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This paper studies an energy storage (ES) sharing model which is cooperatively invested by multiple buildings for harnessing on-site renewable utilization and grid price arbitrage. To maximize the economic benefits, we jointly consider the ES sizing, operation, and cost allocation via a coalition game formulation. |
We present a new online learning algorithm for cumulative discounted gain. This learning algorithm does not use exponential weights on the experts. |
In this work, we introduce the concept of non-negative weighted regret, an extension of non-negative regret \cite{anagnostides2022last} in games. Investigating games with non-negative weighted regret helps us to understand games with conflicting interests, including harmonic games and important classes of zero-sum <a ... |
Understanding the properties of games played under computational constraints remains challenging. For example, how do we expect rational (but computationally bounded) players to play games with a prohibitively large number of states, such as chess? |
This article poses the following problem: Does there exist a probability distribution over subsets of a finite partially ordered set (poset), such that a set of constraints involving marginal probabilities of the poset's elements and maximal chains is satisfied? We present a combinatorial algorithm to positively r... |
This paper studies the use of a multi-attribute auction in a communication system to bring about efficient relaying in a non-cooperative setting. We consider a system where a source seeks to offload data to an access point (AP) while balancing both the timeliness and energy-efficiency of the transmission. |
We consider a single-facility location problem, where agents are positioned on the real line and are partitioned into multiple disjoint districts. The goal is to choose a location (where a public facility is to be built) so as to minimize the total distance of the agents from it. |
A central problem in Microeconomics is to design auctions with good revenue properties. In this setting, the bidders' valuations for the items are private knowledge, but they are drawn from publicly known prior distributions. |
Public goods games in undirected networks are generally known to have pure Nash equilibria, which are easy to find. In contrast, we prove that, in directed networks, a broad range of public goods games have intractable equilibrium problems: The existence of pure Nash equilibria is NP-hard to decide, and mixed Nash equ... |
We study the revenue guarantees and approximability of item pricing. Recent work shows that with $n$ heterogeneous items, item-pricing guarantees an $O(\log n)$ approximation to the optimal revenue achievable by any (buy-many) mechanism, even when buyers have arbitrarily combinatorial valuations. |
There is only one technique for prior-free optimal mechanism design that generalizes beyond the structurally benevolent setting of digital goods. This technique uses random sampling to estimate the distribution of agent values and then employs the Bayesian optimal mechanism for this estimated distribution on the remai... |
A dinner table seats k guests and holds n discrete morsels of food. Guests select morsels in turn until all are consumed. |
Most of the economic reports forecast that almost half of the worldwide market value unlocked by AI over the next decade (up to 6 trillion USD per year) will be in marketing&sales. In particular, AI will enable the optimization of more and more intricate economic settings, in which multiple different activities ne... |
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have been decided, withdraw some of her false-name identities (have some of her false-name identities refuse to pay). While these withdrawn identiti... |
Cooperative interval game is a cooperative game in which every coalition gets assigned some closed real interval. This models uncertainty about how much the members of a coalition get for cooperating together. |
We study envy-free mechanisms for scheduling tasks on unrelated machines (agents) that approximately minimize the makespan. For indivisible tasks, we put forward an envy-free poly-time mechanism that approximates the minimal makespan to within a factor of $O(\log m)$, where $m$ is the number of machines. |
Mean-field reinforcement learning has become a popular theoretical framework for efficiently approximating large-scale multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) problems exhibiting symmetry. However, questions remain regarding the applicability of mean-field approximations: in particular, their approximation accuracy ... |
Extracting from shared resources requires making choices to balance personal profit and sustainability. We present the results of a behavioural experiment wherein we manipulate the default extraction from a finite resource. |
Parity games have been broadly studied in recent years for their applications to controller synthesis and verification. In practice, partial solvers for parity games that execute in polynomial time, while incomplete, can solve most games in publicly available benchmark suites. |
In this paper, we study a daycare matching problem in Japan and report the design and implementation of a new centralized algorithm, which is going to be deployed in one municipality in the Tokyo metropolis. There are two features that make this market different from the classical hospital-doctor matching problem: |
We consider a multi-player non-zero-sum turn-based game (abbreviated as multi-player game) on a finite directed graph. A secure equilibrium (SE) is a strategy profile in which no player has the incentive to deviate from the strategy because no player can increase her own payoff or lower the payoff of another player. |
Taobao, as the largest online retail platform in the world, provides billions of online display advertising impressions for millions of advertisers every day. For commercial purposes, the advertisers bid for specific spots and target crowds to compete for business traffic. |
Since the 1990s spectrum auctions have been implemented world-wide. This has provided for a practical examination of an assortment of auction mechanisms and, amongst these, two simultaneous ascending price auctions have proved to be extremely successful. |
Recently, in [K.R. Apt and S. Simon: Well-founded extensive games with perfect information, TARK21], we studied well-founded games, a natural extension of finite extensive games with perfect information in which all plays are finite. We extend here, to this class of games, two results concerned with iterated eliminati... |
We study the problem of collaborative machine learning markets where multiple parties can achieve improved performance on their machine learning tasks by combining their training data. We discuss desired properties for these machine learning markets in terms of fair revenue distribution and potential threats, includin... |
Fair division is the problem of allocating a set of items among agents in a fair manner. One of the most sought-after fairness notions is envy-freeness (EF), requiring that no agent envies another's allocation. |
This paper proposes a differentially private energy trading mechanism for prosumers in peer-to-peer (P2P) markets, offering provable privacy guarantees while approaching the Nash equilibrium with nearly socially optimal efficiency. We first model the P2P energy trading as a (generalized) Nash game and prove the vulner... |
Given two bounded convex sets $X\subseteq\RR^m$ and $Y\subseteq\RR^n,$ specified by membership oracles, and a continuous convex-concave function $F:X\times Y\to\RR$, we consider the problem of computing an $\eps$-approximate saddle point, that is, a pair $(x^*,y^*)\in X\times Y$ such that $\sup_{y\in Y} F(x^*,y)\le \in... |
Moses & Nachum ([7]) identify conceptual flaws in Bacharach's generalization ([3]) of Aumann's seminal "agreeing to disagree" result ([1]). Essentially, Bacharach's framework requires agents' decision functions to be defined over events that are informationally meaningless for the agents. |
For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to single buyer sub-problems. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly satisfies the following assumptions: |
The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal communication (or signaling) scheme for the sender. |
We study the following multiagent variant of the knapsack problem. We are given a set of items, a set of voters, and a value of the budget; each item is endowed with a cost and each voter assigns to each item a certain value. |
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we provide a unified framework, by means of non-trivial examples, to compare the results obtained in simultaneous-move and sequential-move versions of bilateral oligopoly with the Cournot model and the Cournot-Walras approach. |
We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete à la Cournot, by choosing the quantities of good to supply to each market they have access to in ... |
In this paper, we study the problem of minimizing regret in discounted-sum games played on weighted game graphs. We give algorithms for the general problem of computing the minimal regret of the controller (Eve) as well as several variants depending on which strategies the environment (Adam) is permitted to use. |
In high-risk environments where unlawful surveillance is prevalent, securing confidential communications is critical. This study introduces a novel steganographic game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic interactions between a defending company and an adversary. |
According to the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, any competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient. Unfortunately, competitive equilibrium prices only exist under strong assumptions such as perfectly divisible goods and convex preferences. |
Human societies engage in a number of games which use tokens as a means to allocate, issue and access gated resources and property rights: The notion of exchanging tokens that represent and carry value from the past into the future to facilitate economic exchange is a fundamental concept. As agents exchange tokens a n... |
We improve the best known competitive ratio (from 1/4 to 1/2), for the online multi-unit allocation problem, where the objective is to maximize the single-price revenue. Moreover, the competitive ratio of our algorithm tends to 1, as the bid-profile tends to ``smoothen''. |
We study the sample complexity of learning revenue-optimal multi-item auctions. We obtain the first set of positive results that go beyond the standard but unrealistic setting of item-independence. |
Sponsored Search Auctions (SSAs) arguably represent the problem at the intersection of computer science and economics with the deepest applications in real life. Within the realm of SSAs, the study of the effects that showing one ad has on the other ads, a.k.a. externalities in economics, is of utmost importance and h... |
Müller games form a well-established class of games for model checking and verification. These games are played on directed graphs $\mathcal G$ where Player 0 and Player 1 play by generating an infinite path through the graph. |
We study PAC learnability and PAC stabilizability of Hedonic Games (HGs), i.e., efficiently inferring preferences or core-stable partitions from samples. We first expand the known learnability/stabilizability landscape for some of the most prominent HGs classes, providing results for Friends and Enemies Games, Bottom ... |
Diffusion auction design for combinatorial settings is a long-standing challenge. One difficulty is that we cannot directly extend the solutions for simpler settings to combinatorial settings (like extending the Vickrey auction to VCG in the traditional settings). |
We consider the Hegselmann-Krause model for opinion dynamics and study the evolution of the system under various settings. We first analyze the termination time of the synchronous Hegselmann-Krause dynamics in arbitrary finite dimensions and show that the termination time in general only depends on the number of agent... |
We consider the classical linear assignment problem, and we introduce new auction algorithms for its optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are founded on duality theory, and are related to ideas of competitive bidding by persons for objects and the attendant market equilibrium, which underlie real-life aucti... |
In this paper, we discuss a well-known self-referential paradox in foundational game theory, the Brandenburger - Keisler paradox. We approach the paradox from two different perspectives: non-well-founded set theory and paraconsistent logic. |
In this paper, we propose a novel user-cell association approach for wireless small cell networks that exploits previously unexplored context information extracted from users' devices, i.e., user equipments (UEs). Beyond characterizing precise quality of service (QoS) requirements that accurately reflect the UEs&#... |
We study network coordination problems, as captured by the setting of generalized network design (Emek et al., STOC 2018), in the face of uncertainty resulting from partial information that the network users hold regarding the actions of their peers. This uncertainty is formalized using Alon et al. |
We study the trade-off between the Price of Anarchy (PoA) and the Price of Stability (PoS) in mechanism design, in the prototypical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. We give bounds on the space of feasible mechanisms with respect to the above metrics, and observe that two fundamental mechanisms, namely the Firs... |
There has been much work on exhibiting mechanisms that implement various bargaining solutions, in particular, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution \cite{moulin1984implementing} and the Nash Bargaining solution. Another well-known and axiomatically well-studied solution is the lexicographic maxmin solution. |
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have significantly improved the accuracy of intelligent applications on mobile devices. DNN surgery, which partitions DNN processing between mobile devices and multi-access edge computing (MEC) servers, can enable real-time inference despite the computational limitations of mobile devices. |
As data emerges as a vital driver of technological and economic advancements, a key challenge is accurately quantifying its value in algorithmic decision-making. The Shapley value, a well-established concept from cooperative game theory, has been widely adopted to assess the contribution of individual data sources in ... |
Mean-payoff games on timed automata are played on the infinite weighted graph of configurations of priced timed automata between two players, Player Min and Player Max, by moving a token along the states of the graph to form an infinite run. The goal of Player Min is to minimize the limit average weight of the run, wh... |
We propose a game-theoretic model of the reliability of decentralised systems based on Varian's model of system reliability, to which we add a new normalised total effort case that models \textit{decentralisation conscious players} who prioritise decentralisation. We derive the Nash equilibria in the normalised to... |
We study metric distortion in distributed voting, where $n$ voters are partitioned into $k$ groups, each selecting a local representative, and a final winner is chosen from these representatives (or from the entire set of candidates). This setting models systems like U.S. presidential elections, where state-level deci... |
Interactive-proof games model the scenario where an honest party interacts with powerful but strategic provers, to elicit from them the correct answer to a computational question. Interactive proofs are increasingly used as a framework to design protocols for computation outsourcing. |
A growing body of literature in networked systems research relies on game theory and mechanism design to model and address the potential lack of cooperation between self-interested users. Most game-theoretic models applied to system research only describe competitive equilibria in terms of pure Nash equilibria, that i... |
Distributed ensemble learning (DEL) involves training multiple models at distributed learners, and then combining their predictions to improve performance. Existing related studies focus on DEL algorithm design and optimization but ignore the important issue of incentives, without which self-interested learners may be... |
We consider how selfish agents are likely to share revenues derived from maintaining connectivity between important network servers. We model a network where a failure of one node may disrupt communication between other nodes as a cooperative game called the vertex Connectivity Game (CG). |
We identify a whole family of approval-based multi-winner voting rules that satisfy PJR. Moreover, we identify a subfamily of voting rules within this family that satisfy EJR. |
In this paper, we introduce and study the Facility Location Problem with Aleatory Agents (FLPAA), where the facility accommodates n agents larger than the number of agents reporting their preferences, namely n_r. The spare capacity is used by n_u=n-n_r aleatory agents sampled from a probability distribution \mu. |
We continue previous work by Mattei et al. (Mattei, N., Pini, M., Rossi, F., Venable, K. : Bribery in voting with CP-nets. |
We consider the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible items (goods or bads) under capacity constraints. In this setting, we are given a set of categorized items. |
Parrondo's paradox was introduced by Juan Parrondo in 1996. In game theory, this paradox is described as: A combination of losing strategies becomes a winning strategy. |
The conditional commitment abilities of mutually transparent computer agents have been studied in previous work on commitment games and program equilibrium. This literature has shown how these abilities can help resolve Prisoner's Dilemmas and other failures of cooperation in complete information settings. |
Team formation is ubiquitous in many sectors: education, labor markets, sports, etc. A team's success depends on its members' latent types, which are not directly observable but can be (partially) inferred from past performances. |
Social distance games have been extensively studied as a coalition formation model where the utilities of agents in each coalition were captured using a utility function u that took into account distances in a given social network. In this paper, we consider a non-normalized score-based definition of social distance g... |
Crowdsourcing platforms offer a way to label data by aggregating answers of multiple unqualified workers. We introduce a \textit{simple} and \textit{budget efficient} crowdsourcing method named Proxy Crowdsourcing (PCS). |
We study the efficiency guarantees in the simple auction environment where the auctioneer has one unit of divisible good to be distributed among a number of budget constrained agents. With budget constraints, the social welfare cannot be approximated by a better factor than the number of agents by any truthful mechani... |
We present a polynomial-time algorithm that always finds an (approximate) Nash equilibrium for repeated two-player stochastic games. The algorithm exploits the folk theorem to derive a strategy profile that forms an equilibrium by buttressing mutually beneficial behavior with threats, where possible. |
Aggregative games have many industrial applications, and computing an equilibrium in those games is challenging when the number of players is large. In the framework of atomic aggregative games with coupling constraints, we show that variational Nash equilibria of a large aggregative game can be approximated by a Ward... |
We design a novel algorithm for solving Mean-Payoff Games (MPGs). Besides solving an MPG in the usual sense, our algorithm computes more information about the game, information that is important with respect to applications. |
A class of discrete Bidding Combinatorial Games that generalize alternating normal play was introduced by Kant, Larsson, Rai, and Upasany (2022). The major questions concerning optimal outcomes were resolved. |
The Seat Arrangement Problem is a problem of finding a desirable seat arrangement for given preferences of agents and a seat graph that represents a configuration of seats. In this paper, we consider decision problems of determining if an envy-free arrangement exists and an exchange-stable arrangement exists, when a s... |
In a PoW-based blockchain network, mining pools (the solo miner could be regarded as a mining pool containing one miner) compete to successfully mine blocks to pursue rewards. Generally, the rewards include the fixed block subsidies and time-varying transaction fees. |
We study mechanism design when agents may have hidden secondary goals which will manifest as non-trivial preferences among outcomes for which their primary utility is the same. We show that in such cases, a mechanism is robust against strategic manipulation if and only if it is not only incentive-compatible, but also ... |
In this paper, we experimentally compare major approval-based <br>multiwinner voting rules. To this end, we define a measure of <br>similarity between two equal-sized committees subject to a given <br>election. |
In this paper, online game is studied, where at each time, a group of players aim at selfishly minimizing their own time-varying cost function simultaneously subject to time-varying coupled constraints and local feasible set constraints. Only local cost functions and local constraints are available to individual playe... |
In AAMAS 2014, Bouveret and Lemaitre (2014) presented a hierarchy of fairness concepts for allocation of indivisible objects. Among them CEEI (Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes) was the strongest. |
The advent of generative AI (GenAI) technology produces transformative impact on the content creation landscape, offering alternative approaches to produce diverse, high-quality content across media, thereby reshaping online ecosystems but also raising concerns about market over-saturation and the potential marginaliza... |
Crowdsourcing has become an important tool to collect data for various artificial intelligence applications and auction can be an effective way to allocate work and determine reward in a crowdsourcing platform. In this paper, we focus on the crowdsourcing of small tasks such as image labelling and voice recording wher... |
Competitive resource allocation between adversarial decision makers arises in a wide spectrum of real-world applications such as in communication systems, cyber-physical systems security, as well as financial, political, and electoral competition. As such, developing analytical tools to model and analyze competitive r... |
Sparse iterative methods, in particular first-order methods, are known to be among the most effective in solving large-scale two-player zero-sum extensive-form games. The convergence rates of these methods depend heavily on the properties of the distance-generating function that they are based on. |
In the domain of machine learning and game theory, the quest for Nash Equilibrium (NE) in extensive-form games with incomplete information is challenging yet crucial for enhancing AI's decision-making support under varied scenarios. Traditional Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) techniques excel in navigatin... |
We consider two-alternative elections where voters' preferences depend on a state variable that is not directly observable. Each voter receives a private signal that is correlated to the state variable. |
We study policies aiming to minimize the weighted sum of completion times of jobs in the context of coordination mechanisms for selfish scheduling problems. Our goal is to design local policies that achieve a good price of anarchy in the resulting equilibria for unrelated machine scheduling. |
A group of players which contain n sellers and n buyers bargain over the partitions of n pies. A seller(/buyer) has to reach an agreement with a buyer (/seller) on the division of a pie. |
Liquid democracy has a natural graphical representation, the delegation graph. Consequently, the strategic aspects of liquid democracy can be studied as a game over delegation graphs, called the liquid democracy game. |
Modeling strategic conflict from a game theoretical perspective involves dealing with epistemic uncertainty. Payoff uncertainty models are typically restricted to simple probability models due to computational restrictions. |
The problem of assigning tasks to workers is of long-standing fundamental importance. Examples of this include the classical problem of assigning computing tasks to nodes in a distributed computing environment, assigning jobs to robots, and crowdsourcing. |
Benefiting from powerful convolutional neural networks (CNNs), learning-based image inpainting methods have made significant breakthroughs over the years. However, some nature of CNNs (e.g. local prior, spatially shared parameters) limit the performance in the face of broken images with diverse and complex forms. |
Given a small training data set and a learning algorithm, how much more data is necessary to reach a target validation or test performance? This question is of critical importance in applications such as autonomous driving or medical imaging where collecting data is expensive and time-consuming. |
Recent advancements in text-to-video (T2V) generation have been driven by two competing paradigms: autoregressive language models and diffusion models. However, each paradigm has intrinsic limitations: language models struggle with visual quality and error accumulation, while diffusion models lack semantic understandi... |
This paper explores pedestrian trajectory prediction in urban traffic while focusing on both model accuracy and real-world applicability. While promising approaches exist, they often revolve around pedestrian datasets excluding traffic-related information, or resemble architectures that are either not real-time capabl... |
Malicious Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) present a significant threat to next-generation networks (NGNs), posing risks such as unauthorized surveillance, data theft, and the delivery of hazardous materials. This paper proposes an integrated (AE)-classifier system to detect malicious UAVs. |
Tolerance to image variations (e.g. translation, scale, pose, illumination) is an important desired property of any object recognition system, be it human or machine. Moving towards increasingly bigger datasets has been trending in computer vision specially with the emergence of highly popular deep learning models. |
In this paper, we propose a novel end-to-end approach for scalable visual search infrastructure. We discuss the challenges we faced for a massive volatile inventory like at eBay and present our solution to overcome those. |
The field of novel view synthesis has made significant strides thanks to the development of radiance field methods. However, most radiance field techniques are far better at novel view interpolation than novel view extrapolation where the synthesis novel views are far beyond the observed training views. |
We propose VisFusion, a visibility-aware online 3D scene reconstruction approach from posed monocular videos. In particular, we aim to reconstruct the scene from volumetric features. |
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