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We have seen variations in opinion regarding political and economic issues (e.g. monetary union) in the EU. In the far more thorny area of defence policy, the EU member-nations’ interests are even more divergent. For example, the French position on Algeria may be different from the United Kingdom’s. This difference in priorities will ultimately lead to deadlock, as no country wishes to see its soldiers dying on a battlefield that provides no direct strategic interest to itself. | |
A single army would enhance the political integration of EU members states The European Union has significant integration and convergence of the political and economic spheres. Integration of defence policy and the establishment of a European Defence Force should be the logical next step. The African Union took this step and has achieved success in combat missions defending the Union [1] . [1] The UN Refugee Agency (31 January, 2008) Comoros: Military invasion of Anjouan imminent, government warns. Accessed September 7, 2011 from: | |
NATO and the proposed European Defence Force are designed to address very different concerns. NATO exists to deal with situations of such magnitude that the nations of Western Europe are likely to adopt a common defence policy. In contrast, the EDF is targeted at smaller geopolitical incidents which would otherwise be ‘beneath’ the notice of NATO. Unfortunately smaller incidents by their nature do not have uniform effects on all EU member-nations, and are therefore unlikely to generate a consensus of policy among EU nations. | |
Regional instability in certain areas of continental europe necessitates the creation of an EU defence force Constant political instability and war in and near the Middle East call for a united single force charged with the defence of EU countries lying close to the volatile areas.. Turkey is a prime candidate for EU membership, and with its location on the border of both Syria and Iraq, will require support if its refugee problem is to remain manageable. The revolutions in Northern Africa also call for a stabilising force in the region, particularly in Italy where a ‘refugee crisis’ has coincided with the attempts of anti-Gaddafi Libyans to flee the country [1] . If the EU is to take its growing role upon the world stage seriously, it needs a dedicated defence force to make an impact in the region. [1] Day, M. (14 May, 2011) Flood of North African refugees to Italy ends EU passport-free travel. Accessed September 7, 2011 from: | |
The EU needs a dedicated defence force It is important for the EU to have a defence policy independent of NATO. With its origins in the Cold War, and its preponderance of American influence, NATO carries a great deal of historical and geopolitical baggage. This means that NATO cannot easily intervene in Eastern Europe without incurring the displeasure of Russia. This was best proven during the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia, when Georgia’s impending accession to NATO was seen as part of the incentive for Russian support to the ‘break-away’ regions in Georgia [1] . The European Defence Force will allow the EU to deal with crises in Eastern and Central Europe more effectively, as they will not have to tiptoe around Russia as much. [1] Parsons, R. (8 August, 2008). Georgia pays price for its NATO ambitions. Accessed September 7, 2011 from: | |
NATO has successfully defended the interests of Western Europe for several decades now – why rock the boat? It is hard to see a problem which NATO cannot solve, which the European Defence Force could instead. In any case, we will always have to consider Russia’s sensibilities when engaging in peacekeeping operations in Eastern Europe, and it is far better to have America’s bargaining power and geopolitical clout backing us when we negotiate with Russia. If we create a European Defence Force, we will marginalise NATO and the United States. This will lead to a reduced US engagement in Europe, which may in turn diminish our influence when having discussions with Russia over security issues in Europe and beyond. | |
Although there is instability in neighbouring regions, most of Europe is in complete and utter peace. The new force would simply be another layer of defence in a stable continent that simply doesn’t need it. War in Europe is completely inconceivable in the 21st century, and considering the threat of war should be the primary reason for holding a standing army, it seems that an EU army has no reasonable case for existence. | |
Even if we assume that the massive costs of a standing military force can be borne by the EU and its members, the key barriers to establishing a standing defence force are often political. Creating a European Defence Force de novo would require us to decide on several thorny questions, namely the command structure, whether the role should be merely defensive or include peacekeeping, the choice of equipment and supplier, creating a common defence policy, and choosing a language of communication. All of these questions involve political considerations or economic vested interests, all of which are likely to result in on-going wrangling that will yield a stillborn EDF. | |
NATO has established a precedent for multilateral military action NATO has been crucial to maintaining the balance of power during the cold war. Although there have been some arguments amongst its member states, NATO has shown us that a standing multinational defence force is possible and more importantly works well overall. The recent NATO deployment in Libya is an example of its regional influence and military flexibility [1] . Considering many members of NATO are also members of the EU, the proposed European Defence Force could follow its example and complement it. [1] BBC News (26 August, 2011) Libya conflict: Nato jets hit Gaddafi Sirte bunker. Accessed September 7, 2011 from: | |
The economic strength of the EU enables the creation of a strong military With the growing industrial and economic maturity of the European Union and its members, it is now financially feasible for the EU to have its own standing defence force [1] . The proposed EDF would also create a great many jobs as European defence contractors could be recruited into supplying equipment and weaponry. [1] Amadeo, K.. The EU has replaced the U.S. as the world’s largest economy. Accessed September 7, 2011 from About: | |
This is mostly speculation. The proposition takes a more optimistic view of US-EU relations after the creation of a European Defence Force. America will more than welcome a strong friend in the region, anything to calm the instability in the near regions of North Africa and the Middle East, not to mention the global markets. | |
The EU has managed to pass similar large amounts of apparently ‘unconstitutional’ legislation through member state legislatures. The Lisbon Treaty, for example, managed to be signed. And so, it seems that archaic constitutional convention cannot stop EU integration – the European Project is simply turning its eyes upon defence: integration has occurred in many walks of life, now it is defence policy’s turn. | |
Germany Europe has been torn apart twice in the 20th century and on both occasions a German Army has been the aggressor. If the E.U. ever had a defence force, no doubt German troops would be at the heart of it. It is just over 60 years ago that German troops invaded many of the countries that today will be forced to fight alongside them. This, especially for the people who fought against a German Army and are alive today, is at best insulting and at worst, political provocation. This is even without mentioning the Holocaust and its ever-present artifacts that litter eastern Europe; a constant reminder to Europeans of the horrors a German Army had once committed. | |
A large and diverse collective defence for would be impossible to command and develop It does not take an in-depth analysis to imagine the issues, on the ground and at HQ, such as army would face. There would be communication issues, would the force use French, Spanish or English? There would be accountability questions [1] , who would be in charge and who would pay for resources? Finally, there would be hostilities within the army and potentially inherent racism between the nations involved. Such a force would not be effective in a combat situation, and valuable lives and resources would be wasted. [1] Ioannides, I. (4 September, 2002). The European Rapid Reaction Force: Implications for Democratic Accountability. Accessed September 7, 2011 from: | |
The creation of a standing army would be contrary to the spirit and purpose of the EU It was not the aim of the original European Community to integrate defence. The original partnership was called the European Coal and Steel Community for a reason [1] , designed as a union for mutual economic development and the sharing of scarce resources [2] . The acceleration of the EU has therefore gotten out of hand, and it’s high time it came to an end. A defence force would be one step to far – it would signal the creation of some sort of federal super state, something that not many people in Europe want. [1] CVCE (18 April, 1951). Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. Accessed September 7, 2011 from: [2] The Irish Times (26 August, 2011). A thirst for peace. Accessed September 7, 2011 from: | |
The creation of an EU army could harm diplomatic relations with the USA We are completely ignoring the issue of geopolitics and how the creation of this entity would be a direct move to replace NATO as the primary defender of Europe. This would of course mean a rejection of the US, as the heart of NATO. What would follow from this would be an extremely unpredictable and volatile place to practice international relations. One thing that we can predict, however, will be the ‘cold shoulder’ the US would suddenly show the EU. The US would feel as if its ally had used it to gain strength after WWII (The Marshall Plan), and now that it’s back on its feet again can forget and even challenge America’s supremacy. | |
The proposition believes in a more liberal and open-minded average European soldier. There will be no communication issues in the 21st century where translators and bilingual officers are easy to come by. There will be no accountability issues when we create a proper command structure. And there will be no racism because to believe that there would be is to prejudge the whole of Europe and insult the culture-shapers’ attempts to respect and learn from Europe’s dark past, not to repeat it. | |
Constitutional obstructions Every EU country would have an incredibly hard time making the constitutional changes necessary for the handing over of a part of defence policy to an EU institution. In fact, for many EU countries it would be unworkable. In the U.K., constitutional issues might not be as bad as say in France – but this does not change the fact that it would require deft political skill and manoeuvring, often undemocratic and without any sort of referendum, in order to make the constitutional changes necessary to create this force [1] . [1] Wagner, W. (May 19, 2007). The Democratic Deficit in the EU’s Security and Defense Policy – why bother? . Accessed September 7, 2011 from: | |
It might not have been the original aim to integrate defence. Nevertheless, it doesn't mean that defence integration should not be done. The aims are changeable; they should be reconsidered and revised, according to requirements and demands of current situations. Few would have imagined how far Europe would come in other areas such as freedom of movement or the creation of a European Common Foreign policy from a mere industrial coalition between few countries. The EDF will be a rationally reasonable step for the EU, considering the advances that the community has made in integration in other areas of policy. To protect all its achievements, to connect its member states, and to provide its citizens with more safety the EU needs a dedicated defence force. | |
The status of Germany is an irrelevant issue. What has happened in the past should have no bearing on judging the Germany of today. Their whole system of government and culture has changed with a new constitution and the maturity of an open-minded youth born after WW2. It’s simply an insult to judge those Germans who have done everything they can to make up for the past atrocities of their nation, by once again digging up the past. | |
In other cases, such as in Yugoslavia, the deterrent effects of international courts have been dubious. Prosecutions, far from being on both sides, may lead to allegations of bias against one side or another by the international court, which could lead to it being seen as merely another battlefield. | |
Would prevent further atrocities An international mechanism where Sharon would have been able to be tried would be likely to have been one which would have been able to hear cases dealing with the – serious – allegations of crimes against humanity and war crimes by various other groups such as the al-Qassam brigades (the paramilitary group attached to Hamas). This would have been able to prevent further atrocities by acting as a deterrent through punitive methods as well as showing that the law applies to Western nations and their allies too. | |
Is an aid for historians really worth all the upheaval and problems a trial would cause? Denialism can still continue even though there are established facts, such as denial of the Japanese role in Second World War forced prostitution [1] . [1] See Honda, Masakazu and Takada, Makoto, “LDP Pressure led to cuts in NHK show”, The Asahi Shimbun, 12 January 2005, | |
Impunity In addition to events mentioned in the introduction, Sharon was accused of, along with troops under his command, execution-style killings of 49 Egyptian civilians taken prisoner by the IDF in the Saini peninsula in 1956 [1] - wilful killing of civilians being a war crime as per the Fourth Geneva Convention. The purpose of international criminal law is that individuals are brought to trial to ensure that individuals are held accountable for war crimes and crimes against humanity: if a person isn’t prosecuted, either by a domestic or international court, the credibility of the limits civilized nations place on war is eroded. [1] Miller, Marjorie, ‘Israel to Probe Deaths of Egyptian POWs in '56 : Sinai: At Cairo's request, defense officials will investigate general's claim that scores were shot.’, Los Angeles Times, 16 August 1995, | |
It is up to sovereign states to deal with their own criminality, not that of international courts. Israel decided Sharon had nothing to answer for. There have been commissions into some of his actions; the Khan Commission of Inquiry looked into the massacre at Sabra and Shatilla and concluded that “blunders constitute the non-fulfillment of a duty with which the Defense Minister was charged.” Sharon was only indirectly responsible. [1] When he became a head of state, head of state immunity applied to him – a necessary thing to keep the wheels of international diplomacy turning. This has been accepted by the International Court of Justice in the arrest warrant case [2] . [1] The Kahan Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report into the Events at the Refugee Camps in Beirut’, Jewish Virtual Library, 8 February 1983, [2] Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 14 February 2002 | |
This fails for two reasons. Firstly, prosecutions are not always a deterrent to future crimes. Secondly that justice is not necessary in all cases to prevent recidivism – justice has not been needed in many cases, such as in Haiti after the 2004 coup, Haiti’s subsequent problems being caused by natural disasters. Even if Sharon were to be brought to trial before an international tribunal, the Israeli state apparatus would be able to carry on with a new leader, rendering the exercise futile in trying to stop the conflict. A prosecution would not have brought peace it would simply entrench the Israeli position. | |
Historical record Prosecutions by international criminal courts have a positive side-effect of creating a historical record of events. This creates an impartial record of events which takes in to account the evidence provided by all parties. By removing scope for denialism, a peace can be constructed on the foundations of an impartial truth. Many of the actions of Israel have been controversial, The Guardian says it is the issue that is most controversial and comes under most scrutiny, [1] such an impartial historical record would be particularly useful for a full understanding of atrocities committed by all sides. [1] Editorial, ‘Fairness: Israel – Palestine’, guardian.co.uk, accessed 16/1/2014, | |
Necessary for an impartial peace. By prosecuting perpetrators, justice creates a deterrent. The deterrent effect, as accepted in criminal law generally, is likely to make the peace more long standing and stable in the future – it will make those minded to perform atrocities think again. If those who committed atrocities ‘get away with it’ they will be much more likely to plunge the country back into violence. If Sharon was prosecuted for his crimes in the 50s, would he have gone on to have the same political career? He would likely not have had the chance to allow the Sabra and Shatia massacre or Operation Defensive Shield. [1] The career of Laurent Nkunda is a good example of this; he fought in the Tutsi group that took control of Rwanda in 1994 ending the genocide and then was a rebel commander in both Congolese civil wars in which he was accused of atrocities before launching his own rebellion, only now after 14 years as an army commander is he under arrest [2] . Clearly Nkunda being locked up at some stage would have been better than regularly negotiating with him to try and create peace. [1] Hasan, Mehdi, ‘Five Numbers That Suggest Ariel Sharon Was a War Criminal’, Huffington Post, 12 January 2014, [2] BBC News, “Profile: General Laurent Nkunda”, 23 January 2009, | |
Good: impunity is a bad thing. Those who break those norms of international law , and commit war crimes, crimes against humanity and the crime of aggression should be prosecuted - on all sides. Actions by Hamas and other organizations that are reprehensible are matters that should be brought before impartial courts, too. While there is no international international definition of terrorism, there are a number of acts which are prohibited by particular treaties – they can be prosecuted too. | |
If both parties are sincere negotiators – which is doubtful at best – the prospect of prosecutions may focus the mind on preventing further atrocities, de-escalating the situation entirely. | |
Was unlikely ever to happen anyway At any rate, a prosecution was unlikely. In addition to the general support for Israel amongst the permanent members of the UN Security Council such as the United States – the US would have been likely to use its veto power to stop any International Criminal Tribunal for Israel-Palestine. Also, many of these actions were before the renaissance of international criminal law in the early 1990s following the creation of the ICTY and ICTR by UN Security Council resolutions. | |
Took a key role in negotiations Sharon was not a genocidal maniac. He led the withdrawal of settlers from Gaza, as part of the unilateral disengagement plan. If he continued in office, perhaps further negotiations would have continued with further successes rather than the stalled talks and false hope of more recent events. [1] Leaks of State department Cables show that Sharon had stressed to US senators that he would face down “a left that has no power, and a right which was totally opposed to his initiative” in order to negotiate a peace and was willing to hand over some Arab neighbourhoods in Jerusalem and he said “A final settlement might take a few years, but it can be achieved.” [2] [1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, [2] Ravid, Barak, ‘Sharon was planning diplomatic moves beyond Gaza, leaked documents reveal’, Haaretz, 13 January 2014, | |
If Sharon is tried then many others would have to be as well While many of the actions of Sharon were unacceptable, he is not the only person who committed horrible acts: not just only in the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, but across the world. If he were to be prosecuted, many others would be. Hamas figures would have to be indicted for their actions, too – for example Mohammed Deif, who masterminded the 1996 Jaffa Road bus bombings which killed 33 civilians as with many other commanders of groups – Hamas, Islamic Jihad, even Fatah - that have engaged in targeting civilians could be put on trial. | |
Prosecutions are an impediment to peace negotiations A prosecution against a prominent military or political figure could jeopardize faith in the international community, which would be harmful to peace negotiations. Prosecuting one side would effectively allocate blame, damaging Israel’s position. Sharon may have been the only man who could have led the Gaza pullout, [1] he would not have had the chance or would not have been able to if he was prosecuted. This is not a new concern – there were issues following ICTY indictments and the Dayton negotiation, with some parties being unable to attend [2] . Similarly, the Lord’s Resistance Army offered to surrender but refused due to ICC arrest warrants [3] . [1] Vick, Karl, ‘Ariel Sharon: Israel’s Soldier and Strongman, 1928-2014’, Time, 11 January 2014, [2] Goldstone, Richard, “Peace versus Justice”, Nevada Law Journal, 2006, at p421-p322 [3] Otim, Michael, and Wierda, Marieke, ‘Justice at Juba: International Obligations and Local Demands in Northern Uganda’, in Waddell and Clark eds., Courting Conflict? Justice, Peace and the ICC in Africa, pp.21-28 | |
The occupation of the West Bank still continued, including the construction of settlements. The general role of individuals in the peace negotiations is beside the point: individuals who commit atrocities should be responsible for them. | |
Just because something is difficult does not mean it should not be attempted. Israel itself was no stranger to war crimes trials between Nuremberg and the ICTY: Adolf Eichmann, the logistical architect of the Holocaust, was tried and put to death by an Israeli court in 1962. Sharon has been accused of things after the creation of the ICTY came in to force, such as deaths as a result of Israeli operations in Jenin in 2002 [1] . [1] Human Rights Watch, ‘Jenin’, 2 May 2002, | |
The majority of these laws have done little to prevent citizens from seeking a career as a mercenary. While they are commendable on principle, mercenary specific legislation has not translated in to a high number of prosecutions for mercenarism in Africa7. Examples such as Angola and Zimbabwe are rare exceptions. Mercenaries generally operate in conflict zones, where government control is weak. This makes it difficult for the state to enforce such laws, especially as the mercenaries may be working for opposition factions. 7) Fallah,K. ‘Corporate actors: the legal status of mercenaries in armed conflict’, 2006 pg. 610 | |
Legislation against mercenaries Nation states and the United Nations have passed laws making mercenary activity illegal. Legislation against mercenaries prevent either seeking employment as a mercenary or hiring one. Western states such as Austria and Germany have made it illegal for citizens to become mercenaries, revoking their citizenship if they choose to do so anyway6. South Africa, a major source of hired guns, passed the ‘foreign military assistance act’ in 1998 which prohibited citizens from joining foreign wars with the exception of humanitarian intervention. In international law, the United Nations has outlawed mercenaries through the UN Mercenary Convention of 1989 which bans the use of foreign soldiers from fighting for profit. Finally, many African states have passed further legislation which restricts mercenaries operating in their countries. The trial of thirteen mercenaries in Angola and the arrests of Simon Mann’s unit Zimbabwe in 2004 were both due to their mercenary status. The increased legal pressure is a symptom of changing attitudes towards the use of mercenaries in Africa. 6) Mian,Q. ‘Legal status of mercenaries’ | |
There are still enough wars and rebel movements to provide opportunity for employment. By 2013 there were 23 conflicts in Africa, with many other small militia groups actively fighting low-intensity wars. This stream of conflicts has ensured revenue for mercenaries. Reports have surfaced that ex-commander for the anti-terror unit in Liberia, Benjamin Yeaten, raised a mercenary force to fight against the army of the Ivory Coast between 2012 and 201311 With the prediction of ‘forever wars’ by Gettlemen12, where rebels have no object except banditry, mercenaries could maintain their prevalence in Africa for a long time. 11) Heritage ‘Liberia: UN reports- Yeaten remains a threat to peace and security in Liberia’ 2013 12) Gettlement,J. ‘Africa’s Forever Wars’ Foreign Policy 2012 | |
Private corporations have replaced mercenaries Private Military Companies (PMCs) are independent, registered, corporate actors who have risen in prominence and replaced mercenaries in their security function. PMCs are different to mercenaries in the sense that mercenaries will fight for the highest bidder. PMCs on the other hand will only work for legitimate governments and intergovernmental organisations such as the UN1. Their main roles include; support services, logical support, humanitarian support and the upholding of law and order and defensive military action2. PMC activity has seen corporations operating on behalf of the Somalian government training coast guards to deal with the threat of piracy which peaked in 20093. The legal status of PMCs, compared with mercenaries, makes them a preferable choice for the aforementioned tasks reducing the prominence of illegal hired guns. 1) Jefferies,I. ‘Private Military Companies- A Positive Role to Play in Today’s International System’, 2002 Pg.106 2) Jefferies,I. ‘Private Military Companies- A Positive Role to Play in Today’s International System’, 2002 Pg.107 3) Stupart,J. ‘Somalia’s PMCs: What’s the Big Deal?’, 2012 | |
PMCs are just mercenaries under a different name, demonstrating a continued prevalence of the dogs of war in Africa. To escape the name, and the illegal status, of mercenary a PMC must only avoid one of the several clauses laid out by the United Nations Mercenary Convention4 While they are rarely hired for fighting roles, companies such as Military Professional Resources Inc. have demonstrated a willingness to engage in military operations; making them guns for hire5. Executive Outcomes’ operations in Sierra Leone equated to mercenary work, as they undertook offensive military operations with a force of foreign soldiers for profitable gain. In this sense, mercenaries still maintain their position on the continent. 4) Sheimer,M. ‘Separating Private Military Companies From Illegal Mercenaries in International Law’, 2009 Pg. 624 5) Milliard,S. ‘Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognise and Regulate Private Military Companies’, 2003 Pg.16 | |
More than half of African countries are ruled by dictatorships. Authoritarian regimes remain numerous enough, and the opposition still prominent enough, for there to be adequate instability for mercenaries to gain employment. During the Libyan revolution, caused by the poor governance of Gaddafi’s regime, South African mercenaries attempted to extract Gaddafi from Libya with supposed Tuaregs joining his force as guns for hire14. 14) Hicks,C. ‘Tuareg rebels make troubled return from Libya to Mali’ 2012 | |
Decreased Conflict and the end of the mercenary age The decline of conflicts and mercenary freedom on the African continent has meant less work for mercenaries. The Congo conflict of the 1960s, is seen as the first mercenary age8. Hired guns fought on all sides of the conflict and enjoyed the freedom to act at their discretion. The 1976 execution of mercenaries in Angola was seen as a symbolic ending of this age. That said, mercenaries were still prevalent into the 1990s and early 2000s. Since the peak of the 1990s, however, there has been a noticeable decrease in the number of conflicts in Africa from 27 civil wars and 9 interstate wars to 5 major civil wars and no interstate wars9,10 . As wars and civil unrest are an obvious source of employment for mercenaries; this decrease in conflict leaves them with fewer opportunities. The African Union’s promise to end war on the continent by 2020 also puts the future prospects of mercenaries in to question. 8) Keane,F. ‘There will be work for mercenaries in Africa until democracy replaces dictatorships’ 2004 9) The World Bank ‘World Development Report 2011’ pg.52 10) Wikipedia ‘List of ongoing armed conflicts’ | |
The expansion of democracy The increased presence of democracies on the African continent has led to greater security. Mercenary activity is usually associated with the presence of bad governance, which is most commonly featured in dictatorships. Dictatorships generally lead to corruption, unrest and economic collapse. The dispossessed in society then begin to resist, with the ensuing conflict providing employment opportunities for mercenaries. A prime example of this being Equatorial Guinea, where mercenary Simon Mann planned to use popular support to remove the infamous Teodoro Nguema13. Since the first mercenary age, however, the number of democracies has increased from 3 to 25 which has reduced instability on the continent in some regions, reducing opportunities for mercenaries. 13) Keane,F. ‘There will be work for mercenaries in Africa until democracy replaces dictatorships’ 2004 | |
NGOs are actively discouraged from hiring mercenaries. In 2003, UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw strongly advised against the use of mercenaries by British companies on the Ivory Coast. In addition to government deterrence, many charities are more likely to depend on the United Nations to secure conflict zones before they operate. In Darfur, aid agencies relied upon the United Nations to set up refugee camps in the region rather than seek protection from mercenaries27. 27) Pham,J. ‘Send in the Mercenaries’ 2006 | |
Firstly, the emergence of the African Union (AU) as a peacekeeping force on the continent negates the need for mercenaries. The AU’s has become increasingly involved in peacekeeping since 200316. They are more willing to involve themselves in African affairs than the West, and have deployed the lion’s share of soldiers in peacekeeping operations as in the Central African Republic17. Secondly, the UN has condemned mercenary use in general and it would seem hypocritical to begin hiring them. The UN’s weaker states have been reluctant to agree to UN mercenaries for fear they could be used against them18. The UN has actively criticised humanitarian mercenaries in the past for their lack of appreciation of conflict dynamics19, making them unlikely to employ dogs of war. 16) Pan,E. ‘African Peacekeeping Operations’ December 2005 17) Felix,B. ‘Militia attack Muslim neighbourhoods in Central African Republic’s Capital’ 2013 18) Avant,D. ‘Mercenaries’ pg.26 19) Chrisafis,A. ‘UN and aid groups criticise “Humanitarian Mercenaries’ 2007 | |
Mercenaries still have a presence in coups African Mercenaries have been crucial to the success of many coups in the 21st Century, and are a ‘ubiquitous factor in the continent’s conflicts over the years, often determining the duration or outcomes of such conflicts’20. The 2013 coup in the Central African Republic saw President Francois Bozizi ousted from power and was accomplished with support of mercenaries from Chad and the Sudan21. An attempted coup by Simon Mann against Equatorial Guinea failed in 2004 and Bob Dernard’s five coups against the Comoros22 demonstrate that mercenaries still have a role in the changing of political leaders within Africa. 20) Mwagiru,C. ‘Mercenaries: Are the ‘dogs of war’ still prevalent in Africa?’ 2012 21) Melly,P. ‘Central African Republic: France and the CAR- Now Comes the Hard Part’ 2013 22) Mwagiru,C. ‘They Kill Africans, paid by Africans’ 2012 | |
Cyber Mercenaries There is a new form of mercenary appearing on the continent which is hired to use technology, rather than a gun, to fight. Cyber mercenaries are a relatively recent phenomenon. In 2013, British intelligence service GCHQ stated that nations were beginning to employ hackers to ‘attack their enemies’28. Kenya experienced attacks by cyber mercenaries in 2013, with 91% of its organisations coming under attack from these hired hackers29. There is potential for this to become a substantial form of mercenary work in the future. 28) The Age ‘Hackers turn into cyber-mercenaries as nations battle a virtual war’ 2013 29) Murule,R. ‘Kenya: Firms Battle Cyber Crime’ 2013 | |
Mercenaries are still hired by NGOs Non-Governmental organisations struggle to operate in conflict zones, and still hire mercenaries to protect them. Extractive industries also require security for their installations and operations in unstable regions25. The massacre of 74 civilians at a Chinese oil field in Ethiopia in 2007 and the 2013 Amenas siege demonstrate the continued need for security, which mercenaries can provide. Charities have employed mercenaries in the past to ensure better security. In 2002, mercenaries were hired by the African Rainforest and Rivers Conservation Organisation to seek out elephant poachers who they could not pursue themselves26. 25) Avant,D. ‘Mercenaries’2004, pg.26 26) Astill,J. ‘Charities hire gunmen to stop elephant poachers’ 2002 | |
Humanitarian mercenaries Mercenaries are finding a more ethical role in the form of humanitarian missions. The idea of humanitarian mercenaries is a concept of hired guns employed by governments and the United Nations to prevent genocide in the place of nation state militaries. The major benefit of using mercenaries would be the absence of a political cost should there be mercenary causalities as seen in Iraq15. There will not be waning political support from the military’s home country. Early examples include the use of mercenaries in Sierra Leone. When the Revolutionary Unified Front (RUF) was advancing on the capital Executive Outcomes and other mercenaries held back the RUF, preventing a massacre. They would later seek out and destroy elements of the rebel group. The lack of political cost makes them ideal for operations where other countries have no domestic political will to intervene. 15) Raffin,R. ‘Humanitarian Mercenaries’ 2008 | |
Hired hackers don’t count as real mercenaries. While it is true that they are not a citizen of either state’s military structure and that they seek to gain profit from their venture, they do not qualify under the UN mercenary convention. To be a mercenary, one must qualify under all the conditions listed in the convention. Cyber mercenaries are not directly involved in acts of violence, which disqualifies them under Article 1, sub-section 2.A of the UN mercenary convention30. Definitions will have to be updated in the future if cyber-mercenaries are going to be considered anything other than criminals. 30) United Nations ‘United Nations Mercenary Convention’ 1989 | |
Coups are becoming less frequent and less successful. The number of coups, which some mercenaries headed personally, has decreased from an average twenty per decade between 1960 and 1990 to ten a decade23. Success has also been less forthcoming; Simon Mann’s attempted coup in Equatorial Guinea was met with failure when he was arrested in Zimbabwe, and Bob Denard was eventually arrested by French forces for disgracing France’s reputation abroad with his frequent coups24. 23) August,O. ‘Africa Rising: A Hopeful Continent’ 2013 24) Mwagiru,C. ‘They Kill Africans, paid by Africans’ 2012 | |
The long-term security of Israel rests in a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempting to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security. A crucial step towards peace is to bring Hamas to the bargaining table. Israel's levelling of Gaza emboldened Hamas' message of resistance, and allowed Gazans to continue to rely on Hamas. As long as Israel continues to justify Arab and Palestinian anger through its disproportionate response, it is unlikely that enough trust can be established to reach a peace deal. Even Israelis recognize that this assualt has created an even larger barrier to peace. “This policy [Operation Cast Lead] is not strengthening Israel,” noted Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues. “The trauma that 1.5 million people have been undergoing in Gaza is going to have long-term effects for our ability to live together."(10) | |
The military operations were necessary for long term peace: As Michael Oren and Yossi Klein Haleviargue explain, “the Israeli public will not make territorial concessions on the West Bank or the Golan Heights if Gaza is allowed to become a neighboring terrorist state that can launch attacks with impunity. Israel had already had a bad enough experience letting that happen with Hezbollah in Southern Lebanon.”(1) Without the assurance that they will be allowed to protect their homes and families following withdrawal, Israelis will rightly perceive a two-state solution as an existential threat. They will continue to share the left-wing vision of coexistence with a peaceful Palestinian neighbor in theory, but in reality will heed the right's warnings of Jewish powerlessness.(4) Meanwhile, the stronger Hamas becomes, the more resistance moderate Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas will face to making any concessions to Israel.(1) Therefore damaging Hamas, via Operation Cast Lead, actually aided the peace process in the long run, and was necessary in order to make an eventual two-state peace solution possible. The Israeli attacks may also eventually help force Hamas to accept a more durable ceasefire. Unlike the botched invasion of Lebanon in 2006, when Israel set itself the unattainable goal of eliminating the military capability of Hezbollah, during Operation Cast Lead it was made clear that the objective was not to wipe out Hamas, but instead to force the radical group to accept a durable cease-fire on Israel's terms.(8) This was necessary as prior to Operation Cast Lead Hamas showed no interest in peace, opting instead to pursue its political objectives through the use of terrorism. When Hamas came to power in Gaza in January 2006, it failed to control the rocket fire from the variety of miltary brigades, including its own al-Qassam brigade, into Israel and failed to establish internal stability. The widespread violence between Fatah and Hamas, which ended in June 2007, when Hamas took control of Gaza and ousted leaders of President Mahmoud Abbas's Fatah movement, made Israel more wary of the security threat an unstable Gaza could pose.(9) In Israel's view, Hamas' behavior and its reliance on terror tactics will never change if it thinks it can attack with impunity, and so the Israeli military operations were necessary and justified in the name of restoring Israel's deterrent and weakening Hamas, both of which make long term peace more likely. | |
Under the same logic, over 1 million residents of Gaza have been under occupation since 1967, facing limited rights of movement, regular air raids, military checkpoints, random searches and seizures, random arrests, the destruction of sanitation facilities, homes, schools, roads, shops, markets, and health facilities, and therefore Hamas has the right act in its own self-defense by whatever means it sees fit. If Palestinians do not have an army to call to its defense, how can the entire population be punished for the actions of non-state military groups? Israel’s right to take positive steps of some kind in the interests of its own safety does not mean it has the right to do anything it wishes in order to protect itself. It is also evident that Israel violated international law and committed war crimes, was was reported in the Goldstone Report. Between the time when the shelling from Gaza started in 2001 and Operation Cast Lead, 20 Israeli civilians were killed by rockets or mortars, according to estimates by Israeli human rights groups. That doesn’t justify an all-out ground invasion that killed more than 1,400 people.(10) As Javier Solana, chief of foreign policy for the European Union, said in late December 2008, "the current Israeli strikes are inflicting an unacceptable toll on Palestinian civilians."(14) It is a widely accepted principle of international law that actions taken pursuant to a state’s right to defend itself must be proportionate to the danger that the state faces. While the 20 deaths that resulted from the actions of Hamas and its associates were tragic, the nature of these attacks did not justify a full scale military invasion of the Gaza strip, or the mass destruction of infrastructure essential to life in the strip. | |
The military operations were legitimate as Israeli self-defense: The military operations were a legitimate use of the Israeli state’s right to defend itself and its citizens: To quote then-President-elect Barack Obama - "If somebody was sending rockets into my house where my two daughters sleep at night, I would do everything to stop that, and would expect Israel to do the same thing."(1) Prior to Israel's 2008-2009 military operations, Hamas had consistently violated the terms of the ceasefire between Gaza and Israel. It launched a total 6,300 rockets during an agreed hiatus in the confrontation, killing 10 and wounding more than 780. Hamas refused to extend the truce past 19 December 2008 and subsequently resumed attacks, firing nearly 300 more missiles, rockets and mortars.(1) Hamas was the first to actually escalate the conflict after the ceasefire expired, with a systematic increase in rocket attacks to a magnitude of hundreds of rockets fired daily in late December.(2) The 250,000 Israelis who lived in the southern part of the country were under constant threat, often in bomb shelters, and the economy suffered as a result.(1) Israel went to great lengths to avoid its military escalation. Just a few days before Israel's military operations, outgoing Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert made an appeal on the Arab television station Al-Arabiya asking Gaza residents to stop the firing of rockets and mortar shells so that a military response could be avoided.(3) This appeal was apparently ignored by Hamas and the other militant groups in Gaza, and so Israel proceeded to respond militarily to remove the capacity of Gaza to launch rocket and mortar attacks – Israel was left with no other way to ensure that the inhabitants of the country’s southern regions would not have to live in fear of rocket fire. Gaza was also a test case, intended to prove that Israel remained a legitimate and authoritative actor in the region. Much more was at stake than merely the military outcome of Israel's operation. The issue, rather, was Israel's ability to restore its deterrence power and uphold the principle that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity.(4) Israel's military operations were a good tool to fulfill this need for self-defense and did so effectively. The Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces, both to its leadership and to the tunnels from Gaza to Egypt that Hamas uses to smuggle in weapons and build its growing army.(1) Doing this damage was necessary as Israel could never be safe with a strong terrorist regime in control of Gaza. As David Harris, Executive Director for the American Jewish Committee, argued: "Israel could not tolerate a terrorist regime on its border that was launching repeated rocket and mortar attacks against Israeli towns and villages."(5) Therefore there can be no debate that Israel had the right to defend itself as well as the right to determine how best to do so. While it is easy for countries and foreigners to state their opinions about Israel's security interests and how its actions may or may not fulfill them, Israel's right to make that judgment itself must be respected. Therefore Israel's military operations against Gaza were justified as legitimate self defense against Hamas and militant aggression which was putting the lives of Israeli citizens in jeopardy. | |
Israel similarly violated the ceasefire prior to 2008, and had unlawfully kidnapped and imprisoned hundreds of Palestinians. Furthermore, Israel's attack on Gaza was not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the following principle: an end to the Israeli siege on Gaza in exchange for an end to Hamas-led rocket attacks on Israel. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before Operation Cast Lead was launched. Israel should have accepted Hamas’s offer and assessed whether Hamas’s intention to be bound by its terms was genuine before launching a military attack.(6) If an action isn't truly an act of last resort, it cannot be legitimately termed 'self-defense', and so is not justified. Hamas were prepared to enter into negotiations with Israel and it was prepared to discuss the more intricate details of the deal it had proposed. Its attempts to avoid conflict were committed and consistent enough to suggest that Gaza’s leaders were not engaged in diplomatic posturing or sabre rattling. Israel targeted more than just military targets, including UN warehouses holding medical and food supplies, UN schools, and hospitals. Its imprecise tactics and refusal to allow access of humanitarian workers show that it was not merely self-defense. | |
The military operations were proportionate to the threat: Operation Cast Lead was justified as it was proportionate to Hamas' rocket attacks against Israel. It should be remembered that 250,000 Israelis living in the southern part of the country had lived under years of terrorism before Operation Cast Lead was launched, often in bomb shelters, and the economy has suffered. The world's media may only have paid attention when Israel responded to Hamas' barrage, but this does not mean that Israel was not already under severe attack by this point.(1) Moreover, the Israeli strikes were rightly measured to disable Hamas rocket attacks.(11) Terror groups fire indiscriminately at innocent Israelis and then complain of excessive or disproportionate force when Israel fires back. But according to internationally accepted laws of war, Israel is permitted to respond with the force necessary to end the conflict.(2) Israel was legitimate in using full force to win its war on Hamas; Israel was under no obligation to restrain itself in what is, on Hamas' own terms, an existential war. Provoked by Hamas, Israel had every right to wage a disproportionate and overwhelming response. Hamas has repeatedly stated that its objective is to destroy Israel. Such an existential threat goes beyond simply Hamas' rocket attacks, as it portends much more destructive attacks in the future. This justifies defensive attacks from Israel that go beyond responding merely to the Hamas rockets, and would even justify Israeli efforts to fully demobilize or destroy Hamas.(12) In spite of this, Israel was actually far more restrained and proportionate than it was obligated to be. Israeli precision strikes sought to minimize civilian deaths, as Benjamin Netanyahu argued: "In launching precision strikes against Hamas rocket launchers, headquarters, weapons depots, smuggling tunnels and training camps, Israel is trying to minimize civilian casualties."(13) Unlike Hamas, Israeli strikes targeted military sites, not civilians. As Gary Grant argued: "Even if you target your action at military sites, civilians are inevitably going to get killed...these need to be contrasted with the actions of Hamas where every single rocket is designed to attack civilian populations, so every single act of Hamas in firing these rockets is clearly an illegal act without any legal justification."(2) Israel may have been justified in acting disproportionately, but instead chose to respond in a proportionate and limited manner which minimized civilian deaths in Gaza, and thus the Israeli military operations were certainly justified. | |
It is indisputable that Hamas has launched violent attacks against civilian targets. Israel, on the other hand, conducts its operations exercising all due care to limit civilian casualties. Hamas terrorists, however, set up their headquarters and store weapons in private homes, schools, colleges and mosques. Both Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas and Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit have blamed Hamas for provoking the Israeli attack on Hamas targets embedded in civilian areas.(28) Israel's air assault has resulted in more Palestinian casualties, but that is in part because Hamas deliberately locates its security forces in residential neighborhoods. This is intended both to deter Israel from attacking in the first place as well as to turn world opinion against the Jewish state when it does attack. By all accounts, however, the Israeli strikes hit their targets precisely enough to do significant damage to Hamas forces.(1) Israel actually put its own troops in harm’s way to minimize civilian casualties during Operation Cast Lead.(13) This shows Israel's commitment to preventing civilian casualties and thus the justification of Operation Cast Lead. The disparity between Israeli and Palestinian casualties can be explained by the fact that Israel has early warning systems and hospitals. Israel invests significantly more in stable buildings that do not crumble when subjected a blast, systems that can detect incoming rocket fire, and an extensive and modern network of hospitals and emergency response teams. This, and the fact that Israel does not attempt to shield its military installations behind civilian homes and businesses, helps lower the number of civilian casualties as compared to in Gaza.(2) The claim that Israel violated the principle of proportionality, by killing more Hamas terrorists than the number of Israeli civilians killed by Hamas rockets, is absurd. There is no legal equivalence between the deliberate killing of innocent civilians and the deliberate killings of Hamas combatants. Under the laws of war, any number of combatants can be killed to prevent the killing of even one innocent civilian.(29) Moreover, if Israel were to be 'proportional' and respond to the Hamas attacks in the same way, what would that mean? Would this require that it launch rocket attacks back against Gazan civilians? Obviously not (this would result in even more civilian deaths), and this is where the logic of proportionality against terrorist attacks makes little sense. | |
None of these arguments change that fact that 250,000 Israelis in southern Israel lived under constant fear of Hamas rocket attacks, which Hamas escalated after a ceasefire which it refused to extend. It is notable that Syria, an implacable enemy of Israel, actually played a significant role in triggering he conflict. The Damascus office of Hamas, which operates under the aegis of the regime of Bashar al Assad, vetoed the efforts of Hamas leaders in Gaza to extend the cease-fire and insisted on escalating rocket attacks.(4) The role of foreign powers in proving the conflict through Hamas has been recognized outside of Israel was well: Egypt's Foreign Minister, Ahmed Abul Gheit, assailed Israel's air strikes but also held Hamas responsible. The Egyptian government understood that Hamas, like Hezbollah, is increasingly allied with Iran and its goals for fomenting regional instability.(1) Israel could not possibly have been expected to thus not take military action to defend itself when coming under rocket fire from a terrorist government dedicated to Israel's destruction and under the direction of foreign states which are mortal enemies of Israel's existence. There was simply no other way to stop the rocket attacks. Moreover, Israel's blockade of Gaza was not a justified reason for Hamas' rocket attacks. Israeli control of Gaza’s borders was a response to Hamas’ exploitation of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza to turn it into an armed, Islamic state dedicated to the destruction of Israel above all else, even its own economy. Hamas was not provoked. Quite the contrary. Hamas’ arms smuggling was the provocation. Then, on top of this provocation, Hamas fired rockets indiscriminately into Israel. The idea that Hamas was provoked leapfrogs the facts.(27) | |
Israel's military operations harmed the chances of peace in the long term: The long-term security of Israel rests with a stable peace agreement with the Palestinians, not in attempts to bludgeon Hamas into a truce 'on Israel's terms'. To the extent that Israel's large scale assault on Gaza eliminated the hopes of such an agreement, the attacks worsened Israel's long-term security.(10) Operation Cast Lead ignored history, which teaches that there is no military solution to peace with the Palestinians. As a Daily Star Editorial argued, "For the Israelis, once they have exercised this latest spasm of gratuitous bloodletting, there will be yet another opportunity to accept the oft-proved impossibility of a military solution. The Palestinian people will not be battered into submission, no amount of air strikes will make the core issues in the moribund peace process go away, and all of the same difficult decisions will still be waiting when the dust settles."(18) Thus Operation Cast Lead actually undermined future peace by once more making Israelis believe they can fight their way to a solution, which they cannot. As Nicholas Kristoff argues, "What we’re seeing in the Middle East is the Boomerang Syndrome. Arab terrorism built support for right-wing Israeli politicians, who took harsh actions against Palestinians, who responded with more terrorism, and so on. Extremists on each side sustain the other."(10) Israel cannot stop rocket attacks by military action alone; eventually a political deal will be needed.(19) Operation Cast Lead emboldened the anti-negotiation side of Israeli politics, however, which focus on their claim that Israel should not negotiate with Hamas. However, Hamas was democratically elected, and so Israel must make peace with them. If Hamas was an authoritarian regime, Israel could possible attempt to get rid of it and make peace with the Palestinians in Gaza separately. But, because Hamas was democratically elected, any efforts by Israel to destroy them will be seen in Gaza as an effort to destroy the Palestinians and their democratic will. This would not enable any long-term peace with the Palestinians. Therefore, a long-term peace depends on working with Hamas, rather than attempting to destroy them.(20) Instead, Israel pursued Operation Cast Lead, which included an Israeli ground assault in Gaza, the excessive force of which is likely to create more terrorists in the long run.(10) The fact that Hamas was always going to survive Israel's assault meant that Operation Cast Lead was always going to help to consolidate the legitimacy of the Hamas movement, and to ensure that all the efforts of Israel to eliminate that fundamental pillar of resistance will produce the reverse result.(22) Israel's offensive gave Iran and its allies a way to pressure Egypt, Jordan and other Arab 'moderates'. Like the Lebanon war of 2006, Israel's battle with Hamas in Gaza produced a schism among Muslim states. Iran and its Lebanon based ally Hezbollah have joined Hamas's Damascus-based leadership in calling for a new intifada, or uprising, against Israel -- and also against the governments of Egypt and Jordan, which are accused of silently supporting Israel's air attacks.(23) Israel’s ruthless attack on Gaza and the massive civilian casualties it has inflicted has severely damaged the nation's moral stature in the world. This moral deficit will cause problems for Israel in its future engagements in the world. Therefore long term peace in the region was harmed by Operation Cast Lead, and so it was not justified. | |
Israel's military operations were disproportionate and harmed too many civilians: The killing of over 1,400 Palestinians, mostly civilians, and more than 4,500 injuries, accompanied by the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN compounds and government buildings, which Israel has a responsibility to protect under the Fourth Geneva Convention, is not commensurate to the deaths caused by Hamas rocket fire. For 18 months Israel had imposed an unlawful blockade on the coastal strip that brought Gazan society to the brink of collapse. In the three years after Israel’s redeployment from Gaza, 11 Israelis were killed by rocket fire. And yet in 2005-8, according to the UN, the Israeli army killed about 1,250 Palestinians in Gaza, including 222 children. Throughout this time the Gaza Strip remained occupied territory under international law because Israel maintained effective control over it.(15) The targeting of civilians, whether by Hamas or by Israel, is potentially a war crime. Every human life is precious, but the numbers speak for themselves: 800 Palestinians, most of them civilians, were killed during Operation Cast Lead. In contrast, around a dozen Israelis were killed, many of them soldiers.(17) Precision strikes which avoided civilian deaths were never going to be possible in the crowded Gaza Strip. As Akiva Eldar argued: "The tremendous population density in the Gaza Strip does not allow a 'surgical operation' over an extended period that would minimize damage to civilian populations. The difficult images from the Strip will soon replace those of the damage inflicted by Qassam rockets in the western Negev. The scale of losses, which works in 'favor' of the Palestinians, will return Israel to the role of Goliath."(24) It is notable that Israel is more culpable for the civilian deaths it causes than Hamas is with its rockets, as Israel had options (such as ending the blockade and negotiating with Hamas) which could have caused fewer civilian deaths, whereas Hamas did not. Rather Hamas responds as the disproportionately weaker party; the Palestinians were compelled to use the crude means at their disposal to free their lands from Israeli occupation, even if this meant being unable to target them well and some civilian deaths resulting.(25) Israel's Operation Cast Lead was less legitimate as it was not Israel's only option, and so cannot be regarded as proportionate. Furthermore, Israel's use of white phosphorous in Gaza was a humanitarian crime. The use of white phosphorous by Israel to shield its military movements in Gaza was a humanitarian crime, as the chemical causes serious health problems to civilians that inhale it. And, by all accounts, the chemical was inhaled by many Gazan civilians.(25) | |
Israel's military operations were aggression, not self defense: Israel has sought to justify its military attacks on Gaza by stating that they amounted to an act of 'self-defense' as recognized by Article 51, United Nations Charter. This contention should be rejected: the rocket attacks on Israel by Hamas deplorable as they were, did not, in terms of scale and effect amount to an armed attack entitling Israel to rely on self-defense. Under international law, self-defense is an act of last resort and is subject to the customary rules of proportionality and necessity. Operation Cast Lead caused the deaths of over 1,400 Palestinians, over 300 of whom were children, injured 4,500 more and resulted in the destruction of schools, mosques, houses, UN facilities and government buildings. If, as Israel has stated, Cast Lead was carried out in accordance with the terms of international law, and the safeguards incorporated into the contemporary law of war, then Israeli forces had a duty to protect civilian infrastructure under the fourth Geneva Convention. The death and destruction that Israeli forces wrought throughout the Gaza Strip was not commensurate with the losses caused by Hamas rocket fire, no matter how horrific those attacks may have been. Israel’s actions amount to aggression, not self-defense, not least because its assault on Gaza was unnecessary. Israel could have agreed to renew the truce with Hamas.(15) Israel's attack on Gaza was also not an act of last resort. Israel could and should have tried to negotiate a truce with Hamas based on the principle that Hamas stop firing rockets at Israel in return for Israel lifting its siege on Gaza. This is the deal Hamas offered Israel before it started Operation Cast Lead, and Israel should have taken it then and seen how went before resorting to military force.(6) Israel arguably provoked the entire conflict by targeting Palestinian civilians with its blockade on Gaza. According to Hebrew University international law expert Yuval Shani, "It is my opinion that in this situation, and given the question marks regarding Israel's status in Gaza and Gaza's long-standing dependency on Israel, cutting off its water and electricity supplies would be equivalent to a direct attack on a civilian target, especially given that the motive for doing so is one of collective punishment, which is, in itself, a problematic motive."(26) Hamas had offered to renew the ceasefire if Israel reopened Gaza's border crossings. The strip had been sealed by Israel in an economic siege aimed at toppling Hamas. The blockade had brought the territory near economic collapse.(21) Therefore this blockade must be seen as the true cause of the conflict, and thus Operation Cast Lead was not a legitimate act of self-defense. The lack of efficacy of Operation Cast Lead also undermines its legitimacy as 'self-defense': while Hamas's offensive capacities were blunted for a while, the likelihood, as with Hezbollah after Lebanon in 2006, is that it will quickly rebuild its military strength. Indeed, the assassinations of its leaders by Israel over the years- and the raids on its weapons workshops- did little to limit its rise to power.(16) Israel's overall strategy, moreover, is not one of 'self-defense' against Hamas, but rather to make ordinary Palestinians suffer in hopes of creating ill will toward their Hamas government. This is why, beginning in 2007, Israel cut back fuel shipments for Gaza’s utilities, and why, in the aftermath of the bombings, 800,000 Gaza residents were deprived running water. As Sari Bashi, the executive director of Gisha, an Israeli human rights group that works on Gaza issues, argued: “The Israeli policy on Gaza has been marketed as a policy against Hamas, but in reality it’s a policy against a million-and-a-half people in Gaza.”(10) Rashid Khalidi added to this argument: "This war on the people of Gaza isn’t really about rockets. Nor is it about 'restoring Israel’s deterrence,' as the Israeli press might have you believe. Far more revealing are the words of Moshe Yaalon, then the Israeli Defense Forces chief of staff, in 2002: 'The Palestinians must be made to understand in the deepest recesses of their consciousness that they are a defeated people.'"(17) Israeli internal politics may also have played a role in determining the size and scope of Cast Lead. Israel was preparing for general elections on 10 February 2009. The prospect of a return to power by the hawk Benjamin Netanyahu, leader of the right-wing Likud party, promising tough action against Hamas, hardened the positions of Israel's more moderate political leaders, and may have caused them to launch such an operation to 'look tough', rather than judging its proportionality on its own merits.(21)Therefore Operation Cast Lead should be regarded not as legitimate self-defense, but rather as an act of aggression against the Palestinian people of Gaza, and consequently w | |
The most important thing for regional peace in the long run is not the belief among Israelis that there is a 'military solution' to the conflict, but rather the belief of Hamas and its backers in Syria and Iran that Israel can be 'solved' militarily. It is this belief that causes them to constantly return to using force against Israel, as they did with the rocket attacks. Therefore to establish peace in the long run, Israeli deterrent and demonstration that its citizens cannot be targeted with impunity are the most important factors, and these are exactly what Operation Cast Lead re-established. Moreover, Hamas may promotes itself as the legitimate power in Gaza, but in reality, Hamas is at its core a terrorist organization that refuses to renounce violence or recognize Israel's right to exist. Hamas is listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Hamas came to power in Gaza through a violent coup against the Palestinian Authority government. Since Hamas refuses to live in peace with Israel, the Israeli government has no choice but to seek Hamas' replacement.(2) | |
Because of the size of the global community, and ease of communication and transport, most countries can still attain necessary weapons and tools. As the world has globalized and information can be passed, attained, and hidden, with the click of a button, arms embargos are much more difficult to maintain. The UN placed an arms embargo on the Sudan due to fears of ethnic cleansing carried out by the Janjaweed, yet it was reported that there were violations of the embargo on all sides of the conflict. In fact, there were accusations backed up by pictorial evidence that even after the arms embargo was put into place, China and Russia, both members of the UN security council, were selling weapons to the country1. Arms embargoes often fall short of their goals. 1 BBC (2007), "China, Russia deny weapons breach", [Accessed June 10, 2011] | |
Sanctions can block the weapons that are used to perpetrate human rights violations. Arms embargos are a type of sanction that specifically target types of weapons. If a country is being particularly violent towards its people or at risk of civil war, arms embargos can be used to decrease the weapons available to the government or the people. In 1993-1994 an arms embargo was placed on Haiti by the United Nations after a military coup by the group FaDH (the Forces ArmArmées d’Haiti). Forces were estimated to shrink from 6000 to 1000 by the time the US invaded in 1994 thanks to the arms embargo [1] . Preventing governments from attaining weapons can be the most effective way of stopping government violence. If they don’t have weapons to arm their military, civil war and genocide become more difficult to perpetrate. Arms embargoes have been successful and when used in conjunction with other policy actions can be an effective way of addressing fears of civil war, ethnic cleansing, government violence, and coups. [1] Bromley, Mark (2007), “United Nations Arms Embargoes: Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behaviour. Case study: Haiti, 1993–94”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,Bromley, Mark (2007), [accessed June 7, 2011]. | |
Sanctions often hurt the people more than they hurt the regimes, rendering it difficult to discern whether the state(s) imposing sanctions truly care about the citizens involved or their own self-interests. Inflicting the pain of poverty and starvation obviously does not show solidarity, but instead can crush any opposition movement in the country. If people are worried about feeding themselves they are less likely to take action against their government. Additionally, sanctions are not the only form of supporting the people of a country. In the most recent Arab Spring, the US did not support protesters solely through sanctions, but instead publicly called for reforms1. Drawing international attention to certain issues can also be an effective means of taking action. Sanctions are therefore not a necessary or effective way of showing support. 1 Sharp, Jeb (2011), "President Obama Calls for Middle East Reform", PRI's The World, [accessed June 10, 2011]. | |
Sanctions have been an effective long term policy tool in the past. If sanctions are effective, their use is justified because they ultimately achieve a desired outcome. They cause financial pain to leaders pressuring them to reform. Long term sanctions on South Africa were an effective policy. They caused the living standards in the country to deteriorate, however this ultimately led to the right amount of pressure on the government for apartheid to be ended1. Economic restrictions were first placed on South Africa in 1963 and were ultimately lifted after the end of apartheid almost 30 years later. Nelson Mandela himself has stated that sanctions played a role in forcing the South African government to end apartheid2. The success of sanctions in the past has prevented the international community from taking military action against certain states. Due to prior success in South Africa, sanctions are an appropriate tool to push countries towards reform while preventing military escalation. 1 Foer, Franklin (1996), "Economic Sanctions", Slate.com,, [Accessed June 7, 2011]. 2 Laverty, Alexander (2007), "Impact of Economic and Political Sanctions on Apartheid", The Africa File, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. | |
Sanctions have also failed in the long term. A recent study found that sanctions were used 116 times between 1914 and 1990, and after 1973 were only effective 24% of the time1. South Africa is not an appropriate example because the US and EU had a cooperative relationship with the country prior to sanctions therefore increasing the impact the trade restrictions had. Sanctions are now mostly used against isolated countries, like North Korea and Myanmar, who do not have a close relationship with international actors, and for whom cutting off trade is not such a detrimental loss. Since the countries sanctions are currently being used against do not fit the profile of South Africa, sanctions are ineffective and success in South Africa is irrelevant. 1 Gilboy, George (2008), "Political and Social Reform in China: Alive and Walking", Washington Quarterly, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. | |
Recent sanctions failures can make sanctions a less viable threat. Seeing that Myanmar, Iran and North Korea have successfully been able to deflect the pain and pressure of sanctions onto their people1, the threat of sanctions becomes less powerful because it is less likely to spell the end of a regime2. The failure of sanctions, not the infrequent use, makes them useless. 1 The Economist (2011), "An aye for sanctions", [Accessed June 10, 2011]. 2 Noland, Marcus (2009), "The (Non-) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea", The National Bureau of Asian Research, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. | |
Sanctions make clear where a country stands. Sanctions send a strong message to the people of a country that the Western world is on their side and will not just remain compliant by dealing with an oppressive regime as if it has done nothing wrong. Part of what encourages peoples to stand up for their civil liberties is a feeling of support against their regime from outside actors. True reform needs to come from pressure within and outside of the state as it did in South Africa. The only way to incentivize internal pressure is by expressing support for civilian movements. In the case of the repressive government in Myanmar, the lifting of sanctions would be viewed as a betrayal by the Myanmarese and would reverse any progress that sanctions have helped to achieve. The leader of the opposition movement, Aung San Suu Kyi, in Myanmar has called for a continuation of sanctions, and in an act of support the US has complied1. Therefore sanctions can be an important signal of support to a country's people, which makes them more likely to stand up to their government and create the necessary internal pressure for reform. 1 Colvin, Jake and Cox, Simon (2007), "Are Economic Sanctions Good Foreign Policy?", Council on Foreign Relations, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. | |
Just the threat of sanctions can be an effective coercive tool. Most diplomatic negotiations occur behind closed doors, and it has been hypothesized that if sanctions are going to be effective it is the threat of the sanctions that forces the country to concede, not the sanctions themselves1. That said, if sanctions were never followed through, the threat would be meaningless. The use of sanctions builds up the fear of sanction. This fear can bend countries towards the will of the sanctioning nation. To maintain the threat of sanctions as a viable negotiating tool, sanctions need to be implemented on occasion to prevent sanctions from becoming an empty, meaningless threat. 1 Colvin, Jake and Cox, Simon (2007), "Are Economic Sanctions Good Foreign Policy?", Council on Foreign Relations, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. | |
Free trade does not guarantee democracy and causes bargaining countries to lose leverage. In order to increase their own wealth most dictatorial oligarchies welcome free trade. Once they have been accepted into the free trade arena the West no longer has any leverage on them. It is true, for example, that a sanctions regime against China would be impossible to implement but that does not mean we should concede entirely. We should reinstate MFN as a lever and use it to force China to improve upon its human rights record. To believe that free trade can lead to democratization is naïve. It is far too hopeful to suggest that the wealth produced thereby will be allowed to filter down to the people. For example, pervasive poverty still persists in China [1] . In reality free trade has acted as a mechanism to worsen the living standards of the people in China as profits are concentrated in the business sector, and people are subject to terrible working conditions and low wages [2] . As this continues, China also suppresses the voice of the people and censors the internet [3] . Trade liberalization has clearly not made a China a democracy, and thus cannot be declared a more successful policy option than sanctions. [1] Wall Street Journal (2009), “Facts About Poverty in China Challenge Conventional Wisdom”, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. [2] Roberts, Dexter (2007), “China's Widening Income Gap”, Bloomberg News, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. [3] Ramzy, Austin (2011), “State Stamps Out Small 'Jasmine' Protests in China”, Time Magazine, [Accessed June, 10 2011]. | |
A unified front is not impossible, and when executed correctly can have effective results. Sanctions were used in South Africa, and due to grassroots pressures in the US and Europe trading with South Africa became stigmatized1. Even though it is difficult to create effective sanctions, it is not impossible particularly if there is pressure internally and externally on the country to reform. 1 Foer, Franklin (1996), "Economic Sanctions", Slate.com,, [Accessed June 7, 2011]. | |
Sanctions are ineffective because they hurt ordinary people more than leadership. Sanctions operate under the assumption that they will hurt leaders of a country so much that they will bend to the will of the sanctioning country. Yet this assumption is false: governments have the tools to insulate themselves thereby preventing sanctions from imposing necessary pressure. By keeping all available resources for themselves, the government ensures that the sanctions impact only the people. Governments that can achieve this deflection have a relatively powerless citizen base that even when they are suffering have difficulty standing up to the government. Punishing innocent people is immoral, because they are suffering for a crime they did not commit. When the US and UK placed sanctions on Saddam Hussein, it lead to the death of hundreds of thousands of children in Iraq, although the exact number is contested. Considering that US ultimately invaded Iraq, these children died in vain. In North Korea, it is thought that sanctions have led to the starvation of hundreds of thousands of people. In both Myanmar and North Korea most of the pain from sanctions is deflected onto the largely helpless population who have little ability to put pressure on their oppressive governments to stop the suffering1. Because this suffering often does not affect the leadership, they can essentially ignore any pressure to reform2. And, many of these governments simply don't have an interest in improving the lives of their people, making sanctions immoral and ineffective3. 1 Carpenter, Ted and Preble, Christopher (2006), "North Korean Sanctions: A Cruel Mirage", The CATO Institute, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. 2 House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2006-2007), "The Impact of Economic Sanctions, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. 3 Loyola, Mario (2010), "We Don't Need to 'Get Over the Sanctions Delusion'", National Review,, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. | |
Sanctions are ineffective because they can be counterproductive. Sanctions often cut off a country from the international community. This blocks the flow of outside information into a country and permits dictators to mercilessly use propaganda to strengthen their own position. It is impossible for the people to believe such propaganda is false when there are no competing external claims1. This propaganda can deflect blame for the economic suffering from the government to the international community. This is called the "rally around the flag effect" characterized by the banding together of opposing factions because of the adverse actions of an outside power2. For example, sanctions in Myanmar will only serve to insulate the SPDC, the ruling party, in power. The SPDC's grip on the national media means that it is able to disseminate propaganda which demonizes the West as the enemy of the Myanmarese, and casts the military junta as their hero. This can make the people more willing to stand up to the Western powers instead of their government. The lifting of sanctions may ensure that ordinary Myanmarese citizens are exposed to Western technology, labor practices and political ideologies which in turn will equip them with the belief and self-determination necessary to engineer change in their own country. The power of media cannot be underestimated, and isolation of sanctioned countries jeopardizes the opposition movements in that country integral to regime change. This threat ultimately outweighs potential benefits of sanctions. 1 Eland, Ivan (2006), "Economic Coercion Is Not an Effective Foreign Policy Tool", Independent Institute, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. 2 Chapman, Terrence and Reiter, Dan (2004), "The United Nations Security Council and the Rally Around the Flag Effect", Emory University Political Science Department, [Accessed June 20, 2011]. | |
Sanctions are the opposite of free trade and therefore should not be used because free trade has greater benefits. Sanctions prevent free trade, which is ultimately more effective for incentivizing reforms. Three mechanisms can be broadly identified through which free trade brings about democratization. Firstly, it permits a flow of information from Western countries. Secondly, it leads to an increase in the wealth of everybody and thirdly it facilitates the growth of a middle class. The middle class is usually the one that calls for political reform, because they no longer have to worry about living from day to day, and are not complacent about their government's corruption and failure to address their concerns1.These three factors together result in internal pressure and consequent political change; economic freedoms lead to political freedoms. This approach was successful in helping to bring about the downfall of communism in the Warsaw pact and is starting to lead to increased freedoms in China. For example, China has been taking a slow path to government reform2. Previous policy directed toward China was to link trading rights, in the form of MFN (most favored nation) status to improvements in human rights. All China ever did was offer fleeting changes whenever necessary to preserve MFN status. It is only with unlimited free trade that we will see deep structural changes in human rights in China. Additionally, economic growth due to increased trade has not only impacted China, but other countries in the region as well, like Taiwan and South Korea. There, new constitutions and managed elections, led over time to a more meaningful democracy3. These success stories show that free trade can be implemented in other countries to produce effective government change over time and is a more viable option than sanctions. 1 Tlili, Moustapha (2011). "Tunisia's Revolution Was Led By Secular Middle Class", Daily Star (Lebanon), (Accessed June 20, 2011) 2 Gilboy, George (2008), "Political and Social Reform in China: Alive and Walking", Washington Quarterly, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. 3 Heritage Foundation (1997), "A User's Guide To Economic Sanctions", , [Accessed June | |
Sanctions are ineffective because it is very difficult to unify an adequate number of countries to cripple an economy. Many countries must employ sanctions for them to be successful, yet due to competing political objectives unifying enough countries is almost impossible. If sanctions are only imposed by a few countries, the sanctioned nation can replace lost trade from those countries with trade from other allies, deflecting the economic consequences of the sanctions. North Korea is so isolated from the international community that sanctions have had little effect, particularly because their most important trade partner, China, has continued to do business with them1. The UK and US sanctions have not been effective in the case of Myanmar given that the country mainly trades with other ASEAN member states, India, China and Japan. The violation of sanctions often has to do with political motives. In the case of ASEAN, the member countries are concerned that China may use Myanmar for military and naval bases, so they are pouring money into the country and breaking US sanctions to promote their own self-interest in the region and counter China2. Considering that every country has their self-interest in mind, it is ultimately too difficult to forge a united front between enough countries to cripple the country they are sanctioning. 1 Noland, Marcus (2009), "The (Non-) Impact of UN Sanctions on North Korea", The National Bureau of Asian Research, [Accessed June 10, 2011]. 2 Heritage Foundation (1997), "A User's Guide To Economic Sanctions", , [Accessed June 10, 2011]. | |
Not all peoples are so easily manipulated by a corrupt government. It is naïve to suggest that the Myanmarese people accept the government’s propaganda without question. After all, many are still reeling from the tragedy that befell them in 1990 when the results of democratic elections were annulled and scores of opposition party supporters were arrested and imprisoned without trial [1] . The popularity of Aung San Suu Kyi, the main opposition leader, and the NLD remain high [2] . Further, social networking sites like Facebook and Twitter make propaganda less effective and help disseminate criticism of governments even in times of extreme media censorship [3] . With current internet tools, crushing opposition movements, even with propaganda, is not so easy therefore countering the potential threat of sanctions. [1] BBC (2010), “Burma's leaders annul Suu Kyi's 1990 poll win” [2] BBC (2011), "Burma upholds dissolution of Suu Kyi's NLD party' [3] Shirky, Clay (2011), “The Political Powers of Social Media”, Foreign Affairs | |
Although they do indeed hurt ordinary people, in the long term this can create appropriate pressure on governments. When people are suffering enough at the hands of the government, they are likely to take action. In Egypt and Tunisia the leaders were getting richer, and the people were becoming poorer, leading to the protests for regime change1. Sanctions worked in South Africa and in the former Rhodesia. It is true that they can lead to the mass suffering of the very people they are designed to help, as they did to the black population of South Africa2. Yet this suffering creates necessary internal pressure for regime change. By the utilitarian standard, which says it is just to help the most people, the current suffering of some due to sanctions is outweighed by the future freedom promised to all citizens. Sanctions are therefore justified and effective even though they hurt the people as well as the leaders of a country. 1 Bajoria, Jayshree and Assaad, Ragui (2011), "Demographics of Arab Protests", Council on Foreign Relations, [Accessed June 20, 2011]. 2 Heritage Foundation (1997), "A User's Guide To Economic Sanctions", , [Accessed June 10, 2011]. | |
This is clearly extremely unfair on those countries that traditionally have much lower turnouts. It essentially means that countries with low turnouts will have less representation than they do at the moment. There is little reason why a nation as a whole should be punished by having less representation for some of its citizens not going out to vote. | |
Get out the vote! In a system where every vote counts the same and where there are not set constituencies it is much more important to get the vote out. Political parties in countries with low turn outs, such as the UK which in 2009 has a turnout of just 35%, [1] will need to get their people motivated and voting if they want to win many seats as they currently control. If a country with a comparably sized electorate were to get twice the turnout then it would get twice the representation in the parliament regardless of the similarities in the populations of those countries. What would matter is getting the national constituency out voting. This will help show that individuals really do need to vote in order to get their voice heard. [1] ‘European Parliament Elections 2009’, House of Commons, Research Paper 09/53, 17 June 2009, p.23 | |
It is not just much more choice but too much choice! Do people in Greece really want the opportunity to vote for the UK Independence Party? Will anyone really have the information to make an informed choice between all the possible parties throughout Europe? The European People’s party (one of the groupings in the European parliament) alone has 51 parties as members of its grouping is anyone really going to look up the different party policies to work out which best represents their views? [1] [1] ‘Member Parties European Union countries’, European People’s Party, | |
Encourages Europe wide thinking At the moment paradoxically European elections are often not about Europe. Much of the time they are about national politics, and since they are almost always mid-term what they are often about is punishing the national government. Governing parties’ almost always loose votes while opposition parties gain, it is notable that governing parties only gain if the election is held in their ‘honeymoon’ period after they are voted into power. More generally European elections are seen as an opportunity to vote for small parties rather than bigger ones – implying it is a chance to follow ones heart over one’s head. Europe however remains a minor element. [1] This change in system is unlikely to mean that national governing parties gain significantly more votes but it will raise the profile of the European dimension in the elections. When people are able to vote for parties that do not contest their national elections they will have no choice but to see it as a European election rather than a national one. Voters will be much more likely to ask how the policies of these foreign parties affect them and some may even consider voting for them. A few particularly enterprising parties are likely to run transnational campaigns in the hope of picking up votes outside their home nation. The vote will simply be more European rather than the same old national parties being the only choice. [1] Hix, Simon, and Marsh, Michael, ‘Punishment or Protest? Understanding European Parliament Elections’, The Journal of Politics, Vol.69, No.2, May 2007, pp.495-510, , pp.501, 503, 507 | |
One person one vote that will count in exactly the same way as everyone else’s The European Parliament has a proportional representation system meaning that almost everyone’s vote counts but the change to a single constituency would still improve this. Everyone’s vote should count for the same no matter where they live. This system ensures that there is such equality in the voting for the European Parliament. From the 2014 elections Germany will have 96 MEPs and Malta 6 [1] since Germany has a population of 82 million against Malta’s 400,000 [2] it has one for every 854,000 inhabitants against Malta’s one MEP per 66,000. Voters in smaller states have an outsize influence. Changing to a single constituency would make every European citizen’s vote worth the same. [1] European Parliament, ‘How many MEPs will each country get after European Parliament elections in 2014?’, Europarl.europa.eu, 13 March 2013, [2] ‘Member countries of the European Union’, Europa.eu, , accessed 7 May 2013 | |
While it may be true on an individual level that everyone’s vote would count for the same in practice when looked at from a broader perspective there will not be equality. It will mean inequality among nations as turnouts will differ. Moreover democracy is not just about equality but also about defending the rights of the minority so as to prevent a tyranny of the majority this system however does not protect smaller states but allows the larger much greater influence. | |
Simply allowing parties from other countries to compete is not going to encourage Europe wide thinking. There is very little to stop parties from other countries registering elsewhere already, and as the voting is already proportional there is already a chance that they could win seats. It has however not happened. | |
Far from rationalising the system the European Parliament elections will become more irrational with a single constituency. Everyone will find it very odd that they can potentially vote for parties from the other side of the continent that they have never heard of. It may make the system the same everywhere but this does not mean it is a sensible system for European elections. The number of parties makes it complex, as does the concept of an international parliament where all votes go into one central pool rather than being based on nationality. | |
Much more choice Having only one constituency across the whole of the European Union would mean a lot more choice for the voter. They would not be restricted to just their own national parties, instead they could vote for parties from other countries across the EU. One of the most important things in a democracy is making sure that votes actually count – a greater choice helps immensely. There will not be any opportunity to say ‘they are all the same’ when there are dozens of parties to choose from. Everyone will be able to find a party that represents their views. For example a left wing voter in the UK might want to vote for the left party in Germany feeling that the Labour party no longer represents them. | |
Rationalises an irrational system The current system for the European Parliament elections is irrational and quirky because it is partially set individually per nation. The vote is not held on the same day in every country – the elections take place from Thursday when the UK and Netherlands votes through to Sunday when most of the EU votes, [1] some countries divide themselves into multiple constituencies – such as the UK which has 12 [2] – while others like Germany have one constituency for the whole country. Perhaps oddest of all Austrians are able to vote when they reach 16 years old while everyone else has to wait until they are eighteen. [3] And all this is before the oddities of little countries votes counting for more is included. Rationalisation of this system is clearly necessary and this is what this proposal does. Clearly the main rationalisation is in terms of making the value of votes the same. It would also eliminate differences over constituencies. It is likely that it would eliminate the age difference too; Austria allowing its citizens to vote at 16 would effectively give it more say compared to its population size. The chances are then that other states would follow and reduce their voting age for European Parliament elections to 16. While there is no necessary link to voting on the same day it would also provide a good chance to make the change so the voting occurs at one time. [1] ‘EU elections: Polling day will stay on Thursday, insists government’, BBC News, 13 March 2013, [2] ‘Your Members in the European Parliament’, European Parliament Information Office in the United Kingdom, [3] European Parliament, ‘About Parliament - Members’, europarl.europa.eu, , accessed 3 May 2013 | |
This assumes that there could never be agreement in the European Council, between member states, to set up such a system. Members have an interest in having a representative system that is fair democratic system of elections so should welcome these changes. The member states have already effectively agreed that the European Parliament can decide for itself what elections for the European Parliament should look like having agreed in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to accept European Parliament proposals for elections of parliament members. [1] [1] ‘Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’, Official Journal of the European Union, , Article 223 | |
No nation in the European Union has a majority so this is a baseless concern. The biggest country in the EU is Germany with a population of 81.8million against a total of 508million so Germany makes up a mere 16.1% of the EU total. [1] This is certainly not enough to dominate the continent. [1] | |
Punishes apathy People have a right not to be engaged by voting, and all the more so for a parliament they see as a gravy train with little political power. The European Parliament has comparatively little power, and where it does have power it does not affect the issues that concern people; taxes, welfare, education, and health. [1] This policy however punishes their countrymen for their desire not to vote because political apathy means less votes within that nation – which in turn means that nation’s parties will be less represented in the parliament. [1] Pech, Laurent, ‘European Parliament Elections: The Significance of Voter Apathy’, International Law Prof Blog, 3 June 2009, | |
Some countries may be left without representation It is difficult to conceive of how a system can be fair when some countries will be left without any representation at all. On average there is one seat in the European Parliament for every 670,000 individuals in the EU however Malta (452,000) and Luxembourg (537,000) both have populations that are smaller than this. In effect each of these countries will only have around two thirds of a MEP. It is very unlikely that even the most popular Maltese and Luxembourgian parties will secure a seat in a fully proportional system with a single constituency. Two countries would therefore effectively be disenfranchised by this system. | |
This avoids the real questions about the European Parliament The real problems with the European Parliament are not about the voting system; most people agree that the system is currently pretty fair. Rather the problem is with A, a lack of interest in European policies – only 43% are interested in European Affairs in 2013, a fall from 51% in 2012. B, the inability of the European Parliament to address the main concerns of the people which are in order unemployment, social inequalities, public debt, jobs for youth, it is not until the 7th most important challenge, immigration that the European parliament has a significant impact. [1] C, a lack of power, and where it has power lack of knowledge about the European Parliament. A change in voting system does not mean a change in the Parliament’s powers or perception. [1] Directorate-General for Communication Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, ‘European Parliament Eurobarometer: One year to go until the 2014 European elections’, European Parliament, EB 79.5, 21 August 2013 , p.69, 81 | |
Would undermine national sovereignty Separating the European Parliament elections from the individual countries of Europe is clearly a challenge to national sovereignty. Each member state should be able to decide how it conducts its elections (within a certain general framework), what parties can compete in those elections, the rules governing campaigning etc. The basis of the European Union is what is agreed between the member states by the members of the European Council. In the treaty of Lisbon it was agreed that “Representation of citizens shall be degressively proportional, with a minimum threshold of six members per Member State. No Member State shall be allocated more than ninety-six seats.” [1] A change to a single constituency would break this provision that has been agreed by the nation states. [1] ‘Article 9 A’, Official Journal of the European Union, 17 December 2007, C306/17 | |
It is not true that they won’t have representation; they may not have a specifically Luxembourger or Maltese party but there will be so much choice of parties that their viewpoints will be represented. Additionally this system allows the parties from these small nations to solve this problem by appealing to a wider audience beyond their borders. It is simply an added incentive to Europeanise. | |
Big countries will dominate This system would create a tyranny of the majority that the current system guards against. The reason why smaller member states have greater representation is to prevent the possibility of the bigger states dominating in the parliament. Having smaller countries with a greater share of the seats in parliament ensures that their voice is heard. A change to a single constituency would change this to a big advantage for the bigger states. Under the current system in 2014 Germany will have 96 seats; if it were exactly proportional Germany would have 120 – a gain of 24 seats (presuming the limit of 750 remains the same). The smaller states will on the other hand loose seats and their voice in the parliament will become much more marginal. | |
Discussing electoral systems may seem esoteric but the voting system makes an immense difference to the composition of a parliament. This in turn affects the balance of power in that Parliament and so what laws are actually passed. So a change in the voting system does not completely avoid the question of powers. It may also change perceptions because of the ability of parties to campaign in countries where they have not done so before. While the lack of powers is a concern for the European Parliament this is something that is slowly changing anyway. The European Parliament was in 2009 made co-legislator with the council meaning it has much more power to stop European level legislation rather than simply being consulted. The change in 2014 to having an elected Commission President will also mean that parliament elections have some influence on the executive. Additionally even on those issues where the Parliament has little power this does not mean it does not take into account citizens’ concerns, on youth unemployment for example the parliament has launched a €15 million program of job creation aimed at youth. [1] [1] ‘European elections 2014: Different this time?’, EurActive.com, 18 September 2013, | |
Part of the reason for such apathy is the belief that 62% of European Citizens believe that their vote “wouldn’t change anything”. [1] Why vote if it does not matter. However by changing the electoral system to being completely proportional as this change does peoples votes really do count, this is no longer a reason for apathetically not voting. [1] Merritt, Giles, ‘European parliament: unpopular, uninteresting, indispensable’, theguardian.com, 31 May 2009, |
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