Datasets:
HHazard
/
continuous-learning

Dataset card Data Studio Files
xet
Community
1
text
stringlengths
13
991
Cleveland and McGill's experiments to elucidate the graphical elements humans "detect" most accurately is a fundamental component of good statistical graphics design principles. In practical terms, graphs displaying relative position on a common scale most accurately are most effective. A graph type that utilizes this element is the dot plot. Conversely, angles are perceived with less accuracy; an example is the pie chart. Humans do not naturally order color hues. Only a limited number of hues can be discriminated in one graphic.
Graphic designs that utilize visual pre-attentive processing in the graph design's "assembly" is why a picture can be worth a thousand words by using the brain's ability to perceive patterns. Not all graphs are designed to consider pre-attentive processing. For example in the attached figure, a graphic design feature, table look-up, requires the brain to work harder and take longer to decode than if the graph utilizes our ability to discern patterns.
Graphic design that readily answers the scientific questions of interest will include appropriate "estimation". Details for choosing the appropriate graph type for continuous and categorical data and for grouping have been described. Graphics principles for accuracy, clarity and transparency have been detailed and key elements summarized.
Compartmentalization is a subconscious psychological defense mechanism used to avoid cognitive dissonance, or the mental discomfort and anxiety caused by a person having conflicting values, cognitions, emotions, beliefs, etc. within themselves.
Compartmentalization allows these conflicting ideas to co-exist by inhibiting direct or explicit acknowledgement and interaction between separate compartmentalized self-states.
Psychoanalysis considers that whereas isolation separates thoughts from feeling, compartmentalization separates different (incompatible) cognitions from each other. As a secondary, intellectual defense, it may be linked to rationalization. It is also related to the phenomenon of neurotic typing, whereby everything must be classified into mutually exclusive and watertight categories.
Otto Kernberg has used the term "bridging interventions" for the therapist's attempts to straddle and contain contradictory and compartmentalized components of the patient's mind.
Compartmentalization may lead to hidden vulnerabilities in those who use it as a major defense mechanism.
Those suffering from borderline personality disorder will often divide people into all good versus all bad, to avoid the conflicts removing the compartments would inevitably bring, using denial or indifference to protect against any indications of contradictory evidence.
Using indifference towards a better viewpoint is a normal and common example of this. It can be caused by someone having used multiple compartment ideals and having been uncomfortable with modifying them, at risk of being found incorrect. This often causes double-standards, and bias.
Conflicting social identities may be dealt with by compartmentalizing them and dealing with each only in a context-dependent way.
In his novel, "The Human Factor", Graham Greene has one of his corrupt officials use the rectangular boxes of Ben Nicholson's art as a guide to avoiding moral responsibility for bureaucratic decision-making—a way to compartmentalize oneself within one's own separately colored box.
Doris Lessing considered that the essential theme of "The Golden Notebook" was "that we must not divide things off, must not compartmentalise. 'Bound. Free. Good. Bad. Yes. No. Capitalism. Socialism. Sex. Love...'".
The psychology of programming (PoP) is the field of research that deals with the psychological aspects of writing programs (often computer programs). The field has also been called the empirical studies of programming (ESP). It covers research into computer programmers' cognition, tools and methods for programming-related activities, and programming education.
Psychologically, computer programming is a human activity which involves cognitions such as reading and writing computer language, learning, problem solving, and reasoning.
It is desirable to achieve a programming performance such that creating a program meets its specifications, is on schedule, is adaptable for the future and runs efficiently. Being able to satisfy all these goals at a low cost is a difficult and common problem in software engineering and project management. By understanding the psychological aspects of computer programming, we can better understand how to achieve a higher programming performance, and to assist programmers to produce better software with less error.
Some methods which one can use to study the psychological aspects of computer programming include introspection, observation, experiment, and qualitative research.
Models of consciousness are used to illustrate and aid in understanding and explaining distinctive aspects of consciousness. Sometimes the models are labeled theories of consciousness. Anil Seth defines such models as those that relate brain phenomena such as fast irregular electrical activity and widespread brain activation to properties of consciousness such as qualia. Seth allows for different types of models including mathematical, logical, verbal and conceptual models.
The Neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) formalism is used as a major step towards explaining consciousness. The NCC are defined to constitute the minimal set of neuronal events and mechanisms sufficient for a specific conscious percept, and consequently sufficient for consciousness. In this formalism, consciousness is viewed as a state-dependent property of some undefined complex, adaptive, and highly interconnected biological system.
Timothy Leary introduced and Robert Anton Wilson and Antero Alli elaborated the Eight-circuit model of consciousness as hypothesis that "suggested eight periods [circuits] and twenty-four stages of neurological evolution".
Daniel Dennett proposed a physicalist, information processing based multiple drafts model of consciousness described more fully in his 1991 book, Consciousness Explained.
The Dehaene–Changeux model (DCM), also known as the global neuronal workspace or the global cognitive workspace model is a computer model of the neural correlates of consciousness programmed as a neural network. Stanislas Dehaene and Jean-Pierre Changeux introduced this model in 1986. It is associated with Bernard Baars's Global workspace theory for consciousness.
Clouding of consciousness, also known as brain fog or mental fog, is a term used in medicine denoting an abnormality in the regulation of the overall level of consciousness that is mild and less severe than a delirium. It is part of an overall model where there's regulation of the "overall level" of the consciousness of the brain and aspects responsible for "arousal" or "wakefulness" and awareness of oneself and of the environment.
Electromagnetic theories of consciousness propose that consciousness can be understood as an electromagnetic phenomenon that occurs when a brain produces an electromagnetic field with specific characteristics. Some electromagnetic theories are also quantum mind theories of consciousness; examples include quantum brain dynamics (QBD).
Orchestrated objective reduction (Orch-OR) model is based on the hypothesis that consciousness in the brain originates from quantum processes inside neurons, rather than from connections between neurons (the conventional view). The mechanism is held to be associated with molecular structures called microtubules. The hypothesis was advanced by Roger Penrose and Stuart Hameroff and has been the subject of extensive debate,
Min proposed in a 2010 paper a Thalamic reticular networking model of consciousness. The model suggests consciousness as a "mental state embodied through TRN-modulated synchronization of thalamocortical networks". In this model the thalamic reticular nucleus (TRN) is suggested as ideally suited for controlling the entire cerebral network, and responsible (via GABAergic networking) for synchronization of neural activity.
Functionalism is a view in the theory of the mind. It states that mental states (beliefs, desires, being in pain, etc.) are constituted solely by their functional role – that is, they have causal relations to other mental states, numerous sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs.
Sociology of human consciousness uses the theories and methodology of sociology to explain human consciousness. The theory and its models emphasize the importance of language, collective representations, self-conceptions, and self-reflectivity. It argues that the shape and feel of human consciousness is heavily social.
Levels of Consciousness are a complete overview of the evolution of Human Consciousness and possible life experiences.
The model of hierarchical complexity (MHC) is a framework for scoring how complex a behavior is, such as verbal reasoning or other cognitive tasks. It quantifies the order of hierarchical complexity of a task based on mathematical principles of how the information is organized, in terms of information science. This model was developed by Michael Commons and Francis Richards in the early 1980s.
The model of hierarchical complexity (MHC) is a formal theory and a mathematical psychology framework for scoring how complex a behavior is. Developed by Michael Lamport Commons and colleagues, it quantifies the order of hierarchical complexity of a task based on mathematical principles of how the information is organized, in terms of information science. Its forerunner was the general stage model.
Behaviors that may be scored include those of individual humans or their social groupings (e.g., organizations, governments, societies), animals, or machines. It enables scoring the hierarchical complexity of task accomplishment in any domain. It is based on the very simple notions that higher order task actions:
It is cross-culturally and cross-species valid. The reason it applies cross-culturally is that the scoring is based on the mathematical complexity of the hierarchical organization of information. Scoring does not depend upon the content of the information (e.g., what is done, said, written, or analyzed) but upon how the information is organized.
The MHC is a non-mentalistic model of developmental stages. It specifies 16 orders of hierarchical complexity and their corresponding stages. It is different from previous proposals about developmental stage applied to humans; instead of attributing behavioral changes across a person's age to the development of mental structures or schema, this model posits that task sequences of task behaviors form hierarchies that become increasingly complex. Because less complex tasks must be completed and practiced before more complex tasks can be acquired, this accounts for the developmental changes seen, for example, in individual persons' performance of complex tasks. (For example, a person cannot perform arithmetic until the numeral representations of numbers are learned. A person cannot operationally multiply the sums of numbers until addition is learned).
The creators of the MHC claim that previous theories of stage have confounded the stimulus and response in assessing stage by simply scoring responses and ignoring the task or stimulus. The MHC separates the task or stimulus from the performance. The participant's performance on a task of a given complexity represents the stage of developmental complexity.
Development of Hierarchal Complexity and Relationship to the Traditional Stage Theory.
The traditional stage theory is the idea that an action’s complexity is determined by how frequently specific sub actions occur. This differs from the theory of hierarchal complexity, as the complexity of an action here is determined by the nonarbitrary organization of sub actions. In other words, the primary difference is that TST counts repeated sub actions, whereas THC organizes sub actions.
The traditional stage theory was unsatisfying to Commons and Richards, as they felt it did not show the existence of the stages more than describing sequential changes in human behavior. This led them to create a list of two concepts they felt a successful developmental theory should address. The two ideas they wanted to study were (1) the hierarchical complexity of the task to be solved and (2) the psychology, sociology, and anthropology of the task performance (and the development of the performance).
One major basis for this developmental theory is task analysis. The study of ideal tasks, including their instantiation in the real world, has been the basis of the branch of stimulus control called psychophysics. Tasks are defined as sequences of contingencies, each presenting stimuli and each requiring a behavior or a sequence of behaviors that must occur in some non-arbitrary fashion. The complexity of behaviors necessary to complete a task can be specified using the horizontal complexity and vertical complexity definitions described below. Behavior is examined with respect to the analytically-known complexity of the task.
Every task contains a multitude of subtasks. When the subtasks are carried out by the participant in a required order, the task in question is successfully completed. Therefore, the model asserts that all tasks fit in some configured sequence of tasks, making it possible to precisely determine the hierarchical order of task complexity. Tasks vary in complexity in two ways: either as "horizontal" (involving classical information); or as "vertical" (involving hierarchical information).
Hierarchical complexity refers to the number of recursions that the coordinating actions must perform on a set of primary elements. Actions at a higher order of hierarchical complexity: (a) are defined in terms of actions at the next lower order of hierarchical complexity; (b) organize and transform the lower-order actions (see Figure 2); (c) produce organizations of lower-order actions that are qualitatively new and not arbitrary, and cannot be accomplished by those lower-order actions alone. Once these conditions have been met, we say the higher-order action coordinates the actions of the next lower order.
To illustrate how lower actions get organized into more hierarchically complex actions, let us turn to a simple example. Completing the entire operation 3 × (4 + 1) constitutes a task requiring the distributive act. That act non-arbitrarily orders adding and multiplying to coordinate them. The distributive act is therefore one order more hierarchically complex than the acts of adding and multiplying alone; it indicates the singular proper sequence of the simpler actions. Although simply adding results in the same answer, people who can do both display a greater freedom of mental functioning. Additional layers of abstraction can be applied. Thus, the order of complexity of the task is determined through analyzing the demands of each task by breaking it down into its constituent parts.
The hierarchical complexity of a task refers to the number of concatenation operations it contains, that is, the number of recursions that the coordinating actions must perform. An order-three task has three concatenation operations. A task of order three operates on one or more tasks of vertical order two and a task of order two operates on one or more tasks of vertical order one (the simplest tasks).
Stage theories describe human organismic and/or technological evolution as systems that move through a pattern of distinct stages over time. Here development is described formally in terms of the model of hierarchical complexity (MHC).
Since actions are defined inductively, so is the function "h", known as the order of the hierarchical complexity. To each action "A", we wish to associate a notion of that action's hierarchical complexity, "h(A)". Given a collection of actions A and a participant "S" performing A, the "stage of performance" of "S" on A is the highest order of the actions in A completed successfully at least once, i.e., it is: stage ("S", A) = max{"h(A)" | "A" ∈ A and "A" completed successfully by "S"}. Thus, the notion of stage is discontinuous, having the same transitional gaps as the orders of hierarchical complexity. This is in accordance with previous definitions.
Because MHC stages are conceptualized in terms of the hierarchical complexity of tasks rather than in terms of mental representations (as in Piaget's stages), the highest stage represents successful performances on the most hierarchically complex tasks rather than intellectual maturity.
The following table gives descriptions of each stage in the MHC.
The hierarchal complexity model builds directly on both Piaget’s and Kohlberg’s theories. Because of this, it is considered by many to be neo-Piagetian, as it supposes the Piagetian model is correct, but that there are several stages above it that a normal human adult achieves (which are explained and described in the theory of hierarchal complexity).
There are some commonalities between the Piagetian and Commons' notions of stage and many more things that are different. In both, one finds:
What Commons et al. (1998) have added includes:
This makes it possible for the model's application to meet real world requirements, including the empirical and analytic. Arbitrary organization of lower order of complexity actions, possible in the Piagetian theory, despite the hierarchical definition structure, leaves the functional correlates of the interrelationships of tasks of differential complexity formulations ill-defined.
Moreover, the model is consistent with the neo-Piagetian theories of cognitive development. According to these theories, progression to higher stages or levels of cognitive development is caused by increases in processing efficiency and working memory capacity. That is, higher-order stages place increasingly higher demands on these functions of information processing, so that their order of appearance reflects the information processing possibilities at successive ages.
The following dimensions are inherent in the application:
More complex behaviors characterize multiple system models. The four highest stages in the MHC are not represented in Piaget's model. The higher stages of the MHC have extensively influenced the field of positive adult development. Some adults are said to develop alternatives to, and perspectives on, formal operations; they use formal operations within a "higher" system of operations. Some theorists call the more complex orders of cognitive tasks "postformal thought", but other theorists argue that these higher orders cannot exactly be labelled as postformal thought.
Jordan (2018) argued that unidimensional models such as the MHC, which measure level of complexity of some behavior, refer to only one of many aspects of adult development, and that other variables are needed (in addition to unidimensional measures of complexity) for a fuller description of adult development.
The MHC has a broad range of applicability. Its mathematical foundation permits it to be used by anyone examining task performance that is organized into stages. It is designed to assess development based on the order of complexity which the actor utilizes to organize information. The model thus allows for a standard quantitative analysis of developmental complexity in any cultural setting. Other advantages of this model include its avoidance of mentalistic explanations, as well as its use of quantitative principles which are universally applicable in any context.
The following practitioners can use the MHC to quantitatively assess developmental stages:
In one representative study, Commons, Goodheart, and Dawson (1997) found, using Rasch analysis (Rasch, 1980), that hierarchical complexity of a given task predicts stage of a performance, the correlation being r = 0.92. Correlations of similar magnitude have been found in a number of the studies. The following are examples of tasks studied using the model of hierarchical complexity or Kurt W. Fischer's similar skill theory:
As of 2014, people and institutes from all the major continents of the world, except Africa, have used the model of hierarchical complexity. Because the model is very simple and is based on analysis of tasks and not just performances, it is dynamic. With the help of the model, it is possible to quantify the occurrence and progression of transition processes in task performances at any order of hierarchical complexity.
The descriptions of stages 13–15 have been described as insufficiently precise.
An object of the mind is an object that exists in the imagination, but which, in the real world, can only be represented or modeled. Some such objects are abstractions, literary concepts, or fictional scenarios.
Closely related are intentional objects, which are what thoughts and feelings are about, even if they are not about anything real (such as thoughts
about unicorns, or feelings of apprehension about a dental appointment which is subsequently cancelled). However, intentional objects may coincide with real objects (as in thoughts about horses, or a feeling of regret about a missed appointment).
Mathematics and geometry describe abstract objects that sometimes correspond to familiar shapes, and sometimes do not. Circles, triangles, rectangles, and so forth describe two-dimensional shapes that are often found in the real world. However, mathematical formulas do not describe individual physical circles, triangles, or rectangles. They describe ideal shapes that are objects of the mind. The incredible precision of mathematical expression permits a vast applicability of mental abstractions to real life situations.
Many more mathematical formulas describe shapes that are unfamiliar, or do not necessarily correspond to objects in the real world. For example, the Klein bottle is a one-sided, sealed surface with no inside or outside (in other words, it is the three-dimensional equivalent of the Möbius strip). Such objects can be represented by twisting and cutting or taping pieces of paper together, as well as by computer simulations. To hold them in the imagination, abstractions such as extra or fewer dimensions are necessary.
If-then arguments posit logical sequences that sometimes include objects of the mind. For example, a counterfactual argument proposes a hypothetical or subjunctive possibility which "could" or "would" be true, but "might not" be false. Conditional sequences involving subjunctives use intensional language, which is studied by modal logic, whereas classical logic studies the extensional language of necessary and sufficient conditions.
In general, a logical antecedent is a sufficient condition, and a logical consequent is a necessary condition (or the contingency) in a logical conditional. But logical conditionals accounting only for necessity and sufficiency do not always reflect every day if-then reasoning, and for this reason they are sometimes known as material conditionals. In contrast, indicative conditionals, sometimes known as non-material conditionals, attempt to describe if-then reasoning involving hypotheticals, fictions, or counterfactuals.
Truth tables for if-then statements identify four unique combinations of premises and conclusions: true premises and true conclusions; false premises and true conclusions; true premises and false conclusions; false premises and false conclusions. Strict conditionals assign a positive truth-value to every case except the case of a true premise and a false conclusion. This is sometimes regarded as counterintuitive, but makes more sense when false conditions are understood as objects of the mind.
A false antecedent is a premise known to be false, fictional, imaginary, or unnecessary. In a conditional sequence, a false antecedent may be the basis for any consequence, true or false.
The subjects of literature are sometimes false antecedents. For instance, the contents of false documents, the origins of stand-alone phenomena, or the implications of loaded words. Moreover, artificial sources, personalities, events, and histories. False antecedents are sometimes referred to as "nothing", or "nonexistent", whereas nonexistent referents are not referred to.
Art and acting often portray scenarios without any antecedent other than an artist's imagination. For example, mythical heroes, legendary creatures, gods and goddesses.
A false consequent, in contrast, is a conclusion known to be false, fictional, imaginary, or insufficient. In a conditional statement, a fictional conclusion is known as a non sequitur, which literally means "out of sequence". A conclusion that is out of sequence is not contingent on any premises that precede it, and it does not follow from them, so such a sequence is not conditional. A conditional sequence is a connected series of statements. A false consequent cannot follow from true premises in a connected sequence. But, on the other hand, a false consequent can follow from a false antecedent.
As an example, the name of a team, a genre, or a nation is a collective term applied ex post facto to a group of distinct individuals. None of the individuals on a sports team is the team itself, nor is any musical chord a genre, nor any person America. The name is an identity for a collection that is connected by consensus or reference, but not by sequence. A different name could equally follow, but it would have different social or political significance.
In metaphysics and ontology, Austrian philosopher Alexius Meinong advanced nonexistent objects in the 19th and 20th century within a "theory of objects". He was interested in intentional states which are directed at nonexistent objects. Starting with the "principle of intentionality", mental phenomena are intentionally directed towards an object. People may imagine, desire or fear something that does not exist. Other philosophers concluded that intentionality is not a real relation and therefore does not require the existence of an object, while Meinong concluded there is an object for every mental state whatsoever—if not an existent then at least a nonexistent one.
In philosophy of mind, mind–body dualism is the doctrine that mental activities exist apart from the physical body, notably posited by René Descartes in "Meditations on First Philosophy".
Many objects in fiction follow the example of false antecedents or false consequents. For example, "The Lord of the Rings" by J.R.R. Tolkien is based on an imaginary book. In the "Appendices" to "The Lord of the Rings", Tolkien's characters name the "Red Book of Westmarch" as the source material for "The Lord of the Rings", which they describe as a translation. But the "Red Book of Westmarch" is a fictional document that chronicles events in an imaginary world. One might imagine a different translation, by another author.
Social reality is composed of many standards and inventions that facilitate communication, but which are ultimately objects of the mind. For example, money is an object of the mind which currency represents. Similarly, languages signify ideas and thoughts.
Objects of the mind are frequently involved in the roles that people play. For example, acting is a profession which predicates real jobs on fictional premises. Charades is a game people play by guessing imaginary objects from short play-acts.
Imaginary personalities and histories are sometimes invented to enhance the verisimilitude of fictional universes, and/or the immersion of role-playing games. In the sense that they exist independently of extant personalities and histories, they are believed to be fictional characters and fictional time frames.
Science fiction is abundant with future times, alternate times, and past times that are objects of the mind. For example, in the novel "Nineteen Eighty-Four" by George Orwell, the number 1984 represented a year that had not yet passed.
Calendar dates also represent objects of the mind, specifically, past and future times. In "", which was released in 1986, the narration opens with the statement, "It is the year 2005." In 1986, that statement was futuristic. During the year 2005, that reference to the year 2005 was factual. Now, "The Transformers: The Movie" is retro-futuristic. The number 2005 did not change, but the object of the mind that it represents did change.
Deliberate invention also may reference an object of the mind. The intentional invention of fiction for the purpose of deception is usually referred to as lying, in contrast to invention for entertainment or art. Invention is also often applied to problem solving. In this sense the physical invention of materials is associated with the mental invention of fictions.
The theoretical posits of one era's scientific theories may be demoted to mere objects of the mind by subsequent discoveries: some standard examples include phlogiston and ptolemaic epicycles.
This raises questions, in the debate between scientific realism and instrumentalism about the status of current posits, such as black holes and quarks. Are they still merely intentional, even if the theory is correct?
The situation is further complicated by the existence in scientific practice of entities which are explicitly held not to be real, but which nonetheless serve a purpose—convenient fictions. Examples include field lines, centers of gravity, and electron holes in semiconductor theory.
A reference that names an imaginary source is in some sense also a self-reference. A self-reference automatically makes a comment about itself. Premises that name themselves as premises are premises by self-reference; conclusions that name themselves as conclusions are conclusions by self-reference.
In their respective imaginary worlds the "Necronomicon", "The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy", and the "Red Book of Westmarch" are realities, but only because they are referred to as real. Authors use this technique to invite readers to pretend or to make-believe that their imaginary world is real. In the sense that the stories that quote these books are true, the quoted books exist; in the sense that the stories are fiction, the quoted books do not exist.
Object permanence is the understanding that objects continue to exist even when they cannot be seen, heard, or otherwise sensed. This is a fundamental concept studied in the field of developmental psychology, the subfield of psychology that addresses the development of young children's social and mental capacities. There is not yet scientific consensus on when the understanding of object permanence emerges in human development.
Jean Piaget, the Swiss psychologist who first studied object permanence in infants, argued that it is one of an infant's most important accomplishments, as, without this concept, objects would have no separate, permanent existence. In Piaget's theory of cognitive development, infants develop this understanding by the end of the "sensorimotor stage", which lasts from birth to about two years of age. Piaget thought that an infant's perception and understanding of the world depended on their motor development, which was required for the infant to link visual, tactile and motor representations of objects. According to this view, it is through touching and handling objects that infants develop object permanence.
Piaget concluded that some infants are too young to understand object permanence. A lack of object permanence can lead to A-not-B errors, where children reach for a thing at a place where it should not be. Older infants are less likely to make the A-not-B error because they are able to understand the concept of object permanence more than younger infants. However, researchers have found that A-not-B errors do not always show up consistently. They concluded that this type of error might be due to a failure in memory or the fact that infants usually tend to repeat a previous motor behavior.
In Piaget's formulation, there are six stages of object permanence. These are:
In more recent years, the original Piagetian object permanence account has been challenged by a series of infant studies suggesting that much younger infants do have a clear sense that objects exist even when out of sight. Bower showed object permanence in 3-month-olds. This goes against Piaget's coordination of secondary circular reactions stage because infants are not supposed to understand that a completely hidden object still exists until they are eight to twelve months old. The two studies below demonstrate this idea.
There are primarily four challenges to Piaget's framework:
One criticism of Piaget's theory is that culture and education exert stronger influences on a child's development than Piaget maintained. These factors depend on how much practice their culture provides in developmental processes, such as conversational skills.
Experiments in non-human primates suggest that monkeys can track the displacement of invisible targets, that invisible displacement is represented in the prefrontal cortex, and that development of the frontal cortex is linked to the acquisition of object permanence. Various evidence from human infants is consistent with this. For example, formation of synapses in the frontal cortex peaks during human infancy, and recent experiments using near infrared spectroscopy to gather neuroimaging data from infants suggests that activity in the frontal cortex is associated with successful completion of object permanence tasks.
One of the areas of focus on object permanence has been how physical disabilities (blindness, cerebral palsy and deafness) and intellectual disabilities (Down syndrome, etc.) affect the development of object permanence. In a study that was performed in 1975–76, the results showed that the only area where children with intellectual disabilities performed more weakly than children without disabilities was along the lines of social interaction. Other tasks, such as imitation and causality tasks, were performed more weakly by the children without disabilities. However, object permanence was still acquired similarly because it was not related to social interaction.
The language of thought hypothesis (LOTH), sometimes known as thought ordered mental expression (TOME), is a view in linguistics, philosophy of mind and cognitive science, forwarded by American philosopher Jerry Fodor. It describes the nature of thought as possessing "language-like" or compositional structure (sometimes known as "mentalese"). On this view, simple concepts combine in systematic ways (akin to the rules of grammar in language) to build thoughts. In its most basic form, the theory states that thought, like language, has syntax.
Using empirical evidence drawn from linguistics and cognitive science to describe mental representation from a philosophical vantage-point, the hypothesis states that thinking takes place in a language of thought (LOT): cognition and cognitive processes are only 'remotely plausible' when expressed as a system of representations that is "tokened" by a linguistic or semantic structure and operated upon by means of a combinatorial syntax. Linguistic tokens used in mental language describe elementary concepts which are operated upon by logical rules establishing causal connections to allow for complex thought. Syntax as well as semantics have a causal effect on the properties of this system of mental representations.
These mental representations are not present in the brain in the same way as symbols are present on paper; rather, the LOT is supposed to exist at the cognitive level, the level of thoughts and concepts. The LOTH has wide-ranging significance for a number of domains in cognitive science. It relies on a version of functionalist materialism, which holds that mental representations are actualized and modified by the individual holding the propositional attitude, and it challenges eliminative materialism and connectionism. It implies a strongly rationalist model of cognition in which many of the fundamentals of cognition are innate.
The hypothesis applies to thoughts that have propositional content, and is not meant to describe everything that goes on in the mind. It appeals to the representational theory of thought to explain what those tokens actually are and how they behave. There must be a mental representation that stands in some unique relationship with the subject of the representation and has specific content. Complex thoughts get their semantic content from the content of the basic thoughts and the relations that they hold to each other. Thoughts can only relate to each other in ways that do not violate the syntax of thought. The syntax by means of which these two sub-parts are combined can be expressed in first-order predicate calculus.