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defence house would employ mercenaries | PMCs can be made much more legitimate by regulation Currently mercenary work as a profession is not regulated by law, which allows the corruption and lack of guaranteed quality, as well as the problems of accountability to remain problematic. Regulating PMCs encourage a safer, professionalised security sector which can be standardised and controlled. Governments would then legislate, regulate and moderate the use of such forces rather than provide them outright. PMCs today are legitimate businesses, much of their work has nothing to do with fighting and killing MPRI for example "shipped more than $900,000,000 worth of donated food and medical supplies to the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union over a five year period”. These companies are already placing greater emphasis on having a good reputation and are increasingly transparent so many companies would welcome regulation.(Vaknin, 2011) |
defence house would employ mercenaries | This image of responsible professionals may not be entirely justified. Some employees of PMCs may have no military experience, those who do may have been dishonourably discharged from duty and some may be implicated in criminal activity or atrocities, such as Eeben Barlow (former officer in South African 32nd Battalion- Assassination squad during Apartheid, now a chief of PMC Executive Outcomes which predominantly employs ex-secret policemen). These people may know how to do the job but they may also not be the kind of people we want working with the military. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | PMCs provide a service that may be otherwise unavailable. Many nation states have achieved sufficient unity to rely on their own armies but for those which cant, mercenary forces provide an invaluable and possibly only mode of protection and security. British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw believes that in an era of “small wars and weak states” mercenaries have a “legitimate role” (The Economist, 2002). Mercenaries may be the only way of providing short term security guarantees to allow a government to establish itself without relying on warlords or one side of an ethnic conflict. This could be the only way out of a pattern of coup and counter-coup. Recruiting local mercenaries also has the benefits of reducing transportation costs, instant readiness as well as any knowledge of the local politics, geography and customs which may be highly valuable to a security force. These local recruits may be less inclined to share this information with a government force. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | PMCs are a valuable resource PMCs are a flexible and efficient tool with which to fight 21st Century wars making them a necessity. Private contractors can be hired at short notice and used only when necessary. They can be used to carry out specific missions, to reinforce traditional troops where greater numbers are required or to protect other contractors whilst traditional troops carry out more lucrative missions. Additionally, most PMCs are non-combative but rather defensive, providing security for officials, supply trains etc. As a result they are viewed less as invaders or “the enemy” and more as peace-keepers. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | PMCs are ineffective as they do not fit in with a disciplined army. PMCs are not bound by the same rules and standards of conduct and accountability as conventional troops. When problems arise it is often unclear whether army representatives or PMCs should be held responsible. Moreover, the lack of regulation means that there is no means to ensure mercenaries breaking laws are disciplined. Currently most mercenaries can operate outside martial law with relative freedom. Some of the worst offences at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq were committed by “privatised interrogators” (Hersh, 2004) who are yet to be punished. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | The use of mercenaries is counterproductive for unstable states. By relying on hired mercenaries weak states encourage private competition rather than reinforcing their own nascent armies. The emergence of powerful local, as well as international, mercenary organisations frustrates the ultimate goal of securing a state monopoly over the use of force. There are many cases where mercenaries have remained in a region long after their official contract ended in an attempt to exploit regional instability in order to further a particular ideological cause or reap financial reward. Colonel Bob Denard fought vaguely “against Communism” in Africa and attempted to overthrow the government of the Comoros Islands off Madagascar on four separate occasions. Similarly, Colonel “Mad” Mike Hoare tried to topple the government of the Seychelles in 1981, arriving with 43 mercenaries disguised as rugby playing members of a beer-tasting club named The Ancient Order of Froth Blowers. Furthermore, PMCs may be helpful in resolving conflicts in the short-term, they are not viable solutions because they do nothing to actually solve the problem in the long-term. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | The amount of attention and suspicion depends on what the PMCs are doing not that they are PMCs. Whilst mercenaries appear to be less disliked than American troops in Iraq, in parts of Africa their activities have increased tension. The reputation of a national government is often stained by the activities of hired mercenary groups. The involvement in national military operations of white supremacist adventurers and discredited individuals like Simon Mann is used by men such as Mugabe to challenge the legitimacy of British policy in Africa. These kind of actions by some groups mean that all PMCs are considered with suspicion. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | PMCs have an equally strong incentive to perform. PMCs must perform carefully and effectively to secure future contracts. It is therefore in their interests to ensure their employees are well- trained and well-equipped and perform to the highest standard. Most PMCs recruit ex-service personnel as a way to ensure the quality of their force. In 2004 more SAS soldiers worked privately in Iraq than served in the army. Additionally, governments increasingly recognise the quality of mercenaries. PMCs and regular militaries cross over on occasion: An American PMC -Military Professional Resources Inc - trains the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) on behalf of the US Government (Lock, 2011). The British Ministry of Defence now allows soldiers yearlong sabbaticals to work as mercenaries in the hope they will return having earned more in the private sector. This official recognition suggests that mercenaries have shed their “dogs of war” image. They are no longer disreputable maverick figures operating in failed states but highly trained professionals endorsed by national governments |
defence house would employ mercenaries | PMCs attract less attention and suspicion and can carry out their role more effectively. Mercenaries often arouse less hostility amongst civilians than soldiers fighting for national armies. In ethnic conflict they are perceived as less partisan. The fact that civilians to some extent do not connect mercenaries with a particular ideological cause, invasion or civil war makes them ideal for protecting safe areas and policing reconstruction projects. For example, PMC Global Risk Strategies successfully guarded the Green Zone in Baghdad, the sealed off section inhabited by coalition staff. As they are mercenaries they can be fighting for the national or local government of where their mission even if they have a different paymaster. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | A good reputation is vital to any company, including PMCs, so human rights abuses or any other activity which is deemed questionable would be avoided. Mercenaries are not protected by legal immunity would have to face justice for any crime like any other criminal. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | PMCs do not really have an interest in conflicts never ending. Like any other organisation in a conflict zone they lose men and material while carrying out their missions. They may wish there to be an environment where they can still be useful but this does not mean stoking a conflict. Even if PMCs were helping to increase conflict to increase their own business it would still only be a very small factor in any conflict. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | PMCs are untrustworthy The possibility of mercenaries pulling out will always remain a risk. PMCs are not fighting for their own country so they can never be threatened with a charge of desertion. PMCs are motivated by money and do not have the interests of their employer at heart. Loyalty is given to the highest bidder and is therefore delicately balanced. “The fact is, they have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a trifle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready enough to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe.”(Machiavelli, 1515) Machiavelli considered that it was mercenaries that ruined Italy much as they are now doing in Iraq and Afghanistan. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | The role of PMCs has had a negative effect on traditional militaries and their operations. Soldiers trained at high expense by the state may leave for the greater income of private employment, reducing the power of the state’s military and bolstering the attraction of PMCs. PMCs also have a much more relaxed, business-like attitude to conflict. Being unregulated gives them a freedom to work outside of the law to an extent, using illicit practices such as torture and bribery which goes unnoticed. However, these practices strengthen the morale and line the purses of “the enemy”, such as warlords or the Taliban in Afghanistan, putting the militaries they are fighting alongside in danger. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | PMCs violate human rights and International agreements in pursuit of profit or power. Some PMCs may abuse the power they wield. Simon Mann, founder of PMCs EO and Sandline International, in a recent plot to oust President Obiang in Equatorial Guinea (BBC News, 2008) shows that even mercenary organisations considered legitimate by the British Government remain staffed by corrupt opportunists. It is highly morally questionable whether organisations with such a profound disrespect for the sovereignty of other nation states should be involved with the training of our armed forces, let alone fighting alongside them. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | PMCs have an interest in conflict. ncreased reliance on mercenaries is destabilising in the long term. It allows invaders and local governments to feel that they can get away with not providing sufficiently trained or numerous security forces because there are men on the ground. It also means that the most influential actors, large multi-national companies, no longer have to pressure governments so hard to provide security guarantees for everyone because they can buy their own. That leaves those without influence or money high and dry. This then leads to a proliferation of armed forces in the country, some working for the central government, others for local governments and some for private individuals and firms. These PMCs are hired provide security and to help create stability yet that is not where their interests lie. If the country returns to stability they are out of a job so it is in their interest to keep an unstable situation unstable to result in more work. (Wennmann, 2008) |
defence house would employ mercenaries | This does not necessarily mean that there is anything inherently wrong with using PMCs. While it might be true that the United States has sometimes misjudged which private forces to hire, this does not mean that we cannot use PMCs altogether. In fact, there can be solutions to ensure the quality of PMCs, such as legal regulation. The risk of inadvertently funding the enemy temporarily is perhaps worth taking, considering the alternative may be to have them constantly preventing anything being done to help. Short-term compromise could be the best option to long-term victory. |
defence house would employ mercenaries | It is in the interest of PMCs to fulfil their contractual obligations to ensure future contracts and avoid the reputation of being treacherous. While PMCs are often considered to be untrustworthy there are very few examples, if any, of them actually running away or switching sides since the end of the cold war. |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Guns don’t kill people – people kill people. Restricting gun ownership will do nothing to make society safer as it is the intent of the criminal we should fear, and that will remain the same whatever the gun laws. In the vast majority of crimes involving firearms, the gun used is not legally held or registered. Many of illegal weapons are imported secretly from abroad, or converted from replica firearms rather than being stolen from registered owners. |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | The legal ownership of guns by ordinary citizens inevitably leads to many accidental deaths The legal ownership of guns by law-abiding citizens inevitably leads to many unnecessary and tragic deaths. Legally held guns are stolen and end up in the hands of criminals, who would have greater difficulty in obtaining such weapons if firearms were less prevalent in society. Guns also end up in the hands of children, leading to tragic accidents and terrible disasters such as the Columbine High School massacre in the U.S.A. Sometimes even normal-seeming registered gun owners appear to go mad and kill, as tragically happened at Hungerford and Dunblaine in the U.K. |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Shooting is a major sport enjoyed by many law-abiding people, both in gun clubs with purpose-built ranges and as a field sport. These people have the right to continue with their chosen leisure pursuit, on which they have spent large amounts of money – an investment the government would effectively be confiscating if their guns were confiscated. In addition, field sports bring money into poor rural economies and provide a motivation for landowners to value environmental protection. While compensation could be given the cost would be huge; in the UK shootings value to the economy was £1.6billion in 2004. [1] [1] ‘£1,600,000,000 – the value of shooting’, Shooting Times, 27 September 2006, |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | The only function of a gun is to kill The only function of a gun is to kill. The more instruments of death and injury can be removed from our society, the safer it will be. In the U.S.A. death by gunshot has become the leading cause of death among some social groups; in particular for African-American males aged from 12 to 19 years old. [1] Quite simply, guns are lethal and the fewer people have them the better. [1 ‘Study: Homicide leading cause of death among young black males, Jacksonville.com, 5 May 2010, |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Prohibition is not the answer, especially not in countries such as the USA where gun ownership is such an entrenched aspect of society. Banning guns would not make them disappear or make them any less dangerous. It is a legitimate right of citizens to own weapons with which they can protect themselves, their family, and their property (see point 4). Many people also need guns for other reasons. For example, farmers need guns in order to protect their stock and crops from pests, e.g. rabbits, birds, deer, foxes, stray dogs attacking sheep, etc. |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | There are substantial exceptions to that correlation, for example Japan has the world’s 5th highest suicide rate but very low gun ownership. [1] As the proposition concedes, the availability of firearms is not a direct cause of suicide and thus the restriction of availability of firearms can only have a marginal effect on the suicide rate. [1] |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Sports shooting desensitizes people to the lethal nature of firearms Shooting as a sport desensitises people to the lethal nature of all firearms, creating a gun culture that glamorises and legitimises unnecessary gun ownership. It remains the interest of a minority, who should not be allowed to block the interests of society as a whole in gun control. Compensation can be given to individual gun owners, gun clubs and the retail firearms trade, in recognition of their economic loss if a ban is implemented. |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Gun ownership increases the risk of suicide There is a correlation between the laxity of a country’s gun laws and its suicide rate – not because gun owners are more depressive, but because the means of quick and effective suicide is easily to hand. As many unsuccessful suicides are later glad that they failed in their attempt, the state should discourage and restrict the ownership of something that wastes so many human lives. |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Shooting as a sport has the potential to desensitize people to the lethal nature of all firearms, creating a gun culture that glamorizes and legitimizes unnecessary gun ownership. |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Burglary should not be punished by vigilante killings of the offender. No amount of property is worth a human life. Perversely, the danger of attack by homeowners may make it more likely that criminals will carry their own weapons. If a right to self-defence is granted in this way, many accidental deaths are bound to result. Moreover the value of guns for self-defence is overrated. A firearm kept in the home for self-defence is six times more likely to be used in a deliberate or accidental homicide than against an unlawful intruder. [1] [1] Drinan, Robert F. ‘Gun Control: The Good Outweighs the Evil’. The Civil Liberties Review. August/September 1976 |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Gun ownership increases national security within democratic states “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary top the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” – 2nd Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. [1] Any country is much more able to defend itself from aggression if many of its citizens are able to use guns, keeping them for leisure and sporting use. Some countries actively require adult citizens to maintain weapons in their house, and periodically to train in their use. The high levels of firearm availability in Iraq and Afghanistan have been significant contributory factors in allowing for a viable insurrection to form which has the potential to generate the political pressure necessary to cause the withdrawal of foreign occupiers. Of course, such widespread ownership of weapons is also a safeguard against domestic tyranny. [1] See also DIstricxt of Columbia v Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Effective gun control is not achievable in democratic states with a tradition of civilian gun ownership Much like the failure of the prohibition era to stop alcohol consumption, trying to restrict the use of guns that are already widely owned and prevalent in a society is an impossible task. [1] The people who intend to use guns for illegitimate purposes are obviously unconcerned with the fact that it is illegal to acquire the guns in the first place in countries where this is already the case such as in the UK . [2] [3] [1] Kates, Don B. ‘Why a Civil Libertarian Opposes Gun Control’. The Civil Liberties Review. June/July 1976 [2] The Independent. ‘Up to 4m guns in UK and police are losing the battle’. 4th September 2005. [3] The Guardian. ‘Firearms: cheap, easy to get and on a street near you’ 30th August 2008. |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Sports shooting is a safe activity Shooting is sport enjoyed by many law-abiding people, both in gun clubs with purpose-built ranges and as a field sport. These people have the right to continue with their chosen leisure pursuit, on which they have spent large amounts of money – an investment the government would effectively be confiscating if their guns were confiscated. |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Gun ownership is an integral aspect of the right to self defence Law-abiding citizens deserve the right to protect their families in their own homes, especially if the police are judged incapable of dealing with the threat of attack. Would-be rapists and armed burglars will think twice before attempting to break into any house where the owners may keep firearms for self-defence. (This can also be applied to the right to carry concealed weapons, deterring potential rapists, muggers, etc.) |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | Limited restrictions on ownership and use are different in nature to absolute prohibition and are more easily enforced. Statistical analysis shows that that gun control laws do have a deterrent effect on firearm deaths and that the magnitude of the effect is dependent on how well the rules are enforced. [1] The ineffectiveness of badly drafted or enforced gun control regulations is not an indicator of the ineffectiveness of well drafted and enforced regulations. [1] Kwon et al. ‘The effectiveness of gun control laws: multivariate statistical analysis’, The American Journal of Economics and Sociology. Jan |
eneral politics politics general house would limit right bear arms | The 2nd Amendment of the U.S. Constitution was written in the age of horse and musket, where a private citizen could gain access to the same (or even better) weaponry that the state did. Unless the opposition want to remove all barriers on gun ownership completely, no armed citizenry can seriously compete with a modern military armed with tanks, drones and precision weaponry. Popular resistance movements rely upon creating an unaffordable political cost to maintaining the occupation (e.g. The US was eventually forced from Vietnam, despite winning virtually every major battle of the war), but this assumes that the occupying power is vulnerable to that kind of pressure. An undemocratic invader or a domestic tyranny will happily slaughter dissidents with impunity (see the pre-intervention stages of the Libyan civil-war and the 2011 Syrian uprising). |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | No one doubts that politicians have to make morally difficult decisions, where sometimes every option is unpleasant. However, no one wants politicians to have an unrestricted ability to make ethical questionable decisions. That is exactly what immunity would deliver them. A politician who knows that they cannot be touched is incentivized and licensed to be much more brazen in their behavior when in office, and we want a bulwark against unrestricted rule-breaking. A state of affairs wherein politicians can sometimes be prosecuted creates the ideal amount of disincentive for politicians to break rules; they will do so only when there is a pressing need, and only to a moderate degree. Because of the plausible justifications for such acts, politicians need not fear prosecution in the overwhelming majority of cases. For instance, no official from either the UK or USA has been actually indicted with regard to highly-legally-dubious programs to torture detainees [1] [2] . Moreover, politicians are seldom prosecuted anyway, especially because they tend to belong to socioeconomic strata that punished less or not all compared to the rest of society. There is no legitimate need to give them more protection. [1] Ambinder, Marc, ‘CIA Officers Granted Immunity from Torture Prosecution’, The Atlantic, 16 April 2009, [Accessed September 9, 2011] [2] Human Rights Education Association, ‘Torture, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment’, hrea.org, [Accessed September 9, 2011] |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | Politicians should be able to make difficult decisions without fear that selecting one option will lead to their incarceration. By the most popular definition, a state is the entity with the monopoly on the legitimate use of force within a defined territory. Politicians, as the government of that state, necessarily wield the institutions of that state force. This results in the tremendous responsibility of deciding when the overwhelming power of the state is exercised. This pertains to a variety of areas, such as police action against civil unrest, the interrogation of both alleged and convicted terrorists, and economic policies that subsidize industries with state resources. While it is certainly possible to brazenly abuse this power, in many cases politicians are presented with options which are, if at all illegal, marginally so, and made with the good faith interest of the nation at heart. There are even conceivable situations in which a politician may exercise options that are clearly illegal but serve an overwhelming state interest; consider an illegal raid on a private building in order to prevent a nuclear bomb from going off. While documented instances of policy-makers choosing not to act for a particular reason are rare, several senior CIA officials stated that they had become risk averse merely because the idea of prosecuting officials who made security policy had entered the public discourse. [1] We ought to place politicians in a situation where the only factor in their decision-making process is what serves the public interest, rather than having to weigh what they consider to be the right action against the chance it will lead to their incarceration. Attempting to avoid this through a limited system which allowed for the prosecution of apolitical crimes but immunity for political decisions would fail to accomplish the goals of prosecution of politicians, which is primarily to protect against political abuses of state power which threaten the rights of the citizenry. [1] Crawford, Robert, ‘Torture and the Ideology of National Security’ Global Dialogue, Vol.12 No.1, Winter/Spring 2010, (“A Risk-Averse CIA” subsection) [Accessed 22 September 2011] |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | These mechanisms are not immediate enough to put an immediate stop to an aberrant behavior. Impeachment proceedings take months at least; elections may be years away; and reputational damage is even more long-term. Moreover, these punishments are nowhere near a sufficient deterrent. If loss of one’s job, and damage to one’s public image were sufficient deterrents, we would not prosecute business leaders for insider trading, nor celebrities for drunk driving. The fact is that a criminal justice system which punishes everyone equally is not just fair; it’s also a practical method of achieving meaningful deterrence. Finally, even if we are willing to settle for one of these lesser punishments, the threat of a great punishment gives prosecutors leverage to strike deals with the politicians, such as offering not to prosecute in exchange for coming forward with the details of misdeeds. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | Prosecutions of politicians are often motivated by partisan concerns. As noted above, the political life is steeped in difficult decisions, and some of these are bound to result in choices that are at least potentially illegal. The ability to prosecute politicians incentivizes political opponents to search out past actions by said politicians so as to immobilize them politically. Such prosecutions are therefore not motivated by concern for justice, nor are they conducive to a well-functioning, multipartisan political system wherein representatives seek to work together to achieve their political ends. In the most extreme cases, powerful politicians use prosecutions to immobilize their political opponents. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | Giving politicians’ immunity from prosecution allows them to focus on performing their duties The premier reason that most states, even those that allow for the prosecution of politicians, abstain from prosecuting them while they hold office is that being a politician is a job that requires one’s undivided attention. Especially for the holders of prominent national-level offices, writing legislation, responding to crises under one’s purview, consulting one’s constituents, and engaging in campaign work often lead to politicians working an upwards of 12 hour day, every day. To expect politicians cope with all of these concerns will simultaneously constructing a defense against pending charges would be to abandon all hope of them serving their constituents effectively. We are rightly aggravated when politicians take extensive vacations or other extracurricular forays. [1] Being under indictment not only consumes even more of a politician’s time; the stress it causes will inevitably seep into what remaining time they do allocating to fulfilling their duties, further hindering their performance. The impeachment proceedings for Bill Clinton on charges of perjury and obstruction of justice were so intensive that they took tremendous resources away from not only the president himself, but all branches of the federal government for several months [2] , amidst serious domestic and foreign policy concerns such as the ongoing war in Kosovo. [1] Condon, George E. Jr., ‘The Long History of Criticizing Presidential Vacations’ The Atlantic, 18 August 2011, [Accessed September 9, 2011] [2] Linder, Douglas O., ‘The Impeachment Trial of President William Clinton’, UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI-KANSAS CITY (UMKC) SCHOOL OF LAW, 2005, [Accessed September 19, 2011] |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | Politicians have to divide their focus anyway. As the examples above concede, being a politician means being pulled in several different directions. Elections are particularly distracting, and in jurisdictions with fixed election cycles like the United States can make periods of up to a year prior to the election a write-off for getting real work done. Thus, personal liability is nothing special among the many concerns a politician has. In fact, accountability, of this direct type, and for serious offences, is probably more important than most of the things a politician is forced to consider, and at the very least deserves inclusion among them. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | Motivation does not matter. Almost every time someone presses criminal charges, it is for their own personal concerns (such as wanting retribution), rather than concern for the public good; that does not change the fact that if charges are laid, it is because the prosecuting authority has decided that, regardless of why the crime has come to their attention, the interest of society at large requires that the individual be prosecuted. If political motivations are what is needed for politicians to be held accountable, so be it. Even if this is a problem, it can be mitigated with sufficient oversight from an independent prosecuting authority. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | If we don’t want politicians hurting the dignity of the office, there is only one thing we can do: not elect politicians likely to commit crimes! Of course, this is often impossible to tell in advance, but the dilemma remains: a crime has been committed, and that hurts the dignity of the office no matter what action we take. One thing that’s worse than having an office’s holder raked over the coals is for them to get away with a behavior that otherwise warrants punishment. See discussion below under “hurts the image of the office.” |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | In the event of major abuses of power it should be the public that holds politicians to account. The obvious benefit to prosecuting politicians is that it punishes – and thereby deters – corruption by politicians. However, this benefit can be achieved through other means. Firstly, many western liberal democracies have one form or another of removing a politician from office in the midst of their term, such as impeachment in the American system or a vote of no confidence against the government in the Westminster system. While defenders of immunity oppose impeachment as contrary to the principles outlined above (because of the effect that it may have on political duties), this is an option that remains in cases of gross misconduct. If the political will cannot be mobilized to remove a sitting politician, they are held accountable by the electorate to whom they must answer in the next election, and who will likely punish blatant misuse of political power. Even if the individual politician has reached a limit on their term of office, or does not seek reelection, they are still held in check by the damage that will be done to their party in the event of major misconduct on their part. Finally, most politicians are significantly concerned about their legacy, which is tarnished significantly by corruption even if they are never held legally accountable for it. While Nixon received a full pardon from his success, [1] his name has become synonymous with criminality and scandal: a fate most politicians wish to avoid. [1] Ford, Gerald R., Proclamation 4311, 8 September 1974, [Accessed September 9, 2011] |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | Seeing a politician put on trial hurts the integrity of their office. It does tremendous damage to the public perception of a given political position to see the holder of that position on trial for criminal acts. Politicians are important role models for the populace at large, and shining light on everyone one of their misdeeds is not conducive to them playing such a role. This hurts the ability of their successors who, though completely innocent, are stepping into an institution now tainted with the image of corruption or scandal. Finally, the very process of prosecution can be damaging to the country, as citizens on opposing sides of the political spectrum disagree over the legitimacy of charges. These effects all deal real damage to the political institutions necessary for the functioning of the state. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | The concept of retribution is a narrow and dubious foundation for justice. A modern, civilized legal system should not be geared around delivering payback on behalf of victims, but rather around advancing the best consequences for the future. For exactly this reason legal systems give several ways in which defendants can avoid punishment, even though they are technically guilty, if punishing them would have bad consequences; these include jury nullification and suspended sentences. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | See argument above regarding other accountability mechanism. Jeopardizing future electoral success, harming one’s political party, and damage to one’s personal legacy are all meaningful checks on the behavior of politicians. To suggest that, in the absence of prosecutions, an under-used tool anyway, politicians will be able to abuse their station with impunity, is simply untrue. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | Politicians who commit crimes are likely unfit to serve. The sort of person who commits an offense has demonstrated irresponsibility and so is unworthy of the public trust. Would any reasonable citizen wanted to be represented by a domestic abuser, or have a fraudster manage the public treasury? While almost all people are capable of atonement and redemption, someone who commits crimes worthy of prosecution while in office ought to be immediately removed for the betterment of the state. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | Immunity creates a perverse incentive to hang on to their office as long as possible. Prosecutorial immunity brings about a massive side-benefit to being in office. It is easy to get used to a life where minor indiscretions go regularly unpunished, as has happened with dignitaries holding diplomatic immunity. [1] Immunity from prosecution may spur a politician to seek reelection into their old age when they are significantly less effective at performing their duties. This is one reason why in the vast majority of democracies elected representatives, while far from poor, are not paid massive salaries; we don’t want people getting into politics for the wrong reasons. [1] Uhlig, Mark A., ‘Court Won’t Bar Return of Boy in Abuse Case to Zimbabwe’, The New York Times, 1 January 1988, [Accessed September 9, 2011] |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | Immunity for politicians hurts the image of their office Far from the worst PR for an office being that a holder of it is on trial, the worst possible public perception of a political institution is that it is wracked with corruption, with it not even theoretically possible to hold its members to account. Prosecuting politicians makes it clear that their office is not a den of impunity, and in the wake of a scandal, restoring public confidence in politicians to come. The public wants their politicians to be accountable and granting immunity harms accountability by denying an option. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | Immunity for politicians is an unjust double standard Every victim deserves to have the perpetrator of their suffering answer for their misdeeds. It is unjust that certain offenders would avoid retribution, and certain victims would be denied their day in court, simply because of a factor external to the commission of the crime. Even if the crime is not external to the criminal’s political role, the foundation of a free and fair justice system is that all individuals are treated alike, regardless of perceived importance. Hence, a wealthy philanthropist will not be spared from prosecution simply because they are a pillar of the community. Politicians should receive no greater reprieve. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | With regard to this issue, elections are unquestionably an effective alternative mechanism. The act of a politician in a liberal democracy holding on to office for another term, by definition, requires public assent. The citizenry has an out: don’t continue electing politicians who aren’t serving the public interest. Regardless, politicians already have a plethora of motives, both legitimate and self-serving, to hold on to public office; this doesn’t move the barometer on incentives to run. Most elections are at least modestly well contested precisely because many qualified candidates really want the position. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | The ability to prosecute politicians is the ultimate protection against the abuse of power. It is impossible to overstate the power that the threat of prosecution has to stay the hand of anyone, including a politician, from transgressing the laws of the state. In fact, we need more aggressive prosecution of politicians. Not a single person has been prosecuted for approval illegal torture or wiretapping. These are illegal actions actually happening which the populace, with only the blunt instrument of voting for or against a politician on the sum total of their policies, is unable to effectively influence. There is no greater deterrent that could be used against politicians. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | The difference between the harm to the office of a politician getting away with a crime and the harm from them being tried for that crime is that the trial is inherently public. Short of widespread corruption – the sort that would probably preclude prosecuting politicians anyway – it is unlikely that unpunished wrongdoing in an office will ever become public. A trial, by contrast, creates a media flashpoint that captures the public consciousness. Thus, even if the damage to the integrity of the office is greater per person in cases of unpunished crimes, the act of punishing the crime informs enough people to outweigh the fact that it may not do as much damage per capita. |
eneral punishment politics government house would grant politicians immunity | This is not necessarily true. A politician could be a brilliant diplomat who happens to commit a minor offence such as drink driving; very few indictable offences correlate directly with one’s ability to discharge the mandate of a political office. Historically, politicians have often had their secret vices, including the rumored drug habits of many 19th century politicians, that have not impeded the performance of their duties. |
government local government voting house believes quebec should secede canada | Although there have been flaws in the way that Canada has dealt with Quebec in the past, it simply isn’t true that it is currently denied its right to self-determination. First of all, it is not the will of the people to become an independent nation, shown by the results of the most recent referendum on the issue and recent polling figures [1] . Therefore, it is the will of the Quebecers to be governed as part of Canada and becoming independent would in fact violate this right to self-determination. Second, there have been large steps taken to rectify these past issues of exclusion of the Quebec voice such as in 2006 where Prime Minister Harper’s recognition of Quebec as a distinct nation within Canada [2] . [1] Chung, Andrew. "Sovereignty "outmoded," Quebec poll indicates." Star 19 May 2010, n. pag. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . [2] "Harper: Quebec a nation... within Canada." Canada.com 22 Nov 2006, n. pag. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . |
government local government voting house believes quebec should secede canada | Quebec has the right to self-determination. All people have the right to determine their own form of government and representation and Quebec has been systematically denied this right. Quebec has historically been denied the right to determine its own form of governance systematically and therefore the Canadian government has no right to claim legitimacy over Quebec and cannot stop it from leaving the federation. The Canadian Constitution was patriated in 1982 in a backroom deal known as the Meech Lake Accord [1] where Quebec was explicitly excluded from the negotiations and their issues were ignored. Specifically, Quebec was attempting to entrench recognition of their special status and needs as a distant society within Canada [2] and this was denied. To this day, Quebec has refused to sign the Canadian constitution as it feels it doesn’t adequately represent its interests and needs [3] . Therefore, Quebec has the right to independence as its sovereignty was illegitimately taken from it and it is systematically denied adequate representation in Canadian politics. [1] "The Meech Lake Accord." Peace and Conflict. Historica, n. d. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . [2] "The Meech Lake Accord." Peace and Conflict. Historica, n. d. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . [3] "The Meech Lake Accord." Peace and Conflict. Historica, n. d. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . |
government local government voting house believes quebec should secede canada | The right to self-determination does not necessitate independence, but rather determination of their own governance. This principle is widely seen as not being about sovereignty, but rather the right to control local governance for their peoples, a right already extended to the Quebecois. The International Court of Justice, the most important court of international law, has recognized the right of self-determination as being adequately fulfilled by devolved governance. [1] Moreover, as explained in counterargument one, there is no basis for the Quebecois to claim that they are systematically denied adequate representation, making the international legal precedent on self-determination irrelevant. [1] Van der Vyver, Johan D., „Self-Determination of the Peoples of Quebec under International law“, Journal of Transnational Law and Policy, Vol. 10, No. 1, < >, p.11 |
government local government voting house believes quebec should secede canada | Quebec needs to be independent to retain its distinct language and culture. The only way to ensure that Quebecers get to retain their distinct culture is to gain independence as a country and remove themselves from the Canadian federation. A very big issue for certain Quebecers is the threat that an overwhelmingly English-speaking country has on their pocket of distinct French-Quebecois culture [1] . The unrestricted immigration of English-speaking Canadians to Quebec has diluted the culture of the Quebecois and has set off the process of cultural-loss and the highly feared loss of their language [2] . Moreover, whenever Quebec has tried to put in place provisions to protect their culture and language, such as with Bill 101 [3] , Quebec is called racist and Canadian Federal Courts try to strike down their laws to stop their “discrimination” against English-speaking Canadians in their province [4] . The only way that Quebec can protect its language and culture is to be able to stop the unrestricted flow of English-speaking immigration into its territory and gain complete control over its own law and cultural policy. The only way to do this is to gain independence from Canada. [1] "Only Quebec independence can protect French language: PQ strategist." CBS News Canada 26 Nov 2007, n. pag. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . [2] "Only Quebec independence can protect French language: PQ strategist." CBS News Canada 26 Nov 2007, n. pag. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . [3] "Bill 101." The Canadian Encyclopedia. Web. 1 Dec 2011. < . [4] "Bill 101." The Canadian Encyclopedia. Web. 1 Dec 2011. < . |
government local government voting house believes quebec should secede canada | Although it may be true that traditional Quebecois culture is under threat, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Cultures change and evolve to reflect the rich history of a territory and its peoples and the interaction with Anglophonic Canadians is a very important part of that history that should be reflected in Quebecois culture. Moreover, Quebec is more than able to institute language laws and cultural policy, as they were able to continue the vast majority of the provisions in Bill 101 [1] after it was struck down once they stripped out the parts that explicitly discriminated against English-speaking Canadians and once they enacted the Constitutional not-withstanding clause that the Canadian constitution has in place to help accommodate Provincial diversity such as this. Further to this, Canada is officially a bilingual country, and thus the linguistic and cultural rights of the French are constitutionally protected by the Federal government not only within Quebec but in wider Canadian society. It is simply fallacious to claim that the Canadian government does not recognize or protect the distinct culture and language of French Canadians. [1] "Bill 101." The Canadian Encyclopedia. Web. 1 Dec 2011. < . |
government local government voting house believes quebec should secede canada | International Law Mandates Quebec be allowed Independence International law recognizes Quebec’s right to self-determination and denying them self-determination is therefore a violation of international law. International law recognizes the right of all peoples to self-determination. The international community has decided that it is oppressive to individuals to live under a government that is systematically incapable or unwilling to protect them and their interests. [1] The Quebecois have been systematically denied adequate representation in the federal government of Canada. Quebecois legislation protection their basic rights to retain their language and culture have been met with contempt [2] and legal action by the federal Canadian government and courts. [3] This is but one example of the very clear denial of basic representation and self-governance that afflicts the Quebecois in Canada. Therefore, Quebec has the legal right to self-determination and independence in international law. [1] „Reference re Secession of Quebec“, Supreme Court of Canada, 1998, 2 S.C.R. 217, < > [2] “Maxime Bernier on Quebec law: ‘We don’t need Bill 101’”, The Canadian Press, 4 February 2011, < > [3] Hudon, R., „Bill 101“, The Canadian Encyclopedia, < > |
government local government voting house believes quebec should secede canada | Many countries in the world have bad economies; this is not a reason to not be an independent country. Economic circumstances can change and be improved through different economic initiatives; this simply isn’t a good enough reason to not secede from Canada. Furthermore, there is significant economic evidence that suggests that smaller states, such as that of Quebec, have a higher chance of thriving economically than larger states such as Canada. [1] Therefore, this argument not only does not justify the opposition case, but also is entirely speculative and likely incorrect. Quebec’s economy could very well benefit significantly from detaching its economy from Canada. [1] Price, Adam, „Small Is Cute, Sexy, and Successful: Why Independence for Wales and Other Countries Makes Economic Sense“, Harvard Kennedy School Review, 2011, < > |
government local government voting house believes quebec should secede canada | This is not the will of the people of Quebec. Secession from Canada would not be a fair or adequate representation of the will of the people of Quebec. The most recent referendum and all current polling data suggest that an overwhelming majority of Quebecers are opposed to Quebec seeking independence from Canada [1] . The government of Quebec pursuing such a policy is only representative of a very small minority of people in Quebec, and therefore is undemocratic in nature. Moreover, this policy explicitly denies consideration or enfranchisement for the very large populations of Anglophone Quebecers who also deserve representation, and whose interests are being wholly discounted to pursue this one policy on behalf of the Francophones in their province. Therefore, pursuing secession is both wholly undemocratic, but also specifically disenfranchises a very large portion of the population entirely in a trade-off for one specific policy that doesn’t appeal strongly to anyone beyond a very small minority of citizens. [1] Chung, Andrew. "Sovereignty "outmoded," Quebec poll indicates." Star 19 May 2010, n. pag. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . |
government local government voting house believes quebec should secede canada | Quebec would not be able to be economically viable on its own. Quebec independence simply will not work because Quebec would not be financially viable as an independent economy. Quebec has been financially dependent on the rest of Canada for years [1] specifically being dependent on “have” provinces such as Alberta to prop-up its economy as a “have-not” provinces through equalization payments [2] . Moreover, all financial indicators point to the situation staying as it is or worsening, with no signs of improvement in the economy visible [3] . If Quebec were to gain independence, it simply would not be able to sustain itself as an independent country. Quality of life would necessarily have to drop for all those living in Quebec and the economy would only crash further as confidence in it would dwindle once you remove the credibility the support of the Canadian government and economy that currently gives it. Therefore, Quebec should not secede from Canada as it would only serve to harm their economy and the livelihoods of the people they supposedly are there to protect. [1] Van Praet, Nicolas. "No progress in Quebec prosperity: report." Financial Post 30 Aug 2011, n. pag. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . [2] Van Praet, Nicolas. "No progress in Quebec prosperity: report." Financial Post 30 Aug 2011, n. pag. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . [3] Van Praet, Nicolas. "No progress in Quebec prosperity: report." Financial Post 30 Aug 2011, n. pag. Web. 1 Dec. 2011. < . |
government local government voting house believes quebec should secede canada | Quebec is in a unique position as the homeland for French-speaking Canadians and therefore has a very different mandate than a normal state or province. Quebec has an obligation to the rights of French Canadians as a group due to its unique position, and just because Anglo-Canadians have migrated to Quebec does not mean that the primacy of this special obligation has disappeared because the mandate’s representation within its territory has been diluted. |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | While elections can create a focal point for protest and violence this may actually make things more predictable not less. Countries without elections are not without opposition groups and protests, all this means is that the spark for the protests is going to be different; police beating someone up, a particularly extravagant piece of corruption, an attempted cover up, the disappearance of an opposition activist. Not having elections simply prevents the divisions in society from being highly visible; it does not get rid of the divisions, indeed it gets rid of one of the safety valves. |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | Avoids the costs and uncertainty of elections It is hard to see what the benefit of an election that can change nothing is, but there are certainly all the costs associated with a normal election. Elections can be costly in financial terms, the United States elections cost several billion dollars but even much smaller and less extravagant elections need financing. Zimbabwe’s elections in 2013 forced the government to ask its neighbours for $85 million to carry out the polls, for a nation that is essentially bankrupt this is a lot of money. [1] Another cost is uncertainty. In fully democratic elections the uncertainty is with what the policies will be when the government changes. With sham elections the uncertainty is whether the elections will be a focus for violence. Sometimes this is during campaigning itself as with Zimbabwe in 2008 where up to 200 people were killed. [2] Otherwise violence occurs when there is a perception that an election has been stolen so the Green Movement in Iran took to the streets and was met with a violent crackdown in 2009. [3] [1] VOA News, ‘Zimbabwe Seeks Help to Cover Election Costs’, Voice of America, 10 July 2013, [2] ‘Zimbabwe: No Justice for Rampant Killings, Torture’, Human Rights Watch, 8 March 2011, [3] AFP, ‘Iran opposition says 72 killed in vote protests’, Google, 3 September 2009, |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | There is little evidence that countries without elections are more willing to take difficult decisions, or able to take wise decisions, than those that face some form of election. Many petro states have failed to diversify their economies despite having the money to do so – often investing in wild ideas such as Saudi Arabia investing $84 billion in agriculture in the desert from 1985-2000. [1] [1] Alterman, Jon B., ‘Water and National Strength in Saudi Arabia’, Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 2011, |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | Having no elections is honest Holding sham elections is fundamentally dishonest as it is asking the people to choose a government and then ignoring their choice. Not holding elections is at least honestly telling the people that they get no say in who is in power. Holding a sham election inevitably means having to lie to the people somewhere along the line; whether it is in preventing people registering, or voting, or in manipulating the results. The people usually know the result is a sham or at least are suspicious – in the latest Zimbabwean election the headlines in the newspapers included “ZANU-PF gloats over victory”. [1] Without a sham election the government can at least be honest with their people so enabling a level of trust or even a kind of contract between the two – the government and the people each lets the other get on with it. Thus for example in China trust in government in 2012 was 76% against the world average of 51%. [2] [1] Chinaka, Cris, ‘Africa and West at odds over disputed Zimbabwe election’, Reuters, 4 August 2013, [2] Sedghi, Ami, and Rogers, Simon, ‘Do we trust our government? See how your country compares’, TheGuardian.com, 24 January 2012, |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | Being honest about depriving the people of their right to choose the government is not beneficial. An unwillingness to hold elections does not build any trust even when the government has proved itself capable at governing because an unwillingness to hold elections fundamentally shows distrust by government of the people. If the government trusted the people in return it would trust them to elect a competent government and representatives. |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | The problem with good governance and economic success as the basis of legitimacy is that a crisis of legitimacy is created whenever growth falters or corruption comes to light. Legitimacy based upon performance also has the problem that if a certain performance becomes normal then the benchmarks must be higher and higher over time to continue to provide legitimacy. [1] Having legitimacy at least in part based on periodic elections, even if these are somehow rigged, is more sustainable as the legitimacy is renewed whenever there is a new election or change in government. This has the added benefit that as fairer elections are seen as more legitimate there is a greater chance that sham elections will become real elections to ensure the regime has more legitimacy even at the risk of it being voted out - as shown recently by Burma being willing to take the democratic route. [1] Lam, Jon-Jon, ‘Performance Legitimacy: an Unstable Model for Sustaining Power’, The Politic, 10 January 2013, |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | Allows the ruler to make necessary but unpopular decisions Democracy and elections are about popularity but popular decisions are not always the right ones. Even mature democracies have sometimes seen their government’s make use of the levers of government to boost their electoral chances; for example Margaret Thatcher’s government stoked the economy in the Lawson boom in 1987 which just happened to be an election year. [1] Governments without elections can engage in long term planning and make unpopular decisions without fear of the consequences. Thus for example Saudi Arabia is willing to pump less oil (and so get less money in the short term at least) in order to create stability in the oil market by having enough excess capacity to prevent price spikes. [1] Congdon, Tim, Keynes, the Keynesians and Monetarism, 2007, p.73 |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | Forces the ruler to find another way to placate the people Not having any elections – or only elections for a powerless advisory parliament – may actually have a benefit in putting responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the rulers. Only a country that is comparatively well governed, or successful, can manage without a democratic safety valve. It is notable that the remaining absolute monarchies or those where the King rules as well as reigns are mostly very wealthy petro states. Several of the remaining communist regimes, China and Vietnam, rely on rapid economic growth to cement their legitimacy combined with meritocracy in their selection of leaders. In both cases there is an incentive for good governance by those in power as they are in for the long term. The leaders know they are not going to be elected out of office so have the motivation to reduce corruption and create long term growth through investment in infrastructure because this will benefit them in the future. [1] [1] Feldman, Noah, ‘Feldman examines corruption and political legitimacy in China’, Harvard Law School, 11 March 2013, |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | If the government were genuinely interested in what the people want then there would be far more reliable ways than through an election. Polling could be done on each individual policy providing a much finer granularity of response to tell policymakers what they really want. All that a government will be able to tell from a sham election is that the people don’t like the government. |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | States can have elections that have almost no chance of changing the government for decades. These elections can actually set back the cause for genuine democracy. There are several reasons for this. First having elections, or marginally expanding the number of parties or franchise, so providing liberal political reform can be used to keep the opposition on side through constantly dangling the prospect of further reform. Thus Sadat in 1977 allowed elections in response to discontent over peace overtures to Israel and in 1984 following his assassination Mubarak made these elections multiparty. [1] Secondly having elections can be used to disrupt the opposition as coalitions of disparate elements are difficult to create so it will likely lead to internal squabbling and victory for the ruling party. Encouraging such squabbling will then prevent there being a single recognised opposition party or figure than can be seen as able to take over. When there is no clear path after a revolution the people are going to be much more likely to stick with the dictator they know. [1] Lust, Ellen, ‘The Multiple Meanings of Elections In Non-Democratic Regimes: Breakdown, Response and Outcome in the Arab Uprisings’, Yale University, p.5. |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | Elections of any sort force rulers to meet their people Elections almost anywhere in the world mean politicians getting out and campaigning. Regardless of the legitimacy of the final election the leadership of the country will be going out and meeting voters. In many of these events individuals won’t be able to express their views but there are also likely to be protests and meetings where individuals can get their views across. This provides an opportunity for the leader to stay in touch with the people – often a problem with dictators who have been in power too long. Dictators will want to, and often believe that they are likely to win even without resort to fraud, as Marcos did in 1985. [1] They are then are much more likely to consider the views of the electorate to still be relevant if there are elections than if there are not. Thus for example Mugabe in the most recent elections made a bid for, and won, the youth vote by promising a direct stake in the economy, [2] so responding to their desire for jobs. [3] [1] Kline, William E., ‘The Fall of Marcos: A Problem in U.S. Foreign Policymaking’, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1992, p. 10 [2] Agyemang, Roy, ‘Why a Robert Mugabe victory would be good for Zimbabwe’, theguardian.com, 2 August 2013, [3] AFP, ‘Youth, rural voters may hold key to Zimbabwe election’, Fox News, 27 July 2013, |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | Sham elections do not mean the elections have no influence or impact. For an autocracy the election for the top job needs to be predetermined, but the other elections do not. This means that elections for the legislature can still be competitive. The seats do have some influence, provide patronage, and have status attached so there are plenty of people who want to contest them. In the Arab world before the Arab spring there was a less than 25% incumbency rate for legislatures. [1] Having elections that determine control in local areas or allow opposition some control in parliament is far preferable to the alternative where the government appoints everyone. Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy in Burma have for example gained entry into Parliament and have despite being a minority had an impact. This has particularly been the case internationally. They have helped liberalise the new Foreign Investment Law and have encouraged more liberalised freedom of the press and association. [2] [1] Lust, Ellen, ‘The Multiple Meanings of Elections In Non-Democratic Regimes: Breakdown, Response and Outcome in the Arab Uprisings’, Yale University, p.7. [2] Turnell, Sean, ‘Myanmar has made a good start to economic reform’, East Asia Forum, 27 March 2013, |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | Even a sham election demonstrates what the people want In an election the people show what their policy preferences will be. Even if the government is engaging in vote rigging or voter intimidation they will still know how the people voted or wanted to vote (if they stuffed the ballot they will know how many extra votes they added) so will have some guidance as to the policies that the people wish implemented. If there are multiple different parties competing in the elections then it will be possible to tell which party platforms are the most popular and so which to take ideas from. If there are elections then there are opposition parties and independent MPs who are given much more space than they would be without elections. Being MPs gives the opposition some status and gives them a controlled setting in which to criticise the government. This provides the opposition with the chance to channel the voice of the people and encourage change from the governing party. |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | Some kind of election is more likely to lead to real democracy than no election The acceptance by most autocrats that there need to be elections shows the idea that legitimacy derives from the people is generally accepted. Meaning that these states are already part way to having a genuine democracy. Having regular elections, even if the outcome is preordained, means that the electorate becomes used to voting and the idea of voting to make their voice heard. In such circumstances eventually they are going to want their vote to really count. If there is a creeping process of reform eventually this will result in free and fair elections. Having any kind of elections means that there are people who are recognised as an opposition. This means that there is a viable alternative to the ruling party which can be turned to in a crisis, or can take on the leadership role when the regime is finally toppled. For example in Philippines the opposition was able to create a united opposition party in 1984 and coalesce around Corazon Aquino in the snap elections of 1985. [1] This meant that Aquino was in a position to swiftly set up a government following the people power revolution and flight of Marcos. [2] [1] Kline, William E., ‘The Fall of Marcos: A Problem in U.S. Foreign Policymaking’, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 1992, Pp.4, 10 [2] Reaves, Joseph A., ‘Marcos Flees, Aquino Rules’, Chicago Tribune, 26 February 1986, |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | This is simply co-opting the opposition in an attempt to allow the regime to survive longer than it would otherwise done. As Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe has found out even being in a coalition government with a dictator does not give you the power to change the outcome over the long term. He has called his election defeat “coup by ballot” reflecting the vote rigging that he believes occurred to keep President Mugabe in power. [1] The Movement may have had a significant impact during its time in government economically but it totally failed to prise the real power out of the hands of Zanu PF. [1] Smith, David, ‘Morgan Tsvangirai loses hope following election defeat’, The Guardian, 4 August 2013, |
government voting house would have no elections rather sham elections | There is little difference between a stage managed election and stage managed events without elections. In either case the chances of the autocrat meeting real people who present opinions that are not on the party message are slim. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | An elected mayor would give the appearance of accountability, but at the risk of stifling democratic debate. At present policies are debated by council committees, and then by the full council, which represents a wide spectrum of views and interests; the public and media can usually attend these meetings, so overall proposals have to survive detailed examination. Focusing power in the hands of one person risks policy mistakes, ignores the interests of minorities, and allows for the possibility of corruption, especially if they are in office for four years and cannot be removed by vote of the council. Ken Livingstone, who was Mayor of London for eight years, argues “It’s easy to avoid serious scrutiny – Boris has had six press conferences in four years. When you come to see how the assembly gets to question him once a month that’s not the same as a detailed scrutiny by a council committee.” [1] Greater accountability could instead be achieved by use of citizens’ juries to consider particular local issues, and local referenda on issues such as the level of council tax. [1] Waterson, James, ‘Ken: Mayor has too much power for one person’, City A.M., 18 April 2012. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Mayors would be more accountable than a council Electing mayors would improve accountability in local government. A Mayor would have a bigger mandate, which could be up to 500,000 votes compared to 5,000 for individual councillors making them more directly accountable to the city’s electorate. [1] They are also more visible; 57% of people could name their mayor when they had one compared to only 8% being able to name their council leader and so they are more likely to be held to account for their individual policies. [2] By comparison where there are not mayors an elaborate and confusing series of committees make decisions in most areas, making it easy for individual councillors or parties to dodge responsibility for unpopular decisions or failed policies. Bristol is a good example of this with wobbly coalitions resulting from backroom deals and constantly shifting politics; the council changed hands seven times in the ten years to 2012. [3] Placing this power in the hands of an elected mayor would streamline decision-making and increase accountability. A mayor who failed to improve local services or in other ways implement their campaign promises would have little chance of re-election. [1] Sims, Sam, ‘Electing mayors for more English cities would increase local democratic accountability and widen political participation. But the government must grant them real power and freedom’, blogs.lse.ac.uk, 7 October 2011. [2] Gash, Tom, ‘A turning point for England’s big cities’, Institute for Government, 29 March 2012. [3] The Economist, ‘Why elected mayors matter’, 19 April 2012. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Talented individuals with a proven track record are unlikely to seek mayoral office unless local government is given much greater autonomy by central government. With the powers for each city not yet clear many may not be willing to take the risk. The reason for the lack of talent in councils is therefore not because they work as a body rather than one prominent individual but that councils themselves have too little power. Regardless of the system of election, if real power is offered, real leaders will be attracted by the prospect of wielding it and will rise to prominence. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Electing a Mayor will revitalise local democracy An elected mayor would revitalise local democracy. At present many people have no idea who their local councillors are, or who leads their council, perhaps because collective decision-making is generally unexciting. It is not surprising then that turnout is only around 30% and in some urban areas in Britain fewer than 1 in 4 adults bother to vote in local elections – the worst turnout in the EU. [1] An elected mayor would act as a focus for local people, both symbolically and as someone with real power to improve their lives. Local elections would gain more coverage and more people’s attention as they are voting for one recognisable figure rather than a number of councillors. This in turn would turn attention to local democracy and increase turnout in elections. [1] Shakespeare, Tom, ‘For Good Measure Devolving Accountability for Performance and Assessment to Local Areas’, Localis, 2010, p.17 |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Directly elected mayors would do little to renew local democracy. In the past, councils in the UK used to have a great deal of power, controlling schools, housing and local utilities, and setting budgets and raising revenues more or less as they wished. Since 1979 these powers have been greatly reduced with power increasingly centralised in Whitehall, which also greatly limits councils’ financial freedom so that local taxes bear little relation to local expenditure. [1] Not surprisingly, as the real decision-making power of local councils has diminished, so has the proportion of citizens who think it is worth voting for them. There is no reason to think that people will flock in greater numbers to vote for a mayor who may well end up with similar restrictions placed upon them. [1] Parry, Keith, ‘Local government: timeline from 1979’, House of Commons Library, 10 January 2008. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Electing a maverick candidate could do the image of a town or city a great deal of harm rather than good. Cities such as Birmingham have already been highly successful at attracting inward investment under the present system of local government. In any case, the major bureaucratic constraints on investment relate to issues of subsidy and tax-breaks, which are outlawed by the EU, and to national taxation and planning policies, set in Whitehall, none of which will be affected by an elected mayor. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Elected Mayors would attract the best candidates to run for office. Elected mayors would allow talented individuals to make a difference, regardless of their party affiliation. The present system rewards long-serving and loyal party hacks rather than innovative managers, thinkers and leaders; polls show that the public think councillors put party politics above the needs of their community. Those who are most talented who are elected are simply using the council as a stepping stone for running for national office. If mayors were directly elected, local parties would have to find dynamic candidates with a proven ability to solve problems and manage big organisations, or risk such candidates running and winning as independents. This has already been shown to be the case in London where Ken Livingstone (who initially became Mayor as an independent) and Boris Johnson, both established and well known politicians, ran for Mayor, and in Birmingham where Lam Byrne, formally no.2 at the treasury, has expressed an interest in running. [1] [1] BBC News, ‘Labour’s Liam Byrne wants to run for Birmingham mayor’, 30 March 2012. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Mayors would raise the profile of the city they represent Elected mayors would speak on behalf of their communities, raising the profile of their town or city nationally and internationally. This could be particularly valuable when negotiating with businesses, helping to draw valuable investment into their area and overcoming bureaucratic hurdles that typically hinder development. Chambers of commerce in cities that are holding referendums believe a figurehead will provide a focal point for business relations and a single point of contact that champions the city’s interests. [1] In addition, mayors would give local government in general a higher profile after years of increasing centralisation by national government. Acting collectively, and through the change in attitudes their higher media profile would generate, mayors would be able to draw power away from the centre once again and bring it closer to the people. [1] Carter, Andrew, ‘Mayors and Economic Growth’, in Tom Gash and Sam Sims eds., What can elected mayors do for our cities? Institute for Government, 2012, pp.37-42, p.41 |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | While there may be some extra costs to having a mayor this is likely to be marginal and overall costs may well fall, as Prime Minister Cameron argues “if you end up with a mayor, you’ll actually save money, because mayors can bang heads together, get rid of bureaucracy, and right now, any mayor worth their salt will be trying to get bills down.” [1] There are many layers of funding which create needless overlaps and administration; in Leicester it is estimated for economic development it costs £135 million in overheads to spend £176 million on projects, [2] an inefficiency the new mayor would be in a good position to get to grips with. [1] ITV News, ‘Bristol mayor will save money, says Prime Minister’, A Mayor for Bristol, 24, April 2012. [2] Carter, Andrew, ‘Mayors and Economic Growth’, in Tom Gash and Sam Sims eds., What can elected mayors do for our cities? Institute for Government, 2012, pp.37-42, p.42 |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Electing a mayor would not concentrate power too much in the hands of one individual. Although models of local government vary, mayors usually have to pick a cabinet from among the elected councillors and to seek approval for their policies and budget from the whole elected council. A mayor would thus have to persuade and build a consensus in order to govern effectively. This is a more transparent approach to local decision making than the present one, and should therefore be free from the accusations of corruption and nepotism that have been levied at the old system. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Directly elected mayors provide opportunities for populists. The position of elected mayor is likely to attract populist and maverick candidates, who will seek to capitalise on the unpopularity of party politics with “single issue sloganising, glib promises and headline grabbing” (Ken Walker, Labour leader of Middlesbrough council). [1] A good example is Paul Massey, who has had 25 convictions in the past and yet is running to be Mayor of Salford and could even have a chance of winning. [2] In office such candidates are likely to alienate elected councillors and other crucial local partners, to disappoint voters as their promises run up against the actual limitations of their power, and to neglect many aspects of local government in favour of their own pet issue. This danger is even greater if a far-right candidate were to exploit local concerns about immigration and asylum-seekers to inflame racial tensions. Again Lutfur Rahman of Tower Hamlets is a good example of how this could happen, he has links to a Muslim extremist group, and only needed a mere 23,000 votes, 13% of the electorate because there was such low turnout. [3] [1] Hetherington, Peter, ‘Vote for US-style mayors exposes deep Labour rifts’, The Guardian, 20 October 2001. [2] Gilligan, Andrew, ;The town hall dictator taking over near you’, The Telegraph, 22 April 2012. [3] ibid |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Mayors could split economic regions The value of a mayor is dependent upon that mayor having a distinct area of control. However often this area is set too small. Cities are the hubs for neighbouring towns and countryside as well as the inner city. This could then end up splitting up economic regions. Birmingham and Coventry are very close to each other but at some point in the future could potentially have different city mayors. There would then be confusion; who runs regional transport policy or the West Midlands police that affects both cities? [1] [1] McCabe, Steve, ‘An executive mayor – can we afford it?, Birmingham Mail, 17 April 2012. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Mayors will come at a cost Having Mayors is costly. First of all there is the referendum and the election of the Mayor himself which Bristol council has said could cost up to £400,000. [1] This is then followed by the extra administrative cost created by having a Mayor who will of course have to have deputies, staff, offices, cars and a publicity budget, which could mean up to £3 million a year. [2] This is money that at a time where councils are facing budget cuts could be better spent on shoring up the services councils provide. [1] The Economist, ‘Why elected mayors matter’, 19 April 2012. [2] McCabe, Steve, ‘An executive mayor – can we afford it?, Birmingham Mail, 17 April 2012. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Mayors would result in too much centralisation of power. An elected mayor would have too much power, making the prospect of its misuse alarming. If the mayor has the power to choose their own cabinet of councillors, this could be as small as three members, all of whom could be sacked at will for opposing the wishes of the mayor. If the mayor has the right to delegate powers to his cabinet members, they equally have the authority to reserve all the real powers to themselves. And those councillors outside the cabinet would have little to do other than to monitor broken streetlights and the standard of refuse collection in their ward. Why would talented and ambitious people stand for council in these circumstances, and what would the absence of such people do for the council’s oversight of the mayor? |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | Coordinating between a few mayors in a region is considerably easier than between hundreds of councillors. The whole point of devolving power is to let local people have more influence and decide for themselves. Neighbouring areas could eventually have referendums to become part of the area controlled by the mayor if it is seen as being necessary just as they would to get a mayor of their own. |
local government house would directly elect city mayors | If the position of Mayor is given powers then it will attract a wide range of candidates, which may include extremists. However these candidates are no more likely to win than they would be in any other election. As with any other election voters are likely to vote for centrist candidates that have strong manifestos and good ideas about how to solve the city’s problems. |
y political philosophy politics defence government house would impose democracy | First, it is not clear whether such a position is topical. Second, it is better to support protesters in this case, rather than taking the lead. To begin with, it is not clear that assisting individuals in the fight for democracy is a valid interpretation of the phrase "imposing democracy": if the majority of people want it, perhaps it is not really an imposition. But second and more importantly, if internal movements exist, foreign nations should seek to strengthen and support those movements rather than impose a government. Democratic governments gain legitimacy through popular support: both in origin and in survival. A government chosen and filled by the citizenry is far more legitimate, and thus more likely to command respect and maintain order, than one enforced by a foreign regime. |
y political philosophy politics defence government house would impose democracy | Imposing democracy can be a way to support individuals unable to fight for democracy themselves. If the people within a nation want democracy, it is not wrong -- indeed it may even be morally required -- for us to assist them by imposing democracy against the will of the governing class. Often internal movements lack resources, weapons, or organization, making the fight for democracy very difficult. When individuals seek to defend their rights against an oppressive regime, other nations do them a disservice by allowing evil to win out. Thus NATO's intervention in Libya was in support of rebels often seen as part of the 'Arab spring' wave of democratization but the internal movement even if it had large amounts of support was being suppressed and would have been destroyed without outside intervention1. 1 Traub, James. "Stepping In", Foreign Policy |
y political philosophy politics defence government house would impose democracy | First, democracies are not necessarily more peaceful than other governments. Second, imposition of democracy is likely to fuel terrorism. First, it is not entirely clear that democracies have not gone to war: for example the Central Powers in WWI, although not classified as democracies per se, did have elected parliaments just like the Allies. Further, just because democracies have not gone to war in the past does not mean they will not in the future: a culture of negotiation within the democracy does not necessarily translate into a lack of aggression externally. Second, even if democracies are more peaceful, the imposition of democracy can threaten to world peace by fuelling terrorist movements. Invasions, particularly by Western nations, increase East-West tensions, galvanize terrorist groups by validating their claims that Western nations pose a threat. Indeed, in Osama bin Laden's public "letter to the American people," he cited interventions in Somalia, Palestine, India, Chechnya, Lebanon and Iraq as reasons for the 9/11 attacks1/2. 1 "Do Democracies Fight Each Other?" BBC. 2 bin Laden, Osama. "Full Text: bin Laden's 'Letter to America.' The Guardian. |
y political philosophy politics defence government house would impose democracy | Interventions can be successful given the right conditions. Certain factors may increase the chance of success: for example imposing democracy on a nation with which there were once colonial relationships increases the expected lifespan of the democracy. Democratic transitions in general also tend to be more successful if economic conditions are better. Obviously we are not advocating imposing democracy on every country which does not have it, but if there are strong enough institutions and conditions, imposition can work and there have been past successes like Germany and Japan post WWII that show the worth of imposing democracy1/2. 1 Enterline, Andrew J. and Greig, J. Michael."Against All Odds? Historical Trends in Imposed Democracy & the Future of Iraq & Afghanistan." 2 Przeworski et al "What Makes Democracies Endure?" Journal of Democracy. |
y political philosophy politics defence government house would impose democracy | Interventions are far more likely to fail than to succeed. As explained further in Opposition Argument 2, empirically and logically imposed democracy is likely to fail. Governments can try and minimize the risk of failure, but it is inherent to the nature of imposition that a government is being instated against the country's will. It is consequently very unlikely to generate support and remain stable. |
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