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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 1, 2005, a group of men, who claimed they were wrongfully searched, filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the City of Oakland, the Oakland Chief of Police, and Oakland police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, alleged that the defendants violated the plaintiffs’ constitutional rights through a policy and practice of performing strip searches and body-cavity searches in public on only “reasonable suspicion” that people were hiding something illegal. The plaintiffs sought both injunctive relief and damages. This case was related to eight similar cases pending in the Northern District of California. On September 20, 2005, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint for class action and individual relief for injuries and violation of their civil rights. On October 6, 2005 the case was reassigned to Judge Marilyn Hall Patel. Discovery proceeded for 18 months. On January 29, 2007, Judge Patel denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 2007 WL 219796. The parties each moved for summary judgment, and the individual defendants sought qualified immunity (immunity from liability for a public official who is performing a discretionary function, as long as the conduct does not violate clearly established constitutional or statutory rights). On March 27, 2008, Judge Patel granted in part the plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. Judge Patel issued a declaratory judgment that the Oakland Police Department’s (“OPD”) policies were unconstitutional in certain respects. Judge Patel denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on liability and declaratory relief for the individual searches at issue. The strip-search policy was held unconstitutional because it provided too low a threshold for officers seeking to check for contraband on suspects in public places. The Court held that while reasonable suspicion is adequate to justify a strip search in the context of a detention facility when institutional security is a concern, it is “insufficient to justify a strip search in the field.” The police policy was held unconstitutional to the extent that it allowed strip searches of any kind in the field to be performed on less than probable cause. Judge Patel also found that an earlier version of the policy, enacted in 1998, was unconstitutional because it did not require that more invasive body-cavity searches be conducted by medical personnel. 621 F.Supp.2d 779 (N.D. Cal. 2008). Litigation continued regarding the plaintiffs’ claims for liability and declaratory relief on the individual searches at issue. The plaintiffs renewed their motion for class certification, but on January 13, 2009, Judge Patel again denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. 2009 WL 88433. On December 14, 2009, Judge Patel granted in part an individual plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment on his Fourth Amendment claim for the unlawful strip search that a defendant officer conducted on the plaintiff. Judge Patel declined to rule on the issues of qualified immunity and damages because factual disputes needed to be resolved first. 675 F.Supp.2d 992 (N.D. Cal. 2009). The officer petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to rule on the issue of qualified immunity. On January 13, 2010, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendant’s petition because there were still material questions of fact regarding qualified immunity, and the defendant had not asked the district court to rule on qualified immunity either by filing a motion for summary judgment or at trial. On March 3, 2010, Judge Patel found that two of the cases were related to each other (C-08-4255MHP and C-04-4843MHP), but the other claims had been misjoined. Judge Patel gave the plaintiffs in those actions twenty days to drop all but one of the plaintiffs in each of the actions and to file new actions for each of the dropped plaintiffs. On December 1, 2011 the case was reassigned to Judge Susan Illston. Discovery and settlement negotiations proceeded for the next two years. On April 18, 2013, the parties agreed to a settlement of injunctive and declaratory relief claims. The City of Oakland through the OPD agreed to institute a new policy concerning strip searches in the field. The OPD was required to capture and retain all complaints about strip searches conducted in the field and all reports of such searches for a period of two years from the entry of the order. Those reports were forwarded to the plaintiff’s counsel every six months, and the court maintained jurisdiction to ensure compliance for the two years. In the absence of any further proceedings, these related matters were fully and finally dismissed with prejudice on April 18, 2015. The case is closed.
<|assistant|>
On August 1, 2005, a group of men, who claimed they were wrongfully strip searched, filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Oakland, the Oakland Chief of Police, and Oakland police officers. On April 18, 2013, the parties agreed to a settlement of injunctive and declaratory relief claims requiring the defendants to institute a new policy limiting strip searches in the field.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 9, 2009, several agricultural growth and trade associations that employ immigrant workers under the H-2A or H-2B nonimmigrant visa programs filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District Court of North Carolina under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL"). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorneys' fees and costs, claiming that the defendants' proposed "Solis Final Rule" is arbitrary and has significant deficiencies, such as opening agricultural growers to significant liability and requiring growers to give different wages and work conditions to H-2A workers on short notice and without an adequate public comment period. Before the promulgation of the "Chao Rule," the H-2A nonimmigrant visa program was plagued with severe administrative and processing issues, such as long delays, but was the only viable legal route to obtaining certain immigrant workers. Then, in January 2009, after months of working on solving many of the issues associated with the H-2A program and receiving comments from the public, the DOL promulgated the "Chao Rule." As a result of this rule, the H-2A program was streamlined, the calculation of wages and required expenses were clarified, and workers were given more rights. Employers also did not have to pay for the moving expense during the first week of work, which the growers pushed for. It also included in the H-2A program guest workers in the logging industry and agricultural packing house operations and excluded such workers from certain FLSA regulations. These workers used to have to apply under the H-2B program which, unlike the H-2A program which has no caps, had longer application wait times since the caps for the whole year were generally filled by March. In March 2009, Hilda Solis was sworn in as Secretary of Labor and proposed the "Solis Final Rule" to replace the "Chao Rule." The "Solis Rule" would potentially allow workers to sue their employers for FLSA violations that occurred from January 2009 to March 2009 even though they were legal and not violations under the "Chao Rule." The plaintiffs alleged that DOL promulgated a new rule without a reasonable public comment period and in the middle of the growing season. Further, they alleged that the DOL's reasoning behind replacing the "Chao Rule" with the "Solis Rule" was flawed and would significantly harm the farming business. On July 1, 2009, the District Court (Judge William Lindsay Osteen, Jr.) granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction due to the relatively slight amount of harm the defendants will suffer from not being able to implement the new "Solis Rule" and the likelihood of plaintiffs' success on the merits. On August 4, 2009 , the defendants appealed this ruling to the Fourth Circuit. On October 14, 2009, the District Court (Judge Osteen) denied the defendants' motion to stay the case until their appeal is decided, and on November 19, 2009, the Fourth Circuit (Judge Paul Victor Niemeyer, Judge Dennis W. Shedd, and Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III) likewise denied the defendants' motion to stay the district court case. While the appeal was pending, on December 3, 2009, the District Court (Judge Osteen, Jr.) allowed other farm organizations and individuals to intervene as defendants. On March 30, 2010, the Fourth Circuit (Judge Niemeyer, Judge Shedd, and Judge Wilkinson) dismissed the defendants' appeal. The parties went through discovery and on October 4, 2011, the District Court (Judge William Lindsay Osteen, Jr.): denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against the federal defendants; granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against the defendant-intervenors; permanently enjoined implementation of the new "Solis Rule;" and dismissed the defendant-intervenors' claims. On November 1, 2011, the defendant-intervenors filed a notice of appeal but on December 21, 2012 the Fourth Circuit (Judge Albert Diaz, Judge Barbara Milano Kennan, and Judge J. Harvey Wilkinson III) affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the plaintiffs. The District Court retained jurisdiction for the bill of costs and on January 17, 2013 charged defendants $384.74 to be paid to the plaintiffs.
<|assistant|>
On June 9, 2009, several agricultural growth and trade associations that employ immigrant workers under the H-2A or H-2B nonimmigrant visa programs filed a class action lawsuit in the Middle District Court of North Carolina under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Fair Labor Standards Act against the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and U.S. Department of Labor ("DOL"). The plaintiffs opposed the "Solis Final Rule" which would replace the previous H-2A rule (the "Chao Rule"). The Court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and permanently enjoyed implementation of the Solis Rule.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 26, 2007, a woman residing in a rooming unit with her children, both under the age of 16, filed a lawsuit under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act, and New York state law against the City of New York in the United States District Court, Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, represented by public interest attorneys, asked the court for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief, claiming that a provision of the New York City Housing Maintenance Code (HMC section 27-2076) which prohibited children between the ages of one and sixteen from residing in single residence occupancy units discriminated on the basis of familial status. On October 1, 2008, the court (Jed S. Rakoff) held that the City had carried its burden of demonstrating that HMC section 27-2076 furthered legitimate government interests in the health, safety, and welfare of children that could not be achieved through other alternatives and that it did not violate the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiff's requests for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief were denied. This case is closed.
<|assistant|>
A woman residing in a rooming unit with her children, both under the age of 16, filed a lawsuit under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act, and New York state law against the City of New York, claiming that a provision of the New York City Housing Maintenance Code (HMC section 27-2076) discriminated on the basis of familial status. The court (Jed S. Rakoff) held that the City had carried its burden of demonstrating that HMC section 27-2076 furthered legitimate government interests in the health, safety, and welfare of children and that it did not violate the Fair Housing Act. The plaintiff's requests for injunctive, declaratory, and monetary relief were denied. This case is closed.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: Inmates held at Weld County Jail (Colorado) with high risks of complications from COVID-19 filed this putative class action lawsuit against the Sheriff of Weld County. They sought injunctive relief, in the form of following public health guidelines in the jail, and declaratory relief. The parties received preliminary approval of a class action settlement on December 29, 2020. <hr> On April 7, 2020, inmates held in Weld County Jail with high risks of complications from COVID-19 filed this putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado. The plaintiffs sued the Sheriff of Weld County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the conditions of confinement violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. They alleged that the defendant had failed to adequately address the COVID-19 pandemic and that Weld County Jail was not following public health guidelines. They also claimed that they shared common utilities, such as toilets, that they were unable to practice social distancing, and that they did not have regular access to hand soap. The plaintiffs sought class certification, a temporary restraining order, and that the court order the defendant to implement a plan that would ensure compliance with public health guidelines. Concurrent with the complaint, the plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and expedited hearing. The plaintiffs' proposed class was: All current and future persons held at the Weld County Jail who are at high risk of complications from COVID-19 because<blockquote> (a) they are age 55 or older; or (b) they have the following chronic health conditions: cancer; autoimmune disease (including lupus, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis, Sjogren’s, Crohn’s); chronic lung disease (including asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, bronchiectasis, idiopathic pulmonary fibrosis or other chronic conditions associated with impaired lung function); history of cardiovascular disease; chronic arthritis; chronic liver or kidney disease; diabetes; hypertension; heart failure; HIV; on chronic steroids or other immunosuppressant medications for chronic conditions; (c) they have history of smoking or other substance abuse disorders; or (d) they are pregnant. </blockquote> On April 14, 2020, plaintiffs filed a motion to withdraw their request for a temporary restraining order and moved for a setting of a preliminary injunction hearing. On April 15, 2020, Judge Philip A. Brimmer granted the motion and set a preliminary injunction hearing for the week of April 27, 2020. On April 17, 2020, plaintiffs filed an emergency motion for limited expedited discovery, seeking: (1) an inspection of the Weld County jail by plaintiffs' medical expert; (2) a daily report from April 11 to the date of the preliminary injunction hearing detailing the number of individuals in isolation or quarantine; (3) a daily report from April 11 to the date of the preliminary injunction hearing detailing the number of individuals at the jail who had tested positive for COVID-19; and (4) copies of all policies and procedures issued by defendants concerning COVID-19. Defendants opposed the motion, arguing that the inspection would be unnecessary and an undue burden. On April 21, 2020, Judge Brimmer granted in part and denied in part plaintiffs' motion for limited expedited discovery. Judge Brimmer granted a limited inspection of Weld County Jail and the requested daily reports, but denied the request for all policies and procedures. On April 26, 2020, defendant filed a motion for a protective order, seeking to block a public records request by the plaintiffs for "policies, procedures, manuals, guidelines, training materials, and orders relating to the coronavirus." On April 27, 2020, Judge Brimmer denied the motion, asserting that the defendant had failed to show that it would suffer any harm by complying with the plaintiffs' request. On May 11, the plaintiff's motion for TRO and preliminary injunction was granted in part. 2020 WL 2320174. Specifically, the court ordered that on or before May 18, the defendant provide a list of persons “medically vulnerable” currently held at the Weld County Jail (over the age of 65 or with medical conditions). Additionally, they were required to institute a policy to ensure medically vulnerable inmates are “socially distanced” from other inmates housed in the Jail, enhanced sanitization, and increased monitoring for COVID-19 for those medically vulnerable by May 21. The defendants were also required to provide a report on the same day. The case has been reassigned to Magistrate Judge S. Kato Crews on May 12. On May 18, the defendants notified the court of their complete compliance with the court's preliminary injunction order. The plaintiffs disagreed and filed a motion for a hearing regarding the defendant's non-compliance on May 21. On July 2, the court denied the motion finding that the plaintiff's purpose of asking for a hearing is unclear. The court noted that the plaintiffs did not ask that defendant be held in civil contempt for violating the preliminary injunction order nor ask the court to modify the preliminary injunction order. Instead, they sought a hearing because of an “imbalance in access to relevant information," but failed to explain why this information must be probed at a hearing rather than through the discovery process. On July 24, the plaintiffs sought to renew the preliminary injunction for an additional 30 days, which was granted on July 29. The plaintiffs again sought to renew the preliminary injunction for an additional 30 days on September 3, which was granted the next day. The preliminary injunction continued to be extended until December 9, 2020. On November 11, 2020, the parties filed a joint motion for the preliminary approval of class settlement, certification of a class and appointment of class counsel, and permission to post class notice. The parties reported that they had successfully negotiated a resolution to the dispute. The parties included in their motion a proposed consent decree that would ensure measures to protect class members from COVID-19. The parties reported that the proposed consent decree was negotiated at arms-length without any conflicts of interest. Both parties conceded that they were uncertain of what the eventual outcome of the litigation would be considering the novelty of COVID-19. Both parties agreed that a settlement would be more valuable than proceeding to trial, given the complexity of the resolution and the immediacy of the COVID-19 crisis. <i>Consent Decree</i> The proposed consent decree implemented the CDC's definition of "medically vulnerable", subject to future modification by the CDC. The defendant agreed to identify medically vulnerable inmates during booking and intake and to protect such individuals during the remainder of the intake process. The WCJ agreed to attempt to house medically vulnerable inmates in single-cell units during intake and to use specified procedures to minimize exposure if single cells are not available. The WCJ agreed to continue to limit the exposure of medically vulnerable inmates in the general jail population and pledged to permit the maximum amount of daily out-of-cell time for inmates consistent with social distancing protocols. As part of the consent decree, the WCJ agreed to medically isolate COVID-19 positive inmates in isolation units and to ensure that such an environment would be non-punitive. The jail also promised to use enhanced sanitation procedures, to distribute masks, and to regularly monitor medically vulnerable inmates for COVID-19 symptoms. The jail also agreed to provide testing for inmates consistent with CDC guidelines and to continue remote visitation opportunities. WCJ agreed to maintain modified arrest standards that would remain in place for the duration of the COVID-19 crisis and pledged to advise Weld County police chiefs to be judicious with jail space. The consent decree also provided that the defendant comply with robust data reporting to plaintiffs' counsel to monitor compliance with the decree. The plaintiffs and the class were required to release all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief arising from COVID-19 at the WCJ prior to the decree. The expiration of the decree was set at the expiration of the executive order made by the Governor of Colorado declaring a state of emergency, unless the order was renewed or replaced. The defendant also agreed to pay the plaintiffs' counsel $122,387.60 for attorney's fees and costs. The November 11 motion also included a certification of settlement class and appointment of class counsel. The parties sought to certify all past, present, and future inmates housed at WCJ from April 7, 2020 through the end of the COVID-19 emergency who are "medically vulnerable". The two proposed class representatives fell within the high-risk populations vulnerable to COVID-19. Counsel for the plaintiffs were appointed class counsel. On December 11, 2020, Judge Brimmer ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs to clarify the meaning of "past" and "future" within the definition of the class and to discuss locations for posting the notice of the settlement within the WCJ in English and Spanish, as well as a location for sending objections. On December 29, 2020, Judge Brimmer granted the joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement, certification of a class and appointment of class counsel, and permission to post class notice. The parties agreed to withdraw past inmates from the proposed class and agreed that the extension of the consent decree to the end of the COVID-19 emergency covered future medically vulnerable inmates. The parties designated one of plaintiffs' counsel as the person to receive objections to the proposed settlement. The parties also agreed to upload the class notice to the WCJ's jail-wide television system in English and Spanish. The court preliminarily certified all present and future medically vulnerable inmates through the end of the COVID-19 emergency and ordered that plaintiffs' attorneys were appointed class counsel. On February 16, 2021, the court issued a final judgment granting the joint motion for final approval of class action settlement and final certification of the proposed class and dismissing the case with prejudice.
<|assistant|>
Inmates held at Weld County Jail with high risks of complications from COVID-19 filed this putative class action lawsuit against the Sheriff of Weld County. They sought injunctive relief, in the form of following public health guidelines in the jail, and declaratory relief. On December 29, 2020, the court granted a joint motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. On February 16, 2021, the court issued final judgment granting the class action settlement and dismissed the case with prejudice.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 16, 2002, plaintiffs, Santa Cruz residents who suffered various forms of blindness, filed a complaint against the state transit agency in the United States District Court for the District of Northern California for violations of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq.; (2) Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. and various state laws. Plaintiffs sought injunctive and monetary relief. Plaintiffs claim that the defendant failed to implement systems to announce at which stop a bus was stopping and, for individuals waiting at a bus stop, to announce which bus had arrived. Thus, the plaintiffs alleged they had missed stops and taken the wrong bus. The plaintiffs alleged the defendant had been aware of its inaccessible bus system since at least 1989 and that bus drivers were not helpful and lacked training. On July 11, 2003, the parties entered into a settlement agreement and filed it with the court. The defendant agreed to install "talking technology" equipment to announce bus stops, ensure discipline of drivers who did not comply with the changes, and pay for an outside agency to monitor compliance by riding buses for at least 100 hours per quarter. The agreement was to last two years from the date on which the last bus was fitted with the talking technology. The defendant also agreed to pay $5000 to each plaintiff and $135,000 in attorneys' fees and costs. On July 22, 2003, the court dismissed the case by stipulation. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
Blind plaintiffs sued a state transit agency because its buses did not have an audio-announcement system to warn them when the bus was approaching their stop. The agency settled and agreed to install an electronic announcement system, pay $5000 to each plaintiff, and pay $135,000 in attorneys' fees and costs.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 27, 2012, the North Carolina Environmental Justice Network (NCEJN), the Neuse Riverkeeper Foundation, and the Waterkeeper Alliance filed this complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs alleged that the Taylor Finishing Company, a swine concentrated animal feeding operation, illegally polluted under the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and that this pollution endangered human health and the environment. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge James C. Dever III and Magistrate Judge James E. Gates. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated the CWA and RCRA by causing the release of pollutants, including nitrogen, phosphorus, and bacteria, onto the lands and into waters surrounding defendants’ facilities near the Neuse River Basin. The complaint described that defendants caused illegal discharges of pollutants without a permit, illegal open dumping of swine waste, and illegal treatment, storage, and disposal of swine waste. The plaintiffs argued that this disregard for disposal requirements created an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health and the environment. Between September and November of 2013, the three defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint claiming that this court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to serve a proper notice of intent to sue prior to filing the complaint. But before the motions were decided, on April 25, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint. The defendants filed responsive motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. On August 26, 2013, Judge Dever denied the motion and the parties proceeded to discovery. On October 21, 2014, the NCEJN filed a stipulation of dismissal, asking that the court dismiss their claims with prejudice and that each party bear their own costs. The court granted this motion later that month. On November 21, 2014, the remaining defendants moved for summary judgment, claiming that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim due to insufficient evidence and the undisputed fact that none of the plaintiffs had suffered an injury that could be causally connected to the defendants’ conduct. On that same day, one of the defendants moved for summary judgment of count three of the second amended complaint, claiming that the plaintiffs could not establish that there was an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment caused by the defendant. Additionally, another defendant filed a similar motion for summary judgment, even asking that the court enter judgment in their favor on the grounds that there were no genuine issues of material fact and they were entitled to judgment in their favor as a matter of law. On January 14, 2015, Judge Gates entered a report and recommendation with the court, recommending that the court deny without prejudice the three pending motions for summary judgment. 2015 WL 1630602. On April 13, 2015, Judge Dever agreed with Judge Gates and denied the motions without prejudice. 2015 WL 1880200. Then, defendants filed a notice of bankruptcy with the court and on June 3, 2015, the court entered an order staying the action pending resolution of the bankruptcy case. After the stay, negotiations took place and on June 29, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a notice of a proposed consent decree. The agreement required that the contaminated lagoon be inspected annually, that the defendants remove sludge from the lagoon, and that records are kept regarding the activities. The consent decree further stipulated that the parties would make a joint public statement, that the plaintiffs could not do sample testing on the defendant’s surrounding property, and that the defendants must operate their facility in accordance with the terms of the facility’s permit. The parties agreed to seek enforcement of the terms in bankruptcy court so the court would not retain jurisdiction over the matter. On August 13, 2018, the court approved the consent decree. The parties subsequently filed a stipulation to a voluntary dismissal of the case. The case was closed on August 29, 2018.
<|assistant|>
This 2012 lawsuit was brought by the North Carolina Environmental Justice Network (NCEJN), the Neuse Riverkeeper Foundation, Inc., and the Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs sued the Taylor Finishing Company under the CWA and the RCRA, alleging that the company had caused the release of hazardous pollutants into the Neuse River Basin. In June 2018, the parties entered into a private consent decree and the court approved it in August.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In October 1969, plaintiffs, an independent candidate and his supporters, filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against the Democratic Organization of Cook County, the City of Chicago, and various government officers at the state and local levels under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court to enjoin the extensive patronage system of Chicago politics. They argued that this system violated their rights under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and of certain civil rights statutes. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that their constitutional rights as a candidate, and as taxpayers and voters, were violated by the defendants' practice of coercing employees as a condition of keeping their jobs to contribute money to various Democratic organizations and candidates. Defendants had also allegedly coerced employees into doing political and campaign work both during their regular working hours and on their own time for candidates endorsed by the organization and its affiliates. Finally, defendants had allegedly coerced employees into voting for specific party candidates. Plaintiffs asserted that these coercive practices directly resulted in the defeat of independent candidates and perpetuated the dominance of the Democratic Party in Cook County. On November 6, 1969, District Court Judge Abraham Marovitz granted defendants' motion to dismiss. <a href="http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0008-0019.pdf">310 F.Supp. 1398 (1969)</a>. The district court found that plaintiffs did not have standing to assert the alleged violations of the rights of employees and that the complaint did not allege facts sufficient to demonstrate injury. Plaintiffs appealed and filed an amended complaint joining additional Democratic defendants and numerous Republican defendants also engaged in the patronage system. On October 23, 1970, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Thomas Fairchild reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. <a href=" http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0008-0001.pdf">435 F.2d 267 (1970)</a>. Defendants appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Over the course of the next couple of years, the parties engaged in a series of negotiations resulting in a consent order entered into by the majority of the defendants. The order was approved by District Court Judge Marovitz on May 5, 1972. <a href="http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0008-0002.pdf"> 356 F.Supp. 1241 (1972)</a>. The order prohibited compulsory or coerced political financial contributions and permanently enjoined politically motivated firings, demotions, transfers, or other punishment of government employees. This consent order came to be known "the Shakman decree." Litigation continued for several years involving those defendants that declined to enter into the aforementioned consent agreement. On September 24, 1979, District Court Judge Nicholas Bua issued a ruling concluding that the patronage system infringed upon the plaintiffs' rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. <a href="http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0008-0020.pdf">481 F.Supp. 1315 (1979)</a>. Defendants appealed. On August 5, 1987, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Kenneth Ripple reversed the district court, finding that plaintiffs did not have standing. <a href="http://clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-IL-0008-0004.pdf">829 F.2d 1387 (1987). The circuit court found that a number of very speculative inferences would be required to connect plaintiffs' alleged injury with activities attributed to the remaining defendants. However, the circuit court explicitly noted that nothing in the holding could be construed as affecting the continued validity of the Shakman decree. Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which denied certiorari. Over the next two decades, litigation continued with periodic revivals for enforcement of the consent agreements and for seeking damages or lawyers' fees. Also, consent agreements, like that entered into in 1972, were periodically made with various defendants. Individual defendants found to be substantially compliant with the terms of consent decrees were intermittently dismissed from further requirements related to the consent agreements. On August 28, 2006, plaintiffs filed an application to hold Cook County and other government personnel in civil contempt for violation of the consent agreements. A series of negotiations between the parties began that month and a settlement was reached. As part of the settlement, on November 29, 2006, District Court Judge Wayne R. Andersen, appointed a compliance administrator in an effort to ensure future compliance with the decree. On May 15, 2014, the parties jointly moved for a hearing regarding the substantial compliance of the City of Chicago. On June 16, 2014, the court found the City of Chicago to be in substantial compliance and dismissed the City from the case. On November 18, 2014, the court appointed a Special Master to oversee the determination of which positions within the Illinois Department of Transportation (IDOT) could be properly exempt from compliance with the consent decrees. Employers could take political affiliation into account when filling particular positions if that consideration was relevant for effective performance. This order arose from the IDOT's overuse of exemptions. On August 15, 2016, the plaintiffs filed a motion to expand the Special Master's responsibilities to oversee all bodies under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Illinois. On November 28, 2016, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion, reasoning that the Special Master's experience and oversight would aid in compliance and avoid downstream litigation when non-compliance was uncovered. Tensions once again came to a head on September 6, 2019, when the plaintiffs moved for supplemental relief, alleging that the Clerk of Cook County violated the consent agreements. The County Clerk argued that the court was unable to rule on the alleged violations and that the consent agreements were irrelevant due to changes in legal and factual circumstances over the past few decades, but the court ultimately ruled on April 17, 2020, in favor of the plaintiffs. The court thus found the County Clerk in violation of the consent agreements and additionally appointed a Special Master to oversee compliance. On July 14, 2020, Governor Pritzker moved to vacate the consent decree, arguing that the State of Illinois has been substantially compliant with the decree. The State additionally argued that the consent agreements were so far removed from the original controversy that there was no longer a relevant claim under law. As of February 26, 2021, the litigation concerning the State of Illinois is still ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In October 1969, plaintiffs, an independent candidate in the election for delegates to the 1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention and his supporters, filed a class action lawsuit against the Democratic Organization of Cook County, the City of Chicago, and various government officers at the state and local levels claiming that the extensive patronage system of Chicago politics violated their constitutional rights. Litigation was heavily complicated by procedural and standing issues, though it gave way to consent decrees prohibiting the patronage system. As of February 26, 2021, the State of Illinois has attempted to vacate the consent agreements, claiming that it is substantially compliant with the agreements' requirements.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 19, 2007, attorneys with Community Legal Services of Arizona and Farmworker Justice filed this suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona on behalf of American farmworkers who had been replaced by foreign workers during 2006-2007 and previous citrus harvesting seasons. Plaintiffs alleged that defendants, an Arizona grower and farm labor contractor, violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1802 et seq., by providing false and misleading information to the federal government concerning the terms and conditions of employing farmworkers. Plaintiffs, who all worked for defendants during the 2005-2006 season, alleged that defendants refused to rehire them for the 2006-2007 season and instead told the government that they couldn't find any workers, therefore forcing them to hire migrant workers under the H-2A foreign guest-worker program. Plaintiffs sought lost wages and an injunction to prevent the defendants from discriminating against U.S. workers in their hiring practices. Shortly after the case began, it was consolidated with another action for pretrial purposes only (Reynaldo Guerra Jimenez, et al. v. Servicios Agricolas Mex Inc., et al., No. CV07-1492-PHX-GMS). On September 20, 2010, the Court (Judge G. Murray Snow) entered an order denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment and granting and denying in part the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. 742 F. Supp. 2d 1078 (D. Az. 2010). The Court found that the plaintiffs had put forth evidence that defendants had refused to rehire them and had instead hired non-citizen immigrant workers. The Court held that the defendants had deprived the plaintiffs of an equal right to contract, as was enjoyed by others, and that the defendants had engaged in such discrimination against the plaintiffs based on their citizenship status. The Court denied summary judgment to all other claims. On April 8, 2011, the parties notified the Court that they had reached a settlement in the <i>Jimenez</i> case; however, the parties also informed the Court that they were unable to settle the claims in this case. The Court unconsolidated the two cases and dismissed <i>Jimenez</i> with prejudice. From August 23 through September 2, 2011, a seven-day bench trial was held before Judge Snow. The defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law after they rested their case. On March 27, 2012, Judge Snow entered his findings of fact and conclusions of law. 2012 WL 1030084 (D. Az. Mar. 27, 2012). The Court found that the defendants violated the "working arrangement" they had undertaken with certain plaintiffs, and that they did not inform these plaintiffs prior to the beginning of the season that defendants would not be employing them. As a result, the Court found, a number of the plaintiffs were unemployed for some time at the beginning of the harvest season while they sought work elsewhere. The Court held this was a violation of a provision of AWPA, 29 U.S.C. § 1832(c), and awarded statutory damages in the amount of $500 to ten of the plaintiffs, $250 to another ten, and $150 to another eight. The Court awarded no relief to the remaining 143 plaintiffs. The Court entered judgment accordingly on April 26, 2012. On May 25, 2012, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, seeking review of the Court's final judgment. The case was argued before and submitted to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in March of 2014. On March 6, 2015, a panel of three Ninth Circuit judges affirmed the District Court’s holding, stating that the defendants had complied with the AWPA regarding the remaining plaintiffs. 592 Fed.Appx. 613 (Mem). The defendants were able to show that “the job” in dispute was no longer the same opportunity due to a 90-mile location change. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On December 19, 2007, a group of U.S. citizens and permanent residents filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act ("AWPA") against an Arizona grower and farm labor contractor. Following a trial, the District Court awarded statutory damages to certain of the plaintiffs, finding that defendants had violated a provision of the AWPA. The Court denied all further relief. Plaintiffs appealed the decision, but the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower court holding on March 6, 2015.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 9, 2014, a lawfully-present alien authorized to work in the U.S. under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) program filed this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiff sued Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance, Inc., under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging discrimination based on alienage in the making of employment contracts. Represented by private counsel and MALDEF, he sought declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief. Citing the defendant’s advertised practice of requiring new employees to have had three or more continuous years of U.S. residency, hold permanent visas, and read and write English fluently, the plaintiff alleged that the company unlawfully refused or rescinded employment contracts to individuals based on their status as non-citizens or permanent residents. The named plaintiff, who had applied for employment and interviewed with the defendant, alleged that after one of its employees learned of his status as a non-citizen without a green card, the company decided to decline him an employment contract because of his alienage status. On September 4, 2014 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint. After hearing oral arguments, Judge Katherine Forrest denied the motion to dismiss on November 11, 2014, holding that the plaintiff could successfully plead intentional discrimination by alleging that the defendant acted pursuant to a facially discriminatory policy. In this case, Judge Forrest found that the policy facially discriminated against lawfully present aliens without green cards, who, as lawfully present aliens, are protected by § 1981. 69 F.Supp.3d 364. The defendants moved to appeal shortly after, and on December 20, 2014 Judge Forrest stayed the case pending the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s decision whether or not to accept the defendant’s interlocutory appeal. On March 17, 2015, the Second Circuit granted the defendants permission to appeal the District Court’s (non-final) denial of their motion to dismiss. However, before appellate briefing, the parties settled, out-of-court. On May 20, 2015 the plaintiffs filed a stipulation for dismissal of the case with prejudice, with each party to pay their own fees and expenses. Although the details of the settlement are unclear, on August 19, 2015, MALDEF posted the following <a href="https://www.facebook.com/MALDEF/photos/a.479912060698.266123.18053840698/10153527413040699/">on Facebook</a>, which appears to be related to the settlement in this case: "As part of an amicable legal agreement, MALDEF and Northwestern Mutual have launched a new recruitment program aimed at immigrants authorized to work, without sponsorship, including those in the DACA program, interested in a financial representative internship or financial representative contract." According to the post, individuals may be eligible for up to $7,500 in awards if they were told on or after July 1, 2010 that they were ineligible for a financial representative internship or contract because of their work authorization or immigration classification.
<|assistant|>
In the Southern District of New York in July of 2014, a lawfully-present alien alleged he was denied employment contract because of his alienage status and brought a class action suit against Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance, Inc under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging discrimination based on alienage in the making of employment contracts. In May of 2015, the case settled out of court with a favorable outcome for the plaintiff.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This lawsuit is part of an ongoing legal battle, across several cases, over allowing transgender individuals access to public facilities matching their gender identities. With eleven states joining together to challenge the DOJ, DOE, EEOC, and DOL over their interpretations of antidiscrimination statutes, it represents the broadest challenge to date of the Obama administration’s position that transgender individuals should have access to bathrooms, changing rooms, and other public facilities and services that are in accordance with their gender identities. The eleven states filed this suit in response to the heightened debate over transgender rights that began after the North Carolina passed House Bill 2 (HB2), on March 23, 2016. The law prohibited municipalities from enacting antidiscrimination policies, curtailed private right of action to enforce antidiscrimination statutes in state courts, required that in restroom and changing facility access in government buildings be restricted based on biological sex, and formally changed the definition of sex in the state's antidiscrimination law to "the physical condition of being male or female, which is stated on a person's birth certificate,” which prevents discrimination against transgender people from being classified as a type of sex discrimination. The law sparked widespread condemnation from progressives, and a <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15261">lawsuit</a> from the ACLU, in North Carolina. It also prompted the DOJ to send a letter to North Carolina Governor Pat McCrory on May 4, 2016, informing him that they believe the law violates federal law and requesting that the governor not enforce it. After McCrory responded to their letter with a <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15316">lawsuit</a> against the DOJ on May 9, the DOJ brought its own <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=15345">lawsuit</a> against North Carolina in the Middle District of North Carolina, arguing that HB2 violated Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the Violence Against Women Re-Authorization Act (VAWA). The lawsuit that the DOJ brought against North Carolina threatens the state with a potential loss of millions of dollars in federal aid if the state is found to be non-compliant with the statutes cited. The eleven states that are plaintiffs in this case feared similar action by the DOJ against themselves, and so on May 25, 2016, they filed this lawsuit against the DOJ and against all other agency rules and guidance stating that antidiscrimination statutes require states to provide transgender individual access to public accommodations consonant with their gender identities. They filed their lawsuit in the Northern District Court of Texas, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Declaratory Judgement Act), 5 U.S.C. § 706 (Administrative Procedure Act), and 5 U.S.C. § 611 (Regulatory Flexibility Act). Specifically, they asked the court to find that the agencies have violated federal law and the Constitution and to issue an injunction preventing the agencies rules, regulations, and guidance on the subject from having legal force. The judge issued an order granting the preliminary injunction on August 21, 2016. 201 F. Supp. 3d 810. The order found that the action was reviewable and plaintiffs had standing. The judge also held that the Department of Education was not entitled to deference because Title IX was not ambiguous and referred to biological sex. The district court further clarified the preliminary injunction on October 18, 2016, ruling that the injunction did apply nationwide. 2016 WL 7852331. The preliminary injunction and clarification were appealed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 21, 2016 (Docket No. 16-1534). The district court denied a stay on the injunction on November 20, 2016, finding that the defendants were unlikely to succeed on appeal and suffered no irreparable harm. 2016 WL 7852330. After the change in presidential administrations, the DOJ and DOE issued new guidance that withdrew the previous guidance on transgender access to public facilities. That guidance can be found below. On March 2, 2017, the government filed an unopposed motion to withdraw the appeal, which was granted. The case was dismissed in the district court without prejudice on March 3, 2017.
<|assistant|>
Eleven States sue the DOJ and other agencies over their position that transgender access to bathrooms and other public facilities is required by Title IX, Title VII, and the Violence Against Women Act, asking for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Northern District Court of Texas. The Court granted the preliminary injunction on August 21, 2016. 201 F.Supp.3d 810. The preliminary injunction was appealed and the case was ultimately dismissed without prejudice due to a voluntary withdrawal by defendants on March 3, 2017, due to a change in presidential administrations and policy.
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