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We study the behavior of Range Voting and Normalized Range Voting with respect to electoral control. Electoral control encompasses attempts from an election chair to alter the structure of an election in order to change the outcome. |
In this paper, we consider the competitive diffusion game, and study the existence of its pure-strategy Nash equilibrium when defined over general undirected networks. We first determine the set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria for two special but well-known classes of networks, namely the lattice and the hypercube. |
Federated learning is a setting where agents, each with access to their own data source, combine models from local data to create a global model. If agents are drawing their data from different distributions, though, federated learning might produce a biased global model that is not optimal for each agent. |
In this paper, we introduce the first algorithmic framework for Blackwell approachability on the sequence-form polytope, the class of convex polytopes capturing the strategies of players in extensive-form games (EFGs). This leads to a new class of regret-minimization algorithms that are stepsize-invariant, in the same... |
We design a Copula-based generic randomized truthful mechanism for scheduling on two unrelated machines with approximation ratio within $[1.5852, 1.58606]$, offering an improved upper bound for the two-machine case. Moreover, we provide an upper bound 1.5067711 for the two-machine two-task case, which is almost tight ... |
We study the problem of a buyer (aka auctioneer) who gains stochastic rewards by procuring multiple units of a service or item from a pool of heterogeneous strategic agents. The reward obtained for a single unit from an allocated agent depends on the inherent quality of the agent; the agent's quality is fixed but ... |
We consider a combinatorial auction setting where buyers have fractionally subadditive (XOS) valuations over the items and the seller's objective is to maximize the social welfare. A prophet inequality in this setting bounds the competitive ratio of sequential allocation (often using item pricing) against the hind... |
Spot electricity markets are considered under a Game-Theoretic framework, where risk averse players submit orders to the market clearing mechanism to maximise their own utility. Consistent with the current practice in Europe, the market clearing mechanism is modelled as a Social Welfare Maximisation problem, with zona... |
For a constant $\epsilon$, we prove a poly(N) lower bound on the (randomized) communication complexity of $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium in two-player NxN games. For n-player binary-action games we prove an exp(n) lower bound for the (randomized) communication complexity of $(\epsilon,\epsilon)$-weak approximate Nash equ... |
The quest for a polynomial time algorithm for solving parity games gained momentum in 2017 when two different quasipolynomial time algorithms were constructed. In this paper, we further analyse the second algorithm due to Jurdziński and Lazić and called the succinct progress measure algorithm. |
There are many settings in which a principal performs a task by delegating it to an agent, who searches over possible solutions and proposes one to the principal. This describes many aspects of the workflow within organizations, as well as many of the activities undertaken by regulatory bodies, who often obtain releva... |
This paper studies game-theoretic decision-making for autonomous vehicles (AVs). A receding horizon multi-player game is formulated to model the AV decision-making problem. |
With the growth of the internet it is becoming increasingly important to understand how the behaviour of players is affected by the topology of the network interconnecting them. Many models which involve networks of interacting players have been proposed and best response games are amongst the simplest. |
In this paper, we introduce a preliminary model for interactions in the data market. Recent research has shown ways in which a data aggregator can design mechanisms for users to ensure the quality of data, even in situations where the users are effort-averse (i.e. prefer to submit lower-quality estimates) and the data... |
This paper proposes a conceptual framework for the analysis of reward sharing schemes in mining pools, such as those associated with Bitcoin. The framework is centered around the reported shares in a pool instead of agents and results in two new fairness criteria, absolute and relative redistribution. |
We consider the $n\times n$ game of Phutball. It is shown that, given an arbitrary position of stones on the board, it is a PSPACE-hard problem to determine whether the specified player can win the game, regardless of the opponent's choices made during the game. |
This paper presents a game theoretic formulation of a graph traversal problem, with applications to robots moving through hazardous environments in the presence of an adversary, as in military and security scenarios. The blue team of robots moves in an environment modeled by a time-varying graph, attempting to reach s... |
Envy-freeness has become the cornerstone of fair division research. In settings where each individual is allocated a disjoint share of collective resources, it is a compelling fairness axiom which demands that no individual strictly prefer the allocation of another individual to their own. |
Value methods for solving stochastic games with partial observability model the uncertainty about states of the game as a probability distribution over possible states. The dimension of this belief space is the number of states. |
Strategic behavior in two-sided matching markets has been traditionally studied in a "one-sided" manipulation setting where the agent who misreports is also the intended beneficiary. Our work investigates "two-sided" manipulation of the deferred acceptance algorithm where the misreporting agent and the... |
We study the complexity of equilibrium computation in discrete preference games. These games were introduced by Chierichetti, Kleinberg, and Oren (EC '13, JCSS '18) to model decision-making by agents in a social network that choose a strategy from a finite, discrete set, balancing between their intrinsic prefe... |
Shared-constraint games are noncooperative $N$-player games where players are coupled through a common coupling constraint. It is known that such games admit two kinds of equilibria -- generalized Nash equilibria (GNE) and variational equilibria (VE) -- with two different economic interpretations. |
Federated learning is typically considered a beneficial technology which allows multiple agents to collaborate with each other, improve the accuracy of their models, and solve problems which are otherwise too data-intensive / expensive to be solved individually. However, under the expectation that other agents will sh... |
Proportional representation (PR) is often discussed in voting settings as a major desideratum. For the past century or so, it is common both in practice and in the academic literature to jump to single transferable vote (STV) as the solution for achieving PR. |
We consider a multiproduct monopoly pricing model. We provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal mechanism can be implemented via upgrade pricing -- a menu of product bundles that are nested in the strong set order. |
While Nash equilibrium has emerged as the central game-theoretic solution concept, many important games contain several Nash equilibria and we must determine how to select between them in order to create real strategic agents. Several Nash equilibrium refinement concepts have been proposed and studied for sequential i... |
Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. |
A proper mechanism design can help federated learning (FL) to achieve good social welfare by coordinating self-interested clients through the learning process. However, existing mechanisms neglect the network effects of client participation, leading to suboptimal incentives and social welfare. |
The online bipartite matching problem has offline buyers desiring to be matched to online items. The analysis of online bipartite matching of Eden et al. (2021) is a smoothness proof (Syrgkanis and Tardos, 2013). |
We perform a simulation-based analysis of keyword auctions modeled as one-shot games of incomplete information to study a series of mechanism design questions. Our first question addresses the degree to which incentive compatibility fails in generalized second-price (GSP) auctions. |
We consider an auction design problem where a seller sells multiple homogeneous items to a set of connected buyers. Each buyer only knows the buyers she directly connects with and has a diminishing marginal utility valuation for the items. |
We report on three pre-registered studies testing whether people in the position of describing a decision problem to decision-makers exploit this opportunity for their benefit, by choosing descriptions that may be potentially beneficial for themselves. In Study 1, recipients of an extreme dictator game (where dictator... |
The auction theory literature has so far focused mostly on the design of mechanisms that takes the revenue or the efficiency as a yardstick. However, scenarios where the {\it capacity}, which we define as \textit{``the number of bidders the auctioneer wants to have a positive probability of getting the item''}... |
An algorithm is proposed to verify whether a finite game is a weighted potential game (WPG) without pre-knowledge on its weights. Then the algorithm is also applied to find the closest WPG for a given finite game. |
The rapid growth of wireless and mobile Internet has led to wide applications of exchanging resources over network, in which how to fairly allocate resources has become a critical challenge. To motivate sharing, a BD Mechanism is proposed for resource allocation, which is based on a combinatorial structure called bott... |
We study the computational complexity of fairly allocating a set of indivisible items under externalities. In this recently-proposed setting, in addition to the utility the agent gets from their bundle, they also receive utility from items allocated to other agents. |
We initiate the study of mechanism design with outliers, where the designer can discard $z$ agents from the social cost objective. This setting is particularly relevant when some agents exhibit extreme or atypical preferences. |
When delegations to an assembly or council represent differently sized constituencies, they are often allocated voting weights which increase in population numbers (EU Council, US Electoral College, etc.). The Penrose square root rule (PSRR) is the main benchmark for fair representation of all bottom-tier voters in th... |
Human behaviors are regularized by a variety of norms or regulations, either to maintain orders or to enhance social welfare. If artificially intelligent (AI) agents make decisions on behalf of human beings, we would hope they can also follow established regulations while interacting with humans or other AI agents. |
We study collaborative learning systems in which the participants are competitors who will defect from the system if they lose revenue by collaborating. As such, we frame the system as a duopoly of competitive firms who are each engaged in training machine-learning models and selling their predictions to a market of c... |
Credit-based congestion pricing (CBCP) has emerged as a mechanism to alleviate the social inequity concerns of road congestion pricing - a promising strategy for traffic congestion mitigation - by providing low-income users with travel credits to offset some of their toll payments. While CBCP offers immense potential ... |
Ride-hailing marketplaces like Uber and Lyft use dynamic pricing, often called surge, to balance the supply of available drivers with the demand for rides. We study driver-side payment mechanisms for such marketplaces, presenting the theoretical foundation that has informed the design of Uber's new additive driver... |
Electric boolean games are compact representations of games where the players have qualitative objectives described by LTL formulae and have limited resources. We study the complexity of several decision problems related to the analysis of rationality in electric boolean games with LTL objectives. |
We study Matching and other related problems in a partial information setting where the agents' utilities for being matched to other agents are hidden and the mechanism only has access to ordinal preference information. Our model is motivated by the fact that in many settings, agents cannot express the numerical v... |
We consider solutions of normal form games that are invariant under strategic equivalence. We consider additional properties that can be expected (or be desired) from a solution of a game, and we observe the following: <br>- Even the weakest notion of individual rationality restricts the set of solutions to be equilib... |
A simple game $(N,v)$ is given by a set $N$ of $n$ players and a partition of~$2^N$ into a set~$\mathcal{L}$ of losing coalitions~$L$ with value $v(L)=0$ that is closed under taking subsets and a set $\mathcal{W}$ of winning coalitions $W$ with $v(W)=1$. Simple games with $\alpha= \min_{p\geq 0}\max_{W\in {\cal W}, L\... |
In many economic, social and political situations individuals carry out activities in groups (coalitions) rather than alone and on their own. Examples range from households and sport clubs to research networks, political parties and trade unions. |
We extend the study of the complexity of finding an $\eps$-approximate Nash equilibrium in congestion games from the case of positive delay functions to delays of arbitrary sign. We first prove that in symmetric games with $\alpha$-bounded jump the $\eps$-Nash dynamic converges in polynomial time when all delay functi... |
Consider costly tasks that add up to the success of a project, and must be fitted by an agent into a given time-frame. This is an instance of the classic budgeted maximization problem, which admits an approximation scheme (FPTAS). |
An important problem in project management is determining ways to distribute amongst activities the costs that are incurred when a project is delayed because some activities end later than expected. In this study, we address this problem in stochastic projects, where the durations of activities are unknown but their c... |
We study parameterized approximability of three optimization problems related to stable matching: (1) Min-BP-SMI: Given a stable marriage instance and a number k, find a size-at-least-k matching that minimizes the number $\beta$ of blocking pairs; (2) Min-BP-SRI: Given a stable roommates instance, find a matching that ... |
We study the problem of fair allocation of a set of indivisible goods among $n$ agents with $k$ distinct additive valuations, with the goal of achieving approximate envy-freeness up to any good ($\alpha-\mathrm{EFX}$). <br>It is known that EFX allocations exist for $n$ agents when there are at most three distinct valu... |
We introduce a new approach to the study of influence in strategic settings where the action of an individual depends on that of others in a network-structured way. We propose \emph{influence games} as a \emph{game-theoretic} model of the behavior of a large but finite networked population. |
The growth in the use of online advertising to foster brand awareness over recent years is largely attributable to the ubiquity of social media. One pivotal technology contributing to the success of online brand advertising is frequency capping, a mechanism that enables marketers to control the number of times an ad i... |
In this paper we develop a novel approach to relaxing Arrow's axioms for voting rules, addressing a long-standing critique in social choice theory. Classical axioms (often styled as fairness axioms or fairness criteria) are assessed in a binary manner, so that a voting rule fails the axiom if it fails in even one ... |
We introduce General Lotto games with Scouts: a General Lotto game with asymmetric information. There are two players, Red and Blue, who both allocate resources to a field. |
We consider correlated equilibria in strategic games in an adversarial environment, where an adversary can compromise the public signal used by the players for choosing their strategies, while players aim at detecting a potential attack as soon as possible to avoid loss of utility. We model the interaction between the... |
People are often reluctant to sell a house, or shares of stock, below the price at which they originally bought it. While this is generally not consistent with rational utility maximization, it does reflect two strong empirical regularities that are central to the behavioral science of human decision-making: a tendenc... |
Time-inconsistency refers to a paradox in decision making where agents exhibit inconsistent behaviors over time. Examples are procrastination where agents tends to costly postpone easy tasks, and abandonments where agents start a plan and quit in the middle. |
We study the fair division of a collection of $m$ indivisible goods amongst a set of $n$ agents. Whilst envy-free allocations typically do not exist in the indivisible goods setting, envy-freeness can be achieved if some amount of a divisible good (money) is introduced. |
In Cooperative Games with Externalities when the members of a set S \subset N of agents wish to deviate they need to calculate their worth. This worth depends on what the non-members (outsiders) N \setminus S will do, which in turn depends on which coalition structure the outsiders will form. |
A traditional assumption in game theory is that players are opaque to one another -- if a player changes strategies, then this change in strategies does not affect the choice of other players' strategies. In many situations this is an unrealistic assumption. |
Redistribution mechanism design aims to redistribute the revenue collected by a truthful auction back to its participants without affecting the truthfulness. We study redistribution mechanisms for diffusion auctions, which is a new trend in mechanism design [19]. |
We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where bidder $i$ has a private value $v_i$, a budget $b_i$, and is interested in all the items in $S_i$. The value to agent $i$ of a set of items $R$ is $|R \cap S_i| \cdot v_i$. |
In participatory budgeting, communities collectively decide on the allocation of public tax dollars for local public projects. In this work, we consider the question of fairly aggregating the preferences of community members to determine an allocation of funds to projects. |
A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's private type and also an unknown state of nature. |
This paper studies a setting in which multiple suppliers compete for a buyer's procurement business. The buyer faces uncertain demand and there is a requirement to reserve capacity in advance of knowing the demand. |
We consider $\epsilon$-equilibria notions for constant value of $\epsilon$ in $n$-player $m$-actions games where $m$ is a constant. We focus on the following question: What is the largest grid size over the mixed strategies such that $\epsilon$-equilibrium is guaranteed to exist over this grid. |
In the restructured electricity industry, electricity pooling markets are an oligopoly with strategic producers possessing private information (private production cost function). We focus on pooling markets where aggregate demand is represented by a non-strategic agent. |
We prove that the two-dimensional Schelling segregation model yields monochromatic regions of size exponential in the area of individuals' neighborhoods, provided that the tolerance parameter is a constant strictly less than 1/2 but sufficiently close to it. Our analysis makes use of a connection with the first-pa... |
In this paper, we introduce an improved upper bound for the efficiency of Nash equilibria in utilitarian scheduling games on related machines. The machines have varying speeds and adhere to the Shortest Processing Time (SPT) policy as the global order for job processing. |
The standard game-theoretic solution concept, Nash equilibrium, assumes that all players behave rationally. If we follow a Nash equilibrium and opponents are irrational (or follow strategies from a different Nash equilibrium), then we may obtain an extremely low payoff. |
We consider a revenue-maximizing seller with a single item for sale to multiple buyers with i.i.d. valuations. Akbarpour and Li (2020) show that the only optimal, credible, strategyproof auction is the ascending price auction with reserves which has unbounded communication complexity. |
We develop a quasi-polynomial time Las Vegas algorithm for approximating Nash equilibria in polymatrix games over trees, under a mild renormalizing assumption. Our result, in particular, leads to an expected polynomial-time algorithm for computing approximate Nash equilibria of tree polymatrix games in which the numbe... |
This paper introduces an objective for optimizing proper scoring rules. The objective is to maximize the increase in payoff of a forecaster who exerts a binary level of effort to refine a posterior belief from a prior belief. |
We consider structural and algorithmic questions related to the Nash dynamics of weighted congestion games. In weighted congestion games with linear latency functions, the existence of (pure Nash) equilibria is guaranteed by potential function arguments. |
The nucleolus is a fundamental solution concept in cooperative game theory, yet computing it is NP-hard in general. In convex games-where players' marginal contributions grow with coalition size-the only existing polynomial-time algorithm relies on the ellipsoid method. |
Prediction markets are powerful tools to elicit and aggregate beliefs from strategic agents. However, in current prediction markets, agents may exhaust the social welfare by competing to be the first to update the market. |
Blockchain networks are facing increasingly heterogeneous computational demands, and in response, protocol designers have started building specialized infrastructure to supply that demand. This paper introduces Resonance: a new kind of transaction fee mechanism for the general two-sided market setting (with users on o... |
We propose and analyze a broad family of games played by resource-constrained players, which are characterized by the following central features: 1) each user has a multi-dimensional action space, subject to a single sum resource constraint; |
In this paper, we approach the classical problem of clustering using solution concepts from cooperative game theory such as Nucleolus and Shapley value. We formulate the problem of clustering as a characteristic form game and develop a novel algorithm DRAC (Density-Restricted Agglomerative Clustering) for clustering. |
We consider a dynamic mechanism design problem where an auctioneer sells an indivisible good to groups of buyers in every round, for a total of $T$ rounds. The auctioneer aims to maximize their discounted overall revenue while adhering to a fairness constraint that guarantees a minimum average allocation for each grou... |
We study finite-memory (FM) determinacy in games on finite graphs, a central question for applications in controller synthesis, as FM strategies correspond to implementable controllers. We establish general conditions under which FM strategies suffice to play optimally, even in a broad multi-objective setting. |
The stable matching problem sets the economic foundation of several practical applications ranging from school choice and medical residency to ridesharing and refugee placement. It is concerned with finding a matching between two disjoint sets of agents wherein no pair of agents prefer each other to their matched part... |
There have been extensive studies on learning in zero-sum games, focusing on the analysis of the existence and algorithmic convergence of Nash equilibrium (NE). Existing studies mainly focus on symmetric games where the strategy spaces of the players are of the same type and size. |
We consider a strategic variant of the facility location problem. We would like to locate a facility on a closed interval. |
We introduce a model of estimation in the presence of strategic, self-interested sensors. We employ a game-theoretic setup to model the interaction between the sensors and the receiver. |
The question of how people form their opinion has fascinated economists and sociologists for quite some time. In many of the models, a group of people in a social network, each holding a numerical opinion, arrive at a shared opinion through repeated averaging with their neighbors in the network. |
Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has emerged as a new frontier in the design of blockchain systems. In this paper, we propose making the MEV extraction rate as part of the protocol design space. |
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction is the primary auction used for monetizing the use of the Internet. It is well-known that truthtelling is not a dominant strategy in this auction and that inefficient equilibria can arise. |
In this chapter, we deal with some specific domains of applications to game theory. This is one of the major class of models in the new approaches of modelling in the economic domain. |
We provide the first separation in the approximation guarantee achievable by truthful and non-truthful combinatorial auctions with polynomial communication. Specifically, we prove that any truthful mechanism guaranteeing a $(\frac{3}{4}-\frac{1}{240}+\varepsilon)$-approximation for two buyers with XOS valuations over ... |
Ad exchanges are kind of the most popular online advertising marketplaces for trading ad spaces over the Internet. Ad exchanges run auctions to sell diverse ad spaces on the publishers' web-pages to advertisers, who want to display ads on ad spaces. |
Stackelberg Security Games are often used to model strategic interactions in high-stakes security settings. The majority of existing models focus on single-defender settings where a single entity assumes command of all security assets. |
The Shapley value is the prevalent solution for fair division problems in which a payout is to be divided among multiple agents. By adopting a game-theoretic view, the idea of fair division and the Shapley value can also be used in machine learning to quantify the individual contribution of features or data points to ... |
Do runoff elections, using the same voting rule as the initial election but just on the winning candidates, increase or decrease the complexity of manipulation? Does allowing revoting in the runoff increase or decrease the complexity relative to just having a runoff without revoting? |
We propose in this paper a coinvestment plan between several stakeholders of different types, namely a physical network owner, operating network nodes, e.g. a network operator or a tower company, and a set of service providers willing to use these resources to provide services as video streaming, augmented reality, aut... |
In this paper we study the problem of allocating a scarce resource among several players (or agents). A central decision maker wants to maximize the total utility of all agents. |
The Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction used typically to model sponsored search auctions does not include the notion of budget constraints, which is present in practice. Motivated by this, we introduce the different variants of GSP auctions that take budgets into account in natural ways. |
Escalation is the fact that in a game (for instance an auction), the agents play forever. It is not necessary to consider complex examples to establish its rationality. |
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