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Hidden ball tricks can be used in rugby and lacrosse.
In baseball, the field manager (commonly referred to as the manager) is the equivalent of a head coach who is responsible for overseeing and making final decisions on all aspects of on-field team strategy, lineup selection, training and instruction. Managers are typically assisted by a staff of assistant coaches whose responsibilities are specialized. Field managers are typically not involved in off-field personnel decisions or long-term club planning, responsibilities that are instead held by a team's general manager.
The manager chooses the batting order and starting pitcher before each game, and makes substitutions throughout the game – among the most significant being those decisions regarding when to bring in a relief pitcher. How much control a manager takes in a game's strategy varies from manager to manager and from game to game. Some managers control pitch selection, defensive positioning, decisions to bunt, steal, pitch out, etc., while others designate an assistant coach or a player (often the catcher) to make some or all of these decisions.
Some managers choose to act as their team's first base or third base coach while their team is batting in order to more closely communicate with baserunners, but most managers delegate this responsibility to an assistant. Managers are typically assisted by two or more coaches.
In many cases, a manager is a former professional, semi-professional or college player. A high proportion of current and former managers played the central position of catcher during their playing days, including Yogi Berra, Bruce Bochy, Wilbert Robinson, Joe Girardi, Mike Scioscia, Joe Torre, Connie Mack, Ralph Houk, and Ned Yost.
The manager's responsibilities normally are limited to in-game decisions, with off-field roster management and personnel decisions falling to the team's general manager. The term "manager" used without qualification almost always refers to the field manager (essentially equivalent to the head coach in other North American professional sports leagues), while the general manager is often called the GM. This usage dates back to the early days of professional baseball when it was common practice for teams to have just one "manager" on their staff, and where GM duties were performed either by the field manager or (more commonly) by the owner of the team. Some owners (most famously, Connie Mack of the Philadelphia Athletics) carried out both GM and field managerial duties themselves.
Major League Baseball managers differ from the head coaches of most other professional sports in that they dress in the same uniform as the players and are assigned a jersey number. The wearing of a matching uniform is frequently practiced at other levels of play, as well. The manager may be called "skipper" or "skip" informally by his players.
Control pitchers, who succeed by avoiding surrendering walks, are different from power pitchers who succeed by striking out batters and keeping the ball out of play.
Three of the most famous examples of control pitchers in the history of baseball are Christy Mathewson, Ferguson Jenkins, and Greg Maddux, though Maddux and Jenkins have also had significant strikeout totals (they are members of the 3,000 strikeout club) because of their ability to change speeds and the deceptive nature of their pitches.
In an interview for "ESPN The Magazine" before the , an NBA general manager who chose to remain anonymous (though speculated to be either Rob Hennigan of the Orlando Magic or Ryan McDonough of the Phoenix Suns) stated that because "the last place you want to be is in the middle", his team would try to tank that season to have the best chance at a top pick in the 2014 NBA draft, which was anticipated to be one of the deepest in recent league history. The GM explained how he got the team's owners and the coach to agree to it while trying to keep it a secret from the players.
One of the first teams to "tank" was the 1983–84 Houston Rockets, who considered the season lost after starting 20–26 and decided to play more bench players in order to fall in the standings and get higher in the draft order for the following season. In the 1983–84 NHL season, the Pittsburgh Penguins and New Jersey Devils admitted they wanted to lose in order to get the number one pick in the draft and select Mario Lemieux. But tanking did not become prevalent until the 2010s, when teams in all four major American leagues (the MLB, NFL, NBA, and NHL) were engaged in various forms of the practice.
The Chicago Cubs and Houston Astros pioneered the practice in the MLB in the 2010s, finishing last in their respective leagues for several years. Both teams used subsequent draft picks to select star players who led them to championships, as the Cubs won the 2016 World Series and the Astros won in . Other teams like the Miami Marlins, Baltimore Orioles, Kansas City Royals, and Detroit Tigers have sought to emulate the strategy by trading away top players with the goal of drafting and developing top players and cutting costs in order to become competitive again several years later.
In 2014, the Australian Football League's Melbourne Football Club were fined $500,000 for their involvement in a 2009 tanking scandal.
When Jon Gruden retook control of the Oakland Raiders prior to the 2018 NFL season he liquidated most of the Raiders' talent, most notably trading five-time Pro Bowler Khalil Mack to the Chicago Bears for two first round draft picks, leading to accusations that he was intentionally tanking the team in hopes of fielding a competitive team when the Raiders moved to Las Vegas in 2020. The Raiders, who had finished 12–4 and qualified for the playoffs two seasons prior, finished their 2018 season with only four wins, but saw significant improvement the next season thanks to strong play from the team's rookies.
Philadelphia Eagles head coach Doug Pederson faced allegations of deliberately losing the final game of the 2020 season after he replaced starting quarterback Jalen Hurts for backup Nate Sudfeld. The Eagles were losing by only three points against the Washington Football Team early into the fourth quarter, but an ineffective Sudfeld committed two turnovers on consecutive drives that allowed Washington to win 20-14. As a result, the 4-11-1 Eagles moved up from ninth overall to sixth overall in the 2021 NFL Draft, while Washington clinched the NFC East, which would have been clinched by the New York Giants if Philadelphia won. Pederson denied the allegations, stating he intended to give Sudfeld the opportunity to play, although he would be fired a week after the game.
Fans of the Philadelphia 76ers adopted the mantra "Trust the Process" when the team was tanking from 2013 to 2016.
While tanking can be a successful strategy in eventually building a winning team, it alienates fans in the midst of the rebuilding process as fans are frustrated by losing teams. During the Astros' rebuilding years of 2011–2013 when they lost an average of 108 games per season, attendance was cut in half and one game had a television rating of 0.0. The Sabres have also seen dips in attendance since their alleged rebuilding years in the 2010s and have also been described as a "toxic environment".
Tanking can lead to strife with players' unions as tanking teams choose rookies on inexpensive contracts over free agents wanting multimillion dollar deals.
Leagues also see tanking as a threat to their existing revenue streams. The NBA, for example, sees this as a potentially major issue. One of professional leagues largest drivers of revenue generation is gate receipts from attendance. Tanking has been shown to drastically reduce attendance and thus hurt the NBA's bottom line.
The NBA and NHL have responded to the phenomenon in recent years by changing their draft from reverse-order to a lottery formula which is only loosely tied to the previous season's standings. Some observers have called for leagues to adopt a European-style relegation system where the worst teams are demoted to a minor league to make tanking less attractive. The NBA has even fined executives and owners for referencing the merits of losing.
The NBA changed the way teams are given draft picks. In 2018, they decided to level the odds more at the top of the draft so that the worst team does not have the highest chance of getting the number one overall pick. This change serves to dissuade teams from intentionally losing.
Sabermetrics or SABRmetrics is the empirical analysis of baseball, especially baseball statistics that measure in-game activity.
Sabermetricians collect and summarize the relevant data from this in-game activity to answer specific questions. The term is derived from the acronym SABR, which stands for the Society for American Baseball Research, founded in 1971. The term "sabermetrics" was coined by Bill James, who is one of its pioneers and is often considered its most prominent advocate and public face.
Henry Chadwick, a sportswriter in New York, developed the box score in 1858. This was the first way statisticians were able to describe the sport of baseball by numerically tracking various aspects of game play. The creation of the box score has given baseball statisticians a summary of the individual and team performances for a given game.
Sabermetrics research began in the middle of the 20th century with the writings of Earnshaw Cook, one of the earliest sabermetricians. Cook's 1964 book "Percentage Baseball" was one of the first of its kind. At first, most organized baseball teams and professionals dismissed Cook's work as meaningless. The idea of a science of baseball statistics began to achieve legitimacy in 1977 when Bill James began releasing "Baseball Abstracts", his annual compendium of baseball data. However, James's ideas were slow to find widespread acceptance.
David Smith founded Retrosheet in 1989, with the objective of computerizing the box score of every major league baseball game ever played, in order to more accurately collect and compare the statistics of the game.
Sabermetrics was created in an attempt for baseball fans to learn about the sport through objective evidence. This is performed by evaluating players in every aspect of the game, specifically batting, pitching, and fielding. These evaluation measures are usually phrased in terms of either runs or team wins as older statistics were deemed ineffective.
The traditional measure of batting performance is considered to be hits divided by the total number of at-bats. Bill James, along with other fathers of sabermetrics, found this measure to be flawed, as it ignores any other way a batter can reach base besides a hit. This led to the creation of the On-base percentage, which takes walks and hit-by-pitches into consideration. To calculate the On-Base percentage, the total number of hits + bases on balls + hit by pitch are divided by at bats + bases on balls + hit by pitch + sacrifice flies.
Another issue with the traditional measure of the batting average is that it does not distinguish between hits (i.e., singles, doubles, triples, and home runs) and gives each hit equal value. Thus, a measure that differentiates among these four hit outcomes, the slugging percentage, was created. To calculate the slugging percentage, the total number of bases of all hits is divided by the total number of times at bat. Stephen Jay Gould proposed that the disappearance of .400 batting average is actually a sign of general improvement in batting. This is because, in the modern era, players are becoming more focused on hitting for power than for average. Therefore, it has become more valuable to compare players using the slugging percentage and on-base percentage over the batting average.
These two improved sabermetric measures are important skills to measure in a batter and have been combined to create the modern statistic OPS. On-base plus slugging is the sum of the on-base percentage and the slugging percentage. This modern statistic has become useful in comparing players and is a powerful method of predicting runs scored from a certain player.
Some of the other statistics that sabermetricians use to evaluate batting performance are weighted on-base average, secondary average, runs created, and equivalent average.
The traditional measure of pitching performance is earned run average. It is calculated as earned runs allowed per 9 innings. Earned run average does not separate the ability of the pitcher from the abilities of the fielders that he plays with. Another classic measure for pitching is a pitcher's winning percentage. Winning percentage is calculated by dividing wins by the number of decisions (wins and losses). Winning percentage is also heavily dependent on the pitcher's team, particularly on the number of runs it scores.
"Baseball Prospectus" created another statistics called the peripheral ERA. This measure of a pitcher's performance takes hits, walks, home runs allowed, and strikeouts while adjusting for ballpark factors. Each ballpark has different dimensions when it comes to the outfield wall so a pitcher should not be measured the same for each of these parks.
Batting average on balls in play (BABIP) is another useful measurement for determining pitcher's performance. When a pitcher has a high BABIP, they will often show improvements in the following season, while a pitcher with low BABIP will often show a decline in the following season. This is based on the statistical concept of regression to the mean. Others have created various means of attempting to quantify individual pitches based on characteristics of the pitch, as opposed to runs earned or balls hit.
Value over replacement player (VORP) is considered a popular sabermetric statistic. This statistic demonstrates how much a player contributes to his team in comparison to a hypothetical player that performs at the minimum level needed to hold a roster position on a major league team. This measurement was invented by Keith Woolner, a former writer for the sabermetric group/website "Baseball Prospectus".
Wins above replacement (WAR) is another popular sabermetric statistic for evaluating a player's contributions to his team. Similar to VORP, WAR compares a given player to a replacement-level player in order to determine the number of additional wins the player has provided to his team. WAR values vary with hitting positions and are largely determined by a player's successful performance and amount of playing time.
Many traditional and modern statistics, such as ERA and Wins Shared, don't give a full understanding of what is taking place on the field. Simple ratios are not sufficient to understand the statistical data of baseball. Structured quantitative analysis is capable of explaining many aspects of the game, for example, to examine how often a team should attempt to steal.
Sabermetrics can be used for multiple purposes, but the most common are evaluating past performance and predicting future performance to determine a player's contributions to his team. These may be useful when determining who should win end-of-the-season awards such as MVP and when determining the value of making a certain trade.
Most baseball players tend to play a few years in the minor leagues before they are called up to the major league. The competitive differences coupled with ballpark effects make the exact comparison of a player's statistics a problem. Sabermetricians have been able to clear this problem by adjusting the player's minor league statistics, also known as the Minor-League Equivalency. Through these adjustments, teams are able to look at a player's performance in both AA and AAA to determine if he is fit to be called up to the majors.
Sabermetrics methods are generally used for three purposes:
A machine learning model can be built using data sets available at sources such as baseball-reference. This model will give probability estimates for the outcome of specific games or the performance of particular players. These estimates are increasingly accurate when applied to a large number of events over a long term. The game outcome (win/lose) is treated as having a binomial distribution.
Predictions can be made using a logistic regression model with explanatory variables including: opponents' runs scored, runs scored, shutouts time at bat, winning rate, and pitcher whip.
Many sabermetricians are still working hard to contribute to the field through creating new measures and asking new questions. Bill James' two "Historical Baseball Abstract" editions and "Win Shares" book have continued to advance the field of sabermetrics, 25 years after he helped start the movement. His former assistant Rob Neyer, who is now a senior writer at ESPN.com and national baseball editor of SBNation, also worked on popularizing sabermetrics since the mid-1980s.
Nate Silver, a former writer and managing partner of "Baseball Prospectus", invented PECOTA. This acronym stands for "Player Empirical Comparison and Optimization Test Algorithm", and is a sabermetric system for forecasting Major League Baseball player performance. Simply put, it assumes that the careers of similar players will follow a similar trajectory. This system has been owned by "Baseball Prospectus" since 2003 and helps the website's authors invent or improve widely relied-upon sabermetric measures and techniques.
Beginning in the 2007 baseball season, the MLB started looking at technology to record detailed information regarding each pitch that is thrown in a game. This became known as the PITCHf/x system which is able to record the speed of the pitch, at its release point and as it crossed the plate, as well as the location and angle of the break of certain pitches through video cameras. FanGraphs is a website that favors this system as well as the analysis of play-by-play data. The website also specializes in publishing advanced baseball statistics as well as graphics that evaluate and track the performance of players and teams.
In baseball, the left right switch is a maneuver by which a player that struggles against left- or right-handed players is replaced by a player who excels in the situation, usually only for the duration of the situation in question. For instance, a right-handed pitcher who is weak against left-handed hitting and is facing a left-handed hitter would be replaced with a pitcher, usually left-handed, who does a superior job of getting a left-handed hitter out. Similarly, a batter who has difficulty hitting against a left-handed pitcher will sometimes be pinch hit for by a batter who does well, even if the original player is superior in other respects.
Conventional baseball wisdom suggests that, when a pitcher and a hitter pitch or bat with the same hand, the pitcher typically has the advantage. This especially holds true for left-handed pitchers, as lefties are less common in a major-league lineup than righties. As a result, the most common use of the lefty-righty switch is when a right-handed pitcher is facing a left-handed batter. The manager of the defensive team will sometimes go to the bullpen, especially in close games where a reliever has already entered the game, and pull out a left-handed specialist to face the left-handed batter. The new pitcher will then attempt to get the batter out. Whether he succeeds or fails, the pitcher will often be replaced after the at-bat.
The lefty-righty switch can also be used against switch hitters who are noticeably poorer from one side of the plate than the other, or in the somewhat rarer instance of a batter who does poorly against "opposite"-handed pitchers. The basic principle in these cases remains the same.
It is less common, although still frequent, for a batter to be replaced to gain a handedness advantage over a pitcher. For instance, with a left-handed pitcher in and a left-handed batter due up, a right-handed bat may be called in from the bench. The righty may not be as strong an all-round player as the player he replaced (thus, his absence from the everyday lineup), but he is a superior tactical choice for the purpose of getting on base in one at bat with a favorable matchup. Such a batter can be pinch run for if he gets on, replaced with a better defensive player for the next half-inning, or simply left in for the duration of the game.
Similarly, position players must accept facing both left-handed and right-handed pitching as part of their job. Managers will usually juggle batters who are exceptionally weak against one sort of pitcher so that they only face starting pitchers who offer favorable matchups, but it is impossible to shield a batter from every instance in which he will face a pitcher who has him at a disadvantage. As a result, a position player must be prepared at all times to face a lefty-righty switch in a situation where his team cannot afford to pinch hit for him.
Inside baseball is a strategy in baseball developed by the 19th-century Baltimore Orioles team and promoted by John McGraw. In his book, "My Thirty Years of Baseball", McGraw credits the development of the "inside baseball" to manager Ned Hanlon. In the 1890s, this kind of play was referred to as "Oriole baseball" or "Baltimore baseball".
Inside baseball is an offensive strategy that focuses on teamwork and good execution. It usually centers on tactics that keep the ball in the infield: walks, base hits, bunts, and stolen bases. One such play, where the batter deliberately strikes the pitched ball downward onto the infield surface with sufficient force such that the ball rebounds skyward, allowing the batter to reach first base safely before the opposing team can field the ball, remains known as a Baltimore Chop.
Another term in use in the 1890s for this style was "scientific baseball", referring to calculated one-run game strategies based on intelligent, cooperative actions of the players. An article in "The New York Times" published in 1911 described "scientific baseball":Scientific baseball of to-day – "inside ball" they call it – consists in making the opposing team think you are going to make a play one way, then shift suddenly and do it in another.
McGraw in his book writes: "So-called inside baseball is mostly bunk. It is merely working out of definite plans that the public does not observe".
This strategy did not rely on big hits and home runs and became the primary offensive strategy during the dead-ball era.
The equivalent modern term is "small ball".
Critics also note that the reputation of the Orioles for the "inside baseball" grew only in retrospect. At the time, the Orioles were more famous for deliberately playing dirty.
Win probability is a statistical tool which suggests a sports team's chances of winning at any given point in a game, based on the performance of historical teams in the same situation. The art of estimating win probability involves choosing which pieces of context matter. Baseball win probability estimates often include whether a team is home or away, inning, number of outs, which bases are occupied, and the score difference. Because baseball proceeds batter by batter, each new batter introduces a discrete state. There are a limited number of possible states, and so baseball win probability tools usually have enough data to make an informed estimate.
American football win probability estimates often include whether a team is home or away, the down and distance, score difference, time remaining, and field position. American football has many more possible states than baseball with far fewer games, so football estimates have a greater margin of error. The first win probability analysis was done in 1971 by Robert E. Machol and former NFL quarterback Virgil Carter.
As a brief example, guessing that each team playing at home will win is based on home advantage. This guess uses a single contextual factor and involves a very large number of games. But with only one factor, the accuracy of this guess is limited to home advantage itself (about 55–70% across sports) and does not change within the game based on in-game factors.
Win probability added is the change in win probability, often how a play or team member affected the probable outcome of the game.
Current research work involves measuring the accuracy of win probability estimates, as well as quantifying the uncertainty in individual estimates. That is, if a tool estimates a 24% win probability because 24% of previous teams in that situation won their games, do future teams win at the same 24% rate? Estimating from hidden data uses testing tools like cross-validation.
While many models involve frequency analysis of past events, other models use Bayesian processes.
Some models include a measure of teams' strength coming into the game, while others assume every team is average. Including strength estimates increases the number of possible states, and therefore decreases an estimate's power while possibly increasing its accuracy.
Whiteyball is a style of playing baseball that was developed by former Major League Baseball manager Whitey Herzog. The term was coined by the press during the 1982 World Series to describe the style of Herzog's St. Louis Cardinals. The team won the Series without a typical power hitter, instead using speed on the base paths, solid pitching, excellent defense, and line drive base hits. Whiteyball was well-suited to the fast, hard AstroTurf surface that Busch Memorial Stadium had at the time, which created large, unpredictable bounces when the ball hit it at sharp angles. In his book "White Rat", Herzog says the approach was a response to the spacious, artificial surface stadiums of the time. He said of the media's dismay at his teams' success:
Herzog used this strategy for his team during the 1980s until he left the Cardinals in 1990.
A 2012 sports article described Whiteyball as follows:
Herzog used many switch-hitters such as Ozzie Smith, Willie McGee, Tom Herr, Terry Pendleton, Vince Coleman, José Oquendo, Garry Templeton, Ted Simmons, Luis Alicea, Mike Ramsey, Tony Scott, and Félix José in St. Louis, along with Willie Wilson and U L Washington when he managed in Kansas City. Kansas City Royals manager Ned Yost used his own version of Whiteyball to get to the 2014 World Series, and win the 2015 series.
According to "The Dickson Baseball Dictionary", a team has "batted around" when each of the nine batters in the team's lineup has made a plate appearance, and the first batter is coming up again during a single inning. Dictionary.com, however, defines "bat around" as "to have every player in the lineup take a turn at bat during a single inning." It is not an official statistic. Opinions differ as to whether nine batters must get an at-bat, or if the opening batter must bat again for "batting around" to have occurred.
In modern American baseball, some batting positions have nicknames: "leadoff" for first, "cleanup" for fourth, and "last" for ninth. Others are known by the ordinal numbers or the term #-hole (3rd place hitter would be 3-hole). In similar fashion, the third, fourth, and fifth batters are often collectively referred to as the "heart" or "meat" of the batting order, while the seventh, eighth, and ninth batters are called the "bottom of the lineup," a designation generally referring both to their hitting position and to their typical lack of offensive prowess.
For example, Rule 36 ("The Batsman's Position--Order of Batting") in "The Playing Rules of Professional Base Ball Clubs" of 1896 stated the following: "The Batsmen must take their positions within the batsmen's lines ... in the order in which they are named in the batting order, which batting order must be submitted by the Captains of the opposing teams to the Umpire before the game, and this batting order must be followed except in the case of a substitute player, in which case the substitute must take the place of the original player in the batting order. After the first inning the first striker in each inning shall be the batsman whose name follows that of the last man who completed his turn ... in the preceding inning."
In cricket, the batting order is generally fixed so that players are sure of their role within the team, but there is no obligation to submit a definitive batting order and stick to it. A "batsman" can be "promoted" to a higher spot (or conversely, demoted to a lower one) in the batting order according to the team's wishes.
The idea of a "revolving" batting order is unique to baseball, in which the on-deck batter at the time the final out is made in one inning becomes the lead-off batter (unless the current batter had not been struck-out or put a ball in play, in which case he returns as the lead-off batter with a 0-0 reset pitch count) in the next inning (unless his spot is taken by a pinch-hitter).
In the shorter form of cricket, there is only one innings per side, while in the longer form each side bats a maximum of two times. In a typical innings of this latter form, all eleven players on the team will have a chance to bat, and the innings finishes when 10 players are out. In the team's second innings, the batting order is usually maintained, but the team can make any changes it desires.
As in baseball, many batting order configurations are possible, but a standard order might be:
The concept of a batting order in baseball is "profoundly democratic; no matter how good a hitter you are, you have to wait your turn." In that respect, although baseball, like cricket, "may have begun as a gentlemen's game," Americans gravitated toward baseball as a better embodiment of the country's egalitarian ideal, and as a symbol of cultural as well as political independence from the British colonial legacy.
However, it should also be remembered that in cricket a single innings lasts hours or even days, and there are periods in which batting can be markedly easier or more difficult. A related factor is that a single ball is used in an innings for around 80 overs (approximately 5 hours of play). At the beginning of an innings, therefore, when bowlers are fresh and the ball is hard, it would be appreciably more challenging for the non-specialist batsmen to make an impact. Conversely, if such a player bats when the ball is old and the bowlers are tired, he can thrive, and this can often be a great source of pleasure to spectators, as insult is added to injury for the other side.
Finally, in cricket, there is no such thing as a designated hitter, so even if a bowler has no batting ability, he will still be required to bat, usually as the last man in the order.
The first player in the batting order is known as the leadoff hitter. The leadoff batter is traditionally an individual with a high on-base percentage, plate discipline, bat control, good speed, and the ability to steal bases. His goal is to ensure the team has baserunners when the later, more powerful hitters come to bat. Once on base, his main goal is to get into scoring position (that is, 2nd or 3rd base) as quickly as possible, either through steals, hit and run plays or intelligent baserunning decisions, and then on to score.
His need for a high on-base percentage (OBP) exceeds that of the other lineup spots. Because leadoff hitters are selected primarily for their speed and ability to reach base, they are typically not power hitters, but contact hitters. Leadoff hitters typically hit mostly singles and doubles and draw walks to get on base. However, speed is not essential, as was shown by Wade Boggs, but it is highly desired among leadoff hitters.
However, today's model for a leadoff hitter developed only gradually. An early "job description" for a leadoff hitter by baseball pioneer Henry Chadwick in 1867 advised only, "Let your first striker always be the coolest hand of the nine." By 1898, though, a "Sporting Life"
article noted, "It is customary to have a small, active fellow who can hit, run and steal bases, and also worry a pitcher into a preliminary base on balls, as a leader in the list."
Examples of classic leadoff hitters are Phil Rizzuto, Richie Ashburn, Maury Wills, Lou Brock, Pete Rose, Rod Carew, Tim Raines, and Ichiro Suzuki, with some having somewhat more power (Dick McAuliffe, Lou Whitaker, Rickey Henderson, Paul Molitor, Derek Jeter, Carlos Gómez, Gerardo Parra, Johnny Damon).
The term “leadoff hitter” can be used interchangeably to describe not only the first batter on the lineup card, but also the first batter up in any particular inning. For example, if, in the second inning, the fifth batter in the lineup card is the first batter up, it will be said that he is leading off or that he is the leadoff batter for that particular inning.
The third batter, in the "three-hole", is generally the best all-around hitter on the team, often hitting for a high batting average but not necessarily very fast. Part of his job is to reach base for the cleanup hitter, and part of it is to help drive in baserunners himself. Third-place hitters are best known for "keeping the inning alive". However, in recent years, some managers have tended to put their best slugger in this position.
Typically the greatest hitters for a combination of power and OBP on their teams bat third, as is shown by the use of such hitters as Rogers Hornsby, Babe Ruth, Stan Musial, Mel Ott, Ted Williams, Tony Gwynn, Willie Mays, Chipper Jones, Barry Bonds, Mickey Mantle, Carl Yastrzemski, Albert Pujols, Joey Votto, Andrew McCutchen, Miguel Cabrera, Ken Griffey Jr., Ryan Braun, Josh Hamilton, Evan Longoria, José Bautista, Edwin Encarnación, Mike Trout, and Hank Aaron in this position in the lineup. Even without the combination of extreme power (Yogi Berra, Al Kaline, George Brett) or high batting average (Ernie Banks, Harmon Killebrew, Johnny Bench, Mike Schmidt, Reggie Jackson) this batting position contains an inordinate number of hitters who eventually become members of the Baseball Hall of Fame.
The theory behind the cleanup hitter is that, at the beginning of the game, if at least one of the first three batters reaches base with a single-base hit or walk, a home run will result in two or more runs rather than just one (a "solo" home run). If all three players reach base, thereby loading the bases, the cleanup hitter has the chance to hit a grand slam, scoring four runs. But even without the grand slam, this batter can extend an inning with a high batting average and frequent walks.
However, since home runs were a rarity before 1920, the concept of slotting a home run hitter fourth was slow to develop. However, the need for a good run producer in that position was recognized from the early days in baseball history, as demonstrated by player-manager Cap Anson generally penciling his name there. As power came to play a larger role in the game, the tendency to bat home run hitters fourth developed accordingly. In 1904, sportswriter Tim Murnane stated unequivocally that "The heavy hitter of the team is located at the fourth place."
The #3 and #4 hitters can often be switched in roles. For example, the 2011 Detroit Tigers had Miguel Cabrera as their #4 hitter but moved him to the #3 hitter after acquiring Prince Fielder as a free agent before the 2012 season.
In the presence of the designated hitter, the ninth batter is often like the second leadoff. Ninth-hitters tend to be fast, and have a decent on-base percentage like the leadoff hitter.
On August 18, 1956, major league manager Bobby Bragan placed his best hitter in the leadoff position and the remainder of his lineup in descending batting average order. Earnshaw Cook in his 1966 book, "Percentage Baseball", claimed that, using a computer, Bragan's lineup would result in 1 to 2 more wins per season. A recent computer simulation demonstrates the superiority of Bragan's lineup.
Power hitter is a term used in baseball for a skilled player that has a higher than average ability in terms of his batting, featuring a combination of dexterity and personal strength that likely leads to a high number of home-runs as well as doubles and triples.
In terms of detailed analysis, looking at a player's ability as a power hitter often involves using statistics such as someone's 'slugging percentage' (a function that's calculated by evaluating someone's number of moments at bat in relation to the nature of their hits and strikes). 'Isolated Power' (ISO), a measure showing the number of extra bases earned per time at bat that's calculated by subtracting someone's batting average from his slugging percentage, is another statistic used.
The concept generally is analogous to that of a power pitcher, a player who relies on the velocity of his pitches (perhaps at the expense of accuracy) and a high record of strikeout associated with them (statistics such as strikeouts per nine innings pitched are common measures).
Barry Bonds, who set the record for the most home runs in a season in Major League Baseball history, is often cited as a power hitter. His career was later bogged down by issues regarding performance enhancing drugs. However, he managed a total of 762 home runs while also earning a comparatively high ISO compared to his rivals, with the publication "Business Insider" labeling him #3 in a list of the greatest power hitters of all time.
Other baseball figures so cited include the famous hitters Babe Ruth, Lou Gehrig, and Ted Williams. Popular newspaper writer Victor O. Jones wrote about Williams in particular, "Ted is lucky to come along in a baseball age that worships on the shrine of power, pure, unadulterated power."
However, in an instance where if the runner at 3rd base scoring ends the game immediately, a team may elect to have a fifth infielder, as to decrease the chances of a groundball getting through. The drawback is that it decreases the chance of an outfielder getting to a potential fly ball that may result in a play at the plate, however, any fair fly ball hit deep enough is good enough to end the game.
For scorekeeping purposes, whatever position a player is listed as in the box score is the number they get assigned. For example, if a left fielder moves in to play the third base position, and a ball is hit to him, and he throws to the catcher to get the out, the play is recorded as 7–2.
In , in an Opening Day game between the Toronto Blue Jays and Cleveland Indians at Progressive Field in Cleveland, Ohio, in the bottom of the 12th, with the score tied 4–4, the Indians loaded the bases with one out. Manager John Farrell of the Blue Jays decided to take out left fielder Eric Thames and bring in veteran infielder Omar Vizquel (who won 11 Gold Gloves in his career) to play at second base, being the pivot of a potential double play. Sure enough, pitcher Luis Pérez got Asdrúbal Cabrera to ground into the inning ending double play, 6–4–3, although Vizquel was not involved in the double play. The Jays ended up winning 7–4 in 16 innings, which was the longest Opening Day game in MLB history.
Later in 2012, on September 13, 2012 in a game vs. the Tampa Bay Rays and Baltimore Orioles at Camden Yards in Baltimore, Maryland, with the game tied 2–2 in the bottom of the 13th, the Orioles loaded the bases with no one out. Rays manager Joe Maddon took out left fielder Sam Fuld to bring in infielder Reid Brignac to play in the middle of the infielder. Rays pitcher Chris Archer ended up getting Robert Andino to ground into a force at home plate before striking out Matt Wieters and Nate McLouth to get out of the jam. The Orioles ended up winning 3–2 in 14 innings.

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