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die. That is, there is no difference which depends solely on the
distinction between an act and an omission. (This does not mean
that all cases of allowing to die are morally equivalent to killing.
Other factors - extrinsic factors - will sometimes be relevant.
This will be discussed further in Chapter 8.) Allowing to die -
sometimes called 'passive euthanasia' - is already accepted as
a humane and proper course of action in certain cases. If there
is no intrinsic moral difference between killing and allowing to
die, active euthanasia should also be accepted as humane and
proper in certain circumstances.
Others have suggested that the difference between withholding
treatment necessary to prolong life, and giving a lethal injection,
lies in the intention with which the two are done. Those
who take this view resort to the 'doctrine of double effect', a
doctrine widely held among Roman Catholic moral theologians
and moral philosophers, to argue that one action (for example,
refraining from life-sustaining treatment) may have two effects
(in this case, not causing additional suffering to the patient, and
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shortening the patient's life). They then argue that as long as
the directly intended effect is the beneficial one that does not
violate an absolute moral rule, the action is permissible. Though
we foresee that our action (or omission) will result in the death
of the patient, this is merely an unwanted side-effect. But the
distinction between directly intended effect and side-effect is a
contrived one. We cannot avoid responsibility simply by directing
our intention to one effect rather than another. If we
foresee both effects, we must take responsibility for the foreseen
effects of what we do. We often want to do something, but
cannot do it because of its other, unwanted consequences. For
example, a chemical company might want to get rid of toxic
waste in the most economical manner, by dumping it in the
nearest river. Would we allow the executives of the company
to say that all they directly intended was to improve the efficiency
of the factory, thus promoting employment and keeping
down the cost of living? Would we regard the pollution as
excusable because it is merely an unwanted side-effect of furthering
these worthy objectives?
Obviously the defenders of the doctrine of double effect would
not accept such an excuse. In rejecting it, however, they would
have to rely upon a judgment that the cost - the polluted river
- is disproportionate to the gains. Here a consequentialist judgment
lurks behind the doctrine of double effect. The same is
true when the doctrine is used in medical care. Normally, saving
life takes precedence over relieving pain. If in the case of a
particular patient it does not, this can only be because we have
judged that the patient's prospects for a future life of acceptable
quality are so poor that in this case relieving suffering can take
precedence. This is, in other words, not a decision based on
acceptance of the sanctity of human life, but a decision based
on a disguised quality of life judgment.
Equally unsatisfactory is the common appeal to a distinction
between 'ordinary' and 'extraordinary' means of treatment,
coupled with the belief that it is not obligatory to provide ex-
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traordinary means. Together with my colleague, Helga Kuhse,
I carried out a survey of paediatricians and obstetricians in Australia
and found that they had remarkable ideas about what
constituted 'ordinary' and what 'extraordinary' means. Some
even thought that the use of antibiotics - the cheapest, simplest,
and most common medical procedure - could be extraordinary.
The reason for this range of views is easy to find. When one
looks at the justifications given by moral theologians and philosophers
for the distinction, it turns out that what is 'ordinary'
in one situation can become 'extraordinary' in another. For
example, in the famous case of Karen Ann Quinlan, the young
New Jersey woman who was in a coma for ten years before
she died, a Roman Catholic bishop testified that the use of a
respirator was 'extraordinary' and hence optional because Quinlan
had no hope of recovery from the coma. Obviously, if doctors
had thought that Quinlan was likely to recover, the use of the
respirator would not have been optional, and would have been
declared 'ordinary'. Again, it is the quality of life of the patient
(and where resources are limited and could be used more effectively
to save lives elsewhere, the cost of the treatment) that
is determining whether a given form of treatment is ordinary
or extraordinary, and therefore is to be provided or not. Those
who appeal to this distinction are cloaking their consequentialist
views in the robe of an absolutist ethic; but the robe is worn
out, and the disguise is now transparent.
So it is not possible to appeal to either the doctrine of double
effect or the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary
means in order to show that allowing a patient to die is morally
different from actively helping a patient to die. Indeed, because
of extrinsic differences - especially differences in the time it
takes for death to occur - active euthanasia may be the only
humane and morally proper course. Passive euthanasia can be
a slow process. In an article in the British Medical Journal, John
Lorber has charted the fate of twenty-five infants born with
spina bifida on whom it had been decided, in view of the poor
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prospects for a worthwhile life, not to operate. It will be recalled
that Lorber freely grants that the object of not treating infants
is that they should die soon and painlessly. Yet of the twentyfive
untreated infants, fourteen were still alive after one month,
and seven after three months. In Lorber's sample, all the infants
died within nine months, but this cannot be guaranteed, or at