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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 15, 2005, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) filed suit against House of Philadelphia, Inc., on behalf of an employee who was allegedly fired because she was pregnant. Seeking monetary and injunctive relief for the employee (including economic damage, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages), the EEOC brought suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex. The EEOC also sought to recover its costs. Via private counsel, the employee filed a motion to intervene in the suit, which was automatically granted after the period for filing objections passed without incident. The employee brought claims under Title VII and state law and sought substantially the same relief as the EEOC, except that the complaint specifically sought reinstatement. Eventually the parties came to a settlement agreement, which the Court (Judge Kristi K. DuBose) entered as a consent decree on Jan 10, 2009. The terms of the decree, which lasted 3 years, provided monetary and injunctive relief. The employee received $8,000, while House of Philadelphia, Inc., was required to institute and follow policies to eliminate sex discrimination and pregnancy discrimination from the workplace and to post and distribute the policies to employees. House of Philadelphia also had to provided yearly training to its employees explaining pregnancy and sex discrimination, informing them of its illegality, and explaining how to avoid it, who to file complaints with, and that managers would be evaluated for enforcing the anti-discrimination policies. House of Philadelphia was further required to investigate complaints adequately and report the results of each investigation to the EEOC. The 3-year decree period passed without court involvement and the case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought a Title VII sex discrimination case against House of Philadelphia, Inc., on behalf of an employee who was allegedly fired because she was pregnant. The EEOC sought monetary and injunctive relief for the employee (including economic damage, compensation for emotional harm, and punitive damages). The employee later intervened in the suit. The parties came to a settlement that was entered as a consent decree. The decree provided for monetary relief for the employee and subjected House of Philadelphia to a 3-year injunction. The case is now closed.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
NOTE: This is one of three identically named cases in the Clearinghouse. For the 2005 case generally challenging the unnecessary institutionalization of individuals with disabilities in New Jersey, see <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12675">PB-NJ-0007</a>. For the case challenging the long waitlists for community-based services, see <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=11664">PB-NJ-0004</a>. On April 5, 2005, a non-profit organization representing approximately one thousand individuals confined in psychiatric hospitals in New Jersey filed a lawsuit against Commissioner of the New Jersey Department of Human Services under Due Process Clause, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The plaintiff, represented by public services counsel, asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, alleging that the defendant failed to provide community placements for individuals currently residing in state psychiatric hospitals that had been adjudicated as no longer meeting the standards for civil commitment. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had used the Conditional Extension Pending Placement ("CEPP") to confine individuals for excessive periods of time and has failed to implement an effective plan for discharging these individuals into the community, even though under New Jersey law, the state might use CEPP to continue confinement while the state was still developing an appropriate community placement. On September 30, 2005, the Court (Judge Stanley R. Chesler) denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. On July 29, 2009, after extended negotiations, the parties reached a settlement whereby the state agreed to place 1065 individuals in the community through FY 2014. The agreement was initially set to last until 2014. But, by November 2014, the defendant was not set to meet the requirements of the consent decree. Judge Wolfson therefor extended the agreement until 2016. On March 2, 2017, the parties submitted a letter to the court notifying it of substantial compliancy by the defendants. The consent decree terminated and the case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
The case was brought by a non-profit organization against the state of New Jersey seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On July 29, 2009, the parties reached a settlement in favor of the plaintiff.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 11, 2006, African-American employees of a restaurant in Berkeley, California filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act against McCormick & Schmick's Seafood Restaurants ("M&S"). The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, asked the court for injunctive and declaratory relief, and damages, alleging that McCormick & Schmick's discriminated against African-Americans on the basis of race with respect to hiring, job assignment, compensation, promotion to managerial positions, discipline, and other conditions of employment. Specifically, this action was seeking an end to M&S's discriminatory policies or practices, and recovery of back pay and front pay. On November 28, 2006, U.S. District Court Judge Claudia Wilken granted the plaintiffs' motion to compel production of statistical data. The plaintiffs sought the statistical data to support their contention that the defendant's discriminatory hiring practices were company-wide, and not limited to a single restaurant. <i>Wynne v. McCormick and Schmick's Seafood Restaurants</i>, 2006 WL 3422226 (N.D. C.A. Nov. 28, 2006). On March 16, 2007, Magistrate Judge Bernard Zimmerman issued an order to show cause why the defendant should not be held in contempt of court or sanctioned for failing to comply with the Court's Discovery Order. The court preliminarily approved a class settlement on April 4, 2008. The court provisionally certified settlement classes, approved class notification, and preliminarily approved the consent decree. On August 7, 2008 the court granted final approval to the settlement and consent decree On the same day, the court granted about $900,000 in attorney fees and costs. The Consent Decree was filed on August 8, 2008. It provided injunctive relief relating to hiring, promotion, training, and reporting and record-keeping. Further, it provided that the defendant would pay $2.1 million for the benefit of the class. The Consent Decree was set to remain in effect for five years after the Court's final approval. The Decree required annual reports to the plaintiffs, but they weren't filed in court. Presumably the case ended after the 2013 report; the last entry in the docket sheet dealt with a procedural matter in 2010.
<|assistant|>
This case was brought by African American employees of McCormick and Schmick's Restaurants seeking equitable relief and damages to remedy alleged discrimination based on race. The case was settled in August 2008, resulting in more than $2 million for Plaintiffs, as well as injunctive relief relating to hiring, promotion, training, and reporting.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
Pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") conducted an investigation of conditions at the Mercer County Geriatric Center ("MCGC"), a public nursing home facility in New Jersey, evidently operated by Mercer County. The investigation resulted in an October 9, 2002, findings letter being sent to the County Executive. The letter stated that in December 2001, DOJ advised county officials of its intent to conduct an investigation of the facility pursuant to CRIPA authority, but the county and its counsel wholly declined to cooperate in the investigation. The investigation occurred nonetheless, even though the county's attorney interfered with the investigators' access to the MCGC's residents. The letter stated that non-cooperation is one factor considered adversely when drawing conclusions about a facility, but the DOJ explained it also relied upon federal and state survey information, news articles, medical records, family interviews, private attorney and advocate interviews, and publicly available data. The letter advised that the DOJ's investigation led it to find that certain conditions at MCGC violated residents' federal rights, in that (1) Mercer County did not maintain sanitary and safe living conditions at MCGC; (2) MCGC residents did not receive adequate medical and mental health care; (3) MCGC residents were denied rehabilitation, restorative care, and freedom from unreasonable restraints; (4) MCGC mealtime assistance, nutrition, and hydration practices were not adequate; (5) MCGC residents were not treated in the most integrated setting appropriate to individual resident needs; and (6) staffing, administration, and policy deficiencies contributed to inadequate care at MCGC. Among the policy deficiencies listed was the county's denial of MCGC residents' First Amendment right to communicate with federal officials who were conducting the CRIPA investigation. The DOJ findings letter proposed remedial actions to remedy the deficiencies, invited the county to address the issues, and alerted the county to the possibility of a CRIPA lawsuit brought by the United States to compel remedial action. Negotiations evidently followed, because the county and the DOJ eventually entered into a settlement agreement obligating the county to improve a wide range of policies and practices at MCGC. The settlement contained substantive provisions addressing (A) assessment and care planning, (B) restraints and medication usage, (C) mealtime assistance, resident nutrition, and hydration practices, (D) therapeutic activities, rehabilitation, and restorative care, (E) mental health care, (F) treatment in the most integrated setting appropriate to individualized needs, and (G) management, oversight, and training. The settlement allowed for DOJ and its' consultants to retain access privileges to MCGC, its residents, and documents and records, for monitoring and technical assistance purposes, as well as to have access privileges to alternative placement settings. Further, the agreement called for the county to fund a jointly agreed-upon monitor. The county had 180 days to implement the changes called for in the settlement document which, by its terms, expired in three years. Attorneys for the county signed the agreement on December 28, 2004, followed by relevant DOJ officials' signatures being added on February 18, 2005, when the document and its attached monitoring protocol were received by the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. The same date, the United States filed its complaint against the county and its subdivision and officials responsible for the operation of the MCGC. The CRIPA-based complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief, citing the deficiencies at MCGC and alleging that the defendants' conduct violated residents' federal constitutional, statutory, and regulatory rights, including those provided by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the nursing home reform provisions of the Omnibus Budget and Reconciliation Act of 1987, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395i-3 and 1396r, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (and implementing regulations). District Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr., signed the settlement as the order and judgment of the court October 14, 2005. The judge's unpublished order of November 29, 2005, appointed Marie Boltz as monitor in the case. Her subsequent reports were attached as part of the United States' status reports to the court on the case. On Nov. 24, 2008, the parties jointly moved to conditionally dismiss the case with one year of oversight in response to the defendants' progress implementing the settlement agreement. The court granted the motion on Jan. 9, 2009. The defendants moved to dismiss the case on Aug. 6, 2010, which the court granted later that month. The case is closed.
<|assistant|>
Pursuant to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act ("CRIPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997, the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") conducted an investigation of conditions at the Mercer County Geriatric Center ("MCGC"), a public nursing home facility in New Jersey, evidently operated by Mercer County. The investigation led the DOJ to find that certain conditions at MCGC violated residents' federal rights. The parties settled and the case is now closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 30, 2015, the Freedom of the Press Foundation (a non-profit organization focusing on First Amendment press rights) sued the U.S. Department of Justice in the Northern District of California seeking injunctive relief under the Freedom of Information Act. Plaintiff sought the expedited processing and release of records from the FBI concerning the procedures by which the Bureau issues National Security Letters ("NSLs") and exigent letters to investigate members of the press. Plaintiff believes that the records met FOIA’s requirements for expedited processing as they are are “of widespread and exceptional media interest in which there exist possible questions about the government’s integrity which affect public confidence.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(E)(v)(II). 18 U.S.C. § 2709 authorizes the FBI to NSLs to obtain subscriber information, toll billing records, and transactional records from wire or electronic communications service providers in national security investigations. The FBI issues these NSLs without any prior judicial review, and Section 2709(c) allows the FBI to impose an indefinite nondisclosure order on an NSL recipient. Similarly, exigent letters allow the FBI to obtain phone records in emergency situations without serving prior legal process. In three cases simultaneously before the Ninth Circuit, the constitutionality of the NSL framework was being challenged, though the practice of issuing NSLs continues. See Under Seal v. Lynch, Nos. 13-15957, 13-16731, 13-16732 (9th Cir. argued Oct. 8, 2014). FBI procedures for interacting with the media are contained in a publicly available document called “Media Guidelines.” The latest update to the Guidelines in January 2015 contains no procedures for issuing NSLs or exigent letters, so Plaintiff requested this information in a FOIA request dated March 10, 2015. While the FBI granted the request for expedited processing only ten days later, the agency has yet to make a final determination to release the records. Plaintiff appealed the constructive denial in May 2015, and received a letter in July indicating that the request would take a further seven months to be decided upon. This is far beyond the generally applicable twenty-day deadline for processing any FOIA request. A hearing schedule was set on January 21, 2016 and the hearing occurred on August 18, 2016. On March 13, 2017, the Court (Judge Haywood S. Gilliam) granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. The Court found that the defendant conducted an adequate search in response to the request, and properly invoked exemption 1 (authorized to be kept secret in the interest of national defense by Executive Order), exemption 3 (exempted from disclosure by statute), exemption 5 (exempted from disclosure because document is an interagency or intra-agency memorandum which should not be available by law to a party other than an agency unless in litigation with the agency), exemption 7(E) (exempted from disclosure as it is a law enforcement record that would reveal techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations, prosecutions, or guidelines for investigations or prosecutions). The Court also found the plaintiff did not sufficiently specify how the withheld material matched previously disclosed material and thus could not raise Official Acknowledgment over the FOIA exemptions. Next, the Court found the defendant appropriated segregated and disclosed the portions of documents that were not exempted. Finally, the Court denied a request of in camera review, finding the defendant sufficiently supported its exemptions. 241 F. Supp. 3d 986. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
A non-profit organization dealing with rights of the press sued the USDOJ over its unreasonable withholding of a FOIA request about the FBI's use of National Security Letters and exigent letters to retain information about the press. These methods of investigation allow for seizure of phone records and other telecom info without prior legal process. The FBI's criteria for issuing NSLs and exigent letters was not contained in the most recent version of its Media Guidelines, so Plaintiff submitted a FOIA request in March 2015. In March 2017, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, finding that the defendant properly withheld information under FOIA exemptions 1, 3, 5, and 7(E).
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 4, 2010, the United States of America filed this lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts against AIG Federal Savings Bank in the United States District Court, District of Delaware. The plaintiff, represented by attorneys from the U.S. Department of Justice and the U.S. Attorney's office asked the court for declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief, claiming that AlG had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race. Specifically, the U.S. claimed that from July 2003 to May 2006, black borrowers nationwide were charged broker fees 20 basis points higher, on average, than the broker fees charged to white borrowers. On March 19, 2010, the parties entered into a consent decree in which the bank agreed to: 1) refrain from engaging in any act or practice in wholesale home mortgage lending that discriminates on the basis of race or color; 2) maintain during the period of the order annual fair lending training; 3) develop and implement specific, nonracial standards for the assessment of direct broker fees on residential real estate-related loans; 4) post and prominently display in each location where loan applications are received by the lender a notice of nondiscrimination; 5) require brokers to make certain disclosures to applicants; 6) participate in a monitoring program to ensure compliance with the provisions of the consent decree; 7) provide a minimum of $1 million to certain organizations to provide credit counseling, financial literacy; and other related educational programs to African-American borrowers; 8) provide employees with equal credit opportunity training; and 9) pay $6.1 million in damages to those affected by AIG's discriminatory lending practices. On July 7, 2011, the Court (Judge Leonard P. Stark) entered an order for distribution of the funds remaining in the settlement fund ($1,268,372.92) among the National Urban League, Operation HOPE and the American Financial Services Association Education Foundation.
<|assistant|>
The United States of America filed a lawsuit under the Fair Housing and Equal Credit Opportunity Acts against AIG Federal Savings Bank, claiming that AlG had engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination on the basis of race. Specifically, the U.S. claimed that from July 2003 to May 2006, black borrowers nationwide were charged higher broker fees than white borrowers. The parties entered into a consent decree in which the lender agreed to implement policies designed to aid in the prevention of racial discrimination, to provide monetary relief to the affected parties, and to assist in funding financial education programs. This case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On October 1, 2013, three same-sex couples and the minor child of one of the couples filed a lawsuit against Kanawha County, West Virginia in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The plaintiffs, represented by Lambda Legal Defense & Education Fund, asked the court to declare unconstitutional any West Virginia laws banning same-sex marriage, to enjoin West Virginia from refusing to recognize same-sex marriages undertaken in other states, and to award the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit. The plaintiffs claimed that their rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the United States Constitution were violated. They further asserted that the ban on same-sex marriage discriminated on the basis of sexual orientation, sex, and parental status. The plaintiffs also alleged that they were being denied a multitude of other social and legal rights that marriage provides. On December 2, 2013, the Court (Judge Robert C. Chambers) granted the State of West Virginia's Motion to intervene as a defendant. On January 29, 2014, The District Court (Robert C. Chambers, Chief Judge) held that: the Court would consider the case law, but not legal argument, contained in untimely notice of supplemental authority filed by plaintiffs; the action did not present difficult questions of state law, therefore the case would remain in federal court; the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge constitutionality of the non-recognition statute, however, the plaintiffs were allowed to challenge the other parts the West Virginia marriage ban. 993 F. Supp .2d 639. The Court <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detailDocument.php?id=75611">stayed the case</a> on June 10, 2014, pending the outcome of <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12807">Bostic v. Schafer</a>, a Fourth Circuit case that had a substantial overlap in issues with McGee v. Cole. The holding in Bostic, that same-sex marriage bans are unconstitutional, controlled this case. On November 7, 2014, the Court, in keeping with <i>Bostic</i>, applied strict scrutiny to the marriage ban and found that it was not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, and decided in favor of the plaintiffs. It issued an opinion and order that granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, while denying the State of West Virginia's motion to dismiss. In the order, the Court disagreed that there would be uniformity problems regarding the enforcement of the marriage ban across the counties of West Virginia. While the defendants claimed that the decision would only ban the named clerks from denying same-sex couples marriage licenses, the Court found that would not be the case. The Court further held that the marriage ban was not a narrowly-tailored state interest and that it violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. The case ended on November 7, 2014. On July 16, 2015, Judge Chambers awarded the plaintiffs $92,125 in attorneys’ fees, including paralegal fees, and $7,679.64 in costs and expenses. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
On October 1, 2013, three same-sex couples and the minor child of one of the couples filed a lawsuit against Kanawha County, West Virginia. The plaintiffs asked the court to declare unconstitutional any West Virginia laws banning same-sex marriage, enjoin West Virginia from refusing to recognize same-sex marriages undertaken in other states, and to award the plaintiffs reasonable attorney's fees and costs of suit. The case was decided in favor of the plaintiffs, who were granted summary judgment in November 2014 and awarded attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 1, 2013, two men who were arrested for trespassing on property open to the public filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan. The plaintiffs sued the City of Grand Rapids, its chief of police, and two individual officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the National ACLU and ACLU of Michigan, asked the court for a declaratory judgment, damages, and injunctive relief concerning the use of "No Trespass Letters." The plaintiffs claimed that the City of Grand Rapids, its chief of police, and police officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights. According to the amended complaint, the Grand Rapids Police Department ("GRPD") had arrested individuals for trespassing based on a City trespass ordinance, under which the City solicits No Trespass Letters from area businesses indicating their intent to prosecute trespassers. The plaintiffs alleged they were arrested for trespassing while sitting in their vehicles in a business's parking lot, without any warning or complaint from the business itself. The plaintiffs claimed their arrests were without probable cause and therefore in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Additionally, the plaintiffs claimed that the ordinance violated the void-for-vagueness doctrine of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. On December 3, 2013, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief. They argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief because they were not suffering an imminent threat of repeated future misconduct. Additionally, defendants argued that the plaintiffs' claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were not ripe because the City had changed the No Trespass Letters following the plaintiffs' filling of the Complaint. Defendants did not challenge the Court's jurisdiction to hear the plaintiffs' claim for damages. On August 4, 2014, the Judge Paul L. Maloney dismissed the claims of one of the plaintiffs against the defendants according to the parties' stipulation. However, the other plaintiffs' claims remained. While the motion to dismiss was still pending, the defendants and the plaintiffs both filed motions for summary judgment. In April 2015, the court postponed the trial date pending the resolution of multiple motions made by both the defendants and the plaintiffs. Following a hearing on the defendants' motion to dismiss, as well as both parties' motions for summary judgment, Judge Maloney granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for injunctive and declaratory relief on June 21, 2017. 256 F.Supp.3d 742. The Court held that, because the plaintiffs had not alleged sufficient facts to present a threat of an imminent, as opposed to a speculative, injury, they lacked standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court also noted that the City's changes to the No Trespass Letters following the filing of this case rendered the requests for prospective relief unripe. The Court did not, however, grant the defendants' motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for damages. Notably, the Michigan Court of Appeals addressed the same issue of whether the Grand Rapids ordinance is constitutional and held that it is unconstitutional. People v. Maggitt, 903 N.W.2d 868 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017). Following the Michigan Court of Appeals' ruling, the City effectively ended its practice of arresting individuals pursuant to the No Trespass Letters. On October 17, 2018, Judge Maloney held that both sides were entitled to partial summary judgment. 407 F.Supp.3d 707. The Court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs on their municipal liability claim against the City of Grand Rapids. The Court found that the City had an unconstitutional policy or custom whereby police officers arrested individuals for trespassing on property covered by a no-trespass letter without first informing the suspect that he or she must leave the property. However, the Court found that the plaintiffs had failed to show that the City's trespass ordinance was unconstitutionally vague. Additionally, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims against the individual defendants because it found that the police officers were entitled to qualified immunity. At the time of the arrests, it was not clearly established law what knowledge the officers must have before concluding that they had probable cause to arrest a suspect for violating the City's ordinance. After a February 4, 2019 conference with Judge Maloney, the parties appeared to move into settlement negotiations. Judge Maloney filed an order on April 12 stating that he had received word from the parties that they had settled the issue on the matter of damages. A damages amount was not publicly disclosed; the ACLU <a href="https://www.aclu.org/cases/hightower-v-city-grand-rapids">described</a> it as a "favorable settlement agreement resulting in significant compensation for each of our four plaintiffs." The parties continued litigating over attorney fees, but came to a private agreement on the matter on December 23, 2019. Judge Maloney dismissed the case on January 24, 2020.
<|assistant|>
Two men who were arrested for trespassing on property of businesses open to the public filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan against the city of Grand Rapids, its chief of police, and two individual officers. The plaintiffs claimed that the Grand Rapids Police Department's policy and practice of arresting individuals for trespass -- without probable cause and based on general Letters of Intent to Prosecute signed by Grand Rapids businesses -- results in unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The parties came to a private settlement agreement for damages and attorney's fees in late 2019. The Judge dismissed the case in early 2020.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 27, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The lawsuit alleged that Allstate sought to convert all of its employee-agents into independent contractors. Employee-agents were informed that they would all be terminated by June 30, 2000. However, if employees signed a broad release, they could continue working for Allstate as independent contractors. The release encompassed all claims under the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA) (29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) (42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 et seq.), and Title VII. The EEOC alleged that requiring employees to sign these agreements constituted retaliation in violation of the ADA, ADEA, and Title VII and interference, coercion, and intimidation in violation of the ADA. The EEOC filed this lawsuit on behalf of approximately 300 persons who had filed charges with the EEOC. The EEOC sought declaratory relief that the release was invalid. The case was assigned to Judge Gerald J. Pappert. On February 6, 2002, Judge Pappert granted the parties' joint motion to consolidate the case with Romero v. Allstate, a private lawsuit that also alleged the issue of retaliation as well as numerous other challenges to company reorganization actions. Judge John Fullam presided over the newly consolidated case. Both parties submitted motions for summary judgment. On March 30, 2004, Judge Fullam entered a declaratory judgment, holding, in part, that the releases were voidable so long as the employees tendered back all benefits received in connection with signing those releases. The plaintiffs filed a timely motion for reconsideration challenging only the propriety of the “tender back” requirement imposed by the Court. While that reconsideration motion was still pending, Allstate filed a second motion for summary judgment in December of 2005, as to all of the plaintiffs' underlying causes of action. That motion remained undecided until March 2007, when the plaintiffs asked the court to reassign its case to a different judge because of Judge Fullam's failure act on numerous pending motions. Right after the plaintiffs made this request, Judge Fullam announced his intentions to reverse his original finding as to the validity of the Releases. Ultimately, on June 20, 2007, Judge Fullam held that he erred in his 2004 Declaratory Judgment and vacated that decision. He further granted summary judgment in Allstate's favor on the entirety of the plaintiffs' actions in Romero v. Allstate and in EEOC v. Allstate. On November 26, 2007, the plaintiffs appealed this ruling to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Reviewing the history of this case, the Third Circuit noted that Plaintiffs had not received the benefit of full discovery as to issues regarding the validity of the Releases, and determined that these issues were dispositive as to the rest of the plaintiffs' claims. The court went on to vacate the district court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 344 F. App'x 785. On January 29, 2010, after remand from the Court of Appeals in Romero, the three cases were reassigned to Judge Ronald L. Buckwalter. Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Amend the Complaint in Romero and, on July 28, 2010, this Court granted the requested leave, resulting in the filing of the Second Amended Complaint. Consistent with the Third Circuit's mandate, this court then permitted discovery to proceed in bifurcated fashion, with the parties limited to discovery only on the validity of the release. During approximately the next three years, the parties engaged in this targeted discovery and related motion practice. On September 12, 2012, the court consolidated Romero and EEOC v. Allstate for administrative purposes. It is not clear from the docket or the court's summary of the procedural history how the 2012 consolidation differs from the 2002 consolidation. 1 F.Supp.3d 319. In compliance with the court's scheduling order, the parties began filing summary judgment motions in early April 2013. The individual plaintiffs and Defendants Allstate and Edward Liddy, the former President and CEO of Allstate, filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On February 27, 2014, Judge Ronald Buckwalter ultimately denied the cross-motions and determined that genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the release was knowingly and voluntarily signed. 2014 WL 796005. On March 13, 2014, Judge Buckwalter ruled on the remaining motions for summary judgment that the EEOC and Allstate had filed. He found that there was no genuine issue of material fact, holding that the release did not constitute a substantive violation of the anti-retaliation provisions set forth in any federal anti-discrimination law at issue. Accordingly, Judge Buckwalter granted Allstate's motion and denied the EEOC's, ultimately dismissing the EEOC's action in its entirety. 3 F.Supp.3d 313. The EEOC appealed and the case was assigned to Judges Thomas Hardiman, Anthony Scircica, and Maryanne Barry on the Third Circuit. On March 26, 2015, writing for the court, Judge Hardiman affirmed Judge Buckwalter's ruling. 778 F.3d 444. On May 23, 2014, the plaintiffs from the Romero cases filed a motion for class certification with respect to four issues in the litigation. On October 6, 2014, Judge Buckwalter denied the motion for class certification, finding that issue certification would be unmanageable. 52 F.Supp.3d 715. On February 26, 2015, the Romero plaintiffs sought leave to file a Third Amended Complaint in order to add 368 employee-agents as named plaintiffs. On April 21, 2015, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion. From June 1, 2015 to June 17, 2015, the court conducted its first trial in the matter. The jury decided exclusively the issue of whether ten of the plaintiffs knowingly and voluntarily signed the release of claims that Allstate used. The jury found that, as to eight of the Plaintiffs, the Release was not knowingly and voluntarily signed, but, as to the remaining two Plaintiffs, the Release had been knowingly and voluntarily signed. These remaining plaintiffs then asserted two defenses -- "unclean hands" and "unconscionability." Because these are equitable defenses, the court, rather than the jury, had to decide whether the defenses were applicable. On January 28, 2016, Judge Buckwalter concluded that the defenses were not applicable. Judge Buckwalter retired from serving as an active judge and Judge Pappert subsequently took control of the case. On February 10, 2016, Judge Pappert entered an order upholding Judge Buckwalter's findings as to the defenses but noted that this finding would not apply to any of the subsequent trials on the matter. 158 F.Supp.3d 369. Only July 28, 2015, defendants Allstate and Liddy filed motions to dismiss the third amended complaint and complaints of two intervenors. On November 12, 2015, Judge Buckwalter held that the plaintiffs' state law claims were barred by doctrines of "tender back" and "ratification" and thus granted the defendants' motion to dismiss as to the state law claims. The plaintiffs immediately filed motions for reconsideration which Judge Pappert granted. 170 F.Supp.3d 779. The plaintiffs moved to amend Judge Buckwalter's January 28 finding and Judge Pappert's February 10 order. On April 12, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Mark A. Kearney. On May 3, 2016, Judge Kearney determined that there was no basis for modifying Judge Buckwalter's findings. However, he ordered that Judge Pappert's order be amended to reflect the parties' agreement that the release was unenforceable as to state law claims (the court had already found the agreement unenforceable as to federal law claims). 2016 WL 2595102. Allstate contested the jury verdict for the eight plaintiffs and filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. On May 4, 2016, Judge Kearney denied the motions, writing that a careful review of the record showed that the verdict was proper and that no prejudicial error occurred. 2016 WL 2619853. On July 6, 2016, Judge Kearney denied defendants Allstate and Liddy's motions to dismiss the third amended complaint, finding that the complaint stated valid claims under ERISA and the ADEA. 2016 WL 3654265. Allstate filed a motion for partial summary judgment on certain ERISA claims and breach of fiduciary duty claims. On November 22, 2016, Judge Kearney granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion, allowing plaintiffs to proceed on certain ERISA claims. 2016 WL 6876307. The court ordered the plaintiffs to proceed to trial by dividing common federal questions into two separate phases. Phase I would address certain ERISA questions and Phase II would address any remaining common federal questions. Following the Phase I bench trial, the court concluded that Allstate's policies functioned as an unlawful "cutback" of employee benefits with respect to certain plaintiffs. On April 27, 2017, the court ordered that Allstate disclose to plaintiffs the benefits they would have received the benefit of their early retirement subsidy. If the plaintiffs would have received the benefit, then those plaintiffs will proceed to individual trials. 2017 WL 1508879. On the same day that the court released its Phase I findings of law and fact, the court granted Allstate's motion for partial summary judgment on ADEA disparate impact claims and certain ERISA claims that were a part of Phase II of the trial. All remaining Phase II issues, including the plaintiffs' ADEA disparate treatment claims, were inappropriate for common resolution and needed to be tried individually. Accordingly, Judge Kearney closed Phase II of the trial. 251 F.Supp.3d 867. Allstate filed another motion for partial summary judgment on the eight agents residing in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania who were scheduled for trial. Allstate specifically sought summary judgment on the breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims. Judge Kearney found that there were unresolved factual questions relating to the "tender back" requirement that precluded summary judgment. Accordingly, Judge Kearney denied Allstate's motion on September 5, 2017, and ordered that the cases proceed to trial. 2017 WL 3881215. On the same day, Judge Kearney granted one of Allstate's other motions for summary judgment. There, Allstate claimed that the group of six plaintiffs bringing age discrimination complaints failed to file complaints with the EEOC, thereby failing to satisfy the administrative exhaustion requirement. Judge Kearney agreed with Allstate, granted the motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the six plaintiffs' claims. 2017 WL 3881217. On January 29, 2018, Judge Kearney ruled on another one of Allstate's motions for partial summary judgment. In this motion, Allstate asserted that they was no factual dispute as to whether they unlawfully retaliated against several plaintiffs. Judge Kearney granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part. Specifically, he granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims that Allstate's counterclaims violated the anti-retaliation provisions of ADEA and ERISA. He denied summary judgment on five plaintiffs' additional claims of retaliation. 2018 WL 627116. On May 22, 2018, Judge Kearney again ruled an Allstate motion for partial summary judgment. In this motion, Allstate alleged that twelve plaintiffs' claims were barred by Pennsylvania's statute of limitations. Judge Kearney disagreed and denied Allstate's motion, finding the statute of limitations was tolled per a Congressional mandate. 2018 WL 2325405. On May 30, 2018, 369 plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their suits because they had reached a settlement agreement with the defendants. The voluntary dismissal had no bearing on the 28 remaining plaintiffs. On June 13, 2018, five additional plaintiffs reached a settlement. On August 17, 2018, another nine plaintiffs settled with the defendants, leaving 16 remaining plaintiffs. On September 19, 2018, Allstate filed another motion for summary judgment on the remaining plaintiffs' claims. On September 20, 2018, eleven additional plaintiffs settled with the defendants. The following day, two additional plaintiffs reached a settlement, leaving three plaintiffs remaining. On October 31, 2018, the remaining plaintiffs settled, thereby leading Judge Kearney to dismiss the case in its entirety. All settlement agreements between the plaintiffs and defendants appear to be private and confidential.
<|assistant|>
On December 27, 2001, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The lawsuit alleged that Allstate violated the Age Discrimination and Employment Act (ADEA), the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and Title VII by requiring employees to sign a broad release in order to continue working for Allstate as contractors. The EEOC sought declaratory relief that the release was invalid. The court consolidated this suit with several related suits that employees brought on behalf of themselves. The court ultimately dismissed the EEOC's claims. After extensive, protracted litigation that lasted nearly two decades, Allstate reached a settlement with all the plaintiffs whose claims had not been dismissed. The settlement was private and thus not available.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 31, 2015, three prisoner-plaintiffs filed this putative class action lawsuit against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging that MDOC was discriminating against them and other deaf and hard of hearing prisoners. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and was assigned to Judge Sean Cox. The plaintiffs were represented by Michigan Protection and Advocacy, the Washington Lawyers’ Committee and private counsel. The plaintiffs alleged that MDOC consistently failed to provide them with effective communication opportunities, depriving them of full participation in prison programs, services, and activities, including visitation, religious activities, and disciplinary and parole proceedings. They also alleged that since they couldn’t hear guards’ orders, they were sometimes unable to obey prison regulations and were then unfairly disciplined. The plaintiffs alleged that this treatment violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. They also alleged that the absence of devices enabling them to communicate with their families and others violated their free speech rights under the First Amendment. MDOC sought summary judgment on May 1, 2015. On October 30, 2015, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation to deny the motion. The court adopted this Report and Recommendation with an order denying MDOC’s motion for summary judgment on March 24, 2016. 2016 WL 1156740. On June 30, 2017, the magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation to certify the plaintiffs’ class. The court adopted this recommendation on July 20, 2017, certifying the class as “all deaf and hard of hearing individuals in the custody of MDOC (whether now or in the future), who require hearing-related accommodations, including but not limited to interpreters, hearing devices, or other auxiliary aids or services, to communicate effectively and/or to access or participate in programs, services, or activities available to individuals in the custody of MDOC.” 2017 WL 3085785. On March 9, 2018, the court partially granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and denied MDOC’s motion for summary judgment. 294 F. Supp. 3d 695. The court found that the devices that MDOC provided to the plaintiffs failed to meet the standard of reasonable accommodation. The court therefore granted summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims, and agreed that a training program would be appropriate as well. It ordered MDOC to make videophones available to all deaf and hard of hearing inmates and to provide necessary auxiliary aids to enable equal participation in prison programs and services, including access to ASL interpreters, mandatory training for officers and staff on how to interact with deaf and hard of hearing inmates, and appropriate compliance monitoring. The plaintiffs had additionally sought summary judgment on a claim that MDOC’s policies for classification and housing placement were insufficient; the court denied summary judgment on this claim. By September 2018 the parties had reached a settlement agreement, and they filed a joint motion for preliminary approval of a class-action settlement on September 26, 2018. The settlement agreement required MDOC to provide specified accommodations for the plaintiffs and all other current and future class members, appointed a monitor to oversee enforcement of the settlement, and mandated that MDOC pay $1.3 million for plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees and costs. In particular, MDOC agreed to provide hearing assessments, adequately accommodating facilities, communications technology, and auxiliary aids and services necessary to allow the class members to access MDOC services, programs, and activities. The agreement also required MDOC to install non-auditory notification systems and develop and implement new procedures regarding the accommodations for MDOC guards and staff. On January 15, 2019, the court granted the motion for preliminary approval of the settlement agreement and set a fairness hearing for March 28, 2019. The day after the hearing, the court issued an order granting the parties’ joint motion for final approval of the settlement. The settlement was set for enforcement until 2021. On August 12, 2019, a hard of hearing MDOC prisoner (“Class Member 1”) filed, as a class member and as an interested party, a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. Another prisoner (“Class Member 2”), filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement on October 10, 2019. On October 22, 2019, Class Member 2 filed a motion for a temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, and a protective order, claiming that MDOC subjected him to adverse treatment, such as discrimination and harassment, for filing a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. On December 2, 2019, Class Member 1 filed another motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The post-judgment complaints were referred to the Magistrate Judge David R. Grand. On February 20, 2020, the court issued an order recommending the process by which such complaints would be adjudicated, including a mediation process. On the same day, the court recommended that Class Member 1’s motions be denied, holding that there was insufficient evidence to support the claims in his initial motion. The court held, among other things, that the “most efficient and effective means of addressing the issues [Class Member 1] raised in his motions is for him to first pursue them through the mediation process with the Settlement Monitor pursuant to the procedures outlined” in the magistrate judge’s order issued on the same day. On March 3, 2020, the magistrate judge issued a recommendation on settlement compliance, setting out deadlines for implementation of certain terms of the settlement agreement. The court adopted the recommendations on March 25, 2020. Class Member 1 appealed this decision. The magistrate judge issued orders on Class Member 2’s motion for enforcement, temporary restraining order, and preliminary injunction on May 26, 2020. As to enforcement, the magistrate judge recommended denial, because the issues raised were not “exceptional or extraordinary.” Because Class Member 2 “has provided ample notice to Defendants as to his request for injunctive relief, the Court will treat his motion [for temporary restraining order] as one for preliminary injunction.” The magistrate judge recommended that the motion be denied, holding, among other things, that Class Member 2 had failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits. The court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations on July 6, 2020. As of July 20, 2020, Class Member 1’s appeal is pending before the Sixth Circuit.
<|assistant|>
This class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan was filed March 31, 2015 by three prisoner-plaintiffs alleging that the Michigan Department of Corrections was discriminating against them and other deaf and hard of hearing prisoners. MDOC’s summary judgment motion was denied by the court in 2016. The court certified the plaintiffs’ class on July 20, 2017. On March 9, 2018, the court ordered MDOC to provide necessary aids to inmates who are deaf or hard of hearing. The court approved a settlement agreement on March 29, 2019. Two class members later filed motions to enforce the settlement agreement, both of which were denied; as of July 20, 2020, one of the class members has an appeal pending before the Sixth Circuit.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In August 2006 the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging discrimination on the basis of age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967. Specifically, the complaint alleged that the defendants terminated the complaining party and a class of employees who were forty-years-old or older and made comments concerning the age of the complaining party. In 2007, the parties entered settlement talks as they continued to engage in discovery. On December 17, 2007, TIN moved for summary judgment. On June 2, 2008, District Judge Neil Wake granted the defendant's motion on the grounds that "the EEOC has not provided direct evidence that the termination of [claimants] were motivated by age-based animus...TIN has articulated legitimate, nondiscrimination reasons for the terminations...[t]he EEOc has not established that TIN's articulated reasons are mere pretext." Therefore, "a reasonable fact-finder could not conclude that age discrimination was the real reason for the terminations of [claimants]." 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43193. The EEOC appealed this decision on July 31, 2008. The 9th Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for trial, finding that a jury could potentially find age discrimination. 349 Fed. Appx. 190. On June 11, 2010, the parties entered a consent decree. The settlement enjoined the defendant from engaging in an employment practice that constituted age discrimination, including retaliation. Further, the defendant agreed to pay $250,000 to resolve the claims, provide training about the ADEA to employees, expunge references to the complaints from personnel files, provide neutral letters of references to claimants, modify its policies to ensure equal opportunity for employees of all ages, and file reports with the EEOC Phoenix District Office for the Duration of the decree (two years). Since there is no subsequent enforcement activity, presumably the matter closed finally in June 2012.
<|assistant|>
In August 2006 the Phoenix District Office of the EEOC filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona alleging discrimination on the basis of age. Specifically, the complaint alleged the defendants terminated the complaining party and a class of employees who were forty-years-old or older and made comments concerning the age of the complaining party. The matter was settled through a consent decree on June 11, 2010.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 2, 1990, prisoners at the Shasta County jail filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County of Shasta and the County Sheriff. The plaintiffs, represented by the Prisoner Rights Union and private counsel, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their conditions of confinement violated the Eight Amendment. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged problems with overcrowding, inadequate staffing, and inadequate medical, dental and mental health care. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief. Plaintiffs amended their complaint on December 26, 1990, and on April 12, 1991, the District Court (Judge Edward J. Garcia) certified a class of all present and future prisoners at the Shasta County jail, as well as subclasses for male and female prisoners. On November 8, 1991, defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the issues of medical, dental and mental health care. After holding a hearing on May 13, 1992, on September 4, 1992, Magistrate Judge Peter A. Nowinski recommended that the defendants' motion be granted and the case be dismissed. On October 28, 1992, the Court (Judge Garcia) adopted Magistrate Judge Nowinski's recommendations in full, over the plaintiffs' objections. The plaintiffs appealed, and during the appeals process litigation continued in the District Court over attorneys' fees and discovery. On April 6, 1994, the Court (Judge Garcia) adopted further recommendations by Magistrate Judge Nowinski to deny plaintiffs' motion for attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs appealed this decision as well. On October 21, 1994, a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit (Judge Poole, Judge Canby and Judge Rymer) affirmed in part and vacated in part the District Court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. <i>Wooden v. Cnty. of Shasta</i>, 39 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1994). The Circuit Court affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the issues raised in the defendants' motion, but found the District Court's grant of summary judgment sua sponte on the issues of overcrowding and inadequate staffing to be improper and remanded to have those issues properly briefed and argued. On January 6, 1995, the defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all remaining claims. Magistrate Judge Nowinski issued a report on March 31, 1995, recommending that the motion be granted, and the Court (Judge Garcia) adopted this report on June 9 and dismissed the case. A further motion for attorneys' fees by plaintiffs was later denied. As of the date of this summary, we have no further information on this case.
<|assistant|>
On August 2, 1990, prisoners at the Shasta County jail filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California against the County of Shasta and the County Sheriff, challenging the constitutionality of their conditions of confinement. The Court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied the plaintiffs attorneys' fees, and the case was definitively dismissed in 1995.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On January 4, 2011, visually impaired and blind inmates at Sullivan and Wende Correctional Facilities filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The plaintiffs, represented by Legal Aid and private attorneys, asked the court for declaratory and injunctive relief. The plaintiffs sued the State of New York for violations of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and Title II of the American with Disabilities Act, alleging discriminatory denial of access to services, activities and programs on the basis of their disabilities. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the State of New York denied them access to adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations with regard to both mobility and reading materials, among other things. On March 14, 2014, the court (Judge James L. Cott) released an order certifying settlement class. Attached to this order was a copy of the private settlement agreement negotiated by both parties. The agreement provided that the Department of Corrections shall provide visually impaired prisoners with any reasonable accommodation recommended by a medical professional. It also provided that visually impaired prisoners will have their glasses replaced at no cost as long as the glasses were not negligently lost or broken; that the law library will have two PCs with assistive programs; that law clerks will be on hand to assist visually impaired prisoners with their legal research; that the correctional facilities will have games, books, and legal forms appropriate for use by the visually impaired; and many other things. It also included that the Department of Corrections would pay attorneys' fees to plaintiffs' counsel. This private settlement agreement was intended to last two years, with a possibility of adding two more years if the Department of Corrections was deemed to not be following it adequately. Moreover, many of the provisions in the settlement agreement were to be added to the official facility policies of the Sullivan and Wende Correctional Facility. On July 22, 2014, Judge Cott released a final judgment, creating the effective date of the private settlement agreement and dismissing the lawsuit with prejudice. Judge Cott ordered to keep the docket open for letters from plaintiffs about whether the correctional facilities have been following the provisions of the settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was set to expire on July 22, 2016, with the possibility of extension dependent on the defendants' compliance. Although the court received letter in 2016 alleging that the defendant failed to comply, the docket indicates no extension of the agreement, and the case is presumed closed.
<|assistant|>
In January 2011, visually impaired inmates at Sullivan and Wende Correctional Facilities filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of New York for violations of their rights to adequate medical care and reasonable accommodations. In 2014, plaintiffs and defendants negotiated a private settlement agreement that came into effect on July 22, 2014. The settlement provided for plaintiffs' attorneys' fees and reasonable medical care and accommodations. The lawsuit is currently closed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On November 10, 2004, Voices for Independence, a non-profit disability advocacy group, and a class of disabled individuals, filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, against Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). The Plaintiffs alleged that when PennDOT had resurfaced highways in the cities of Meadville and Erie, it failed to install mandatory curb cuts and otherwise comply with the accessibility mandates of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701. On September 7, 2006, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint joining the cities of Meadville and Erie as defendants in the case. Voices for Independence had previously filed a suit against Meadville (see related cases) but joined the City in this case because PennDOT denied legal responsibility to retrofit non-compliant curb cuts at intersections of state and local roads. On December 22, 2006, PennDOT, Meadville, and the Plaintiffs entered a court-approved settlement wherein Meadville and PennDOT agreed to share responsibility for the remediation of non-compliant intersections where future resurfacing work was to be performed. The Defendants agreed to retrofit existing non-compliant intersections which, under the ADA, should have been remediated as part of earlier resurfacing work performed within the two years prior to the lawsuit. A similar settlement was made between Erie, PennDOT, and the Plaintiffs on April 4, 2007, wherein PennDOT assumed responsibility for constructing ADA-compliant curb cuts in all its future road projects in Erie and to remediate non-compliant curb cuts which were constructed or should have been corrected in conjunction with prior road projects going back to March 28, 2004. The parties could not agree as to whether a statute of limitations relieved the Defendants of responsibility to retrofit non-compliant intersections modified after January 26, 1992, when the ADA first came into effect, but more than two years prior to the date the lawsuit was filed. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue, asking the Court to declare that they were not responsible for these retrofitting these intersections. On September 28, 2007, the Court (Judge Sean J. McLaughlin) issued a Memorandum Opinion and Order in which it denied the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Voices for Independence v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Dept. of Transportation, 2007 WL 2905887 (W.D. Penn, 2007). On March 4, 2009, the plaintiffs and PennDOT agreed to a third settlement, in which PennDOT agreed to retrofit intersections where necessary on all roads it resurfaced in Erie and Meadville from January 24, 1992, to March 28, 2004, and to issue an Annual Report of Compliance on or before January 31 of each year during the life of the settlement, listing each curb cuts installed, repaired, or retrofitted, with relevant measurements. If these reports showed that PennDOT was unlikely to complete the retrofitting project by January 1, 2014, then the Plaintiffs were to follow dispute resolution measures outlined in the earlier settlements. On March 11, 2009, the Plaintiffs, the City of Meadville, and PennDOT entered a Consent Decree, wherein Meadville and PennDOT divided responsibility for certain resurfaced roads, sidewalks, and intersections in Meadville that were still in need of retrofitting in order to be ADA-compliant. On January 30, 2012, the Plaintiffs and PennDOT entered into a fourth settlement, clarifying the requirements of the earlier settlements and ensuring that within the cities of Erie and Meadville all newly constructed or altered State roads and highways would have curb cuts at all intersections containing curbs or other barriers to entry from a street level pedestrian walkway. In cases where PennDOT felt that this was inappropriate, it was required to provide written notice to the Plaintiffs. PennDOT also agreed to install the curb cuts that it had omitted in work performed since 2007. The settlement also addressed problems with undulating sidewalks and other obstructions. In the settlement, PennDOT agreed to pay an unspecified amount in attorneys' fees and costs to the Plaintiffs. On May 23, 2012, the Plaintiffs filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement, alleging that PennDOT had failed to install approximately one thousand curb cuts required by the earlier settlements, and that it failed to file with the Court the detailed annual report listing the exact number and location of each omitted curb cut. This was granted on January 29, 2013. On April 18, 2013, the Plaintiffs and PennDOT entered into a fifth settlement, which included a list of curb cuts remaining to be installed. PennDOT agreed to install all these curb cuts by December 31, 2013, excepting certain intersections where ongoing construction would prevent them from being completed by the deadline. The fifth settlement recognized that discussions about other ADA compliance issues were still ongoing between the parties. PennDOT agreed to pay an unspecified amount in attorneys' fees and costs to the Plaintiffs. As in the previous four settlements, the court approved the terms of the agreement and retained jurisdiction concerning interpretation of and compliance with the terms of the settlement. Since entry of the fifth settlement agreement, defendants have continued to submit status reports. On November 23, 2016, the parties submitted a joint motion to dismiss the City of Meadville. They agreed that Meadville had fulfilled its obligations under the settlement and consent decrees by, among other things, installing about 860 curb ramps. The court granted the motion to dismiss on November 28, 2016. This case was reassigned to Judge Susan Paradise Baxter on February 5, 2019. As of May 21, 2020, the remaining defendants are still subject to the settlement agreements. The court continues to monitor their compliance and the parties file periodic status reports.
<|assistant|>
On November 10, 2004, Voices for Independence, a non-profit disability advocacy group, and a class of disabled individuals, filed a lawsuit in federal court against Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). The Plaintiffs alleged that when PennDOT had resurfaced highways in the cities of Meadville and Erie, it failed to install mandatory curb cuts, and to otherwise comply with the accessibility mandates of ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The Plaintiffs later added the cities of Meadville and Erie as defendants in the case, because PennDOT denied legal responsibility to retrofit non-compliant curb cuts at the intersections of state and local roads. The parties have entered a series of five court-approved settlement agreements, the first on December 22, 2006 and the most recent on April 18, 2013; the settlements require future compliance with the ADA on all state road and highway resurfacing projects in Meadville and Erie, and the retrofitting of all non-compliant intersections resurfaced after January 26, 1992 (the date the ADA became effective) with ADA-compliant curb cuts.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 4, 2017, two inmates of Pierce County Jail (PCJ) with mental health issues brought this class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs sued Pierce County and the Pierce County Sheriff’s Department under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU of Washington, sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorneys’ fees and costs. The case was assigned to Judge Ronald B. Leighton, and referred to Magistrate Judge David W. Christel. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants violated their Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. The complaint alleged that the defendants did not adequately screen for mental illness during the booking process or during incarceration, ignored clear signs of mental illness and requests for care and, and, as a result, routinely failed to document serious mental health symptoms, psychiatric medications, and treatment history. As such, the plaintiffs’ mental illnesses were allowed to progress unchecked, leading to hallucinations, delusions, and an increased risk of self-harm. The complaint also alleged that the defendants "routinely warehouse these individuals in solitary confinement for 21 to 24 hours a day," and that they have a formal written policy of placing people with “poor behavioral control due to a mental disorder” in “crisis cells” for 23 hours a day. On December 21, 2017, after filing and withdrawing two motions to certify class, the plaintiffs filed a third motion to certify class, defining the class as: “All qualified individuals who have mental illnesses that are disabilities as defined in 42 U.S.C. §12102 and 29 U.S.C. §705(9)(B), and who are now, or will be in the future, incarcerated at the Pierce County Jail.” On February 2, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss, among other claims, the plaintiffs' §1983 claim of inadequate mental health treatment. The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring their administration of psychiatric medication upon release claim because they fail to show the existence of an imminent injury. On March 28, 2018, Judge Leighton granted in part the defendant’s motion to dismiss, dismissing the claims against the named agents of the county but retaining the claims against Pierce County and Pierce County Sheriff’s Department. On May 7, 2018, adopting a report and recommendation by Magistrate Judge Christel, Judge Leighton dismissed the complaint without prejudice for lack of standing. On May 11, 2018, however, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and relief from judgment, arguing that the court mistakenly dismissed the entirety of the complaint instead of the limited dismissal (one claim for lack of standing) sought by the defendants. On May 15, 2018, Judge Leighton granted the motion for reconsideration, saying that the dismissal was an inadvertent administrative error. The defendants filed their answer to the complaint with the court on May 12, 2018, and discovery continued. On June 7, 2018, the defendants filed a motion to strike plaintiffs' motion for class certification. The motion alleged that plaintiffs' failed to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1)(A) and Local Civil Rule 23(i)(3) in their unilateral decision to re-note the motion to certify, resulting in a delay tactic that was prejudicial to the defendants. In an order issued on August 3, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion and additionally ruled against the plaintiffs on a pending discovery motion. The order specified that although the motion to certify was stricken, the class allegations would remain in the complaint and permitted the plaintiffs to file a motion requesting enlargement of time to file a renewed motion to certify. As such, the plaintiffs amended and renewed their motion for class certification on August 29, 2018. After a period of discovery, Magistrate Judge David W. Christel issued his report and recommendations on the motion for class certification on October 15, 2018. He recommended that the certification be denied because plaintiffs had failed to meet the numerosity and commonality requirements. Additionally, he found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), which requires that the defendant acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole. Here, there were too many disparate and individualized issues regarding mental health such that the class lacked cohesiveness. On October 25, 2018, the parties jointly stipulated for dismissal with prejudice, with all parties bearing their own costs. The case officially closed on October 29, 2018.
<|assistant|>
This 2017 class action lawsuit was brought by two former inmates of Pierce County Jail in the U.S. District for the Western District of Washington. They alleged that the defendant had violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to adequately screen for mental illness. On March 28, 2018, Judge Leighton dismissed part of the claim.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 8, 2015, six U.S. citizens who had their email, text message, and telephone call metadata collected by the government during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games in Salt Lake City, Utah, filed suit against the National Security Agency ("NSA") and the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). The plaintiffs challenged the legality of the domestic surveillance program and sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as statutory, actual, and punitive damages. The plaintiffs brought suit in the U.S. District Court for the district of Utah under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA"), the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications, and the Privacy Act. They alleged violations of these acts and of the 4th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and of Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution. The plaintiffs were represented by private counsel. In October of 2001, then President George W. Bush authorized the NSA, in conjunction with the FBI, to intercept the international phone calls and international emails of people within the United States without a warrant. The operation, known as "the President's Surveillance Program," collected email, text message, and telephone call metadata, which was stored in a "security compartment" code-named "STELLARWIND." Before and during the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, this surveillance was expanded in and around Salt Lake City and other Olympic venues. This expansion covered the metadata on every phone call made to and from individuals within the Salt Lake City area, as well as the content of every text message and email to and from those individuals. The plaintiffs were all living and working within the Salt Lack City area during this period, and frequently used the targeted communications methods. The plaintiffs claimed this program of warrant-less surveillance was a violation of their rights under the First and Fourth Amendments, Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution, and several other Federal laws that govern government surveillance of individuals within the United States. The government moved to dismiss the suit on December 18, 2015, claiming a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. They argued that the plaintiffs, (1) failed to plausibly allege their standing, (2) had not otherwise alleged the existence of a live case or controversy to support their claim for equitable relief, (3) failed to plausibly allege their standing in regard to similar surveillance they alleged was continuing, (4) did not plausibly allege standing to seek monetary relief, and (5) made claims for monetary relief that were barred by sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs filed a response to the motion to dismiss on February 18, 2016. The court denied the motion on January 10, 2017, finding the plaintiffs had established a plausible claim that they had suffered a redressable injury. The court held that it was not its role at this stage of the litigation to analyze the likelihood of the allegations being true. 228 F.Supp.3d 1271. On September 27, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss (that is, withdraw) the case. In their motion, they reiterated their position that their rights were violated, but stated that because of the defendants' extensive use of the "state secrets doctrine," discovery had been fruitless. The plaintiffs decided that further litigation of the case would not be beneficial. The same day, the court dismissed the action.
<|assistant|>
During the 2002 Winter Olympic Games, the NSA and FBI collected the content of every email and text message, as well the metadata of every telephone call, moving to and from individuals in Salt Lake City, UT. in 2015, a group of Salt Lake City area residents filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for Utah, challenging the legality of this surveillance program. The court has yet to rule on a motion to dismiss by the defendants.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
In July 2012, Plaintiffs, representing the estates of their respective children, filed suit in United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States and Department of Defense officials in their personal capacities. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights, the plaintiffs alleged that the United States directed and authorized missile strikes resulting in citizens' deaths abroad, in violation of the Fifth and Fourth Amendments and the Bill of Attainder Clause. The defendants moved to dismiss the case in December 2012 under several theories precluding judicial review, including lack of standing, separation of powers concerns, the presence of non-justiciable political questions, and qualified immunity of the federal officials. The district court scheduled oral arguments for July 2013. Meanwhile, the district court took judicial notice of a New York Times article by Charlie Savage, U.S. Admits for First Time Drones Killed 4 Americans, N.Y. Times, May 22, 2013, and requested briefing on how the statements of the Attorney General of the United States affected the legal issues in the case. On April 4, 2014, the Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss, due heavily to special factors that precluded a cause of action under Bivens. The Court found no Fourth Amendment claim because there was no actual seizure of the decedents. The Court found no Fifth Amendment claim for two of the Plaintiffs because their deaths were unanticipated, which amounted only to negligence and not a violation of Fifth Amendment substantive due process rights. The Court stated the claim against the third decedent appeared plausible as the death was not unintended. The Court then found that applying Bivens in this case would be inappropriate, as it would be an unprecedented application of Bivens which would "draw the Court into 'the heart of executive and military planning and deliberation'" because the Court would have to examine national security policy, military chain of command, and operational combat decisions. Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 77 (D.D.C 2014), quoting Lebron v. Rumseld, 670 F.3d 540, 550 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The Court finally found that Bill of Attainder claim was unfounded as Plaintiffs could point to no legislative action. 35 F. Supp. 3d 56. The case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In July 2012, plaintiffs, representing the estates of their respective children, filed suit in United States District Court for the District of Columbia against the United States and Department of Defense officials in their personal capacities. Represented by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Center for Constitutional Rights, the plaintiffs allege that the United States directed and authorized missile strikes resulting in citizens' deaths abroad, in violation of the Fifth and Fourth Amendments and the Bill of Attainder Clause. On April 4, 2014, the case was dismissed. The Court found the application of Bivens would be inappropriate as it was unprecedented and would require the Court to review military planning and operations.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On November 21, 2007, private attorneys filed a national class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the refusal by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (a component of the Department of Homeland Security) to accept concurrent adjustment of status applications for special immigrant religious workers. It was the general USCIS policy to accept concurrent filing of underlying visa petitions (I-360) with family-based and other employment-based permanent resident applications (I-485). By regulation, however, this approach was not available for those seeking religious worker visas. See 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2)(i)(B). Plaintiffs contended that the policy violated their constitutional rights to freedom of religion, equal protection, and due process, as well as the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and the Immigration and Nationality Act. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as class certification. Separate motions for a TRO and Preliminary Injunction to stop the accrual of unlawful presence time was filed with the Complaint and granted December 27, 2007 and Aug. 21, 2008. 2007 WL 4593876; 2008 WL 3928016. In June 2008, Judge Lasnik granted class action status; the plaintiff class was defined as "all individuals currently in the United States who are beneficiaries of a Petition for Special Immigrant (Religious Worker) (Form I-360) that has been filed or will be filed, and who were or would be eligible to file an Application for Adjustment of Status (Form I-485) but for CIS's policy codified at 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a) (2)(i)(B) that the Form I-360 petition must be approved before the Form I-485 application can be filed." 2008 WL 2645495. In November 2008, Judge Lasnik rejected the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the court could not at that point of the litigation, find that the plaintiffs' various claims were incorrect. 2008 WL 4962685. In March 2009, Judge Lasnik held that the regulation did not appropriately implement the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and was therefore unlawful. 2009 WL 799683. On appeal, the 9th Circuit reversed, finding the regulation permissible under the INA, and remanded to the district court to consider plaintiffs' remaining contentions. Ruiz-Diaz v. United States, 618 F.3d 1055 (9th Cir. 2010). On remand, the District Court, Robert S. Lasnik, held for the government in all respects. In particular: a) the visa provisions of the U.S. immigration code serve a compelling government interest and do not substantially burden Plaintiffs exercise of their religion (satisfying RFRA) by imposing limitations on the grant of visas; b) fraud in the religious worker visa program is endemic, and "the bar on concurrent filings is a rational regulatory attempt to reduce fraud in the religious worker program. Given the government's legitimate interest in reducing fraud and the broad deference courts show the determinations of the political branches in the context of immigration, the bar on concurrent filings," which singles out religious workers for extra scrutiny, "withstands scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause,"; c) Plaintiffs have "no legitimate entitlement to apply for adjustment of status before obtaining CIS approval of the I-360 visa petition." No process for visa applications is constitutionally mandated, or even statutorily required. Therefore, Plaintiffs' due process claims fail as a matter of law; and d) the threshold for a First Amendment violation is higher than for a RFRA violation, and that claim fails for same reasons as the RFRA violation claim. For those reasons, the Court denied Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted Defendants'. 819 F.Supp.2d 1154 Plaintiffs filed their notice of appeal in July of 2011. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Mary M. Schroeder, affirmed for the same reasons. 697 F.3d 1119 (amended 703 F.3d 483). The Court's mandate was issued November 28, 2011, and the district court docket ends there.
<|assistant|>
On November 21, 2007, private attorneys filed a national class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service's refusal to accept concurrent adjustment of status applications for special immigrant religious workers. Other, non-religious classes of immigrants are able to file for concurrent adjustment of their underlying visa provisions. Plaintiffs contended violations of their rights under RFRA, Equal Protection, Due Process and the First Amendment. The district court found that the visa restrictions found in U.S. Immigration policy serve a compelling interest without burdening Plaintiffs' exercise of religion, satisfying RFRA; the special restrictions on religious applicants serve a rational relation to the goal of preventing fraud, satisfying Equal Protection; that there is no statutorily or Constitutionally mandated right to such proceeding, defeating a Due Process claim as a matter of law; and that the First Amendment arguments fail for the same reason as the RFRA arguments. Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit, who affirmed on the same grounds.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On December 16, 2014, the estate of an inmate who died in jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Monterey County, the Monterey County Sheriff, the Monterey County Jail, and the California Forensic Medical Group under 42 U.S.C. §1983. Represented by private counsel, the plaintiffs sought monetary and injunctive relief, claiming a failure to provide medical care in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and a deprivation of substantive due process in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs also claimed negligence and wrongful death under California state law. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants left the inmate lying unconscious, helpless, and untreated in his bed to die from viral influenza syndrome complicated by pneumonia—a treatable condition. At the time of the inmate's death, the jail was already the subject of a class action lawsuit regarding systemic failures to provide adequate medical care. <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=13198"><i>Hernandez v. County of Monterey</i></a>. On June 6, 2016, the case was reassigned to Judge Beth Labson Freeman. On April 21, 2015, the parties agreed to enter into settlement negotiations; a settlement conference was scheduled for October 30, 2015. The parties could not come to a settlement agreement at that conference. Further settlement discussions continued through April and June 2017, but the parties did not settle. In October 2017, the plaintiff filed a stipulation and proposed order with the court for the dismissal of defendant California Forensic Medical Group. The court approved it. That same day, the defendant Sheriff filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the claims against him. He claimed that he could not be liable because the plaintiffs could not show that on January 15, 2014, the defendant Sheriff knew the plaintiff had faced a substantial risk of serious harm and disregarded that risk by failing to take reasonable steps to abate it. Moreover, the defendant Sheriff argued that the doctrine of qualified immunity shielded him from liability for civil damages because his conduct did not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. On April 6, 2018, the court granted in part and denied in part this defendant Sheriff’s motion. Judge Freeman granted the motion as to the plaintiff's first cause of action pursuant to § 1983 for deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment and granted the motion as to Plaintiffs’ second cause of action pursuant to § 1983 for loss of the parent/child relationship in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. These claims were dismissed. The court denied the motion, however, as to the plaintiffs’ alleged violations of California state tort law. The parties continued to engage in discovery and motion in limine briefing through the rest of 2018. At the same time, they continued to engage in settlement conferences and reached a settlement for monetary damages in early 2019. On January 23, 2019, the plaintiff filed a motion for settlement approval. The court approved the settlement agreement on March 18, 2019. The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed the case on April 29, 2019. This case is closed.
<|assistant|>
In 2014, the estate of an inmate who died in jail filed this lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued Monterey County and other defendants under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The plaintiffs claimed a failure to provide medical care in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and a deprivation of substantive due process in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties settled on March 18, 2019 and case was dismissed on April 29, 2019.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
COVID-19 Summary: This is a suit brought by several campgrounds and individuals wishing to travel to Maine against the State of Maine's enforcement of stay-at-home orders and quarantine requirements for those traveling into Maine. The plaintiffs alleged that Maine's orders violated their rights to interstate travel, due process, and equal protection. The court denied their motion for preliminary injunction and found that the orders were narrowly tailored to the goal of protecting public health. The plaintiffs appealed on June 1 and moved for reconsideration. The court denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and the case was stayed on June 8. No outcome on appeal as of November 2020. <hr> The stay-at-home executive orders issued by Maine Governor Janet Mills in response to the outbreak of COVID-19 required people entering Maine to self-quarantine for 14 days. Several campgrounds in rural Maine and individual plaintiffs wishing to travel interstate to Maine alleged that the executive orders violated their rights to interstate travel, due process, and equal protection. Represented by private counsel, plaintiffs sued Governor Mills, in her official capacity, in the United States District Court for the District of Maine under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on May 15, 2020. Plaintiffs, who simultaneously filed a motion for preliminary injunction (PI) and expedited relief, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as attorneys' costs and fees. The case was assigned to Judge Lance E. Walker. Plaintiffs alleged that the restrictions on interstate travel in the executive orders burdened their right to interstate travel and were not the least restrictive means for advancing a compelling government interest. Moreover, plaintiffs asserted that the restrictions on interstate travel "deprived Plaintiffs and their customers of their constitutional rights . . . without any pre- or post-deprivation process." Finally, plaintiffs claimed that "The Rural Reopening plan creates 'winners' and 'losers' of the same, similarly situated businesses, based solely upon their location within the State of Maine," in violation of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses. Plaintiffs requested an order declaring "that the challenged orders unconstitutionally infringe upon Plaintiffs’ rights to interstate travel, due process, and equal protection" and enjoining enforcement of the challenged aspects of the executive orders. 2020 WL 2519973. On May 25, Governor Mills filed an opposition for plaintiffs' motion for PI, asserting that states "have broad latitude when confronting a public health emergency" and that "elimination of the self-quarantine requirement, at least at this time, would threaten the public health, and the plaintiffs’ desire to recreate and visit friends in other states without self-quarantining does not outweigh Maine’s interest in protecting its population." On May 29, the United States Department of Justice filed a statement of interest, stating that "the Court should hold that Maine’s discrimination against out-of-state residents likely violates Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause." The DOJ asserted that the quarantine requirement discriminates between Maine residents and out-of-state residents and that the discrimination appears to be insufficiently tailored to further public safety. Later that day, Judge Walker issued an order denying plaintiffs' motion for PI. Judge Walker concluded that while the executive orders burden plaintiffs' right to travel, plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of success sufficient to justify PI because "it is not at all clear that there are any less restrictive means for the state to still meet their goal of curbing COVID-19." Moreover, Judge Walker found that plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their due process claim; "Because the COVID-19 scenario is the kind of scenario for which emergency action would be expected, and because Plaintiffs have not persuasively shown that they are denied access to quick and meaningful post-deprivation review of administrative action." Finally, Judge Walker held that the "irreparable harm that plaintiffs would suffer as result of orders did not outweigh state's concern for public health posed by COVID-19 pandemic." However, Judge Walker stated that "Plaintiffs have raised a very serious matter for judicial resolution and I am persuaded that they might be able to demonstrate a violation of the Constitution sometime during the travel of this case." 2020 WL 2791797. On June 1, plaintiffs appealed the denial of the motion for PI to the First Circuit (No. 20-1559). Plaintiffs also filed a motion for expedited injunction pending appeal and a motion for reconsideration, arguing that Judge Walker incorrectly placed the burden on plaintiffs to show that the Governor's order was not narrowly tailored. On June 5, Judge Walker issued an order denying plaintiffs' motions for expedited injunction and reconsideration. Judge Walker agreed that the burden of proof rested with the Governor to prove that the orders were narrowly tailored, but stated that he had not indicated that "Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving the Governor’s restrictions were not narrowly tailored, or that they had failed to do so." Judge Walker explained that, in his May 29 order, he found that Governor Mills "carried her burden of proof sufficiently to defeat Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction." On June 8, the defendants filed an unopposed motion to stay pending appeal, which was granted the next day. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
On May 25, 2020, several rural campgrounds and individuals wishing to travel to Maine filed this suit against Governor Mills in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maine. Plaintiffs challenged Maine's executive orders, which required individuals traveling into Maine to self-quarantine for 14 days, alleging that the orders violated their right to interstate travel, as well as their due process and equal protection rights. The Department of Justice filed a statement of interest suggesting that the executive orders likely violated plaintiffs' right to interstate travel. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction and the plaintiffs appealed on June 1 and moved for reconsideration. The court denied the plaintiffs motion for reconsideration and the case was stayed on June 8. The case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On October 19, 2011, several couples who reside in the state of Alabama filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Alabama against Probate Judge Reese McKinney, Jr., under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The plaintiffs, represented by the Southern Poverty Law Center and private counsel, sought a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees, alleging that the defendant's policies discriminated against non-U.S. citizens trying to obtain a marriage license in Alabama. In Alabama, no person may marry without a marriage license. One of a probate judge's ministerial jobs is to issue marriage licenses to those couples that meet the requirements. Alabama law does not explicitly say that proof of citizenship is a requirement to obtaining a marriage license. In fact, in 2008, the Alabama Attorney General, issued a statement saying citizenship was not a requirement to obtaining a marriage license. However, the Montgomery County Probate Office had on its website a requirement of showing "legal presence" in the U.S. for persons 18 years or older trying to obtain a marriage license. On October 21, 2011, the plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint. On December 2, 2011, the clerk for the Middle District Court of Alabama accepted the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of the case.
<|assistant|>
On October 19, 2011, several couples who reside in the state of Alabama filed a lawsuit in the Middle District of Alabama against Probate Judge Reese McKinney, Jr., under the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. On December 2, 2011, the clerk for the Middle District Court of Alabama accepted the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of the case.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On July 1 2018, Sigma Beta Xi (a non-profit organization) and three children filed this class action in the Central District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by the ACLU, National Center for Youth Law, and private counsel, sued the County of Riverside under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations under the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief as well as nominal damages. They claimed that Riverside's Youth Accountability Team (YAT) program, which was an alleged probation supervision program, violated their constitutional and state rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants did not give children adequate notice of charges against them, and used coercion and other misleading tactics to induce them to enter the YAT program without their informed consent. As part of this program, the defendants allegedly searched the homes, belongings, and persons of the children in the YAT program and prohibited children in the YAT program from associating with anyone the program did not approve of. Notably, the complaint contended that the YAT program had a significant adverse impact on Black and Latinx children. The plaintiffs requested injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant from engaging in the YAT program practices that violated the plaintiffs' rights. On September 5, the defendant filed an answer to the complaint, denying generally and specifically the plaintiff's allegations. They stated that the purpose of the YAT program was to "divert certain youth from the juvenile justice system and instead handle them in an informal, treatment-oriented manner, including, without limitation, the provision of school attendance and behavior monitoring, mentoring, and involvement in pro-social activities" and not, as plaintiffs claimed, to "target, ensnare, and discriminate against children in...schools in Riverside County, by stripping them of their constitutional rights and treating them like criminals." The individual plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion to be certified as a class on September 13, 2018. On September 17, 2018, the court granted their motion after determining that the children satisfied the necessary elements of a class (numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy). The class was certified as: "All children in Riverside County who have been referred to the Riverside County Youth Accountability Team ("YAT") program pursuant to Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 601, and who had either been placed on a YAT probation contract or had been referred but not yet placed on a YAT probation contract." The case was referred to Alternative Dispute Resolution in December of 2018. On January 2, 2019, the parties jointly stipulated to a protective order for the youth plaintiffs during the course of this case. After out of court negotiations, the parties moved for class action settlement on July 24, 2019. The proposed settlement agreement mandated the following: 1) Narrowing the category of youth who fall under the jurisdiction of Welfare & Institutions § 602 and will be enrolled in a Welfare & Institutions Code § 654 program or referred for prosecution under Welfare & Institutions Code § 60 2) Defendants agree not to seek or accept referrals from any source regarding any youth under the age of 18 into the YAT program 3) Creation of a presumption for the protection of youth charged with school disruption, possession of alcohol, cigarettes, or marijuana, and possession of a laser pointer or graffiti tools. The Probation Department will counsel and close these matters or refer the youth to a community-based organization 4) Addition of defense counsel to the YAT team to legally advocate for the youth 5) Improvements in the risk-assessment tool used by the YAT program 6) Improvements in communication with youth and their parents/guardians about the responsibilities and expectations involved in the program, including an updated contract 7) Updates in records keeping, data tracking, and personnel policies and training 8) The addition of community representatives to the Juvenile Justice Coordinating Committee The agreement appointed Scott MacDonald and Naomi Goldstein as third-party monitors to report annually on the settlement progress. The agreement is set to expire after 5 years, and the court will retain jurisdiction during that time. The hearing for final approval of the agreement is set for June 20, 2020, although it may be subject to further postponement due to the COVID-19 public health emergency. This case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
A non-profit and children enrolled in the Youth Accountability Team (YAT) program filed this class action on July 1, 2018 against County of Riverside for implementing practices in the YAT program that violated participants' constitutional rights. The court granted class certification in September 2018 and the case remains ongoing.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On August 17, 2005, two New York state prisoners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (the Civil Rights Act of 1871), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA), and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504) against New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and its chief medical officer. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief, compensatory damages, and punitive damages, as well as class action status for the case, claiming that the defendants' failure to administer medical treatment constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, according to the plaintiffs. The defendants refused to provide needed treatment for their medical conditions, Hepatitis C, because the plaintiffs had not completed a DOCS-sponsored substance abuse program. The plaintiffs amended the complaint on September 2, 2005. The state had recently lost similar lawsuits in federal and state courts (see, for example, case PC-NY-52 in the Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse database) and, in October 2005, revised its policies so that completion of DOCS substance abuse programs was not required prior to provision of Hepatitis C treatment to prisoners. The defendants thus argued that, as the plaintiffs were now receiving treatment under the revised policy, the plaintiffs' equitable claims were now moot and that class action status should not be accorded the case. District Judge David N. Hurd rejected the defense arguments in a memorandum and order filed on February 27, 2006. He found that the plaintiffs' claims were not moot, because the defendants had failed to show (1) there was no reasonable expectation of re-institution of the substance abuse treatment policy and (2) complete eradication of the prior policy's effects. The court noted that the revised policy expressly changed due to litigation losses, not due to the defendants' medical judgment, making it difficult for the court to accept that the defendants might not again revise the policy, at some point, to the plaintiffs' detriment. Additionally, Judge Hurd found class certification appropriate, as some 500 of the approximately 9,000 Hepatitis C-positive prisoners in defendants' custody had been deprived of treatment due to the prior policy making treatment contingent upon meeting the substance abuse program requirement. Plaintiffs' counsel were appointed to serve as class counsel. Hilton v. Wright, 235 F.R.D. 40 (N.D. N.Y. 2006). In the following months, the parties engaged in settlement discussions, including conferences with the court. On July 25, 2007, the parties filed with the court their interim settlement agreement. It made explicit the parties' joint agreement that participation in DOCS' substance abuse programs was not a precondition to provision by DOCS of treatment for Hepatitis C and required notification to DOCS medical personnel and known Hepatitis C-positive prisoners of this policy. Prisoners previously denied treatment under the old policy would now be re-evaluated and would receive treatment, if doing so was medically appropriate. Also under the agreement, DOCS had to report its compliance with the agreement's terms to class counsel, and had to pay class counsel's fees stemming from the case, including those incurred over the two year compliance monitoring period established by the agreement. The period could be extended by agreement of the parties or by order of the court. On January 2, 2008, Judge Hurd approved the settlement, but denied the plaintiff's class application for permission to amend their complaint to assert a claim for damages. On December 14, 2009, Judge Hurd dismissed the first amended complaint in its entirety. Plaintiffs appealed this decision and the order was vacated on May 11, 2013 by the Court of Appeals. On May 25, 2010, Judge Hurd awarded the plaintiffs attorney's fees of $23,152. Judge Hurd had also denied attorney's fees beyond the sum of $23,152, but the plaintiffs appealed this order and it was vacated on May 11, 2013 by the Court of Appeals. On April 20, 2012, the Second Circuit vacated in part the judgment and remanded the case on the basis that the district court did not adequately explain why it granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims for damages. In addition, because the district court misinterpreted the parties' settlement agreement with respect to the recovery of reasonable costs, the Court of Appeals vacated the part of the order denying the plaintiffs' application for reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses and remanded the issue to the district court for it to determine in its discretion whether to grant, full or partially, the plaintiffs' application for such costs. Hilton v. Wright, 673 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2012). On May 11, 2013, Judge Hurd issued an opinion vacating the previous orders that the first amended complaint be dismissed and the portion of the order denying attorneys' fees beyond the sum of $23,152. Judge Hurd also granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for summary judgment. All claims relating to the 2003 denial of Hepatitis C treatment based on the length of incarceration requirement was waived. Judge Hurd dismissed all of the claims against the chief medical officer. Judge Hurd awarded additional attorneys' fees of $17,385.45, for a total fee award of $40,537.45. Hilton v. Wright, 928 F. Supp. 2d 530 (N.D.N.Y. 2013). On August 28, 2013 Judge Hurd ordered the defendants to pay to the plaintiff $120,000 in full settlement of any and all claims, inclusive of any and all damages, fees, and costs of any kind. Judge Hurd also ordered that all claims or counterclaims were discontinued.
<|assistant|>
On August 17, 2005, two New York state prisoners filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York under 42 U.S.C. §1983 (the Civil Rights Act of 1871), 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (the Americans with Disabilities Act, or ADA), and 29 U.S.C. § 794 (the Rehabilitation Act, Section 504) against New York's Department of Correctional Services (DOCS) and its chief medical officer. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants' failure to administer treatment for Hepatitis C based on completion of a substance abuse program constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, according to the plaintiffs. Parties reached a settlement that required treatment regardless of completion of the substance abuse program and defendants were required to pay $120,000 in damages, fees, and costs.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 26, 2011, individuals with disabilities and several related organizations filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against New York City and its mayor under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ("Rehabilitation Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 701, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131 <i>et seq.</i>, and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"), New York City Admin. Code §§ 8-101 <i>et seq.</i> Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. The plaintiffs, represented by Disability Rights Advocates, claimed that the defendants unlawfully discriminated against disabled individuals by inadequately planning for the evacuation of people with disabilities, failing to provide an accessible shelter system; ignoring the unique needs of people with disabilities in the event of a power outage; failing to communicate adequately with people with special needs during an emergency; and failing to account for the needs of people with disabilities in recovery operations following a disaster. Specifically, the plaintiffs claim that the City's discrimination in emergency planning was demonstrated by the City's response to Hurricane Irene and September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, which failed in various ways to appropriately accommodate those with disabilities. On June 29, 2012, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add a plaintiff and clarify their factual claims. On November 7, 2012, the District Court (Judge Jesse M. Furman) issued an opinion ruling that both the organized and individual plaintiffs had standing to sue and certifying the class defined as "all people with disabilities, as defined by the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12102, who are within the City and the jurisdiction served by the City's emergency preparedness programs and services." 290 F.R.D. 409. On May 10, 2013, the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York filed a statement of interest urging the court to find that the defendants violated the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act and noting among other things that the defendants nowhere contended that making reasonable accommodations was impractical. On November 7, 2013, after a six-day bench trial on the question of liability the District Court (Judge Furman) ruled that the defendants violated the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the NYCHRL. Specifically the court found that: "(1) The City's evacuation plans do not accommodate the needs of people with disabilities with respect to high-rise evacuation and accessible transportation; (2) its shelter plans do not require that the shelter system be sufficiently accessible, either architecturally or programmatically, to accommodate people with disabilities in an emergency; (3) the City has no plan for canvassing or for otherwise ensuring that people with disabilities -- who may, because of their disability, be unable to leave their building after a disaster -- are able to access the services provided by the City after an emergency; (4) the City's plans to distribute resources in the aftermath of a disaster do not provide for accessible communications at the facilities where resources are distributed; (5) the City's outreach and education program fails in several respects to provide people with disabilities the same opportunity as others to develop a personal emergency plan; and (6) the City lacks sufficient plans to provide people with disabilities information about the existence and location of accessible services in an emergency." 980 F. Supp. 2d 588. On December 4, 2013, the District Court ordered the parties to engage in settlement negotiations with a mediator to be paid for by the defendants. Settlement negotiations progressed throughout 2014. On September 30, 2014, the parties indicated they reached a settlement. The court held a fairness hearing on February 13, 2015. On March 6, the court granted final approval of the settlement. The final settlement provided a remedial plan that included increasing shelter accessibility, surveying facilities for use as hurricane shelters, standardized procedures and amenities in emergency evacuation centers and shelters, operational plan for post-emergency rapid survey of population to determine critical needs, development of adequate accessible transportation and communication, increased accessibility to power outage services, hiring of a Disability and Access and Functional Needs Coordinator and the creation of a Disability Community Panel, and development of a high rise evacuation plan. The settlement also provided monitoring and reporting procedures. On August 24, 2015, the parties stipulated to an agreement that the plaintiffs would be awarded $3,700,000 in attorney's fees. Further, the court would retain jurisdiction over the settlement until May 2019, when the agreement's obligations were set to terminate. On three different occasions between 2018 and 2019, the parties jointly agreed to extend the deadline by which the defendant needed to comply with particular terms of the settlement. The defendant has continued submitting status reports with the court. Monitoring appears to be ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In 2011, individuals with disabilities and related organizations filed a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York against the City of New York and its mayor alleging that they failed to provide reasonable accommodations for people with disabilities in their emergency response plan. After a bench trial in November 2013, the District Court ruled for the plaintiffs and later approved a settlement which included policy changes, ongoing monitoring, and attorney's fees. As of April 10, 2020, monitoring appears to be ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On September 17, 2010, prisoners with physical disabilities under the custody of the North Carolina Department of Corrections ("DOC") filed a putative class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. The plaintiffs, represented by North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, brought the suit against the state of North Carolina. They asked the Court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that defendants discriminated against them. Specifically, they alleged that by reason of their disabilities, defendants denied them the benefits of the DOC's sentence reduction credit programs. Prisoners within the DOC can earn credits that shorten their terms of incarceration if they work or participate in certain programs. Pursuant to the medical gain time policy, the DOC grants disabled inmates sentence reduction credits only if it determines that they are medically unfit to participate in the traditional sentence reduction credit programs. The plaintiffs alleged that the DOC's definition of "medically unfit" misclassified numerous prisoners with disabilities and excluded them from participation in the medical gain time program even when they were physically unable to participate in traditional sentence reduction credit programs. Furthermore, even when prisoners with disabilities were given the opportunity to earn sentence reduction credits through the medical gain time policy, the DOC discriminated against them by providing the opportunity to earn credits at two-thirds the rate available to prisoners without disabilities. On September 19, 2011, Judge Terrence Boyle granted class certification. The class was defined as all present and future prisoners of the DOC with disabilities "who have been, and may in the future be, discriminated against, excluded from participation in, and denied the benefits of the DOC's sentence reduction credit programs by reason of their disabilities." 276 F.R.D. 452. On August 15, 2013, Judge Boyle approved the parties' stipulated consent decree. The agreement mandated that the DOC establish, implement, and modify its policies to provide access to sentence reduction credits to qualified prisoners with disabilities. The plaintiffs' attorneys must have an opportunity to review and comment on the proposed policy changes. Additionally, the DOC must create various new full-time positions, including a position dedicated to monitoring the implementation of the new policies and the consent decree. The DOC was required to pay $56,199.02 to Prisoners Legal Services for expenses associated with the implementation of the consent decree. The requirements of the agreement were set to terminate two years following the date of entry, and the agreement allowed for judicial enforcement. On November 1, 2013, Judge Boyle denied hearing any further action in the case from individuals other than through counsel in the suit. Judge Boyle’s decision did not prohibit individuals from filing separate and distinct suits. This case is now closed.
<|assistant|>
In September 2010, prisoners with physical disabilities within the custody of the North Carolina DOC filed a class action lawsuit against the DOC in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. The plaintiffs alleged that, on account of their disabilities, defendants denied them the benefits of the DOC's sentence reduction credit programs, in violation of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In August 2013, the Court approved the parties' stipulated consent decree, in which the DOC agreed to modify its policies to provide access to sentence reduction credits to qualified prisoners with disabilities and allow a monitor to oversee the implementation of such policies.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On January 20, 2004, Cintas Corporation employees filed a lawsuit against Cintas under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, and the California Unfair Business Practices Act, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented initially by private counsel, asked the Court for declaratory, equitable, and compensatory relief, claiming that Cintas engaged in a pattern or practice of employment discrimination on the basis of race, national origin, and sex. Specifically, the Plaintiffs claimed that Cintas engaged in, among other practices, discriminatory hiring, recruitment, promotion, assignment, transfer, and compensation. On October 29, 2004, the Court (Judge Jeffrey S. White) issued a stipulation and order that defined the scope of the class claims, allowed Plaintiffs to file a third amended complaint, and outlined limited discovery and the schedule for Defendant's motion to compel arbitration. On March 22, 2005, the Court granted Defendant's motion to compel three plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims and stayed the action as to those plaintiffs pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. The Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss to the extent it sought to dismiss those plaintiffs from the action. Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., 2005 WL 658984 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2005). The Court granted the EEOC's motion to intervene on April 26, 2005. Finding that the subject matter was of public importance, that the litigation was still in its early stages, that neither party would be prejudiced, and that neither Plaintiff nor Defendant objected to the EEOC's intervention, the Court ordered the EEOC to file a complaint in intervention within seven days. The EEOC filed its complaint in intervention on April 27, 2005. The complaint asked the Court for equitable relief, back-pay, and punitive damages. On September 20, 2005, after the parties filed a stipulation, the Court issued an order relating Ramirez v. Cintas with Houston v. Cintas (Northern District of California, Docket No. C-05-03145-CRB). The Houston case was also transferred to Judge White. On November 2, 2005, the Court granted Defendant's motion to compel another plaintiff to arbitrate his claims and stayed that action as to that Plaintiffs pending completion of the arbitration proceedings. The Court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss to the extent it sought to dismiss the Plaintiff from the action. Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., 2005 WL 2894628 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2005). On December 8, 2005, based on the parties' joint stipulation, the Court dismissed the class action representatives individual claims with prejudice and removed her as the class representative. The order specified, however, that the former class representative could participate as a member of the certified class if she qualified under the class definition. On January 12, 2006, the Court dismissed another putative class representative's claim claims and individuals claims based on the parties' joint stipulation. The Court found that the individual Plaintiff could not serve as class representative and was not entitled to attorneys' fees and costs. The Court issued a similar order regarding another individual plaintiff on March 9, 2006. On May 11, 2006, the Court ordered that class claims of discrimination against African Americans, Hispanics, and women in hiring for certain positions at Cintas' Rental Division, made pursuant to Title VII and § 1981, were transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. All other claims had been dismissed or stayed pending arbitration. The arbitrator filed an opinion on September 15, 2006. The arbitrator found that the Cintas Employment Agreements permit class-wide arbitration and that there was no limitation to where the class action may be heard. The Court denied Defendant's motion to vacate the arbitration decision on November 22, 2006. The Court found that the arbitrator had not "manifestly disregarded the law" and that the decision was not irrational. Ramirez v. Cintas Corp., 2006 WL 3388628 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 22, 2006). The Court granted Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the putative class action claims without prejudice so that they were able to proceed with their individual claims through arbitration on April 3, 2009. Defendant did not oppose the motion and the case was closed on January 28, 2010.
<|assistant|>
This case was brought by African American and Hispanic employees of Cintas Corporation against Cintas, alleging employment discrimination in hiring, promotion, and pay. The case went into arbitration, and the District Court dismissed all claims on January 28, 2010.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
This case is one of several brought nationwide by States, counties, and nonprofit organizations challenging the Trump administration's revised, final public charge rule, which expands the types of programs that the federal government will consider in public charge determinations to now also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. District court judges from across the countries granted preliminary injunctions enjoining the government from implementing the public charge rule but after multiple Circuit Courts and the Supreme Court issued stays of these injunctions, the public charge rule was implemented by the government on February 24, 2020. On August 21, 2019, the states of New York, Connecticut, and Vermont, along with the city of New York, filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Plaintiff States sued the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), as well as the acting secretaries of both departments in their official capacity, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The Plaintiff States sought relief to declare the Department of Homeland Security’s final public charge rule (the Rule) vacated due to violations of the APA and unconstitutional due to violations of the Equal Protection Clause. The Plaintiff States also sought to preliminarily and permanently enjoin the Rule from being enforced. On August 14, 2019, the DHS published a revised, final public charge rule, which defined personal circumstances that affect the ability of individuals and their families to successfully enter the U.S. or acquire legal permanent resident status (i.e., get a green card). The final rule increased the types of programs that the federal government would consider in public charge determinations to also include previously excluded health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that if an immigration officer finds that a person seeking a visa is likely to become a public charge, that person is “inadmissible.” Thus, under the proposed Rule, an immigrant who uses non-cash benefits such as food stamps or Medicaid, or is deemed likely to receive them in the future, may be found more likely to be a public charge and inadmissible for purposes of a visa or green card application. The Plaintiff States asserted that this Rule would force immigrant families to choose between using these benefits or risk failing to gain permanent resident status. The Plaintiff States further argued that the Rule causes damage to the health and livelihood of immigrant families by deterring them from using these benefits, thereby undermining the sovereign interests of the Plaintiff States and interfering in the policies designed to support the well-being and civil rights of residents. The Plaintiff States contended that the Rule exceeds the Defendant's jurisdiction and authority under the APA; is arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion; and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment. On September 9, 2019, the Plaintiff States filed a motion for preliminary injunction and stay pending judicial review, arguing they are likely to suffer irreparable harm absent preliminary relief, that they were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims made in the complaint, and that preliminary relief is in the public interest. The Rule, unless prohibited, was set to go into effect on October 15, 2019. The Plaintiff States asserted that the Rule should not take effect while the legal action was still pending. On September 27, 2019, the Defendants filed an opposition to the motion. The Defendants contended that the Rule is a "well-reasoned definition of public charge providing practical guidance to Executive Branch officials making public charge inadmissibility determinations" based on foundational principles of United States immigration law. The Defendants also argued that the Plaintiff States and City did not meet their burden of establishing standing, that they did not show an actual or imminent threat of harm as the result of the Rule. Although the Plaintiff States claimed that enforcement of the Rule would cause irreparable harm, the Defendants argued that those claims are not enough to establish standing. The Defendants further argued that the Motion should be dismissed because the Plaintiff States' substantive claims lack merit and because the Plaintiff States are outside the zone of interests regulated by the APA. On October 11, 2019, Judge George Daniels granted the motion for preliminary injunction. First, Judge Daniels found that the Plaintiff States had standing, that their claims were ripe for judicial review, and that they were within the zone of interests regulated by the APA. Then, after analyzing the long-standing definition of the term public charge and whether Congress intended to redefine public charge, Judge Daniels found that the Plaintiff States sufficiently alleged that the Rule exceeds statutory authority and is contrary to law. Judge Daniels also ruled that the Plaintiff States sufficiently demonstrated that the rule is arbitrary and capricious. Judge Daniels found that the Plaintiff States and "law-abiding citizens who have come to this country to seek a better life" will suffer irreparable harm absent a preliminary injunction. Finally, Judge Daniels ordered that the injunction be applied nationwide, in order to unify national immigration policy and in consideration of nearly two dozen other jurisdictions that have had suits brought challenging the Rule. 408 F.Supp.3d 334. On October 30, 2019, the Defendants filed an appeal of the order granting preliminary injunction; the Defendants also sought to stay the preliminary injunction. On December 2, 2019, Judge Daniels denied the Defendants' motion to stay. Judge Daniels reasoned that "to stay the injunction would be inconsistent with this Court's underlying findings of Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, and of the irreparable injury that Plaintiffs, noncitizens, and the general public would suffer in the absence of an effective injunction." 2019 WL 6498250. On January 8, 2020, while the Defendants' appeal was pending, the Second Circuit denied the Defendants' motion for stay pending appeal of the nationwide preliminary injunction. 2020 WL 95815. On January 13, 2020, the Defendants submitted to Justice Ginsburg of the Supreme Court an application for stay of the preliminary injunction while the appeal is pending in the Second Circuit. Justice Ginsburg referred the application to the Supreme Court on January 27, 2020. On January 27, 2020, the Supreme Court of the United States granted the Defendants' application for stay and thus stayed the District Court’s October 11, 2019 orders granting a nationwide preliminary injunction. In granting the Defendants' application, Justice Gorsuch, writing the opinion for the court, addressed the many suits, injunctions, and stays regarding the Rule occurring across the country and concluded that the "routine issuance of universal injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by these conflicting decisions." These nationwide injunctions, Justice Gorsuch reasoned, shared a similar flaw in that "they direct how the defendant must act toward persons who are not parties to the case." Justice Gorsuch also found that these nationwide injunctions encouraged gamesmanship and forum shopping, that if a single district court issued a nationwide injunction, "the government’s hope of implementing any new policy could face the long odds of a straight sweep, parlaying a 94-to-0 win in the district courts into a 12-to-0 victory in the courts of appeal." Thus, in granting the Defendants' application for stay and staying the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court found the occasion to address its concerns with the proliferation of nationwide injunctions. 140 S.Ct. 599. After the Supreme Court ruling, the Defendants stated that the rule would take effect on February 24, 2020. Following the Supreme Court's stay of the preliminary injunction and a Ninth Circuit opinion "concluding that the Rule falls well within the Executive Branch’s discretion to interpret and implement the public charge inadmissibility provision in the INA," the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on February 14, 2020. The Plaintiffs argued that the Defendants were taking "a third bite at the apple" and that because Defendants offered "no new substantive arguments, and this Court has already evaluated and rejected Defendants’ contentions under the more stringent standards governing entry of a preliminary injunction," the motion to dismiss should be denied. On the same day, the Plaintiffs, along with the Plaintiffs in <i>Make the Road New York, et al. v. Kenneth Cuccinelli, et al.,</i> filed a motion to consolidate the two actions for pre-trial purposes. The parties argued that the cases meet the standard for consolidation as they share many common questions of fact and law and also assert the same constitutional violation and cause of action. On March 6, 2020, the Plaintiff States sent a letter to the Defendants urging them "to immediately stop implementation of [the Rule] ... in the wake of the COVID-19 coronavirus." The Plaintiff states asserted that, in the context of a nationwide outbreak of COVID-19, "DHS’s policy of deterring immigrants from using the medical benefits to which they are legally entitled directly undermines and frustrates our public health professionals’ efforts, putting our communities and residents at unnecessary risk." On April 13, 2020, the Plaintiff States filed a motion in the Supreme Court to temporarily lift or modify the Court's stay of the district court's October 11, 2019 and December 6, 2019 orders. The Plaintiffs' asserted that, while state and local authorities had taken "extraordinary efforts to stop the spread of COVID-19 and protect the health and well-being of ... residents," the Rule undermined those efforts by "deterring immigrants from accessing healthcare and public benefits that are essential tools for protecting the public at large . . . ." The Supreme Court denied the motion to temporarily lift or modify the stay on April 24, 2020, but ruled that “[t]his order does not preclude a filing in the District Court as counsel considers appropriate.” Back in the district court, the Plaintiffs filed a second motion for a preliminary injunction and stay or a temporary restraining order on April 28, 2020. The Plaintiffs argued that immigrants would be deterred from seeking public health benefits out of fear of violating the public charge rule, which would exacerbate the national health crisis. These changed facts, the plaintiffs believed, provided the district court the authority to issue an injunction despite the Supreme Court's previous stay. On July 29, 2020, the district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claim that DHS and USCIS lacked the authority to promulgate the Rule, but granted the Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction and enjoined the Defendants from implementing the Rule at any point during the COVID-19 outbreak. 2020 WL 4347264. The Defendants appealed the court’s preliminary injunction order to the Second Circuit on August 3, 2020. On August 12, 2020, the Second Circuit stayed the injunction with respect to all states but the Plaintiff States (Connecticut, New York, and Vermont) until the Second Circuit ruled on the motion to stay. The Second Circuit then stayed the second preliminary injunction altogether on September 11, 2020 while the Second Circuit considered the Defendants’ appeal of the district court’s first preliminary injunction order. 974 F.3d 210. The Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 2, 2020 alleging that DHS and USCIS violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) and the Homeland Security Act (HSA) by implementing the Rule because the Rule was promulgated by an Acting DHS Secretary who was unlawfully serving in his position. As a result, the Plaintiffs argued, DHS’s and USCIS’s implementation of the Rule exceeded the departments’ statutory authority under FVRA and was not in accordance with the law under the APA. On October 7, 2020, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s initial preliminary injunction orders, finding that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims that the Rule is contrary to the INA and arbitrary and capricious. 969 F.3d 42. The Defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court. Following their Second Circuit win, the Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in district court on October 27, 2020, arguing that the Rule was null and void because the Acting DHS Secretary promulgated it while serving in violation of the FVRA and HSA. In response, on November 17, 2020, the Defendants moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims that the Rule was invalid because it was issued by an unlawfully serving Acting DHS Secretary, insisting that the Rule was promulgated pursuant to the APA and ratified by lawful agency officials, including the Acting DHS Secretary. As of December 19, the case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
In August of 2019, three states and the City of New York filed this suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. The Department of Homeland Security's Public Charge Rule, enacted in August of 2019, expanded the number of programs that the federal government would consider when making public charge determinations to include health, nutrition, and housing programs. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Public Charge Rule would result in harm to the Plaintiff States and its residents by deterring legal residents from enrolling in basic benefit programs out of fear of being determined a "public charge" and rendered inadmissible for citizenship. District Court Judge George Daniels granted the Plaintiff States' Motion to Stay Pending Judicial Review and Preliminary Injunction, resulting in the Rule not being implemented as planned. In January 2020, the Supreme Court issued an order staying the district court's nationwide preliminary injunction, and Defendants accordingly implemented the Rule in February 2020. In April 2020, the Supreme Court denied the Plaintiffs' motion to lift the stay of the January 2020 order in light of the ongoing COVID-19 national emergency. The Plaintiffs also filed a motion for preliminary injunction in the district court, asserting that the Rule is hindering efforts to stop the spread of COVID-19 and causing irreparable harm to citizens and non-citizens. On July 29, 2020, the district court granted the Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claim that DHS and USCIS lacked the authority to promulgate the Rule, but granted the Plaintiffs’ second motion for a preliminary injunction. The court then enjoined the Defendants from implementing the Rule at any point during the COVID-19 outbreak. The Defendants appealed to the Second Circuit, which stayed the second preliminary injunction order until it ruled on the first. In the meantime, the Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on October 2, 2020 alleging that DHS and USCIS violated the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA) and the Homeland Security Act (HSA) by implementing the Rule because the Rule was promulgated by an Acting DHS Secretary who was unlawfully serving in his position. On October 7, 2020, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction orders, finding that the Plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The Defendants petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court, where the matter was pending as of December 19, 2020. The Plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment in district court on October 27, 2020, arguing that the Rule was null and void because the Acting DHS Secretary promulgated it while serving in violation of the FVRA and HSA. The Defendants opposed the Plaintiffs' motion and moved to dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims that the rule was promulgated improperly. The court has yet to rule on these motions as of December 19, 2020. This case is ongoing.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On May 17, 2000 the City of Chicago adopted an ordinance that required all police officers and firefighters over the age of 63 to be involuntarily retired at the end of the year. Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Chicago on February 6, 2001 after he was forced to retire from the police force. He alleged a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). This act makes it unlawful to discharge a person because of his or her age but contains a public safety exception for police officers and firefighters so long as the forced retirement is not a subterfuge. Plaintiff also alleged due process violations under the United States and Illinois Constitutions. The case was consolidated with Minch v. City of Chicago, a case brought by firefighters with the same complaints. On April 9, 2001 Chicago filed a motion to dismiss. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois (Judge Elaine E. Bucklo) granted defendant's motion to dismiss in regards to the due process claims of the police plaintiffs but denied it in regards to all other claims on March 25, 2002. Chicago then filed a motion to certify an interlocutory appeal to the Seventh Circuit which was granted on May 5, 2002. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner, Judge Manion, and Judge Rovener) ruled on April 9, 2004 that it was possible for a plaintiff to prevail in a case of this sort but that in this particular case it was not. The Court remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss the ADEA claims. On May 13, 2004 the district court (Judge Samuel Der−Yeghiayan) did so. The cases were completely dismissed on January 26, 2005 after the firefights elected not to continue with their due process claims.
<|assistant|>
Plaintiff filed suit against the City of Chicago on February 6, 2001 after he was forced to retire from the police force. He alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and his due process rights. The case was consolidated with a case brought by firefighters with the same complaints. On March 25, 2002 the due process claims of the police plaintiffs were dismissed. Defendant appealed to the Seventh Circuit which directed on April 9, 2004 that the ADEA complaints be dismissed. The case was completely dismissed on January 26, 2005 when the firefighters elected not to continue with their due process claims.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On February 4, 2020, three Michigan residents whose vehicles were seized and impounded by police filed this putative class action lawsuit against Wayne County in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs, represented by the public interest organization Institute for Justice and private counsel, sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983; they contended that Wayne County's vehicle seizure policies and practices are unconstitutional. They sought declaratory, injunctive, and compensatory relief for violations of the 4th Amendment, the excessive fines clause of the 8th Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The complaint alleged that Wayne County's policies create incentives for "the seizure of property without probable cause" and are designed to "maximize revenue" rather than fight crime. Wayne County allegedly seized and impounded cars "based simply on their proximity to crimes" committed by someone other than the driver. Once confiscated, plaintiffs were allegedly forced to pay "arbitrary fees" or go through a lengthy nuisance-abatement proceeding without the opportunity to assert an "innocent owners" defense. For the named plaintiff, her car was allegedly impounded because her boyfriend was suspected of engaging in prostitution-related activities. She alleged that her car was impounded twice merely because it was in proximity to prostitution and drug-related activities, and that she was ultimately forced to pay a flat redemption fee to reclaim her vehicle, without an opportunity to assert that she was not present or involved in the alleged activity that prompted the seizure. This process ultimately forced her to file for bankruptcy and lose her car. The plaintiffs seek to certify a class of "persons who own a vehicle (or other property within a vehicle) that has been or will be seized by Defendant Wayne County on or after February 5, 2018 and before the date of class certification, whether pursuant to Michigan’s Controlled Substances Act (MCL 333.7521, et seq.), the Public Nuisances chapter of the Revised Judicature Act of 1961 (MCL 600.3801, et seq.), or the so-called Omnibus Forfeiture Act (MCL 600.4701, et seq.)," as well as a subclass of individuals who had their vehicles so seized when they were not present or present but not suspected of any wrongdoing. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint on March 12, 2020. They argued that the named plaintiff lacked standing and suffered no constitutional violation because she waived any challenge to the seizure of her property. Further, they contended that there was probable cause - the car was suspected of being connected to prostitution-related activities - to seize her vehicle, and that therefore she had no legal claim. On May 1, 2020, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to specify that the police did not have probable cause to suspect any prostitution-related activities. Additionally, the amended complaint added an new plaintiff to the lawsuit and greater detail about Wayne County's alleged unconstitutional processes and their impact on the defendants. As of May 31, 2020, the case is ongoing with Judge Arthur J. Tarnow presiding.
<|assistant|>
In 2020, Michigan residents whose cars were seized and impounded filed this putative class action against Wayne County in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan. The plaintiffs alleged that Wayne County's policy of seizing and impounding vehicles and asset forfeiture process violated their 4th, 8th, and 14th amendment rights. As of May 31, 2020, the case is ongoing with Judge Arthur Tanow presiding.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 23, 2004, plaintiffs filed this class action complaint against the Monsanto Co. Pension Plan in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Illinois. The complaint alleged violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in regards to age discrimination. The alleged violations stemmed from Monsanto's conversion on January 1, 1997, of its pension plan from a conventional defined benefit plan to a cash balance plan. As the case proceeded other cases were consolidated and various additional plaintiffs who had similar complaints and defendants with the same pension plan were joined. On September 4, 2006, plaintiffs filed their final amended consolidated class action complaint. It contained ten counts that constituted three general allegations: that the pension plans violated ERISA by ceasing or reducing the rate an employee's benefits accrued on account of age, that the plans violated ERISA by back-loading the rate at which benefits accrued for older workers, and that the payment of interest on late benefit payments was below the rate specified in one of the plans. On August 29, 2007, the district court (Judge Phil Gilbert) denied various motions to dismiss. On September 13, 2007, the court dismissed three counts of the complaint relating to the reduction of the rate at which benefits accrued with prejudice on the basis of a recently decided case in the Seventh Circuit. Class action status was certified on May 22, 2008. The district court (Judge Phil Gilbert) issued two opinions on June 11, 2009, concerning the competing motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs on the claim that one plan failed to pay adequate interest on delayed pension payments. But the court granted defendants summary judgment on the counts relating to the back-loading of the rate at which benefits accrued. On October 27, 2009, plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and on September 22, 2010, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court. On September 30, 2014, the district court ordered the exhibits to be destroyed or disposed of, and the case closed.
<|assistant|>
On June 23, 2004 plaintiffs filed a class action complaint against the Monsanto Co. Pension Plan in the District Court for the Southern District of Illinois alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) in regards to age discrimination. On August 29, 2007 the district court (Judge Phil Gilbert) denied various motions to dismiss. On September 13, 2007 the court dismissed part of the complaint. On June 11, 2009 the district court summary judgment to the plaintiffs on one remaining claim and to defendants on all others. On October 27, 2009 plaintiffs appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and on July 30, 2010 the decision of the district court was affirmed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On June 17, 2015, death row prisoners at California's San Quentin prison, who had been kept in prolonged solitary confinement, filed this class-action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs, represented by private counsel, sued the State of California, the San Quentin State Prison, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming violations of their Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed that they were confined under inhumane and degrading conditions for excessively long periods, from three to twenty-six years, without meaningful review of their placement or hope of release. The plaintiffs claimed that they were deprived of basic human needs, suffered serious psychological and physical injury, had been coerced into providing information, and were subject to disproportionate punishment. Further, the plaintiffs claimed that they were placed in solitary confinement on the basis of allegations of gang affiliation without reliable evidence, even though they were not involved in any current gang activity. On August 17, 2015, this case was reassigned to Judge Claudia Wilkens, who had also been assigned to a similar case, <a href="http://www.clearinghouse.net/detail.php?id=12103">Ashker v. Brown.</a> On September 8, 2015, the case was referred to Magistrate Judge Nandor J. Vadas for settlement and a settlement conference was set for October 28, 2015. As of May, 14, 2016, settlement negotiations were ongoing, and both parties continued to submit status reports. On October 10, 2016, there was a settlement conference before Judge Vadas but the matter was not settled. Another settlement conference was scheduled for January 3, 2017, and it was rescheduled for February 15, 2017. On January 17, 2017, the defendants moved to dismiss the case. On February 15, 2017, the defendants and five of the six plaintiffs entered into a full settlement of the case. Under the settlement, the parties agreed to stay the litigation and suspend all activity until July 18, 2017. The litigation was to remain stayed for an additional ninety days, during which time the plaintiffs could move to have the stay lifted by showing current, ongoing, and systemic constitutional violations continued to exist as alleged in the plaintiffs' complaint. If the plaintiffs did not file such a motion by October 17, 2017, the parties agreed that the case would be voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. One plaintiff did not sign the settlement agreement, and because of this, the plaintiffs argued that the settlement agreement was invalid. The parties continued to negotiate and the plaintiffs presented the defendants with a proposed settlement agreement that was signed by all six plaintiffs. The defendants requested further time to negotiate. On July 24, 2017, the parties requested to stay the litigation once again. On August 21, 2017, Judge Wilken denied the defendants' motion to dismiss in light of the parties' ongoing efforts to settle the case. On October 3, 2017, the parties were still negotiating and declared that they would update the court on their progress towards settlement on October 10, 2017. On October 10, 2017, the parties were still negotiating. On November 9, 2017, the parties requested that the matter be voluntarily dismissed with prejudice, and Judge Wilken granted this order. On January 10, 2018, there was a motion to intervene filed and on January 26, 2018, there was a motion for relief from judgment. Both motions were filed by the same individual, and both motions were denied by Judge Wilken on September 5, 2018.
<|assistant|>
In 2015 death row prisoners at San Quentin prison, who have been kept in solitary confinement for years without meaningful review, filed this lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The plaintiffs sued the State of California, the San Quentin State Prison, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The case was voluntarily dismissed.
<|endoftext|>
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
Petitioners in this class action/habeas petition are Iraqi nationals—many, perhaps most, Chaldean Christian—who have resided in the United States for many years. They have been subject to final orders of removal for years, but the U.S. government permitted them to reside in the community under orders of supervision. In early 2017, political negotiation by the Trump administration with Iraq (related to Iraq's desire to be taken off the Trump Executive Order travel-ban list) led to Iraq’s agreement to accept at least some repatriations, and so the government arrested about two hundred individuals starting June 11, 2017. They faced imminent removal to Iraq. On June 15, 2017, the petitioners brought this class action habeas petition in response. Represented by the ACLU of Michigan, the ACLU National Immigrant Rights Project, and other counsel, they alleged that their removal into dangerous circumstances would violate the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), and that removing them without giving them a chance to assert their defenses under the INA and CAT would violate the Due Process Clause. The case was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and was assigned to Judge Mark Goldsmith. The same day as they initiated the action, petitioners sought a temporary restraining order or stay of removal, ensuring that they would not be deported before the court had a chance to adjudicate the case. The government filed its opposition, and the motion was heard on June 21, 2017. The next day, the District Court granted a 14-day emergency stay of removal pending fuller consideration and decision on the court's authority over the matter. The stay was set for 14 days preliminarily. On June 24, 2017, the petitioners filed a complaint and amended habeas petition, along with a motion to expand the June 22nd 14-day Order Staying Removal to cover a nationwide class of Iraqi nationals facing imminent removal to Iraq. On June 26, the Court granted that the motion, staying removal of "all Iraqi nationals in the United States with final orders of removal, who have been, or will be, arrested and detained by ICE as a result of Iraq’s recent decision to issue travel documents to facilitate U.S. removal." 2017 WL 2806144 (E.D. Mich. 2017). The stay was effective for 14 days, until July 10. On June 29, 2017, the petitioners/plaintiffs (the petitioners became plaintiffs when they filed the complaint in addition to the habeas petition) filed a motion to extend the 14-day stay of removal until resolution of the preliminary injunction they said they'd file on July 14; they also sought discovery of basic information about the putative class. The government opposed both motions. On July 6, Judge Goldsmith extended the 14 day stay until July 24; on July 22, he ruled that he had jurisdiction, and confirmed that the stay would remain in effect. He wrote: <blockquote>"This Court concludes that to enforce the Congressional mandate that district courts lack jurisdiction — despite the compelling context of this case — would expose Petitioners to the substantiated risk of death, torture, or other grave persecution before their legal claims can be tested in a court. That would effectively suspend the writ of habeas corpus, which the Constitution prohibits."</blockquote> At a subsequent status conference, the Court set a briefing schedule; the petitioners' preliminary relief brief was due July 17, the government's response July 20, and any reply by July 21 in the morning. The court undertook to rule on that motion by July 24. On July 24, 2017, the District Court granted the petitioners' requested preliminary relief, staying the enforcement of final orders of removal directed to any and all Iraqi nationals in the United States who had final orders of removal on June 24, 2017, and who have been, or will be, detained for removal by ICE. 261 F.Supp.3d 820 (E.D. Mich. 2017). The court explained that the stay of removal would last for each particular class member until he or she completed adjudication of a motion to reopen through the immigration court and the Board of Immigration Appeals, and (if he or she lost in the immigration courts) until the U.S. Court of Appeals denied an individual stay of removal. The motions to reopen are due, the court said, within 90 days of when the government provides each class member with his or her immigration file. (If a class member fails to file a motion to reopen, or fails to appeal, the stay of removal will expire, as well.) On September 22, 2017, the government appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. While the appeal on the July preliminary injunction was proceeding, various administrative matters moved forward: immigration files were delivered, etc. More substantively, the plaintiffs amended the complaint on October 13, 2017, raising claims that the class's prolonged detention violated the Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act. On November 1, the government moved to dismiss. On November 7, plaintiffs sought a second preliminary injunction on the new detention claims (and also filed an amended motion for class certification). After a hearing on December 22, Judge Goldsmith ruled in favor of the plaintiffs on January 2, 2018; he held that any detainee who had spent more than 6 months in detention -- nearly all of them -- was entitled to release 30 days later unless an Immigration Judge found by clear and convincing evidence at a bond hearing that that detainee poses a flight risk or public safety risk. 285 F.Supp.3d 997 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The government appealed, and the Sixth Circuit consolidated that second appeal with the prior one, which had not yet been argued. Consolidated argument was held April 25, 2018. The matter continued in the district court, with many small issues contested and decided. Among those decisions: The court decided that the regulatory process for governmental immigration bond appeals was unlawful, because it allowed the government to unilaterally extend prolonged detention, and because the process by which the government could obtain a stay of bond release was standardless and deprived the detainee of the opportunity to be heard timely. On June 13, 2018, the plaintiffs filed an emergency motion, seeking to remedy alleged coercion by the government, which was trying to obtain detainees "voluntary" agreement to be deported. On June 20, 2018, the court issued an order requiring, among other things, seven day notice to class counsel of any consular interviews, that the government permit and facilitate communication between the class and class counsel, and that the government cease any threatening or coercive communications with class members. However, class counsel argued that the government was failing to comply, in part by failing to provide detainees with notice of their right to communicate with class counsel at a specific staging facility. The petitioners also argued that class members were suffering mistreatment at the Calhoun County Jail as a result of their involvement in this case. On August 22, 2018, Judge Goldsmith agreed that the government was not obligated to provide this notice at temporary staging facilities under his previous order, but found the petitioners claims of mistreatment substantiated. He ordered the government to provide class counsel with the names of detainees at the Calhoun County Jail who had faced administrative or disciplinary sanction. Judge Goldsmith denied the government’s motion to dismiss on September 24, 2018, at the same time granting the petitioners’ motion to certify the primary class. 342 F.Supp.3d 751 (E.D. Mich. 2018). The petitioners moved for a third preliminary injunction on November 1, 2018, arguing that the subclass of detainees who had been held longer than six months were entitled to immediate release from detention because there was not a significant likelihood of their removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Petitioners argued that under <i>Zadvydas v. Davis</i>, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), in the absence of such a likelihood, prolonged detention was unlawful. On November 20, 2018, Judge Goldsmith granted that injunction, ruling to release all detainees who had been held longer than six months under orders of supervision. 349 F.Supp.3d 665 (E.D. Mich 2018). The releases were to take place no later than December 20, 2018. All but a handful of the detainees were released by that date. On January 18, 2019, the government appealed. Also on December 20, 2018, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision in the consolidated appeals from the first two preliminary injunctions. 912 F.3d 869 (6th Cir. 2018). Writing for the court, Judge Alice Batchelder vacated the District Court’s preliminary injunctions halting removal and ordering bond hearings. The case was ordered remanded with instructions to dismiss the removal-based claims for lack of jurisdiction. On February 4, 2019, the petitioners filed for en banc rehearing of the decision, arguing that the INA did not strip the court of jurisdiction, and that such a broad reading would create a circuit split as well as intra-circuit conflict. The petition for rehearing delayed the effective date of the Court of Appeals order until it was denied; the order then became effective on April 9, 2019. That meant that as of April 9, 2019, the stay of removal was lifted. However, the vacatur of the bond order did not mean that anyone got redetained, because those released on bond were protected by the third preliminary injunction, the release order. The third appeal was still pending, and back in District Court, Judge Goldsmith issued an order on March 12, 2019, staying the case pending resolution of that third appeal. Although Judge Goldsmith stayed future substantive proceedings at the district level, he ruled that the court would continue to supervise compliance with non-reversed court orders. So the release order remained in effect. However, Judge Goldsmith set up a process by which the government could seek to redetain individuals whom ICE believed were close to removal; for several of these individuals, the Court granted redetention. It seemed that Iraq had begun to allow a few removals of class members. In fact, one such class member <a href="https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/31/us/jimmy-aldaoud-iraq-deport.html"> died</a> in Iraq shortly after his repatriation there. On August 30, 2019, the plaintiffs/petitioners sought certiorari review of the Sixth Circuit's stay ruling. On January 3, 2020, the Sixth Circuit issued its decision with regard to the third preliminary injunction, which required the government to release all primary subclass members once the government has detained them for six months. Judge Jeffery Sutton delivered the opinion, in which the court vacated the injunction and remanded for further proceedings. The appeals court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter this class-wide injunction and that it was inappropriate to extend Zadvyas to this setting. Similar to the reasoning in the appeals court's last opinion, the district court lacked jurisdiction because the INA stripped all courts, save for the Supreme Court, of "jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the operation of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1221–1232." The appeals court reasoned that <i>Zadvyas</i> should not be extended because in that case aliens were detained under one provision while in this case, the government has detained class members under four provisions. Because the provisions in each case differed, the appeals court reasoned that the district court should not have extended the <i>Zadvyas</i> standard onto the different provisions. The plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on February 16, 2020. On February 16, 2020, Judge Goldsmith issued an order administratively closing the case pending resolution of appellate matters. Judge Goldsmith concluded that administratively closing the case was appropriate because the Sixth Circuit had yet to issue an operative ruling and that such a ruling would eventually impact further proceedings. While the case was administratively closed for the time being, the district court would continue to supervise and maintain the status quo of the third preliminary injunction until the Sixth Circuit issued a mandate. As of March 16, 2020, the first preliminary injunction (the stay of removal) was vacated, but the matter remained pending on a petition for Supreme Court review. Both the second and third preliminary injunctions were vacated and remanded for further proceedings. On July 2, 2020, the Supreme Court denied the the petition for writ of certiorari. On November 25, 2020, one of the plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the district court, which was denied on December 23. The plaintiff filed a letter on December 24, 2020, which the court treated this letter as a motion for reconsideration of the denial. On January 25, 2021, the court denied to reconsider it because they did not find that there was a palpable defect in the original denial. On March 3, the parties filed a joint memorandum requesting an adjournment of a status conference in light of the Department of Homeland Security's plans to publish new enforcement guidelines by May 19, 2021. On March 4, the court granted the request. The case is ongoing.
<|assistant|>
Petitioners in this class action/habeas petition are Iraqi nationals—many, perhaps most, Chaldean Christian—who have resided in the United States for many years. They have been subject to final orders of removal for years, but the U.S. government permitted them to reside in the community under orders of supervision. In early 2017, political negotiation by the Trump administration with Iraq (related to Iraq's desire to be taken off the Trump Executive Order travel-ban list) led to Iraq’s agreement to accept at least some repatriations, and so the government arrested about two hundred individuals starting June 11, 2017. On June 15, 2017, the petitioners brought this class action habeas petition in response. petitioners sought a temporary restraining order or stay of removal, ensuring that they would not be deported before the court had a chance to adjudicate the case. The district court stayed petitioners' removal, but that injunction was vacated by the Sixth Circuit. Petitioners petitioned for Supreme Court review, which was denied on July 2, 2020. The case is ongoing and the Department of Homeland Security plans to publish new enforcement guidelines by May 19, 2021.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On April 23, 2015, a group of inmates in the Pennsylvania correctional facilities filed this class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link Corporation ("GTL") under the Federal Communications Act (the "FCA"), 47 U.S.C. §§201,206,207 and 276, and Pennsylvania law. They alleged that GTL participated in unjust, unreasonable, unfair and deceptive conduct from January 1, 2000 through the present (the "Class Period") by charging exorbitant rates and fees - up to 100 times normal market rates for intrastate telephone calls to and from inmates pursuant to exclusive contracts with correctional facilities throughout the United States. GTL and its subsidiaries serve over 2,200 correctional facilities and 1.1 million inmates in forty-eight states. The plaintiffs sought certification of this action as a class action and declaratory and monetary relief. The plaintiffs alleged that GTL created a monopoly through exclusive contracts with thousands of correctional facilities, and therefore faces little or no market competition to challenge its intrastate telephone rates. Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that in return for this monopoly power, GTL provided kickbacks to the contracting facilities. Reports have estimated that the kickbacks paid to correctional facilities exceed $124 million per year. During rule-making proceedings, the Federal Communications Commission (the "FCC") looked at whether intrastate charges were unreasonably high, unfair, and far in excess of the cost of providing service. The FCC concluded that they were, and that GTL had exploited their economic position by charging rates for intrastate calls greatly exceeding the cost of providing service, in direct violation of Sections 201 and 276 of the FCA that those rates be just, reasonable, and fair. On October 23, 2015, Plaintiffs' filed a motion to transfer the proceedings to the Western District of Arkansas to join a related pending cases against GTL. That motion was granted on May 31, 2016. Once transferred, the case was consolidated with <i>Chruby et al. v. Global Tel*Link Corporation</i> by Judge Timothy L. Brooks. Once consolidated, the Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was considered and denied by Judge Brooks, citing aspects of the cases brought that required overwhelmingly claimant-specific factual analysis. Plaintiffs' filed an appeal on this question to the US Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on October 12, 2017, and the petition was denied and October 27, 2018. The case was dismissed with prejudice on August 27, 2018.
<|assistant|>
In 2015, inmates in the Pennsylvania correctional facilities filed this class action lawsuit in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The plaintiffs sued Global Tel*Link Corporation ("GTL") under the Federal Communications Act. They alleged that GTL charged exorbitant rates and fees for intrastate telephone calls to and from inmates pursuant to exclusive contracts with correctional facilities. Following consolidation with related cases in the Western District of Arkansas, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification was denied, as was their petition to appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. The case was dismissed with prejudice in 2018.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On March 18, 1997, a federal inmate in state custody in Texas filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The plaintiff, represented by private counsel, asked the court for declaratory relief, injunctive relief and monetary damages, claiming that the defendants had exhibited a deliberative indifference to his medical condition and as such had violated his constitutional and statutory rights. Specifically, the Plaintiff claimed that when he entered the custody of the Defendants his initial medical screening health questionnaire was incorrectly completed in violation of policy. The Plaintiff asserted that as a result of the indifferent administration of the initial medical screening health questionnaire, he was incorrectly classified as not disabled which prevented him from receiving the accommodations he required. Plaintiff in fact has epilepsy, major depression, and a number of other disabling disorders. The Plaintiff was subsequently housed in the administrative segregation section, rather than in the hospital ward as he claimed was required by his medical condition. The Plaintiff contends that this initial misclassification upon entry into custody lead to 17 months of being housed in an incorrect unit without access to the proper accommodations he was entitled to as a disabled person. The Plaintiff claimed that the lack of proper accommodations led to excessive seizures and mental anguish. Furthermore, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants had been deliberately indifferent to his medical condition and failed to adequately treat the Plaintiff's chronic kidney disorder for 17 months, which had serious implications for his health in violation of the equal protection clause and the due process clause. Additionally, the Plaintiff claimed that the Defendants had breached their duty owed to the Plaintiff as a disabled person by compelling him to wear leg irons, despite their use having been restricted because of his orthopedic disability. Furthermore, the Plaintiff claimed that the defendants had failed to provide him with appropriate medical care to control his diabetes, which led to a partial loss of his vision. The Plaintiff further contended that as a result of his inadequate medical care and incorrect classification, he stood trial for a federal crime in a diminished mental and debilitative state in violation of his 5th, 6th, 8th and 14th Amendment rights. On motion for summary judgment, the District Court first found that Congress did not intend for the Americans with Disabilities Act to apply to the treatment of prisoners within state prisons. Furthermore, the District Court found that the Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the Plaintiff's ADA claim. Pursuant to the 11th Amendment, the District Court dismissed all of the Plaintiff's claims for damages against Defendants in their official capacities. On the Plaintiff's deprivation of medical care claims, the court held that o amount a constitutional deprivation of medical care, the acts or omissions must be "sufficiently serious to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Negligent failure to supply medical care does not amount to a constitutional deprivation. Consequently, as to the Plaintiff's §1983 claims, the District Court held that Hall was not denied medical care and consistently received medical care throughout his incarceration, therefore even taken as true, the Defendant's acts and omissions did not amount to a constitutional deprivation of medical care. Therefore, the Plaintiff's §1983 claims were dismissed by the District Court. In the end, the District Court granted all of the summary judgment motions before it, and dismissed a number of claims for failure to state a claim. On appeal to the 5th Circuit Court of Appeals, the Plaintiff argued that the District Court incorrectly granted the motions for summary judgment and the dismissals for failure to state a claim. On October 26, 1999, the 5th Circuit affirmed the District Court's orders but also held that the District Court had erred in holding that the ADA does not apply to prisoners incarcerated in state prisons. Nevertheless, though it held that the ADA applies to the Plaintiff while incarcerated in the County Jail, the 5th Circuit upheld the District Court's decision on grounds of qualified immunity because the Plaintiff failed to show that the Defendants had shown a deliberate indifference to his serious medical need.
<|assistant|>
In this prison conditions case, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to prisons. The Court upheld the District Court's denial of plaintiff's claim on qualified immunity grounds.
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<|system|>
You are a helpful assistant that summarizes text clearly, accurately, and concisely.
<|user|>
Summarize the following text:
On November 15, 2015, the plaintiff, a prisoner and former prisoner observation aid (POA) at the Women’s Huron Valley Correctional Facility (Huron Valley), filed a claim against the warden of Huron Valley, as well as a corrections officer and another staff member at Huron Valley in the U.S. District Court of Eastern Michigan. The claim was filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Michigan Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. The case was presided over by Judge Sean F. Cox. The plaintiff, represented by the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan and private counsel, sought injunctive relief, attorney’s fees, monetary damages, and for the plaintiff to be reinstated as a POA at Huron Valley. The plaintiff claimed that the defendants fired her from her position as a POA in retaliation for reporting misconduct against two mentally ill prisoners to external professional advocates and organizations when her internal reports went unanswered and unresolved. Specifically, the plaintiff witnessed and reported the following: a mentally ill prisoner being “hog-tied” naked and left for an extended period of time screaming in pain, as well as another mentally ill prisoner whose water was intentionally cut off from her cell for multiple days and who later went into cardiac arrest after foaming at the mouth and vomiting from severe dehydration. In both instances, the plaintiff made repeated reports to appropriate officers and staff at Huron Valley, but these reports were ignored. On June 1, 2018, the defendant's motioned for summary judgement. The motion was granted in part and denied in part on March 27, 2019. The court granted the summary judgement in favor of the defendant on the plaintiff's Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) claims, as well as her First Amendment retaliation claim as it pertained to monetary damages. The summary judgement was also denied in part in favor of the plaintiff with regard to the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims against the defendants in their official capacity. The case was dismissed on July 26, 2019 after a settlement agreement was reached between the two parties. Through the settlement agreement, the plaintiff was awarded $6,000 in damages, the option to resume her position as a POA at Huron Valley, and the removal of any records of notations regarding the plaintiff’s initial termination. In addition to the relief awarded directly to the plaintiff, the defendants agreed to instate a new policy allowing POA’s to report misconduct to outside organizations if internal reports are ignored, a training for POA’s on this new policy, and a mandatory annual training given to prison officers and staff regarding prisoners with mental illness. Lastly, defendants agreed to pay $60,000 in attorney's fees.
<|assistant|>
A former prison observation aid witnessed and reported two instances of gross misconduct by prison staff against mentally ill inmates to appropriate supervisors but plaintiff's reports went unanswered. After reporting the misconduct to external organizations and advocates, the plaintiff was fired in retaliation. The case was dismissed after a settlement agreement between the parties; plaintiff was awarded relief and reform was made to the prison's policies.
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