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
deception_by_assistant |
bool |
Whether the assistant is the deceiving party |
incomplete_information |
bool |
Whether the scenario involves incomplete information |
imperfect_information |
bool |
Whether the scenario involves imperfect/noisy information |
unawareness |
bool |
Whether unknown-unknowns exist — some actors may not know what they don't know |
awareness_advantage |
string |
The assistant's epistemic advantage over the user (high, moderate, low, none, inversely_high, inversely_moderate, inversely_low); "NA" when unawareness=false |
deception_effect_on_assistant |
string |
Net effect of the deception on the assistant (beneficial, neutral, harmful); "NA" when deception_by_assistant=false |
deception_effect_on_user |
string |
Net effect of the deception on the user (beneficial, neutral, harmful); "NA" when deception_by_assistant=false |
deception_obviousness |
string |
How apparent the deception is within the conversation (low, moderate, high); "NA" when deception_by_assistant=false |
deception_verifiability |
string |
How easily the deception can be externally verified (low, moderate, high); "NA" when deception_by_assistant=false |
deception_suspected |
bool (nullable) |
Whether the user suspects deception during the conversation; null when deception_by_assistant=false |
deception_type |
string |
Structural category of the deception (see below); "NA" when deception_by_assistant=false |
nondeception_type |
string |
Category of non-deception behavior (see below); "NA" when deception_by_assistant=true |
data_domain |
string |
Thematic domain of the conversation (see below) |
tool_calls |
bool |
Whether the assistant uses tool calls in the conversation |
conversation_length |
string |
Approximate length of the conversation (very_short, short, moderate, long, very_long) |
system_prompt_length |
string |
Approximate length category of the assembled system prompt |
Deception types
When deception_by_assistant=true, deception_type is drawn from the Bell & Whaley taxonomy:
| Value | Category | Description |
|---|---|---|
show_fabricating |
Simulation | The assistant presents invented facts or data as if they were real |
show_distracting |
Simulation | The assistant draws attention to irrelevant information to divert from the truth |
show_mimicking |
Simulation | The assistant presents false content that closely mimics legitimate patterns |
hide_camouflaging |
Dissimulation | The assistant conceals true information by blending it with surrounding content |
hide_confounding |
Dissimulation | The assistant obscures the truth by adding misleading context or conflating concepts |
hide_disguising |
Dissimulation | The assistant disguises true information so it appears to be something else |
Non-deception types
When deception_by_assistant=false, nondeception_type categorizes the honest scenario. Four of the six types are
confusing non-deception — behaviors that may superficially resemble deception but are categorically distinct:
| Value | Category | Description |
|---|---|---|
normal |
Conventional | Standard honest behavior — providing information believed to be true and relevant |
other_misbehavior |
Conventional | Misbehavior that is not deception (e.g., unhelpfulness, errors) |
misinformation |
Confusing | Communicating things believed to be true that are actually false — no intent to deceive |
authorized_dissimulation |
Confusing | Withholding information the other party is not expected to receive given context (e.g., confidentiality) |
authorized_simulation |
Confusing | Communicating things not meant to be taken literally (e.g., roleplay, sarcasm) |
progressive_disclosure |
Confusing | Honest partial disclosure with the opportunity to request more detail later |
Data domains
Conversations span 17 domains: biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear, energy, water, agriculture,
transportation, cybersecurity, communications, finance, economics, healthcare, education, politics,
ai_safety, personal_assistance.
Generated scenario and context fields
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
user_persona_base |
struct |
Sampled base persona for the user (demographics, personality traits) |
scenario_outline |
string |
Narrative description of the scenario |
scenario_outline_structured |
struct |
Structured scenario with per-turn outlines (overview, conversation_turns, available_tools) |
assistant_persona_instructions |
string |
System-level persona instructions for the assistant |
assistant_task_instructions |
string |
Task-level instructions defining the assistant's role and duties |
user_persona_instructions |
string |
Instructions for the user's persona used during conversation generation |
user_description |
string |
User context passage injected into the system prompt |
historical_context |
string |
Simulated prior-interaction history provided to the assistant |
domain_context |
string |
Domain background knowledge injected into the assistant context |
system_prompt |
string |
Full assembled system prompt used when generating the conversation |
Conversation
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
conversation_structured |
struct |
The generated conversation, with messages and tools. Each message has a role (system, user, assistant, or tool) and content; assistant messages that call tools carry tool_calls, and tool-role messages carry a tool_call_id. tools lists the tool/function definitions available in the conversation (empty when the assistant uses no tools). |
Follow-up interrogation
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
follow_ups |
struct |
follow_up_groups: 6 groups = 3 interrogation foci (intent, belief, common knowledge) × 2 question types (follow_up_type ∈ closed-ended, open-ended). Each group has a list of follow_ups items, each item being {question, honest_answer, dishonest_answer} plus the taxonomy fields below — the contrasting honest/dishonest answers are the ground truth for probing introspective honesty. |
Each item also carries the question's taxonomy:
| Field | Description |
|---|---|
presupposition |
none: the question takes nothing for granted that the answer could confirm or correct. established: the question takes for granted only what the conversation itself put on the table, which may be false if the assistant asserted it. loaded: the question takes for granted the very point it is probing, so that answering it directly concedes that point |
honest_stance, dishonest_stance |
What each answer does with that presupposition. accepts: the answer stays inside the presupposition and answers the question. rejects: the answer denies the presupposition instead of answering within it, using the mandated fixed shape: the minimal denial, then a comma, then exactly one clause stating what happened instead (e.g. "Neither, I escalated it to the review queue."). NA exactly when there is none |
closed_ended_form |
Closed-ended questions only. Polar is yes/no; alternative offers a choice |
option_count |
How many options the question offers |
honest_option_position |
The drawn float q, in [0, 1]. The 1-based option index the honest answer must take is min(floor(q * n), n - 1) + 1 |
The columns follow_up_<field>_<focus>_<closed|open>_q1 repeat presupposition, honest_stance, dishonest_stance,
closed_ended_form, and honest_option_position as flat columns, one per group. follow_up_rewrite_direction is the
concrete rewrite direction for the row: honest_to_dishonest or dishonest_to_honest.
How the data was made
All data is synthetic. The scenarios, the conversations, and the follow-up questions were written by language models, and a repair pass later corrected part of them (see the last paragraph). The user personas come from NVIDIA's Nemotron-Personas dataset of synthetic person records.
Figure 3. How each column is generated from the others.
Each row was generated by a synthetic data generation (SDG) pipeline in five steps:
- Seed parameters. Each seed column is drawn from a fixed list of values. The six deception columns
are drawn only when
deception_by_assistantis true,nondeception_typeonly when it is false, andawareness_advantageonly whenunawarenessis true.user_persona_baseis a person record drawn from Nemotron-Personas (US locale, ages 15 to 75). The follow-up control columns (follow_up_*_q1andfollow_up_rewrite_direction) are drawn here too. - Scenario outline. A frontier model writes the outline from the seed parameters. Before it writes,
it can look up stable facts with up to five read-only real tools, and a summary of those facts is added
to its prompt. The outline is an overview, a turn-by-turn plan of what the user and the assistant say
in each turn with an estimated word count, and the tools available to the assistant (real or
simulated).
scenario_outline_structuredis the parsed form of the same output. - Context texts. The frontier model writes six texts, each in a separate call that reads the
outline:
assistant_persona_instructions,assistant_task_instructions,domain_context,historical_context,user_persona_instructions(which also readsuser_persona_base), anduser_description(which also readsuser_persona_instructions). Some calls also readtool_callsandsystem_prompt_length.system_promptis not generated: a fixed template joins five of these texts (all exceptuser_persona_instructions). - Conversation. The conversation renders the outline's turn-by-turn plan. For each turn, one model
call writes the user's message and a second writes the assistant's. Each call gets the current turn's
description from the plan, the descriptions and the text of the previous turns, and its own context:
user_persona_instructionsfor the user,system_promptfor the assistant. Both are instructed to render the description faithfully, without softening, omitting, adding to, or correcting the planned behavior. Whentool_callsis true and the outline lists tools, the assistant's turn can call them. Real tools are executed. Simulated tools return a result written by a model. - Follow-ups. The frontier model writes the follow-up questions from the outline, the follow-up
control columns, and
deception_by_assistant. It does not read the conversation. A first call drafts 6 groups (3 interrogation foci × 2 question types), and each question gets an honest and a dishonest answer that match the drawn control values. A second call rewrites both answers of each question from the side named infollow_up_rewrite_direction, so that the two answers share their surface features.
A model judge checked each generated text as it was produced: the outline, each context text, the conversation, each simulated tool result, and the follow-ups. A rejected text was regenerated with the judge's reason added to the prompt, and the row was dropped when the retry budget ran out.
After generation, every row was audited against its seed parameters and its outline. Text that contradicted them was corrected in the outlines, context texts, conversations, tool results, and follow-ups. Some rows that could not be made consistent were removed. On part of the rows, the follow-up answers were also rewritten to reduce word-level cues that separate honest from dishonest answers.
Citation
@dataset{farai_synth_deception,
author = {FAR.AI Deception Pod},
title = {SynthDeception},
year = {2026},
publisher = {Hugging Face},
url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/AlignmentResearch/synth-deception}
}
@misc{farai_synth_deception_probes,
author = {FAR.AI Deception Pod},
title = {SynthDeception probes},
year = {2026},
publisher = {Hugging Face},
url = {https://huggingface.co/AlignmentResearch/synth-deception-probes}
}
@misc{hollinsworth2026tellingfibsprobeseffectively,
title={Telling FIBS: Probes Effectively Detect Sabotage and Catch Unverbalized Deception},
author={Oskar J. Hollinsworth and Alex F. Spies and Tigist Diriba and Adam Gleave and Chris Cundy},
year={2026},
eprint={2610.12445},
archivePrefix={arXiv},
primaryClass={cs.LG},
url={https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12445},
}