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Private schools provide a better education than state schools In 2007, Time the US magazine discovered that private schools in the US received much higher SAT scores that the state counterparts. Research suggests that private education puts a greater emphasis on critical thinking, while state schools emphasise memory and learning by rote (time.com). These types of critical skills mean that students from private schools have a better start at university education as they are more used to what will be required of them. Furthermore, students from private schools are more likely to get into a university in the first place (Time, 2007/ BBC, 2010). In the US students are twice as likely to get the grades allowing them to go to university if they have had a private education, and for minority groups in America it is more than double (Capenet.org, 2001). This is likely to be replicated across the world. Private schools in Brazil also provide better education, as there is one teacher per 10 students in comparison to the 45-50 students per class in a government funded school. (Cabra; and Throssell 2010). Therefore by denying private education the effect may be disastrous for these minority groups. | |
This is what is already happening. It is the government that sets a curriculum for state schools (such as in Great Britain, Singapore, Japan, China, New Zealand and France) and the government want us to vote for them. So in many ways the education system may already be indoctrinating children in state school in the way this argument fears private schools do. Yet there are also private interests in many state schools already. For example in Britain academies are partially funded privately and in return are outside of local authority control so they do not have to follow the national curriculum.(BBC News, 2010) | |
Abolishing private schools will not bring to an end to inequality between pupils as this is illustrated every day in state schools. For example, bullying is extremely common in all schools whether they be state or private. Bullying represents inequality between pupils as often it is the result of one pupil being different to another. Additionally, teachers may treat their students differently depending on their intellectual ability or their behaviour. In the US racism between students and teachers is still a big issue, as minority groups are consistently placed on slower academic tack and in 38 states “black students are twice as likely as whites to be labelled as mentally retarded” (University of Washington2003). Thus Private schools are not the only means of inequality between students and so the abolition of these would not completely diminish student inequality. On the disparity between private and state schools, the correct way to improve the education for children in state schools is to spend more money on state schools, devote more time, energy and enthusiasm to them rather than punishing those schools that do just that. Preventing a minority from having a certain type of education is not the way to help improve the majority’s education. By and large, the complaint is that private schools are doing well and providing a good education, whilst state schools lag behind. It is in all our interests to set the standard of education as high as we can – you do this by raising state schools to the standard of private schools, not by depriving children of a private education. | |
Private schools lack diversity A private school is an institutionalised, artificial environment where the child will be exposed almost completely to children of their own socioeconomic background. This has two very interlinked problems. 1) One of the most important factors of a child’s education is to be exposed to a variety of races, religions, economies and abilities. This allows children to grow up to be more aware of these differences between people and more accepting of diversity as they get older. Yet private schools admission costs alone mean that students are from wealthy backgrounds, and this means they are largely exposed to other people from wealthy backgrounds. As we know, the majority of the people in the world are not wealthy and therefore these students have an extremely blinkered view of their country. Pakistan can be used as a prime example, where half of its children cannot read a full sentence at primary level and government spending on education has been cut from 2.5% to 1.5%. For those in private education and who usually go to university aboard they will never see or understand the situation of the majority in Pakistan and thus has a dysfunctional view of their country. (Landzettel 2011) 2) It is an inevitable feature of democracies that the rich have particular access to politicians and policy-makers. Furthermore, students from private education are much more likely to go into government or political roles. As mentioned above 66% of British politicians went to private school, and 44% of American politicians (against an 11% national average). While the rich don't have a need for state education because they can pursue education for their children from other sources, they have no motivation to lobby politicians on behalf of the education system and a perverse incentive to remove education from political agendas in favour of their preferred issues and legislation. Only by forcing the rich into the same situation as the poor can we expect to gain meaningful ground in terms of education reform, especially in terms of increased funding relative to national and municipal budgets. We cannot expect education will be a national priority until the entire nation has a vested interest in the good order of the system. | |
Schools should be free from bias Private education needs funding, be it from a business, individual funders or organisations and private schools rely on this money to run. It seems unlikely then, in this context, that these funders that the school is so reliant on may have an influence (even if unintentional) on various factors of the school life such as curriculum, food or teaching style. In many countries, such as the US, the curriculum in private schools does not need to be standardised (as State education does) and therefore teachers are free to teach what they desire and this might not give an open and full account of certain topics. The bias could be political, charitable or even commercial. We could have a political group like GreenPeace wanting to run a school and heavily emphasising environmental issues, or a company like Shell emphasising our desperate need for oil. Neither of these would present a balanced education which is what our children need. An example of this is that about 50 independent Christian schools in the UK teach creationism as part of biology.(Walker, 2006) In countries such as the Netherlands, South Africa and the republic of Ireland, private schools are set up and run by religious groups, and therefore will have a degree of influence over the curriculum. Education is a powerful tool, especially to impressionable children. And ultimately it appears that private education is at a much higher risk of being biased in its teaching than state education. | |
Private schools encourage elitism Private education suggests that a higher level of schooling is a privilege of those who can afford it, rather than a right. This encourages a cycle, whereby those who get a good, private education are more likely to get higher paid jobs as private education increases access to higher education (in the UK twice the percentage of students from private school went to university than those from state school), certain sectors of employment, (in the UK only 7% of students go to private schools, yet these people hold 86% top media jobs and 70% of barrister positions, 33% of MPs) (Gibson, 2006) and employer networking. Thus their children are more likely to go to private school and get a better job. This means that by allowing private education we create a society where the rich remain rich, and the poor remain poor, with the gulf between the two areas ever increasing. If we were to remove private education the field would be open for people from all walks of life to achieve a range of different things. | |
Similarly the counterargument to this has two distinct principles. 1) That some state schools lack social diversity as much as private schools, particularly in small, rural areas. Therefore we cannot simply criticize private schools, and must recognise that all schools have different levels of diversity. MacKinnon recognises that segregation in the United States schooling system is often defended on the grounds that it ‘represents the community’. Yet this is only the case because housing itself is segregated (Scrapbook). Therefore if we are banning private schools on the grounds of diversity, we should enforce a policy whereby neighbourhoods are forced to be diverse in order to ensure the same thing happens in state schools. 2) That rather than shut down private schools we should encourage the creation of funded places or bursaries. This way people who can afford private school do not have their choices limited, but that there is a greater diversity as people from poorer backgrounds would still be able to attend the schools. | |
Gaddafi was not deliberately killing civilians but rather targeting armed rebels fighters who were targeting his government. In his words he said he would show no mercy to rebels and did not speak about civilians. When pro Gaddafi forces regained control of Brega and Zawiyah, there was no bloodshed reported or any conflict harming civilians [1]. We don’t know what would have happened had Gaddafi regained control of Benghazi, but it is likely there would have been no bloodbath. [1] RT news, ‘Gaddafi gaining ground in battle, losing on information front’, rt.com, 11 March 2011 | |
Intervention prevented an impending bloodbath in Benghazi. From the day of the uprising in Benghazi, the government was committed to fight back till the end. Gaddafi asserted that he will chase down the protesters and cleanse house by house while his son said that rivers of blood would flow with thousands of deaths, if the uprising didn’t stop [1]. Military jets and helicopter gunships were indiscriminately unleashed upon people who had no means to defend themselves against assault from the air. The resolution of a no fly zone passed by the security council weakened and prevented government forces from killing people and destroying cities using air strikes[2]. Air strikes went on to destroy artillery, armor and other weapons that could be used for indiscriminate attacks. The intervention therefore stopped large scale civilian bloodshed. [1] The middle east in revolt, ‘Gaddafi’s son; last gasp of Libya’s dying regime?’, time.com [2] Los Angeles Times, ‘Obama on Libya; Intervention prevented more bloodshed’, latimes.com, 28 March 2011 | |
Far from creating a liberated and free democracy western intervention has set Libya on the path to becoming a failed state. The country is today ranked among the most insecure countries in the world [1]. Two years after the war, The country has not managed to form a unified police force or a professional army, and it has even formally recognised several of the militias, entrusting them with security tasks [2]. It may be better but freedom of information in Libya is still under threat [3]? The threat is simply different; less from the state, and more from a chaotic situation. Freedoms are also not gaining ground in all areas; notably there are concerns that religious freedom is declining with the country moving towards Sharia law, and with minorities being attacked and forced to convert to Islam [4]. [1] The New York times, ‘Clashes and car bombings highlight insecurity across Libya’, nytimes.com, 4 November 2012 [2] Euronews, ‘Libya’s internal insecurity appears long-term militia problem’, euronews.com, 10 October 2013 [3] World press freedom index, ‘Middle east and North Africa’, rsf.org [4] Nzwili, Fredrick, ‘Christians in Libya cast anxious eye at religious freedom’, The Washington Post, 10 January 2014 | |
A long ruling and ruthless dictator was toppled. Gaddafi was an oppressive ruler who led Libya for 42 years. The country had no Parliament, political parties, or NGO’s and no civil society [1]. He ruled Libya with an iron fist, eliminating any political opposition, restricting people’s rights and worst of all supporting different terrorist groups around the world. The same man was responsible for the 1988 bombing of a Pan Am jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, which killed 270 people [2] and he supported the leadership of Iddi Amin a dictator who killed masses in Uganda. His leadership posed a threat not only to Libya but to countries around the world. Western intervention in the Libyan civil war paved a clear path for the downfall of Gaddafi’s rule. We should consider the downfall of such a dictator to be a success and benefit to Libya and all who Gaddafi threatened. [1] Neil, MacFarquhar, ‘An erratic leader, brutal and defiant to the end’ nytimes.com, 20 October 2011 [2] BBC News South Scotland, ‘Colonel Gaddafi ordered Lockerbie Shooting’, bbc.co.uk, 23 February 2011 | |
Intervention was approved under the doctrine responsibility to protect and it aimed at protecting civilians in Libya [1]. While toppling Gaddafi was successful, it did not help in stabilising Libya. Many would prefer stability under a dictatorship than chaos. The situation today is even worse than during Gaddafi’s regime, with insecurity and chaos across the country, increased reports of human rights violation and terrorism [2]. Intervention however did not restore peace and did nothing to help or protect civilians in the longer term. [1] The economist, ‘The lessons of Libya’, economist.com, 19 May 2011 [2] The fault lines, ‘Libya; state of insecurity background reading’, Aljazeera.com, 14 February 2014 | |
Ushered in the liberation of Libya. The uprising sparked off as a concern for freedom in the country, people were tired of the oppressive regime and wanted to be liberated. This could not happen by people power alone; Gaddafi was willing to crack down to prevent it like Assad in Syria did. Western intervention in the civil war helped the citizens gain power and force to fight for their rights, by providing them with training, intelligence and logistics among others hence ejecting the oppressive leadership a symbol for liberation. After the civil war, people were able to participate in an election of the national assembly considered free and fair for the first time in Libya[1]. The part of the Mo Ibrahim index that rates participation and human rights rose from 20% in 2010 to 30.5% in 2012 [2]. More democratic and accountable government institutions have been set up, NGO’s welcomed and civil society empowered. Libya is becoming much freer with freedom house upgrading the country from ‘not free’ to ‘partially free’ [3]. [1] BBC news Africa, ‘Libya election success for secularist Jibril’s bloc’, bbc.co.uk, 18 July 2012 [2] Mo Ibrahim foundation, ‘Ibrahim index; Libya’, moibrahimfoundation.org [3] ‘Freedom in the World 2013’, Freedom House, 2013 | |
Russia’s long standing antagonism with the west is not new [1] and Libya is not the cause. Its reaction towards the Syrian conflict is driven by a complex mixture of political and economic interests including having a naval base in the country [2]. The UN security council has also continued to ensure that its operations are successful and have acted on the Syrian crisis too. It approved a mission to destroy chemical weapon stockpiles in Syria and evacuate people from Homs. This shows how the UNSC usually works; where the major powers can agree they do and act, where they can’t the council does nothing. This would have happened in Syria regardless of what occurred in Libya; Syria is simply worth more strategically to Russia than Libya was. [1] Con, Coughlin, ‘While Putin still believes the west is still an enemy, Russia will not change’, telegraph.co.uk, 3 December 2010 [2] Nicholas, Kosturos, ‘What Drives Russia’s Unrelenting Position on Syria?’, americanprogress.org, 13 August 2012 | |
The no-fly zone on its own was not sufficient to protect civilians on the ground. It was the responsibility of NATO to take further action aimed at protecting people whose lives were at risk from gaddafi’s soldiers. This NATO did by attacking military targets such as artillery. This was also part of the UNSC agreement “permit all necessary measures to protect civilians”[1]. Specifically, NATO targeted military weapon stores and facilities not homes and camps as Gaddafi’s military did. 72 civilians were killed during this bombing campaign [2] a small number compared to the thousands of sorties. No one can know how long the conflict would have lasted without NATO intervention, it is therefore impossible to state that the conflict lasted six times longer than it would have without NATO involvement. [1] Richard, Roth, ‘UN Security council approves no fly zone in Libya’, cnn.com, 18 March 2011 [2] BBC news Africa, ‘Nato hits back at Libya's civilian deaths report’, bbc.co.uk, 14 May 2012 | |
It increased conflict and instability in Libya and its neighbours. The toppling of Muammar Gaddafi has had unpleasant side effects. Gaddafi’s army involved a large number of mercenaries, many of them Tuaregs from northern Mali. When Gaddafi was overthrown they returned to their homeland without having given up their arms. These returnees helped spark a rebellion that deposed a democratically elected president under a coup and prompted yet another western intervention[1]. In Libya the situation never fully calmed down with the country left dealing with militia groups and terrorist attacks. The US ambassador to Libya Chris Stevens was killed, Prime minister Ali Zaidan was kidnapped and there are reports of ongoing insurgencies [2]. Previously Libyans may have lived under an eccentric dictator but at least they had order and stability. [1] Owen, Jones, ‘The war in Libya was seen as a success now here we are engaging in the blowback in Mali’, independent.co.uk, 13 Jan 2013 [2] Chris, Stephen, ‘Assassination pushes Libya towards civil war, two years after Gaddafi’s death’, thegurdian.com, 19 October 2013 | |
Created a large divide in the UN security council. The UN security council approved humanitarian intervention in Libya that ensured a no fly zone to protect civilians from government attacks. However, the west went beyond the resolution’s intent and turned it into a de facto campaign for regime change [1]. This made Russia and China who initially had opposed any intervention feel cheated. The divide has affected the response of the security council to other crises notably in Syria where over a hundred thousand people have been killed and an even larger number displaced. Russia and China have vetoed resolutions on Syria three times [2] fearing that it may end like the Libyan case a fact that Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stressed; “Russia will not allow a repetition of the Libyan scenario in Syria” [3]. Such divisionism has destroyed the credibility of the security council [4] and created an unintended casualty of the Libyan intervention. [1] David, Blair, ‘Putin thinks Cameron conned him over Syria, he won’t allow that to happen again with Syria’, telegraph.co.uk, 2 August 2012 [2] Rick, Gladstone, ‘Friction at the U.N. as Russia and China Veto Another Resolution on Syria Sanctions’, nytimes.com, 19 July 2012 [3] Global research, ‘Russia Will not Allow Repetition of “Libya Scenario” in Syria’ globalresearch.ca [4] Mick, B. Krever, ‘Why won’t the UN Security council intervene in Syria?’, cnn.com 14,January 2012 | |
The intervention backfired. NATO’S action increased the conflict’s duration about a six fold and the death toll at least sevenfold, but also increasing human rights abuses, humanitarian suffering, and weapon proliferation in Libya and neighbouring countries [1]. The UN security council approved the resolution for protecting civilians in Libya [2] but NATO just did the opposite. Their operation came at the expense of increasing harm to Libyans. NATO attacked Libyan forces indiscriminately including those in Sirte who posed no threat to civilians as Sirte remained in government hands right to near the end of the conflict and continued to support the rebels offering them weapons, military training, intelligence and troops on ground [1], even when they rejected cease fire offers from the government that would have helped end the crisis and spare civilians. [1] Alan, Kuperman, ‘Lessons from Libya; How not to intervene’, harvard.edu September 2013 [2] Robert, winnet and Richard Spencer, ‘UN approves no fly zone as British troops prepare for action’, telegraph.co.uk, 17 March 2011 | |
The Malian conflict is not new and has been on for a long period notably the 1960, 1996 and the 2006 rebellions[1]. It did not break up from the Libyan conflict and additionally the Tuareg were not the only rebels involved in this crisis. The insecurity reports across Libya is typical for every emerging democracy in transition and cannot be a reason to claim that it is not stable. Even the Libyan people accept it with 71% of the population being optimistic about the current situation [2]. [1] Mats,Utas, ‘The Malian crisis; Causes, consequences, responses’, wordpress.com 7 May 2013 [2] JMW Consulting, ‘Believing in Democracy: Public Opinion Survey in Libya’, National Democratic Institute, August 2013, p.6 | |
A minor addition to what the UK has is hardly securing a special place for the UK. Moreover there is no reason to keep such a position if it is not working for Britain. The renegotiation deal did not succeed in making the EU work how Britain would like – a move back to greater national sovereignty – so Britain is better off out. Indeed some, such as former Conservative leader Michael Howard argue “There is only one thing that just might shake Europe’s leaders out of their complacency: the shock of a vote by the British people to leave… If the UK voted to leave, there would be a significant chance that they would ask us to think again [with greater concessions].” [1] [1] Howard, Michael, ‘David Cameron’s reform bid has failed – it’s time to go’, The Telegraph, 25 February 2016, | |
Secures a special place for the UK The renegotiation deal ensures that the UK has a special place in Europe. One where it is both a leading part of the club with a major say in the council, commission and parliament, and is also outside of those areas such as the Eurozone and anything relating to the Euro which the UK does not wish to join. Donald Tusk, current president of the European Council, says that the deal "strengthens Britain's special status"; [1] the renegotiation document “recalls” the special position already holds listing previous opt outs on joining the Euro and Schengen among others. This deal adds to that an opt out from ever closer union. With such a privileged position within the EU secured Britain should not rush to the exit so giving away such a status. As European politicians have made clear the UK will not receive such favourable treatment when outside the EU. [2] [1] BBC News, ‘EU deal gives UK special status, says Cameron’, 20/2/16 [2] Verhofstadt, Guy, ‘Message to Michael Gove: this deal is binding, and it’s the best Britain will get’, The Guardian, 24 February 2016, | |
The only way to ensure that the UK does not become part of a political union is to leave entirely. The European Scrutiny Committee of the UK Parliament has concluded that the “ever closer union” is largely symbolic so guarantees against it amount to little. [1] Meanwhile the pledges about competitiveness are vague. It leaves as an open question what are the administrative burdens that are going to be lowered or what legislation might be repealed. Without specifics is it likely that any such repeal will take place? [1] European Scrutiny Committee, ‘Voters must know EU changes will require Treaty amendment’, parliament.uk, 15 December 2015, | |
A fundamental change to Britain’s relationship with Europe It was too much to hope that the deal might involve a complete change for the EU as a whole. However it has the potential to fundamentally change the UK’s relationship with the EU by putting it on a much more secure footing. The most fundamental change is the acceptance of two Europes. By accepting the UK opting out of ever closer union in perpetuity there is now an acceptance that the whole of Europe is not necessarily even moving to the same goal. As the deal states there can be “a deeper degree of integration among the Member states that share such a vision of their common future, without this applying to other Member States.” [1] The second change is increasing democratic accountability through increasing the power of national Parliaments. Now if 55% of national parliaments reject a European Council proposal the Council will need to think again. [2] [1] Annex 1, P.17 [2] Annex 1, P.17 | |
While it is quite correct that the UK should not have to be signed up to taking part in a European super-state the renegotiation does not represent a big leap forward. With its’ opt outs that are not time limited the UK was already not further integrating with the EU. The change to accepting the de facto truth is not a big one. Allowing national parliaments a say may have a long term impact, but under the current mechanism it means almost nothing. It seems unlikely that 55% of member states national governments (which of course signed the deal) are ever going to lose in their parliaments. The bar is raised even higher by their being a time limit of 12 weeks. | |
Ensures Europe stays of the track Britain wants it to be on Britain’s ideal for the European Union is a union that is founded upon free trade; an economic not a political block. The agreement ensures that the European Union remains on this path in two ways. First through agreement on competitiveness where members pledged the “lowering administrative burdens and compliance costs on economic operators, especially small and medium enterprises, and repealing unnecessary legislation”. [1] Second it is explicitly stated “references [in EU treaties] to ever closer union do not apply to the United Kingdom” [2] which ensures that the UK will never have to become part of a political union but can instead remain in an economic partnership with the EU even if the EU itself moves towards political union. [1] Annex 1, p.15 [2] Annex 1, p.16 | |
Neither are at all likely. Gove’s opinion has been rejected by the Attorney General saying “It has legal effect from the point the UK says it intends to remain in the EU, and the European court must take it into account. The job of the European court is to interpret the agreements”. [1] Similarly the European Parliament is very unlikely to reject the deal which has been agreed by the leaders of all member states. MEPs have generally shown support for the UK remaining in Europe and the leader of the EPP, the biggest group, has stated “We support the core of the agreement.” [2] [1] Mason, Rowena, ‘Attorney general rejects Gove claim that EU deal is not legally binding’, The Guardian, 24 February 2016, [2] European parliament web team, ‘EU Referendum: MEPs Debate the UK's European Future’, Huffington Post, 25 February 2016, | |
This is the case in all negotiations. Both sides start out with their maximalist demands that they would like to have and both sides compromise and reduce their own demands until they meet in the middle. During this compromise many ideas and proposals are dropped or watered down until both sides get the core of what they want. Cameron was never going to get all of his demands and it is disingenuous to suggest this could have happened. | |
The deal makes no difference to migration David Cameron failed to even negotiate on the area that the people of the UK most want changed; cutting migration. The only way to do this is to end freedom of movement through the Schengen agreement; something that was never on the table. As a result the changes are minor ones to benefits which the Office for Budgetary Responsibility has said “changes to benefit rules are unlikely to have a huge impact on migration flows” indeed “In my opinion: not much”. [1] Polling by ComRes within days of the agreement showed that 53% of the British public believe there will be no change in migration as a result of the deal while roughly equal numbers think it will increase as decrease; 21% to 22%. [2] [1] May, John, and Whale, Sebastian, ‘OBR: Four-year ban on benefits 'unlikely' to cut EU immigration significantly’, Politics Home, 8 December 2015, [2] Slack, James, ‘A complete failure: Voters offer damning verdict on PM's Europe deal with three-quarters claiming migration will not change as a result of his reforms - and could even increase’, 24 February 2016, | |
The renegotiation agreement could yet fall through At the moment is simply an agreement between the leaders of the states within the EU. Until it is written into treaties the agreement is vulnerable. There are two ways in which it could fall through or be changed. The first is for the European Court to declare part of it incompatible with the EU treaties. The Secretary of State for Justice Michael Gove has argued "The facts are that the European Court of Justice is not bound by this agreement until treaties are changed and we don't know when that will be". [1] The second is that the European Parliament still needs to approve as would any legislature when given a proposal by the executive branch. [2] Members of the European Parliament have refused to rule out that it could be rejected. [3] Even then nothing is secure until there is treaty change as the only way the agreement can be legally binding “would be through Treaty amendment, or the equivalent agreement of a Protocol.” [4] [1] ‘EU reforms ‘not legally binding’ – Michael Gove’, BBC News, 24 February 2016, [2] Peers, Steve, ‘The draft UK/EU renegotiation deal: is it ‘legally binding and irreversible’?’, EU Law Analysis, 10 February 2016, [3] Stone, Jon, ‘David Cameron’s EU deal can’t be legally binding, EU Parliament president Martin Schulz says’, Independent, 16 February 2016, [4] European Scrutiny Committee, ‘Voters must know EU changes will require Treaty amendment’, parliament.uk, 15 December 2015, | |
The renegotiation makes little difference Conservative MP Jacob Rees-Mogg described the deal as “pretty thin gruel” which hits the mark. The British Prime Minister has not been able to go nearly as far as he would like for example with his pledge on migrant benefits where Cameroon failed to ensure that all who claim must contribute to the UK for at least four years. Instead there is a break that the UK can use if migrants are putting excessive pressure on public services. Meanwhile Cameron failed to get anything at all on the Working Time Directive that restricts working hours in the EU. [1] More important is what Cameron did not even demand; greater democracy in the EU, bringing power back to national parliaments, or opting out or significant changes to common agricultural and fisheries policies. [1] Foster, Peter, ‘EU deal: What David Cameron asked for… and what he actually got’, The Telegraph, 20 February 2016, | |
Migration is a benefit to the UK financially. Most migrants don’t claim benefits which is why such benefit rules changes will not make much difference. Cutting migration would be easier outside the European Union however even then there is unlikely to be scope to cut migration as far as skeptics want. Net migration from outside the EU in year ending September 2015 was 191,000 [1] far above the Conservative target to get migration below 100,000. [1] White, Nicola, ‘Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: February 2016’, ons.gov.uk, 25 February 2016, | |
As an American state, Puerto Ricans would pay federal income taxes, which most currently do not. Some businesses would also lose tax breaks they currently enjoy. [1] This would harm not only the wealth of individual Puerto Ricans but also harm the country's economic standing, as it would become less appealing as an investment destination without these tax breaks and with the presence of federal income taxes. There is no guarantee that the extremely high rates of economic growth the pro-statehood optimists forecast will actually come about to balance out these increased costs for all Puerto Ricans. Historically statehood could have been disastrous for Puerto Rico's economy: the post-World War Two economic growth in Puerto Rico was the result of special treatment via exemption from Federal corporate taxes resulting from Puerto Rico' special non-state status. [2] [1] Constitutional Rights Foundation. “BRIA 17 4 c Puerto Rico: Commonwealth, Statehood, or Independence?”. Constitutional Rights Foundation. Fall 2001 (17:4). [2] Leibowitz, Arnold H. “Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of United States Territorial Relations”. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 1989. | |
Puerto Rico would benefit economically from statehood American statehood would lead to significant economic growth for Puerto Rico. Statehood would mean that the island would shed its ineffective and costly reliance on preferential tax credits and more fully integrate into the national economy. In a study by Hexner, Jenkins, Lad and Lame, "Puerto Rican Statehood: A Precondition to Sound Economic Growth," the case is persuasively made that statehood is necessary for the island's economic growth. [1] [2] As an American state, the standard of living in Puerto Rico would profoundly improve for the average person. With average income going up, families would be able to pay their fair share of taxes while still improving their net income and standard of living. For those with low incomes, the U.S. citizens of Puerto Rico would have the same access to tax relief and federal support programs as any other citizen of the country, unlike under the present status where significant disparities exist. This is particularly significant as approximately 50% of Puerto Ricans live under the federal poverty line. [3] Many areas of US Federal funding to Puerto Rico would actually improve. For example, the current 50 states can receive up to 90% reimbursement through Medicaid for critical health information technologies; Puerto Rico is not eligible for these supplements. According to 2005 Congressional testimony by Governor Anibal Acevedo-Vila, had Puerto Rico been treated like the other states, it would have received $1.7 billion dollars in federal Medicaid support instead of the $219 million received. Translated to monthly amounts, federal Medicaid support in the states approximated $330 per month per participant; the amount in Puerto Rico was about $20 per month. [4] The US is one of the richest countries on earth, and being a full part of it would give Puerto Ricans a lot of practical advantages that the independent countries of the Spanish-speaking Caribbean lack. The right to move to the US-proper and work there legally, for example, is extremely valuable. [5] Overall, therefore, there is a compelling economic case for Puerto Rico to seek American statehood. [1] Puerto Rico Statehood Students Association. “Statehood”. [2] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. [3] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. [4] Frisse, Dr. Mark. “Puerto Rico”. Wellshpere. 7 September 2008. [5] Yglesias, Matthew. “What is the Case for Puerto Rican Independence?”. Think Progress. 1 May 2010. | |
The foreignness of English in Puerto Rico is greater in magnitude than it was in any state at any time in our national experience, including the examples listed. Census data show that just 20 percent of the island’s residents speak English fluently. By comparison, California has the lowest proficiency rate among the 50 states, but its 80 percent proficiency rate dwarfs Puerto Rico’s. The deeply rooted preference for Spanish makes Puerto Rico’s 1993 elevation of English to “co-official” status practically irrelevant. Authentic “official English” policies increase English learning, but they will not work when English is merely an add-on to a pre-existing official language that is spoken in 95 percent of homes. [1] [1] Schultz, Tim. “A Spanish 51st State?” National Review Online. 8 March 2010. | |
Puerto Ricans deserve full political rights and citizenship Currently, Puerto Ricans do not receive full political rights and equal representation, despite their American citizenship. Although it has its own Governor and legislature which handles some domestic matters, inhabitants of Puerto Rico receive no say in US federal matters or foreign policy, despite being heavily affected by them (more so than most current American states, as Puerto Rico sits in the Caribbean surrounded by other island nation-states). [1] If Puerto Rico became a US state, Puerto Ricans would then share as everyone else in full benefits from the US government, while paying taxes like everyone else. The status quo perpetuates a semi-colonial situation in Puerto Rico, where American citizenship, which they have held since 1917, carries fewer rights than in the US proper. This has been the situation since the US captured Puerto Rico in 1898, and no other US territory has been held in limbo like this for so long. During this time Puerto Ricans have supported the US by serving in large numbers, both voluntarily and through conscription, in the US military in every major war since the Spanish-American War. [2] However the island's current status still prompts United Nations to still debate whether Puerto Rico is a colony. [3] US congressional inquest into Puerto Rico's political situation has found that, despite the divergent views that Puerto Ricans have with respect to their preferred political status, “all factions agree on the need to end the present undemocratic arrangement whereby Puerto Rico is subject to the laws of Congress but cannot vote in it.” [4] The former chief justice of the Puerto Rico Supreme Court, Jose Trias Monge, has written a book on the political status of Puerto Rico entitled “Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World.” Therein he argued that just prior to the U.S. invasion, the Island enjoyed greater freedom and rights in certain areas than it does now, including an insular parliament that could legislate in matters of monetary policy, banking, import/export duties, and public credit; the ability of Puerto Rico to negotiate its own commercial treaties; Puerto Ricans were Spanish citizens, equal in all respects to mainland Spanish citizens; the Spanish Constitution applied in Puerto Rico in the same manner as it applied in Spain proper; the Autonomic Charter of 1897, which governed Puerto Rico's relation with Spain, could not be changed except with Puerto Rico's consent. [5] The political rights currently enjoyed by Puerto Ricans, such as their right to elect their own Governor, are not even guaranteed to them in the status quo. In 1993, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that Congress may unilaterally repeal the Puerto Rican Constitution or the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act and replace them with any rules or regulations of its choice. [6] To perpetuate this current second-class status is morally unacceptable in a nation which pledges itself to “liberty and justice for all”. [1] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. [2] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. [3] Constitutional Rights Foundation. “BRIA 17 4 c Puerto Rico: Commonwealth, Statehood, or Independence?”. Constitutional Rights Foundation. Fall 2001 (17:4). [4] U.S House of Representatives. ‘Puerto Rico Democracy Act’, 110th Congress. Second Session. Report #597. 2007, Washington, D.C. [5] Monge, Jose Trias. “Puerto Rico: The Trials of the Oldest Colony in the World”. Yale University Press. 1997. [6] Hill, Fay and Edmondson, "United States v. Sanchez, 992 F.2D 1143 (1993) United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Paragraphs 44 – 46)" | |
Regardless of what Puerto Ricans may or may not “deserve”, the fact is that Puerto Ricans have rejected statehood many times now, making their voices heard on this issue many times since the late 1960's. The island has repeatedly voted to remain a commonwealth when votes were taken in 1967, 1993, and 1998. [1] If Puerto Ricans actually like their current status enough to vote for it when presented with the alternatives of statehood or independence, where is the injustice in that status continuing? [1] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. | |
English is not a problem for Puerto Rican statehood Some have made the argument that Puerto Rico should not be a state because Puerto Ricans do not speak English, and that the US should not have a non-English speaking state. This argument does not hold up for the following reasons: English is already an official language on the island with the same status as Spanish. Puerto Ricans are already citizens of the U.S., and have been since1917. [1] There was no language requirement with the granting of citizenship then, so it makes no sense to ask this question now. In fact, there has never been a language requirement of territories entering the union in American history. English is a required subject in public schools through high school. English is the only language of the Federal Court system and all U.S. government agencies in Puerto Rico and is the common language in banking, commerce, real estate and the tourism industry. Learning English as well as Spanish just makes good sense. English is the international language of business, science, and increasingly, diplomacy. Puerto Rico should do all it can to increase English language capability. But, making it a requirement of statehood would ignore the precedents of Enabling Acts of Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma and Arizona, all of which similarly had issues of large non-English speaking populations and gave or give these other languages some official status in law. [2] [1] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. [2] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. | |
Firstly, Puerto Ricans have repeatedly rejected independence in referendums in 1967, 1993, and 1998, with the votes for independence always being fewer than those for statehood. But secondly, the reasons against Puerto Rican independence are myriad. If Puerto Rico were to vote for independence, it would be hugely costly. It is inconceivable that the U.S. would set Puerto Rico adrift without a large "transition package" and continued foreign aid of a large magnitude. This would be necessitated by the fact that Puerto Ricans are currently U.S. citizens, who would demand favourable treatment and help. Puerto Rico, as an island with 3.8 million people and no other significant natural resources, is not economically viable as a separate nation without significant external aid and free access to large markets like the US enjoys. With statehood, Puerto Rico can be economically viable and a contributor to the United States' wealth, but with independence it would be impoverished and isolated. [1] Moreover, the American 'melting pot' has always been about the fusion of different cultures together, not their disappearance, and this will be the same for Puerto Rican identity. [1] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. | |
The arguments regarding the loss of Puerto Rican culture under statehood do not stand up because Puerto Rican identity is strong and will continue to be so. Puerto Rico has been exposed to U.S. mainland cultures for over 100 years, and Puerto Rican culture and heritage has thrived and grown. Puerto Ricans and mainland citizens have moved freely between the island and the mainland with no resulting cultural dilution or weakening of Puerto Rican's strong identity, even with the large migrations of the 1930's, the 1950's and since then. There is no reason to believe this would change under statehood. Puerto Rico has adopted and adapted aspects of U.S. culture, just as we have incorporated much of Puerto Rican culture when exposed to it. Puerto Ricans, while citizens, in much the same way as Texans and others view themselves, are still Puerto Ricans despite the more than 100 years of the deep and strong relationship with the mainland United States. [1] [1] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. | |
Puerto Rican statehood is not economical for the US If Puerto Rico were to enter the US in such a way as to harm the US economy or if it were to become a burden to the US, this could lead to resentment of Puerto Rico by the rest of the US and hamper integration. The unemployed in Puerto Rico will at least have higher welfare benefits to fall back on if statehood is granted, meaning more money lost to the U.S. treasury. [1] Puerto Rico's per capita income of $8,509 is less than one third of the US average, and about one half that of Mississippi, the poorest state. The government sector in Puerto Rico generates approximately 380,000 jobs, or 33% of total employment can be unfavourably compared to the percentage of the economy of Puerto Rico from tourism: About 6%. The average monthly per capita income in Puerto Rico $709 per month. Social Security Disability payments are at least $790 per month. Rank of a state of Puerto Rico as a state among states based on population: 25th. Rank of Puerto Rico currently if included among states based on persons receiving disability income: 16th. [2] Even with the gain to the U.S. Treasury of taxes now not being paid by Section 936 companies, the CBO put the cost of Puerto Rican statehood as $9.4 billion in the first four years. These costs do not include matters like government and court translation expenses should Puerto Rico declare itself to be a solely Spanish-speaking land. [3] [4] [5] Nor does it include the costs to the U.S. Treasury of as many as seven representatives and two Senators whose continuance in office will depend on their pleasing an impoverished constituency. Legislation to increase federal spending on social programs of all sorts need not fail narrowly in either house of the U.S. Congress, as it does at the moment, if Puerto Rico's delegation (twice the size of West Virginia's) enters the equation. [6] Clearly neither the United States nor Puerto Rico can afford Puerto Rican statehood, and it makes no sense for Puerto Rico to enter into such an unstable relationship where resentment against Puerto Rico (and Puerto Ricans living in the US) will breed fast. [1] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. [2] NoPuertoRicoStatehood. “Puerto Rico Statehood”. 29 May 2011. [3] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. [4] Puerto Rico Statehood Students Association. “Statehood”. [5] Schultz, Tim. “A Spanish 51st State?” National Review Online. 8 March 2010. [6] Fund, John. “Puerto Rico, the 51st State?”. The Wall Street Journal. 13 May 2010. | |
Statehood would prevent Puerto Rican independence The US has treated Puerto Rico as little more than a colony for 100 years, and this has seeped into the Puerto Rican mentality in harmful ways. According to educational scientists Francesco Cordasco and Eugene Bucchioni, in their 1973 work The Puerto Rican Experience: a Sociological Sourcebook, the belief that Puerto Rico cannot survive on its own results from teachings since grade school. “Puerto Ricans here and in Puerto Rico are taught three things: Puerto Rico is small and the US is big, Puerto Rico is poor and the US is rich, Puerto Rico is weak and the US is strong.” [1] Popular author and Puerto Rican culture enthusiast Jesús Omar Rivera similarly argues that “in Puerto Rico, ever since you are a child, you are told that you live on a tiny island that has no natural resources, nothing. This is what they teach you in school, on TV, the media, and it’s always negative.” He argues says this perception is a by-product of the island’s political dependence on the U.S.. “There is this colonized mentality that everything from abroad is better.” [2] None of this would change under statehood, and arguably would get even worse as Puerto Rican culture, still perceived as 'inferior' to all things American, would decline even further. Puerto Rican nationalist Juan Mari Brás has argued “Only through a great unified movement looking beyond political and ideological differences, can the prevalent fears of hunger and persecution be overcome for the eventual liberation of Puerto Rico, breaking through domination by the greatest imperialist power of our age”. [3] Attaining Puerto Rican independence us the only great cause which can unite all Puerto Rican people and allow them to break out of this colonized mentality and reclaim their dignity as a people and as a nation. To enter into US statehood would simply be to accept this colonized mentality and the denigration of all things Puerto Rican, to the advantage of the all-consuming American culture. [1] Cordasco, Francesco and Bucchioni, Eugene. “The Puerto Rican Experience: a Sociological Sourcebook”. 1973. Littlefield, Adams, & Co.. [2] Martorell, Carlos Rodríguez. “Have a Puerto Rican question? Ask El Boricuazo”. NYDailyNews. 3 June 2008. [3] Peacehost.net. “Juan Mari Brás”. | |
The language barrier and Puerto Rican identity Puerto Rico should not become an American state because linguistic and cultural differences continue to divide the other 50 states and Puerto Rico. This would mean that Puerto Rico would either fit incongruously into the union, or it would lose its distinct cultural identity. Historically the US administrations of Puerto Rico have pursued 'Americanization' campaigns there, focusing especially around imposing the use of the English language and casting aside 'old values'. This policy was deeply resented and strongly resisted by most Puerto Ricans, and it failed. Thus, after 91 years of intimate association, Puerto Rico remains a separate cultural nationality. [1] [2] Furthermore in terms of national identity, Puerto Rico joining the US would result in it losing the semi-independent (or at least distinct) identity which it currently has in the eyes of much of the world. To name but two examples, Puerto would no longer have its own representative in the Miss Universe Pageant (which Puerto Rico has actually won on three occasions) and they would not be recognized as an individual nation in the Olympic games, as it currently is. These international representations would be curbed under statehood, as Puerto Rico would be required to participate in the same manner as the other 50 states, and to compete to represent the United States collectively, and not Puerto Rico individually, in these international events. [3] Changing language policies would also undermine Puerto Rican culture: the territories that became Arizona, New Mexico, and Oklahoma (who all had large and historically rooted non-English-speaking populations) were all admitted to the union by congressional enabling acts that required that “schools shall always be conducted in English” in order to ensure assimilation. [4] This would likely also be the case with Puerto Rico, and could undermine the access of future generations of Puerto Ricans to their Hispanic heritage and culture, subsuming it within the overpowering tide of English-speaking American culture. Thus the Puerto Rican people are highly independent and have immense pride in their district and rich Latin culture and Spanish language, and they should not be deprived of that culture, which statehood would arguably contribute towards. [1] NoPuertoRicoStatehood. “Puerto Rico Statehood”. 29 May 2011. [2] Schultz, Tim. “A Spanish 51st State?” National Review Online. 8 March 2010. [3] Essortment. “Puerto Rican Statehood, the An overview of the pros and cons”. Essortment.com. [4] Schultz, Tim. “A Spanish 51st State?” National Review Online. 8 March 2010. | |
Much of this argumentation assumes that the Puerto Rican economy will not expand with statehood, which there are many good reasons to believe would occur. Look at what happened to the last two states admitted to the Union, Hawaii and Alaska. Both economies grew substantially after being admitted to the Union and became net contributors to the U.S. Treasury. Puerto Rico would receive equal treatment in both taxes and benefits, the same as the other states. Benefits to the island under the current system are limited by Congress. Those limitations would be removed. At the same time, payments of federal taxes would be phased in, as provided by the enabling legislation. It has been estimated Puerto Rico as a state will contribute nearly $2 billion to the U.S. Treasury each year. [1] How is that possible? Through economic growth. With economic growth there are more jobs, fewer unemployed, and less of a public assistance burden. [1] United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. “Statehood Issues”. United States Council for Puerto Rico Statehood. 2004. | |
It does not matter if think tanks are used in this way, so long as the conclusions that are reached by the think tanks are true. If there is objective value in an idea it should be communicated as well as possible. If this cannot be done with conventional marketing, it is good for it to be possible through a think tank. If the think tank’s idea and conclusion is wrong, the fact that it is presented objectively makes it no less falsifiable. Think tanks do not exist in a vacuum, and for every false idea presented as positive there will be another think tank to scrutinise it. In either case, the consumer is given useful information in an accessible way that can still be questioned. | |
Think tanks’ power of objectivity is the best form of marketing for biased views Think tanks are considered more credible than corporate marketing. [1] In the case of corporate marketing the recipient is aware that he is being sold a product. In the case of think tanks, the recipient believes he is being given unbiased information. Therefore, it is tempting for corporations to finance think tanks and encourage them to reach the conclusions that they otherwise would promote through marketing. This way, think tanks can be powerful tools for promoting a biased agenda: if done successfully the same message is communicated but in the form of credible information rather than manipulative marketing. In fact, it is common practice for journalists to quote think tanks without labelling their political bias. [2] And they most certainly don’t say if there is funding from a particular interest for example with the supposedly free market Institute of Public Affairs in Australia that somehow ends up arguing for government investment and intervention in Northern Australia – a position suspiciously close to several big mining companies. [3] This violates people’s freedom to make an informed decision, and can give biased views disproportionate and undue influence. By forcing them to disclose, any corruption or bias will become obvious to all. [1] Mayer, Jane. “Covert Operations”, A Reporter at Large, The New Yorker. 30 August 2010 [2] Dolny, Michael. “What’s in a Label?”, Extra!, FAIR. 1 May 1998 [3] MediaWatch, “Disclosing the funding of think tanks”, ABC News, 27 May 2013, | |
It is already in the interest of think tanks to be transparent. Think tanks exist in societies that depend on open communication and the free flow of ideas. Numerous organisations exist to criticise and unmask non-transparent think tanks: [1] this is sufficient incentive for them to reveal their funding. There may be exceptions in which the benefits of non-disclosure overrule the disadvantages in terms of trust, but these are rare, and it does not follow that it will be abused. [1] Who Funds You, Political Innovation, | |
Think tanks may become smoke screens for criminal groups In the status quo, the ability of think tanks to be non-transparent potentially provides a framework for criminal groups, or in extreme cases organisations, to handle large amounts of money without revealing where their money comes from or goes. We are allowing extremist groups to be exempt from answering to the government or shareholders in their management of money or information. In the US and Canada, think tanks are also exempt from tax. [1] By this mechanism, false think tanks can be used, for example, to channel money from openly extremist groups that could otherwise not access those parts of the world. [1] 26 USC § 501 - Exemption from tax on corporations, certain trusts, etc., Legal Information Institute | |
People have a right to know where their information comes from Democracies rely on transparency. Our commitment to transparency means surrendering part of our autonomy for the collective. This does not mean that our autonomy does not still belong to us; the institutions that affect our lives are under a constant obligation to justify their decisions and existence in relation to us. I do not have a right to know everything about the local football club (if I don’t play football and they are not a public company their decisions don’t affect me). Think tanks, however, are highly influential, and directly affect the society in which we live: some have, for example, lobbied successfully against action to prevent global warming. [1] Therefore they are to be considered a power in society, and the principle of transparency must be extended to them. [1] Monbiot, George. “The educational charities that do PR for the rightwing ultra-rich”, Comment is Free, The Guardian. 18 February 2013, | |
Think tanks don’t have any legislative power. At the end of the day, what they do is merely make suggestions. If they were active lobbyists they would lose their privileged legal position as an academic organisation. [1] Even if there may be other benefits of them being transparent, the legal concept of transparency cannot be extended to them. That would open the door to forcing other independent private institutions to reveal details of their organisation. Furthermore, think tanks rarely claim to be completely impartial. They usually have an agenda and are aligned with a political party. This concession in terms of impartiality merits equal concessions in terms of demanded transparency. At the end of the day it is their work that influences the agenda and that same work shows where their sympathies lie. [1] “The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 115, No. 5, March 2002, pp. 1502-1524. | |
There is no necessity to disclose think tank funding publically in order to circumvent this issue. As long as there are public institutions that scrutinise think tanks and are also bound to secrecy unless there are anomalies, the risk of terrorism can be successfully regulated. Being a think tank does not prevent an organisation from having to be transparent to government about their finances. It is unnecessary to expose think tanks that do not act illicitly to the general public. | |
Think tanks can choose transparency in the status quo anyway (as shown by nef): this benefit is relatively small. On the other hand, it harms the many other think tanks that need to protect the information of who funds them if, for instance, the funders do not wish to disclose it. It is a loss of freedom for the majority, not a gain. | |
The status quo promotes non-transparency Non-disclosure can be perceived as objectivity. It is easier for the public to criticise a think tank that is openly associated with a particular funder. That kind of prejudice is stronger than the more general the prejudice against non-disclosure. A person might distrust a non-transparent think tank, but dislike a think tank that is funded by an organisation they are already prejudiced towards. [1] In any comparison between two such organisations the distrusted organisation will have greater impact than the disliked organisation. [2] This gives non-transparent think tanks an advantage over transparent and honest ones. Billionaires are then able to buy influence by secretly funding organisations such as the Global Warming Policy Foundation or the Institute of Economic Affairs that is then listened to, by the media and therefore the public, when their own views would simply be dismissed due to the personal motivations of the backers. [3] By forcing all think tanks to reveal their funding, we level the playing field. [1] Bentley, Guy. “The state funding swindle: how left wing think-tanks are pulling taxpayer-funded wool over our eyes”, Commentary, The Commentator. 20 September 2012, [2] “The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 115, No. 5, March 2002, pp. 1502-1524. [3] Monbiot, George. “The educational charities that do PR for the rightwing ultra-rich”, Comment is Free, The Guardian. 18 February 2013 | |
Legally requiring disclosure from all benefits think tanks Even think tanks benefit from the introduction of this policy. The status quo leaves disclosure as a strategic device: think tanks are unwilling to disclose more than their competition for fear of being unfavourably portrayed. Such negative competition, i.e. competition in factors that do not improve the products of the market, makes them unable to make rational decisions about their funding if, for instance, potential funders want to contribute only on the condition that this funding be made public. As a consequence, the advent of organisations who call for transparency has been praised by prominent think tanks like the New Economics Foundation. [1] By depriving everybody of the strategic tool of revealing none or only a part of their funding, think tanks cannot be pressured into hiding or providing certain information about their funders, and they can thus act more independently. [1] Read, Sam. “Think tank funding matters: it’s central to democracy”, the nef blog, 22 June 2012, | |
On the other hand, by disclosing funders more corporations and individuals will have an incentive to fund think tanks. They will be assured that they will be publically recognised for it, and thus be rewarded when the think tanks they support produce good ideas. | |
Such a system, in which one allows think tanks to accept substantial anonymous donations, has immense downsides. It is simply too easy for a think tank to claim all, or most, of its funding is anonymous to them when it is questioned, while in fact they have been having informal strategic talks with potential funders days prior to, during, or after the donation. We cannot adopt a policy that is so easy too abuse, and since all think tanks must know who their funders are, we are not restricting their independence any further by asking them to make it public. | |
Overregulating think tanks sets a dangerous precedent The public scrutiny on think tank funders may backlash on perfectly innocent investors. Investors may be accused of corruption if think tanks that share their values independently reach favourable conclusions. Alternatively, minor investors may become guilty by association, for instance, if notorious companies or political parties have been seen supporting the same think tanks – even if this is done for completely different reasons. The motivations of think tanks cannot be made synonymous with their funders, but these funders should also not be made synonymous with each other. Thus for example Policy exchange is both seen as a think tank for UK conservative modernisers – the progressive wing of the party while also having been labelled as a “neo-con attack dog”. [1] [1] Helm, Toby, and Hope, Christopher, “The top twelve think tanks in Britain”, The Telegraph, 24 January 2008, | |
Private investors have a right to privacy The public scrutiny on think tank funders may backlash on perfectly innocent investors. Investors may be accused of corruption if think tanks that share their values independently reach favourable conclusions. Alternatively, minor investors may become guilty by association, for instance, if notorious companies or political parties have been seen supporting the same think tanks – even if this is done for completely different reasons. The motivations of think tanks cannot be made synonymous with their funders, but these funders should also not be made synonymous with each other. Thus for example Policy exchange is both seen as a think tank for UK conservative modernisers – the progressive wing of the party while also having been labelled as a “neo-con attack dog”. [1] [1] Helm, Toby, and Hope, Christopher, “The top twelve think tanks in Britain”, The Telegraph, 24 January 2008, | |
Think tanks should be assessed by the value of their ideas, not by who funds them One can conceive of an infinite amount of cases in which results of a think tank’s research are completely independent of their funders. Their opposition, however, will be likely to signal corruption, when in fact there may be no relation between a funder and certain results. Even if they are associated by sharing a perspective or an aim, this is not a sign of corruption or bias, and it should not enter into the value of a think tank. There has been one study of charity donations (as think tanks are) that concludes that anonymous donations are “a costly signal of a charity’s quality by an informed donor”. [1] [1] Peacey, Mike W., “Masked Heroes: endogenous anonymity in charitable giving”, Centre for Market and Public Organisation Bristol Institute of Public Affairs, May 2013, p.27 | |
Being subject to scrutiny discourages investors from supporting good projects Think tanks depend largely on voluntary funding for their projects, [1] so they must be careful when risking potential investments. Investors are likely to be put off from funding think tanks with good aims if this funding will be scrutinised and their interests questioned. [2] They are likely not to wish to risk being associated with seemingly biased results: a system by which funders can support ideas in themselves, perhaps even anonymously for the think tanks themselves, is the one in which think tanks best flourish and best produce results. Those that produce the best and most interesting ideas will be those who succeed in obtaining funding. [1] Think Tank Funding, On Think Tanks, accessed 11 June 2013 [2] Butcher, Jonathan, “Does it Matter Who Funds You?” One World Trust, 12 July 2012, | |
This is not an inherent flaw in the system. In the status quo, large investors can still publically advertise the fact that they are funding a project, and this too can have repercussions and bring negative associations for other investors. It is a risk anyone makes when investing in a given idea. The right to privacy of investors in political campaigns was discarded once evidence of potential abuses and political arrangements surfaced. Similarly, this right cannot apply to think tank funders. [1] [1] “The Political Activity of Think Tanks: The Case for Mandatory Contributor Disclosure”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 115, No. 5, March 2002, pp. 1502-1524. | |
Think tanks should be able to choose not to know who funds them The information think tanks provide can be extremely useful to society. Therefore we should be hesitant to restrict their key strength, which is their independence. There may be scenarios in which think tanks, in need of funding for a purely positive project, ask for donations from anyone who believes in their values. Wanting to avoid any negative associations or any accusations of bias, they choose not to find out who their funders are, and thus they cannot disclose that information. For think tanks who claim independence by only asking for anonymous donors, this is no longer an option when they are forced to disclose. The attempt to create more objectivity actually removes one of the ways of being perfectly impartial. | |
People are capable of assessing a biased idea after discovering its bias, while it is dangerous to present potentially biased ideas as genuine, for this limits discussion. This is especially so in the status quo, where the suspicions of who may be funding think tanks remain when they choose not to disclose their funders. A blanket obligation of all think tanks to reveal their funding allows for open discourse and thus more space to discuss the ideas themselves. | |
Suggesting that feminising African politics will stop poverty and provide empowerment returns to the ideas we attach to women. Women are often associated with domesticity, care, and reproductivity. Who’s to say that this is what women are or what they stand for? Basing quota systems on what women are believed to do is dangerous – in reality behaviour cannot be predicted, as women remain diverse and heterogeneous. A study has shown that there is no relationship between the number of women cabinet members and the sex of the executive implying that women don’t really help other women in politics (Jalalzai, p.196). Additionally who is to say that by having women in political roles they will instantly be able to implement and act on their desired policies? How resources and power are distributed within the political system is key. Resources may remain controlled by men. | |
Feminising the state: women helping women Including women in politics helps enable poverty to be tackled. Poverty is a women’s issue; women are more likely to live in poverty than men, and women are needed in politics to change this. Women understand each other, and what they need. Furthermore, although data varies, evidence shows gender inequalities remain intertwined to poverty and impoverishment [1] [2] . Women in positions of power and leadership can put the issues women face on the agenda and apply action. There is clearly a need to get women into politics to counter the current ‘boys club’ that exists in most countries where men help each other into positions of power squeezing out women and other methods of doing things. [1] See further readings: Gender Inequality Index, 2014. [2] See further readings: Chant, 2003. | |
Women become integrated into a man’s world. But the territory may not be changed. First, women may become like men in response to the jobs they take up and how one is expected to act in the given role. When we consider what conditions women are introduced, potentially with limited training in public speaking, confidence or acceptance, how will they fare? Their best way forward is to get help from the men already in parliament. Secondly, how do women experience work and are they treated at work? Quotas introduce more women, however, they may experience gender-based harassment and unfair treatment at work. In the case of Kenya, a female politician was publicly slapped [1] . Who will ensure their rights are protected and they are treated equally in a political world? Finally, is power redistributed? Frequent protests in Senegal show that despite quota systems being implemented women do not end up with power despite being in parliament. [2] Women are legally enrolled into local and national parties but do their seats ensure they can lead political parties? Does being a local candidate ensure the potential for national progression? [1] African Spotlight, 2013. [2] Kabwila, 2012. | |
Democracy must be representative Quotas are building representative democracies. Through the quota system women are given a voice in society. Quotas mean women are represented in politics. Women are half of the electorate so should be around half of the legislature. Although not there yet the rising numbers symbolise positive change. In 2012, on average, 1/5 of MPs in sub-Saharan Africa were women (The Economist, 2013). In South Africa and Rwanda the number is far above this. Women make up 42% of parliament seats in South Africa, and 64% in Rwanda (ibid.). At present, in Africa we have 2 female presidents (Liberia; Malawi); and 1 prime minister (Aminata Toure, Senegal). Notably Malawi, Rwanda, Senegal, and South Africa all have some form of quota system (quotaProject, 2014). | |
Having more women does not mean a representative democracy is built as it is not just gender balance that needs to be considered but ethnicity, language groups etc. as well. Additionally, the bias quota system will cause future problems. In the future men will need to be targeted and receive help. For example in Rwanda the focus on including women has pushed men out of politics. Implementing quotas favours the creation of a certain ‘representative democracy’. The democracy becomes ‘represented’ by what we think democracy should look like. | |
When we don’t just consider battle deaths the extent to which violence is declining is questionable [1] . Furthermore, we cannot suggest women in politics will limit war, conflict, or violence, as anomalies are found – such as Margret Thatcher’s use of violence in closing down industries across the UK and willingness to engage in the Falklands conflict. Furthermore the idea returns to a preconceived image and ideal women. The women are represented as the caregiver, submerged within traditional constructions of women as nurturing and empathetic. [1] See further readings: WDR, 2011. | |
Changing the male territory African politics remains masculinised and strongly male dominated. Implementing quotas shows a commitment to change gender inequalities by increasing women’s political participation (Bachelet, 2013). More women mean gender imbalances can be changed, women empowered, and the territorial boundaries defining what men and women do will become blurred. Additionally women in African politics can change the ‘boys club’ of bad governance in Africa. Bad governance can be tackled as the prominence of males controlling decisions will be changed, and internal political relations altered. The least corrupt countries on the continent; Rwanda and Botswana both have some form of quota system(quotaproject, 2014, Transparency International, 2013) | |
A safer world International relations debates, and conflict theories, suggest more women in politics makes for a safer world. In Pinker’s (2011) book the feminisation of politics is identified as a key factor to explain the decline in conflict and violence – battle deaths have declined from 20 per 100,000 people to only 1 or 2 today. Women are more inclined to call for peace resolution and being ‘maternal beings’ reflect nurturing behaviours. | |
It remains difficult to compare the experiences of women in Scandinavia and Africa. The contexts – history, ideas, and social geographies – are completely different. While Scandinavia may well not need quotas to change perceptions in Africa it may be the best way to do so. Women in Africa need a voice, and therefore politics provides a platform for their empowerment both vocally and in their use of public space. Quotas are a fast-track. It’s not forcing change but guiding and enabling it. | |
The women’s quota is a vital start to tackle underlying inequalities. Quotas of multiple identities such as race, class, age, sexuality, class and ethnicity will need to be included following the implementation of a women’s quota. | |
The woman’s ‘political job’ Quotas mean more women are able to enter the political world; however, how is it decided what political jobs and positions they can utilise? The inclusion of women into politics in Africa has mainly been in certain departments i.e. gender and health. More powerful women are needed in positions that remain masculinised – such as defence and security. Therefore the quota may introduce more women in politics, however, how active are they in deciding what area of politics? The quota may well be seen merely a means to introduce women passively into new distinct gender roles. If women are believed to be granted positions as a result of the quotas, rather than it being a position they have earned, they may be more at risk of marginalisation at work. Having a quota provides a reason to argue that an exceptional woman has received her place no based upon merit but due to the quota. This may be used as an excuse to prevent women reaching the most important positions. | |
Assuming causality: Africa Vs Scandinavia Scandinavian countries – Norway, Sweden and Denmark – have high female participation rates in parliament. However, Rwanda is one African nation that has even greater female parliamentary representation. In Scandinavia the quota has been introduced but is only implemented by some parties. Nevertheless there is little difference between parties in Denmark, for example, that utilise the quota and those that do not. This shows that voluntary quotas can work but also that they are not really necessary. This is because the position of women and capability to engage in politics was tackled first. The key thing is the perception of women; if they are perceived equally and voted for on their own merits women will win as often as men. This shows, crucially, political participation by women should not be dependent on quotas. We should not rely on quotas for gender equality. Women face multiple barriers to political participation; deeper action is required to adjust imbalances rather than simple quotas. Having quotas simply encourages a perception that gender matters in politics when the desired outcome is the opposite; a belief by the electorate that politics is genderless with both as able to perform the role. In Senegal for example, the quota is being criticised as challenging traditional culture and patriarchal society norms it is however those norms that need to be changed not just the number of women in politics [1] . [1] See further readings: Hirsch, 2012. | |
Are the women representative of all women? How can it be assured the women entering African politics are representative of the women in that African nation? Further, will the leader implement politically popular ideas or required policies? If we are introducing quotas for women in politics we need to think about what women are entering. The concern with race, ethnicity, age, sexuality, and class is fundamental as if we accept the principle that an unrepresented group should get a quota of parliamentarians this should not just apply to women. We need to think about who the women are, what they represent, and who. Even for women simple quotas do not ensure effective representation of what all women want, or ensure the means for change. Women are heterogeneous, as are their challenges in life. | |
Working within gender departments does not mean a woman will be limited in integrating with departments of security. Politics is integrated, and interconnected, therefore learning how to run one political department shows how to run another. Having a woman represent a department shows them in a position of power regardless of the department. We should not believe that the department of health is somehow less important than Defense. | |
The opinions of foreign governments and the international community have frequently failed to have any real impact upon the situation 'on the ground' in Tibet. For example, The US joined most other UN members in condemning the Chinese 'aggression' and 'invasion' of Tibet in 1950, however the Chinese exerted their authority there anyway. [1] The international community will therefore acquiesce with whatever is decided between Tibet and China – they will applaud any deal or condemn any repression but this will not affect the positions of either side. Rather, what matters is what the Tibetan population support, and there is good reason to believe that the 'Middle Way' does not satisfy them. Many younger Tibetans would prefer that the Dalai Lama push for total independence, an regret that he did not pursue a more confrontational path with China over the 2008 Olympics. [2] [1] The Office of Tibet, New York. “Historical Overview”. The Office of Tibet, New York. [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. | |
The 'Middle Way' has international support The USA, the most powerful nation in the world, has been vocal in its support for the 'Middle Way' strategy. Concurrently, the US has not given any indication that it would support complete Tibetan independence – nor is it likely to. America is unlikely to jeopardise trade relations with China over the Tibetan issue by giving political legitimacy to those advocating complete independence. [1] The European Parliament and the Scottish Parliament have also both passed motions advocating for the 'Middle Way' as a solution in Tibet. [2] [3] Such international support for the 'Middle Way' should be compared to the fact that no country in the world has ever recognised Tibetan independence. [4] Only the involvement of international actors and inter-governmental organisations can guarantee that Tibet and China will be able to attain a peaceful and equitable equilibrium with each other. International support means that the international community would accept any change when it occurs and gives China a further incentive to negotiate for some form of the ‘Middle Way’ as it would positively benefit its international relations. [1] Valdes, Manuel. “Dalai Lama to begin 6-day U.S. visit in Seattle to discuss compassion amid turmoil in Tibet”. Associated Press. 10 April 2008. [2] TibetCustom. “European Parliament Discusses Current Situation of Tibet”. TibetCustom. 26 March 2010. [3] Australia Tibet Council. “Sino-Tibetan Dialogue Presented to Scottish Parliament”. Australia Tibet Council. 2011. [4] The Economist. “Britain's suzerain remedy”. The Economist. 6 November 2008. | |
China's supposed strategic interests in Tibet are also why the promised autonomy under the 'Middle Way' will never truly emerge. If China's need to hold onto Tibet is really so important as made out, China will always need to keep tight control over all happenings in Tibet so as to further guarantee its security. This of course assumes China really does have vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet (as the Chinese Government claims, and as is argued opposite), however it is not entirely clear exactly what these strategic interests are. The 'Middle Way' is just a smokescreen for perpetuating the predominance of China's security interests as the most important issue in Tibet. Thus, if China does have vital strategic interests in Tibet, it will never allow it true autonomy (and so the Middle Way is hopeless), and if it has no vital strategic interests in controlling Tibet then Chinese rule there is unjustified -and independence, not the ‘Middle Way’ should be adopted. | |
The 'Middle Way' is the most realistic path for Tibet and China The Dalai Lama believes complete independence is not a viable solution for the Tibet crisis. Rather, his advocacy is aimed at creating common understanding between the Chinese and the Tibetans. He points to the model of the European Union as an example of a modern supranational political system in which different ethnicities and nationalities can cooperate to achieve an agreed ideal of prosperity. “Look at the European Union … What is the use of small, small nations fighting each other? Today it's much better for Tibetans to join [China].” [1] The 'Middle Way' is the most practical and realistic path for Tibet and China, as it bridges the needs of the Tibetan people with and interests of China. Specifically, the "Middle Way" offers a mutually beneficial course of action, as it avoids the concerns that China has regarding national unity and separation and at the same time it enables the Tibetan people to achieve de-facto equivalent of a right to self-determination. Acceptance of the 'Middle Way' would work as a signal demonstrating the increasing openness and accountability of Chinese political culture. As it is beneficial for both parties, it can be considered as a practical political course with a great potential to alleviate an ever growing strained situation. [2] China is more likely to negotiate with Tibetan activists and leaders if their demands are limited to greater political autonomy. Conversely, China is unlikely to give up control of Tibet, as doing so would constitute a grievous blow to the territorial integrity of China itself. The 'Middle Way' provides the current generation of Chinese leaders with an opportunity to accord greater autonomy to Tibet, without risking their domestic political capital or jeopardising China’s international standing. A key aspect of the 'Middle Way' is an undertaking by Tibetan leaders not to push for further independence if greater autonomy is granted. The 'Middle Way' also has the advantage of being in keeping with Tibetan Buddhist beliefs, mirroring the religion’s own ‘middle way’ tradition. The Buddhist 'Middle Way' is the descriptive term that Siddhartha Gautama (the Supreme Buddha) used to describe the character of the path he discovered that led to liberation. It was coined in the very first teaching that he delivered after his enlightenment. In this sutta- known in English as The Setting in Motion of the Wheel of Dharma- the Buddha describes the middle way as a path of moderation between the extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification. [3] The Dalai Lama's “Middle Way” in Tibet is designed, per its name, around these Buddhist principles, and so it has the advantage of being in keeping with the religious beliefs of most of Tibet's population. This adds to its practicality as it would offer a political strategy consistent with the cultural norms of most Tibetans. Therefore, the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way's is the most practical and realistic path toward rapprochement between Tibet and China. [1] Liu, Melinda. “Fears and Tears”. The Daily Beast. 19 March 2008. . [2] Gyaltsen, Kelsang. “The Middle-Way approach”. Tibetan Bulletin, July-August 1997. [3] Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta, Samyutta Nikaya, 56:11 . | |
The 'Middle Way' is no different from the current situation. Although, theoretically, the 'Middle Way' proposition offers the Chinese authorities and ordinary Tibetans a way to harmonise their conflicting interests, it is practically no different from the political accommodation that Tibet currently subscribes to. Under the ‘Middle Way’, the Dalai Lama has expressed willingness to accept socialist rule in Tibet. He has also dropped former Tibetan demands that their homeland be offered a political relationship as expansive as China’s offer in the early-1980s to Taiwan in favour of an insistence on a Hong Kong-style ‘association’ relationship with Beijing. Since the early 2000s, in keeping with the ‘Middle Way’, his hints about a residual international personality have been kept to a minimum. Further, the autonomy arrangement sought is an amalgam of the Hong Kong ‘one country, two systems’ formula and the existing autonomy provisions of the PRC Constitution. [1] This gradual dropping of Tibetan demands under the name of the ‘Middle Way’ means that it offers little improvement from the status quo. The background in terms of political events that led to a proposition of a "Middle Way" sheds more light into the fact that his strategy is just a new name on the board for the same as the provisions currently existing within the PRC constitution. [2] If the PRC sees that the ‘middle way’ is slowly reducing the demands for more freedom for Tibet then they are unlikely to embrace it as they can equally wait for more concessions. Despite all these concessions to the PRC position there are still things that China will never accept such as any idea that Tibet will be transformed into a ‘zone of peace and non-violence’ or that there should be a popularly elected legislature – it would inevitably mean others in China would believe they should have more democracy. By giving away so many concessions before negotiations but still making it impossible for the PRC to accept the Dalai Lama makes it unlikely that his middle way will get anywhere in negotiations so it is not really ‘realistic’. [1] Gupta, Sourabh. “The Dalai Lama’s Middle-Way approach needs re-adjustment”. EastAsiaForum. 8 March 2010. http :// www . eastasiaforum . org /2010/03/08/ the - dalai - lamas - middle - way - approach - and - the - need - for - re - adjustment / [2] ChinaDaily. “What is Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way'”. ChinaDaily.com.cn 26 July 2007. | |
The 'Middle Way' respects China's right to territorial integrity The Chinese government has a right to protect the unity of China against Tibetan separatism. US President Abraham Lincoln, in justifying efforts to maintain the union in the face of an imminent civil war, said in 1858, “A house divided cannot stand”. [1] Unity was argued to be essential to the integrity and future of the union if the United States as a much more decentralized federal union cannot sanction such a division then a much more centralized China cannot. China can put forth the same rationale as Lincoln for forcing Tibet to remain part of China, for example when it notes argues that the concept of an independent Tibet has historically been used by what it calls ‘foreign imperialists’ to interfere in China internally and split it up so that it can more easily be controlled from abroad. As an example of this, the CIA’s support for Tibetan separatists during the Cold War is cited. [2] [3] Mongolia provides a striking precedent for for Chinese worries about Tibetan independence, as it gained independence through Soviet backing and subsequently came under effective control of the USSR. [4] If Tibet were to achieve independence, both China and Tibet would be weaker, with less geopolitical strength and with greater tensions and opportunities for conflict. This is especially true in light of the history of foreign attempts to interfere with China internally, as noted above. The Dalai Lama made a similar argument himself when he stated: “Look at the European Union … What is the use of small, small nations fighting each other? Today it's much better for Tibetans to join [China].” [5] In 2008 the Foreign Minister of Cyprus similarly argued that the ‘One China’ policy, including Tibet, was necessary to safeguard China’s territorial integrity. [6] The government of Fiji has offered similar support. [7] The 'Middle Way' accounts for this need of China's whilst also offering greater autonomy to the Tibetan people, thus respecting the rights of both parties. [1] Abraham Lincoln Online. “House Divided Speech”. Abraham Lincoln Online. [2] Xinhua News report Xinhua News Report. Xinhua News. http :// news . xinhuanet . com / zhengfu /2002-11/15/ content _630888. htm [3] Wonacott, Peter. " Revolt of the Monks : How a Secret CIA Campaign Against China 50 Years Ago Continues to Fester ; A Role for Dalai Lama ' s Brother " . Wall Street Journal . 30 August 2008. http :// online . wsj . com / article / SB 122005956740185361. html ? mod = googlenews _ wsj [4] Xinhua News report Xinhua News Report. Xinhua News. http :// news . xinhuanet . com / zhengfu /2002-11/15/ content _630888. htm [5] Liu, Melinda. “Fears and Tears”. The Daily Beast. 19 March 2008. [6] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. “Cyprus supports the principle of a ‘single’ China”. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cyprus. 20 March 2008/ . http :// www . mfa . gov . cy / mfa / mfa 2006. nsf / All /5 B 640 E 57 BE 973 A 1 FC 22574120050 A 086? OpenDocument [7] Fijilive. “Fiji backs China’s action in Tibet”. Fijilive. 24 March 2008. http :// www . fijilive . com / news _ new / index . php / news / show _ news /3075 | |
China will simply never accept independence for Tibet, and so it is not a reasonable alternative to hold up against the 'Middle Way'. Rather, whatever gains can be made by adopting the 'Middle Way' should be embraced, as the alternative is not independence but rather unchanged Chinese dominance and control. | |
The average Tibetan does not actually want independence from China. For example, Dr. Lobsang Sangay, who was born in a refugee camp in India in 1968 and was named Prime Minister of the Cental Tibetan Administration (Tibetan exiles) on April 27, 2011, was once a militant of the Tibetan Youth Congress, a group that unequivocally supports Tibetan independence, but who now says he has matured and now supports the Middle Way Approach. [1] Certainly, many Tibetans want independence- of a type different to that proposed by the Dalai Lama- and some protest in favour of it. The Tibetan exile population is particularly vocal in this regard, but this should not be taken to mean that a majority of Tibetans want complete independence from China. Most Tibetans like everybody else would be happy with more freedoms within China rather than full independence. This is reflected in the views of the Dalai Lama, who seeks only greater freedoms and autonomy, but not independence, under the 'Middle Way'. [2] [1] Editorial Board of The Tibetan Political Review. “Investigating the Candidates on the Middle Way”. The Tibetan Political Review. 15 March 2011. http :// sites . google . com / site / tibetanpoliticalreview / project - updates / investigatingthecandidatesonthemiddleway [2] Barnett, Robert. “Seven Questions: What Tibetans Want”. Foreign Policy. 26 March 2008. | |
The Dalai Lama is no longer relevant to Tibet's future The Dalai Lama's influence and significance in the debate over Tibet’s future has been fading; he has resigned from all ‘formal authority’ and handed over his political role [1] , and his support for the 'Middle Way' strategy- over attempts to secure full independence- may well have reduced his influence. During the 2008 riots and protests in Lhasa in favour of Tibetan independence, a feeling of incongruity between the Dalai Lama and the desires of the Tibetan people was vocalized. A Tibetan teacher at the protests stated “We are demanding a peace dialogue between His Holiness and the Chinese. But at the moment, Dalai Lama is out of the picture. It's a Tibetan people's movement.” [2] Tibet appears to have moved beyond the 'Middle Way', but the Dalai Lama has not. For a new generation of Tibetans the Middle Way is considered to be an ineffective negotiation strategy, one that will not allow them to obtain the rights and political equality that they seek. Many activists operating within Tibet itself believe that violent confrontations comparable to the Palestinian intifada will be more effective in extracting concessions from the Chinese than the non-violent protests advocated by the Dalai Lama. [3] The Dalai Lama himself has recognized that the 'Middle Way' may become a redundant aspect of the Tibet debate. In 2003, he told a French reporter: “If no results can be achieved in two or three years of negotiations, I would find it hard to explain to the young that the 'middle way' is more effective than seeking independence... If I fail, these young people would raise torches and cry for independence”. [4] Events on the ground are simply the Dalai Lama's own prediction coming true, as he become less relevant and less in touch. The Chinese government has also tried to discredit Dalai Lama. The Beijing authorities have released a documentary portraying the Dalai Lama as exploiting the Tibetan people to further his own political agenda. The documentary also emphasized the increased pace of economic development in the region. [5] Quite simply, Tibet has moved beyond the Dalai Lama and his 'Middle Way', and both are increasingly irrelevant to Tibet's youth and future. The 'Middle Way' continues to be followed mostly out of a nostalgic fascination with the Dalai Lama, or out of the international community's desire for a single, moderate Tibetan voice, even if he does not represent the Tibetan people. [1] Banyan, ‘The Dalai Lama resigns So long, farewell’, The Economist, 14 March 2011, [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. [3] Sonam, Tenzing. “Until the Last Tibetan”. Tibet Writes. 26 December 2007. [4] ChinaDaily. “What is Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way'”. ChinaDaily.com.cn 26 July 2007. [5] Little, Matthew. “CCTV-4 Steps up Propaganda Against Dalai Lama”. Epoch Times. 10 April 2008. | |
The Chinese government is exploiting the 'Middle Way' against Tibet's interests The Chinese government manipulates people every day, and it is clear how Beijing is manipulating the good intentions of the Dalai Lama and his 'Middle Way'. The Middle Path is therefore not only hopeless, but also dangerous. Henry Kissinger once said that in politics, one never pays for goods that have already been delivered. True to form, China is using the moderate stance of Tibet’s leadership-in-exile to extort concessions while giving nothing of substance in return. For example, Beijing spread false rumours that the Dalai Lama would be invited to China to prevent demonstrations when Hu Jintao visited the U.S. The 'Middle Way' policy is sapping momentum from the Tibet movement, depriving it of focus, and obscuring its goals. People are drifting away from a movement that appears to be drifting itself; political fervour can be difficult to sustain – especially when the Tibetan government-in-exile actually asks its supporters to behave in a passive a non-confrontational fashion. [1] By asking Beijing for an official agreement to grant autonomous status to Tibet, the Tibetan government-in-exile will be surrendering many of the rights they are now entitled to and locking the entire Tibetan people into a constricted and precarious situation from which they cannot withdraw. Chinese restrictions will remain on the practice of Tibetan religion, culture and traditions within "autonomous" Tibet, the promotion of Tibetan culture, religion and traditions abroad will either be prohibited or restricted as it concerns foreign affairs, and all foreign travel will be controlled and restricted by the Chinese. [2] Accepting the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' will forever close the door on independence but leave Tibet still victim to China's cultural repression and control, and so it should not be supported. [1] Dondup, Ketsun Lobsang. “Independence as Tibet’s Only Option: Why the ‘Middle Path’ is a Dead End”. Phayul.com. 25 January 2007. [2] Shakabpa, Tsoltim N. “The Case Against Autonomy for Tibet”. Tibet Writes. 2 January 2008. | |
Tibetans want independence, not the 'Middle Way' The Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' is far from popular amongst the Tibetan population. Many ordinary Tibetans have criticised the Dalai Lama's conciliatory approach to China. His refusal to call for a boycott of the Beijing Olympic Games is symbolic of this conciliatory approach where the majority of the Tibetan population, particularly the young disagreed with him. "China does not deserve to host the Olympics. It's evident that they do not deserve the Olympics," said Tsewang Rigzin, the leader of the Tibetan Youth Congress, at Dharamshala in 2008. [1] Tsewang Rigzin also stated “There is a growing frustration within the Tibetan community, especially in the [younger] generation... I certainly hope the Middle Way approach will be reviewed. As we can see from the protests here and all over the world, the Tibetan people remain committed to achieving independence.” [2] The (sometimes violent) 2008 protests made it clear that many Tibetans don't support the Dalai Lama's peaceful, non-revolutionary, non-independence 'Middle Way'. The Dalai Lama even had to threaten to resign if violent protests continued. Clearly, these protests showed that the Dalai Lama's 'Middle Way' lacks support amongst the young of Tibet – the individuals who will comprise successive generations of political, religious and business leaders. [3] Within Tibet, pro-independence protesters have recently had more leverage than 'Middle Way' voices. The 'Middle Way' is a nuanced approach to the Tibetan issue and, therefore, is a less potent rallying for Tibetans who have been marginalised or excluded by Chinese policies in the region. Calls for Tibetan Independence mobilise more support among grass-roots activists in other areas of the world. [4] This is valuable, and is an argument in favour of, at least, continuing to call for Tibetan Independence, not merely the 'Middle Way'; it has a greater impact. In this situation, it makes no sense for the Dalai Lama to alienate so many of his young people, so many of the most dedicated to the Tibetan cause, by preaching his 'Middle Way' when he should be calling for what his people truly want and need -Tibetan independence. [1] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. [3] The Economist. “Trashing the Beijing Road”. The Economist. 19 March 2008. [4] The Economist. “A flaming row”. 9 Arpil 2008. | |
The Dalai Lama is the only solution for Tibet. His political advocacy as a leader and religious figure is imperative for the problem of Tibet. His commitment for non-violence and cohabitation and cooperation serves the peaceful interests of Tibet while accommodating for moderate changes. His 'Middle Way' platform is the bridge between China Tibet and world-wide international consensus on the Tibetans' right to self-determination. If resistance to China becomes more violent, as it did in 2008, then the Dalai Lama’s third way will become much more relevant as a solution that both sides can potentially sign up to. It may become the only way forward towards a compromise. Irrespective of some discontent, the Dalai Lama still enjoys the loyalty and respect of most Tibetans. [1] During the 2008 protests in Tibet, the protesters regularly chanted the Dalai Lama's name, displayed his picture and recited a "long life" prayer for him. [2] He remains the undisputed moral leader of Tibetan people, and as such his 'Middle Way' path still has weight. [1] The Economist. “A colonial uprising”. The Economist. 19 March 2008. [2] Bell, Thomas. “Tibetans criticise Dalai Lama's 'middle way'”. The Telegraph. 18 March 2008. | |
Status in the world is not based upon having one extremely powerful weapon; there are much more important factors such as a country’s economy and use of diplomacy. Britain would still be a major financial centre, a major economy, a member of the UNSC (which is not based on nuclear weapons) as well as being one of the biggest contributors to peace and security in the world through peacekeeping and aid. ‘Status’ is one of the popular justifications for acquiring nuclear weapons. However while countries like North Korea that develop nuclear weapons may acquire deterrence they don’t gain any more diplomatic clout. Britain giving up its deterrent or combining it into a European deterrent would help to undermine this perception by showing that nuclear weapons are not needed to maintain a powerful role in the world. | |
Trident allows the UK to maintain its global status Currently the UK is recognised as a nuclear power by the Nuclear non-proliferation treaty along with the USA, China, France and Russia. All of whom are either modernising or maintaining their current nuclear arsenals. This means to not replace Trident would mean that we'd suffer a severe loss of status in relation to the other permanent members of the UN Security Council. This would also raise questions of whether the UK even deserves its place as a member there as it would show the UK’s declining global role and military power. Other countries that can be considered "more representative" such as India (the world's largest democracy) now would be an obvious replacement at the top table. [1] Churchill said that the H bomb that it was "our badge to the Royal Enclosure [at Ascot]" [2] and today Trident remains one of our master keys to the Britain’s status at organisations such as the United Nations Security Council. There are already plenty of reasons why other countries might be more deserving of a security council place than the UK; we don’t need to add another. [1] James Wirtz in "Contemporary Security Studies" Oxford University Press, First Edition 2007, Chapter 15, p273 [2] Adamson, Samuel H., ‘Supreme Effort: A lesson in British decline’, BC Journal, Vol. 16, 2010. | |
We already rely on the USA for our Trident missile systems so our ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ is already a fiction. The USA can at the moment easily pull the rug out from underneath us. While the UK maintains command and control over its weapons the United States is needed to keep the weapons operational. This means we are reliant on the United States one way or the other anyway. | |
Deterrence is still necessary. The Trident Weapons System while it may be a "horrific part of our system" is still necessary even in today’s post-Cold War world. Firstly through deterrence it protects us from being blackmailed by any other states, and in particular so called "rogue states" like North Korea and potentially in the future Iran who could threaten our vital interests – such as closing the straits of Hormuz. [1] Moreover having a second strike capability, the ability for nuclear weapons to survive a nuclear assault by an opponent so allowing retaliation, is also still necessary. [2] It may currently seem unlikely that any of the major nuclear armed states will threaten the United Kingdom however we do not know what may happen in the future and by the time a threat appears it would be too late to build a new nuclear second strike capability. [1] The Secretary of State for Defence and The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’, Ministry of Defence, December 2006. [2] James Wirtz in "Contemporary Security Studies" Oxford University Press, First Edition 2007, Chapter 15, p276 | |
A deterrent is useless if no one thinks it will ever be used. The only conceivable use of Britain’s nuclear deterrent would be in the event of a nuclear attack on the UK, and if that has happened then there is little point in firing the missiles as there will be nothing left to save. Any blackmail today is likely to be much smaller, no state is going to threaten the use of nuclear weapons in order to get their way on trade. The only real possibility of nuclear blackmail is by terrorists who could not be deterred by a nuclear armament. | |
Can we rely on US nuclear umbrella? The UK nuclear weapons programme was first created in late 1945 a time when people were concerned about the US commitment to Europe which was uncertain as the rise of the Iron Curtain had not been yet apparent. Currently if we didn't replace trident and disarmed more likely than not we would fall under the American strategic nuclear umbrella which would be fair enough in the short term and medium term as the relationship is currently strong despite certain cobblestones. A similar thing also applies with the French But can we really rely on the Americans to keep that umbrella extended over the long term when their interests and emphasis may shift, regardless of cultural or ideological links? Relying on someone else’s deterrent will always be risky as the US or France would not want to put themselves at risk of being attacked in order to deter an attack on us. [1] An independent deterrence arsenal is necessary to maintain deterrence. [1] The Secretary of State for Defence and The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ‘The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent’, Ministry of Defence, December 2006, p.18. | |
That Britain is not currently threatened with nuclear Armageddon as it was during the cold war does not mean that such a threat could never again occur. Britain must remain prepared for any eventuality which has to include the unthinkable such as the United States no longer being an ally. The world is not yet a safe place there are many unstable states, such as North Korea, developing nuclear weapons capabalities. Beyond these dangers it is easily conceivable that the world will once again face tensions similar to those of the cold war. Given the length of time it would take to rearm should such tensions occur Britain would be safer to keep its nuclear armament. | |
A state of the art nuclear weapons system is always going to be costly and no one wants to cut corners for the risks that could create. Yet it is money well spent when compared to the damage which would be caused if Britain was attacked due to not having a nuclear deterrent. | |
The UK should encourage others to reduce their own stocks of nuclear weapons. Britain as a signatory of the Non Proliferation Treaty the United Kingdom is obliged to pursue “nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” [1] While complete disarmament by all states with nuclear weapons is a long way off the United Kingdom could make a good start by getting rid of its own weapons. A Nuclear Weapons state giving up its weapons after sixty years would show that nations can manage without nuclear weapons and so act as an encouragement to others to do the same. [1] ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/140, 22 April 1970, Article VI. | |
Trident is not an independent weapons system Britain tries to maintain that it has an ‘independent nuclear deterrent’ but this is just a fiction. Britain has not had an independent nuclear deterrent for fifty years. The United Kingdom has used American missiles since the Polaris Sales Agreement of 6 April 1963 first with the United States supplying Polaris missiles and then Trident missiles. [1] The UK does not own its missiles, they are leased, and the UK is completely dependent on the US for the maintenance of the missiles and even for targeting data. [2] The United States certainly appears to consider Britain’s deterrent to be dependent on them; wikileaks revealed that the US handed over the serial numbers of the missiles it transfers to the UK over to Russia to help the Russians verify the number of UK missiles. [3] [1] Jimmy Carter: "Sale of Trident I Missiles to the United Kingdom Exchange of Letters Between the President and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom. ," July 14, 1980. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project. [2] ‘UK’s Trident system not truly independent’, Select Committee on Defence Written Evidence, 7 March 2006. [3] ‘Geneva: Agreed statements meeting, 10Geneva135 26 February 2010’, The Telegraph, 4 February 2011. | |
Nuclear weapons are no longer needed When the United Kingdom first tested Nuclear Weapons in 1952 she was still a great power with a large empire to defend. In the early 1980s when trident was being conceived [1] the UK fought a war with Argentina and the Cold War was perhaps at its deepest following the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. The Country was therefore in an international situation in which nuclear weapons were potentially required to deter the Soviet Union. A study of the vulnerability of Nuclear Weapons states shows that the UK is the least vulnerable nuclear weapons state because the country is surrounded by allies and is nowhere near any states that may potentially become failed states. [2] The only conclusion from this can be that the UK no longer has any need for nuclear weapons. [1] Fairhall, David, ‘£5 billion Trident deal is agreed’, The Guardian, 16 July 1980. [2] Asal, Victor, and Early, Bryan, ‘Are We Focusing on the Wrong Nuclear Threat?’, Foreign Policy, 24 May 2012. | |
The cost of replacing trident is prohibitive Britain is in the longest recession it has ever been in – longer even than the great depression of the 1930s – with the economy not having recovered to pre-recession levels four years after the start of the downturn. [1] This is obviously completely the wrong time to be wasting money on ruinously expensive new weapons systems. The cost of replacing trident is disputed with the Government saying it would be between £15 and £20 billion [2] but campaign group Greenpeace puts the total cost at £97billion once running costs over the missiles thirty year lifetime are included. [3] Both figures are incredibly costly for a system which we hope we won’t ever have to use and for which we have allies with similar systems. The money should instead be spent on helping to get the economy moving or services that benefit society such as health and education. [1] Oxlade, Andrew, ‘Economy watch: What caused the return to recession and how long will it last?’, This is Money.co.uk, 4 May 2012. [2] BBC News, ‘Q&A: Trident replacement’, 22 September 2010. [3] Greenpeace, ‘£97billion for Trident: five times government estimates’, 18 September 2009. |
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