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A forced runner's force base is the next base beyond his time-of-pitch base. Any attempt by fielders to put a forced runner out is called a force play.
A force on a runner is "removed" when the batter or a following runner is put out. This most often happens on fly outs—on such, the batter-runner is out, and the other runner(s) must return to their time-of-pitch base, known as tagging up. It also occasionally happens when a sharply hit ground ball is fielded by the first baseman, who then quickly steps on first base to force out the batter-runner. This removes the requirement that the runner already on first must advance to second base; he cannot be forced out by a defensive player holding the ball while touching second base, and the runner can try to escape from a rundown by returning to first base.
For force outs resulting from neighborhood plays, see the highlighted link.
An appeal play may also be a force play; for example, with runners on first and third bases and two out, the batter gets a hit but the runner from first misses second base on the way to third. After a proper appeal, this runner will be called out. This is a force out because the runner was out for failing to touch a base to which he was forced; this force out is the third out and thus the run does not score. However, most appeals are not force plays, because appeals usually do not involve a forced runner.
It is not a force out when a runner is put out while trying to tag up after a caught fly ball. Because this out is similar to a true force out, in that the runner can be put out by a fielder possessing the ball at the base that the runner needs to reach, there is a widespread misconception that this out is a force out. But it is not, which means the run would count if it scored before the third out is made on a runner trying to tag up
A rundown, informally known as a pickle or the hotbox, is a situation in the game of baseball that occurs when the baserunner is stranded between two bases, also known as no-man's land, and is in jeopardy of being tagged out. When the base runner attempts to advance to the next base, he is cut off by the defensive player who has a live ball and attempts to return to his previous base before being tagged out. As he is doing this, the defenseman throws the ball past the base runner to the previous base, forcing him to reverse directions again. This is repeated until the runner is put out or reaches a base safely.
A rundown can be escaped if a fielder makes an error, the runner gets around the fielder with the ball without running out of the baseline, a fielder throws the ball elsewhere (e.g., toward home plate if another runner is trying to score), or the runner manages to get by the fielder without the ball while there is no other fielder to cover the runner's destination base.
In baseball, an appeal play occurs when a member of the defensive team calls the attention of an umpire to an infraction which he would otherwise ignore.
A runner shall be called out, after a successful live ball appeal, if he:
Fielders have the right to appeal any runner at any base he has reached or passed, at any time while the ball is alive, subject to the following restrictions:
An appeal is "legal" if the fielder
Umpires will only rule on legal appeals. A potential appeal is "viable" if the appeal is legal and the umpire knows that the runner has indeed committed an infraction and will be called out if the appeal is executed by a fielder.
Suppose that runners are on first and third base, and the batter hits a fly ball. The runner on third tags up, leaving third base immediately after the outfielder touches the ball. The runner seems to score, beating the throw home, but failing to touch home plate. He proceeds into his dugout without again attempting to touch home base. The runner on first base stays at first base, and action becomes relaxed while the ball is in the infield.
The fielders now suspect that the runner left third base too early and also missed the plate. Suppose that a fielder, with the live ball, touches third base and tells the nearest umpire, "I think he left too early." This is a proper legal appeal, and the umpire should rule with a safe signal, perhaps saying, "No, he was fine." Now no legal appeal may again occur on that runner at third base. Suppose then that a fielder, with the live ball, touches home base and says to the nearest umpire, "I think he never touched home." This is a legal and viable appeal, and so the umpire should call the runner out and direct that his run shall not count.
Since the ball was live (and indeed must be for appeals to be legal), the runner from first could have attempted to advance at any time during the appeals. If the defense attempts to play on that runner, their opportunity to appeal the runner from third base is lost, and the run would count regardless of any subsequent attempt to appeal.
A member of the defensive team may appeal to the umpire when a batter bats out of turn. The umpire then enforces the penalty for batting out of turn, if any. The ball must be live for this as for any appeal. After the appeal is made, the umpire will usually signal "Time" and figure out whether the appeal is successful.
In U.S. high school games or other games governed by NFHS rules, the defense may execute any of the live ball appeals above during a dead ball by simply communicating the infraction to the umpire, so it is never necessary to attempt a live ball appeal; it is always safer for the defense to ask for time to make the ball dead, and then make any requests to the umpire.
Tie goes to the runner is a popular interpretation of baseball rules. The claim is that a batter-runner who arrives on base the same time as the ball is safe. However, umpires generally reject the concept that baseball provides for a tie in this way, and instead rule on the basis that either the player or the ball has reached the base first.
The wording of rule 5.09(a)(10), formerly 6.05(j), of the "Official Baseball Rules" is that a batter is out when "After a third strike or after he hits a fair ball, he or first base is tagged before he touches first base". Therefore, if the runner or first base is not tagged before he touches first base, he is safe.
In response to a question from a Little League umpire, Major League Baseball umpire Tim McClelland has written that the concept of a tie at a base does not exist, and that a runner either beats the ball or does not. In 2009, umpire Mark Dewdeny, a contributor for Bleacher Report, citing McClelland, also rejected the idea of a tie, and further commented that even if a "physicist couldn't make an argument one way or the other" from watching an instant replay, the runner would still be out.
One of the most notorious MLB players with a reputation for wall climbing is Minnesota Twins outfielder Torii Hunter. He has won nine Gold Gloves in his sixteen-year major league career. He once robbed Barry Bonds of a home run in right-center field in the first inning of the 2002 MLB All-Star Game.
In baseball, an unassisted triple play occurs when a defensive player makes all three outs by himself in one continuous play, without his teammates making any assists. Neal Ball was the first to achieve this in Major League Baseball (MLB) under modern rules, doing so on July 19, 1909. For this rare play to be possible there must be no outs in the inning and at least two runners on base, normally with the runners going on the pitch (e.g., double steal or hit-and-run). An unassisted triple play usually consists of a hard line drive hit directly at an infielder for the first out, with that same fielder then able to double off one of the base runners and tag a second for the second and third outs.
Most unassisted triple plays in MLB have taken this form: an infielder catches a line drive (one out), steps on a base to double off a runner (two outs), and then tags another runner on the runner's way to the next base (three outs). In general, the "next base" is usually the same base that the infielder stepped on to record the second out, and the last runner is tagged before he can return to the previous base. Infrequently, the order of the last two putouts is reversed.
It is nearly impossible for an unassisted triple play to occur unless the fielder is positioned between the two runners. For this reason, all but two of these plays have been accomplished by middle infielders (second basemen and shortstops). The other two were completed by first basemen, who were able to reach second base before the returning baserunner. For example, after collecting the first two outs, Tigers' first baseman Johnny Neun ignored his shortstop's shouts to throw the ball, and instead ran to second base to get the final out himself. The only unassisted triple play that did not take one of these forms occurred in the 19th century, under rules that are no longer in effect (see below).
It is plausible that a third baseman could complete an unassisted triple play with runners at second and third or with bases loaded, but this has never happened in MLB. Players in other positions (pitcher, catcher, outfielders) completing an unassisted triple play would require unusual confusion or mistakes by the baserunners, or an atypical defensive alignment (for example, repositioning an outfielder as a fifth infielder).
The unassisted triple play, the perfect game, hitting four home runs in one game and five extra-base hits in a game are thus comparable in terms of rarity, but the perfect game and the home run and extra-base hit records require an extraordinary effort along with a fair amount of luck. By contrast, the unassisted triple play is essentially always a matter of luck: a combination of the right circumstances with the relatively simple effort of catching the ball and running in the right direction with it. Troy Tulowitzki said of his feat, "It fell right in my lap", and as WGN-TV sports anchor Dan Roan commented, "That's the way these plays always happen."
In baseball and softball, the curveball is a type of pitch thrown with a characteristic grip and hand movement that imparts forward spin to the ball, causing it to dive as it approaches the plate. Varieties of curveball include the 12–6 curveball, power curveball, and the knuckle curve. Its close relatives are the slider and the slurve. The "curve" of the ball varies from pitcher to pitcher.
The expression "to throw a curveball" essentially translates to introducing a significant deviation to a preceding concept.
The delivery of a curveball is entirely different from that of most other pitches. The pitcher at the top of the throwing arc will snap the arm and wrist in a downward motion. The ball first leaves contact with the thumb and tumbles over the index finger thus imparting the forward or "top-spin" characteristic of a curveball. The result is the exact opposite pitch of the four-seam fastball's backspin, but with all four seams rotating in the direction of the flight path with forward-spin, with the axis of rotation perpendicular to the intended flight path, much like a reel mower or a bowling ball.
From a hitter's perspective, the curveball will start in one location (usually high or at the top of the strike zone) and then dive rapidly as it approaches the plate. The most effective curveballs will start breaking at the apex of the arc of the ball flight, and continue to break more and more rapidly as they approach and cross through the strike zone. A curveball that a pitcher fails to put enough spin on will not break much and is colloquially called a "hanging curve". Hanging curves are usually disastrous for a pitcher because the low velocity, non-breaking pitch arrives high in the zone where hitters can wait on it and drive it for power.
The curveball is a popular and effective pitch in professional baseball, but it is not particularly widespread in leagues with players younger than college level. This is with regard for the safety of the pitcher – not because of its difficulty – though the pitch is widely considered difficult to learn as it requires some degree of mastery and the ability to pinpoint the thrown ball's location. There is generally a greater chance of throwing wild pitches when throwing the curveball.
When thrown correctly, it could have a break from seven to as much as 20 inches in comparison to the same pitcher's fastball.
Due to the unnatural motion required to throw it, the curveball is considered a more advanced pitch and poses inherent risk of injury to a pitcher's elbow and shoulder. There has been a controversy, as reported in "The New York Times", March 12, 2012, about whether curveballs alone are responsible for injuries in young pitchers or whether it is the number of pitches thrown that are the predisposing factor. In theory, allowing time for the cartilage and tendons of the arm to fully develop would protect against injuries. While acquisition of proper form might be protective, Dr. James Andrews is quoted in the article as stating that in many children, insufficient neuromuscular control, lack of proper mechanics, and fatigue make maintenance of proper form unlikely.
The parts of the arm most commonly injured by the curveball are the ligaments in the elbow, the biceps, and the forearm muscles. Major elbow injury requires repair through elbow ligament reconstruction, or Tommy John surgery.
The "12–6 curveball" vs. the "Roundhouse Curveball" vs. the "Slurve".
Curveballs have a variety of trajectories and breaks among pitchers. This chiefly has to do with the arm slot and release point of a given pitcher, which is in turn governed by how comfortable the pitcher is throwing the overhand curveball.
Pitchers who can throw a curveball completely overhanded with the arm slot more or less vertical will have a curveball that will break straight downwards. This is called a 12–6 curveball as the break of the pitch is on a straight path downwards like the hands of a clock at 12 and 6. The axis of rotation of a 12–6 curve is parallel with the level ground and perpendicular to its flight path.
Generally the Magnus effect describes the laws of physics that make a curveball curve. A fastball travels through the air with backspin, which creates a higher pressure zone in the air ahead of and under the baseball. The baseball's raised seams augment the ball's ability to develop a boundary layer and therefore a greater differential of pressure between the upper and lower zones. The effect of gravity is partially counteracted as the ball rides on and into increased pressure. Thus the fastball falls less than a ball thrown without spin (neglecting knuckleball effects) during the 60 feet 6 inches it travels to home plate.
On the other hand, a curveball, thrown with topspin, creates a higher pressure zone on top of the ball, which deflects the ball downward in flight. Instead of counteracting gravity, the curveball adds additional downward force, thereby giving the ball an exaggerated drop in flight.
There was once a debate on whether a curveball actually curves or is an optical illusion. In 1949, Ralph B. Lightfoot, an aeronautical engineer at Sikorsky Aircraft, used wind tunnel tests to prove that a curveball curves. On whether a curveball is caused by an illusion, Baseball Hall of Fame pitcher Dizzy Dean has been quoted in a number of variations on this basic premise: "Stand behind a tree 60 feet away, and I will whomp you with an optical illusion!"
However, optical illusion caused by the ball's spinning may play an important part in what makes curveballs difficult to hit. The curveball's trajectory is smooth, however the batter perceives a sudden, dramatic change in the ball's direction. When an object that is spinning and moving through space is viewed directly, the overall motion is interpreted correctly by the brain. However, as it enters the peripheral vision, the internal spinning motion distorts how the overall motion is perceived. A curveball's trajectory begins in the center of the batter's vision, but overlaps with peripheral vision as it approaches the plate, which may explain the suddenness of the break perceived by the batter. A peer-reviewed article on this hypothesis was published in 2010.
Popular nicknames for the curveball include "the bender" and "the hook" (both describing the trajectory of the pitch), as well as "the yakker" and "Uncle Charlie". New York Mets pitcher Dwight Gooden threw a curve so deadly that it was nicknamed "Lord Charles" and the great hitter Bill Madlock called it "the yellow hammer” - apparently because it came down like a hammer and was too yellow to get hit by a bat. Because catchers frequently use two fingers to signal for a curve, the pitch is also referred to as "the deuce" or "number two".
Records of the Princeton University (then the College of New Jersey) game from September 26, 1863 in the "New York Clipper" of the Nassaus facing the Athletics refer to F. P. Henry, Princeton Class of 1866, "slow pitching with a great twist to the ball achieved a victory over fast pitching." By 1866, many Princeton players were pitching and hitting "curved balls".
In the past, major league pitchers Tommy Bridges, Bob Feller, Virgil Trucks, Herb Score, Camilo Pascual and Sandy Koufax were regarded as having outstanding curveballs.
In baseball, a sacrifice bunt (also called a sacrifice hit) is a batter's act of deliberately bunting the ball, before there are two outs, in a manner that allows a baserunner to advance to another base. The batter is almost always putout, and hence sacrificed (to a certain degree that is the intent of the batter), but sometimes reaches base due to an error or fielder's choice. In that situation, if runners still advance bases, it is still scored a sacrifice bunt instead of the error or the fielder's choice. Sometimes the batter may safely reach base by simply outrunning the throw to first; this is not scored as a sacrifice bunt but rather a single.
A successful sacrifice bunt does not count as an at bat, does not impact a player's batting average, and counts as a plate appearance. Unlike a sacrifice fly, a sacrifice bunt is not included in the calculation of the player's on-base percentage. If the official scorer believes that the batter was attempting to bunt for a base hit and not solely to advance the runners, the batter is charged an at bat and is not credited with a sacrifice bunt.
In leagues without a designated hitter, sacrifice bunts are most commonly attempted by pitchers, who are typically not productive hitters. Managers consider that if a pitcher's at bat will probably result in an out, they might as well go out in a way most likely to advance the runners. The play also obviates the need for the pitcher to run the base paths, and hence avoids the risk of injury. Some leadoff hitters also bunt frequently in similar situations and may be credited with a sacrifice, but as they are often highly skilled bunters and faster runners, they are often trying to get on base as well as advance runners.
A sacrifice bunt attempted while a runner is on third is called a squeeze play. A sacrifice bunt attempted while a runner on third is attempting to steal home is called a suicide squeeze.
Although a sacrifice bunt is not the same as a sacrifice fly, both fell under the same statistical category until 1954.
In scoring, a sacrifice bunt may be denoted by SH, S, or occasionally, SAC.
Notable players with 300 or more sacrifice bunts.
The following players have accumulated 300 or more sacrifice bunts in their playing careers:
Since the beginning of the live-ball era (1920), the career leader in sacrifice bunts is Joe Sewell with 275. He was first called up by the Cleveland Indians late in the 1920 season shortly after the death of Indians star shortstop Ray Chapman after being hit in the head by a pitch, the event which is generally regarded as the start of the live-ball era.
Though touted as good strategy by traditionalists, the sacrifice bunt has received significant criticism by modern sabermetrics. Simply, sabermetricians argue that the value of moving a runner to another base is offset by the team's sacrificing one of its limited and valuable 27 outs. An out conceded is an out wasted, in other words.
The following stats illustrate the argument. From 1993-2010, if a team had a runner on first base with no outs, on average it would score .941 runs from that point until the end of the inning. If a team had a runner on second base with one out, however, the average was .721 runs from that point forward. Thus, if a batter walks to lead off an inning and his team bats, that team will, on average, score almost one run in the inning. On the other hand, that team decreases its run expectancy by 23 percent if it successfully bunts and moves the runner to second with one out.
Complicating affairs are the many difficulties and risks associated with bunting. The runner or runners on base must have speed, or the defense may get an easy force out. A manager could feasibly pinch run, but then his bench becomes smaller (that is, there are fewer substitute players available). The player at the plate must also lay down a quality bunt. That is, the player must lay down a bunt that does not pop up, go foul, or go straight to a fielder. Even if all goes well, if the sacrifice bunt is successful, the team must still get a hit to score the runner, and they now have 2 outs remaining instead of three.
In baseball, a sacrifice fly (sometimes abbreviated to sac fly) is defined by Rule 9.08(d):
"Score a sacrifice fly when, before two are out, the batter hits a ball in flight handled by an outfielder or an infielder running in the outfield in fair or foul territory that
It is called a "sacrifice" fly because the batter allows a teammate to score a run, while sacrificing his own ability to do so. Sacrifice flies are traditionally recorded in box scores with the designation "SF".
As addressed within Rule 9.02(a)(1) of the Official Baseball Rules a sacrifice fly is not counted as a time at bat for the batter, though the batter is credited with a run batted in.
The purpose of not counting a sacrifice fly as an at-bat is to avoid penalizing hitters for a successful action. The sacrifice fly is one of two instances in baseball where a batter is not charged with a time at bat after putting a ball in play; the other is the sacrifice hit (also known as a sacrifice bunt). But, while a sacrifice fly does not affect a player's batting average, it counts as a plate appearance and lowers his on-base percentage. A player on a hitting streak will have the hit streak end if he has no official at-bats but has a sacrifice fly.
The sacrifice fly is credited even if another runner is put out so long as the run scores. The sacrifice fly is credited on a dropped ball even if another runner is forced out by reason of the batter becoming a runner.
On any fly ball, a runner can initiate an attempt to advance bases as soon as a fielder touches the ball by tagging up, even before the fielder has full control of the ball.
The most sacrifice flies by a team in one game is five; the record was established by the Seattle Mariners in 1988, tied by the Colorado Rockies in 2006, and tied again by the Mariners in 2008.
Five teams have collected three sacrifice flies in an inning: the Chicago White Sox (fifth inning, July 1, 1962 against the Cleveland Indians); the New York Yankees twice (fourth inning, June 29, 2000 against the Detroit Tigers and third inning, August 19, 2000 against the Anaheim Angels); the New York Mets (second inning, June 24, 2005 against the Yankees); and the Houston Astros (seventh inning, June 26, 2005 against the Texas Rangers). In these cases one or more of the flies did not result in a putout due to an error.
Since the rule was reinstated in its present form in 1954, Gil Hodges of the Dodgers holds the record for most sacrifice flies in one season with 19, in 1954; Eddie Murray holds the record for most sacrifice flies in a career with 128.
As of the end of the 2018 season, players who had hit 115 or more career sacrifice flies:
Only once has the World Series been won on a sac fly. In 1912, Larry Gardner of the Boston Red Sox hit a fly ball off a pitch from the New York Giants' Christy Mathewson. Steve Yerkes tagged up and scored from third base to win game 8 in the tenth inning and take the series for the Red Sox.
The New York Yankees' former closer Mariano Rivera, one of the foremost practitioners of the cutter, made the pitch famous after the mid-1990s, though the pitch itself has been around since at least the 1950s.
When the cut fastball is pitched skillfully at speed, particularly against the opposite hand batter (that is, a right-handed pitcher facing a left-handed hitter), the pitch can crack and split a hitter's bat, hence the pitch's occasional nickname of "the buzzsaw". Batter Ryan Klesko, then of the Atlanta Braves, broke three bats in a single plate appearance during the 1999 World Series while facing Rivera. To deal with this problem a few switch hitters batted right-handed against the right-handed Rivera—that is, on the "wrong" side, as switch hitters generally bat from the same side of the plate as the pitcher's glove hand.
In , Dan Haren led all major league starting pitchers with nearly 48% of his pitches classified by PITCHf/x as cutters. Roy Halladay was close behind at 45%. Other pitchers who rely (or relied) heavily on a cut fastball include Jon Lester, James Shields, Josh Tomlin, Will Harris, Mark Melancon, Jaime Garcia, Wade Miley, David Robertson, Jerry Reuss, and Andy Pettitte. Over the course of Kenley Jansen's career from (2010-present) he has thrown his cutter 85.1% of the time, second only to Rivera at 87.2% among pitchers with at least 30 innings during that time period.
The cutter grew in popularity as certain pitchers, including Dan Haren, looked to compensate for loss of speed in their four-seam fastball. Braves third baseman Chipper Jones attributed the increased dominance of pitchers from 2010–2011 to a more prolific use of the cutter, as did Cleveland Indians pitcher Chris Perez. By 2011, it was commonly being called the "pitch du jour" in the baseball press.
Some pushback has developed against (overuse of) the pitch, due to concerns that a pitcher overusing the cutter could develop arm fatigue. Baltimore Orioles General Manager Dan Duquette instructed prized prospect Dylan Bundy not to throw the pitch in the minor leagues, believing its use could make Bundy's fastball and curve less effective.
The wheel play is a defensive strategy in baseball designed to defend against a sacrifice bunt. The play's name derives from the wheel-like rotation of the infielders.
The wheel play is typically only employed when all of the following conditions exist:
In such a scenario, the batting team may attempt a sacrifice bunt in order to move the runner at second base to third base, accepting that the batter will be put out at first base. If that happens, the offense would then have a runner at third base with one out, and that runner could subsequently score on a sacrifice fly.
To defend against this scenario, the wheel play is used by the defense in an attempt to prevent the offense from advancing the runner at second base to third base via a sacrifice bunt.
The wheel play is a unique bunt defense in that the play is designed to put out the lead runner at third base. Most bunt defense strategies give priority to making sure the defense gets an out at first base.
The wheel play begins with the shortstop running to cover (defend) third base. As the pitch is thrown by the pitcher, the third baseman and first baseman rush toward home plate, to be in position to field the bunted ball as quickly as possible, while the second baseman runs to cover (defend) first base. Additionally, the pitcher moves into a defensive position, backing up one of the inrushing fielders (which one, usually depends on which direction the pitcher's pitching motion carries him towards).
The defense seeks to have defenders in position such that once the ball is bunted, it can be picked up quickly by one of the charging fielders, who will be much closer to the batter than they would be in their normal fielding positions. If that occurs, the fielder who picks up the ball can throw it to the shortstop (who is covering third base) to retire the runner advancing from second base, either via a force play (when applicable) or tag out. Recording an out at third base represents a successfully executed wheel play. Additionally, if the batter is not a fast runner, the shortstop (at third base) may be able to throw to the second baseman (at first base) to successfully complete a double play.
Alternately, if a fielder is slow in picking up the ball, and/or he sees that the runner advancing from second base is unlikely to be retired at third base, the fielder can throw the ball to the second baseman (who is covering first base) to retire the batter. While this is not a successfully executed wheel play, it provides no worse an outcome than would have occurred on a normally executed sacrifice bunt.
The offense can attempt to defeat the wheel play:
One of the earliest recorded instances of the wheel play being used in Major League Baseball (MLB) was when it was executed by the Pittsburgh Pirates against the St. Louis Cardinals on August 14, 1960, resulting, as reported by "The Pittsburgh Press", in "an electrifying double play [...] that had the 36,775 fans screaming." Several Pirate players and coaches said they had never seen the play before, but the Pirate players who executed the play attributed the original idea to former Chicago Cubs manager Charlie Grimm, whom they thought used it in 1950.
The Cardinals successfully used the wheel play against the Texas Rangers in the second inning of Game 6 of the 2011 World Series. With runners on first base and second base and no outs, Texas pitcher Colby Lewis attempted a sacrifice bunt, resulting in a double play when third baseman David Freese fielded the bunt, threw to shortstop Rafael Furcal at third base for the first out, and Furcal threw to second baseman Nick Punto at first base for the second out.
A hit and run is a high risk, high reward offensive strategy used in baseball. It uses a stolen base attempt to try to place the defending infielders out of position for an attempted base hit.
The hit and run was introduced to baseball by Ned Hanlon, who was often referred to as "The Father of Modern Baseball", at the beginning of the 1894 season of the National League, as part of what came to be called "inside baseball". Hanlon was manager of the Baltimore Orioles at the time. His team developed the hit and run along with other tactics during spring training at Macon, Georgia. After its implementation in the season's series opener against the New York Giants, the opposing manager objected to its use; however, it was deemed acceptable.
The hit and run relies on the positioning of the defensive players in the infield. The first and third basemen normally stand near the foul lines, generally near the inside of their bases, set slightly back to allow more time to react to sharply hit balls. However, if the runner is on first, the first baseman stands closer to the base to prevent steals by means of pick-off attempts by the pitcher; consequently, such positioning produces a bigger gap between second and first basemen. The second baseman and shortstop stand on opposite sides of second base, covering the areas between first and second, and second and third, respectively. Second base itself is not directly covered, as the pitcher can field batted balls in this direction.
In normal play, if the ball is hit into the infield, one of the infielders will run toward the ball while another runs toward the base that is no longer covered. For instance, if the ball is hit toward the second baseman, he will run toward the ball while the shortstop runs to cover second base. This allows the fielding player to throw the ball to the player covering the base to attempt a put out.
However, during a stolen base attempt, the normal gameplay and positioning is altered. In the typical case, a baserunner on first base will start running toward second, causing the middle infielders to move toward that base in order to tag the runner when the ball is thrown to them from the pitcher or catcher. This reaction places the infielders out of position for a hit ball, with gaps opening at midway points between first and second and second and third.
The hit and run takes advantage of this difference by having the baserunner attempt to steal as soon as the pitch is thrown; the batter then attempts to hit the ball into one of the resulting gaps in the infield defense.
The name "hit and run" is therefore a potential misnomer in that the chronological order of the offensive play is "run and hit," with the runner beginning the steal attempt before the batter makes contact, although in a logical sense it is accurate in that the batter's swing occurs while the runner's steal attempt is ongoing, such that any contact ("hit") will occur simultaneously with ("and") the steal attempt ("run").
Ideally, the ball will be hit into a gap and travel into the outfield, allowing the runners plenty of time to reach the bases. Even if the ball is hit toward a fielder's initial position before the fielder has had time to move away from it, however, the fielder may have turned to run toward the base in order to cover the baserunner. In normal play the fielders would face the batter, allowing them to react in any direction, but after they have turned toward the base this becomes much more difficult. Their momentum in this direction adds to this problem.
The risk in the hit and run is that, if the batter fails to make contact with the ball, the runner is vulnerable to being thrown out at second base, which the official scorer will record as a caught stealing. The defensive team can improve its odds in this case by using a pitchout, having the pitcher throw the ball far outside the strike zone so the catcher can easily catch it and attempt to pick off the runner.
The batter may choose to take a swing at a bad pitch to make it harder for the catcher to handle the incoming pitch, or so the ball goes foul (in which case the runner is allowed to return to first, so the attempt protects the runner from being caught stealing). Either way, this can cause the batter to fall behind in the count, making it harder for him to get a hit. And if he does hit a bad pitch he really can't handle, it could result in poor contact leading directly to the batter being put out, so he may end up giving his at-bat away with no advantage to the offense.
The hit and run has the best chance to be successful when the batter is someone who does not frequently swing and miss, at a time when the count won't disadvantage a hitter if he takes a bad swing, with a runner fast enough to take second base even if the batter does swing and miss.
Often the precise circumstance to call for a hit and run occurs with a two-balls, one-strike count on a hitter, as this situation may meet all of the above criteria, depending on who is at bat and who is on base, but it can occur at other times. An alert defense understands the probability that the offense will call the play at a specific moment, and thus it may choose to call for a pitchout at that moment to defend it. An alert offense, in turn, understands the probability of a forthcoming pitchout, and use the hit and run opportunity as a decoy, causing the pitchout to become another ball in the count in the hitter's favor, increasing his chances of reaching base by walk or hit.
The hit and run is a very old baseball strategy, dating back to the 19th-century game.
In baseball, a triple play (denoted as TP in baseball statistics) is the rare act of making three outs during the same continuous play.
Triple plays happen infrequently – there have been 723 triple plays in Major League Baseball (MLB) since 1876, an average of approximately five per season – because they depend on a combination of two elements, which are themselves uncommon:
In baseball scorekeeping, the abbreviation GITP can be used if the batter grounded into a triple play.

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