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PSYOP 10.pdf | Deception, and Lies
B. TAXONOMY OF DECEPTION
1. Taxonomy of Method
Taxonomies are systems of categorizing items in a set into subordinate sets based
on a defined system of characteristics. The most recognizable example for taxonomies is
the system of classifying living things into kingdoms, phyla, classes, orders, fam... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | , taxonomy by commission-omission breaks
down deceptions based on whether the deception causes the target to acquire a false
belief or contributes to the target continuing a false belief. For this purposes of this work,
taxonomy by method is used as it closely matches existing U.S. Army doctrinal concepts
of deception ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ve deception and
cover. Active deception consists of those actions designed to convey deceptive indicators
to the target. Cover, as used here, is the set of actions designed to prevent the target
access to the indicators necessary for constructing a correct perception of the situation
44
and environment, and thus neces... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | actions traditionally associated with military
deception. Active deception is divided into four broad categories: displays, feints,
demonstrations, and disinformation.
a. Displays
Displays are static depictions of activities, forces, or equipment for the
purpose of deceiving the target’s collection apparatus.134 Though... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | and Force
Design Group, Tactical Cover and Deception: Final Report, 1-4; Daniel and Herbig, Propositions on
Military Deception, 4; Robert Goldsmith and Ralph Gerenz, Techniques for Detecting Cover and
Deception, (Billerica, MA: Betac Corporation, 1983), accessed 16 May 2012,
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADP002896, 145.... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ion (other than planned aggression) for the
observable military activity.” Cynthia Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, ed.
Jan Goldman (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, Joint Military Intelligence
College, 2002), accessed 14 May 2012, www.ni-u.edu/ni_press/pdf/Antici... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | vation.” Headquarters, Department of
the Army, Field Manual 1-02, 1-83.
45
to create a dummy force or capability. Decoys are models or dummies used to replicate
actual equipment, buildings, and personnel.135 Magruder’s Quaker guns were decoys
used to create the perception that the Confederate lines were more heavily fo... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ms of
portrayals where the unit being portrayed is either a third party or an element of the
target’s forces. Colonel Funston’s ruse during the Philippines Insurrection involved his
force portraying the insurgent force in order to gain access to the insurgent camp.138
British forces in Kenya used pseudo-operations to m... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | , 5.
136 See Chapter V for more information on MACVSOG deception operations.
137 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Training Circular No. 30-1, 10.
138 See Chapter V for additional details on Colonel Funston’s operation.
139 Kitson, Frank, Gangs and Counter-gangs, (London: Barry and Rockliff, 1960).
140 John Prados,... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ts are operations designed to deceive the target into reacting as if the
feint is an actual decisive operation.142 Feints differ from demonstrations in that some
manner of contact with the target is sought. The degree of contact varies significantly.
Feints are used for several purposes; for example, to distract the ta... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ) has an element of feint, though its primary mission is not deception.144
In addition to traditional offensive and defensive operations, feints also encompass lures
designed to draw the target into an unequal fight, e.g., the bait and ambush tactics of
guerrilla and insurgent forces.
c. Demonstrations
Demonstrations a... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ary deception, an offensive action
involving contact with the adversary conducted for the purpose of deceiving the adversary as to the location
and/or time of the actual main offensive action. (Army) A form of attack used to deceive the enemy as to
the location or time of the actual decisive operation. Forces conductin... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | m of deceiving the enemy. 2. (DOD only)
In military deception, a show of force in an area where a decision is not sought; made to deceive an
adversary. It is similar to a feint but no actual contact with the adversary is intended. (Army) 1. A form of
attack designed to deceive the enemy as to the location or time of th... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | on146
Disinformation is the exposure to target collection assets of false,
modified, or selectively true information with the intent to deceive.147 Disinformation has
no set form or design; any communication from a presidential proclamation to a scrap of
paper left in a waste basket can be used to convey disinformation... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | on flooding contains deceptive indicators intended to mislead
the target; whereas, the jamming of a radio net with static does not. Using multiple radio
networks to obscure the actual location of a unit is an example of this form of
disinformation, as is swamping a regime’s police hotline with false reports in order to... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ption and Surprise in War (Cambridge, MA, Center for
International Studies Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969), accessed 16 February 2012,
http://www.vietnam.ttu.edu/virtualarchive/items.php?item=2171516001, 17.
148 See David Mure’s Master of Deception and Ben MacIntyre’s Agent Zigzag for further information
o... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | . There are
two categories of cover: camouflage and denial.
a. Camouflage
Camouflage seeks to prevent indicators from being detected by the target’s
collection assets. Within camouflage, there are four broad methods: hiding, blending,
disguising, and securing. In hiding the item is concealed by a physical barrier; such... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | educed via the use of operations security,
information security, and emissions control. While not traditionally considered aspects of
camouflage, securing functions serve the same purpose—suppression of friendly
indicators. The concepts of camouflage are applicable across the spectrum of operations.
A special operation... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | on this definition of cover versus the competing definition.
151 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 5-20, 1968, 17 – 20.
49
b. Denial
Whereas camouflage focuses on masking indicators, denial attacks the
channels indictors travel on to the target. Denial seeks to degrade target collection
channels so th... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | the case with the British DOUBLE CROSS operation in
WWII. Denial methods include counterreconnaissance, jamming, counterintelligence,
and physical destruction of collection tools. While these methods are not normally
considered aspects of deception by U.S. Army doctrine, they are forms of cover to be
considered during ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | eptions by commission are typified by the
deceiver contributing causally to the belief of the target. Deceptions by omission are
typified by the deceiver facilitating the target’s maintenance of an existing belief.
50
Deception by Commission
1- Deceiver contributes causally to target acquiring belief in the proposition... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | tion of the proposition
8- Deceiver allows target to continue without the belief in the negation of the proposition
Table 2. Chisholm and Feehan’s Eight Ways to Deceive.152
b. Level of Sophistication
Gerwehr and Glenn in Unweaving the Web: Deception and Adaptation in
Future Urban Operations present a way to categorize ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | …are in place
regardless of state, activity, or the histories of either the deceiver or target.”153 The Army
Combat Uniform is an example of static camouflage. “Dynamic deceptions are those that
activate under specific circumstances. The ruse itself and the trigger do not change over
time, nor do they vary much by circ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | s an
152 Chisholm and Feehan, The Intent to Deceive, 143 – 159.
153 Gerwehr and Glenn, Unweaving the Web, 33.
154 Gerwehr and Glenn, Unweaving the Web, 33.
155 Gerwehr and Glenn, Unweaving the Web, 34.
51
example of adaptive camouflage. Premeditative deceptions display the greatest level of
sophistication. “Premeditati... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | o broad subdivisions: hiding and showing. Hiding deceptions seek to
obscure indicators, and consist of masking, repackaging, and dazzling. Masking
deceptions hide by blending the object into the background, as in camouflage.
Repackaging deceptions hide the real by making the object appear as something
innocuous, e.g., ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | nting deceptions mislead
via creation of new objects, as in notional documents. Decoying misleads by presenting
alternate options as the actual option, such as the First U.S. Army Group being used to
mislead German leadership as to the actual target of Operation OVERLOAD.157
C. DECEPTION AND UNCERTAINTY
1. Uncertainty
... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | s, infiltration of
noise corruption, and the fundamental inability to read the opponent’s mind. The
compounded result of these phenomena is an obscuration of the situation, as if a
metaphorical fog had settled over the field. As Whaley states:
It [“the fog of war”] refers to the chaos of information inherent in the fas... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | jangled
representations of fiction and fact. The Commander neither knows what he
knows nor can be certain of what he doesn’t know. Crucial decisions
about deployment, tactics, and strategy are made with the most
fragmentary information.159
Deception and uncertainty enjoy a complex relationship. The fog of war created
... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ng, or A-Type, deception. Deception
used to create a false reduction of uncertainty is often referred to as misleading, or M-
Type, deception.160
2. A-Type Deception
A-type deceptions seek to increase the ambiguity of a situation so that the target
becomes “…unsure as to what to believe.”161 Ambiguity can be increased ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | h
aspects. A-type deceptions can be attempted solely through the use of covering aspects,
such as a unit camouflaging itself in a wood line. One of the goals of A-type deceptions is
to cause the target to delay decision-making in the hopes of further information, thereby
allowing the deceiver to seize or retain initiat... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e goal of M-
type deceptions is for the target to concentrate resources against the deception, allowing
the deceiver opportunity to successfully conduct the true plan.164 For example, the
ambush of the Japanese fleet at Midway was facilitated by deceptive radio traffic which
created the perception that Admiral Halsey’s... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | sitions on Military Deception, 5 – 6.
163 Daniel and Herbig, Propositions on Military Deception, 6.
164 Daniel and Herbig, Propositions on Military Deception, 6.
165 Katherine Herbig, “American Strategic Deception in the Pacific: 1942-44,” Strategic and
Operational Deception in the Second World War, ed. Michael Handel ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | question of the role of surprise in war; of
122 battles surveyed in Whaley’s classic study, the casualty ratio in battles without
surprise was one-to-one; however, the casualty ratio where surprise was achieved was
one-to-five in favor of the initiator.168 Deception is the handmaiden of surprise as the
secrecy necessa... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of action. Deception can
also be used to assist the movement of key leaders. For example, President Roosevelt’s
secret meeting with Prime Minister Churchill to hammer out the Atlantic Charter in the
fall of 1941 was facilitated by a portrayal depicting the president as being on a fishing
trip off Cape Cod.170
166 Jock ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | n be used to save lives and resources in three ways. First, through the
achievement of surprise, gaining of freedom of action, and securing of relative
superiority, deception can reduce the amount of fighting necessary to reach a decision,
thus reducing casualties and material costs. Second, deception can be used to el... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ying U.S. forces on the crest of the hill. When the
decision was made to withdraw the forces, rather than risk a night withdrawal, the forces
were withdrawn using armored personnel carriers mimicking a supply run.172
5. Mislead the Target
“Deception is by itself an asymmetric approach to warfighting: tricking the
oppon... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | g a weakness is
illustrated by an example from the Vietnam War. A brigade commander was ordered to
detach two battalions to support another operation, and the brigade commander realized
that to do so would offer the Viet Cong an opportunity to exploit the reduction in forces
171 The Editors of the Army Times, The Tangl... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | enting the Viet
Cong from seizing the advantage, the brigade commander directed support personnel to
portray the advance parties of another division while spreading the rumor that the
portrayed division would be assuming control of the area of operations. The combination
of the portrayal and the ruse caused the Viet Co... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ions
Negative reactions by target to deception
1- Failure to move reserves to meet intended offensives
2- Failure to exploit our weaknesses
3- Failure of counterattack
4- Failure to disengage
5- Failure to locate and act against true positions of artillery, reserves, dumps, etc.
Table 3. Examples of Target Responses to... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | German command to retain forces in Pas de Calais even after
the Normandy landing assisting in the Allies gaining and maintaining relative superiority
174 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Reference Book 31-40, 6-12.
175 Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, Strategic and Tactical Cover and Deception, 13.... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | achieved if, in addition to the correct information which the enemy receives, he is also
provided with incorrect information. Confusion is the only effective method of
maintaining secrecy.”178 This is especially true for irregular warfare and intelligence
operations. Deception in support of security typically relies he... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ted the organization was simply a special staff section focused on the
comprehensive study of counterinsurgency operations, with no implementation
authority.180
8. Subversion
Subversion is defined as: “Action designed to undermine the military, economic,
psychological, or political strength or morale” of a targeted org... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | 1.
http://www.dod.gov/pubs/foi/International_security_affairs/vietnam_and_southeast_asiaDocuments/520-
18.pdf.
180 Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Affairs (SACSA), Draft MACSOG
Documentation Study Appendix H Security, Cover & Deception, H-10.
181 This definition is modified from the official definit... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | t groups and authoritarian regimes.
MACVSOG’s use of poison pen letters to increase distrust within the North Vietnamese
leadership is an example of deception to achieve subversion.183
9. Mental Isolation
Deception Mental isolation occurs when the target is unable to perceive or make
sense of the situation.184 The ulti... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | a target can negate the
target’s fighting power and thus ability to resist.187 During the Six-Day War, Israeli
Military Intelligence attempted a form of mental isolation against Arab forces. Operation
FOG OF BATTLE “misled top enemy commanders, drew them into traps, diverted their
forces in the wrong directions, sprea... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 136.
184 John Boyd, "The Strategic Game of ? and ?" (Presentation, John Boyd Compendium, 1987),
accessed 19 February 2012, http://www.danford.net/boyd/strategic.pdf, 36.
185 Boyd, The Strategic Game of ? and ?, 47.
186 Mao Tse-tung, "On the Protracted War " in Selected Works of Mao Tse... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | the
communications environment and the target’s decision-making process. Roberta
Wohlstetter’s Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision provides insight to the role of noise
within the communications process. Wohlstetter defines noise as competing or
contradictory signals that are useless for understanding a situation.189 W... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | tion works through communication.
Deception occurs within the framework of communication (Figure 6). An actor is
constantly emitting indicators of his actions, capabilities, and intentions into the
environment, and is likewise constantly receiving indicators from other actors. Indicators
travel from one actor to anothe... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ctitioner for use in the target’s
decision-making process. Because the target does not have access to all the indicators of
the practitioner, the target never has a complete picture of the actor’s intentions,
capabilities, and actions.
189 Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford, CA: Stanford ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | o channel to convey the indicator to the
target. The white indicators represent indicators of the practitioner’s true capabilities and
intentions. The grey indicators represent deceptive indicators. The dashed line indicator
represents an indicator obscured through cover means. The In8j=kator indicator
represents an in... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | icators
Indicators are individual snippets of information about the capabilities, intentions,
and actions of an actor created through the actor’s interaction with the environment.
Indicators can take myriad forms and include exercises and training events; personnel and
61
equipment movements; updates on social network ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | aphical or syntax errors, improper execution of guidance, and
translation errors. For example, a notional identification document with an outdated
stamp is an error in encoding. Errors in transmission alter the indicator as it transits a
channel from the transmitter to the receiver and can occur due to noise causing
co... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | a truck is an error in decoding.192
3. Channels
Channels are “the specific ways in which information about a given subject
reaches an audience.”193 For deception, the most commonly used channel is the
intelligence collection capabilities of the target. Intelligence channels consist of the suite
of intelligence collecti... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | on and Wirtz, Strategic Denial and Deception, 19.
194 Abram Shulsky, "Elements of Strategic Denial and Deception," in Strategic Denial and Deception:
The Twenty-First Century Challenge, eds. Roy Godson and James J. Wirtz (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 2002), 19 – 26.
62
intelligence collection channels, there... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | during WWII to
convey notional plans to German intelligence is an example of a created channel.
Intelligence Human, Signal, Imagery, Measures, Electronic
Traditional Media Newspapers, Radio, Television, Handbills, Leaflets, Loudspeakers
Internet Social Media Sites, Commercial Email, Notional Sites
Military Communicati... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | be reduced through various security measures. Channels can be closed off
via denial capabilities. For indicators that cannot be hidden from the target by cover tools,
simulations and portrayals can be used to drown the indicator in a sea of noise.
F. DECEPTION AND TARGET DECISION-MAKING
To understand how deception affe... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e
Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop.195 The OODA places decision-making in an
iterative process where perceptions are created by the synthesis of new information and
existing perceptions through the schematic lenses. From the revised perceptions,
decisions are made, driving actions and inaction. While Boyd includes... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | processing strategies… a
cognitive bias does not result from any emotional or intellectual disposition towards a
certain judgment, but rather from subconscious mental procedures for processing
information.”196 Heuer categories the cognitive biases by their effect on intelligence
analysis: “evaluation of evidence, perce... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e.”198 Cultural biases are “the result of interpreting and
judging phenomena in terms particular to one’s own culture and is influenced by the
knowledge, beliefs, customs, morals, and habits, and cognitive styles that are acquired as
195 John Boyd, “Organic Design for Command and Control,” (Working Paper, 1987), access... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | he goals, mores, policies, and traditions that characterize the specific organization in
which the individual works.”200 Bennett and Waltz’s expansion of biases increases the
number of potential levers a deception practitioner has to influence the deception target.
In order to explore how deception affects the target, ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | collect a perfect picture of the
situation as some indicators are missed and others corrupted by transmission and coding
199 Bennett and Waltz, Counterdeception Principles, 72.
200 Bennett and Waltz, Counterdeception Principles, 74.
201 Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War (New York, NY: Bac... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | . Through camouflage, indicators of friendly activity are obscured from target
collection. Furthermore, through denial, target collection channels are closed off,
preventing the collection of unobscured indicators—both friendly and other actor.
Finally, through active deception, manipulated or manufactured indicators a... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | he target in order to increase probability of reception of the manipulated
indicators; as well as, to prioritize camouflage and denial activities towards protecting
vulnerable indicators. Equally important is an understanding of what the target expects to
see from the practitioner; in other words, the practitioner need... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | cepts, entities, and events used by
202 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 8 – 10.
203 Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 3rd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1996), 113; This is an important point; an engineer, infantryman, and helicopter pilot looking at a
wooded glen will see di... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | al schemata include the collective
experiences, legacies, biases, and heuristics developed by organized groups. Personal
schemata include personal experiences and the resultant biases and heuristics. Genetic
schemata include the cognitive biases and heuristics developed through conflict based
natural selection. Schemat... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | raqi, and Kurdish aspects.
While members of a particular culture are not perfectly uniform in their cultural
schemata, understanding the culture of the target is vital to the success of deception.
Culture can be a source of trappings for a deception to increase its legitimacy, for
example, the Sacred Sword Patriots Lea... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | n societies without a strong oral tradition. Understanding the degree to which a
culture values certain channels can help in deciding which channels to priorities for
exploitation or denial.
204 Hazel Markus, "Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self," Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 35, no.... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | operations occurred in the Burma Campaign of World War II. The Japanese
command in Burma did not trust its intelligence analysts. British efforts to deceive the
Japanese commander failed because of this bias against the intelligence analysts, the
deception indictors presented by the British never impacted the Japanese ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | for the Italian Army’s desire to avoid combat.
Rather than reinforcing the southern approaches to repulse the perceived British
offensive, the Italians withdrew northward, towards the actual British offensive.207 [This
episode led to Dudley Clarke’s admonishment to plan deception in terms of the target’s
actions, and n... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | n; and whether the individual has a sufficient range of experience to develop
alternative perceptions.208
206 Dewar, The Art of Military Deception in Warfare, 10.
207 Dudley Clarke, 6 September 1972, “Some Personal Reflections on the Practice of Deception in the
Mediterranean Theatre from 1941 to 1945,” memorandum incl... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ating a set of notional dossiers
detailing Soviet officers’ interactions with German intelligence officers. In a brilliant
move, the dossiers were not created from scratch; rather Abwher used dossiers from an
actual episode of German-Soviet military cooperation in 1927 as the basis for the
notional dossiers. By modifyi... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | s of the Soviet
armed forces prior to Operation BARBAROSSA.209
c. Cognitive Biases and Heuristics
Cognitive biases and heuristics are what the OODA loop considers to be
genetic heritage; that is cognitive biases and heuristics have developed through natural
selection. There are many cognitive biases and heuristics; the... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | eption benefits from the small number bias by
lessening the number of indicators needed to generate the required perception. However,
the small numbers bias also increases the difficulty of shifting initial perceptions.
209 Edward Epstein, Deception: The Invisible War between the KGB and the CIA (New York, NY:
Random H... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | deception is twofold.
First, anchoring reinforces the maxim that deceptions should use the target’s existing
perceptions. Second, anchoring indicates a need to ensure when deception is in support of
a specific plan that the deceptive indicators are transmitted before indicators of the actual
plan begin transmission.
C... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | e formed relying on deceptive
indicators, then confirmation bias will generally work to support the deception.
Rubicon bias is the tendency of individuals to place greater confidence in
a decision once the decision is made. Prior to making a decision, an individual tends to
evaluate the benefits, costs, and risks of th... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | son to
evaluate the likelihood of an event based on “…the ease with which they can imagine
211 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 150 – 151
212 Thomas Gilovich, How We Know What Isn't So (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 33.
213 Dominic Johnson and Dominic Tierney, “Crossing the Rubicon: The Perils of Committi... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | , the
availability heuristic can cause the perception of deception where none exists. Next, since
the availability heuristic relies on recall and imagination, deception can be used to reduce
or increase the perceived probability of an event. Finally, since the availability heuristic
utilizes the probable, deception can... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | tions impact how the expectancy bias affects the collection of new
information. Successful deception corrupts the outputs of the orientation phase causing
the target to perceive the situation as the deceiver intends.
3. Decide
Once the indicators are synthesized and analyzed, and the target’s revised
perception of the ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ples, 102.
215 Johnson and Tierney, “Crossing the Rubicon,” 1.
71
4. Act
Finally, the chosen courses of action are implemented. These activities create
indicators via interaction with the environment. It is at this point a successful deception
plan reaches fruition though the target’s implementation of the decided acti... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | deception process as a deception planning loop that
begins with the development of a desired deception goal in support of the strategic goal.
The first half of the loop is the decision sector where the potential stratagem, illusion,
channel, ruse, and characteristics are considered. The second half of the loop, the
pe... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | s, rather than what the
target does. This runs the risk of the target thinking what the deceiver desires, but not
acting in the desired way.
216 Bell and Whaley, Cheating and Deception, 71.
72
Figure 8. Bell and Whaley’s Deception Planning Loop (From: 217)
Figure 9. Example of Bell and Whaley’s Deception Planning Proce... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | he deception
objective. Next, the practitioner considers what the target must think in order to cause the
deception goal. Finally, the practitioner formulates what the target must see in order to
create the necessary perceptions to drive the target’s thoughts. The set of indicators the
target needs to see becomes the d... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | a strategic, operational, or tactical objective, e.g.,
establish a beachhead on the mainland of Europe. From this objective a deception
objective is derived, e.g., German forces reinforce Pas de Calais, leaving Normandy
thinly defended. Potential deception objectives must be feasible, that is, the target must
be capabl... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | al, organizational, and personal schemata
influence the target’s decision-making. In the case of the example, knowing the Germans
already viewed Pas de Calais as the likely landing zone greatly aided the deception
219 Joint Staff, JP 3-13.4: Military Deception, (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2006), pIV-
1 to I... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | he English Channel from Pas de
Calais. This set of indicators is what will paint the deception picture for the target to see.
Again it is vital to understand what the target already perceives, as the existing perception
not only drives how new indicators are interpreted through filters like the expectancy and
confirmat... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | did not contradict the Pas de Calais deception,
and thus did not need to be covered; such as, the airborne training operations, and the
general build up of materials and personnel. This allowed cover efforts to focus on
protecting critical indicators like the Mulberry harbors. Once the deception plan is
implemented, co... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | rovides a five-step deception planning process.
Step one—situation analysis—focuses on friendly and enemy situations, target analysis,
and a stated desired situation. Step two—deception objective formulation—consists of
determining the five w’s of the deception objective: what action/inaction is necessary to
achieve th... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | an—focuses on
producing the overall plan for how to convey the necessary information to the enemy, as
well as the recommending the intelligence requirements to look for indicators that the
plan is working or not.221
FM 3-13: Information Operations provides a five-step deception planning process
designed to nest within ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ption plan.
Interestingly, the initial iteration of the information operations field manual, FM 100-6,
published in 1996, did not contain a discrete deception planning process.
220 Quoted in Center for Army Lessons Learned, CALL Bulletin 3-88, 7.
221 Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 90-2: Battlefield ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | E—THINK—DO methodology.
In addition to the preceding examples of doctrinal deception planning, there is a
vast body of official and unofficial research addressing the planning and practice of
deception. Exemplars of the official research include the CIA Deception Research
Program’s Deception Failures, Non-Failures and ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | of historic accounts of deception planning and
execution to draw from, with much of the work covering the World War II era. For
example, Roger Hesketh’s Fortitude represents the official history of the London Control
Section’s pinnacle operation. Similarly, the Official History of the 23rd Headquarters
Special Troops ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | works is
their discussion of deception in real world application—outside the realm of theory.
222 Joint Staff, JP 3-13.4, IV-3.
78
A. DECEPTION PLANNING PROCESS
The 2012 edition of JP 3-13.4 utilizes a six-step process for planning deception:
deception mission analysis, deception planning guidance, staff deception esti... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | nning must occur before the beginning of
formal planning, and ideally the introspective analysis of friendly forces should be a
continuous process even prior to receipt of a mission. For example, development of
profiles of potential target leaders must be integrated with ongoing intelligence
preparations, so that when ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ing, and actual missions.
a. Information Requirements
Information requirements for deception operations are complex, but not
overwhelming. “In developing such [deception] plans the commander must visualize and
understand the enemy viewpoint….”225 As TC 30-1 states:
223 Joint Staff, JP 3-13.4, IV-4 to IV-14.
224 This di... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | iendly commander transplanted into the enemy situation. This is
possible only as a result of a thorough understanding of the enemy, his
culture, and military system. The enemy intelligence system must be
evaluated because this system is the vehicle that carries the deception
story to the enemy commander. Determination ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | record of his military career.226
Note, while TC 30-1 talks in terms of the “enemy commander,” it is important to realize
when targeting non-hierarchal organizations such as networked non-state actors, the
target may not be a “commander;” rather, the target may be someone like a low level
leader, key financier, or tec... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | he
collection of feedback in order to assess the deception operation’s effectiveness. The
deception practitioner should take every effort reasonable within the constraints of time
and resources to develop a full understanding to the target. Fortunately, there are several
products generated by others which are useful in... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | Information
OPSEC Indicators
Chaplain Religious Assessment
Interagency Country Studies
Key Leader Profiles
Commercial Databases Open Source Information
Table 5. Sample Deception Planning Resources
Not only must the practitioner understand multiple targets’ personal
characteristics, organization, and culture, the pract... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | trayals and simulations. One of the critical tasks for the 23rd Headquarters Special
Troops was the reconnaissance of friendly formations. The signals units collected “…an
unequalled library of combat [Standard Operating Procedures], [Signal Operating
Instructions], and radio peculiarities.” Likewise, the 603rd Combat ... |
PSYOP 10.pdf | ould be a continuous process, carried out in garrison, training, and
actual operations. For this, military deception planning must also be continually nested
with operations security planning. Understanding the myriad indicators an element on the
move generates, prior to the start of formal mission planning, allows the... |
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