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PSYOP 4.pdf | Psychological oPerations after the second
World War
ltcol Zbigniew Modrzejewski
abstract
This paper has two purposes. From the personal side, the topic was chosen because I
am interested in the history of psychological operations. To benefit the reader, I address
psychological operations in selected military conflicts after the Second World War in order
to consider this issue.
The goal of this study is to depict examples of the psychological operations conducted after
World War II as part of military operations and examine the increasing importance of these
issues to all involved in the battle. The article describes methods and means of psychological
activities carried out by both sides in conflicts against both soldiers and civilians. Most
attention in the article is devoted to the potent |
PSYOP 4.pdf | ial of the United States, which is without
doubt a leader in the development of psychological operations. US PSYOP equipment is the
most sophisticated and covers a broad spectrum of diverse technological means of influence.
It results especially from the permanent engagement of US troops in military activities in
various parts of the world after the end of World War II.
Psychological operations have been an essential element of warfare since ancient times. The
purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behaviour
favourable to the originator’s objectives. It has been used throughout history to influence
foreign groups and leaders. Moreover, psychological operations targeted the enemy’s will to
fight. In various conflicts after World War II, we can ob |
PSYOP 4.pdf | serve more and more attention being
paid to psychological operations. Today we can observe arevolution in PSYOP capabilities.
This is related to the development of modern technologies, especially the internet, which
gives new opportunities for information transfer.
Keywords: psychological operations, media, audience, influence, dissemination
74
introduction
Nowadays, we should consider psychological operations as an integral part of
military operations.
PSYOP may be conducted in both the long and short term across the full spectrum
of military operations. ��ooddeerrnn PPSSYYOOPP aarree eennhhaanncceedd bbyy tthhee ee��ppaannssiioonn ooff mmaassss
communication capabilities (Internet, mobile phones, social media etc.).
To employ successful PSYOP it is essential to use effective communicati |
PSYOP 4.pdf | on
techniques to convey the message to the target audience. The function of PSYOP
is to use communication to influence behaviour.
Carl von Clausewitz said “killing the enemy’s courage is as vital as killing his troops”.
�ore of my favourite PSYOP quotes are included below:
“To capture the enemy’s entire army is better than to destroy it; to take intact a
regiment, a company, or a squad is better than to destroy them. For to win one
hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the
enemy without fighting is the acme of skill”.
Sun Tzu (544 B.C.–496 B.C.)
“There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run the
sword is always beaten by the mind”.
Napoleon Bonaparte (1769–1821)
“The real target in war is the mind of the enemy comman |
PSYOP 4.pdf | d, not the bodies of his
troops. If we operate against his troops it is fundamentally for the effect that action
will produce on the mind and will of the commander; indeed, the trend of warfare
and the development of new weapons – aircraft and tanks – promise to give us
increased and more direct opportunities of striking at this psychological target”.
B.H. Liddell Hart (1895–1970)
1 Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations AJP-3.10.1(B), SEPTE�BER 04, p. -.
2 G.L. Whitley, PSYOP operations in the 21th century, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania 000, p. .
L.D. Harter, J. Sullivan, Propaganda Handbook, 0th Century Publishing Company,
Washington 95, p. 98.
75
“Machines don’t fight wars. Terrain doesn’t fight wars. Humans fight wars. You
must get into |
PSYOP 4.pdf | the mind of humans. That’s where the battles are won”.
Col. John R. Boyd (1927–1997)
According to various sources, PSYOP is considered to be one of the key elements
of Info Ops accompanied by Electronic Warfare (EW), Operations Security
(OPSEC), Civil-�ilitary Cooperation (CI�IC), Deception, Physical Destruction
and many other activities4.
Psychological operations - definitions and aims
In order to e�amine the issue, providing a PSYOP definition is essential for further
considerations.
Allied Administrative Publication defines psychological operations as: planned
activities using methods of communication and other means directed at approved
audiences in order to influence perceptions, attitudes and behaviour, affecting the
achievement of political and military objectives.
According to th |
PSYOP 4.pdf | e Polish doctrinal document “Operacje Psychologiczne
DD/.0.(A)”: psychological activities are a complex planned activities during
peace, crisis and war time, directed at hostile, friendly and neutral audiences
influencing their attitudes and behaviour in order to achieve desired by the leader
political and military objectives. They are implemented in the country and outside
its border, in areas of responsibility and interest of commands and staffs at all
levels. They can be run independently or as a part of NATO or other coalition
combined operation.
The US uses the term Military Information Support Operations (MISO) to replace
the term psychological operations appropriately, which more accurately reflects
and conveys the nature of planned peacetime or combat operations activities.
4 A |
PSYOP 4.pdf | llied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations AJP- 3.10 (A), DDEECCEE��BBEERR 000555,,, ppp...---000...
5 AAP-06 (2014) NATO Glossary Terms and Definitions, NSA, 9 April 04, -P-0.
6 Operacje psychologiczne DD/3.10.1 (A), Sztab. Gen., Warszawa 00, p. 0.
76
They define �ISO as: planned operations to convey selected information and
indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective
reasoning, and ultimately the behaviour of foreign governments, organizations,
groups, and individuals in a manner favourable to the originator’s objectives.
Psychological operations take place throughout the tactical, operational, and
strategic environments and, as a consequence, we can distinguish three categories
of military PSYOP: strategic, operational and ta |
PSYOP 4.pdf | ctical.
Figure 1. Categories of military psychological operations
PSYOP activities can create a supportive atmosphere and a willingness to
cooperate by influencing target audience behaviour, attitudes and perception to
support mission objectives.
Our national doctrinal document identifies three main objectives of psychological
operations8:
) weakening of the will to act and the aggressive intentions of the opposite or
potentially opposite target audiences;
) strengthening the commitment and support from friendly target audiences;
) obtaining support and cooperation from uncommitted or undecided
communities.
Various methods are used to deliver PSYOP products to target audiences. It
depends on the resources and measures for disseminating them.
7 Joint Publication JP-3-13.2 Military Operat |
PSYOP 4.pdf | ion Support Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
07 January 00 Incorporating Change 0 December 0, GL-4.
8 Operacje psychologiczne …, op. cit., p. 4.
77
Figure 2. Common methods of delivering messages
There are three basic categories of PSYOP products: audio, visual and audiovisual.
At the tactical level, messages are usually delivered by loudspeaker and face to
face communication. For more deliberate campaigns, leaflets, radio or television
may be used. Furthermore, radio or television broadcasts and various publications
may be used during strategic operations. However, in modern times, the internet
plays a vital role in psychological warfare campaigns (see conflict in the Ukraine).
The internet provides access to information through a variety of means, including
worldwide websites, |
PSYOP 4.pdf | social media, chats, interactive TV etc. In the following
section, I will give several e�amples of the mentioned methods in subjectively
chosen conflicts
Psychological operations during the Korean War (1950–1953)
The Korean War began on 5th June 950, when North Korean forces invaded
South Korea. Psychological operations were used e�tensively during this war. At
the beginning, both sides conducted psychological activities accusing each other of
aggression. The first and the greatest problem for US PSYOP officers in conducting
78
psychological operations in Korea was to identify the mind and character of the
target audience. It was especially difficult because of wide differences between the
cultures of the East and of the West.
During the operation, each side employed psychological opera |
PSYOP 4.pdf | tions to try to
convince the soldiers of the other side to lay down their arms, surrender to the
enemy, or to spread confusion and reduce morale. Another aim of PSYOP was
to discourage local civilians from aiding the opponent army of the other side by
providing food or billeting and to discredit the enemy in the eyes of civilians.
American specialists began radio broadcasts and leaflet drops over the Republic
of South Korea immediately after North’s Korea’s invasion across the 8th Parallel
in June 950.
The most common method was dropping leaflets or flyers on territory held by
enemy troops.
They used different types of leaflets. The first type of leaflet was a warning against
UN air attack. The leaflets, meant for civilians, directed them to stay away from
roads, railways, and other mili |
PSYOP 4.pdf | tary targets.
Source: http://www.digitalhorizonsonline.org (left), http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil (right),
31January 2017.
Figure 3. Examples of the leaflets
On the left we can see a fire prevention – clear up poster. It shows a Korean
woman and a child with a burning home in the background. The leaflet on the
right warned civilians to stay away from une�ploded bombs and military targets
like main highways, railroads and military factories.
79
The other main type of leaflets portrayed the people of North Korea as pawns of
the Korean, Chinese, and Soviet Communists. These leaflets blamed Kim II Sung,
�ao Tse Tung and Joseph Stalin for lying to the Korean people and prolonging
the war. The United States Psychological Warfare Division also employed patriotic
music leaflets. �oreover, photos |
PSYOP 4.pdf | of happy prisoners of war were used successfully
on many propaganda leaflets.
Those aimed at soldiers tried to instill fear by warning that the only escape from
the “Flying Tigers of the Free World” was to surrender.
Source: http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil, 06 February 2017.
Figure 4. Safe certificate
The certificate dropped by Air Force aircraft shown above promised enemy soldiers
safe passage through UN lines if they surrendered. One side of this looked like a
North Korean 00 Won bill, which would entice an enemy soldier to pick it up.
The other side had instructions written in Korean, English and Chinese.
According to a press release from Cheonggyecheon �useum, the Communist
side dropped 00 million flyers, while the United Nations dispersed .5 billion9.
9 PsyWar: an exhibition of K |
PSYOP 4.pdf | orean War propaganda leaflets, http://www.korea.net/
NewsFocus/Society/view?articleId=8778, .0.07.
80
Furthermore, US troops used some psychological warfare military transport
aircraft – Douglas C-47, which were equipped with powerful speakers to broadcast
propaganda over the enemy’s positions.
Psychological operations in Vietnam (1956–1975)
Psychological operations were also e�tensively used in Vietnam. The 4th
Psychological Operations Group (4 POG) provided tactical support for allied
operations and took part in strategic campaigns against North Vietnam.
Nowadays, the 4th Psychological Operations Group of the US Army is an active
psychological operations unit located at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. It deploys
anywhere in the world on short notice for all levels of conflict.
During i |
PSYOP 4.pdf | ts service in Vietnam, the organisation of the 4th POG was completely
different. The four battalions of the group were divided by geographic regions. The
th PSYOP Battalion was stationed at Bien Hoa and provided services to the tactical
units, both American and Vietnamese, and to the various political entities such as
provinces and cities in the area of III Corps. The 7th PSYOP Battalion was stationed
in Da Nang and provided service to I Corps. The 8th PSYOP Battalion was based at
Nha Trang, but one of its field teams (B Company) was based out of Pleiku nearly
00 kilometres away. The 8th Battalion served the II Corps area of Vietnam. The 0th
PSYOP Battalion was stationed in Can Tho and served IV Corps.
8th PSYOP Battalion advisory team assisted Vietnamese radio broadcasters
in programmi |
PSYOP 4.pdf | ng PSYOP messages to hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese
civilians, North Vietnamese soldiers and Viet Cong. 8th PSYOP Battalion radio
technicians manned the Group’s 50-thousand watt transmitter from its hilltop site
outside Pleiku City. In connection with the operation, PSYOP aircraft dropped
thousands of small transistor radios to Viet Cong and North Vietnamese Army
troops. All were pre-tuned to the station’s frequency. The 8th PSYOP Battalion
provides PSYOP support for all of the II Corps. To provide adequate coverage
in Vietnam’s largest corps it became necessary to detach one of its companies
from its headquarters in Nha Trang and station it permanently in Pleiku. The Nha
Trang and Pleiku elements had printing and field team capabilities. The company
at Pleiku also maintained a small |
PSYOP 4.pdf | PSYOP Development Center (PDC), which was
81
an e�tension of the Group PDC system. On �arch 98, The Viet Cong sent about
0 sappers against the radio station and destroyed the radio tower0.
4
POG
7t
h
bn
8th
bn
6t
h
bn
10t
h
bn
Figure 5. Location of 4th Psychological Operations Group in Vietnam
4th POG were not alone in participating in psychological activities in Vietnam.
“Quick Speak” was the project name for the psychological operations (PSYOP) of
the USAF 5th Air Commando Squadron which consisted of si�teen single engine
U-0s and four C-47s, all equipped with 000 watt loudspeaker systems and leaflet
dispenser chutes. During the first si� months of 9, the squadron dropped
more than 508 million leaflets. The leaflets urged the Viet Cong to surrender to
Government forces, promisin |
PSYOP 4.pdf | g them good treatment and eventual repatriation
to their families. The biggest single operation of project “Quick Speak” was its
Tet programme in January. �ore than 0 million leaflets were dropped and 80
hours of speaker broadcasts were flown in an effort to e�ploit the natural desire of
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese soldiers to be with their families during Tet, the
nation’s most important holiday season.
10 http://timyoho.net/BVApage/7thPsyOp/�erkle-KIA-Accounts.html, 9.0.07.
82
The most popular U.S. psychological activity was leaflet dissemination. The Joint
United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) was the main proponent of leaflets
and specified the main objectives of campaign which were clarified and amplified
by 98:
. To convince the people of North Vietnamese that the |
PSYOP 4.pdf | bombing was in self-
defence for communist attacks in the South.
. To convince the people that the Americans and South Vietnamese had
humanitarian concern for people of North Vietnam.
. To convince the people of the North that it was in their best interests to oppose
the war.
4. To keep the people and the government informed of the policies of the USA
and republic of Vietnam.
5. To reduce confidence in the USSR and the China as faithful allies.
. To condition soldiers to think about the Chieu Hoi (“Open Arms”) programme
as a way to escape hardship and death.
7. To discredit the Hanoi regime.
The targets of the campaign were the general population, the armed forces, the
party cadre and the leadership of communist Party.
The opposite side also conducted some psychological activities. Earl |
PSYOP 4.pdf | y in the
war, all of the Viet Cong leaflets were simply hand- written te�t with very short
messages.
Source: http://www.psywarrior.com, 04 February 2017.
Figure 6. A very early Vietnam propaganda leaflet
83
As the Vietnam War went on for a decade, the Viet Cong leaflets became more
intricate, political and colourful and the messages got far more technical with
references to American politicians and peace marches at home.
Source: http://museum.vhpa.org/propaganda/propaganda.shtml (left), http://www.usmilitariaforum.
com (right), 04 February 2017.
Figure 7. Viet Cong propaganda leaflet
The enemy forces in Vietnam were rarely e�posed to sustained air, artillery or
other military attack. Communist commanders largely held the initiative for
determining the time and place of a battle, the Viet C |
PSYOP 4.pdf | ong and North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) forces were able, for the most part, to control their own combat
e�posure and casualties. �ost engagements were short-lived, and most communist
units fought only a few times a year. As a result of these combat conditions, U.S.
and Government of South Vietnam forces never caused a catastrophic break in
communist morale or an en masse surrender of a large-sized enemy main force
unit. Even though the U.S. and Government of South Vietnam mounted massive
PSYOP campaigns involving billions of leaflets and tens of thousands of hours of
aero broadcasts to induce enemy defections and surrenders, the number of main-
force prisoners and defectors that came into allied hands was minuscule compared
with the number of enemy troops engaged and killed during the conflic |
PSYOP 4.pdf | t.
11 S.T. Hosmer, Psychological effects of. U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars 1941-1991: Lessons
for U.S. Commanders, Santa �onica, California 99, pp. 5-9.
84
To conclude, during the war in Vietnam, PSYOP specialists used three main
types of psychological influence on the enemy: printed materials, via radio and
by electro acoustic measures. For obvious reasons, the usage of television would
have been at that time unreasonable. However, in later years, its potential impact
has been fully appreciated (especially the concepts of impact on the population in
the occupied territories and against prisoners of war in the camps).
Psychological operations in The Former Yugoslavia (1995–1999)
NATO’s Balkan multinational operations under the codename Operation
Enduring Freedom started as a pea |
PSYOP 4.pdf | ce enforcement mission with the deployment of
the Implementation Force (IFOR) into Bosnia on 0th December 995 and lasted
for one year. IFOR was a 0 000 person, nation coalition force. �any of the
national forces earmarked for IFOR, mainly the French and British, were already
in Bosnia as a part of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). On
th December 99, the task of IFOR was taken over by thee Stabilisation Force
(SFOR) and the military operation continued mainly as a peacekeeping mission.
Furthermore, NATO has been leading a peace-support operation in Kosovo since
June 999 in support of wider international efforts to build peace and stability in
the area – the Kosovo force (KFOR). KFOR was established when NATO’s 78-day
air campaign against �ilosevic’s regime, aimed at |
PSYOP 4.pdf | putting on end to violence in
Kosovo, was over.
Since December 995, over 000 soldiers from the U.S. Army’s Civil Affairs and
Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) have supported IFOR and
SFOR in the former Yugoslavia. The PSYOP component to this mission represents
one of the largest and most comprehensive PSYOP missions in U.S. history.
The PSYOP campaign was designed to influence the local population and the
former warring factions to cooperate with NATO activities. To achieve these
goals, the task force launched a multimedia campaign, albeit a limited one, and
sought to use step by step psychological processes to entice attitudinal changes.
To accomplish this, the Combined Joint Psychological Operations Task Force
85
(CJPOTF) oversaw the operation of 4 subordinate organisations |
PSYOP 4.pdf | including theatre,
divisional and brigade support elements as well as tactical PSYOP teams.
Psychological operations played a key role during operation Allied Force. The
IFOR/SFOR information campaign was massive both in terms of the quantity of
materials disseminated and the variety of themes e�plored during the operation.
Since December 995, the Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task
Force (CJIICTF) has produced and disseminated close to million products
within the Federation of Bosnia and the Republic of Srpska. This includes handbills,
pamphlets, posters, the Herald of Peace (a weekly IFOR newspaper focusing on
news and features of national interest), the Mirko teen-oriented magazine, as
well as various radio, television, and miscellaneous products such as soccer balls,
c |
PSYOP 4.pdf | olouring books, and IFOR/SFOR logo pens.
By December 99, with the transition from IFOR to SFOR, the PSYOP task force
organisation had changed slightly. The headquarters and Product Development
Cell (PDC) became multinational instead of all-U.S. with French and British liaison
officers assigned to the Combined Joint Information Task Force headquarters. The
British-led division acquired some printing equipment in spring 99 to develop
products specific for its area of responsibility.
The primary mission of IFOR and SFOR Psychological Operations was to deter
armed resistance and hostile behaviour against IFOR/SFOR troops and operations.
The Allies also produced mine-warning leaflets. �ore than 04.5 million leaflets
were dropped throughout Serbia over the course of the campaign. Perhaps |
PSYOP 4.pdf | the
most interesting is the mine-warning -page Superman comic book entitled
“Deadly Legacy”.
There were a number of magazines and newspapers published by the Allied
forces. For e�ample, US forces in Sarajevo published a weekly news magazine
called Herald of Peace (under SFOR this became the Herald of Progress). British
forces in Banja Luka printed a magazine called Mostovi. The German forces in
Sarajevo published a monthly magazine for teenagers entitled Mirko.
12 http://www.psywarrior.com/bosnia.html, 0 February 07.
1 See �.R. Jacobson, Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle, The National Defense
University, 997, p. 94-95.
86
Figure 8. Mine warning products
Figure 9. Magazines
In February 999, soldiers of the 4th Psychological Operations Group deployed
to establish and form |
PSYOP 4.pdf | the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) in
support of Joint Task Force Noble Anvil. Their mission was to get the message
of truth to the diverse masses, which included Serb military, police forces in
Kosovo, and the civilian population in Belgrade as well as in the small towns and
villages throughout the remaining of Serbia, and to Kosovo refugees in Albania
and �acedonia. During the 78-day air campaign, the JPOTF developed over
40 different leaflets. Over 00 million of these leaflets were bo� dropped by
�C-0H Combat Talon aircraft from the 7th Special Operations Squadron over
87
Serbia. 4.5 million more leaflets were distributed by F- and B-5 aircraft via
�K-9 leaflet bombs4.
The JPOTF also produced radio and television programmes in Serbian and
Albanian which were |
PSYOP 4.pdf | broadcast by EC-0E Commando Solo aircraft of the
9rd Special Operations Wing. Three EC-0E were deployed from Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania to a base in Brindisi in Italy as a direct response to persistent hostile
Bosnian - Serb radio and television propaganda from the Karadzic faction. EC-
0E Command Solo aircraft transmitted both radio and television broadcasts,
blanketing Belgrade and Northern Yugoslavia, Kosovo, and southern Serbia with
“Allied Voice Radio and Television”. The Command Solo aircraft continued to fly
and broadcast “Allied Voice and Television” even after the air campaign ended on
9 June, 999.
In 999, Radio KFOR was the only radio station in the Pristina area. After 00,
the station had to face fierce competition from a myriad of newly founded local
radio stations.
T |
PSYOP 4.pdf | he German, French, Belgian, Italian and Spanish contingents also conducted
PSYOP activities in support of their missions. Both German KFOR in the south
(�NB South) and French KFOR in the north (�NB North) produced their own
printed magazines: Dritarja/Prozor (German AOR) and Bonjour (French AOR).
In 994, French forces were unable to conduct PSYOP because of lack PSYOP
specialists to advise the commanders in the field, and no printing facilities to
communicate with the local population or factions. �oreover, they misunderstood
and mistrust the motives of the US PSYOP personnel who dominated the early
effort in Bosnia. Over time, the French began to accept increased US PSYOP
support, including a PSYOP radio station in �ostar and a small group of US
tactical PSYOP soldiers who disseminated m |
PSYOP 4.pdf | aterials. In addition, they decided
to develop their own capability in order to influence the PSYOP conte�t more
directly. This led to the establishment of a French-run PSYOP radio station and
creating, together with Spanish and German PSYOP, a print product development
capability in �ostar.
14 http://www.psywarrior.com/kosovo.html, 0 February 07.
88
Belgium had a small PSYOP Support Element unit called the Information
Operations Group consisting of about 0 regular military personnel and selected
reservists as needed. The first Belgians operation were in late 999 in Kosovo where
they installed a PSYOP radio station called “Radio Horizon” in the Belgian camp
called “Center City” at the French-occupied section of Kosovo in Leposavic.
The Italian contingent developed a comic strip featur |
PSYOP 4.pdf | ing Bugs Bunny to raise
children’s awareness of mines.
During the Bosnia and Kosovo war, the technologies used shifted from pamphlets
and leaflets to comics and television programmes.
Psychological operations during the Persian gulf War (1991)
The Persian Gulf War was triggered by Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait on August ,
990. The allied coalition’s military offensive against Iraq began on January
–7, 99. Persian Gulf War strategic and tactical field level psychological
operations supported the goals and conditions set forth by coalition leaders upon
an international scale.
Psychological operations played a key role in the destruction of enemy morale and
contributed to the large scale surrender and desertion of Iraqi soldiers. According to
statements by an Iraqi division commander, PSYO |
PSYOP 4.pdf | P leaflets were a great threat to troop
morale, the second in terms of significance after the Coalition bombing campaign.
During this war, PSYOP units dropped over 9 million leaflets to encourage Iraqi
soldiers to surrender, usually by stressing the inevitability of their defeat. Estimates
show that nearly 98% of all Iraqi prisoners acknowledged having seen a leaflet, 88%
said they believed the message and 70% said the leaflets affected their decision to
surrender. Of the estimated 00 000 soldiers who deserted or surrendered, many were
found carrying leaflets in their hands or carrying them in their clothes.
The principal method for leaflet dissemination was through aerial delivery. Prior
to combat operations, leaflets were disseminated by C-0 aircraft. Specially
configured �-9E lea |
PSYOP 4.pdf | flet bombs were later utilised effectively by B-5, F-
and F/A-8 aircraft.
89
Source: https://thaimilitaryandasianregion.wordpress.com/2016/06/05/.
Figure 10. M129E1/E2 Leaflet Bomb
The �-9 is capable of holding appro�imately 0,000 to 80,000 leaflets.
The PSYOP radio network, “Voice of the Gulf” broadcast from 9 January 99
until the end of the war. “Voice of the Gulf” was the most reliable source of war
news available to the Iraqi soldier throughout operation “Desert Storm”. �oreover,
si�ty si� PSYOP loudspeaker teams provided tactical support for every major
ground unit throughout the ground war.
Leaflet and loudspeaker operations continued non-stop during the air and
ground phases of the conflict. Psychological operations played a key role in the
destruction of enemy morale and |
PSYOP 4.pdf | contributed to the large scale surrender and
desertion of Iraqi soldiers.
After the Persian Gulf War, Pentagon e�perts agreed on one thing: the action was
a psychological weapon that does not kill, but was psychologically shocking and it
was seen as an important factor in increasing the ability of combat troops and at
the same time affecting a significant reduction in losses on both sides.
Psychological operations in iraq 2001–2011
President George W. Bush announced the opening of the second Gulf War at
5 on 9 �arch 00 just 90 minutes after the deadline for Saddam to e�ile
himself and his sons from Iraq. Operation Iraqi Freedom aircrews dropped more
than million leaflets over 9 military and civilian targets on �arch. The mi�
consisted of 7 different leaflets. The Coalition pre |
PSYOP 4.pdf | viously dropped eleven of the
90
leaflets during the “No-Fire Zone” warning phase of the campaign5. Leaflets
dropped over Iraq and radio broadcasts urging civilians to stay in their homes
and away from military forces.
The US PSYOP teams in Iraq were the largest of any conflict including companies
and almost ,000 personnel in Iraq or in support roles in the US, according to Lt
Col Glenn Ayers commander of the 9th Psychological Operations Battalion.
�ore than 50 million leaflets have been produced at Fort Bragg and distributed
throughout Afghanistan and Iraq since September 00.
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org.
Figure 11. UH-60 PSYOP leaflet drop near Hawijah in Iraq – 06 March 2008
The most famous leaflet of the war in Iraq is the U.S. military issued illustrated
deck of card |
PSYOP 4.pdf | s depicting the 5 “most wanted” members of the Saddam Hussein
regime delivered to thousands of U.S. troops in the field. They printed the same
data on posters and leaflets for the Iraqi public. Four aces showed the most
wanted fugitives: Saddam Hussein, his sons Uday and Qusay, and the presidential
secretary Abid Hamid �ahmud Al-Tikriti.
15 H.A. Friedman, Psychological Operation in Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003, https://
www.psywar.org/content/opiraqifreedom, 04.0.07.
16 J. Krane, US units try to win Iraqi hearts and Minds, http://www.kvue.com/sharedcontent/
iraq/military/0050cciraqhearts.8d08054.htm, 0 January 07.
91
Source: http://www.dailymail.co.uk .
Figure 12. Deck of “Most Wanted Iraqi” playing cards
In addition to leafleting, the other PSYOP mass medium used heavily |
PSYOP 4.pdf | by the
Coalition was the radio. The coalition broadcast from fi�ed transmission towers
as well as from the flying airborne broadcast platform, the EC-0E aircraft
Commando Solo. Local PSYOP radio stations were also set up outside the major
population centres. For instance, the UK PSYOP radio station, “Radio Nahrain”
(Two Rivers), an F� radio station was established on the outskirts of Basra.
Additionally setting up its own radio transmitters, the Coalition attempted
electronically to jam Iraqi radio stations, in order to gain a monopoly on the
information available to the Iraqi people through this medium.
One of the more innovative means used by Coalition PSYOP in the build-up to
“Iraqi Freedom” was the use of mobile phone te�t messaging and e-mails sent
directly to key decision-makers in |
PSYOP 4.pdf | the Iraqi regime. At the start of 00, there
were only 0 internet cafes in Iraq, and the connection fee of US $5 per home
was beyond the reach of most ordinary Iraqis. Also, the Iraqi regime was wary of
allowing access to the internet throughout Iraq. So, while many ordinary Iraqis
did not have access to the internet, most of the Baath Party leadership did, and the
Coalition used this means specifically to outline each the cost of their continued
support for Saddam both for Iraq collectively and for themselves personally7.
17 S. Collins, Mind Games, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/00/Wake-Iraq/�ind-games/
EN/inde�.htm, .0.07.
92
I would like to emphasise that the armed intervention in Iraq was the biggest
operation abroad in which the Polish army participated after the Second W |
PSYOP 4.pdf | orld
War. In September 00, commanded by a Polish general, the �ultinational
Division Central-South (�ND-CS) took over responsibility for one of the zones
in Iraq. The Polish �ilitary Contingent (first rotation) deployed to Iraq with
appro�imately 00 soldiers and took over an area of responsibility (AOR) in the
Central-South sector.
Source: Z. Antczak, The multinational division: is it viable in peace enforcement operations? U.S.
Army War College, Pennsylvania 2005, p. 5.
Figure 13. MND-CS Area of Responsibility in 2003
What I also found important was the role of psychological operations elements
during the stabilisation operation. At the beginning, the PSYOP contingent in
�ultinational Division Central-South consisted of the branches shown on the
diagram below.
93
Figure 14. PSYOPS str |
PSYOP 4.pdf | ucture in MND-CS
The structure and tasks of the PSYOP contingent in �ND-CS had been changing
during the operation. However, the main role in �ND-CS was played by PSYOP
elements detached from the Central Psychological Operations Group. This unit is
located in Bydgoszcz and officially began functioning on 0 April 00.
The most important role in the field of psychological influence in �ND-CS was
played by the Divisional Psychological Support Element (DPSE). DPSE was a
�ND CS staff element and was subordinate to the G- chief. DPSE consisted of
three functional cells as shown in the diagram below.
Figure 15. Structure of Polish DPSE
94
DPSE equipment included: mobile print facility, risograph, audio/video production
studio, media (OSINT8), monitoring studio and off-road vehicle SCORPION.
He |
PSYOP 4.pdf | nce, the Division Psychological Support Element conducted psychological
operations in order to change or reinforce the behaviour of local governing
institutions, organisations, groups, and individuals in �ND CS AO.
The Polish psychological operation in Republic of Iraq was carried out in the
framework of the thirteen main programmes in the diagram below.
Figure 16. Polish PSYOPS programs in Iraq
Polish PSYOP specialists identified the main objects of impact:
− Shiite population,
− people of other ethnic and religious groups,
− Iraqi local leaders,
− religious leaders,
− representatives of local government,
− local police,
− refugees and immigrants,
− paramilitary organisations.
18 OSINT – Open Source of Information.
95
During the Polish involvement in Iraq, the psychological operation elem |
PSYOP 4.pdf | ent tested
the entire spectrum of psychological techniques to spread from direct messages
through electronic, radio and TV broadcasts, websites and the discharge of leaflets
from helicopters and airplanes.
Figure 17. Polish PSYOPS products
One of the key recommendations for psychological influence was the recognition
of direct communication as the most effective form of this kind of action.
During one rotation, the Polish Contingent DPSE conducted9:
− 0 psychological actions,
− leaflet airdrops,
19 Data from VI Rotation of the Polish Contingent.
96
− surveys in WASIT province,
− events in 8 Iraqi Army Division,
− took part in the operation EAGLE II,
− 0 combat patrols (�SR TA�PA & escort for rotation convoy).
For e�ample, from January till June 00, over 898 000 PSYOPS products ( |
PSYOP 4.pdf | handbill,
leaflet, poster, comic book, billboard, warning sign, press publication, multimedia
(TV) spot, announcement, soccer ball, T-shirt, mascot, notebook, pencil, etc.)
were disseminated by the Polish DPSE.
The Polish PSYOP element during the VI rotation conducted operations according
to OPORD �ultinational Corp – Iraq (�NC-I), which determined four main
psychological objectives:
− increasing support for the local governments of Wasit and Quadisiyah;
− reducing the effectiveness of the Anti-Iraqi Forces (AIF);
− increasing support for the Coalition;
− increasing support for economic development in the �ND CS area of operation
(AO).
Psychological Operations conducted in �ND CS AO resulted in a positive or
neutral attitude of the majority of the population towards Iraqi Security Forces a |
PSYOP 4.pdf | nd
Coalition Forces, and increased the number of tips concerning terrorist activities
given by local society and peaceful ASHURA and ARBA’EEN observances.
conclusion
Psychological operations were carried out on a larger or smaller scale by both
sides in all military conflicts after World War II. The conclusions of the analysis
indicate that the United States is the undoubted leader in the global environment
of psychological operations. This results from the repeated involvement of the
US in military activities in various parts of the world and e�isting potential to
conduct psychological operations. US psychological operations are characterised
by the continuous development of their potential in all possible aspects.
97
The Polish Army also noted the need to develop capabilities to conduct
|
PSYOP 4.pdf | psychological activities and, therefore, the Central Psychological Operations
Group was created. Soldiers from this unit participated in the operation “Iraqi
Freedom” and they gained knowledge and e�perience, which was then used in
Afghanistan.
Furthermore, a successful information campaign contributes to building and
preserving public support for the operation. Thus, the successful use of information
can help the commander achieve operational goals by influencing parties, resolving
crises, defusing misunderstandings, and correcting misperceptions.
Nowadays, there is no doubt that the influencing of the opponent through
psychological impact has become one of the key ways of fighting. Therefore,
psychological operations will include activities before, during and after major
combat operation |
PSYOP 4.pdf | s. It will serve for systematically weakening the enemy’s morale,
aiming to degrade the functioning of society, and ultimately leading to the collapse
of state structures and the functioning of victory.
In conclusion, a psychological operation has the potential to be the most powerful
weapon in the military’s arsenal. It targets the mind and influences decision
makers. The effect of military operations can be magnified by PSYOP through the
modification of the foreign target audience’s behaviour. Psychological operations
as long term activities require continuity of efforts in order to achieve determined
objectives.
references
AAP-06 (2014) NATO Glossary Terms and Definitions, NSA, 9 April 04.
Allied Joint Doctrine for Information Operations AJP- 3.10 (A), DDeecceemmbbeerr 000555.. |
PSYOP 4.pdf | .
Allied Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations AJP-3.10.1(B), September 04.
Antczak Z., The multinational division: is it viable in peace enforcement operations?, U.S.
Army War College, Pennsylvania 005.
Collins S., Mind Games, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/00/Wake-Iraq/�ind-
games/EN/inde�.htm.
Friedman H.A., Psychological Operation in Iraq: Operation Iraqi Freedom, 2003, https://
www.psywar.org/content/opiraqifreedom.
98
Harter L.D., Sullivan J., Propaganda Handbook, 0th Century Publishing Company,
Washington 95.
Hosmer S.T., Psychological effects of. U.S. Air Operations in Four Wars 1941-1991: Lessons
for U.S. Commanders, Santa �onica, California 99.
Jacobson �.R., Tactical PSYOP Support to Task Force Eagle, The National Defence
University, 997.
Joint Publication JP-3 |
PSYOP 4.pdf | -13.2 Military Operation Support Operations, 07 January 00,
Incorporating Change , 0 December 0.
Krane J., US units try to win Iraqi hearts and Minds, http://www.kvue.com/sharedcontent/
iraq/military/0050cciraqhearts.8d08054.htm.
Operacje psychologiczne DD/3.10.1 (A), Sztab. Gen., Warszawa 00.
Whitley G.L., PSYOP operations in the 21th century, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, Pennsylvania 000.
PsyWar: an exhibition of Korean War propaganda leaflets, http://www.korea.net/
NewsFocus/Society/view?articleId=8778.
http://timyoho.net/BVApage/7thPsyOp/�erkle-KIA-Accounts.html.
http://www.psywarrior.com/bosnia.html.
http://www.psywarrior.com/kosovo.html.
99
|
PSYOP 10.pdf | NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA
THESIS
DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
by
James D. Monroe
June 2012
Thesis Advisor: Hy Rothstein
Second Reader: Kalev Sepp
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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
This thesis explores the history of U.S. Army deception and doctrine, and combines the insights gained with the
various works on deception, cognitive psychology, communications, and decision-making in order to distill a concise
handbook for deception practitioners. A longitudinal review of U.S. Army doctrine reveals a wide variation in the
treatment of deception, from emphasized to ignored. This variation can be primarily explained by the U.S. preference
for the cumulative destruction style of war and the perceived balance of power between |
PSYOP 10.pdf | the U.S. and its adversaries.
This thesis strives to fill the current doctrinal gap by distilling the existing body of work to create a theory of
deception in the military context. The theory presented provides a cogent structure, taxonomy, and lexicon; as well as,
emphasis on how deception functions within the frameworks of communications and decision-making. Next, a
synthesis of the practice of deception is presented, with a focus on deception planning and the essential elements of
deception practice. Examples of U.S. use of deception from the Revolutionary War to Operation DESERT STORM
are presented to provide illumination on the utility and use of deception. Finally, the thesis provides recommendations
on how to organize for deception operations.
14. SUBJECT TERMS Military Deception, |
PSYOP 10.pdf | Communications, Decision-Making, OODA, Doctrine, 15. NUMBER OF
Planning PAGES
173
16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF
CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT
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Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
James D. Monroe
Master Sergeant, United States Army
B.A., Thomas Edison State College, 2004
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2012
Author: James D. Monroe
Approved by: Dr. Hy Rothstein
Thesis |
PSYOP 10.pdf | Advisor
Dr. Kalev Sepp
Second Reader
Dr. John Arquilla
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis
iii
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iv
ABSTRACT
This thesis explores the history of U.S. Army deception and doctrine, and combines the
insights gained with the various works on deception, cognitive psychology,
communications, and decision-making in order to distill a concise handbook for
deception practitioners. A longitudinal review of U.S. Army doctrine reveals a wide
variation in the treatment of deception, from emphasized to ignored. This variation can be
primarily explained by the U.S. preference for the cumulative destruction style of war
and the perceived balance of power between the U.S. and its adversaries. This thesis
strives to fill the current doctrinal gap by distilling the existing |
PSYOP 10.pdf | body of work to create a
theory of deception in the military context. The theory presented provides a cogent
structure, taxonomy, and lexicon; as well as, emphasis on how deception functions within
the frameworks of communications and decision-making. Next, a synthesis of the
practice of deception is presented, with a focus on deception planning and the essential
elements of deception practice. Examples of U.S. use of deception from the
Revolutionary War to Operation DESERT STORM are presented to provide illumination
on the utility and use of deception. Finally, the thesis provides recommendations on how
to organize for deception operations.
v
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vi
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................ |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ............................1
A. BACKGROUND ..............................................................................................1
B. HYPOTHESES ................................................................................................3
C. SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE ......................................................................3
D. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................4
II. DECEPTION IN U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE ..............................................................7
A. PRE-WORLD WAR II ERA ..........................................................................8
B. WORLD WAR II ERA ..................................................................................10
C. POST WORLD WAR II THROUGH VIETNAM . |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ....................................13
D. POST VIETNAM ERA THROUGH DESERT STORM ...........................18
E. POST COLD WAR ERA ..............................................................................21
F. CONCLUSIONS OF DOCTRINE REVIEW .............................................24
III. EXPLANATIONS FOR VARIATION OF DECEPTION EMPHASIS ...............25
A. THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR..............................................................25
1. Styles of War ......................................................................................26
2. American Preference for Cumulative Destruction .........................29
3. Balance of Power ................................................................................31
B. PROFESSIONAL OFFICER CLASS .......................... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ...............................34
C. OVER-CLASSIFICATION ..........................................................................35
D. MORALITY ...................................................................................................36
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................37
IV. THEORY OF DECEPTION .....................................................................................39
A. WHAT IS DECEPTION ...............................................................................39
1. Deception Defined ..............................................................................40
2. Deception: Truth and Lies ................................................................41
B. TAXONOMY OF DECEPTION ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ...............................................................43
1. Taxonomy of Method .........................................................................43
2. Deception ............................................................................................44
3. Active Deception.................................................................................45
a. Displays....................................................................................45
b. Feints .......................................................................................47
c. Demonstrations .......................................................................47
d. Disinformation ........................................................................48
4. Cover ................................. |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ..................................................................49
a. Camouflage .............................................................................49
b. Denial ......................................................................................50
5. Alternate Deception Taxonomies ......................................................50
a. Commission and Omission .....................................................50
b. Level of Sophistication ............................................................51
c. Effect-Based ............................................................................52
C. DECEPTION AND UNCERTAINTY .........................................................52
vii
1. Uncertainty ....................................................................... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ..................52
2. A-Type Deception ...............................................................................53
3. M-Type Deception ..............................................................................54
D. THE WHY OF DECEPTION .......................................................................54
1. Overview .............................................................................................54
2. Surprise ...............................................................................................55
3. Freedom of Action..............................................................................55
4. Save Lives and Resources ..................................................................56
5. Mislead the Target ........................................ |
PSYOP 10.pdf | .....................................56
6. Relative Superiority ...........................................................................57
7. Security ...............................................................................................58
8. Subversion ..........................................................................................58
9. Mental Isolation .................................................................................59
E. COMMUNICATIONS PROCESS OF DECEPTION ................................60
1. Overview of Communications ...........................................................60
2. Indicators ............................................................................................61
3. Channels................................................... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ...........................................62
4. Deception’s Role in the Communications Process ..........................63
F. DECEPTION AND TARGET DECISION-MAKING ...............................63
1. Observe ...............................................................................................65
2. Orient ..................................................................................................66
a. Cultural Schemata ..................................................................67
b. Personal Schemata ..................................................................68
c. Cognitive Biases and Heuristics .............................................69
d. Results of Orientation .............................................................71
3. Decide .................. |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ................................................................................71
4. Act........................................................................................................72
G. DECEPTION PROCESS ..............................................................................72
1. Bell and Whaley .................................................................................72
2. See-Think-Do ......................................................................................74
3. Revised Deception Process ................................................................74
V. PRACTICE OF MILITARY DECEPTION ...........................................................77
A. DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS ........................................................79
1. Mission An |
PSYOP 10.pdf | alysis .................................................................................79
a. Information Requirements .....................................................79
2. Planning Guidance .............................................................................82
3. Planning Methodology .......................................................................83
a. DO ............................................................................................83
b. THINK .....................................................................................84
c. SEE ..........................................................................................84
4. Deception Means ................................................................................85
a. Physical............... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | .....................................................................85
b. Cyber Electromagnetic ............................................................86
c. Administrative .........................................................................87
5. Execution and Assessment ................................................................88
viii
a. Execution .................................................................................88
b. Assessment ...............................................................................89
6. Termination ........................................................................................90
B. PRINCIPLES OF DECEPTION ..................................................................91
1. Know the Target and Exploit Existing Perceptions |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ........................93
a. Understand the Target ............................................................93
b. Exploit Existing Perceptions ..................................................93
c. Avoiding Windfalls ..................................................................94
2. Security is Paramount .......................................................................95
3. Utilize Flexibility, Variety, and Conditioning .................................96
a. Flexibility .................................................................................96
b. Variety......................................................................................96
c. Conditioning ............................................................................97
4. Coordination and Control ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ..............................................................98
a. Control .....................................................................................98
b. Coordination............................................................................98
5. Requirement for Target Action ........................................................99
6. Preparation and Timing ....................................................................99
7. Beware Unintended Consequences .................................................100
C. DECEPTION IN SUPPORT OF IRREGULAR OPERATIONS ...........101
1. Unconventional Warfare .................................................................101
2. Counterinsurgency/Foreign Internal Defense ...............................103
3. Stability Operations / H |
PSYOP 10.pdf | umanitarian Assistance Operations ......104
4. Counterterrorism .............................................................................105
5. Cyberwarfare ...................................................................................106
D. MILITARY DECEPTION FAILURES .....................................................106
VI. HISTORIC U.S. ARMY USE OF DECEPTION ..................................................109
A. REVOLUTIONARY WAR – BATTLE OF TRENTON .........................109
B. CIVIL WAR .................................................................................................110
1. Peninsula Campaign ........................................................................110
2. Capture of Atlanta .................................................................. |
PSYOP 10.pdf | .........111
3. Athens, Alabama ..............................................................................112
C. PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION – RAID ON PALANAN ......................113
D. WORLD WAR I – SAINT MIHIEL ..........................................................115
E. DECEPTION IN WORLD WAR II ...........................................................117
1. Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH .........................................................117
2. 23rd Headquarters Special Troops ................................................119
3. Operation WEDLOCK .......................................................................120
F. KOREAN WAR – INCHON LANDING ...................................................122
G. VIETNAM WAR ........................................................ |
PSYOP 10.pdf | .................................124
1. MACVSOG ..........................................................................................124
a. Sacred Sword Patriots League ..............................................124
b. Deception in Support of Security..........................................126
2. MACV ...............................................................................................127
H. OPERATION DESERT STORM ...............................................................129
ix
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................133
A. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................133
B. RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ....134
1. Doctrine .............................................................................................135
2. Leadership, Education, and Training ............................................136
3. Personnel Selection ..........................................................................138
4. Facilities ............................................................................................139
C. FINAL NOTE ...............................................................................................139
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................141
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .......................................................................................153
x
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Time |
PSYOP 10.pdf | line of Deception-Related Doctrine and Deception Proponents from
1905–2011..........................................................................................................8
Figure 2. Comparison of Balance of Power and Doctrinal Emphasis of Deception .......32
Figure 3. Daniel and Herbig’s “Deception’s Subsidiary Concepts.” (From: ) ................42
Figure 4. Interrelationship of Truth, Deception, and Lies ...............................................43
Figure 5. Taxonomy of Deception ..................................................................................44
Figure 6. Communications Cycle ....................................................................................61
Figure 7. Expanded OODA Process (From: ) ...................................................... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ...........65
Figure 8. Bell and Whaley’s Deception Planning Loop (From: ) ...................................73
Figure 9. Example of Bell and Whaley’s Deception Planning Process in Action
(From: ) ............................................................................................................73
Figure 10. Revised Deception Process ..............................................................................76
xi
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xii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Characteristics of Cumulative Destruction and Systemic Disruption ..............27
Table 2. Chisholm and Feehan’s Eight Ways to Deceive. .............................................51
Table 3. Examples of Target Responses to Deception. ..................................................57
Table 4. Examples |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of Channels ......................................................................................63
Table 5. Sample Deception Planning Resources ...........................................................81
Table 6. Notional Execution Matrix Based on Events of Operation DESERT STORM ....88
Table 7. Potential Termination Triggers ........................................................................91
Table 8. Deception Fundamentals, Principles, and Maxims ..........................................92
Table 9. Deception Analysis of Battle of Trenton .......................................................110
Table 10. Deception Analysis of Peninsula Campaign ..................................................111
Table 11. Deception Analysis of Atlanta ...................................... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | .................................112
Table 12. Deception Analysis of Athens, Georgia .........................................................113
Table 13. Deception Analysis of Raid on Palanan.........................................................115
Table 14. Deception Analysis of Saint Mihiel ...............................................................116
Table 15. Deception Analysis of Operation FORTITUDE SOUTH ....................................118
Table 16. Deception Analysis of Operation KODAK ......................................................120
Table 17. Deception Analysis of Operation WEDLOCK .................................................122
Table 18. Deception Analysis of Operation CHROMITE .................................................123
Table 19. Deception Ana |
PSYOP 10.pdf | lysis of SSPL ...........................................................................126
Table 20. Deception Analysis of MACVSOG Security ....................................................127
Table 21. Deception Analysis of DIAMOND I .................................................................128
Table 22. Deception Analysis of Ranger Assault ..........................................................128
Table 23. Deception Analysis of Operation DESERT STORM .........................................131
Table 24. Recommended Personnel for Formal Deception Education ..........................137
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xiv
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
APD Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP Army Doctrine Reference Publication
ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam
AT |
PSYOP 10.pdf | TP Army, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
C&D Cover and Deception
CCD Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoys (Army)
CCD Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception (Joint)
D&D Denial and Deception
DOTLMPF Doctrine, Organization, Training, Leadership, Materials,
Personnel, and Facilities
EEFI Essential Elements of Friendly Information
FM Field Manual
HUMINT Human Intelligence
ICD Imitative Communication Deception
IDF Israeli Defense Forces
JOPES Joint Operations Planning and Execution System
JP Joint Publication
JSC Joint Security Control
MACV Military Assistance Command – Vietnam
MACVSOG Military Assistance Command – Vietnam Studies and Observation
Group
MD Military Deception
MDMP Military Decision Making Process
MED Manipulative Electronic Deception
MISO Military Information Support Operations |
PSYOP 10.pdf |
xv
NCOIC Non-commissioned Officer in Charge
NKPA North Korean People’s Army
NVA North Vietnamese Army
OIC Officer in Charge
OODA Observe-Orient-Decide-Act
SOP Standard Operating Procedures
TC Training Circular
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
VC Viet Cong
xvi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank the faculty and staff of the Defense Analysis Department for
providing this amazing experience. I am humbled by the collective knowledge and
experience in this department. I would also like to thank Dr. Hy Rothstein and Dr. Kalev
Sepp for their invaluable mentorship and advice, without which I would not have been
able to complete this thesis. Thanks also to Zooey Lober and the rest of the hard-working
and patient personnel at the Dudley Knox Library Interlibrary Loan desk for their |
PSYOP 10.pdf | tireless
efforts in finding my esoteric, and often quixotic, requests. Additionally, I thank the
myriad organizations who responded to my plaintive information requests, especially the
folks at the United States Army Military History Institute. To my fellow students, thanks
for the prodding and cajoling to tackle this topic, and for the opportunity to interact and
learn from you. Finally, I have to thank my lovely wife, Christy, whose patient support
and faith, both in this endeavor and my career, have been invaluable.
xvii
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xviii
I. INTRODUCTION
For where the lion’s skin will not reach, you must patch it out with the
fox’s.
– Lysander the Spartan1
During the opening phases of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War, Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) hammered the networ |
PSYOP 10.pdf | k of Hezbollah bunkers along the Lebanese border.
Hezbollah had been building the bunker network for years, under the watchful eyes of
IDF surveillance, Lebanese spies working for Israel, and the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), patrolled the southern Lebanese border. What the IDF did
not realize until far too late was the network of bunkers so diligently—and visibly—
emplaced by Hezbollah were decoys; Hezbollah’s true bunkers were scattered across the
countryside and covered by layers of security and camouflage. The bunker deception was
but one of several cunning stratagems used by Hezbollah to blunt the IDF’s technological
and information advantages, allowing Hezbollah to maintain combat effectiveness in the
face of the Israeli assault. Deception had once more proven its |
PSYOP 10.pdf | worth.2
A. BACKGROUND
Stratagems are essential in war, as commanders seek to hide their real intentions,
capabilities, and actions from the enemy, while cunningly showing false intentions
capabilities and actions to lure the enemy into defeat. From the earliest battles of
antiquity, commanders have used guile and misdirection for tactical, operational, and
strategic effect. Hannibal at Cannae, the Greeks’ use of the Trojan Horse, and Gideon’s
raid on the Midianites are but a few examples of successful deception in the ancient
world. Operations OVERLORD and BARBAROSA during WWII, British pseudo-operations
1 Plutarch, John Dryden and Arthur Hugh Clough, Plutarch's Lives, Modern Library paperback ed.,
Vol. 1 (New York: Modern Library, 2001), 588.
2 David A. Acosta, "The Makara of Hizballah: |
PSYOP 10.pdf | Deception in the 2006 Summer War" (Master’s thesis,
Naval Postgraduate School), 43 – 45, accessed 15 January 2012, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA469918.
1
during the Mau-Mau insurgency in Kenya, and Hezbollah’s use of deception against
Israel during the 2006 war demonstrate the continuing utility of deception in the modern
era.
Even within the more limited scope of U.S. Army history, deception has played
an important role. General Washington utilized numerous stratagems to great effect
during the Revolutionary war, including deceiving the British about the status of his
forces at Valley Forge to deter attack, and later about his intentions to attack New York,
setting the stage for the final showdown at Yorktown. During the Civil War, Confederate
General Magruder used decoy cannons made o |
PSYOP 10.pdf | f nothing more than painted tree trunks to
hold Union forces in check for months after the First Battle of Manassas. General
Pershing deceived the Germans about his intentions in order to gain surprise for the
assault on the St. Michel salient during World War I.3 U.S. use of deception reached a
plateau during World War II. After a slow start, the U.S. Army became adept at using
deception and by 1947 Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eisenhower [in a 1947 memo
to the Lauris Norstad, Director, Plans and Operations Division] stated:
…no major operations should be undertaken without planning and
executing appropriate deception measures. As time goes on… there is a
danger that these two means [psychological warfare and cover and
deception] may in the future not be considered adequately in ou |
PSYOP 10.pdf | r planning.
I consider it essential that the War Department should continue to take
those steps that are necessary to keep alive the arts of… cover and
deception and that there should continue in being a nucleus of personnel
capable in handling these arts in case an emergency arises. I desire
therefore that the Director of Plans and Operations maintain the potential
effectiveness of these arts in order that their benefits may become
immediately available, as and when desired, in furtherance of national
security.4
During Vietnam, the Military Assistance Command Vietnam—Studies and
Observation Group [MACVSOG] made extensive use of deception in its operations against
3 Richard Baker, "The Lost and found Art of Deception" (Paper presented at the Conference of Army
Historians, Arlington, Virgin |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ia, 25 – 28 July 2011).
4 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Chief of Staff, ed. Louis
Galambos, Vol. VIII (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1978), 1763.
2
North Vietnam. During Operation DESERT STORM, U.S. forces deceived Saddam’s forces
into believing the assault into Kuwait would come from the sea, and not from the now
famous “left hook.”
In spite of the demonstrated utility of deception in support U.S. military
operations, the U.S. Army currently falls short on the requirement to provide practitioners
of deception with a solid doctrinal foundation in the theory and practice of deception.
Instead, the U.S. Army has for the most part of two decades done little more than pay lip
service to the importance of deception, or in the case of camouflage and concealme |
PSYOP 10.pdf | nt,
stripped the concepts of their deception lineage. The last dedicated deception manual was
published in 1988, and is no longer available through official channels. Furthermore, the
1957 and 1967 editions of the deception field manual have effectively disappeared.5
Current U.S. Army doctrine, discounting uses of the word “deception” as a buzzword, is
limited to a 30-page section in the information operations field manual that completely
ignores essential tenets of deception like perceptual and cognitive biases. There is a need
for a concise distillation of theory and practice for the military practitioners of deception.
B. HYPOTHESES
The degree of emphasis of deception in U.S. Army doctrine is primarily related to
the perceived balance of power between the United States and potential adv |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ersaries.
There are essential tenets of the theory and practice of deception that can be
drawn from the existing bodies of work.
C. SCOPE AND SIGNIFICANCE
What the literature review shows is there is a definite lack of guidance on the
theory and practice of deception within current U.S. Army doctrine, despite a continuing
theme in the doctrine that deception is of utility to operations. On the civilian side, there
is a diversity of ideas on the theory and practice of deception; however, these ideas are
5 The author’s quest to find these manuals has included contacting each service academy and war
college, all the proponents for deception; as well as, the U.S. Army Military History Institute, and the
National Archives. These requests were in addition to the tireless and patient work of the |
PSYOP 10.pdf | Dudley Knox
Library Staff. The vanishing of FM 31-40 is indicative of the U.S. Army’s habit of purging “obsolete”
doctrine; a habit that perhaps merits its own thesis on the value of institutional knowledge.
3
dispersed over a large body of work. What is lacking in the civilian literature is an
equivalent to the Grand Unification Theory in Physics, one work that distills the breadth
and depth of the deception field into a usable synthesis. While not being so presumptuous
as to present a Grand Unification Theory of deception, this thesis will bridge the gap in
U.S. Army doctrine by creating a petite military deception focused synthesis of the body
of deception work. This work is not intended to be proscriptive or all-inclusive; rather,
the goal of the work is to provide commanders and pract |
PSYOP 10.pdf | itioners a framework of concepts
and ideas which can be altered to fit their organizational and operational needs. Central to
this thesis is a reunification of cover with deception, as cover and active deception are
mutually supporting concepts. The creation of an unclassified deception handbook will
fill a doctrinal void and hopefully increase the perceived utility of deception within the
force.
D. METHODOLOGY
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the breadth of U.S. Army military
deception history and doctrine, and combine the insights gained with the various works
on deception theory and practice, cognitive psychology, communications, and decision-
making in order to distill the theory and practice of deception into a concise handbook for
deception practitioners. Rather than attempti |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ng to cover the entirety of deceptive
practices, the scope of this thesis is deception as employed in support of military
objectives.
In order to achieve this goal, the thesis first constructs a longitudinal review of
U.S. Army doctrine focusing on the capstone operations manual series and deception
related manuals in order to discern whether there is a pattern to U.S. Army doctrine’s
treatment of deception. The scope of this survey is from the 1905 Field Service
Regualtions through the 2012 ADP 3-0. Next the thesis examines the reasons commonly
given for why deception is marginalized within military affairs. This examination is
conducted through the lenses of doctrine and practice.
Then the thesis shifts to a distillation of the existing body work on deception to
create a theory of decept |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ion in the military context. Within the theory of deception
4
chapter the focus will be on providing a cogent structure, taxonomy, and lexicon for
deception with an emphasis on how deception works. The structure provided by Bell and
Whaley’s general theory of deception will be used as the initial framework. To the
framework is added an understanding of the role of perceptional and cognitive biases in
deception; a fleshed out lexicon of deception related terms; and a broad set of categories
for deception techniques. This requires taking the mélange of existing works on
deception and rendering the concepts down to a cohesive synthesis.
After deception theory, the thesis presents a synthesis of the practice of deception.
The practice of deception chapter first presents a planning process that |
PSYOP 10.pdf | builds upon the
planning process presented in JP 3-13.4: Military Deception. Next, the chapter reviews
the various maxims, principles, and considerations presented by deception theorists and
practitioners to draw out the essential elements of deception practice. Additionally, the
chapter examines the uses of deception in war illuminated with examples from history.
The practice chapter ends with a discussion of deception failures in order to reinforce the
necessity of proper planning and execution.
A chapter surveying U.S. military use of deception from the Revolutionary War to
Operation DESERT STORM follows the practice chapter in order to provide additional
illumination in the context of historic U.S. operations. This chapter serves a secondary
purpose of priming the mind of the reader b |
PSYOP 10.pdf | y demonstrating the U.S. military has a long
and storied history of using deception. Finally, a conclusions chapter provides
recommendations on how to organize for deception operations, with ideas on manning,
training, integration in the staff, and special resource requirements.
5
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6
II. DECEPTION IN U.S. ARMY DOCTRINE
Deception is common sense soldiering.
– General Carl E. Vuono6
According to FM 1, The Army, “Doctrine is the concise expression of how Army
forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements.”7
Furthermore, doctrine creates a shared culture for the force; standardizes operations; and
provides a common frame of reference.8 Thus any attempt to understand the role of
deception within the U.S. Army must begin with an exam |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ination of U.S. Army doctrine.
The U.S. Army has two capstone manuals that serve as the doctrinal foundations of the
force; currently, these manuals are: FM 1: the Army and APD 3-0: Unified Land
Operations.9 FM 1 serves as a broad overview of the U.S. Army’s “fundamental purpose,
roles, responsibilities, and functions, as established by the Constitution, Congress, and the
Department of Defense.”10 APD 3-0 serves as the “overarching doctrinal guidance and
direction for conducting operations.”11 In addition to these capstone documents, it is
necessary to examine other doctrine publications directly related to the various aspects of
deception. Each of these manuals in its various incarnations over time plays a vital role in
setting the conditions for the role, or lack of a role, of deception |
PSYOP 10.pdf | in U.S. Army operations.
The adjectives best describing the U.S. Army’s historical and present guidance on
deception are haphazard and shallow. Within the operations field manuals are statements
to “use deception” sprinkled about almost as an afterthought. Only rarely are any
statements approaching the strength of General Eisenhower’s about the essential
6 Quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, CALL Bulletin 3-88: Deception (Fort Leavenworth,
KS: Combined Arms Training Activity, 1988), 3.
7 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1: The Army, 2005
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2005), 1-20.
8 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 1: The Army, 2005, 1-20 to 1-21.
9 Each of these manuals has undergone name and nomenclature changes over their history.
10 |
PSYOP 10.pdf | Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-1: The Army (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, 1994), v.
11 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3-0: Unified Land Operations
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2011), ii.
7
importance of deceptions in every operation. Discussion of how deception works is either
missing or disregarded. For example, in FM 3-13, the section on exploiting target biases
states that the target’s biases can be “the most powerful weapon in the MD [military
deception] planner’s arsenal;” however the very next sentence obliterates the importance
of the target’s biases with “However, such information is not essential to preparing a
viable MD plan.”12
Figure 1. Timeline of Deception-Related Doctrine and Deception Proponents |
PSYOP 10.pdf | from
1905–2011
A. PRE-WORLD WAR II ERA
Discussion of the concept of deception in U.S. military doctrine prior to the
World War II era was minimal, and when present often negative. The 1905 edition of the
War Department’s Field Service Regulations admonishes there will be no quarter
12 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-13: Information Operations: Doctrine,
Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Department of the Army, 2003), 4-9.
8
expected for troops utilizing the enemy’s uniform for “treacherous advantage,” and
advised commanders forced to use pieces of the enemy’s uniform in extremis to maintain
sufficient difference from the enemy’s ensemble so as to avoid the charge of willful
deception.13 Where concealment is discussed, it is almost purely in association with force
pr |
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in Data Studio
PSYOP Detection Dataset
Dataset Description
The PSYOP Detection Dataset is a collection of textual excerpts extracted from academic and military literature discussing psychological operations (PSYOP), information warfare, propaganda, and psychological influence strategies.
The dataset was created to support research on detecting psychological manipulation techniques in text, including persuasion, propaganda, and influence operations.
Source documents were segmented into smaller text chunks to facilitate training and fine-tuning of language models for classification, detection, or analysis tasks related to psychological operations.
Dataset Structure
The dataset contains the following columns:
- source: The original PDF document the text was extracted from.
- text: A chunk of text extracted from the source document.
Each row represents a text segment approximately 800 characters long.
Total rows: ~1982
Data Collection Process
The dataset was constructed by:
- Identifying publicly available academic and research documents discussing psychological operations, propaganda, and information warfare.
- Discovering and sourcing relevant literature with the assistance of research tools including Google Gemini and Consensus.app, which were used to identify relevant academic publications and research material.
- Extracting textual content from the selected PDF documents.
- Segmenting the extracted text into smaller chunks suitable for machine learning training and analysis.
The goal of this preprocessing was to produce training examples that models can learn from when identifying patterns associated with psychological influence operations.
Data Provenance and Responsibility Disclaimer
The documents used to construct this dataset were identified as publicly accessible academic or research materials at the time of collection. The dataset contains only extracted textual segments intended for research, machine learning experimentation, and academic analysis.
The dataset creator does not claim ownership of the original source materials. All intellectual property rights remain with the respective authors, publishers, or rights holders.
If any rights holder believes that material included in this dataset should not be redistributed or used in this context, they are encouraged to contact the dataset maintainer through Hugging Face so that the relevant content can be reviewed and removed if appropriate.
The dataset is provided as-is for research and educational purposes, and the creator assumes no liability for unintended use or misinterpretation of the included material.
Intended Uses
This dataset may be used for:
- Fine-tuning language models to detect persuasion or propaganda techniques
- Research on psychological operations and information warfare
- NLP research on manipulation detection
- Training classifiers for PSYOP-related content analysis
Limitations
This dataset contains only excerpts from documents describing psychological operations rather than labeled examples of PSYOP content itself.
As a result:
- The dataset may not fully represent real-world PSYOP messaging.
- Additional labeling may be required for supervised learning tasks.
- The dataset is primarily intended as a corpus for further annotation or feature extraction.
Ethical Considerations
The dataset contains discussions of psychological manipulation and influence operations. It should be used responsibly and primarily for research aimed at detecting or mitigating harmful information campaigns.
Citation
If you use this dataset in research, please cite:
Giroux, T. (2026). PSYOP Detection Dataset. Hugging Face.
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