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| language: | |
| - en | |
| task_categories: | |
| - text-classification | |
| annotations_creators: | |
| - machine-generated | |
| language_creators: | |
| - machine-generated | |
| source_datasets: | |
| - original | |
| size_categories: | |
| - 1K<n<10K | |
| tags: | |
| - deception-detection | |
| - ai-safety | |
| - synthetic | |
| - conversations | |
| - llm-behavior | |
| configs: | |
| - config_name: default | |
| data_files: | |
| - split: full | |
| path: data/full/*.parquet | |
| # SynthDeception | |
| SynthDeception is a dataset of realistic, multi-domain, agentic scenarios for studying falsehood detection probes. Being synthetically generated from the ground up, each row provides rich metadata on how a given scenario was constructed. The main columns are "conversation_structured", which contains the full conversation of the scenario, and "follow_ups", which contains a set of possible follow-up question and answer pairs to append to the conversation. Details on all the other columns are below. | |
| ```python | |
| from datasets import load_dataset | |
| ds = load_dataset("AlignmentResearch/synth-deception", split="full") | |
| ``` | |
| The dataset has one split, `full`. Each row is one conversation, identified by `scenario_id`, and holds its 12 | |
| question-answer pairs. Rows are sorted by `scenario_id`. | |
| ## Dataset at a glance | |
| <p align="center"> | |
| <a href="https://huggingface.co/datasets/AlignmentResearch/synth-deception/resolve/main/assets/dataset-at-a-glance.png"> | |
| <img src="https://huggingface.co/datasets/AlignmentResearch/synth-deception/resolve/main/assets/dataset-at-a-glance.png" width="1600" style="max-width: 100%; height: auto;" alt="SynthDeception at a glance: 1,264 scenarios and 15,168 follow-up question-answer pairs (6 questions with 2 answers each per scenario), half honest and half dishonest, mirrored per question. The scenarios vary in deception type (6 ways to hide the truth or show something false), non-deception type (6 types, 4 easily mistaken for deception), information structure, deception profile, industry domain (17 fields), tool use (595 tools, 163 real and 432 simulated), user persona, and context length. The follow-ups vary in question focus (intent, belief, or common knowledge), question type (closed-ended or open-ended), question presupposition (none, established, or loaded), and answer design."> | |
| </a> | |
| <em>Figure 1. Overview and major axes of variation.</em> | |
| </p> | |
| <p align="center"> | |
| <a href="https://huggingface.co/datasets/AlignmentResearch/synth-deception/resolve/main/assets/scenario-composition-and-length.png"> | |
| <img src="https://huggingface.co/datasets/AlignmentResearch/synth-deception/resolve/main/assets/scenario-composition-and-length.png" width="1600" style="max-width: 100%; height: auto;" alt="Left: the 1,264 scenarios by type. 635 deception scenarios: hide 337 (disguising 121, camouflaging 113, confounding 103) and show 298 (distracting 109, fabricating 95, mimicking 94). 629 non-deception scenarios: confusing 419 (progressive disclosure 110, authorized dissimulation 106, misinformation 105, authorized simulation 98) and non-confusing 210 (other misbehavior 109, normal 101). Middle: turns per scenario, from 1 to 48, median 4. Right: tokens per scenario, median 6,266, up to 109k."> | |
| </a> | |
| <em>Figure 2. Dataset composition and statistics.</em> | |
| </p> | |
| ## Fields | |
| ### Seed parameters | |
| These fields are the scenario properties sampled before generation. They are discrete labels, and double as covariates | |
| for per-attribute analysis. The deception fields are filled only when `deception_by_assistant` is true, and | |
| `nondeception_type` only when it is false. | |
| | Field | Type | Description | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `deception_by_assistant` | `bool` | Whether the assistant is the deceiving party | | |
| | `incomplete_information` | `bool` | Whether the scenario involves incomplete information | | |
| | `imperfect_information` | `bool` | Whether the scenario involves imperfect/noisy information | | |
| | `unawareness` | `bool` | Whether unknown-unknowns exist — some actors may not know what they don't know | | |
| | `awareness_advantage` | `string` | The assistant's epistemic advantage over the user (`high`, `moderate`, `low`, `none`, `inversely_high`, `inversely_moderate`, `inversely_low`); `"NA"` when `unawareness=false` | | |
| | `deception_effect_on_assistant` | `string` | Net effect of the deception on the assistant (`beneficial`, `neutral`, `harmful`); `"NA"` when `deception_by_assistant=false` | | |
| | `deception_effect_on_user` | `string` | Net effect of the deception on the user (`beneficial`, `neutral`, `harmful`); `"NA"` when `deception_by_assistant=false` | | |
| | `deception_obviousness` | `string` | How apparent the deception is within the conversation (`low`, `moderate`, `high`); `"NA"` when `deception_by_assistant=false` | | |
| | `deception_verifiability` | `string` | How easily the deception can be externally verified (`low`, `moderate`, `high`); `"NA"` when `deception_by_assistant=false` | | |
| | `deception_suspected` | `bool` (nullable) | Whether the user suspects deception during the conversation; null when `deception_by_assistant=false` | | |
| | `deception_type` | `string` | Structural category of the deception (see below); `"NA"` when `deception_by_assistant=false` | | |
| | `nondeception_type` | `string` | Category of non-deception behavior (see below); `"NA"` when `deception_by_assistant=true` | | |
| | `data_domain` | `string` | Thematic domain of the conversation (see below) | | |
| | `tool_calls` | `bool` | Whether the assistant uses tool calls in the conversation | | |
| | `conversation_length` | `string` | Approximate length of the conversation (`very_short`, `short`, `moderate`, `long`, `very_long`) | | |
| | `system_prompt_length` | `string` | Approximate length category of the assembled system prompt | | |
| ### Deception types | |
| When `deception_by_assistant=true`, `deception_type` is drawn from the Bell & Whaley taxonomy: | |
| | Value | Category | Description | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `show_fabricating` | Simulation | The assistant presents invented facts or data as if they were real | | |
| | `show_distracting` | Simulation | The assistant draws attention to irrelevant information to divert from the truth | | |
| | `show_mimicking` | Simulation | The assistant presents false content that closely mimics legitimate patterns | | |
| | `hide_camouflaging` | Dissimulation | The assistant conceals true information by blending it with surrounding content | | |
| | `hide_confounding` | Dissimulation | The assistant obscures the truth by adding misleading context or conflating concepts | | |
| | `hide_disguising` | Dissimulation | The assistant disguises true information so it appears to be something else | | |
| ### Non-deception types | |
| When `deception_by_assistant=false`, `nondeception_type` categorizes the honest scenario. Four of the six types are | |
| *confusing non-deception* — behaviors that may superficially resemble deception but are categorically distinct: | |
| | Value | Category | Description | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `normal` | Conventional | Standard honest behavior — providing information believed to be true and relevant | | |
| | `other_misbehavior` | Conventional | Misbehavior that is not deception (e.g., unhelpfulness, errors) | | |
| | `misinformation` | Confusing | Communicating things believed to be true that are actually false — no intent to deceive | | |
| | `authorized_dissimulation` | Confusing | Withholding information the other party is not expected to receive given context (e.g., confidentiality) | | |
| | `authorized_simulation` | Confusing | Communicating things not meant to be taken literally (e.g., roleplay, sarcasm) | | |
| | `progressive_disclosure` | Confusing | Honest partial disclosure with the opportunity to request more detail later | | |
| ### Data domains | |
| Conversations span 17 domains: `biological`, `chemical`, `radiological`, `nuclear`, `energy`, `water`, `agriculture`, | |
| `transportation`, `cybersecurity`, `communications`, `finance`, `economics`, `healthcare`, `education`, `politics`, | |
| `ai_safety`, `personal_assistance`. | |
| ### Generated scenario and context fields | |
| | Field | Type | Description | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `user_persona_base` | `struct` | Sampled base persona for the user (demographics, personality traits) | | |
| | `scenario_outline` | `string` | Narrative description of the scenario | | |
| | `scenario_outline_structured` | `struct` | Structured scenario with per-turn outlines (`overview`, `conversation_turns`, `available_tools`) | | |
| | `assistant_persona_instructions` | `string` | System-level persona instructions for the assistant | | |
| | `assistant_task_instructions` | `string` | Task-level instructions defining the assistant's role and duties | | |
| | `user_persona_instructions` | `string` | Instructions for the user's persona used during conversation generation | | |
| | `user_description` | `string` | User context passage injected into the system prompt | | |
| | `historical_context` | `string` | Simulated prior-interaction history provided to the assistant | | |
| | `domain_context` | `string` | Domain background knowledge injected into the assistant context | | |
| | `system_prompt` | `string` | Full assembled system prompt used when generating the conversation | | |
| ### Conversation | |
| | Field | Type | Description | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `conversation_structured` | `struct` | The generated conversation, with `messages` and `tools`. Each message has a `role` (`system`, `user`, `assistant`, or `tool`) and `content`; assistant messages that call tools carry `tool_calls`, and `tool`-role messages carry a `tool_call_id`. `tools` lists the tool/function definitions available in the conversation (empty when the assistant uses no tools). | | |
| ### Follow-up interrogation | |
| | Field | Type | Description | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `follow_ups` | `struct` | `follow_up_groups`: **6 groups** = 3 interrogation foci (`intent`, `belief`, `common knowledge`) × 2 question types (`follow_up_type` ∈ `closed-ended`, `open-ended`). Each group has a list of `follow_ups` items, each item being `{question, honest_answer, dishonest_answer}` plus the taxonomy fields below — the contrasting honest/dishonest answers are the ground truth for probing introspective honesty. | | |
| Each item also carries the question's taxonomy: | |
| | Field | Description | | |
| |---|---| | |
| | `presupposition` | `none`: the question takes nothing for granted that the answer could confirm or correct. `established`: the question takes for granted only what the conversation itself put on the table, which may be false if the assistant asserted it. `loaded`: the question takes for granted the very point it is probing, so that answering it directly concedes that point | | |
| | `honest_stance`, `dishonest_stance` | What each answer does with that presupposition. `accepts`: the answer stays inside the presupposition and answers the question. `rejects`: the answer denies the presupposition instead of answering within it, using the mandated fixed shape: the minimal denial, then a comma, then exactly one clause stating what happened instead (e.g. "Neither, I escalated it to the review queue."). `NA` exactly when there is none | | |
| | `closed_ended_form` | Closed-ended questions only. Polar is yes/no; alternative offers a choice | | |
| | `option_count` | How many options the question offers | | |
| | `honest_option_position` | The drawn float *q*, in [0, 1]. The 1-based option index the honest answer must take is `min(floor(q * n), n - 1) + 1` | | |
| The columns `follow_up_<field>_<focus>_<closed|open>_q1` repeat `presupposition`, `honest_stance`, `dishonest_stance`, | |
| `closed_ended_form`, and `honest_option_position` as flat columns, one per group. `follow_up_rewrite_direction` is the | |
| concrete rewrite direction for the row: `honest_to_dishonest` or `dishonest_to_honest`. | |
| ## How the data was made | |
| All data is synthetic. The scenarios, the conversations, and the follow-up questions were written by | |
| language models, and a repair pass later corrected part of them (see the last paragraph). The user | |
| personas come from NVIDIA's Nemotron-Personas dataset of synthetic person records. | |
| <p align="center"> | |
| <a href="https://huggingface.co/datasets/AlignmentResearch/synth-deception/resolve/main/assets/synthdeception-dag.png"> | |
| <img src="https://huggingface.co/datasets/AlignmentResearch/synth-deception/resolve/main/assets/synthdeception-dag.png" width="1600" style="max-width: 100%; height: auto;" alt="How the SynthDeception columns are made: sampled seed parameters feed the scenario outline, which feeds the context texts, the system prompt, the conversation, and the follow-ups."> | |
| </a> | |
| <em>Figure 3. How each column is generated from the others.</em> | |
| </p> | |
| Each row was generated by a synthetic data generation (SDG) pipeline in five steps: | |
| 1. **Seed parameters.** Each seed column is drawn from a fixed list of values. The six deception columns | |
| are drawn only when `deception_by_assistant` is true, `nondeception_type` only when it is false, and | |
| `awareness_advantage` only when `unawareness` is true. `user_persona_base` is a person record drawn from | |
| Nemotron-Personas (US locale, ages 15 to 75). The follow-up control columns (`follow_up_*_q1` and | |
| `follow_up_rewrite_direction`) are drawn here too. | |
| 2. **Scenario outline.** A frontier model writes the outline from the seed parameters. Before it writes, | |
| it can look up stable facts with up to five read-only real tools, and a summary of those facts is added | |
| to its prompt. The outline is an overview, a turn-by-turn plan of what the user and the assistant say | |
| in each turn with an estimated word count, and the tools available to the assistant (real or | |
| simulated). `scenario_outline_structured` is the parsed form of the same output. | |
| 3. **Context texts.** The frontier model writes six texts, each in a separate call that reads the | |
| outline: `assistant_persona_instructions`, `assistant_task_instructions`, `domain_context`, | |
| `historical_context`, `user_persona_instructions` (which also reads `user_persona_base`), and | |
| `user_description` (which also reads `user_persona_instructions`). Some calls also read `tool_calls` | |
| and `system_prompt_length`. `system_prompt` is not generated: a fixed template joins five of these | |
| texts (all except `user_persona_instructions`). | |
| 4. **Conversation.** The conversation renders the outline's turn-by-turn plan. For each turn, one model | |
| call writes the user's message and a second writes the assistant's. Each call gets the current turn's | |
| description from the plan, the descriptions and the text of the previous turns, and its own context: | |
| `user_persona_instructions` for the user, `system_prompt` for the assistant. Both are instructed to | |
| render the description faithfully, without softening, omitting, adding to, or correcting the planned | |
| behavior. When `tool_calls` is true and the outline lists tools, the assistant's turn can call them. | |
| Real tools are executed. Simulated tools return a result written by a model. | |
| 5. **Follow-ups.** The frontier model writes the follow-up questions from the outline, the follow-up | |
| control columns, and `deception_by_assistant`. It does not read the conversation. A first call drafts | |
| 6 groups (3 interrogation foci × 2 question types), and each question gets an honest and a dishonest | |
| answer that match the drawn control values. A second call rewrites both answers of each question from | |
| the side named in `follow_up_rewrite_direction`, so that the two answers share their surface features. | |
| A model judge checked each generated text as it was produced: the outline, each context text, the | |
| conversation, each simulated tool result, and the follow-ups. A rejected text was regenerated with the | |
| judge's reason added to the prompt, and the row was dropped when the retry budget ran out. | |
| After generation, every row was audited against its seed parameters and its outline. Text that | |
| contradicted them was corrected in the outlines, context texts, conversations, tool results, and | |
| follow-ups. Some rows that could not be made consistent were removed. On part of the rows, | |
| the follow-up answers were also rewritten to reduce word-level cues that separate honest from dishonest | |
| answers. | |
| ## Citation | |
| ```bibtex | |
| @dataset{farai_synth_deception, | |
| author = {FAR.AI Deception Pod}, | |
| title = {SynthDeception}, | |
| year = {2026}, | |
| publisher = {Hugging Face}, | |
| url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/AlignmentResearch/synth-deception} | |
| } | |
| @misc{farai_synth_deception_probes, | |
| author = {FAR.AI Deception Pod}, | |
| title = {SynthDeception probes}, | |
| year = {2026}, | |
| publisher = {Hugging Face}, | |
| url = {https://huggingface.co/AlignmentResearch/synth-deception-probes} | |
| } | |
| @misc{hollinsworth2026tellingfibsprobeseffectively, | |
| title={Telling FIBS: Probes Effectively Detect Sabotage and Catch Unverbalized Deception}, | |
| author={Oskar J. Hollinsworth and Alex F. Spies and Tigist Diriba and Adam Gleave and Chris Cundy}, | |
| year={2026}, | |
| eprint={2610.12445}, | |
| archivePrefix={arXiv}, | |
| primaryClass={cs.LG}, | |
| url={https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.12445}, | |
| } | |
| ``` | |